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Page 1 a Note on Endoxa in Aristotle' Dialectic Kiyoaki AKAI in This Note, I A Note on Endoxa in Aristotle' Dialectic Kiyoaki Kiyoaki AKAi In 也is no 旬， I will modi 命 a li 抗le my own intention of examining several interpretations interpretations on the relationship between dialectic and endoxa in the philosophy Aristotle, of Aristotle, in order to make clear what Aristotle is trying to say, above all, concerning concerning ”endoxa ”and ”dialectic ”． I. I. A general description on ”dialectic ” in Topica 百ie Topics claims to present us with a dialectical method, i.e. ”8Lα 入εKTLKtj (dialectic ）”， and the opening passage is as follows, .H .H μ主 vπp69εσLS" T有吉 πpαyμαTεiαS" µ€9o8ov EUpELV a中’伝 8υvησ6με0α συ 入入 oy （（ εσ0αL lTεpL TIα VTOS" TOU lTpOTε9EVTOS"πpo~入内 μαTOS-E~ 重ν86cwv, KαLαUTOL 入oyo ν台πEXOVTεS" μη0 主v E:pouμενbπεvανTLOV. OUR 廿eatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to to reason 企om opinions 由at 町 e generally accepted about every problem propounded propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an 訂 gument, avoid saying an 戸hing 血at will obstruct us. （仕組sla 旬d byW. A. A. Pickard-Cambridge) 百ie p町 pose of the present treatise is to discover a method by which we shall shall be able to reason fぬ1m generally accepted opinions about any problem set set before us and shall ourselves, when sustaining m 町 gument, avoid 31 31 saying saying an 同iing self-con 甘adictory. （仕組sl 瓜ed by E. S. Forster) The goal of this study is to find a method with which we shall be able to construct construct deductions 企om acceptable premisses concerning any problem 也at is proposed -- when submittimg to 紅gument ourselves -- will not say say anything inconsistent. (translated by R. Smi 也） (Top. (Top. A, 1, 100a18-21) 百iis seems to be one of the most important passages in Corpus for us to understand understand what Aristotle thought ”dialectic ” to be. In fact, scholars have divergent views views on just how ”dialectic ” is to be defined, but some 住aits of ”dialectic ” can be ex 甘acted, at least ，企 om 也is passage. 百lUS ，” dialectic ”is 1 )a sort of method, 2)deduces 企om ”endoxa ”， and 3)can 訂 gues about any problem 白紙 is proposed, and so forth. The second (2) is repeated, as follows, BLα 入εKTLKOS' 8主σu 入入 oγLσμoS' 6 €~ €v86とωνσυ入入oγLC6µε VOS'. Reasoning, Reasoning, on the other hand, is ’dialectical', if it reasons 企om opinions 也剖紅e generally accepted. （仕組slated by W. A. Pickard ・Cambridge) Reasoning Reasoning is dialectical which reasons 企om generally accepted opinions. opinions. （仕組slated by E. S. Forster) dialectical A dialectical deduction, on 血e other hand, is one which deduces 企om what is acceptable. (translated by R. Smith) (Top. (Top. A, 1, 100a29-30) 32 We can find two 仕aits of ”dialectic ” in this passage. ”Dialectic ” is a kind of deduction( deduction( or reasoning, syllogism) on 出e one hand, and it deduces(or reasons) 企om endoxa on the other. IL ”Endoxa ”and its validity In In Topics, Aristotle explains what is ”endoxa ” in this context. ”Endoxa ” is not not a mere ” doxa", which contains some false belief, but is accepted generally by the majority or the specialists in question. 生色~8主 Tel 8oKOUVTα 吋 σlV 内TOLS'πAELσTOLS' ~ TOLS'σo 中OLS' ，καL TOUTOL 宮内 πaσlν 内ToL 雪 π入εiσTOL 宮内 TOLS' μci 入tσTαyνwp(μms KαL か86~0LS'. On the other hand ，出ose opinions 町 e ’generally accepted ’which ぽ e accepted accepted by every one or by the majority or by the philosophers-Le. by all, all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of 也.em. (translated (translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge) Generally Generally accepted opinions, on the other hand ，訂e those which commend themselves themselves to all or to them jority or to the wise －－也 at is, to all of the wise wise or to the m 吋ority or to the most 白mous and distinguished of them. （仕組slated by E. S. Forster) Those 訂 ・e acceptable, on the other hand, which seem so to everyone, or to to most people, or to 也e wise -- to all of them, or to most, or to 白e most 白mous and esteemed. (translated by R. Smith) (Top. (Top. A, 1, 100b21 ・23) 33 33 ”Endoxa ” mentioned above, is not necessarily true, but seems to have some true portion portion of the whole. In ethical writings of Aristotle, we find that he gives a positive positive account of ” endoxa", ofwhich 出e probabili ザ of their truth there is. δε1 δ ’， φσπεp 佐πL TWV d入入 ων ，n8EVTα ヲ Telφαw6μενα KαL πpWTOV 8Lαπop 内σανTαs OUTWδεLKVUVαL μci 入LσTαμ 主νπcl VT αTa Evδo とαπεpl TαUTαTUπcieη ，εt 8主μ内， Telπ 入ε1σγακαl KVpLφTαTα ・E:av yap 入6ηTαi TξTa 8v σxεp 内KαL KαTα 入εLπηTαL Tel EVOO~α ， 8ε8εLyµEVOV av ε1η LKανws. We must, as in all other cases, set 吐ie observed facts before us and, a丘町 first first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the 甘uth of all 也e common opinions about these affections of 由e mind, or, failing 由is, of the greater number and the most authoritative; for if we both refute 也e objections and leave the common opinions undisturbed, we shall shall have proved the case sufficiently. (EN, VII, 1145b2-7, 仕組slated by W. D. Ross) Aristotle Aristotle refers to 白e common opinions about ethical problems accepted by people, people, and suggests 也at they should be 甘ue or, at least, there should be some probabili 守 of their 仕uth. TOUTWV 8主 TU μ主V 甘0 入入 OL kαL πα 入αLOL 入EyovσLν ，TU 8主6入（： yOL kαL 金色色と av8pEs・ ou&TEρ ovs 従 TOUTWνd 入oyov 8LαμαPT cl 民 W TOLS る入 OLS, cl入入’ €1ノ YE TL Tl kαL Telπ 入dσTακαTop9ouv. Now some of these views have been held by many men and men of old, others others by a few eminent pぽ sons; and it is 盟主 probable 也at either of 34 these these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at at least some one respect or even in most respects. (EN, I, 1098b27-29, translated by W. D. Ross) The validity of ”endoxa ”should be examined and verified by means of ”dialectic ”， i.e. i.e. a kind of method, which is mostly supposed to be ” syllogismos( or deduction ）” but occasionaly ”epagoge( or induction ）吋 cf., Top. A, 12). Some problems* remain to be solved, l)what is difference between ”endoxa ” in in dialectic and in rhetoric( or enthymeme ), and 2)how can we find the relationship between ”endoxa ” in dialectic and propositions of premises of (not dialectical but)" but)" demonstrative ” syllogism. * In addition to these problems, or, to consider 合om another point of view, we have now several several interpretations on the relationship between dialectic and endoxa in the philosophy of Aristotle. Aristotle. According to F .E.Peters(Peters, 52 ・53 ），” what the historical Socrates did in conversation conversation and Plato refined 也to the literary form of dialogue, Aristotle analyzed into method ：” A syllogism is demonstrative[ apodeixis] when it proceeds 合om premisses that 紅 e 回 e and primary ... ; it is dialectical when it reasons 企om endoxa ... Endoxa are propositions 由at seem 住ue to all or to the m 司ority or to the wise ” （Top.I, IOOa-b). The definition of endoxa endoxa in the above cited text suggests that opinions have bo 也 a quantitative and qualitative basis. basis. The first seems Socratic, i.e., canvassing what may be termed the ”common-sense ” view, view, and 血is approach is followed at various points in 由ee 血ical treatises( cf. EN VII, 1145b ），邸 well as 創出e very opening of the Metaphysics(Metaph. I, 982a). In 也 is latter text Aristotle Aristotle is seeking the na 加re of sophia and the procedure he adopts is to s旬比企om commonly held held views of what a wise man is. And he can take this tack because of a presumption 由at is left left unspoken in Plato: the unitive and progressive na 加re of philosophy where the 回也is not the the preserve of any on man but the result of a continuous and cumulative investigation(Metaph ., 993a-b). 993a-b). But the definition of endoxa in the Topics opens 由 e possibility of an appeal to qualitative qualitative opi 凶on, to the ”professional ” rather than the ”common-sense ” views, to ” what 35 seems 仕ue to the sophoi. ”Thus begins the history of philosophy, cast not in the role of an independent independent historical discipline, but as p訂 t of the method of philosophy ，出 e major premiss, so so to speak, in a dialectical syllogism. In Aristotle considerations of the opinions of his philosophical philosophical predecessors 町 e always woven into his own investigations. ” But it is not app 町 ent that 也 e validity of this or the following several interpretations can be be confrrmed on 也e basis of texts or the philological procedure. Then, if we examine the following following interpreations[cf. Studies] respectively, we will have to see far into the relationship between between dialectic and endoxa in Aristotle. Studies Studies Berti,E. Berti,E. 1972 ：” La dialettica in Aristotele. ” in Studi aristotelici(l 975), 108 ・133, L ’Aquila. 一－ 1996 ：” Does Aristotle ’s Dialectic Develop ？” In Aristotle ’s Philosophical Development, Development, edited by W. Wians. Lar 由国民Md: Rowman and Littlefield. Bolton,R. Bolton,R. 1990 ：” The Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic. ” In Biologie, Logique Logique et Me ’taphysique chez Aristote, edited by Daniel Devereux and Pierre Pellegrin, Pellegrin, 185 ・236. Paris: Editions du Cen 仕e National de la Recherche Scientifique. Devereux,D. Devereux,D. 1990 ：” Comments on Robert Bolton ’s The EpistemologiCal Basis of Aristotelian Aristotelian Dialectic. ” In Biologie, Logique et Me ’taphysique chez Aristote, edited by Daniel Daniel Devereux and Pierre Pellegrin, 263 ・286.
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