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Home , Matthew Arnold, On Liberty, Perfectionist liberalism, Public philosophy, Social constructionism, Voluntaryism

NOTES

Introduction

1. MacIntyre, After , 11–12. 2. As I explain at the beginning of the second chapter, understanding modern antistatism means exploring the older “politics of redistribution” (with its familiar left–right spectrum) rather than the newer “politics of recognition” favored by contemporary theorists, with its own terminology, such as “political,” “comprehensive,” “modus vivendi,” etc. See Kymlicka, Contemporary Political , 327–335 for a summary of the . 3. Berlin,“Two Concepts of ,”172.

Chapter One

1. Cohen is quoted in Hoffman, “Distinguished Philosopher, Professor Dies at 81.” Nussbaum, “The Enduring Significance of .” For a concise review of the academic measure of Rawls’s significance over the last three decades, see Young, Beyond Rawls, 51–52. 2. Neal, “Three Readings of Political .” The phrase “realistic utopia” is Rawls’s own, meaning when “extends what are ordinarily thought of as the limits of practical political philosophy”: see Rawls, The of Peoples,6. 3. Wall and Klosko,“Introduction,” 3; Dworkin,“Liberalism,” 127. For a very concise summary of this moment in the narrative, see Wall and Klosko,“Introduction,”2–6. 4. The challenge to neutrality, as Sandel notes, takes two forms, only the dominant form of which be examined here.The form focuses on the question of the priority of the or the , which I examine in the next chapter, specifically as articulated by Alasdair MacIntyre, another of the communitarians. For a summary of that other debate, see Sandel, “A Response to Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” 185. For another important description of these two communitarian challenges to neutral liberalism, as relating to and to advocacy respectively, see Taylor, “Cross-Purposes,” 159–163. Cited and paraphrased material is from Sandel,“A Response,”186–187; Rawls, A Theory of , 491. 5. For denials of communitarian influence, see Freeman, “Introduction,” 28; Mulhall and Swift, “Rawls and ,”463; and Rawls, Political Liberalism, xix. 6. MacIntyre, “The Privatization of the Good,” 344–361. Rawls first used the phrase “ of pluralism” in a 1988 essay,“The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good.” See Rawls, Collected Papers, 449–472. He refined it (for his purposes) in Political Liberalism into “the fact of reasonable pluralism.”As will become clear, the unrefined version is more useful for my purposes. Notes to Pages 15–23 163 7. See Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 236 for a nice summary of this fact: i.e., that political liberalism amounts to people “communitarians in private life, and liberals in public life.” 8. Sandel is another theorist often called communitarian, though I read him as a virtue liberal below.The passage is from MacIntyre, “A Partial Response to My Critics,” 302–303, which Beiner cites and discusses in Beiner, “The Quest for a Post-Liberal ,” 3–4. My focus here is on MacIntyre’s moral as typical of not only communitarians but liberals, too; I turn to the antistatism expressed here in the next chapter. 9. See e.g., Neal,“Three Readings of Political Liberalism.” 10. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xviii, xviii–xix. 11. Ibid., xxviii. 12. Young, Beyond Rawls, 13–14. 13. Schonsheck,“Rudeness, Rasp, and Repudiation,”175, 180. 14. Dreben,“On Rawls and Political Liberalism,”316, 328–329. 15. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xl–xli. 16. Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, 5–6. Gray claims as a predecessor, though Berlin’s “value pluralism” can also be found at the heart of William Galston’s work (a virtue liberal theory discussed momentarily) not to mention John Rawls’s political liberalism. See Gray, Two Faces, 30–33; Galston, Liberal Pluralism, 48–62; Rawls, Political Liberalism, 303n. I draw two lessons, both elaborated upon below,from this nearly unanimous embrace of Berlin’s legacy,the first of which is that the various liberal theories have much more in common than their proponents allow. The second is that Berlin’s moral ideal of the skeptic remains the unacknowledged moral program of most contemporary liberal theory. 17. Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, 1, 11, 12, 11–12. Gray does not name names, but I assume that he means Rawls’s political liberalism when he writes in 2000 that “[t]he hope of a rational consensus on values supports the liberal that prevail today” (2000, 3), for political liberalism is by far the prevailing form of liberalism today.In a more recent book, Gray expands his claim (making it even less persuasive) to contend that not only political liberalism but the West itself is reluctant to accept the of pluralism. “Western are governed by the that modernity is a single condition, everywhere the same and always benign,” Gray explains.“As societies become more modern, so they become more alike.At the same time they become better. Being modern means realising our values—the values of the Enlightenment, as we like to think of them.”But “the suicide warriors who attached Washington and New York on September 11th, 2001, did more than kill thousands of civilians and demolish the World Trade Center.They destroyed the West’s ruling .”And “[t]he flaw in the modern myth,” Gray writes,“is that it tethers us to a hope of unity, when we should be learning to live with conflict” (2003, 103). See Gray, Al Qaeda and What It Means to Be Modern, 1, 103. 18. Gray,“Modus Vivendi,”12, 19. 19. Ibid., 10; Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, 21, 106.This similarity between modus vivendi liberalism and political liberalism is particularly notable in their very modest programs for global law. Compare Gray’s proposals in Two Faces to those in Rawls, of Peoples, 3–10. 20. Perfectionist liberals often are confused with both virtue liberals and communitarians on this count, and I return to this again later in the chapter. 21. Douglass and Mara,“The Search for a Defensible Good,”277; Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism, 23.Virtue liberalism is discussed in a number of places, though with different names: see, e.g., Rosenblum,“Introduction,” 5–6 (on “moral liberalism” as opposed to “modus vivendi liberalism”); Kymlicka and Norman, “Return of the Citizen,” 297–300 (on “liberal virtue theory”); Berkowitz, Virtue, 24–32 (on “modern liberalism”); and Galston, Liberal Purposes, 213–237 (on “liberal ”). 22. Galston, Liberal Purposes, 177; Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism, xiii; Galston, Liberal Pluralism, 10. 23. Emphasizing, like all of these theorists, the irreducibly pluralist of contemporary civil ,Robert Post and Nancy Rosenblum have very recently summarized this same spectrum 164 Notes to Pages 24–29 of responses to that pluralism. While their intention is to mark out the variety of theories available today, mine is to note their fundamental sameness in simply assuming pluralism to be irreducible. See Post and Rosenblum,“Introduction,”12–15. 24. Ronald Beiner has also noted that liberal theorists often surrender their moral program with a sense of virtue rather than loss. Liberals, it is assumed, avoid “passing judgment on the moral substance of a way of life,” for to do so “violates the overwhelming ‘fact of pluralism’ that sur- rounds us. For liberals, pluralism—the condition whereby are committed to irrec- oncilably different moral ideals, personal aspirations, visions of the good life—is a sociological given in all modern societies.”See Beiner, Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit,7. 25. On the only local significance of reason for MacIntyre, see Nussbaum,“Non-Relative Virtues,” 33. Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, 3; Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxvi; Dreben, “On Rawls and Political Liberalism,”318; Galston, Liberal Pluralism, 13; Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxviii. 26. Sullivan,“Bringing the Good Back In,”152; Rawls, Collected Papers, 303–358. 27. Beiner has described this same normative restraint in contemporary theory and traced it to theorists’ unwillingness to recognize that “theory must be animated by imperatives of its own that are distinct from our need, as citizens, for salubrious maxims of political practice”— that theory is not freestanding but involves a “search for ground”:see Beiner,Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit, x, xi.Though our proposals ultimately differ, Beiner’s book also finds political the- ory’s weakness precisely in what is nowadays so widely considered to be its strength, and for this reason I found the book’s very reassuring while developing my critique of the account of the fiction of reason. For other examples of Beiner’s criticism of political theory’s readiness to adapt itself the status quo instead of vice versa, see the first half of the book, especially “Preface:The Theorist as Critic,” “Liberalism in the Cross-Hairs of Theory,”and “Reconciling Liberty and Equality”: Beiner, Philosophy, xii–xiii, 4, 9–10, 16, 22–24. 28. Rorty, “A Defense of Minimalist Liberalism,” 118; Rorty, “The Priority of to Philosophy,”258, 265, 268. Like many liberal theorists who focus on the account of the fiction of reason, Rorty enlists Rawls, not least I think with the hope that some of the gravitas of Rawls’s account of the fact of pluralism might lend itself to this other account. Others contend, though, that Rawls himself, in Political Liberalism, backed away from the radical of his transitional writings of the 1980s. See, e.g., Sandel,“A Response to Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” 194–195. For the purposes of my argument, I obviously prefer Rorty’s version of events to Sandel’s. 29. For more criticism of this demotion of theory to handmaiden to history, see also Beiner’s judgment of Rorty and Galston’s of Rawls: Beiner, Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit, 10, 11, 55–56; Galston, Liberal Pluralism, 42–45. 30. As Beiner puts it,“[w]hat distinguishes Rorty’s liberalism is its higher degree of candour, which at least acknowledges that a liberal vision of things, far from being ‘neutral’ toward rival ideas of the good, is implicated in the defence of a particular way of life”: Beiner, Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit, 52. As argued below, I do not always find candor in Rorty, which is why I find his example so useful to demonstrate more generally liberal theory’s essentially suppressed (or perhaps repressed) desire to retain a moral program. 31. Rorty, Contingency,Irony,and Solidarity,xv. 32. See also Raz, The of , 160: “is there reason to think that one is more likely to be wrong about the character of the good life than about the sort of moral considerations which all agree should influence political action such as the right to life, to free expression, or free reli- gious worship? I know of no such arguments.”In contrast, Sandel also questions this distinction between what reason can do in the moral versus the political sphere but in order to emphasize that reason’s effectiveness is limited in both spheres. See Sandel,“A Response to Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” 202–210, where he essentially argues that people’s ideas about the right are as immutable (i.e., as resistant to reason) as their ideas about the good. Because they both empha- size the importance of goods in a liberal society, perfectionist liberals (like Raz and Sher) are often lumped with virtue liberals (like Sandel). But perfectionist liberals believe reason to have Notes to Pages 29–35 165 a major role in both political and moral programs, while virtue liberals believe history, not reason, to play a major role in both programs. Because there is so much confusion on this par- ticular point (which consequently has dulled contemporary of the significance of ), I return to this distinction toward the end of this chapter, as well as emphasize it several times in my presentation of the Victorian liberals as perfectionist rather than virtue liberals in chapters three and four. 33. Sher, Beyond Neutrality, ix. Rorty is always careful to disassociate his efforts in encouragement from anything like the pursuit of , but it is hard to see his program as anything less than a moral one. In reference to the abortion debate, e.g., Rorty recommends in a different essay that we move away from “when does life begin” to “how can some unprincipled and wishy-washy consensus about abortion be hammered out.”This sounds like a strictly political move. But he continues:“Try to get them [opponents of abortion ] to be as flexible and wishy-washy as possible, and to value democratic consensus more than they value almost anything else.”How exactly do we “try to get them” to become like this? Will people really be persuaded to convert to this kind of moral sensibility (one that cherishes deep flexibility as a good way of living one’s life) strictly by appealing to shared political values? I just do not think so: Rorty is really proposing a moral good behind all his casually political propositions. See Rorty,“A Defense of Minimalist Liberalism,”120. 34. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 493–494; Rorty, Contingency,Irony,and Solidarity,xiv. 35. Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 299–300. 36. Russell and Woolf are both cited by Arblaster:The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism,300,302. 37. Galston, Liberal Pluralism, 131; Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 302–303; Caserio, “Auden’s New Citizenship.” Arblaster does not push the point, but he does note that this modern liberal skepticism was reinforced by modern moral philosophy, including G. E. Moore’s,which stressed the subjective and individual nature of judgments about goodness, or what Moore called “emotivism”: see Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 303. I come back to this point, which MacIntyre develops so marvelously, in my discussion of the widespread contemporary acceptance (by most liberals as well as non-liberals) of emotivism in chapter two. 38. Berlin,“Two Concepts of Liberty,”172. 39. Wall and Klosko,“Introduction,”13. 40. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 285–286; Friedrich is cited in Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 317.The three fundamental areas of contemporary work on perfectionist liberalism all have to do with the problem of coercion: moral pluralism, autonomy, alienation costs. See Wall and Klosko,“Introduction,”17–21.Antistatism in modern liberalism is the focus of chapter two, and I respond to this challenge (the dominant one) to perfectionism there. Here, again, I simply expose its distracting dominance. 41. Some may wonder why I do not use for my case study a better known “perfectionist” theorist, Stanley Cavell. However, Cavell’s “moral perfectionism”comes out of a Nietzschean of perfectionism that, unlike Nussbaum’s theory, has never aspired to moral . Indeed, that tradition is aggressively subjectivist (not to mention antiliberal), and so I am not consider- ing it here except as an example of the Nietzschean emotivism that I find at the heart of modern antistatism in chapter two: in other words, Cavell’s perfectionism is just another aspect of the modern of skepticism that stands between us and a sympathetic reading of the Victorians.And, unfortunately,that is literally the case here. I would have no special quarrel with Cavell were it not that he and so many of his champions have sought to find this kind of perfectionism throughout not just the twentieth century but the nineteenth as well. So here I must explicitly disassociate my claims for a Victorian perfectionism, emphasizing as it does a moral objectivism, from others’ claims for a Victorian perfectionism, emphasizing as they do a moral . See Andrew H. Miller’s writings for a reading of perfectionism in the British context explicitly indebted to Cavell: Miller,“Reading Thoughts,” 79–98; Miller,“, Knowingness, and Victorian Perfectionism,” 92–113. For a critique of Cavell 166 Notes to Pages 35–38 and his more numerous champions in nineteenth-century American studies, particularly their role in the program of “de-” generally, see Malachuk, “Transcendentalism, Perfectionism, and Walden,”283–303. 42. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 220. Interestingly, like perfectionist liberals, Marxist perfectionists “rank ways of life according to a trans-historical account of the human good,” according to Kymlicka. See also Kymlicka’s account of this of contemporary Marxist theorists: Contemporary, 190–195. As I suggested in the introduction, the relationship between Marx and Victorian liberalism needs to be seriously reconsidered in light of their shared moral program of perfectionism. 43. While undoubtedly enriching our understanding of the range of political theories that domi- nated the early modern period, the republican tradition has often been hijacked for political purposes for the last three decades. For a critical review of the use and abuse of the republican tradition by political theorists, see Williams, “Notes of a Jewish Episcopalian,” 99–113: e.g., “[i]f had never existed, we would have had to invent it.”I myself may or may not have been guilty of such hijacking in a 2000 article about Rorty,though in my defense Rorty’s moral ambitions (what I then called republican, what I here call modern liberal) need to be insisted upon in order to expose the moral program buried in contemporary liberal theory: see Malachuk,“ ‘Loyal to a Dream Country,’ ” 89–113. I thank Krister Dylan Knapp for compelling me to consider that I may indeed have hijacked the republican tradition in that article. 44. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent, 5, 6, 17; Sandel,“Liberalism and Republicanism.” 45. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 205; Sandel, “Liberalism and Republicanism.” Even Rorty, the self- proclaimed “minimalist” liberal, recognizes the instrumental value of civic virtues: see Rorty, “A Defense of Minimalist Liberalism,” 117–125. Several other articles in the collection edited by Allen and Regan examine the extensive common ground shared by political liberalism and Sandel’s “republicanism”: see Beiner, “The Quest for a Post-Liberal Public Philosophy,” 1–13; Kymlicka,“Liberal and Civic Republicanism,”131–148; and Elshtain and Beem, “Can This Republic Be Saved?,”193–204.This last, on Sandel’s avoiding the objectivist episte- mological claims that would actually make his republicanism distinctive from the rest of con- temporary theory, was very useful to me in formulating the crucial epistemological difference between perfectionism and other theories. 46. himself was a perfectionist according to my definition; his ranking of values was based upon reason. His gesture toward that philosopher duly noted, Rawls nevertheless writes that civic humanists believe that “taking part in democratic politics is . . . the privileged locus of the good life”; in so doing, he continues, civic humanists give “a central place to what Constant called the ‘ of the ancients’ and [therefore have] all the defects of that.” I read this as Rawls’s simply echoing Constant’s critique of the historical inanity of civic rather than Rawls’s chastising the rational claims of civic humanism: see Rawls, Political Liberalism, 206. Kymlicka, incidentally, makes the same distinction among forms of republicanism, dividing the theory into those that promote virtue as an instrumental good (Rawls’s classical republicans and Sandel’s republicans) and those that promote virtue as an intrinsic good (Rawls’s civic humanists): see Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 294–302. However, the role of reason in the latter theory is in Kymlicka’s presentation, as in Rawls’s presentation of civic humanists, not clear to me, so I do not concede that civic humanists are perfectionists as I am describing perfectionists here. 47. Sandel,“Liberalism and Republicanism”; Galston, Liberal Pluralism, 9. Eamonn Callan challenges the line between comprehensive and political theory, too: see Callan, Creating Citizens, 12–42. In contrast, Sher contends that communitarianism is perfectionist because it is objectivist, which is precisely the factor that needs consideration, in my view,though I am not persuaded that the communitarians are in fact objectivist: see, Sher, Beyond Neutrality, 156–175. 48. Neal,“Perfectionism with a Liberal Face?”, 31, 34, 52, 53; Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 160 49. Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism, and Restraint, 10. In fairness, Wall notes in the same place a few books on moral theory that do defend this assumption,but my point is that perfectionist liberals, Notes to Pages 39–45 167 for some reason, have not seen a defense of their to be an important priority. In contrast, see Philip Kitcher on the importance of perfectionists making this defense, and on Thomas Hurka’s distinctiveness among perfectionists in this regard: Kitcher, “Essence and Perfection,”59–83. 50. For an appreciation and critique of this distinctive quality of Nussbaum’s work, see Yuracko, Perfectionism and Contemporary Perfectionist Values, 41–46. 51. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 78–80. See Nussbaum, “Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities,” 102–140 for Nussbaum’s own review of her work in political theory between 1980 and 2000. 52. Nussbaum,“Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities,”126, 128, 118–119, 120. 53. Ibid., 126; Nussbaum,“Political ,”887. 54. Nussbaum,“Political Objectivity,”899, 901.Though Nussbaum would vehemently disagree, her work has become quite similar to Rorty’s, at least in their shared frankness about their deliber- ate suppression of their moral ambitions, their shared bitterness about having to do so, and their shared self-mockery in the kind of liberalism that results (what Rorty calls being “wishy-washy” and Nussbaum “pussyfooting”). For more examples from Rorty, see “A Defense of Minimalist Liberalism,” 120, 124–125. Galston notes that, historically, these kinds of strictly political and pussyfooting defenses are always dropped during moments of political crisis. Pointing to Lincoln’s philosophical defense of equality during the Civil War), Galston recommends that defenses of the liberal framework must be based upon a comprehensive theory instead, but Galston’s own understanding of comprehensive theory (as abiding by the account of the fiction of reason) is not at all like that of Lincoln, a Victorian liberal unfortunately left out of this book: see Galston, Liberal Pluralism, 41. 55. Barry,“How Not To Defend Liberal ,”57, 53. 56. Beiner, Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit, 45, 49. 57. Ibid., 45. 58. Bauerlein,“,”229. 59. Levine, “Victorian Studies,” 136. See Collini, Public Moralists, 88, 90 for the Shaw,Wilde, and Nietzsche references. Fisher,“The Victorian Temper,” 86.Whatever the significance of Strachey’s book, for clarity of contrast with the Victorian liberals, Nietzsche is my preferred starting point. Consider this, also from Twilight of the Idols, 541: “Liberal institutions cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained: later on, there are no worse and no more thorough injurers of free- dom than liberal institutions.Their effects are known well enough: they undermine the will to power; they level mountain and valley, and call that morality; they make men small, cowardly, and hedonistic—every time it is the herd animal that triumphs with them. Liberalism: in other words, herd-animalization.” 60. On Buckley’s challenge to Strachey, see Fisher, “The Victorian Temper,” 86. On Buckley’s exaggeration of Victorian , see Kelvin,“The View from Here,” 83. On Buckley’s Cold War liberalism,see Maynard,“The Dialectical Temper,”81.All three of these sources were part of a recent celebration and reconsideration of Buckley’s book. 61. Levine,“Victorian Studies,”137. 62. Armstrong, “Postscript,” 316. Armstrong also exemplifies this new allegiance to Victorian popular culture:“Postscript,”316–317.As several commentators have remarked, the overwhelming predominance of scholars of fiction (as opposed to poetry or nonfiction prose) in Victorian studies has no doubt had much to do with this reversal of allegiances. See Levine, “Victorian Studies,”150–151 and Shires,“Victorian Studies and ,”481–486. Kucich argues that the extraordinary career pressures in the field of English studies have compelled younger scholars to publish too quickly,resulting in the replication rather than reconsideration of dom- inant academic fashions: see Kucich,“Cultural Studies,Victorian Studies, and Graduate Education,” 477–480. I return to this third period in Victorian studies in chapter two in an examination of Foucauldian antistatism. 63. Anger,“Introduction,”13; Levine, Dying to Know, 13;Anderson, The Powers of Distance,5. 168 Notes to Pages 45–52 64. These postmodern theorists are quoted respectively in Anderson, The Powers of Distance, 8n; Levine, Dying to Know, 287n; and Anger,“Introduction,” 10n. In a recent review of a book by John McGowan, Frederick Luis Aldama has also identified this new effort to “yoke together a humanist belief in universals—to know those that make our world unjust and that are nec- essary for us to fight for true democracy—with a belief that reality is indeterminate and socially constructed.”See Aldama,“Review of Democracy’s Children.”

Chapter Two

1. To be clear, I am referring to the as depicted in liberal theory since the divorce of moral and political programs described in the first chapter.To build a state committed to the compre- hensive theory of, say,Rawls’s Theory would be a step toward justice such as the world as never seen.The problem is that theorists are heading in the other direction. For a description of the disjunction between the kind of state promised in Theory and the kind of state increasingly offered by liberal theorists too anxious to accommodate their theory to contemporary antistatist , see Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 88–96. 2. As cited in the introduction, see Ibid., 327–335 for a summary of the difference between the politics of redistribution and the politics of recognition. 3. That this shift has occurred is indisputable, and, if the “choice” of candidates on our ballots is not enough evidence, it is also described in many recent books. See e.g., Pierre and Peters, “Introduction,”1–7; Stehr and Ericson,“The Ungovernability of Modern Societies,”3–5. 4. This definition is a paraphrase of Mishra, Globalization and the ,3. 5. Perhaps I should note that, if social conservatives (a vocal minority within the U.S. electorate especially) actually prefer an activist state when it comes to “moral” legislation (e.g., restricting abortion services, restricting marriage rights), they do not at all understand their agenda to be in essence a plea for state intervention.What matters for my argument here is the widespread belief within the electorate that the state is never the right answer. I return to this particular case below. 6. Cited in Sigsworth, “Introduction,” 1. On “Victorian” previously being an insult, see Samuel, “Mrs.Thatcher’s Return to Victorian Values,”9. 7. Cited in Briggs,“Victorian Values,”10. 8. Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, 8. If Thatcher’s appropriation of the adjec- tive Victorian to describe her politics was new, her interest in the period was not. As early as 1977, in her book Let Our Children Grow Tall,Thatcher had pointed with approval to the author of the 1859 best-selling Self-Help, Samuel Smiles, for his support of her proposition that “the sense of being selfreliant [sic], of playing a role within the family,of owning one’s own property, of paying one’s own way,are all part of the spiritual ballast which maintains responsible citizen- ship”: see Samuel,“Mrs.Thatcher’s Return to Victorian Values,”11–12. 9. On Reagan’s deliberate if less precise use of history to propagate right-liberal ,see Kaye, “The Use and Abuse of the Past,”346–347. 10. Gingrich, “What Good Is ,” 22. For Gingrich’s self-identification as a Victorian liberal, see Hadley,“The Past Is a Foreign Country,”7. 11. “Marvin Olasky reminds us . . . that in the 19th century, there was a volunteer for every two poor people,” Gingrich wrote. “They actually knew the person they were trying to help. An automatic reaction to a homeless person was to demand,‘Are you willing to work?’ If they were not, you had a moral obligation not to support them. If all you were doing was subsidizing their alcoholism or drug addiction, that itself was immoral”: see Gingrich, “What Good Is Government,” 23–24.The book had been recommended to Gingrich by former Secretary of Education William Bennett, another vocal neo-Victorian within the Republican Party.Bennett hailed Olasky’s book as nothing less than the “most important book on welfare and social policy Notes to Pages 52–61 169 in a decade,” and Gingrich promptly distributed it to all of the newly elected House Republicans. Justifying the Republican to a national audience for the first time, Gingrich declared that “[o]ur models are and Marvin Olasky. We are going to redefine compassion and take it back.” For that citation and a summary of Olasky’s influence on George W.Bush, see Grann,“Where W.Got Compassion,”64. 12. Himmelfarb reminds us, Gingrich wrote in Newsweek,“that in Victorian England they reduced the number of children born out of wedlock by almost 50 percent.They didn’t do this through a new bureaucracy.They did it by re-establishing values, by moral leadership, and by being willing to look people in the face and say,‘You should be ashamed of yourself when you get drunk in public.You should be ashamed if you’re a drug addict.’ ” See Gingrich,“What Good Is Government,”23–24. Pressed by critics to explain the uses of shame in ,Gingrich retorted “[i]t ain’t that hard to understand. Read Himmelfarb’s book. It isn’t that complicated.” For the citation, see Collini,“Cultural Fantasies,”414. Gingrich promoted this book as required reading for his Congressional colleagues as well: see Hadley,“The Past Is a Foreign Country,” 7–8. 13. Himmelfarb,“The Victorians Get a Bad Rap,”A15. 14. Himmelfarb,“Queen Victoria Was Right,”15a. 15. For the connection, see Collini,“Cultural Fantasies,”416. 16. Himmelfarb, The De-Moralization of Society, 50. 17. Ibid., 51, 143. My final sentence paraphrases The De-Moralization, 168–169. 18. Publications included a 1983 edition of New Statesman edited by Raphael Samuel; the 1987 book Victorian Values by James Walvin produced to accompany a Granada Television series that same year; a 1988 volume of essays, In Search of Victorian Values:Aspects of Nineteenth-Century Thought and Society, edited by Eric M. Sigsworth; a 1990 volume entitled Victorian Values:A Joint Symposium of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and the British Academy edited by T. C. Smout; and a 1990 volume Victorian Values:Personalities and Perspectives in Nineteenth-Century Society edited by Gordon Marsden, published in a second edition in 1998. 19. Jones,“Poor and Market Forces,”xiii; Ignatieff,“Law and Order in a City of Strangers,”x. 20. Collini,“Cultural Fantasies,”417. 21. Walvin, Victorian Values, 165–166. 22. Jones,“The Changing Face of 19th-century Britain,”37. 23. This is one of the most established interpretive habits in Victorian studies. For a brief sketch of its history, see Semmel, and the Pursuit of Virtue, 10–12.There is, of course, real merit in the habit, which has its sources after all in the Victorians themselves (e.g., Ruskin’s mis- characterization in Unto This Last (1862) of Mill’s political economy as libertarian). I only recall here the point that, like all habits, this one tends to simplification, particular in relegating Arnold and Mill to extreme positions neither really held. Examples of this, in addition to those exam- ined below, include Himmelfarb, and Liberalism, 291–294 and Alexander, and John Stuart Mill, 232–266. 24. Lipman,“Why Should We Read Culture and ?,” 213; Said,“, Human Rights, and Interpretation.” 25. Lipman,“Why Should We Read ?,” 225. 26. Said,“Nationalism, Human Rights, and Interpretation.” 27. , Republic, 193. 28. Woolf, After the Deluge, 290, 290–291, 291. 29. Ibid., 286. 30. Ibid., 292. 31. Both the Criterion and Christian News-Letter citations are from Kojecky, T.S. Eliot’s Social Criticism, 116, 149–150. 32. Eliot, Notes Toward the Definition of Culture, 13, 20. 33. Cited in Kojecky, T.S. Eliot’s Social Criticism, 26. 34. Ibid., 166. Kojecky makes the connection to Mein Kampf: T.S. Eliot’s, 169. 170 Notes to Pages 61–74 35. Cited in Johnson, The Cultural Critics, 68–69, 91. Indeed, Bell takes his thinking one step further than Eliot’s, in thoughtfully considering whether this requisite inequality might also legitimize .“All else being equal,” he concludes,“I should prefer a civilization based on liberty and justice: partly because it seems to me the existence of slaves may be damaging to that very élite from which civilization springs; partly because slaves too deeply degraded become incapable of receiving the least tincture of what the élite has to give”: see Johnson, The Cultural, 91–92. 36. Eliot, Notes Toward the Definition of Culture, 17; Leavis, Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture,6, 7, 3, 95. 37. Berlin,“Two Concepts of Liberty,”118. 38. Ibid., 144, 147, 149–150, 152. 39. Ibid., 170. 40. Trilling, Matthew Arnold,np. 41. Ibid., 253. 42. Ibid., 260, 260–261, 277 43. Williams, Culture and Society, 116. 44. Ibid., 117. 45. Ibid., 124. For the suggestion that culture seeks to do away with classes, see 48. 46. Ibid., 329. 47. Ibid., 335–336. 48. Ibid., 336–337. 49. Eagleton, Literary Theory, 23. 50. Ibid., 23–24. 51. Baldick, The Social Mission of English Criticism, 37, 43–44. For his acknowledgment of Baldick’s dissertation, see Eagleton, Literary Theory, 218. 52. Compounding the problem is the fact that Arnold’s invention of English has become “received dogma,” as Bill Bell has put it, making commentators working within English departments exceedingly uncomfortable with their own apparent complicity in the propagation of culture on behalf of the state. See Bell,“The Function of Arnold at the Present Time,”203–219; Collini, Arnold, 112–114. 53. Goodheart,“Arnold Among the Neoconservatives,”456–457. 54. Machann, Matthew Arnold, 88. 55. Said,“Nationalism, Human Rights, and Interpretation.” 56. Ibid. 57. On the general hostility toward and absence of consideration of the state during the mid- Victorian period, see Roberts, and Early Victorian England, 46, 272; Roberts, The Social of the Early Victorians, 11, 26–27; and Meadowcraft, Conceptualizing the State, 1–16. On the invention of the individualist–collectivist axis in the late Victorian period, see ibid., 211–215; Collini, Liberalism and . 58. This paragraph paraphrases Bird, The Myth of Liberal , 7–15. 59. Ibid., 16; Dworkin,“Liberalism,”127. 60. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 117. Her critique of welfarism stems from the work of and economist . Recalling my own critique of Nussbaum from the end of chapter one, here is an excellent example of Nussbaum’s nearly singular readiness among liberal theorists to chastise the predominance of moral subjectivism throughout our political culture, an ability that once made her such a strong advocate for a perfectionist liberal- ism characterized by a robust moral objectivism.As I argued in chapter one, however, her theory has lately replaced this robust moral objectivism with a political liberal’s readiness to work with “provisional fixed points” when developing the political framework. I admit to finding a readiness to work with only provisional fixed moral points little different from welfarism in substance. 61. Baldick, The Social Mission of English Criticism, 55, 213. Notes to Pages 75–84 171 62. Ibid., 213, 221. For an illuminating explanation of the similarity between Marxist theories of exploitation and libertarian theories of self-ownership, see Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 177–187. 63. I have chosen to work with Foucault because of his obvious importance to Victorian studies. For another example of postmodern antistatism, see Bourdieu,“Rethinking the State,”53–75. 64. Eagleton, The Illusions of , 27–28. 65. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 209. 66. Goodlad, and the Victorian State, 7. See the entire first chapter of this book for a pointed summary of the irrelevance of Discipline and Punish to the Victorians. 67. Edmundson, Nightmare on Main Street, 63–68. For examples of antistatist ideology throughout American political history,see Friedberg,In the Shadow of the Garrison State,11–15.Edmundson’s argument is restricted to American examples of postmodernism. 68. Gordon,“Government ,”23. 69. Ibid., 27; Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism, 86. 70. Bradley, The Optimists, 183–199. 71. Gordon,“Government Rationality,”47. 72. Ibid., 36. 73. Goodlad, Victorian Literature and the Victorian State, 30. Goodlad’s presentation of Mill as a virtue liberal, however, while not unlike some others offered in the last decade or so, is not as com- pelling from my perspective. I present Mill instead as a perfectionist liberal in chapter three. 74. Barry et al.,“Introduction,”8.For this reason,commentators like David Lloyd and Paul Thomas, committed to the more anarchic spirit of the early Foucault, find his late love affair with governmentality to “veer towards a virtual that lacks any real analytical capacity”: see Lloyd and Thomas, Culture and the State,4. 75. In “Foucault’s Hyper-Liberalism,”Beiner sees Foucault tending toward anarchy in the extrem- ism of his individualism: see Beiner, Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit, 68–78. See also Taylor, “Living with Difference,”224; Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism, 85–88; Lilla, The Reckless , 137–158. Eagleton has recently described Foucault as a “shamefaced libertarian”: see Eagleton, After Theory, 13–14. 76. Cited in Gordon,“Governmentality,”5. 77. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 265–266. 78. Foucault,“Politics and ,”350, 351. 79. While somewhat overdrawn, this is the conclusion reached by Eagleton recently as well. “Both postmodernists and neo-liberals,” Eagleton writes (using the British term for right- liberals),“are suspicious of public norms, inherent values, given hierarchies, authoritative stan- dards, consensual codes and traditional practices. It is just that neo-liberals admit that they reject all this in the name of the market. Radical postmodernists, by contrast, combine these aversions with a somewhat sheepish chariness of commercialism.”See Eagleton, After Theory, 29. 80. For reasons that will become clear, I prefer the Nietzschean context MacIntyre provides to situate this radical individualist ideology,but there are other interesting alternatives here, includ- ing what the historian Christopher Lasch has called the “culture of narcissism,”the philosopher Charles Taylor “the ethics of authenticity,” and the sociologist Robert Bellah “expressive individualism.” For a less theoretical discussion of the same general idea, see the of “the culture of autonomy” in Gaylin and Jennings, The Perversion of Autonomy, 4–9. 81. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 113–114. 82. Ibid., 11–12, 23, 24, 25. 83. Ibid., 26, 26, 74. 84. Ibid., 114. 85. Robbins,“How to Be a Benefactor without Any Money,”173–174. 86. Ibid., 191. 172 Notes to Pages 86–88 Chapter Three

1. Trilling, Matthew Arnold, 262;Woolf, After the Deluge, 289–290.There is a long history of modern commentary on Mill that reads him primarily as the noninterventionist, libertarian author of On Liberty.This is the “traditionalist” interpretation, epitomized by F. A. Hayek’s reading of Mill in The Road to Serfdom: see the summary in Semmel, John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue,4. Others who read Mill this way include Isaiah Berlin and C. L.Ten: see Hamburger, John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control, 4n. 2. I note in passing here that my concern in this book will be with those British and American Victorians exclusively interested in both tasks: i.e., a political program of democracy and a moral program of perfectionism.Those invested in both I call Victorian liberals.There were Victorians interested in democracy but not perfectionism, of course, and there are many existing studies of these Victorians.There were also Victorians interested in perfectionism but not democracy, the most obvious ones being (and I simply list them here without evidence) Carlyle (in On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History, 1840), Ruskin (in Unto This Last, 1862), and Newman (in The Idea of a University, 1873). Here, though, we need more studies.While I noted in chapter one my differences with Andrew H. Miller’s definition of perfectionism (based as his is upon Stanley Cavell’s emotivist brand of “perfectionism”), Miller does provide I think an important first step in coming to terms with the depth and breadth of Victorian perfectionism: see Miller, “Reading Thoughts,”89–93. 3. Stephen,“Liberalism,”49, 50, 50–51.Throughout this chapter and chapter four, I will often find moral perfectionism in —such as Stephen’s “a higher conception of the objects of national existence”—that other commentators have tended to treat more simply as evidence of the Victorian liberal commitment to “tradition.” While not disputing the importance of tradition to the Victorian liberal vision of what comprises perfection, it is the moral perfectionism often buried in such appeals to tradition that I believe to be the more important aspect of Victorian liberalism, at least for the theoretical purposes I have in mind here. For a brief summary of the other, more common approach to this material, see Stapleton, “Introduction,” 7–10. I admit, however, that Stephen in his later writings especially is a marginal case, sometimes evincing this dual commitment to moral excellence and democracy,but often times abandoning both for com- mitments to tradition qua tradition (and not as exemplifying moral excellence) and aristocracy (not democracy), as discussed later. 4. My admittedly Whiggish assessment of modern commentary on Mill is that the perfectionist liberal reading represents its proper and most recent culmination. Beginning in the 1960s, a rival Mill was proposed, one who advocated not (as the “traditionalist” Mill was said to—see the note above) but its opposite: “moral ” in sympathetic books like Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, ix; “moral totalitarianism” in critical ones like Cowling, Mill and Liberalism, 104. Subsequently followed a period of “revisionist” commentary that sought ways to reconcile the “two Mills”: for summaries, see Hamburger, John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control, 4n; Morales, Perfect Equality, 22.The first such commentator, Himmelfarb, was content to wonder at the two Mills—the amoral libertarian and the moral authoritarian—in tension: Himmelfarb, On Liberty and Liberalism, xi. Later commentators, however, made use of the two “” of early modern Anglo-American political history described by historians like J. G. A. Pocock and Gordon Wood—republicanism and liberalism—to interpret Mill as a republican to the extent he emphasized morality (that is, civic virtue) so as to preserve a state that, as a liberal, he imagined zealously protecting individual liberty.This is essentially to interpret Mill as a virtue liberal, and representative books and articles would include much of what was written about Mill’s political thought during the l980s and 1990s, including: Semmel, John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue (1984); Burrow, Whigs and Liberals (1985); Collini, Public Moralists (1991); Justman, The Hidden Text of Mill’s On Liberty (1991); Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism (1992); Biagini,“Liberalism and ” (1996); Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism (1999); and Goodlad, Notes to Pages 88–90 173 Victorian Literature and the Victorian State (2003). Though with different terminology, Mill the perfectionist liberal (i.e., a liberal committed to the political realization of both an objective moral excellence and democracy) emerges in the more recent commentaries: see Capaldi,“John Stuart Mill’s Defense of Liberal Culture” (1999, which shows Mill’s commitment to the devel- opment of liberal culture based upon a philosophical anthropology); Gibbins, “J.S. Mill, Liberalism, and Progress” (1990, which explains Mill’s vision of the perfectible human self within a liberal state); Hamburger, John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control, 225–234 (1999, which shows Mill’s moral ambitions for humankind to be significantly greater than those of the virtue liberals, or what he calls “communitarian liberals”); Kurer, John Stuart Mill (1991, which explic- itly shows Mill’s perfectionism to be lost in the “two Mills” accounts); Ryan,“Mill,” 519–520, 523–524 (1998, which contrasts Mill’s perfectionism to the liberalism of Rawls); Skorupski, “Introduction,”22–25 (1998, which describes in detail Mill’s “,”or what I am calling “perfectionist liberalism”); and Urbinati, Mill on Democracy, 130–133, 160–161 (2002, which assumes Mill’s perfectionism and references several of the above as doing the same).The narrative of Arnold commentary from chapter two could be reiterated in this light, too, though the “tension”between the two Arnolds (as described in Goodheart, Machann, and Said) has yet to coalesce into something approximating the virtue liberal reading, let alone the perfectionist liberal reading offered here. 5. For Mill’s own assessment of Tocqueville’s influence upon his thinking about democracy, see Mill, CW, 1.199–201. 6. Tocqueville, Democracy in America,3,6. 7. “Every thinker now perceives that the strongest and most durable influences in every western society lead in the direction of democracy,” wrote in his 1873 essay “Mr. Mill’s Doctrine of Liberty,” “and tend with more or less rapidity to throw the control of social organ- ization into the hands of numerical majorities.” See Morley, Nineteenth-Century Essays, 117. Stephen’s assurance on this score is evident in the 1862 essay “Liberalism,” cited above, but see also the much more qualified appreciation of democracy’s inevitability in the 1873 Liberty, Equality,Fraternity: Stephen, Liberty, 212. Both of these assessments are a world apart from non- liberal considerations of the same, such as Thomas Carlyle’s dark assessment of democracy’s rise since the events of 1848 in the first number of Latter-Day Pamphlets (1850). 8. Mill, CW, 18.50–51. 9. Arnold, CPW, 2.71, 2.9, 2.8. Arnold would allude to the same passage of Tocqueville’s in a fascinating correspondence with the MP in early 1864, mainly to argue that, as the English aristocracy makes the lower class miserable,the only practical solution is to reform the middle class first to prepare it for a more just rule. See Arnold, The Letters of Matthew Arnold, 2.273. For another example of Arnold’s conviction that the transition from aristocracy to democracy was irreversible, see Arnold, Letters, 1.452, his May 14, 1859 letter from France to his wife about the degree to which “[t]he Revolution has cleared out the feudal ages from the minds of the country people to an extent incredible to us.” See also Arnold, Letters, 1.447, the May 9 letter to his mother about the same. 10. Mill, CW, 13.712. 11. Arnold, CPW, 5.142; Arnold, The Letters of Matthew Arnold, 1.456; Arnold, CPW, 1.81–82. Because of aristocracy’s injustice and its allergy to philosophy, Mill and Arnold were both absolutely opposed to the neo-feudalism of Carlyle, Ruskin, and others. Mill’s objections here are well known, but Arnold has too often been lumped in with the neo-feudalists.The coun- terevidence is legion, though; for an early and rarely cited example, see Arnold, Letters, 1.503–07, an 1859 letter to The Times against the use of Gothic architecture in modern State buildings. Because, as Arnold suggests, the phrase “ideas of 1789” was commonly used by Victorian liberals to quickly designate their philosophy, I will often use it here the same way. This is a simplification, of course, and for every Walter Bagehot, who deploys the phrase off- handedly like Arnold to signal his liberal commitments, there is a Lord Acton, who investigates much more closely how the ideas of 1789 have operated in national and international affairs 174 Notes to Pages 90–94 ever since: see Bagehot, Physics and Politics, 22; Acton, “Nationality,” 76. If seemed to signal his allegiance to the liberal coordination of democracy and the ideas of 1789 in “Liberalism” in 1862, he made it clear eleven years later how distant his idea of “moral excellence” was from those ideas of 1789 in his Liberty,Equality,Fraternity, words that are the “creed” of a new “.”“I do not believe it,”he wrote in the opening pages.“I am not the advocate of Slavery,Caste, and Hatred,”he wrote, but “these words [from 1789] are ill-adapted to be the creed of a religion, [for] the things which they denote are not ends in themselves, and that when used collectively the words do not typify,however vaguely,any state of society which a reasonable man ought to regard with enthusiasm or self-devotion.”See Stephen, Liberty, 52–53. 12. Tocqueville, Democracy in America,7. 13. Arnold, CPW, 2.15, 2.15–16. 14. Mill, CW, 19.385, 387, 390, 390–391.Though I really shouldn’t be, given the conclusion of my study of the in chapter two, I confess to being astounded by those modern critics who have read Mill as an antistatist, an operation which usually requires reading certain sentences from Principles of Political Economy completely out of context, and ignoring long passages from the same book that make Mill’s commitment to an interventionist state perfectly clear. Mill was at pains to position himself between English antistatists and Continental centralizers in Principles: see Mill, CW, 3.799, 3.936–945, as well as (in the Autobiography) CW, 1.201–203. For the passage most often cited to show Mill’s supposed commitment to laissez faire, and a sum- mary of what Mill really meant, see Mill, CW, 3.944–945; Riley, “Introduction,” viii–xiii. Perhaps the first great misreading of Mill in this regard is Stephen in Liberty,Equality,Fraternity, a book that, in its contention that Mill was unwilling to consider any kind of coercion legiti- mate, is best described as a brilliant exercise in consistently missing the point. Mill’s statism will become clear in the policies of his that are described in this chapter and the next. 15. Mill, CW, 8.847. 16. Ibid., 8.898; Morley, Nineteenth-Century Essays, 103; 104. In a 1906 appreciation of Mill, “A Great Teacher,” Morley found the origins of this union in Mill’s , which Morley described then as “an elaborate attempt to perform the practical task of dislodging intuitive phi- losophy, as a step towards sounder thinking about society and institutions; as a step, in other words, toward Liberalism”: see Morley, Oracles on Man and Government, 13. For a summary of Morley’s life-long appreciation of Mill’s union of science and moral hope, see Alexander, John Morley, 23. For his part, Mill traced his own commitment to perfectionist education (meaning the careful control of associations) to his father, , whose “fundamental doctrine was the formation of all human character by circumstances,”Mill recalled in his Autobiography,“through the universal Principle of Association, and the consequent unlimited possibility of improving the moral condition of mankind by education.”See Mill, CW, 1.109–110. 17. Cited by Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen, 101; Morley, Nineteenth-Century Essays, 118. Morley completes the critique, in the 1873 “Mr. Mill’s Doctrine of Liberty,”this way:“How [this strong man, king, hero, dictator] was to be found, neither the master [that is, Carlyle] nor his still angrier and more impatient mimics could ever tell us. The scream of this whole school is a mockery.” For a somewhat cooler assessment of Ruskin’s and Carlyle’s role in the debates of the1860s, see Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen, 103–104. 18. Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen, 101–102. 19. As he himself describes, Mill’s opposition to the “programme of manhood suffrage” was mistaken by conservatives as akin to theirs, even though Mill proposed franchise limitations based upon education, not property: see Mill, CW, 1.278, 1.288, 1.261–262.Though he does not mention Mill by name,A. C. Dicey criticizes all liberals for their “transcendentalism”—i.e., their depar- ture from utilitarian —in devising various ways to limit the franchise: see, Dicey, “The Balance of the Classes,” 97–110. See also Smith’s summary of the franchise debate between Dicey and some of the other authors of Essays on Reform (1867) and Mill: Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen,107–113.Stephen’s most strenuous (though entirely unpersuasive) case against Mill’s progressive politics (particularly his commitments to equality and fraternity) as a Notes to Pages 94–97 175 Rousseau-like lapse from empiricism into a “ of rights” are to be found in the chapters “Equality” and “Fraternity” in Liberty,Equality,Fraternity: Stephen, Liberty, 179–261. See also Smith’s summary of Stephen’s charges against Mill: Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen, 164. As Collini notes, Morley was almost alone among Mill’s former disciples in defending Mill’s philosophical consistency: see Collini, Public Moralists, 177–178. Morley strongly supported Mill’s education-based limitation on the franchise, famously complimenting On Liberty as “one of the most aristocratic books ever written (I do not mean British aristocratic)” (Morley, Nineteenth- Century Essays, 125): see also Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen, 192. However, Morley, too, under- stood Mill to have seriously compromised his utilitarian credentials in his later work, particularly Mill’s explorations of and theism. See respectively Morley, Oracles on Man and Government, 12 and Alexander, John Morley, 25; Morley, Nineteenth-Century Essays, 166–169, 204. Mill always believed himself to be on the side of empiricism against “transcendentalism” or intuitionism; for his description of this philosophical contest as the “foundation of all the greatest differences of practical opinion in an age of progress,”see Mill, CW, 1.269–270. 20. Mill describes his changing understanding of two of the principal means (political economy, democracy) to achieving moral perfection in his Autobiography: from to socialism in the case of one, and from direct to indirect democracy in the case of the other. See Mill, CW, 1.199. 21. Ibid., 10.206, 207, 207. 22. Riley,“Introduction,”vii–xii. 23. Mill, CW, 1.147. 24. Ibid., 10.229, 231. As already noted, Stephen dismissed all of Mill’s rereading of human nature as rank metaphysics masquerading as empiricism,not unlike John Henry Newman in his Grammar of Assent (1870):“[t]here are in these days many speculations by very able men, . . . which can all be resolved into attempts to increase the bulk and weight of evidence by heating it with love.” See Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 265. Stephen, incidentally, stuck carefully to the portrait of human nature recommended by the old , but then explicitly introduced into the formula a Calvinist metaphysics because he worried that self-interest alone would eventually unravel any political regime. See 232–261. At this point, Stephen’s criticism of Mill seems to waver between chastising Mill for abandoning a strict empiricism and (because Stephen himself explicitly abandons the same) arguing the practical merits of upholding a vengeful God as against Mill’s humanist religion. As I argue in the conclusion, Mill himself explicitly considered the liberal possibilities of positing a loving but fallible “God”in his posthu- mously published writings on religion but ultimately contended that empiricism does square with humanism, a position I take as well and recommend as representative of Victorian liberal- ism’s successful union of political and moral programs.Whether I, like Newman, am guilty of heating evidence with love I leave to my readers to determine. Similarly impressed by Mill’s ability to resist the transcendental seduction, Morley once wrote that “the wonder” is that Mill’s reaction against his father’s education “was not of the most violent kind” and “did not land him in some of the extreme forms of transcendentalism”: see Morley, Nineteenth-Century Essays, 141. Stephen, incidentally, abandoned his pragmatic Calvinism in his later years and returned to the agnostic position he once so viciously mocked in Mill: see Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen, 212–214. 25. Mill, CW, 3.754; 1.175; 3.754; 3.756. On socialism as the ultimate economic program for Mill, see in the Principles, CW, 3.775–776, 3.791–792, 3.793–794, the “chapters on socialism,” CW, 5.703–753, and in the Autobiography,CW, 1.239. I note here again the interesting and still to be explored convergence of Mill and Marx as nineteenth-century perfectionists. 26. Mill, CW, 10.216, 216, 217. 27. Ibid., 1.187; 1.173. Following the lead of Mill’s two famous essays, commentary on Mill’s intellectual origins still tends to overemphasize Bentham and his circle on the one hand and Coleridge and the other Romantics on the other, to the exclusion of reading Mill (and those other Victorian liberals,like Arnold,also influenced by the French Enlightenment) as a nineteenth- century continuation of the perfectionism of the Enlightenment. On the influence of 176 Notes to Pages 97–102 Condorcet, specifically, on Mill and Morley, see Mill, CW, 1.115; Morley, Oracles on Man and Government, 25; and Morley, Nineteenth-Century Essays, 160. Mill understood his father to be “the last of the eighteenth century” but Mill himself seems much more at ease with that tradi- tion than the transcendentalism of the Germans and Carlyle:see Mill,CW,1.213,1.233.Morley shared Mill’s understanding of Victorian liberalism as a scientific endeavor, indebted to Condorcet and Turgot:see Alexander, John Morley, 22, 26–33, Morley, Nineteenth-Century Essays, 43. I consider some of Arnold’s Enlightenment (and Romantic) perfectionist predecessors in chapter four. 28. Mill, CW, 19.390–392. 29. Ibid., 19.435, 436. 30. Ibid., 18.223. Another elegant defense of individual liberty as something to be cultivated as a good unto itself can be found in Mill’s Principles of Political Economy and Autobiography: see CW, 3.942–944, and (as cited above) CW, 1.173. Morley is cited in Alexander, John Morley, 24. 31. Mill, CW, 18.260–261; Stephen, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, 83; Morley, Nineteenth-Century Essays, 127, 129. For Bagehot’s description of this ideal type of “animated moderation,” see Physics and Politics, 145–147. Regarding Mill’s view of diversity, one might challenge my claim here by pointing to that one moment in the Autobiography where Mill confesses to having once been “seriously tormented by the thought of the exhaustibility of musical combinations”: see Mill, CW, 1.149. Incidentally, Mill’s two-sided understanding of liberty in On Liberty was the major “problem” that led to the two Mill thesis. For statements of the problem, see Alexander, Matthew Arnold and John Stuart Mill, 255; Berlin “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life,”190; and Hamburger, John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control, 225–234. For other perfectionist readings demonstrating more thoroughly than I how the instrumental and intrinsic defenses of liberty complement one another, see Urbinati, Mill on Democracy, 130–133; Skorupski,“Introduction,”5. 32. Mill, CW, 19.468, 469, 469. 33. Ibid., 1.87. Morley concluded his review of the Autobiography with this passage as most suggestive of the essence of Mill’s character: see Morley, Nineteenth-Century Essays, 163.Though he did not agree that the exercise of the franchise would have these beneficial effects, Stephen did agree with Mill that the trials of professional were an important political and social education, as he discussed in his short 1859 essay,“Doing Good.” See Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 301: “[i]n any calling of this permanent kind there is, and always must be, endless instruction.” 34. Mill, CW, 19.435, 494. As Mill notes, the latter citation originated in the 1859 pamphlet, Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform. Jury duty is recommended for the same reason. See Mill, CW, 19.412: it “must make them ...very different , in range of ideas and development of faculties, from those who have done nothing in their lives but drive a quill, or sell goods over a counter.” 35. Hill, Democratic Theory and , 48. 36. Ibid., 23. See Mill’s 1835 article on the Municipal Corporation Reform: CW, 24.769–774. Incidentally,the contention that local and state government work in concert is also at the heart of the only recent analyses of Victorian municipalism that I could find, scholars of Foucault’s governmentality,who of course take a far darker view of the consequences of this coordination than either Mill or Tocqueville. For a summary of this scholarship and an example of munici- palism as an effort “to fashion cities into spaces within which civil conduct could be both secured and publicly displayed,” see Otter, “Making Liberalism Durable,” 1. As I argued in chapter two, however, after reading these analyses of the disciplinary society,one is left wonder- ing what, short of anarchy,the alternative might be. Mill describes the value of local government in a similar way in Principles, where he also makes the point, first developed by Condorcet, that, mathematically speaking, the common good will be better served by allowing them to vote: Mill, CW, 3.940–942;Wolff, Introduction to Political Philosophy, 82. 37. Mill, CW, 18.58. 38. Ibid., 18.60. Notes to Pages 102–113 177 39. Ibid., 18.63. 40. Ibid., 18.168, 18.169, 5.457. See also 5.432–437 for Mill’s 1851 letter to the Metropolitan Sanitary Association recommending municipal control, with central government oversight, of the water supply,and 29.1.162–165, 29.1.273–276, 29.2.437–542 for Mill’s work between 1866 and 1868 on the Select Committee on Metropolitan Local Government while an MP. 41. Ibid., 19.535, 536; Biagini,“Liberalism and Direct Democracy,”23. 42. Trollope, A History of the Commonwealth of Florence ...,1.2. 43. Ibid., 1.2–3. 44. Ibid., 1.4. 45. Ibid., 4.100–101. 46. Ibid., 3.443. 47. Ibid., 3.445. 48. Ibid., 3.452–453. 49. Arnold, CPW, 9.7. 50. Ibid., 1.66–67. 51. Arnold, The Letters of Matthew Arnold, 2.430, 2,431. 52. Arnold, CPW, 4.306. 53. Ibid., 4.307n. 54. Ibid., 9.12.Though without stating its educational value,Arnold recommends expanding local government in Ireland in the 1885 “A Word More About America”: see Arnold, CPW, 10. 210–211. Arnold’s personal investment in municipalism is suggested, though rather mysteri- ously, by his serving in the Westminster Rifle Volunteers in 1859 during a crisis in British relations with France: see Arnold, The Letters of Matthew Arnold, 1 507–508. 55. Arnold, CPW, 1.67. 56. Mill, CW, 11. 273, 11.313. 57. Ibid., 11.315–316, 11.273. 58. Ibid., 11.313. 59. Ibid., 11.324. 60. Ibid., 11.324. 61. Ibid., 19.411, 412. 62. Ibid., 11.319. 63. Biagini,“Liberalism and Direct Democracy,”33. 64. Arnold, CPW, 2.314. 65. Ibid., 5.108. 66. Ibid., 5.145. 67. Ibid., 5.146. 68. Ibid., 5.224. 69. The one clear answer that Arnold does give in one place in Culture and Anarchy is state- supported culture:“[the best self ] is the very self which culture, or the study of perfection, seeks to develop in us; at the expense of our old untransformed self, taking pleasure only in doing what it likes or is used to do”: see Arnold, CPW, 5.134–135. I examine culture, or what I also call the didactic pedagogy of the state, in chapter four. 70. Ibid., 5.96, 5.201. 71. Mill, CW, 18.260, 231;Arnold, CPW, 5.233. 72. Mill, CW, 18.219–223. 73. Ibid., 19.454–456, 474–475. 74. Thoreau, Reform Papers, 66, 66–67, 69–70. 75. Ibid., 72, 73. 76. Ibid., 65. 77. Ibid., 104. 78. Ibid., 103. 79. Ibid., 89–90. 178 Notes to Pages 113–117 80. See also the 1876 review of Curtius’s History of Greece and the 1882 “A Word About America”: Arnold, CPW, 5.291–292, 10.6–7. 81. Arnold, CPW, 10.145, 10.144, 10.147, 10.148. 82. Rapple,“Matthew Arnold and the Role of the State,”174, 175. 83. Arnold, CPW, 10.149. 84. Ibid., 10.150. 85. Ibid., 10.152. 86. In St. Paul and , Arnold wrote that Paul had “a preponderantly mystic side, and nothing is so natural to the mystic as in rich single words, such as faith, light, love, to sum up and take for granted, without specifically enumerating them, all good moral principles and habits...”:see Arnold, CPW, 6.24. In “Numbers,”Arnold’s own “rich single word,”“the rem- nant,”seems indeed to have mystified audiences. One of his staple lectures when touring America, Arnold was correctly perceived to be criticizing majoritarian democracy but incorrectly perceived to be advocating an aristocracy.See Long,“Matthew Arnold Visits Chicago,”34–45. 87. There are in fact earlier indications of equality’s importance to Arnold. See, e.g., Arnold, The Letters of Matthew Arnold, 1.86–87, a March 1, 1848 letter to his close friend :“[i]f the rule is—everyone must get all he can—the capitalist understands by fair prof- its such as will enable him to live like a colossal Nob: & Lancashire artisans knowing if they will not let him make these,Yorkshire artisans will. . . . But an apostolic capitalist willing to live as an artisan may surely divide profits on a scale undreamed of Capitalisto nobefacturo. And in a country all whose capitalists were apostolic, the confusion a solitary apostle would make, could not exist.”See also Arnold, The Note-Books of Matthew Arnold, 37, an entry in 1866:“ ‘The feeling between classes’ but the distinction of classes should die away and we should be one people.” 88. Arnold, CPW, 5.91. 89. Ibid.,5.94.The emphases are Arnold’s.While Arnold implies in Culture and Anarchy that religion, unlike culture, fails to promote equality,in his 1877 Preface to Last Essays on Church and Religion Arnold summarizes the “natural truth” of the Christian idea of charity to be “solidarity.”While we are every day tempted to conclude that “every man for himself [is] the rule of happiness,” “at least it turns out as a matter of experience . . . that the only real happiness is in a kind of impersonal higher life, where the happiness of others counts with a man as essential to his own,” and that “[he] that loves his life does really turn out to lose it” as promised in the New Testament: see Arnold, CPW, 8.156–157; John 12:25. Compare Mill, CW, 1.145–147, in his Autobiography: “Those only are happy...who have their minds fixed on some objects other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind even in some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end.” 90. Arnold, CPW, 5.215;Arnold, The Note-Books of Matthew Arnold, 38. 91. Arnold, CPW, 5.213. 92. Ibid., 5.95, 5.216. 93. Ibid., 9.7; 9.7–12. 94. Ibid., 8.279. 95. Ibid., 8.286. 96. Ibid., 8.288, 8.289, 8.286–287.The unrivaled virtues of the French people were for Arnold the real measure of equality as a social policy; references to such are found throughout his political writings in the 1860s, but see a series of letters regarding “this wide & deepspread intelligence” to Clough, Arnold’s mother, and Arnold’s sister K in early March 1848: Arnold, The Letters of Matthew Arnold, 1.89, 88–97. Many Victorian liberals came to a similar conclusion, including George Eliot. Writing to a friend in 1848 of the events in France, Eliot admits that she has “no hope of good from any imitative movement at home,” for, while “[i]n France the mind of the people is highly electrified—they are full of ideas on social subjects,”“[h]ere [there is only] selfish radicalism and unsatisfied brute sensuality,” a theme elaborated upon in the infamous “Address to Working Men” from Felix Holt (1866), of course. See Eliot, The George Eliot Letters, 1.254. Notes to Pages 117–124 179 97. Arnold, CPW, 8.290, 8.304. 98. Rousseau, The , 199, 204. 99. Ibid., 267, 185, 268–277. 100. Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism, 23. 101. In a note at the beginning of the chapter, I listed some of the many commentators who read Mill this way and suggested that the “tensions” in Arnold’s thought might also be reconciled through this kind of reading.

Chapter Four

1. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 288, 289. 2. Black, “Revisionist Liberalism and the Decline of Culture,” 247, 255. Perfectionist liberals like are not convinced that culture will survive without a more explicit recogni- tion of culture’s perfectionist purpose: “[s]upporting valuable forms of life is a social rather than an individual matter [and] perfectionist ideals require public action for their viability.Anti- perfectionism in practice would lead not merely to a political stand-off from support for valuable conceptions of the good. It would undermine the chances of survival of many cherished aspects of our culture.”See Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 162. 3. Arnold, CPW, 5.275, 5.274. 4. Ibid., 5.274. 5. Ibid., 5.2776–2777, 5.278. 6. Stephen, “Liberalism,” 64. And, of course, see also Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 119. K. J. M. Smith has noted that both Arnold and Stephen, for all their mutual antagonism toward one another, had a number of similarities, including “favour[ing] a strong meritocracy to pro- vide firm enlightened leadership”: see Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen, 106. As will become clear, I am very hesitant to find similarities between Stephen and Arnold beyond this, given Arnold’s long (and wrong) association with the kind of excessively coercive state championed by Stephen especially in Liberty, a state so coercive and so indifferent to individual liberties that I think Stephen at times drifts out of Victorian liberal theory and into the neo-feudalism of Carlyle.The same cannot be said of Arnold, though of course many have said exactly that. 7. Cited in Chevigny, The Woman and the Myth, 177–178. 8. Arnold, CPW, 5.281. 9. Of the many virtue liberal commentators who read Mill this way,see Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism, 137:“throughout his writings Mill saw that political society based on freedom and equality could not preserve itself unless it had available effective means for the cultivation of certain necessary virtues.” 10. Mill, CW, 22.244, 18.86, 18.195n. 11. Ibid., 10.133. Given my emphasis in chapter three upon Mill’s consistent empiricism, I should note in passing that Mill cites this exact same material from the “Coleridge” essay in Book VI of the Logic, presenting it there as empirical data about the human need for things of perma- nence, rather a political intuition of his own (which is closer to how Coleridge himself pres- ents it). See Mill, CW, 8.921–924. I emphasized in chapter three Mill’s consistency on this score. Despite the importance of this debate between empiricism and intuitionism to Mill and Arnold (evidence of that to come), in the conclusion I make use of the early work of , as well as examples from both Mill and Arnold, to argue that both the empirical and intuitive approaches to ascertaining human nature and subsequently formulating moral perfection can be done without recourse to metaphysics, thus negating the main reason Mill and the utilitarians feared the Intuitionists: their readiness to give metaphysical sanction to the merest passing fancies, dressing whims up as universal . 12. Mill, CW, 10.133–134. 180 Notes to Pages 124–136 13. Arnold, CPW, 5.277. 14. Mill, CW, 10.134. 15. Ibid., 18.310; 10.134; 18.260; 1.241.The emphasis in the citation from On Liberty is mine. 16. Arnold, CPW, 2.15–16.The emphasis is mine. 17. Ibid., 5.162.The emphasis is Arnold’s. 18. Arnold,The Letters of Matthew Arnold,2.311.Of the six quotes Arnold included in his Note-Books from Curtius’s History of Greece is “Solon knew that he himself, wishing to educate truly the citizen of the state, could no more than the teacher who aims at the highest end of education look forward to a speedy result corresponding to his efforts”: see Arnold, The Note-Books of Matthew Arnold, 84. 19. Fuller,“These Sad But Glorious Day,”322–323. 20. Emerson, Essays and Lectures, 568. 21. Thoreau, Walden, 327. I explore the perfectionism of this passage and Thoreau’s political theory in general in Malachuk,“Transcendentalism, Perfectionism, and Walden,”283–303. 22. I draw attention once more to the parallel between Victorian liberals and Marx, who also wrote of the withering away of the state; both theories were ultimately interested with human perfection, not state preservation. 23. This statement must be qualified by exempting the posthumously published Three Essays on Religion, particularly “Theism” which makes the case for God as a kind of didactic pedagogy. I examine this essay’s contemporary significance in the conclusion. 24. Emerson, The Early Lectures of , 1.210, 1.213–216, 2.202. I examine these didactic strategies in more detail as exemplifying Emerson’s early debt to the republican tradition: see Malachuk,“The Republican Philosophy of Emerson’s Early Lectures,”404–428. 25. Emerson, Essays and Lectures, 492. 26. Ibid., 1016, 1019. 27. Ibid., 1018. 28. Ibid., 1020. 29. Ibid., 1020–1021, 1021. 30. Arnold, CPW, 8.288. 31. Emerson, Essays and Lectures, 1024. 32. Ibid., 1028. 33. Ibid., 1029. 34. Ibid., 1033–1034. 35. Fuller, Woman in the Nineteenth-Century, 357. 36. Cited in Chevigny, The Woman and the Myth, 181–184. 37. Ibid., 313. 38. Fuller, The Essential , 332, 333. 39. Ibid., 333–334. 40. Fuller,“These Sad But Glorious Days,”156. 41. Ibid., 156–157, 157, 159. 42. Ibid., 278. 43. Thoreau, Reform Papers, 11, 16. 44. Ibid., 17. Serving the public good was a common theme in Thoreau’s earliest writings. See also Thoreau, Early Essays and Miscellanies, 7 for a December 20, 1834 essay: e.g.,“[s]mall, very small, is the number of those who labour for the public good. . . . He is worthy of all praise: his is indeed true greatness . . . nor is he troubled with his strings of conscience.” 45. Thoreau, Walden, 109. 46. Ibid., 110. 47. Ibid., 110. 48. Ibid., 51. 49. Ibid., 52. 50. Ibid., 115–122. Notes to Pages 137–144 181 51. Thoreau, Reform Papers, 174–175. 52. Ibid., 218. 53. Ibid., 151. 54. Thoreau wonderfully describes that civic solitude in the chapter “Solitude”: Walden, 129–139. 55. It was in 1859 that Arnold published “England and the Italian Question,” his first publication about an explicitly political topic. In chapter three, I discussed this essay in relation to Arnold’s commitments to the “ideas of 1789” and to municipalism. 56. Remarking on the herd mentality of the English “of the last 100 years” and Martineau’s ability to speak to it, Arnold wrote his mother that “I cannot but praise a person whose one effort seems to have been to deal perfectly honestly and sincerely with herself—although for her speculations into which this effort has led her I have not the slightest sympathy”: see Arnold, The Letters of Matthew Arnold, 1.315. 57. Ibid., 2.12–13. 58. Ibid., 2.14–15. 59. Ibid., 2.260, 2.266, 2.238. 60. See Arnold, CPW, 2.18 and 2.299, and 2.25–26 and 2.227–229. 61. Ibid., 5.526. R. H. Super, the editor of the 1965 volume of Culture and Anarchy for the Collected Prose Works, simply includes this passage with all the others that Arnold removed when revising the individual Cornhill essays into the 1869 book. In a of our times, Samuel Lipman, the editor of the 1994 Yale Edition of Culture and Anarchy and vigorously antistatist right-liberal, follows the same (standard) editorial practice as Super except for this one passage, which he restores into the main text: see Lipman,“Culture and Anarchy:A Publishing History,”xvi. 62. Arnold, CPW, 2.19. 63. Ibid., 2.29. 64. Carroll, The Cultural Theory of Matthew Arnold, 78. 65. Arnold, CPW, 2.313, 2.314. 66. As with my cursory review of Mill’s Enlightenment predecessors, what I offer here is very mod- est, and mostly to emphasize again (as I did in the introduction and in chapter three) the need for a more thorough examination of Victorian liberalism’s continuities with the perfectionist aspects of the Enlightenment as well as the Romantics. 67. Arnold, The Letters of Matthew Arnold, 2.281. 68. T. Arnold, Introductory Lectures on Modern History ...,34. 69. Ibid., 64, 64, 65. 70. Trilling, Matthew Arnold, 52. 71. T.Arnold, Introductory Lectures on Modern History ...,67,69,69.’s influence on other Victorian liberals deserves more investigation, too. Though with some admiration, Bagehot declares Arnold’s union of Church and State to be “excellent for the old world from which it was learnt” but “wrong for the modern age to which it was applied.”Bagehot connects Arnold’s proposals to other ancient political pursuits of civic obedience and concludes that these are now irrelevant to modern politics, guided as these new politics are by “the principles of 1789” (as discussed in chapter three).The principles of 1789 are “fitted only to the new world in which society has gone through its early task [of establishing obedience],” Bagehot writes, “when the inherited organization is already confirmed and fixed; when the soft minds and strong passions of youthful nations are fixed and guided by hard transmitted instincts.” See Bagehot, Physics and Politics, 19, 22.While Matthew Arnold agreed that modern states are com- mitted to the realization of the ideas of 1789, he clearly disagreed with Bagehot that modern states could take for granted political unity: this is, in part, the purpose of the didactic pedagogy of culture.Though he does not cite Thomas Arnold in his major book, much of what James Fitzjames Stephen writes in defense of the union of Church and State—to achieve not only stability but also (in a rare moment for Stephen in this book) human perfection—seems indebted to the elder Arnold’s line of thought at least: see Liberty,Equality,Fraternity, 86–96. 72. T. Arnold, Introductory Lectures on Modern History ...,83. 182 Notes to Pages 144–153 73. Cited by apRoberts, Arnold and God, 60. 74. Trilling, Matthew Arnold, 56. 75. Coleridge, On the Constitution of Church and State, 52. I discuss Coleridge’s influence upon Victorian liberalism in more detail in Malachuk,“Coleridge’s Republicanism and the Aphorism in Aids to Reflection,”397–417 and Malachuk,“Labor,Leisure,and the Yeoman in Coleridge’s and Wordsworth’s 1790s Writings.” 76. Critics agree that Coleridge’s influence on Matthew Arnold was, through the influence of his father, tremendous: see apRoberts, Arnold and God, 57–58, and Collini, Arnold, 103.There is no evidence,however,that Coleridge’s clerisy directly influenced Matthew Arnold’s idea of culture. While appreciating Coleridge’s clerisy as “a beautiful theory,”Arnold in the 1863 “The Bishop and the Philosopher” (like Emerson in the 1856 English Traits) expresses some skepticism that such can be installed within the : see Arnold, CPW, 3.51–52; Emerson, Essays and Lectures, 901–902. I examine Coleridge’s morally ambitious clerisy as a function of his republicanism in Malachuk, “Coleridge’s Republicanism and the Aphorism in Aids to Reflection,”397–417. 77. Cited by T. Arnold, Introductory Lectures on Modern History ...,78n. 78. Trilling, Matthew Arnold, 55; Collini, Arnold, 91. 79. Arnold, CPW, 2.300. 80. Ibid., 2.26, 5.425. 81. Other sources for Arnold’s perfectionism would be his Christian upbringing of course and also, intriguingly, his poetry. See Arnold, The Letters of Matthew Arnold, 1.402, his September 6, 1858 letter to sister K about the challenge of writing Merope: “People do not understand what a temptation there is, if you cannot bear anything not very good, to transfer your operations to a region where form is everything: perfection of a certain kind may there be attained or at least approached without knocking yourself to pieces.” 82. apRoberts, Arnold and God, 42, 43. 83. Humboldt, The Limits of State Action, 16. 84. Arnold, CPW, 5.161. 85. Bachem, “Arnold’s and Renan’s Views of Perfection,” 229, 230. As Bachem notes, besides his essay on “Renan” in Essays in Criticism, Third Series, Arnold mentioned Renan in twelve different essays or books and one hundred and twelve times in his Note-books. 86. Arnold, The Letters of Matthew Arnold, 1 515–516. 87. Arnold, CPW, 5.161–162.The emphasis is Arnold’s. 88. Alexander, Matthew Arnold and John Stuart Mill, 258;Trilling, Matthew Arnold, 254. 89. Arnold, CPW, 5.160–162. 90. Ibid., 5.136, 5.191. 91. Ibid., 5.234, 5.88, 5.123–124. 92. Ibid., 5.124–134. 93. Ibid., 5.221. 94. Hopkinson,“Matthew Arnold’s School Inspections,”100. 95. Arnold, The Letters of Matthew Arnold, 2.243–244. 96. Arnold, CPW, 5.253–255. 97. Ibid., 5.234, 5.237. 98. Collini, Arnold, 110.

Conclusion

1. Eagleton has recently concluded that the irrationalism of and postmodernism, as against “top-heavy Victorian ,”has dangerously enfeebled the left. See Eagleton, After Theory, 70–73. I confess to not following all of Eagleton’s arguments in this book,so I am reluctant Notes to Pages 154–158 183 here to note anything beyond our shared belief that the left’s best hope today against the forces of and capitalism lies in a return to rational foundations, not in a continuation of the irrationalism and antifoundationalism that have characterized so much of not the last decades but the last century of left thought. 2. Ignatieff, Human Rights, 54. Here also is Thomas W.Lacqueur’s summary of Ignatieff’s argument in that book: “Human rights activism has been insatiable in its demands and insatiably disap- pointed because it fails to define the limits of its reach.With a horizonless view of the potential of the human rights movement and of the efficacy of military and other forms of intervention, we in the West have put the legitimacy of the rights standard itself into question and in some situations have even made bad situations worse.” See Lacqueur, “The Moral Imagination and Human Rights,” 130. Ignatieff’s and Lacquer’s “slippery slope” arguments against metaphysical defenses of human rights is reminiscent of Berlin’s argument against “,” which I examined in chapter one. 3. Mill, CW, 10.488; Morley, Nineteenth-Century Essays, 167. 4. Mill’s immediate heirs, the New Liberals like T.H. Green, arguably adopted the strategy recom- mended in “Theism,”using “immanentist ” to sustain their moral idealism and social reformism. Rather than read the New Liberals as forging a new secular religion as a response to their own loss of faith, a reading that harkens back to Beatrice Webb’s formulation that for the Victorian “the impulse of self-subordinating service was transferred, consciously and overtly, from God to man,” Mark Bevir argues that the New Liberals at least often rationally adopted immanentist theologies to support their moral program, widely recognized, incidentally, as a perfectionist one. See Bevir,“Welfarism, Socialism, and Religion,”639–661.Webb’s statement is cited by Collini, Public Moralists, 84. 5. Ignatieff cites Wiesel’s claim as evidence of human rights “idolatry”: Ignatieff, Human Rights, 53. 6. Arnold, CPW, 5.164, 5.165. 7. Mill, CW, 18.263. 8. For an explanation of how character’s two definitions in the OED at the time (an evaluative one and a descriptive one) tended to be blurred together in everyday usage, see Collini,“The Idea of ‘Character’ in Victorian Political Thought,”33–37. 9. Mill, CW, 18.256, 265, 257. 10. Skorupski,“Introduction,”5. 11. Nussbaum,“Human Functioning and Social Justice,”206. 12. Ibid., 207. 13. Ibid., 207–208. 14. Nussbaum,“Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities,”118. 15. Ibid., 118–119. In the first chapter, I explained how Nussbaum, like Rawls, handles these “fixed points” as provisional, signaling her shift to a liberalism that abides by the account of the fiction of reason. I have chosen to overlook that significant difference here, and use her phrase “fixed points” without reference to the crucial adjective “provisional.” 16. Nussbaum,“Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities,”120. 17. Nussbaum,“Human Functioning and Social Justice,”212–213. 18. I focus only on Mill and Arnold here, for it may indeed be that the American Transcendentalists offered a moral perfectionism more often externally than internally sanctioned (as “transcen- dentalism” itself suggests), though I believe this deserves more unbiased attention than it has thus far received. In any case, I make the pragmatic argument that a moral perfectionism now and then sanctioned by transcendentalism is still more beneficial and less dangerous than a that is strictly detranscendental: see Malachuk,“Transcendentalism,Perfectionism, and Walden,”297–298. 19. As already discussed in chapter three, Mill’s view of intuitions was quite negative. As he wrote in the Autobiography,“[t]he notion that truths external to the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness, independently of and experience, is, I am persuaded, in these times, the great intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions”: see CW, 1.233. 184 Notes to Pages 159–160 20. Burrow, Whigs and Liberals, 86–95. I examine Mill’s debt to the republican tradition as late as his public speeches of the 1860s and 1870s in Malachuk,“John Stuart Mill’s Platform Populism, the Republican Tradition, and Victorian Liberalism,”110–121. 21. Mill, CW, 18.136, 18.140–141. 22. Arnold, CPW, 3.283. 23. Carroll, The Cultural Theory of Matthew Arnold, 62. 24. Arnold, CPW, 5.97, 5.165. See also his reiteration of culture’s role in the 1873 Preface to Literature and Dogma:Arnold, CPW, 6.151–162. 25. Ibid., 1.24. 26. Ibid., 3.109, 3.110. 27. Ibid., 3.535–536. Bibliography

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Yuracko,Kimberly A.Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Values.Bloomington:Indiana University Press, 2003. INDEX

academe, skepticism in 2–4, 11–12, Anderson,Amanda, and Victorian 25–27, 32, 42, 152–53, 155; objectivity 44–46; see alsoVictorian disciplinarity in 8–9; paranoia in 76; studies see also political theory,postmodernism, Anger, Suzy and Victorian objectivity Victorian studies 44–46; see alsoVictorian studies account of the fact of pluralism, see anti-perfectionism, concerned with pluralism coercion rather than objectivism account of the fiction of reason, see reason 33–34, 37–38, 73; see also neutrality, Acton, Lord 173–174n political program 41–42, 99; see also antistatism, summary of argument pluralism concerning 1, 4–5, 47–50, 71–72, aliens, see minorities 86–87, 162n, 163n, 165n; America, see United States of America anti-perfectionism and 33–34; American Transcendentalists 6, 133, right-liberals and in the Victorian values 165–66n, 183n; see also Emerson, debate 50–55, 56–57; left-liberals and Fuller, metaphysics,Thoreau, in the modern commentary on Arnold transcendentalism 57–71; methodological individualism anarchy 56, 67, 105, 111, 141, 171n, and 71–74; non-liberals and 74–80, 179n 167n, 171n; emotivism and 80–83; ancients, the, summary of argument contemporary Victorian studies and concerning 6; perfectionism of 83–85; instrumental statism of Victorian explained by Rawls 20, 166n; liberals versus 126–127, 174n, 181n; non-mechanization of hailed by Leavis didactic pedagogy and 138; see also state 62; municipalism of suspected by aristocracy,superiority of democracy to Trollope but celebrated by Arnold and for Victorian liberals 88–90, 107, 113; Mill 104–109; saving remnant of temporary role of for Victorian liberals critiqued by Arnold 113–114; 122, 126, 140–41, 173n; perfection of equality of celebrated by Arnold 117; self requires 146, 175n;Victorian culture preservation of explained by sages and illiberal versions of 148, Arnold and Mill 121–125; see also 172n, 178n Aristotle, Greeks, Pericles, Plato, Aristotle, as communitarian 77; as republicanism perfectionist 166n Index 195 Arnold, Matthew,summary of argument , see T.S. Eliot, , concerning 5–8, 48; right-liberals and feudalism, libertarian-authoritarian 55–57; left-liberals and 57–58; history axis, Stephen,Victorian sages,Woolf of modern commentary on 58–71, autonomy,in comprehensive liberal 169n, 170n, 173n; exemplifies Victorian theory 14–17, 37; in political liberal liberalism in commitment to theory 27–32, 39, 42, 57; in democracy and perfectionism 88–91, Nietzsche’s theory 81, 171n 173n; commitment of to experiential pedagogy in: municipalism 105–109, Bagehot,Walter 99, 173–174n, 177n; evoking the best self 109–110, 176n, 181n 177n; minorities 110–111, 113–115, Baldick, Chris, on Arnold 70, 170n; as 178n; equality 115–117, 178n; antistatist 74–75 perfectionist liberalism not virtue balkanization, in communitarian theory liberalism of 118–119, 178n; culture 16, 19–20, 21–22, 23; see also of and state preservation 121–125, immutability,framework, pluralism 180n; state only an instrument for ballot, open 6, 100, 109–110; see also 125–126; uniqueness of in policy commitment to didactic pedagogy Bell, Clive, on Arnold 61; on slaves 137–138; use of rhetoric by to promote 170n didactic pedagogy 138–140, 181n; Beiner, Ronald 16, 42, 163n, 164n, negative arguments of for didactic 171n pedagogy 140–142, 181n; Bentham, Jeremy,and municipalism development of culture as pedagogy 101, 103, 106, 175n by 142–143; sources of culture as Berkowitz, Peter, virtue liberalism of pedagogy for 143–147, 182n; culture 22–23, 118, 163n; reads Mill as virtue of 147–150; essentialist perfectionism liberal 179n of 155–156, 159–161, 179n; France Berlin, Isaiah, anti-metaphysics and and 178n; Stephen and 179n; individualism of 7, 31–32; pluralist Bagehot and 181n aestheticism of 21, 41–42, 64–65; Arnold, Matthew,major writings of, anti-authoritarianism and antistatism “England and the Italian Question” of 63–65;Trilling and 66–68; (1859) 89, 105, 181n; Introduction to Williams and 69; see also autonomy, in France (1861) liberal history 88–89, 90, 126, 135–36, 141–42, 145; A best self, summary of argument French Eton (1863–64) 108, 126, 140, concerning 6; as authoritarian for 141, 142, 143, 145, 147; Culture and modern commentators 59, 67, 70, 75; Anarchy (1869) 56, 59, 62, 66, 68, 71, as kin to Mill’s open ballot 109–110; 89–90, 109–110, 113, 115–116, 126, relation of to minorities policy 114; 141, 146, 147, 148, 150, 156, 159, 177n, relation of to culture policy 131, 142, 178n, 181n 148, 177n; see also policy Arnold,Thomas, authoritarianism of bracketing, of goods 15–17, 41; see also 141–142; perfectionist state of goods, neutrality 143–145, 181n Britain 1, 10, 50–55, 62, 88–90, association, see experience 105–106, 116–117, 135–136, 139–140, Athens, see ancients 159, 169n 196 Index Buckley,Jerome, on Victorian skepticism civic humanism, Rawls opposed to 43–44, 167n; see alsoVictorian studies 36–37; versus perfectionist 166n; see Burke, Edmund, Berlin on 64; also republicanism perfectionism of 117, 144–145 civic virtue, republicanism and virtue Bush, George W., compassionate liberalism and 9, 22–23, 35–36, 166n; conservatism of and Victorian values Foucault and 78–80; Mill and 103, 51, 52, 169n 172n;Arnold and 108;Victorian liberals and state preservation and Calvinism, Mill’s and Arnold’s objections 125–126 to 156; Stephen’s support of 175n; civil society,virtue liberals and 49; see also Hebrew and Hellene Foucault and right-liberals on 77–78; Carlyle,Thomas 5, 9, 55, 67, 71, 93, 148, Arnold and Burke on 117; Fuller on 172n, 173–174n, 176n, 179n; see also 133;Victorian liberals on experiential Victorian sages pedagogy of 138; modern liberals on capitalism, Mill on 95–95, 175n;Arnold irreducible pluralism of 163–164n on 178n; perfectionist liberal response class,T.S. Eliot on 59–61; Bell on 61, to 182–183n 170n; Leavis on 62;Williams on Cavell, Stanley,perfectionism of 165n, 68–69; Eagleton on 69–70; Baldick 172n; see also emotivism on 75;Arnold on 89, 106, 139, character, Sandel on 37; Collini on 54, 141–143, 148, 173n; Stephen on 122; 183n; MacIntyre on 82;Arnold on Mill on 124; Emerson on 129; see 84–90, 123, 156; Mill on 92–97, 100, also clerisy,culture, equality,minorities 107, 109, 156, 158–159, 174n;Thoreau , Rawls on 36–37; on 111–112, 135, 143; Emerson see also republicanism on 127 clerisy,Victorian liberals and 113, 129, Christianity,as fact of pluralism for 132, 182n; see also Coleridge contemporary liberals 20; as source of coercion, focus of commentary about Victorian values for left-liberals 54; as perfectionism 33–34, 37–39, 42, 120, T.S. Eliot’s counter to fascism 59–61; 152; modern liberal obsession with as collectivist threat to modern 64–66, 71, 73; postmodernist obsession liberalism 63; as perfecting for with 76; Stephen’s obsession with Coleridge and Burke 144–145; as not 174n, 179n; see also anti-perfectionism, perfecting enough for Mill and Arnold Foucault 156, 178n, 182n; see also God, religion Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, perfectionism cities and towns, in Trollope’s theory of 10; Mill’s state theory and 103–105; in Arnold’s theory 106–107; 124–125, 129, 141, 179n;Thomas in Thoreau’s theory 127–128, Arnold’s state theory and 144–145; 135–137; in Emerson’s theory 131; in clerisy theory of Victorian liberals and Mill’s theory 176n; see also 132, 182n municipalism Cold War, as ideological 10, 55, 153; civilization,Woolf on 31, 86; Berlin on question of intervention during 50; 32; Bell on 61, 170n; Leavis on 62; modern liberals and 33–34, 44, non-neutrality of 87; Mill on 73, 167n 95–96, 158–159;Trollope on 104; , see , fascism, Arnold on 116–117 individualist-collectivist axis, Index 197 nationalism, patriotism, religious conservatives (Victorian), see feudalism, fundamentalism, socialism, Victorian sages totalitarianism Conservative Party,the 50; see also Collini, Stefan, on Victorian objectivity right-liberals 43, 167n;Victorian values debate and Considerations on Representative 54–55, 169n; on Arnold’s culture Government, see Mill, John Stuart, major policy 150 writings of constructivism, see communism, collectivist threat of to essentialism, postmodernism, skepticism modern liberalism 50, 58–66, 69, conviction, modern liberals against 1, 72–73; see also collectivism, Marx, 15, 30–32;Victorian liberals for 2, welfarism 41–42, 97, 151 comprehensive liberalism, summary of cruelty, see suffering argument concerning 3–4; succeeded cultural studies 4, 45, 167n; see also by political liberalism in response to academe, postmodernism,Victorian communitarianism or pluralism 12, studies 14–15, 17; difficult to recommend culture, summary of argument concerning today due to reason’s restricted range 6, 85, 91, 118;Arnold’s according to 24, 26–27; unrecognized desire for and modern commentators 56–71, 74; consequent continuity of modern Mill on 96, 110;Arnold’s perfectionist liberalism 29–30, 32, 166n; and state-sponsored program of 114, republicanism as 36; difference of 115–116, 138–150, 177n, 178n, 181n, from perfectionist liberalism 37, 182n, 184n; Rawls’s opposition to 167n; Nussbaum’s rejection of yet state-sponsored versions of 120–121, desire for 39, 41; origins in politics of 179n;Victorian liberal interest in not recognition 48; loss of with rise of for state preservation but for perfection right-liberals 73, 168n; see also moral 121–125;Victorian liberal interest in program, political program succeeded by interest in experience communitarianism, summary of argument 129–138; see also didactic pedagogy, concerning 3, 80; liberalism versus moral program, state 9; divorce of moral and political Culture and Anarchy, see Arnold, Matthew, programs in liberalism and 12–13; major writings of liberal adoption of immutability from 14–15, 17, 162n, 163n; balkanization of democracy,summary of argument 19–20, 21–22; virtue liberalism concerning 6, 161; political liberals compared to 22–23, 34–37, 166n; and 17–19, 27, 36, 164n, 165n, 166n; place of in politics of recognition perfectionist coercion and 38; threat 48–49; comparison of to Foucault’s of Arnold’s state to per Woolf 58–59; theory 77–78 mistake of Arnold to favor per T.S. Cobden, Richard 173n Eliot 60;Williams on 69; Robbins Condorcet, Marquis de, importance to on 83–85;Victorian liberal Mill of 97, 175–76n; see also commitment to 87–90, 172n, 173n, Enlightenment 174n;Victorian liberal interest in conservatives (modern), see religious education of 90–99; Mill’s and fundamentalism, right-liberals, Arnold’s commitment to 93–111, Victorian values 113–117, 173n, 175n; comparison of 198 Index democracy—continued experiential versions of 91–93, 97, that commitment with Rousseau’s 174n; Mill’s franchise and 100, 117–119; insufficiency of 174–175n; Mill’s municipalism and to preserve state 121–125; Emerson 101–103;Arnold’s municipalism and on education of 129–132; Fuller on 106–108, 177n, 180n; Emerson’s state education of 132–134;Thoreau on and 127, 131; Fuller on 133; education of 111–113, 135–137; Thoreau on 135–137;Arnold on Arnold on 138–142, 147–150, 178n; 137–140, 159; see also didactic see also didactic pedagogy,experience pedagogy,experience Democratic Party,the 50; see also elite, see class right-liberals Eliot, George 178n Dicey,A. C. 174n Eliot,T.S., on Arnold 59–63; as Arnold’s didactic pedagogy,summary of argument modern representative 68, 69–70, 74; concerning 5–6, 91; in Mill’s theory see also Christianity 129; in Emerson’s theory 129–132; in Emerson, Ralph Waldo, summary of Fuller’s theory 132–33; in Thoreau’s argument concerning 6; stands for theory 135–136; in Arnold’s theory radical individualist 35, 111; 138–150; see also culture, education, instrumental statism and 127–128; experience, state shift of from didactic to experiential disciplinarity, see interdisciplinarity pedagogy 129–132; comparison of to discussion, liberty of, in Mill’s experiential Thoreau and Fuller 132–137; objects pedagogy 98–99; in Arnold’s to didactic pedagogy of the state experiential pedagogy 110–111; 137–138, 147;Arnold and 148; see also experience, policy republicanism and 180n; clerisy and diversity,contemporary liberal theory and 182n; see also American 18, 20–23, 49, 50; modern commentary Transcendentalists on Mill and Arnold and 86; Mill and emotivism, summary of argument 99–100, 176n; Emerson and concerning 2, 5, 48; modern 130–131;Arnold and Humboldt and antistatism and 80–83, 165n; Cavell 146; see also discussion, pluralism, and 165n; see also methodological thought individualism Dworkin, Ronald, neutrality of 13; empiricism 92, 152, 174n, 175n, 179n; methodological individualism of 73; see also experience, defense of culture of 121 England, see Britain Enlightenment, the, modern liberal Eagleton,Terry,on Arnold 69–70, 170n; opposition to 25, 27, 30, 163n; on postmodernism 75–77, 171n, Victorian liberal embrace of 10, 97, 182–83n 123, 175–176n, 181n Edmundson, Marc, on Foucault and epistemology,neglect of in contemporary postmodernism 76–77, 171n perfectionist philosophy 34–42, 73, education, summary of argument 166n, 167n; neglect of in contemporary concerning 5–6, 85; virtue liberalism Victorian studies 45; see also objectivism and 23;T.S. Eliot’s agenda for 60; equality,summary of argument modern liberals suspicious of 64, 65; concerning 6; political liberals and Victorian liberals and 90, 91; Mill’s non-metaphysical status of 40–41, 65; Index 199 Victorian liberals and providential 71, 72–73;T.S. Eliot’s Christian state status of 88–89, 93, 167n; versus 61; see also collectivism commitment of liberals to liberty and feudalism,Victorian liberals versus 93, 49; Bell’s objection to 62, 170n; 103–106, 141, 173 Arnold’s policy of 115–117, 178n; fiction of reason, see reason Gladstone’s objection to 117; Florence 103–104, see also Victorian liberal commitment to as municipalism,Trollope perfectionist 118–119; Stephen’s Forster, E. M. 30, 152 objection to 173–174n, 174–175n; Forster,William 149 see also experience, policy Foucault, Michel, power and 9, 75–80; essentialism, summary of argument antistatism and 4–5, 75–80, 171n, concerning 7–8; Nussbaum’s 176n; communitarians versus 77; defense of 39–40, 156–158; right-liberalism and 77–80; Foucault’s objection to 79–80; contemporary Victorian studies and democracy in Victorian liberal versions 83–85, 171n; see also emotivism, of 89; objectivity in Victorian liberal Nietzsche, postmodernism versions of 156, 158–161; see also frameworks, summary of argument metaphysics, philosophical concerning 3, 6; minimal versions of anthropology in contemporary theory versus in experience, Mill’s empirical commitment perfectionism 12–23, 27–28, 35–37, to 92–95; Mill’s shaping of through 42, 49. 78–79, 167n, 170n; minimal institutions including political versions of and antistatism 47, 49; economy 95–97; liberty of discussion see also emotivism, methodological 97–99; the franchise 99–100; individualism, welfarism municipalism 100–103;Arnold’s France 76, 87, 106, 117, 134, 140, 145, shaping of through institutions 147, 150, 173n, 176n, 177n, 178n; including municipalism 105–109; best see also ideas of 1789 selves 109–110; discursive culture franchise, the,Victorian liberal debate 110; minorities 113–115; equality about 93–94; Mill on 99–100, 115–117;Thoreau’s shaping of through 174–175n, 176n;Trollope on 104; programs including minorities Arnold on 107, 109–110;Thoreau 111–113; nature 137; Emerson’s on 111–112; see also experience, shaping of through programs minorities including individualism 129–130; fraternity 93, 174–175n; see also ideas of civic life 130–132; method of 1789; Stephen nature 132 Fuller’s shaping of freedom, Berlin on 11, 32, 64; Rawls on through programs including 17, 20; virtue liberals on 22, 179n; municipalism 133–134 Sandel on 35; Bell on 61; Foucault experiential pedagogy,defined 5–6, 91; on 78–79;Arnold on 90, 110; Mill see also experience on 97, 107, 124–125, 146;Trollope expression, free, see discussion on 104; Emerson on 127; Fuller on 133;Thoreau on 136; Nietzsche on fact of pluralism, see pluralism 167n; see also discussion, experience, fascism, collectivist threat of to modern ideas of 1789, thought liberalism 19, 30, 41, 58–59, 62–66, free speech, see discussion 200 Index Fuller, Margaret, summary of argument government, neutrality of for left-liberals concerning 6; state preservation and 13, 36, 38, 73; devolution of for right- 122–126; instrumental statism and liberals 51, 53; Mill’s two criteria for 126; shift of from didactic to evaluation of 90–91; see also experiential pedagogy 132–135; governmentality,municipalism, state Thoreau and 135 governmentality,in Foucault’s theory 5, fundamentalism, see religious 77–85 fundamentalism Gray,John, modus vivendi liberalism of 20–25, 28–29, 163n Galston,William, virtue liberalism of Great Britain, see Britain 23–26, 31, 37, 163n, 167n Greece, ancient, see ancients Germany 61, 65, 78, 145, 146, Green,T.H. 183n 147, 176n Grote, George 107–108 Gingrich, Newt,Victorian values debate and 51–55; antistatism and 57 Halt (“steadiness”),Arnold on Gladstone,William 117, 126 122–125, 142 God,Arnold’s state described as 59–60, Hare,Thomas 111 62, 67; postmodernism and death of Harrington, James 129 76;Victorian liberals on 109, 112, Hebrew and Hellene,Arnold on 121, 124, 126, 133, 143; role of in liberalism 123, 147, 156, 159; see also Calvinism per Mill 154–157, 175n, 180n, 183n; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 83–84 see also metaphysics Herder, Johann Gottfried, perfectionism Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, of 145–46 significance to Victorian liberals Himmelfarb, Gertrude,Victorian values 122–123, 133, 160 debate and 52–55 Goodlad, Lauren, on Foucault and historicism 27–28, 164n; see also Victorian studies 78–79, 171n; on postmodernism, reason Mill 171n, 173n; see alsoVictorian Hofstadter, Richard 76 studies humanism, Foucault and 76, 168n; Mill’s goods (moral), summary of argument religion of 175n; see also religion of concerning 1, 3, 4, 7–8; virtue liberals humanity and instrumental versions of 22–24; humanization, civilization’s role in for immutability and non-revisability of Arnold 117, 131 23; modern liberalism’s unrecognized human nature, Nussbaum on 39–40, 27–32, 40–42; neglected objective 179n; democracy and 89; Mill on status of in perfectionist liberalism 96–98;Arnold on 109, 116–117; 33–42; irrational status of in Coleridge on 145;Victorian liberals communitarianism 35, 165n; and 158; Stephen on 175; see also privatized status of in political essentialism, objectivism, perfectionism, liberalism 36; objection to philosophical anthropology pussyfooting about 41–42;Victorian human imperfection, Robbins on objectivity about 43; Mill and 100; 84–85; Mill on 99, 110, 126; Arnold and 116; see also bracketing, see also Calvinism, immutability, epistemology,moral program, neutrality skepticism Index 201 human perfection,Woolf against 68; intervention, see frameworks, neutrality, Victorian liberals for 85, 125–126, perfectionist liberalism, recognition, 128; Mill for 96–100;Arnold for republicanism, state, virtue 115–117, 123, 141, 146–147; Rawls for liberalism 120;Thoreau for 127–128, 136–137; irony,modern liberalism and 28, 31–32, Emerson for 129, 137; objectivity of 42, 153; see also autonomy,Rorty, 152; Marx for 180n;Thomas Arnold skepticism for 181n; see also perfectionism, liberal Italy,Arnold on 89–90, 105, 181n; perfectionism Trollope on 103–104; Fuller on 134 human rights, summary of argument concerning 7; modus vivendi liberalism Jones, Gareth Stedman,Victorian values and 22; Nussbaum and 40; debate and 53 perfectionism and 153–155, 183n jury duty,Mill on 98, 176n; see also Humboldt,Wilhelm von, perfectionism of experience, policy 145–146, 148 justice, neutral liberalism and 13, 120, 168n; political liberalism and 15, 17; ideas of 1789; role of in Victorian modus vivendi liberalism and 22; liberalism 90, 93, 173n, 174n, 181n perfectionism and 29; modern immutability,summary of argument liberalism and 31, 41–42, 47; virtue concerning 3; pluralism and 15; liberalism and 36; Emerson and communitarianism and 15–16; 130; see also frameworks, goods political liberalism and 16–19; modus vivendi liberalism and 19–22; virtue Kant, Immanuel 14, 15, 64 liberalism and 22–23, 36–37, Kymlicka,Will, on communitarianism 164–165n; modern liberalism and 42, versus perfectionism 35; on liberals 47–49; Foucault and 78–80; see also and immutability 163n; on Marxism pluralism, reason as perfectionist 166n; on intrinsic or individualism, see emotivism, instrumental goods 166n; on liberal individualist-collectivist axis, theory and practice 168n; on methodological individualism, Marxism and libertarianism 171n Victorian values individualist-collectivist axis, politics of Labor Party,the 50; see also redistribution and 49–50;Victorian right-liberals values debate and 50–55; libertarian- Leavis, F.R.,elite minorities and 61–62, authoritarian axis and 56–58; 68, 69, 74 summary of argument concerning left-liberals, summary of argument 71–72; methodological individualism concerning 4–5;Arnold as and 72–74 authoritarian and antistatist according institutions, see culture, didactic pedagogy, to 48–49, 56–58, 63–74, 82, 84; see experience, frameworks also methodological individualism, interdisciplinarity 8–10; see also welfarism academe Levine, George, on Cold War Victorian interpretive turn 3, 29; see also studies 44; on Victorian objectivity postmodernism, reason 44–46 202 Index liberalism, see communitarianism, 21–22; immutability and divorce of comprehensive liberalism, left-liberals, moral and political programs of shared modern liberalism, modus vivendi with liberal theorists 16, 23–25, 162n, liberalism, perfectionist liberalism, 163n, 164n, 165n; Foucault shares political liberalism, republicanism, defeatism with 77 right-liberals, virtue liberalism, market, the, politics of redistribution and Victorian liberalism 50, 73–74; right-liberals and 171n liberalism, history of 7, 29–32, 32–34, Martineau, Harriet,Arnold’s 52–55, 62–63, 83–84, 151–154; see also correspondence with 139–140, 181n modern liberalism,Victorian liberalism metaphysics, summary of argument libertarian-authoritarian axis, summary of concerning 7; Rorty against 26–27; argument concerning 6; complex Berlin against 31–32; Nussbaum relationship of with individualist- publicly against but privately for collectivist axis 56–58; summary of 39–42; perfectionism can involve but 71–72; role in modern Victorian studies does not require 152, 154–161; see of 86; see also libertarianism also essentialism, God, philosophical libertarianism, summary of argument anthropology concerning 6; politics of distribution methodological individualism, summary and 49, 50; authoritarianism and of argument concerning 5, 72–74; 56–58; continuity of in modern explanatory limitations of 80; see also liberalism 63–73, 172n; Marxism and emotivism 70–71, 74–75, 171n; postmodernism Marx, Karl, Mill and 10, 44, 166n, 175n, and 75–80, 171n; role in modern 180n; see also Marxism Victorian studies of 86;Victorian Marxism, as non-liberal 5, 49; as liberals and 108, 141, 146, 169n; see antistatist and libertarian 69–71, also libertarian-authoritarian axis, 171n, 74; as emotivist 82; as right-liberals perfectionist 166n; see also Eagleton, liberty, see discussion, human rights, ideas Marx of 1789, thought Mill, James 174n, 176n Lipman, Samuel, represents right-liberal Mill, John Stuart, summary of argument struggle with libertarian-authoritarian concerning 6–8, 42; pluralism and and individualist-collectivist axes 42; as libertarian in modern 56–57, 70; see also Arnold, Said commentary 55, 64, 66–68, 86, 169n; local government, see municipalism and Foucault 78–79, 171n, 172n, Lowe, Robert 93, 148 174n; exemplifies Victorian liberalism in commitment to democracy and machinery,Victorian liberal wariness of perfectionism 88–91, 173n; 6, 59, 86, 108, 109, 110, 116, 132, 133, relationship of to utilitarianism 159;Thoreau’s objection to 135–138; 91–95, 174–176n; commitment of to Arnold’s defense of 149–150 experiential pedagogy in: all institutions MacIntyre,Alasdair, theory of emotivism 95–97; liberty of discussion 98–99; of 2, 5, 48, 80–83, 171n; the franchise 99–100, 176n; communitarianism of 15–16; municipalism 100–103, 176–177n; in antistatism and balkanization of 16, comparison to Arnold 105–117 Index 203 passim; perfectionist not virtue 175n; musical combinations in 176n; liberalism of 118–119; state against intuitions in 183n preservation and 124–125, 141, 145; millet system 21; see also Gray, modus instrumental statism and 125–126, vivendi liberalism 178n; shift from didactic to experiential Milton, John 129 pedagogy by 129; Fuller and minorities, summary of argument 132–134;Thoreau and 136; concerning 6; modus vivendi liberalism Humboldt and 146; clarity of policy and 21–22; Leavis and 62; Mill and of versus Arnold 147; religion’s utility 111;Thoreau and 111–113, 137; for 154–155; essentialist Arnold and 113–115; Rousseau and perfectionism of 155–156, 158–159, 118; Fuller and 122–123, 124–125, 179n, 184n; history of modern 132–133; perfectionism in modern commentary on and perfectionism of movements to liberate 153–154; see 172–173n; interventionist state of also franchise, policy 174n; the Enlightenment and modern liberalism, summary of argument Romanticism and 181n; concerning 3–8; unrecognized goods republicanism and 185n of 29–32, 40; anti-perfectionism of Mill, John Stuart, major writings of:“De 33–34; continuous struggle with Tocqueville on Democracy in collectivism of 62–63; America” (1835, 1840) 88, 101–103, methodological individualism and 124;“Coleridge” (1840) 124, 126, antistatism of 72–74; emotivism and 140, 141, 179n; System of Logic (1843), antistatism of 80–83, 165n;Victorian empiricism in 92, 94, 174n, 179n; liberalism versus 85, 86–87, 152–153; Principles of Political Economy (1848), human rights and 155; Rorty and empiricism in 94; happiness in 95; 166n; see alsoVictorian liberalism intervention in 174n, 175n; intrinsic modus vivendi liberalism, summary of worth of liberty in 176n; argument concerning 3, 15; political municipalism in 176n; On Liberty liberalism and 20–22, 163n; minimal (1859), modern liberals on 66, 68, 86, frameworks of 35; politics of 172n; intrinsic and instrumental worth recognition and 48–49; Berlin and of liberty in 98–99, 110, 176n; 64, 162n instrumental statism and 126; Moot, the, see Eliot,T.S. experiential pedagogy in 129, 134, moral perfectionism, see perfectionism 136; Considerations on Representative moral program, summary of argument Government (1861), criteria for concerning 3–4, 23,47; modern government evaluation in 90–91; theorists reject union of political experiential pedagogy in 97–100, programs and 12–13; Rawls’s in 103, 108–111, 115, 129, 134, Theory 14; liberal theorists adopt Utilitarianism (1861), empiricism in communitarian’s 15; liberal 94; institutional reform in 96; theorists surrender own 16–23, Autobiography (1873) happiness in 164n; comprehensive liberalism 94–95, 178n; pliability of in combines political programs 97, 174n; professional experience in with 24; communitarianism involves 100; institutions in 126; socialism in only 24; skeptical liberal theory 204 Index moral program—continued New Liberals, the 10, 183n abandons 26–27; liberal theorists Newman, Francis William 102–103 fantasizes about 28–30, 166n; Newman, John Henry 172n, 175n continuity of fantasy about 30–32, neutrality,in liberal theory 3–4, 13–15, 163n, 164n;Victorian liberalism unites 57, 63, 73, 82–83, 120–21, 162n; in political and 42, 45, 97, 172n, 175n; virtue liberal theory 23; postmodernism abandons 79; theory perfectionism versus 33–34, 86–87; cannot abandon 86–87; theory can communitarianism versus 36–37; avoid metaphysics with 155–156, see also bracketing, immutability, 183n;Victorians share with Marx political power 166n; see also autonomy,immutability Nietzsche, Friedrich, as Rorty’s private moral relativism, contemporary theory reading 29; as Victorian morality’s foe and 34, 163n, 183n; see also 43–44; as Foucault’s predecessor postmodernism, reason 79–80; as MacIntyre’s exemplary Morley,John, on Mill’s empiricism 92, emotivist 80–82, 165n, 167n; as 174n, 176n; on Mill’s transcendentalism postmodernism’s antistatist 93, 155, 175n; on Mill’s perfectionism godfather 83 98, 99; on democracy’s inevitability non-liberals, see Marxism, postmodernism 173n, 174n non-revisability, see goods, immutability Morris,William 10 normative theory,need for 11; Rawls’s municipalism, role of in experiential modern initiative of 12; pedagogy 6, 95, 98, 100–109, 134, contemporary theory’s abandonment of 138, 176n, 177n; see also Arnold, 25–26, 34–35, 45, 164n; see also modern experience, Fuller, policy,Mill, liberalism,Victorian liberalism, republicanism,Trollope,Victorian skepticism liberalism Nozick, Robert 50, 73, 78; see also libertarianism, right-liberals nationalism, collectivist threat of to Nussbaum, Martha, on Rawls’s modern liberalism 30, 58, 63, 71; significance 12; as perfectionist then see also collectivism political liberal 38–42, 167n, 183n; as Nazism, see fascism similar to Rorty 167n; distinction Neal, Patrick, defends political liberalism between essentialism and metaphysics 12, 29, 162n; rejects perfectionist made by 39, 156–58, 179n; criticism liberalism 37–38, 166n; defends thin of welfarism by 73–74, 170n; frameworks, 163n criticism of MacIntyre’s relativism neo-authoritarianism, see by 164n authoritarianism,Woolf neoconservatives, see right-liberals objectivism, in perfectionism 1–2, 170n; neo-feudalism, of Victorian sages 71, summary of argument concerning 6, 101, 173n, 179n; see also feudalism, 11–12, 85, 151–152; neglect or Victorian sages disparagement of in political theory neoliberals, see right-liberals 33–42; dismissed or disparaged in New England 101, 136; see also Victorian studies 4, 42–43; new municipalism interest in Victorian aspiration Index 205 toward 43–46; role of metaphysics Pericles 108, 122–123, 124, 140 or empiricism and intuitions in philosophy, see normative theory,political 152–161; absent in Cavell’s power “perfectionism” 165n; absent in philosophical anthropology 7–8, Sandel’s communitarianism 166n 156–161, 173n; see also essentialism objectivity, see objectivism Plato, defense of coincidence of political On Liberty, see Mill, John Stuart, major power and philosophy by 58; writings of association of with Arnold in modern commentary 58–69, 74–75, 82; participatory democracy,Rousseau on contrasting role of in modern and 118; see also civic virtue, democracy, Victorian liberalism 85, 86–87; municipalism, republicanism Arnold’s endorsement of the critique paternalism, in Victorian state theories of democracy by 113–114;Arnold’s 104–05, 108; see also authoritarianism, rejection of the philosopher kings of Stephen 148–49; see also political power patriotism, collectivist threat of to pluralism, summary of argument modern liberalism 58; Mill on 103; concerning 3, 49; liberal response to see collectivism, municipalism 11–12; account of the fact of 14–32, pedagogy, see didactic pedagogy,experience 34–35, 37, 38, 40–41, 161n, 163n, perfection, see human perfection 163–164n, 164n; aesthetic of 41–42; perfectionism, summary of argument Berlin and 64–65; see also concerning 1–8, 47; modern liberal frameworks, immutability,reason definition of 33–34; neglect of moral policy,summary of argument concerning objectivism of 34–42;Victorian 5–6;Victorian liberalism and 91; liberal pursuit of democracy and Arnold’s limitations with 109–110, 86–91, 172n;Arnold and 115–117, 114, 118; state preservation and 142–143; virtue liberals versus 121–125; the Tarpeian Rock passage 117–119, 151–152; Emerson and not a serious example of 141–142; see 132; Fuller and 133;Arnold’s sources also best self, didactic pedagogy, of 143–147, 182n; objectivism of equality,experience, franchise, jury 152–161, 183n; Cavell and duty,minorities, municipalism, open 165–166n; Marxism and 166n; ballot republicanism and 166n; commentary political liberalism, summary of argument on Mill and 172–173n; the concerning 15; comprehensive Enlightenment and 175–176n; liberalism and 3, 73; frameworks in Thoreau and 180n; see also 16; response to pluralism of 16–19, perfectionist liberalism modus vivendi liberalism and 19–22, perfectionist liberalism, political theories 163n; virtue liberalism and 22–23, versus 32–42; politics of recognition 163n; account of fiction of reason in and 48–49;Victorian liberals and 24–25; republicanism and 36, 166n; 85; commentary on Mill and Nussbaum and 39–40, 156–157; 172–173n; see also human perfection, Berlin and 64; communitarianism perfectionism, objectivism,Victorian and 163n; see also comprehensive liberalism liberalism 206 Index Political Liberalism, see Rawls, John, major progress, Mill on 91, 95–96, 107, 155; writings of Trollope on 104;Arnold on political power, modern liberal objection 105–106, 116–117, 122–123, 160; to coincidence of philosophy with Thoreau on 112–113 58–71, 82–83, 85;Victorian liberal progressives, Robbins on pursuit of coincidence of philosophy 83–84,Victorian liberals and 93–94; with 86–91 objective moral perfectionism and political program, summary of argument 153–161 concerning 3–4, 23, 29–30; political Progressives,The 10 theory’s divorce of moral programs and public, the, see private 12–13; neutral liberalism and 14; political liberalism and 14–15; radicalism,Victorian authoritarianism account of the fact of pluralism and versus 71; Mill and 92, 94, 175n; 15–16, 24; account of the fiction of see also Marxism, postmodernism, reason and 27–28; republicanism and utilitarianism 36; perfectionist liberalism and 37; Rawls, John, summary of argument Foucault and 79;Victorian liberalism’s concerning 7; neutral and political union of moral program and 161; liberalism of 12–13, 162–163n; good see also moral program in theory of 14; fact of pluralism and political theory,summary of argument 16–20, modus vivendi liberalism and concerning 2–4, 9, 11–12; normative 20–22, 163n; account of fiction of ambition lost by 12–13, 14–15; reason and 24–26, 27, 164n; modern political and moral programs divorced liberalism and 29–33, 165n; by 24; pluralism overwhelming to perfectionism defined by 33–34; civic 26, 27; antistatism in 47, 50; virtue and 36–37, 166n; Nussbaum see also skepticism influenced by 39–40, 183n; Nozick Poor Laws 53, 101 and 50; methodological individualism popular government 98, 101–102; of 73; state-supported culture rejected see also democracy,experience, by 120–121; statism of 168n; see also municipalism, policy Rawls, John, major writings of postmodernism 9; as non-liberal 5, Rawls, John, major writings of, A Theory 49; as emotivist 3, 5, 74–80; as of Justice (1971) 12–14, 25, 29, 33, subjectivist in Victorian studies 120, 161n, 165n, 168n; Political 44–46; as antistatist 83–85, 171n; as Liberalism (1993) 7, 12, 16–17, 20, 36, right-liberal 171n; see also Foucault, 39, 162n, 163n, 164n, 166n skepticism Raz, Joseph, partial defense of objective power, see anti-perfectionism, political moral goods by 37–38, 44; defense of power reasoning about goods as well as rights preservation of state, see state by 164–165n; defense of culture as private, the, modern liberalism’s public or perfectionist by 179n; see also 3, 15, 16–17, 23, 29, 41–42, 51–52, perfectionist liberalism 82–83, 163n;Victorian liberalism’s Reagan, Ronald,Victorian values debate public and 100, 107–08, 127, 132 and 50–51, 168n; right-liberal privatize, see bracketing antistatism of 84 Index 207 realistic utopia 12; see also normative perfectionism of 115, 118, 144–145; theory,Rawls see also Christianity,God, ideas of 1789; reason, summary of argument concerning metaphysics, perfectionism, religion of 3–4, 7, 49, 85, 152–53; account of the humanity fiction of 23–32, 164n; modest role in religion of humanity,Mill’s ideas about rivals to perfectionism 35–37, 166n; 7, 151, 154–55, 175n, 180n, 183n; Raz’s reliance upon 37–38, Stephen’s objection to 174n; 164–165n; skepticism about in see also humanism Nussbaum’s work 34–35, 38–41, religious fundamentalism 154–155, 167n, 183n; skepticism about evident in 182–183n; see also religion aesthetic pluralism 41–42; skepticism remnant, see minorities about in academe 42–43, 45–46; Renan, Ernest, perfectionism of 126, skepticism about in Berlin’s work 145–148, 182n 63–64; skepticism about in Trilling’s representation, see minorities work 65–67; skepticism about in Republican Party,the 50, 51–52, Foucault’s work 79; skepticism about 168–169n, see also right-liberals in Nietzsche’s work 81–82; Mill’s republican tradition, the, see republicanism belief in 97;Arnold’s gratitude to republicanism 9; liberalism and ancients for 105, 107; best selves’ 34–37, 166n; virtue liberalism and reliance upon 109; the state’s 118–119; Mill and 158–59, 172n, provision of to democracy 142, 148; 184n; Emerson and 180n; Coleridge Coleridge’s belief in 144–45; and 182n Humboldt’s belief in 146; essentialism right, the (as opposed to the good), see and 156–61; see also postmodernism justice recognition, politics of, politics of right-liberals, summary of argument redistribution versus 4, 48–50, concerning 4–5; role of in Victorian 162n, 168n values debate 48–55; authoritarianism redistribution, politics of 55–57, see also and 55–57, 70; anti-collectivism and recognition antistatism of 73, 84; Foucault and Reform Bill, of 1832 101; of 1867 93, 77–80; see also Gingrich, Lipman, 101, 174n Reagan,Thatcher Reformation, the 17, 20, 21 rights, see human rights, ideas of 1789 reformism, timorous in postmodernism Robbins, Bruce, defends Victorian state 75; admirable in Victorians and 83–85; see alsoVictorian studies, utilitarianism 83–85, 92; minorities welfarism and 6, 114–115, 146; New Liberalism Romanticism 10, 175–176n, 181n and 183n Rome 62, 126, 134; see also ancients, relativism, see moral relativism Fuller, municipalism religion, fact of pluralism and 15, 17, Rorty,Richard, fiction of reason and 20–21, 27, 41; modern liberalism 26–32; Nussbaum and 167n; see also threatened by 30, 36, 120; virtue and skepticism 22, 121–122, 131, 133, 178n;Arnold’s Rousseau, Jean Jacques, Berlin on 64; culture and 69–70; freedom of 90, virtue liberalism of 118–119, 97, 99; machinery of 110; 174–175n 208 Index Ruskin, John 5, 9, 44, 71, 93, 169n, slavery 40, 112, 130, 131, 137, 158, 172n, 173–174n, 174n; see also 170n, 174n Victorian sages Smith,Toulmin 101 Russell, Bertrand, exemplifies modern social democrats, see left-liberals liberalism 4, 30–32 socialism, perfectionism of 10; Ryan,Alan, defends aesthetic pluralism collectivist threat of to modern 41–42 liberalism 30, 58–59, 69; Mill and 96, 115, 175n; see also communism, sages, seeVictorian sages fascism Said, Edward, represents left-liberal sociology,Rorty on 27; Rawls on 36; struggle with libertarian-authoritarian MacIntyre on 81–82; Mill on 154; and individualist-collectivist axes 57, Nussbaum on 158; philosophical 71; see also Arnold, Lipman anthropology and 158–159 Sandel, Michael, on Rawls’s unrecognized Southern 7, 41–42; see also goods 14; on immutability 15; as religious fundamentalism virtue liberal 35–37 Spencer, Herbert 72 saving remnant, see minorities stability,political liberalism’s goal of schools,Victorians and 54; Bell and 15–18; political theory’s goal of 61; Mill and 102;Arnold and 47–49;Victorian liberalism pursuit of 105–107, 116–117, 140, 149; Emerson more than 118–119, 121–128, 181n; and 117;Thoreau and 135–136 see also frameworks, state secular 10, 30, 155, 183n state, the, modern prejudice against 1–2; self-government 35, 58, 100, 101, 103, summary of argument concerning 106; see also municipalism modern prejudices against and Shaw,George Bernard, rejects Victorian Victorian pedagogies of 4–6; liberal objectivity 43 neutrality and 13–14, 49; liberal and Sher, George, questions restricting reason communitarian difference regarding to rights not goods 29, 164–65n; 16; perfectionist liberals and 33–34; see also perfectionist liberalism summary of representations of outside shopping, Foucault’s defense of political theory 47–48; question of 79–80 intervention of defines politics of skepticism, summary of argument redistribution 50, 56–58; right-liberal concerning modern culture of 2–7, crusade against 50–55 passim, Plato 47–48, 85, 86–88, 150, 151–153; and 58;Woolf and 58–59;T.S. Eliot, accounts of pluralism and reason two Bell, and Leavis and 59–62; more expressions of 11–13; modern recent commentary on Arnold and liberalism and 31–33, 163n, 165n; 69–71; perfectionism versus welfarism perfectionist liberals against 38–42; about 83–85; instrumental version of academic habit of 42;Victorian and Victorian liberalism 125–128; studies and 43–46;Trilling and 67; shift of most Victorian liberals away postmodernism and 77;Victorian from didactic versions of 129–138; liberals against 85, 86–88; hope to Arnold and 138–150; see also move beyond 153–155; see also antistatism anti-perfectionism and antistatism statism, see the state Index 209 Stephen, James Fitzjames, defines 27, 92–95, 174n, 175n, 176n; see also Victorian liberalism 87–88; resists American Transcendentalists ideas of 1789 93–94; charges Mill Trilling, Lionel, on Arnold 65–67 with aesthetic pluralism 99; and 67–71 passim,86 emphasizes preservation not perfection Trollope,Thomas Adolphus, critical of of state 122, 125; shifts from liberal to municipalism 103–105, 108 neo-feudalist authoritarian 172n, 174n, 179n; democracy to be United Kingdom, see Britain inevitable 173n; charges Mill with United States of America 1, 8, 10, 27, fear of coercion 174n; charges Mill 49–52, 58, 62, 72, 76, 83, 87–91, with transcendentalism 174–175n; 101–103, 109, 122, 132–134, 135, 140, embraces Calvinist transcendentalism 166n, 171n, 172n, 178n; see also 175n; describes professional experience American Transcendentalists as an education 176n; compared to utilitarianism, Rawls’s objection to 73; Matthew Arnold 179n; compared to Mill’s revision of 91–97, 174–175n, Thomas Arnold 181n 179n; emphasis on centralization Strachey,Lytton,Victorian objectivity in 101 opposed by 43 subjectivism,Victorian perfectionism and variety, see diversity 156, 165n; see also emotivism, Victorian liberalism, summary of methodological individualism; argument concerning 1–8, 47, objectivism, postmodernism, welfarism 151–152; modern liberalism versus suffering, Rorty and 27–28, 31; Mill 30, 33, 42, 85, 118–119, 121–129; and 96–97 Gingrich misconstrues 51, 168n; Sullivan,William 25–26 defined as committed to democracy and perfection 87–91, 172n, 173n, Thatcher, Margaret,Victorian values 175n; experiential over didactic debate and 50–55 passim, antistatism pedagogy in 137–138; objectivism of of 57 152–161; Marx and 166n; Lincoln Theory of Justice, A, see Rawls, John, major and 167n; Nietzsche and 167n; writings of Enlightenment and 176n, 181n; thought, liberty of,Williams on 68–69; France and 178n; Stephen and Mill on 97, 108; see also pluralism, 179n;Thomas Arnold and 181n; policy Coleridge and 182n; republicanism Tocqueville,Alexis de, Mill and Arnold and 182n; see also modern and 88–91, 173n; Mill’s franchise liberalism theory and 99; Mill’s municipalism Victorian sages, illiberal authoritarianism and 101–103, 173n, 176n; Gingrich of 5, 55, 67, 71, 93, 169n, 173n, 174n; and 169n perfectionism of 172n totalitarianism; collectivist threat of to Victorian studies, summary of argument modern liberalism 19, 33, 50, 172n; concerning 2, 4, 10–11;Victorian see also communism, fascism objectivity in 43–46, 167n; see also transcendentalism, heresy of to modern Anderson,Anger, Buckley,Goodlad, liberals and Victorian utilitarians 17, Levine, Robbins 210 Index Victorian values, summary of argument Emerson’s experiential pedagogy and concerning 5; right-liberals and 48, 129; see also culture, experience, 50–55, 57, 71–72, 73, 169n; Foucault Victorian values and 80; see also Collini, Gingrich, vote, see franchise Himmelfarb,Thatcher virtues, see civic virtues, moral program Wahhabi Muslims 7; see also religious virtue liberalism, summary of argument fundamentalism concerning 3, 6; political liberalism Wall,Steven, and objective moral goods and 22–24; communitarianism, 38; see also perfectionist liberalism republicanism, perfectionism and Weber, Max 81–82 34–37, 152, 164–165n; politics of welfare liberals, see left-liberals recognition and 48–49; antistatism welfarism, methodological individualism and 49; Berlin and 64; Foucault and and 73–74, 170n; Robbins and 78–79, 171n;Victorian liberalism’s 84–85 experiential pedagogy not 117–119; Williams, Raymond, on Arnold 67–71 Victorian liberalism’s didactic pedagogy Woolf, Leonard 63–75 passim, not 120–129; Sandel and 163n; modern liberalism of 31–32; different names for 163n; Mill read as antistatism of in response to 171n, 172–173n, 179n Arnold 58–63, 87, 165n ,Victorian civil society and 78, 168n; neutral liberals and 120; Yeats,W.B. 31, 41