'Natural Friends'? Relations Between the United States and India After 2001

PRIF Reports No. 87 "Natural Friends"? Relations between the United States and India after 2001 Harald Müller/Andreas Schmidt Translation: Lynn Benstead © Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2009 Correspondence to: HSFK x Baseler Str. 27-31 x 60329 Frankfurt am Main x Germany Telephone: +49 (0)69 95 91 04-0 x Fax: +49 (0)69 55 84 81 Email: [email protected] x [email protected] Website: www.prif.org ISBN: 978-3-937829-82-1 Euro 10,- Summary Since the end of the Cold War, India has been very much in the ascendant, not only eco- nomically and technologically, but also from the military and political point of view. Ma- ny observers are therefore already talking about a world power of the 21st century emerg- ing on the Indian sub-continent. It is not surprising, therefore, that India is playing an increasingly important role in the foreign and security policy considerations of the United States, the world’s only remaining superpower. Their respective size, power and geostrategic position mean that bilateral relations between the world’s most mighty and the world’s most populous democracy are a significant factor for the future world order. Central questions which are relevant for world politics are common positions with regard to the “war on terror”, on the one hand, and differences over the legitimacy of armed intervention in the sovereignty of other states, on the other. The long-term characteristics of their respective foreign and security policies are particularly noticeable in the attitude of the two states towards international law (in the context of war and peace), perhaps one of the most important instruments for pro- tecting and shaping the global order. Despite common political values such as democracy, pluralism and rule of law, the relationship between the United States and India during the East-West conflict and in the following few years was characterized by alienation rather than friendship. India, which had had to struggle for its independence from Great Britain, looked on uneasily as the United States took on the legacy of the former colonial powers within the framework of its anti-communist foreign policy (for example in Vietnam) and supported coups to overthrow democratically elected governments in South and Central America. On the other hand, New Delhi’s reputation suffered significantly in Washington as a result of India’s role as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and its proximity to the socialist economic model of the former Soviet Union. The “thaw” did not begin until India started to gradually open up its economic system in the early nineties. Paradoxically, following initial U.S. sanctions, In- dia’s nuclear tests in 1998 also prompted a positive re-assessment of India’s role in Ameri- can foreign and security policy. From then onwards, the relationship improved noticeably and assumed a new strategic character following the events of 11 September 2001. India has been the target of terrorist aggression since it was founded in 1947. The big- gest problem for New Delhi in the meantime is transnational Islamist terrorism. Anti- Indian, militant Islamic fundamentalism is nourished primarily by the continuing Indian- Pakistani conflict over the Kashmir region. This has led to three wars (1947/48, 1965, 1999) between the two neighbouring nuclear powers, also bringing them to the verge of nuclear war in 1990, 1999 and 2001/2002. It is not surprising therefore that India takes a keen interest in the fight against terrorism and in international cooperation which serves this goal. The attacks of 11 September 2001 suddenly provided India with an opportunity to close ranks with the world’s largest military power on the basis of converging interests. India offered the United States its full and unreserved support in the “war on terror” in an un- precedented declaration of solidarity. Shortly afterwards, U.S. President Bush and the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee described in a joint declaration the common war on terror as the mainspring of their countries’ mutual relations. When the Indian sub-continent was hit by a new wave of terrorism from Pakistan in 2001/2002, the United States increasingly supported the Indian position and exercised tremendous political pressure on its ally Pakistan, despite the fact that it urgently needed Pakistan’s support in the fight against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. All things considered, the Indian Government’s decision to side with the United States in the fight against transnational terrorism can be regarded as a political success. For the first time, the United States described the elections in Jammu and Kashmir in autumn 2002 as “free and fair”, and called upon the Pakistani Government to put an end to transnational terrorism emanating from its territory. Moreover, the anti- terrorism alliance, which was forged following the attacks of 11 September 2001 and was further consolidated in the course of the wave of terror in India in 2001/2002, prepared the ground for expanding bilateral relations between Washington and New Delhi in other fields. As a result, both states have not only expanded their trade relations spectacularly in recent years, but have also intensified their military cooperation. Furthermore, a recent nuclear agreement with the United States means that India has de facto officially been admitted to the club of nuclear weapons states. The so-called nuclear deal means that India now has access to the world’s nuclear market, a factor which is extremely important for the country’s energy supplies. The partnership with a thriving India is playing an increasingly important role in the United States’ “Grand Strategy”, particularly in the context of Washington’s competition for power with its challenger, China. Washington wants New Delhi to act as a counterbalance to China in Southern Asia in order to contain Beijing’s influence in the region. Many observers conclude that India and the United States are not merely strategic partners, but much rather “natural friends”: two democracies with the same opponents (China, Islamist terrorism), the same values, transnational networks and concurring economic interests. However, it would be overhasty to presuppose perfect harmony between Washington and New Delhi. Contrary to the hopes of policy-makers in Washington, India did not simply let itself become integrated in the United States’ foreign and security policy. On the contrary, New Delhi continued to uphold its traditionally high opinion of (its own) state sovereignty and studied the demands of its new ally in the light of its own interests and principles (a right which the United States also claims for itself). Policy-makers in New Delhi refused to pursue a policy of counterbalance with China in the way which the United States expected and instead followed an independent course in relations with Beijing with the aim of im- proving bilateral relations. The success of this policy is demonstrated by the significant increase in trade between the two Asian giants. Nowhere were the limits on the anti-terrorism alliance as clear as in India’s harsh criti- cism of the United States’ war against Iraq in early 2003. This was due to considerable differences over shaping the international order. The United States has increasingly de- veloped an instrumental relationship towards international law, appealing to it when it II serves American interests and ignoring it when it contradicts these interests. It appears that international law is much more firmly anchored as a fundamental principle of order in India. In the meantime, India sees its interests and its position of power well protected by the international legal order which safeguards its sovereignty. Unlike the United States in recent years, India does not regard international law and international organization as a ball and chain but as a support for its own sovereignty. India cannot in the foreseeable future be expected to participate in military actions which are unilateral and thus outside the framework of the United Nations. Two predictions are thus of special interest for the developing world order. On the one hand, India will insist on forming its own “pole” in a fairly multi-polar system. It will not allow itself to become involved as a vassal – however important – in a new bipolar system involving an American-led and a Chinese-led coalition. On the other hand, there is a pos- sibility that India could act as an ally to all those forces which are working towards a world order based on international law with a strong United Nations Organization. Indo- American relations will tend to be more tense or more harmonious depending on how far President Obama continues the United States’ policy of regarding its freedom to act as being free from multilateral constraints, a trend which has been evident since the mid- nineties, or perhaps even seeks new constraints in Washington’s own well-understood interest. It is interesting to note from the German point of view that the Indian attitude towards international law and the United Nations is considerably more in line with Berlin’s policy than with that of Washington – or has at least been so in recent times. From Ger- many’s perspective, it would therefore be wise to further consolidate relations with India. India could be an interesting ally when it comes to asserting and expanding the international legal order, even in the face of occasional disapproval from Washington. III Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Estranged democracies: India and the United States before 11 September 2001 2 3. United against terrorism: Indo-American solidarity 3 3.1 India and terrorism 3 3.2 The consequences of 11 September 2001 5 3.3 The new wave of terror in India and the United States’ reaction 6 3.4 The United States’ dilemma and the strengthening of India’s position 9 4.

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