Remembering Elinor Ostrom: Her Work and Its Contribution to the Theory and Practice of Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management

IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy Policy Matters ISSUE 19 - APRIL 2014

RememberingHer Work and its Contribution to the ElinorTheory and Pra Ostromctice of Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy Policy Matters ISSUE 19 – APRIL 2014

RememberingHer Work and its ElinorContributio Ostromn to the Theory and Practice of Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management

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This publication should be cited as: Robson, James P., Iain J. Davidson-Hunt, Alyne Delaney, Gabriela Lichtenstein, Lapologang Magole and Aroha Te Pareake Mead.Policy Matters2014. Remembering Elinor Ostrom: Her Work and Its Contribution to the Theory and Practice of Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management. , Issue 19. CEESP and IUCN: Gland, CH.

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ISBN: 978-8317-1643-5 Table of Contents

5 Preface 7 Introduction 11 CHAPTER ONE

Harini Nagendra, Rucha Ghate, Jagdeesh Rao Governing India’s Commons: The Influence of Elinor Ostrom’s Ideas 23 CHAPTER TWO

TheRaul ImpactPacheco-Vega of Elinor Ostrom’s Scholarship on Commons Governance in Mexico: An Overview 35 CHAPTER THREE

RompiendoLeticia Merino paradigmas: Pérez Gobernanza de los bienes comunes y ciudadanía en las políticas forestal y de conservación Mexicanas 47 CHAPTER FOUR

AnBereket Assessment Tsehaye Haile of Community Management of Traditional Woodland Enclosures (Hiza’ti) in the Highlands of Eritrea 57 CHAPTER FIVE

GoverningElizabeth Gachenga the Commons Through Customary Law Systems of Water Governance: The Case of the Marakwet 69 CHAPTER SIX

ResearchingDerek Kauneckis Complex Governance Arrangements: Elinor Ostrom’s Legacy for Research Methods and the Analysis of Institutional Design 79 CHAPTER SEVEN

RosanneAdvancing Van Algonquin Schie Recognition and Participation in Forest Management in Québec, Canada 91 CHAPTER EIGHT

FromHijaba Theory Ykhanbai to and Practice: Ronnie AVernooy Decade of Co-managing Pasture and Other Natural Resources in Mongolia 103 CHAPTER NINE

RecognitionDiego Pacheco of the Role of Collective Action among Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in the Convention on Biological Diversity 111 CHAPTER TEN

Arun Agrawal and Jesse Ribot Are Ostrom’s Design Principles Sufficient for Design? 117 CHAPTER ELEVEN

Caña Dulce y Caña Brava Un son para Lin Ostrom

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

3 Acknowledgements

The publication of this special issue In addition to the chapter authors we thank emerged from discussions during the IUCN members of CEESP and IASC who agreed Commission on Environmental, Economic to act as peer reviewers for the chapters and Social Policy Steering Group meeting including Drs. David Bray, Catie Burlando, in January of 2013. Aroha Mead and Iain Nathan Deutsch, Rosie Cooney and Jose Davidson-Hunt approached the International Furtado along with some who preferred to Association for the Study of the Commons remain anonymous. We also thank Mr. Marcel who supported the vision and colleagues Jim Morin of Lost Art Cartography for reproducing Robson, Alyne Delaney, Gabriela Lichtenstein maps (pgs. 51, 52, 81, 96) for the volume and Lapologang Magole of the IASC came on and Ms. Patty Nelson of Nelson Architects board to complete the editorial team. As it for graphic design and layout. Along with turns out most of the editors are members photos provided by chapter authors we are of both CEESP and IASC and we thank both also grateful to those members of CEESP organizations for their support in making who responded to Aroha’s request to include this publication possible. A special thanks to photos of Lin in the volume. CEESP and IUCN for providing the funding to print the publication and make it available for the World Parks Congress and also as an ebook available through the IUCN website.

Plate 1: Elinor Ostrom with Aroha Mead, Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend and Taghi Farvar at the CEESP Sharing Power Conference, Whakatane, Aotearoa (New Zealand), January 2011. (Photo credit: CEESP)

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

4 Preface

My lasting memory of Elinor Ostrom is of work that was instrumental in earning her the us sitting together at a picnic table outside 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. We the shop/garage in Taneatua (Bay of Plenty, began trying to match the design principles New Zealand) waiting for a bus. This was to the situation of Maori in general and the in January 2011. Elinor had cut short her Tuhoe people in particular. I struggled to get time at the meeting of the International beyond the principle of having clearly defined Association for the Study of the Commons boundaries and the ability to exclude others. (IASC) in Hyderabad, India, an Association of The bus arrived and we both tucked our which she was a founding member, to travel discussion away. to Whakatane, New Zealand to participate in Our guides for the day were Tuhoe artist and another conference, Sharing Power: A New activist Tame Iti and actor and activist Patrick Vision for Development. The Sharing Power ‘Onion’ Orupe. From Taneatua we visited Conference was organised by the Ngati Awa tribe, Te Whare Wanangao Awanuirangi, and the burial place of the Maori prophet, faith the Commission on Environmental, Economic healer and land rights activist Rua Kenana & Social Policy (CEESP) of the International at Tupou Marae in Waimana and later drove Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). through the blockade that had been put in Elinor was a founding member of the place to keep government officials out of the Commission’s Theme on Governance, Equity & Urewera National Park. The return of Urewera Rights. National Park to Tuhoe was part of the Treaty of Waitangi Settlement negotiation process By the time she travelled to New Zealand, that was currently underway. We stopped Elinor was already feeling poorly. Yet she and talked to the Tuhoe people guarding the insisted on joining the Conference participants blockade and as the bus drove away we passed for a field-trip as soon as she arrived after a number of police cars heading for a stand-off her long journey from Hyderabad. I therefore with the protestors—a day in the life of many had the task of picking her up at the airport indigenous peoples and part of the struggle to and driving to the Taneatua shops to wait for have those with power relate to communities the field-trip bus that was taking participants as fellow citizens rather than protestors or for a tour of the lands of the Tuhoe people in marginalised peoples (names used to diminish the heart of the Urewera ranges. The topic their status and integrity). We then visited Te of the day was ‘Sharing Power—indigenous Rewarewa Marae in Ruatoki to hear from a governance of conservation areas’ and the range of Tuhoe people about their plans and ‘shared power’ part of the discussion was aspirations post-Treaty settlement. centered around the ability or inability of those with power to transfer lands back to Throughout this time Elinor was quiet. She indigenous peoples unfettered. didn’t ask any questions in the open forum, she didn’t speak. After the Marae visit I drove her As we waited for the bus I briefed her on our back to the place where all of the conference tribal hosts for the day, Tuhoe, and mentioned participants converged for dinner after field- that of any tribe in New Zealand, they had the trips into four different tribal areas (Ngati best chance of having the lands of a National Awa, Te Arawa, Ngati Tuwharetoa and Tuhoe). Park located within their territories returned As soon as the car door closed we resumed our to them and that there was widespread discussion. support across New Zealand society for this to happen. In turn, Elinor spoke of her work Whereas I had thought the design principles and the eight “design principles” of collective for common pool resource management would action for commons management discussed in be problematic in the NZ Maori situation her 1990 book, Governing the Commons—the because of the fluid nature of many tribal POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

5 boundaries, she saw this as a reinforcement sustainably over time. Elinor was also very of what truly constitutes common pool clear in her talks with me, and in the Keynote resources. What I mean by ‘fluid nature of presentation she delivered to the Sharing tribal boundaries’ is that while many tribes Power Conference the following day, that can and do confidently assert authority over there is no quick-fix panacea, there is no one their central territories, they tend to adopt a simple solution and nor is there one solution diplomatic inter-tribal relations approach to for all contexts throughout the world. Rather the outer boundaries they share with other the key to effective long-term sustainability tribes. It is not uncommon for neighbouring in using and managing natural resources is tribes to have common areas within their communication—treating nature as a shared respective tribal territories, each one claiming resource—sharing access, use and decision- the area as part of their own territory based making. In other words, sharing power. on a spiritual or cultural historical association. Elinor Ostrom was an accomplished, secure, As we explored the principles of defined positive and unassuming person who had territories, mechanisms of conflict resolution, great loyalty to the individuals and networks a graduated scale of sanctions for resource that helped form her perspectives and career. appropriators who violate community rules, It was a truly generous gesture on her part to self-determination recognised by higher travel to Whakatane, to be with CEESP, Ngati authorities and the opportunity for resource Awa and the other neighbouring tribes and appropriators to participate in decision- conference participants at the Sharing Power making, I questioned their applicability to Conference. CEESP members Janis Alcorn, Maori. Elinor on the other hand was more Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend, Taghi Farvar interested in what self-determination really and Michel Pimbert who knew and worked means for Maori. She wondered if there was with Elinor over a long period of time were a bottom line that guided Maori in their instrumental in securing Elinor’s visit to Treaty settlement negotiations. A line that New Zealand. It is with pleasure that IUCN’s they would never cross because to do so Commission on Environmental, Economic would significantly compromise their ability & Social Policy (CEESP) devotes this special to manage their heritage in the future as edition of the peer reviewed journal Policy commonly held and managed resources. Matters to the influence and legacy of her work. As one can imagine neither of us answered each other’s questions to a satisfactory level. Thank you Elinor for inspiring so many with We were both left with more questions than yourNo reira, ideas, haere, vision haere, and haerebelief ein te a rangatirajust world. answers. However, what I did gain from Haere ki te wa kainga our discussion was an understanding that Go to the home of all the design principles she identified are not Haere ki te kainga tuturu time meant to be interpreted literally but rather Hoki atu ki te Kaihanga Go to the true home expansively. “Defined territories” doesn’t Haere, haere, haere. Return to the creator have to mean fences and signposts. It can also be recognised through customary laws and practices that demonstrate the historical Aroha Te Pareake Mead and cultural association a community holds Ngati Awa, Ngati Porou, Chair with a place that continues to this day and IUCN Commission on Environmental, beyond. The principles, however, should Economic & Social Policy (CEESP) be understood within an overall context of Director, Maori Business, community self-determination and not be School of Management, co-opted to mean other things. Her ideas came Victoria University of Wellington from a place of optimism that people can and should work things out and that communities can successfully manage common resources

6 POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM Remembering Elinor Ostrom Her Work and its Contribution to the Theory and Practice of Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management James P. Robson1, Iain J. Davidson-Hunt2, Alyne Delaney3, Gabriela Lichtenstein4, Lapologang Magole5 and Aroha Te Pareake Mead6

The Commission on Environmental, Laerhoven and Ostrom 2007:19). Economic and Social Policy (CEESP)—Theme on Sustainable Livelihoods (TSL)—of the In recognition of her many achievements, International Union for Conservation of Nature we wanted to invite and publish a series (IUCN), in partnership with the International of commentaries that build upon her work Association for the Study of the Commons and, where possible, provide case studies demonstrating the practical application of her (IASC), is delighted to present this special theoretical contributions. A Call was sent out issue of Policy Matters, which focuses on the in late 2012, soliciting expressions of interest outreach and impact of Dr. Elinor Ostrom’s and abstracts from those keen to be involved. groundbreaking research on common Room was made for both traditional articles property (or commons) theory. Lin was a and more creative print presentations in any supporter and friend of CEESP and a founding of IUCN’s official languages (English, French, member of the IASC, and we were all deeply Spanish). We received an excellent response, saddened by her passing in 2012. and after embarking on a long peer-review Lin Ostrom’s work has been instrumental in and editing process, we were able to whittle shaping contemporary analyses of resource the submissions down to the collection of management and conservation, especially at research papers, essays, commentaries and a local level. A ‘commons’ can be considered songs that follow. any resource subject to forms of collective Encapsulating voices from academia, use, with the relationship between the indigenous communities, government resource and the human institutions that agencies, development agencies and non- mediate its use an essential component of governmental organizations (both local any management regime. While conventional and international), they all make clear the wisdom has long assumed that the sustainable connections between Lin’s work and the management of common resources is best authors’ own scholarship and/or practice. We achieved through centralized government or briefly introduce each in turn. private control, Lin led the way in challenging this assumption—showing how alternative Preceding our introduction was a preface by forms of property can work effectively if well CEESP Chair, Aroha Te Pareake Mead, who matched to the “attributes of the resource provided the impetus to develop this volume and users, and when the resulting rules are following Lin’s participation in the Sharing enforced, considered legitimate, and generate Power Conference of CEESP. Aroha provided long-term patterns of reciprocity” (van a personal testimony of Lin’s tireless efforts

1 4 Visiting Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, National Research Council of Argentina (CONICET), Instituto University of Redlands, United States of America and Nacional de Antropologia y Pensamiento Latinoamericano, member2 of IASC. Email [email protected] Buenos Aires, Argentina and member of IASC and SULi, CEESP/ Associate Professor, Natural Resources Institute, University SSC,5 IUCN member. Email [email protected] of Manitoba and Co-Chair, Theme on Sustainable Livelihoods, Okavango Research Institute, University of Botswana, Botswana CEESP, IUCN and member of IASC. Email davidso4@ and member of IASC and SULi, CEESP/SSC, IUCN. Email ad.umanitoba.ca3 [email protected] Associate Professor, Innovative Fisheries Management Chair, IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic & Social Centre, Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg Policy and Director, Maori Business, School of Management, University, Denmark and Editor-in-Chief, Commons Digest, Victoria University of Wellington. Email [email protected] IADC. Email [email protected]

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

7 to bridge the worlds of activism, policy Remaining with the academic research and academia—a mixture reflected in the community, we continue with a piece by Derek contributions. Kauneckis, a graduate of Lin’s program at Indiana University, who expertly traces how While Lin’s work has had an impact globally, her substantial body of work is informing it is through focusing on individual countries current efforts to develop research tools that one really begins to appreciate the and techniques of institutional analysis for depth of that impact. Nagendra, Ghate and understanding the governance of commons as Puppala, who represent the mélange of complex systems—concluding that her work academia, practice and activism that commons represents the beginning of a “new science of scholarship so readily evokes, report on governance” that others are working hard to the different ways in which Lin’s work has develop. impacted the governance of India’s extensive natural resource commons, taking in both Our final three papers move away from rural and urban environments. Similarly, the academia to focus on the applied nature two papers that follow, by Pacheco-Vega and of Lin’s work; how it is being used, in very Merino-Perez respectively, show how Mexico’s practical ways, to guide and inspire change commons scholars and practitioners, and in the way people relate to and manage their environmental and conservation policies, natural environments. They report on local, have been influenced by Lin’s thinking. national and global efforts respectively. First Pacheco-Vega looks at multiple resource types we head to the boreal forest of northern (water, forests, irrigation systems, small-scale Quebec, Canada, where Van Schie, Economic fisheries) to highlight the range of empirical Development Officer for Wolf Lake First research from Mexico that has drawn on Lin Nation, tells the story of the community’s fight Ostrom for inspiration. Merino Perez, current to ensure that forestry on their customary President of the IASC, provides a brilliant lands is not only environmentally sustainable analysis of how Lin’s work has challenged the but allows for their active involvement as way we view nature-society relationships, and part of a new forest commons framework. does so with an eye on changes to indigenous From Canada we shift focus to Central Asia, territorial management in the south of the where Ykhanbai and Vernooy talk about their country. experiences developing a co-management process in Mongolia that aims to improve While a number of the articles in this pasture management for that country’s Special Issue are written by senior scholars nomadic herders. Ten years in the making, and practitioners, as well as alumni of the it draws heavily upon Lin Ostrom’s work Workshop in Bloomington that Lin founded on commons institutions and institutional with her husband Vincent, we were also diversity. Lastly, we hear from Pablo Pacheco, keen to include contributions from recent current Head of the Bolivian delegation at students and younger scholars who represent the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), a new generation of researchers interested who shows how Lin’s scholarship inspired in the broad area of natural resources and Bolivia to argue (successfully) for local and environmental management. Two case indigenous collective action to be recognized studies from Africa—Bereket’s assessment by the CBD for the role it affords biodiversity of woodland conservation in the Eritrean conservation efforts – opening the door for highlands using the Design Principles from local-level commons institutions to become Ostrom’s seminal Governing the Commons, a more integral player as part of national and and Gachenga’s paper from Kenya that international policy processes. explores how Lin’s thinking on the commons meshes with customary law systems of natural We bring our Special Issue to a close with two resource governance—showcase nicely the pieces. The first, written by leading commons continued relevance of Lin’s work to those scholars Arun Agrawal and Jesse Ribot, builds beginning their careers as commons scholars. upon the lessons of our earlier contributions POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

8 to acknowledge the power of Ostrom’s these diverse contributions highlight, from analyses and the tools that she developed— her early PhD work to the final presentations which have helped us to better understand the she gave in 2012, Lin exhibited a quality of governance of shared resources. Yet, as with all thought, an ability to convey complex ideas in scholarly endeavours, the major advances that understandable and entertaining ways, and an Lin made are not without their limitations, optimism that enabled her ideas to make their and Agrawal and Ribot offer a most useful mark in classrooms, local communities, and critique of her design principles for commons on the most important of policy and legislative institutions so that a key area of her legacy can stages. Our current understanding of natural be carried forward and strengthened. resources management and conservation would not be what it is without her input, and The second is a song, written and performed the prospects for improving environmental by Caña Dulce y Caña Brava, a musical quartet policy at local, national and global levels that from the Tuxtepec region where the Mexican much poorer. states of Oaxaca and Veracruz meet. The group plays in the regional folk style known as We are very happy to be able to share in some Jarocho, and wrote this song in celebration of of her achievements with CEESP, IUCN and Lin’s life and work. They were able to perform IASC members. for her on her final visit to Mexico in 2012. It is Enjoy! a very fitting way to end this special issue. References In providing a platform for such a wide array of voices, and offering cases from so many different geographical and cultural contexts, van Laerhoeven, International Frank and Elinor journal Ostrom. of the this special issue of Policy Matters showcases Commons2007. “Traditions 1 and trends in the study of just how important and far-reaching Lin’s the commons”. work has been (and continues to be). As (1): 3-28.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

Governing India’s Commons The Influence of Elinor Ostrom’s Ideas

Harini Nagendra, Rucha1 Ghate, Jagdeesh Rao Governing India’s Commons The Influence of Elinor Ostrom’s Ideas

Harini Nagendra1 2, Rucha Ghate3 4, Jagdeesh Rao5

Abstract

Elinor1 Ostrom’s research on the commons has fundamental implications for the governance of commons in India. Research from the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) network, coupled with remote sensing analyses conducted by Ostrom and colleagues, has been fundamental in demonstrating the importance of self-governance for the sustainable management of the commons in Indian forests and cities. Recent field experiments conducted in two predominantly tribal communities in central India further demonstrate that communities with strong previous traditions of shared norms and mutual trust, tend to be non-exploitative, non-commercial, and cooperate towards the sustainable harvest of forest resources. Forests and other commons form critical components that supplement and support rural communities dependent on agriculture, livestock, water and other types of natural resources in large parts of India, providing stability and security in an unpredictable environment. In addition to rural commons, urban commons such as lakes play a very important role in Indian cities. Recent studies on lakes in the rapidly growing incipient megapolis of Bangalore demonstrate the importance of polycentric arrangements, involving local citizen groups along with Government agencies in monitoring, restoration and protection. Yet, institutional apathy has led to the neglect of traditional institutional arrangements and the customary rights of people in the solutions proposed under different Government policies and programmes. Currently, common and public lands cover almost a fifth of the geographical spread of India. Such land, if brought under the ambit of local self-governance institutions, could contribute significantly to the rural economy, providing critical ecological functions besides meeting livelihood needs. Recent initiatives by the Supreme Court, coupled with State government and national policy changes are promising, but much remains to be done. Large scale changes are needed while keeping in mind the pillars of Ostrom’s vision—the need for self-governance of the commons at a local level that permits flexibility, adaptation and innovation, with the ultimate goal of ensuring equitable and sustainable access to the commons for all citizens. Keywords: Collective action, sustainable use, self-governance, rural and urban commons, India

1 Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment (ATREE), Royal Enclave, Srirampura, Jakkur P.O., Bangalore 560064, 2India, [email protected] Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change (CIPEC), Indiana University, 408 N. Indiana Avenue, Bloomington3 IN 47408, USA. SHODH: The Institute for Research and Development, 106, K.T. Nagar, Katol Road Nagpur-440013, Maharashtra State, India; [email protected] International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), Khumaltar, Lalitpur G.P.O. Box 3226, Kathmandu, Nepal, [email protected];5 Foundation for Ecological Security, Post Bag 29, Anand, Gujarat, India, [email protected]

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

12 GOVERNING THE COMMONS: ELINOR OSTROM’S IDEAS respected by external government authorities. Unless this is provided, any group—such as a polluting industry—who wants to break the Born in 1933, Elinor Awam Ostrom’s rules on sustainable use created by local user perspective of the world was shaped in an groups, only has to turn to the government era impacted by economic depression and to be able to bypass or overturn these global war, resulting in a life-long, deep community rules. awareness of the limited nature of the earth’s natural resources, as well as the capacity This Design Principle has profound of communities to come together in times implications for the long term sustainability of difficulty, to cooperate and provide a of Indian commons—as is obvious from the helping hand to those in need. These beliefs many recent clashes between industry and were purposeful in shaping a career of indigenous communities across the country, path-breaking research that demonstrated and discussions between the Indian Minister the importance of collective action for the of Environment and Forests and the Minister sustainable use of natural resources. of Finance about setting up a fast-track National Investment Board to provide rapid Ostrom strongly believed in the power of the clearances to mega-infrastructure projects, local. Yet her impact and influence was global. even in environmentally critical forests where She had a special attachment to South Asia, indigenous communities are located. working for decades on issues of irrigation and forest management in Nepal (personally Commons are of immense importance to conducting field work there), and on collective issues of environmental sustainability, equity action in urban and forest contexts in India and democracy in India. Currently, common (Plate 1). Her research on the commons has and public lands cover an estimated 45 to fundamental implications for the governance 60 million hectares—almost a fifth of the of common property resources in India. country’s geographical spread. Such land, if brought under the ambit of local self- Ostrom’s analysis of long-term local governance institutions, could contribute institutions for the commons was done with significantly to the rural economy, providing a view to identifying the conditions that critical ecological functions besides meeting shaped how “a community of citizens can various needs such as fodder, food, medicine, organize themselves to solve the problems firewood, etc. This would benefit large rural of institutional supply, commitment and populations. monitoring” (Ostrom 1990). Impatient In this article, we discuss a number of with a predominant focus that searched for applications of Ostrom’s research on Indian “simple” solutions, she argued for the need to commons, and the applications of her far- distinguish between complexity and chaos, sighted analyses to governance of those often pointing to the importance of complexity commons. in biological systems and challenging political OSTROM’S RESEARCH ON INDIAN scientists to go beyond the formulation of COMMONS simple, one-size-fits-all rules. Thus, rather than develop a set of rules that presumed to dictate how communities would respond in A key factor in Ostrom’s research was all contexts, she articulated her famous set the development of the Nepal Irrigation of Design Principles—both elegant in their Institutions and Systems (NIIS) database, simplicity and yet profound. For instance, which collated and organized information one design principle—often ignored by on farmer-managed irrigation systems in policy makers—states the importance for Nepal. Following a request from the Food and communities to have a “Minimal Recognition Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of the United of Rights to Organize”, i.e. to ensure that the Nations to prepare a similar database to study rule-making rights of a local community are forest governance, Ostrom and her colleagues POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

13 Plate 1: Elinor Ostrom at a community forest group meeting organized by the Foundation for Ecological Security in Karnataka State, India, in February 2012 (Photo credit: Harini Nagendra)

at The Workshop in Political Theory and context, where guards have to cover large Policy Analysis at Indiana University initiated areas, are lightly armed, and have to deal with the International Forestry Resources and social challenges that make it difficult for Institutions (IFRI) program, which would them to enforce rules. In fact, as Agrawal and provide over-time data on peopled forests Chhatre (2006) conclude from IFRI studies in to link information on socio-economic, India and elsewhere, government involvement institutional and ecological aspects. Now may be negatively associated with forest active in a number of countries across multiple condition in some contexts, while community continents, IFRI was founded and tested using managed forests may be better suited to cater a small set of sites that included locations to local needs (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006; in India and Nepal, and continues to contain Chhatre and Agrawal 2008).Thus, warning active programs in these two countries. against a mis-interpretation of the need for monitoring, Ostrom and Nagendra (2006, Research from IFRI locations in India has been 19230-19231) stated that “We do not advocate fundamental in demonstrating the importance using fences and guns to protect government of self-governance and local monitoring for forests… Unless one ensures the livelihoods the sustainable management of community of those living around or within a forest, a forests in critical wildlife habitats in central major investment in monitoring alone is not a India (Ghate 2004; Ostrom and Nagendra sufficient, long-run management strategy and 2006; Ghate, Ghate and Ostrom 2013) and may even be counterproductive”. the eastern Himalayas (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006). Local monitoring, sanctioning and Through a careful examination of forest enforcement of rules seem to be important change in the Tadoba Andhari Tiger Reserve predictors of forest condition in several in Maharashtra, the Mahananda Wildlife IFRI studies (Ghate and Nagendra 2006). A Sanctuary in West Bengal, and the Chitwan complete reliance on government monitoring National Park in Nepal, Ostrom and Nagendra through forest guards is difficult in the Indian (2006) found that the official designation POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

14 of a forest as government, community, or in predominantly tribal communities in the co-managed did not appear to impact forest Indian State of Maharashtra. From eight conservation as much as the legitimacy of experiments conducted in four forest/tribal ownership and degree of local monitoring. rich areas of the state, Ghate, Ghate and Corroborating this, data from 42 forests in Ostrom (forthcoming) found that communities multiple countries established that the type that have had strong previous traditions of of ownership did not have a statistically shared norms and mutual trust tend to be non- significant impact on forest quality as exploitative, non-commercial, and cooperate measured using assessments of tree density towards prioritising, planning,“Homo economicus” and sustainably or tree size. What emerged as most significant managing forest“Homo resources. reciprocans” Thus, human was the involvement of communities in “Homobeings arecooperatus” not always , regular monitoring, with this study concluding they can be and even that “when users are genuinely engaged in in the case of common- decisions regarding rules affecting their use, pool resources. The study confirms Ostrom’s the likelihood of them following the rules and (1998) observation that it is also possible for monitoring others is much greater than when individuals to achieve results that are “better an authority simply imposes rules.” (Ostrom than rational” in certain conditions. and Nagendra 2006, 19224). Local forest users can also provide reliable, low cost assessments Another study that used evolving field of changes in forest density that can be experiments (Ghate, Ghate and Ostrom significant inputs for monitoring ecological 2013) indicates that indigenous communities change (Nagendra and Ostrom 2011). can be trusted with forest management responsibilities, and policies such as Joint The research of Ostrom and colleagues holds Forest Management (JFM) and the FRA are great significance for Indian forest policy, in moving in the right direction. In one of the particular to the discussions of the Scheduled experiments, participants adopted plantations Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers of fast-growing trees for fuel wood and fodder, (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act (FRA) which, they argued, helped them protect of 2006, which provides traditional forest high-value timber trees. It was also clear by dwellers with rights over forest land that their behaviour during the experiments that is customarily used and managed by them. communities are able to address the issue Presently, debates around implementation of equity while sharing the benefits from of the FRA are centred on questions such collective forest protections measures. The as: Are communities capable of monitoring study concludes that if forests collectively and managing such a valuable resource? managed by communities are not degraded Will the transfer of authority result in large- below the critical minimum, communities scale deforestation? Are traditional norms of are capable of successfully protecting and sustainable harvesting and equitable benefit regenerating the resource. However, at least in FIELDsharing EXPERIMENTSeffective in traditional IN INDIGENOUS communities? the initial period, some failures of community INDIAN COMMUNITIES management should not be generalized, because “once altruist and reciprocal motivations are crowded out, it takes some time to re-establish trust and reciprocity” Generally assumed in these discussions RESEARCH(Vollan 2008: ON 563). URBAN INDIAN is the fact that access to markets and commercialisation has affected local COMMONS communities’ attitudes and behaviour regarding forests, making them less inclined to cooperate, and more likely to engage in Ostrom argued it was time to really pay destructive practices of over-harvesting. attention to urban commons. The Social- Ostrom and her colleagues examined this issue Ecological Systems (SES) Framework she in detail using field experiments conducted developed provides a useful common POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

15 language that can be used to understand the involvement of citizens (to closely the patterns of interactions and outcomes monitor and manage local challenges) and occurring in complex urban systems (Ostrom government organizations (to solve large 2007). Ostrom recommended that the SES scale technical problems and deal with framework be used as the initial organizing social challenges such as sanctioning major language by scholars, citizens, and officials polluters). Contrary to the trend of increased who are trying to understand a complex centralization in the country’s urban areas, system so as to achieve effective, fair, and a polycentric structure seems most effective sustainable policies over time (Ostrom for solving the numerous environmental 2009). This framework provides a common challenges plaguing Indian cities (Nagendra analytical language to identify the broad et al. 2012)—especially through the characteristics of a Resource System and explicit provision of opportunities for related Resource Units, a Governance System, local communities to work effectively with and Actors that together impact on the governmentalTRANSLATING agencies. OSTROM’S IDEAS ON structure of Action Situations, leading to THE COMMONS INTO PRACTICE: specific Interactions and Outcomes. During THE INDIAN CONTEXT the last year of Ostrom’s life, she and one of the authors of this paper (HN) had initiated research applying the SES framework to an urban context in the south Indian city of Though the Indian economy is growing at Bangalore, to examine the effects of diverse a rate of 9% annually, the geographies in structural variables on interactions and which this development is located and the outcomes achieved related to seven of the constituency it benefits, remain narrow. city’s lakes (Plate 2). Commons or common pool resources form critical components that supplement and Bangalore, a city in a semi-arid region of support rural communities dependent on south-central India, was formerly dependent agriculture, livestock and forests in large on numerous artificial lakes that have parts of India, but especially across dryland witnessed tremendous encroachment and and tribal areas. The role of land and water pollution in recent years (D’Souza and resources commons in strengthening the Nagendra 2011). Once managed as commons viability of the agro-pastoral production by local communities, these lakes are now systems and the resilience of household governed by a number of government livelihoods has been insufficiently recognized departments with overlapping jurisdictions. so far. While many lakes continue to be severely polluted, a few lakes have been effectively A recent study by the Foundation for restored in recent years and managed Ecological Security (2012) further collaboratively by local citizen groups documented the importance of the commons working with the city municipality (Nagendra for rural livelihood support. Conducted in 2010). Nagendra and Ostrom applied the SES seven states—Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya framework to investigate the conditions that Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra may shape the ecological and social outcomes Pradesh and Odisha—the study spanned associated with these lakes. Collective action 3000 households in 100 villages in arid, was high in six out of the seven lakes studied. semi-arid and sub-humid parts of the country. Yet, only in two of these lakes were citizens Dependence on the commons was very able to successfully translate collective action high, with 98% of households accessing the into positive ecological outcomes. commons for different types of use, with 69% using the commons for grazing, 30% for The Bangalore example highlights the fodder collection, 53% using the commons for challenge of protecting and cleaning up agriculture and 38% for food, 74% deriving urban lakes in a setting of continued fuelwood, and 38% collecting non-timber pollution, which is very difficult without forest products. In sub‐humid areas, people POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

16 Plate 2: Elinor Ostrom planting a jackfruit tree at the Kaikondrahalli lake in Bangalore in February 2012, surrounded by members of the local community closely involved in restoration and lake management (Photo credit: Harini Nagendra).

largely utilized the commons for meeting degradation, by assessing the actual extent agricultural needs, while in arid and semi- and status of resources that are generally arid regions, the commons were critical for considered as common pool in nature as well livestock grazing. Dependence on community as the nature of property rights governing the sources of water, such as tanks, ponds, rivers same. was also high, as was dependence on forests for timber, fuel wood and non-timber forest The studies described above clearly products. Resources from the commons demonstrate that continued access to the contributed to a substantial proportion of commons helps provide stability and security household income, about 25%—and an even in an unpredictable environment. Although higher proportion of 31% of net income for especially critical for landless households, the landless, who were highly dependent commons are also very important for large on fuel wood from the commons. This study rural land-owners. Yet, land use data from indicates that India needs to strengthen its Indian states demonstrates that common information databases on common land lands have seen an overall reduction in and water resources, along the lines of the area, with a marked decline in grazing lands databases developed by Ostrom and her and cultivable “wastelands”. The crisis is colleagues on forest, irrigation and marine a manifestation of institutional apathy, commons across the world. Such databases following neglect of traditional institutional could help to dispel myths related to their arrangements and the customary rights of ‘residual’ character and thereby their people in the institutional solutions proposed POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

17 Ostrom under different landsGram stood Sabhas/Gram vested through Panchayats local laws in the Government of State, which handed over their management believed that India and State to . They were in a country policies and generally treated as inalienable in order that like India, programmes. their status as community land be preserved.” Programmes for with a federal decentralization, This ruling clearly recognizes the diversity of system of based on a Indian commons, a finding supported by Lin Ostrom’s deep appreciation of institutional governance, prescriptive top- down approach diversity (Ostrom and Nagendra 2011). polycentricity without Indeed, at a meeting in Delhi in early January, was critical understanding India’s then Minister of Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh singled out the for effective local social- cultural most powerful insight that he thought Lin’s management dynamics or research had to offer Indian policy—that of the the economic institutions are diverse, and that institutional and ecological monocultures are to be avoided (Foundation commons... conditions, have for Ecological Security 2011). failed to meet expectations. India has a rich diversityVan of traditional Panchayats, Although there gramyaand indigenous institutions for commonsVan has been a Panchayatsmanagement, including shift in the policy paradigm towards more jungles and community forestry. participatory forms of development and are long standing village forest natural resource management since the institutions in Uttaranchal, with a documented history of existence over a century, that have Panchayati1990s, as reflected Raj in the 73rd amendment of Constitution enabling a greater role for been very successfulGramya in the protection and Institutions, JFM arrangements, sustainable management of village forests in and recent Acts such as Mahatma Gandhi the Kumaon hills. jungles are village National Rural Employment Guarantee Act forest institutions recognized in the state (MGNREGA) and Forest Rights Act, several of Odisha, consisting of village forest areas challenges remain in the institutional arena managed for communal and developmental level in order to realize the potential of this purposes within the village boundary. shift. Similarly, there are a variety of long standing indigenous community institutions Mundari that have The Supreme Court of India, in a recent Khuntkattievolved locally to manage forests in different landmark ruling (Jagpal Singh and Others parts of the country, such as the vs State of Punjab and Others (Civil Appeal in Chotanagpur, indigenousDevara Kaadus No. 1132/2011 @ SLP (C) No. 3109/2011), CommunityGunda Thopus Forest Management in Odisha and recognized the importance of the commons, Maharashtra, sacred groves ( stating that “Since time immemorial there and ) in Karnataka. have been common lands inhering in the village communities in India…. These public In most instances, these indigenous utility lands in the villages were for centuries institutions have been insufficiently used for the common benefit of the villagers of recognized by formal administrative rights, the village such as ponds for various purposes with national programs largely focused on e.g. for their cattle to drink and bathe, for approaches such as JFM. For instance, in storing their harvested grain, as grazing parts of the Aravalli hills in north India, an ground for the cattle, threshing floor, maidan important ecoregion which harbours highly for playing by children, carnivals, circuses, biodiverse forests critical for ground water ramlila, cart stands, water bodies, passages, recharge, forests have been traditionally cremation ground or graveyards, etc. These protected by local communities through POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

18 their belief in sacred spirits and yet are for strengthening the efforts to conserve, now threatened by urbanization spreading develop and protect common lands through outwards from the Indian capital, Delhi. community involvement under the National Ostrom believed that in a country like Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme India, with a federal system of governance, (NREGS). The Government of Rajasthan polycentricity was critical for effective was the first to formulate state-specific management of the commons, combining commons legislation, ‘The Draft Rajasthan the greater fiscal and administrative Common Land Policy (2010)’, which it capacities of the government with the local followed up by developing ‘Operational knowledge and monitoring capacity of local Guidelines on the Implementation of Grazing communities (Narayanan 2012). Land Development under MGNREGA’, both with the involvement of the Foundation A major challenge for polycentricity in for Ecological Security. The Supreme Court India is that effective formal and informal of India, as a result of the Jagpal Singh institutions have not been crafted to protect, and Others vs State of Punjab and Others develop and manage common lands. For decisions mentioned previously, directed the instance, Joint Forest Management (JFM) state governments to has largely failed in providing access Panchayati Raj draw up schemes to Large scale to non-timber forest products for local evict encroachments changes are communities. Institutions on common lands have, on the whole, shown limited capacity Panchayats needed, whilst and restore them to manage and develop common lands Gram Sabhas to keeping in and to prioritize MGNREGA and other and developmental funds for restoration and mind the (village institutions). protection of the commons. At times, central pillar Following the apex these have also come into conflict with court’s direction, of Ostrom’s community-led initiatives. In Orissa, south there have been five Gujarat and south Rajasthan, for instance, vision— self- high court orders Foundation for Ecological Security (2012) governance of either admitting found that access to forest lands seems cases against the the commons to have improved as a result of informal taking over of claims and contestations with the forest at a local level village commons department, rather than through formal that permits or rescinding such institutional recognition. takeovers. Twenty- flexibility, In the Indian context, differences in policies nine judiciary adaptation and at the federal (national), state and local pronouncements innovation, levels are also critical, with land-related and twenty-nine policies strongly influenced by state government orders with the interventions. Further, even when state on commons have ultimate goal policies are in place, bridging the gap been issued since of ensuring between legal policies and field programmes the apex court order is critical to achieve actual impact on the last year (Mahapatra equitable and ground. The key, therefore, is to move 2012). The 12th sustainable from a piecemeal approach towards the Plan of the Planning access to the management of natural resources to long- Commission of term policy and programmatic action. India has also commons for Progress is slowly being made in a number recognized the all citizens. of states. A collaborative arrangement importance of the between the Rural Development Department commons, creating of Government of Andhra Pradesh and NGO a working group on networks has been established in 2009 ‘Natural Resources POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

19 Plate 3: Elinor Ostrom with the authors of this manuscript (and Harini Nagendra’s daughter) in Bangalore in February 2012, on the last day of her final visit to India (Photo credit: Venkatachalam Suri).

Management and Rainfed Farming’ and sub national level. In this context, a Model Common group on ‘Institutions and Commons’ for the Lands Bill or such like could provide important 12th Plan preparation, in which the need direction for State Governments. One approach for favourable land tenure arrangements, could include tethering the MGNREGA with a institutional design and programme ‘commons regime’, such that the institutional architecture was highlighted for effective dimensions currently found wanting would be governance and management of commons. filled. The right to employment and the right Following direction from the Lok Adalat over resources combined together can have (people’s court) of Karnataka, two districts a significant impact in protecting ecological in Karnataka have also embarked on a resources and creating robust institutional programme to improve their commons CONCLUDINGregimes. THOUGHTS management.

These new directions for commons regimes, while focusing to date on land, hold promise In conclusion, the ethics and value systems for other commons of importance to India espoused by Elinor Ostrom, and her such as fisheries, water (and ground water in pathbreaking insights into the commons, particular), genetic sources such as agricultural as well as her research on the principles seeds, and patenting of traditional knowledge governing their effective, equitable and systems, traditional health practices and sustainable management, has tremendous medicines. However, while the direction taken implications for the governance of shared by the Indian Supreme Court, the policy and resources in India. India is home to a grand programmatic level decisions of the Central diversity of common pool resources ranging Government, many State Governments, and the from forests to grazing lands, from fresh Planning Commission all provide ways forward, water to marine areas, with both rural and there remains a lack of integration in efforts to urban communities exhibiting widespread address the issue of commons governance at a dependence on these resources for meeting POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

20 a range of economic, social, cultural and Foundation for Ecological Security (FES). spiritual needs. Ostrom’s theoretical and 2011. Dr. Elinor Ostrom and Shri Jairam empirical observations of the commons Ramesh’s Address at the Prof. Bharat Ram provide a framework for governance Memorial Lecture, New Delhi, January 5, 2011. that respects diversity and rights to local Accessed 14 May 2013. http://fes.org.in/ self-governance, while at the same time commons/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Dr.- recognizing the need for multi-level Ostrom-Day-in-Delhi-Jan-5-11.pdf. governance that require governments to fulfil A Commons Story: In the Rain Shadow of Foundation for Ecological Security (FES). their social responsibilities towards equity Green Revolution 2012. and sustainability. India has a long standing . Anand, Gujarat: Foundation diversity of traditional common property for Ecological Security.Uncommons In The systems, with new forms of innovative Commons: Community-Initiated Forest Resource commons governance evolving in areas such Management.Ghate, Rucha. 2004. as patent rights, and in urban commons. Recent initiatives by the Supreme Court of New Delhi: Concept Publishing India, coupled with various Indian State Company. Government initiatives in some states, and the Ghate, Rucha and Harini Nagendra. 2006. “Role national policy changes brought about by the Conservationof monitoring and in institutional Society performance: Forest Rights Act, indicate signs of progress forest management in Maharashtra, India”. that are promising. Yet much remains to be 3: 509-532. done. Large scale changes are needed, whilst keeping in mind the central pillar of Ostrom’s Ghate, Rucha, Suresh Ghate and Elinor vision — self-governance of the commons at a Ostrom. 2013. “IndigenousInternational communities, Journal local level that permits flexibility, adaptation ofcommunication the Commons and cooperation: Taking and innovation, with the ultimate goal of experiments to the field.” ensuring equitable and sustainable access to 7(2): 498-520. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSthe commons for all citizens. Ghate, Rucha, Suresh Ghate and ElinorEconomic Ostrom. and2013. Political “Can communities Weekly plan, grow and sustainably harvest from forests?” XLVIII: 59-67. HN acknowledges financial support from the Department of Science and Technology, Ghate, Rucha, Harini Nagendra and Government of India through a Ramanujan Deepshikha Mehra. 2012. “Is JFM really Fellowship. This article draws substantively on helping communities and forests? The a previous paper—H. Nagendra, R. Ghate and J. need to focus on institutionEnvironmental building”. In: Rao (2013). Governing the commons. Seminar Governance:Bandyopadhyay, Approaches, Jayant, Kanchan Imperatives, Chopra RIndiaeferences 641: 88-93. and MethodsNilanjan Ghosh (eds.), (pp. 163-189). New Delhi: Bloomsbury and Indian Society for Ecological Agrawal, Arun and Ashwini Chhatre. 2006. Economics. “Explaining success on the commons: Science World Development Hardin, Garret. 1968. “The tragedy of the Community forest governance in the Indian commons.” 162: 1243-1248. Himalaya”. 34: 149-166. Jodha, Narpat S. 1986. “Common property Chhatre, Ashwini and Arun Agrawal. 2008. Economic and Political Weekly resources and rural poor in dry regions of “Forest commons and local enforcement”. India”. 21: 1169- PNAS 105: 13286-13291. 1181. D’Souza, Rohan and Harini Nagendra. 2011. Down to Earth Mahapatra, Richard. 2012. “Uncommon swing “Changes in public commons as a consequence Environmental Management for commons”. , June 15. of urbanization: The Agara lake in Bangalore, India”. 47: 840-850. Nagendra, Harini. 2012. “Elinor Ostrom: 1933- POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

21 Current Science Understanding Institutional Diversity 2012”. 103: 433-434. Ostrom, Elinor. 2005. . Princeton, NJ: Princeton Nagendra, Harini and Elinor Ostrom. 2012. International Journal of the Commons University Press. “Polycentric governance of forest resources”. 6: 104- Ostrom, Elinor and Harini Nagendra. 2006. 133. “Insights on linking forests, trees, and people Ecology from the air, on the ground, and in the lab”. andNagendra, Society Harini and Elinor Ostrom. 2011. PNAS 103: 19224-19331. “The challenge of forest diagnostics.” 16: 20. [online] URL: http://www. Ostrom, Elinor and Harini Nagendra. ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss2/art20/. 2007. “Governing the commons in the new Seminar India millennium:Encyclopedia A diversity of Earth of institutions for Nagendra, Harini. 2010. “Maps, lakes and natural resource management”. In: Cutler, J. citizens”. 613: 19-23. (ed.), . Washington, D.C.: Nagendra, Harini, HS Sudhira, Madhusudhan Environmental Information Coalition, National Council for Science and the Environment. Katti, Maria Tengö and Maria Schwenius. 2012. Forests, People and Power: The Political “Urbanization, ecosystems and biodiversity: EcologySpringate-Baginski, of Reform in Oliver South andAsia Piers M. Blaikie. Assessments of India and Bangalore”. Released 2007. at the Cities for Life Summit, parallel to . London, UK: the eleventh meeting of the Conference of Earthscan. the Parties to the Convention on Biological Vollan, Bjørn. 2008. “Socio-ecological Diversity (CBD), Hyderabad, India, 15th explanations for crowding out effects from October. economic field experiments in southern Forbes India, Village Republics: Economic Narayanan, Dinesh. 2012. “Elinor Ostrom on Africa”. Ecological Economics 67: 560-573. Conditions for Collective Action in South India managing common property.” Wade, R., 1988. Governing the Commons: March 1. . The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Action.Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Zagorski, Nick. 2006. “Profile of Elinor Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Ostrom”. PNAS 103: 19221-19223. Press.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

22 The Impact of Elinor Ostrom’s Scholarship on Commons Governance in Mexico An Overview2

Raul Pacheco-Vega The Impact of Elinor Ostrom’s Scholarship on Commons Governance in Mexico An Overview

Raul Pacheco-Vega1

Abstract2

Professor Ostrom’s work has been extremely influential worldwide, and this includes important contributions to Mexican commons scholarship and governance. From water and forest stewardship to small-scale fisheries management, her institutional approach to analyzing commons problems and uncovering opportunities for self-organization, where solutions to complex resource issues are far from straightforward, has been successfully applied to case studies across the country. This paper summarizes lessons learned from such cases, which cover a broad range of resource areas and issues, and offers insight into the degree of impact that Ostrom’s work has had, and continues to have, on Mexico’s efforts to more sustainably manage its extensive natural resource commons. Keywords: Governance, Mexico, commons, neo-institutionalism, water governance, polycentricity, complex adaptive systems

Plate 1: Mountain Stream, humid montane forest, communal territory of Santiago Comaltepec, Oaxaca, Mexico. (Photo credit: James Robson)

1 Professor/Researcher, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica (CIDE), Aguas Calientes, México. Email: raul.pacheco-vega@ cide.edu

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

24 INTRODUCTION OSTROM AND MEXICO

Professor Lin Ostrom’s work has been extremely Before delving into the application of Lin influential worldwide, and her scholarship Ostrom’s work to Mexican cases of shared has been applied across the sphere of Mexican resource management, it is worth outlining the commons governance. From forest stewardship intellectual history of her involvement with to water governance to small-scale fisheries the country’s scholarly endeavours in the field management, Lin’s institutional approach to of common pool resource theory. Lin came to analyzing commons problems and uncovering Mexico several times during her life, as her opportunities for self-organization, especially scholarly collaboration with Dr. Leticia Merino where solutions to complex resource issues are from UNAM’s Institute for Social Research (IIS- far from straightforward, has been successfully UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de applied to cases around the country. This la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México) paper summarizes the lessons learned from blossomed. Professor Merino’s scholarship a number of Mexican studies, which cover a has been integral to how we view forest broad range of natural resource commons, in governance in Mexico (Merino Perez, 2004), order to highlight the influence of her work. I and Merino used Lin Ostrom’s work extensively begin by summarizing the intellectual history to document the institutional arrangements of Mexican interactions with Lin’s scholarship, that have enabled Mexico’s community-based before conducting a review of how her work has forest sector to develop, and flourish in some been used to research and better understand instances, and compare these with experiences multiple types of resource commons and their from other countries. management across the country. Using water governance as a major focus, I then describe Merino was also involved in some of the how Lin’s thinking has influenced policy and watershed moments that punctuate Lin offer a number of potential avenues for applied Ostrom’s influence on Mexican commons scholarly research to build on. scholars more broadly. In 2004, Professor Merino helped to organize, in addition to I may come across as a little biased in my chairing, the Tenth Biennial Conference of writing. There is a simple reason for that—I the International Association for the Study of had been an avid student of Lin’s and her Common Property (IASCP), held in Oaxaca in husband, Vincent, when they came to visit southern Mexico. This exposed many Mexican the University of British Columbia as Green scholars to Lin Ostrom’s scholarship, who then College Residential Visiting Professors. I spent applied the frameworks and theoretical lessons hours listening to their lectures and having of her work more readily to case studies around long scholarly conversations outside of the the country. As Robson and Lichtenstein’s lecture hall and cherished their subsequent (2013) recent study shows, the IASCP’s Oaxaca friendship, mentorship and guidance. It was conference led to a significant increase in Lin and Vincent who encouraged me to engage peer-reviewed published articles from both in water governance scholarship, and it is in Mexico and Latin America more generally. their memory that I now undertake scholarly Then, more recently in 2012, and just a few work on these issues in Mexico. While it was months before her passing, Lin was invited by those personal interactions with the Ostroms Dr. Lourdes Amaya Ventura to give a seminar that led me to the study of neo-institutionalism in Mexico City. On the back of this, a number of and commons governance theories, it has been additional events were organised, including one the applicability of their work that has kept me at the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana in this field since then. Lin Ostrom’s research Cuajimalpa where numerous Mexican scholars has left an indelible mark on environmental presented draft conceptual and empirical policy, and I hope this article showcases some papers for Ostrom to provide feedback on. of the ways by which her thinking has advanced While limited space precludes a review of the our understanding of self-governing resource papers presented at the event, it was clear systems in a Mexican context. that interest in commons governance, neo- POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

25 institutionalism and polycentricity had risen Kastens, & Knieper, 2010). I have been among Agreatly REVIEW since OF Lin’s OSTROM’S earlier visits INFLUENCE to the country. ON the main proponents of IAD applications to MEXICAN COMMONS SCHOLARSHIP Mexican water governance, using the Lerma- Chapala river basin as the case study of choice (Pacheco-Vega & Vega 2008a, 2008b; Pacheco-Vega 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, There appear to be four broad categories of 2012b, 2012c). This work has found that scholarly output from Lin Ostrom that apply institutional reforms for water governance to Mexican commons governance. The first in Mexico such as river basin councils are not one is perhaps the most popular; the concept robust enough to facilitate proper sanitation of common pool resources (CPRs) and the policy. More recently, Briseño Ramírez idea that self-organizing communities can followed a similar strategy in undertaking an build institutions (understood as the rules and institutional analysis of water management in normsGoverning that regulate the Commonsagents’ interactions) for the metropolitan area of Guadalajara in Mexico resource self-governance. Taken from her 1990 (Briseño Ramírez 2012), finding that the book, , Ostrom’s Design structures of resource governance at the local, Principles for commons institutions have been state and regional levels are weak, and that the widely used as an analytical lens by which dilution of jurisdictional responsibilities lead Mexican scholars examine the robustness of to deficient institutional structures that further resource governance systems. undermine water management at the regional The second category concerns the framework level. These findings are consistent with my that evolved partially from Susan Kiser and frequent criticisms of the river basin council Elinor Ostrom’s grammar of institutions and as an arena for water management in Mexico partially from an evolutionary process of (Pacheco-Vega 2012b). understanding how institutions emerge: the The third category deals with Ostrom’s work Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) on polycentricity. Milman and Scott (2010) framework (Gibson, Andersson, Ostrom, & Ostrom’s used Ostrom’s work in this area to examine Shivakumar 2008; the shared Santa Cruz Aquifer that runs Design Olivares & Sandoval alongside the US-Mexico border. Their findings Principles 2008; Ostrom, confirm what we already knew thanks to Lin’s Gibson, Shivakumar, for commons research: that a non-polycentric approach & Andersson can lead to overlapping authority and blurred institutions 2001; Ostrom jurisdictional boundaries, thereby weakening have been 2011; Pacheco- resource governance regimes and limiting Vega 2005). IAD is widely used as proper binational groundwater management. both an analytical Yet by exploring the degree to which Mexican an analytical framework and a water governance is moving towards more lens by which set of heuristics that polycentric models (Pacheco-Vega 2013a, enable scholars to Mexican 2013b), my own work – comparing the study how resource geographies of wastewater in the central cities scholars governance systems of Leon and Aguascalientes and analyzing a examine the function, through dataset of 26 river basin councils in Mexico— the identification robustness finds that such governance arrangements in of structural Mexico are still in their infancy and remain of resource variables that poorly understood. affect institutional governance arrangements The fourth category concerns the broader systems. (Ostrom 2010, decentralization of natural resources 2011; Pacheco-Vega governance and how devolving decision- & Basurto 2008; making power to lower levels of organizational Pahl-Wostl, Holtz, structures can contribute to building better, POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

26 more robust rules for resource management. Mexican natural resource policy. Antinori A glut of recent work on Mexican resource and Bray (2005), for example, contributed management has been espousing the to our understanding of community-based effectiveness of a decentralized governance forest enterprises in Mexico, which drew model (Bravo Pérez, Castro Ramírez, & on insights from the common property Gutiérrez Andrade 2005; Caire Martínez 2004; literature with regards to self-organization Caldera Ortega 2012; Camacho, Aguilar, & and community engagement. Ostrom´s work Cercantes 2012; Cortez Lara 2005; Domínguez has also demonstrated that strong cooperation 2012; Galindo-Escamilla, Palerm-Viqueira, by all actors is necessary to achieve good Tovar-Salinas & Rodarte-García 2008; González governance—something Barsimantsov Santana, n.d.; Licea Murillo 2012; López Mera (2010) picked up on when identifying non- & Chávez Hernández 2012; Murillo Licea 2012; governmental organizations (NGOs) as key Paré & Robles 2000). actors in implementing sound resource management strategies. In his comparison Beyond the field of water governance, Ostrom’s of forest governance in the Mexican states influence has been equally apparent in the of Oaxaca and Michoacán, Barsimantsov study of other natural resource commons in (2010: 62) found that “unless communities Mexico. In the forest sector, for example, the can internalize timber extraction and aforementioned Leticia Merino is among a community development activities, external group of Mexican scholars to have made use non-governmental actors will be critical in of Ostrom’s work, having spent many years community forestry and therefore must be studying the country’s self-organizing forest considered in creating development strategies.” communities. The country’s community forests offer an excellent opportunity to Jacinta Palerm is another leading Mexican empirically apply Ostrom’s thinking given that scholar to frequently useThe Ostrom’s country’s scholarly they function as something of a laboratory work to provide for researching how self-organization affects context to community forest conditions over time. Merino-Perez analyses of forests offer irrigation systems and Hernandez-Apolinar (2004), for example, an excellent analyzed forest conservation initiatives within management in the Monarch Butterfly Biosphere Reserve, Mexico (Palerm opportunity Michoacan, from 1986 to 2000, focusing on the Viqueira, Rivas, to empirically Ávalos Gutiérrez, & experiences of two ejido communities: Cerro apply Ostrom’s Prieto and Donaciano Ojeda. In the former they Pimentel Equihua, found that pernicious self-reinforcing negative 2004; Palerm thinking given incentives led to illegal timber extraction, Viqueira 1999, that they 2000, 2003). With while in the latter, nested formal and informal function as institutions had helped to generate incentives frequent reference for forest conservation and the regulation of to Ostrom, the something of a timber extraction. work of Palerm laboratory for typically focuses Other stand-out case studies include Lujan on organizational researching Alvarez’s (2003) work that argues for the structures and how self- creation of participatory multi-stakeholder the hierarchy of roundtables to empower forest communities division of labor organization to properly manage their timber resources. in irrigation affects forest He used Ostrom’s work to set the stage management in conditions over in highlighting the need for community central Mexico. participation mechanisms in the governance Nevertheless, in time. of Mexico’s forest resources. Among the many some key work non-Mexicans working in the country, several (particularly studies inspired by Ostrom have influenced those involving POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

27 the Cuautla and Nexapa Rivers) Palerm and Finally, any review of Ostrom’s impact on collaborators explore the relevance of formal Mexican commonsRelaciones scholarship is incomplete and informal institutional arrangements within without reference to the Mexican social river basins and associated irrigation districts. science journal , which dedicated a entire volume in 2002 to the application Ostrom’s work has also been applied to the of Ostrom’s work to understanding local study of fisheries management worldwide, self-governance and the commons in Mexico and Mexico is well represented here (Basurto Understanding(Roth Seneff 2002). Institutional This was Diversity something of a et al., 2012; Cinti, Shaw, Cudney-Bueno & pioneering move, given that Ostrom’s 2005 Rojo 2010; Ibáñez de la Calle, Becerra Pérez book was & Brachet Barro 2004; Morán-Angulo 2012; yet to be published, and she was still 7 years Ortiz Paniagua 2004; Zepeda Domínguez away from being awarded the Nobel Prize. 2010). Basurto’s work, in particular, is relevant The volume summarized mostly theoretical as it draws directly from the Ostrom school work but did include some empirical studies of institutional analysis (Professor Basurto on water allocation in Izucar de Matamoros in was a student of Lin’s). In his studies of two northern Mexico, and forestry management Mexican small-scale fisheries in the Gulf of in the Monarch Butterfly Biosphere Reserve California, Mexico, he found broad divergences in Michoacan, comparing governance of in how communities access and govern fish as forest resources there with those found in a resource. While one community used a CPR Oaxaca, southern Mexico. The standout piece, regime approach, the other continued to rely however, was written by Silvia Bofill Poch, who on permits as a policy strategy (Basurto et al., explored community forestry in the indigenous 2012), showing that both formal and informal community of San Juan Parangaricutiro rules and institutions both have a direct in the Purhepecha altiplano (Bofill-Poch, effect on the effectiveness of the resource 2002). In her article, Bofill Poch looked at the governance regime. articulation (or lack thereof) and nesting of political institutions, social norms and power Beyond these more resource-specific fields struggles that have reinforced class struggles of scholarship (water, fisheries and forestry), and conflicts between governments at multiple Ostrom’s work on the commons (particularly scales and forestry community users. In the her study of rules and institutions in self- same vein as Ostrom’s work on self-governing governing systems) has also been applied irrigation units, Bofill Poch shows the more broadly to the governance of Mexico’s myriad conflicts that can stem from perverse extensive resource commons. Her early 1990s ejidos incentives and a lack of robust institutional work, which dealt with agrarian issues, is structures tend to perpetuate negative effects well suited to the study of Mexican — HOWon resources OSTROM’S governance. WORK HAS land-based tenure systems managed by small-scale resource appropriators that share INFLUENCED POLICY: THE CASE OF characteristics of both common and private WATER GOVERNANCE property. For example, Schroederejidos Gonzalez undertook an applied study of ecosystems within the Chamela-Cuxmala (Schroeder Within the context of setting new regulatory Gonzalez 2006), and reported that institutions standards for water governance in Mexico, for resource conservation were lacking and bureaucrats and scholars alike have used indicative of a loss of social cohesion and social Ostrom’s common pool resource (CPR) theory capital in the communities under study—a as an all-encompassing framework to allow finding that resonated strongly with Ostrom’s for innovative institutional reforms to be view that self-governing communities need to implemented in a relatively straightforward develop long-range, robust, and cooperative fashion. In addition, because the vast majority institutional arrangements to ensure resources of Mexican scholarship on water governance are not degraded by the actions of narrow- focuses on water allocation, redistribution minded, short-sighted appropriators. and equitable sharing, Ostrom’s research POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

28 findings are easily applied to Mexican case has been extremely influential in Mexican studies dealing with access to water. In my water policy. As an example, the past couple own research, I have departed from analyzing of years have seen a flurry of works published water access to focus more on the rules and that stressed the need to devolve control to institutions governing wastewater generation, communities as one of the necessary pillars of distribution and treatment (Pacheco-Vega future water governance in Mexico (COLMEX, & Basurto 2008; Pacheco-Vega,2005, 2009, CONAGUA, IMTA, & ANEAS 2012). 2012c). Using a comparative analysis of the sanitation policies of five Mexican States, Taking Ostrom’s insights on decentralization as Ostrom’s work has helped me to demonstrate a main tenet of resource governance, Mexican that when institutional reforms such as river water policy is slowly but surely moving in this basin councils are not robust enough, they direction.Ley de Her Aguas research has been influential can be detrimental to building a potentially Nacionalesin the design of the Mexican National Water sustainable basin-wide sanitation policy. Law ( ), Lin Ostrom’s Lin Ostrom’s teachings were much broader where changes research than just a mere list of 8 design principles for have seen greater demonstrated good commons governance. Unfortunately, emphasis placed the recent popularization of her scholarship on community that (following her 2009 Nobel Prize for participation in communities Economics) have sprouted hundreds of order to build are indeed notes, newspaper and magazine articles on resilient and robust her research that tend to narrow her major institutions for capable of self- achievements down to these very principles. water governance. organizing for As others papers in this special issue show, Similarly, sustainable doing so negates the many contributions of Ostrom’s work Lin Ostrom’s intellectual heritage. This is on institutional water no less the case with water governance in diversity and her governance. Mexico. In reviewing how her contributions emphasis on multi- have been used by scholars to understand layered forms of water governance in the country, three governance have insights in particular should be considered. opened up policy First, Lin Ostrom’s research demonstrated discussions at the national level to increase the that communities are indeed capable of self- perceived value of polycentric arrangements organizinghuertas for sustainable water governance. and to test their feasibility at the sub-national cajasTaking de her agua previous empirical work on level. Last year, Mexico’s National Water Spanish , and applying it to Mexican Commission (Comisión Nacional del Agua, , Palerm and collaborators have CONAGUA) convened a policy workshop shown that communities are capable of self- sponsored by the OECD (Organisation for organizing to improve conditions in their Economic Cooperation and Development) irrigation systems. Second, Ostrom’s insights where discussions around polycentricity and on rule and norm design have helped improve water governance in Mexico were held. These Mexican water governance by highlighting the constituted important conversations involving importance of robust institutions designed the country’s policymakers, and they were from the bottom-up. As an example of this, my informed, in part, by Ostrom’s thinking. work demonstrates how Mexican river basin councils can fail when institutional erosion Officials at all three levels of government occurs because of a conflict between policy are now looking to improve the institutional objectives and overlapping jurisdictional design of river basin councils and river basin attributions (Pacheco-Vega 2013a). And third, organisations. The results to date have been Lin Ostrom’s contribution to our understanding mixed, with both successful (the Lerma- of the notion of resource governance itself Chapala river basin), and not-so-successful POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

29 ... while (Rio Mayo river increased awareness among Mexicans of the Ostrom’s legacy basin) cases. role that local communities could and should is beginning to Nevertheless, the play in natural resources management and mere fact that conservation. Examples abound not only in yield fruit in federal, state and the governance of water resources, but for policy circles municipal-level other resource types also—how institutional around water water authorities innovations can secure sustainable fisheries are increasingly management in coastal zones in Mexico, governance in interested in or how local communities can make use of Mexico, it is no robust institutional and adapt existing customary governance design for shared institutions to help develop their own forest more than a water governance enterprises. beginning— is indicative of the Yet beyond Lin’s obvious contributions to ongoing influence Mexican commons scholarship, it is critical that of Lin Ostrom’s we strive to explore new avenues for scholarly scholarship. research on the commons—work that can While the country’s scholars, practitioners, further the intellectual heritage she provides. and now policy-makers, have begun to delve My hope with this paper is that other scholars more deeply into the long-term implications and practitioners with an interest in Mexican of institutional change for water resource resource commons can be inspired to build governance, new areas are set to be explored. a strong research programme that increases One is the application of Lin Ostrom’s our understanding of their governance institutional analysis framework to study and, in doing so, builds upon the work and rules and norms in non-traditional resource Rachievementseferences of the indomitable Lin Ostrom. management contexts (Pacheco-Vega 2013b). Others include the impact on water governance of the climate as a global commons, adaptation Barsimantov, James A. 2010. “Vicious and to changes to climate across Mexico’s diverse virtuous cycles and the role of external non- geographical regions, and the emerging idea Human government actors in community forestry of anticommons (Osorio & Lara 2012). Thus, Ecology in Oaxaca and Michoacán, Mexico”. while Ostrom’s legacy is beginning to yield fruit 38(1): 49–63. doi:10.1007/s10745- in policy circles around water governance in 009-9289-3 Mexico, it is no more than a beginning—the onus is now on others to follow in her footsteps Basurto, Xavier, Ana Cinti, Luis Bourillón, andCONCLUDING build upon herREMARKS foundational work. Mario Rojo, Jorge Torre and A. Hudson Weaver. 2012. “The emergence of access controls in small-scale fishing commons: A comparative Humananalysis Ecology of individual licenses and common Lin Ostrom’s scholarship on the commons has, property rights in two Mexican communities”. without doubt, had a significant and positive 40(4): 597–609. doi:10.1007/ impact on Mexican resource governance s10745-012-9508-1 scholarship and policy. This paper summarizes a number of those scholarly and applied Bofill-Poch, Silvia. 2002. “NegociandoRelaciones el contributions. Lin was passionate about the interes comun: Poder, conflicto y reciprocidad potential of commons research to improve en San Juan Nuevo, Michoacan”. the lives of Mexicans. During her visits to XXIII(89): 129–156. Mexico, she always kept an ear to the ground, Bravo Pérez, Héctor Manuel, Juan Carlos Castro to think about new ways in which her work Ramírez and Miguel ÁngelGestión Gutiérrez y Política Andrade. and thinking could inform, and be informed Pública2005. El banco de agua: una propuesta para by, the country’s experiences. Perhaps of salvar el lago de Chapala. most importance, her research sparked an XIV: 289–309. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

30 Análisis institucional de la gestión del agua en la Zona MetropolitanaBriseño Ramírez, de GuadalajaraHugo. 2012. Galindo-Escamilla, Emmanuel, Jacinta Palerm- Viqueira, Jorge L. Tovar-Salinas and Raúl. (ZMG). Rodarte-García.Agrociencia 2008. “Organización social en la gestión de una fuente de agua: Los Caire Martínez, Georgina Leticia. 2004. Jagüeyes”. , 42: 233–242. “Implicaciones del marco institucional y de la The organización gubernamentalGaceta Ecológica para la gestión Samaritan’sGibson, Clark Dilemma: C, Krister The Andersson, Political EconomyElinor integral por cuencas. El caso de la cuenca ofOstrom Development and Sujai Aid Shivakumar. 2008. Lerma-Chapala”. 71: 55–79. . Oxford, UK: Oxford Caldera Ortega, Alex Ricardo. 2012. University Press. Entre la “Regulación en el subsector de agua potable organización colectiva y la flexibilidad: y saneamientoSegundo en México: Congreso análisis de la crítico Red de ImpactosGonzález socialesSantana, de Octavio. la adopción de tecnología Investigadoresa la propuesta de Agualas ANEAS y propuesta hidroagrícola en el municipio de Ecuandureo, alternativa”. Michoacán . Red de Investigadores Sociales Sobre Agua (RED-ISSA). . Camacho, Joaquin, Ismael Aguilar and Ibáñez de la Calle, Mariela, Mariana Becerra Fernando Cervantes. 2012. “Confianza,Archivos normas de Pérez and Gaelle Brachet Barro. 2004. “Cuotas zootecnicay participación: análisis de organizaciones de individuales Gaceta transferibles: Ecológica Una alternativa para productores lecheros en México”. resolver la problemática de las pesquerías en 61(234): 197–207. México”. 70: 31–43.Hacia un posicionamiento de gobernanza del agua Cinti, Ana, William Shaw, Richard Cudney- enLicea México Murillo, Daniel (ed.). 2012. Bueno and Mario Rojo. 2010. “The unintended consequences of formal fisheries policies: . El Colegio de México / Comisión Social disparities andMarine resource Policy overuse in Nacional del Agua / Instituto Mexicano de a major fishing community in the Gulf of Tecnología del Agua / Asociación Nacional de California, Mexico”. 34(2): Empresas de Agua y Saneamiento. Mexico, DF. 328–339. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2009.08.002 Hacia un posicionamiento de gobernanza del López Mera, Ricardo and Pablo Chávez aguaCOLMEX, en México CONAGUA, IMTA, and ANEAS. 2012. Hernández. 2012. “Gobernanza del agua y participación social”. In: Murillo Licea, D. . México, D.F.: El Colegio de (ed.), Gobernanza del agua: un desafío actual. México, Comisión Nacional del Agua, Instituto Hacia una mirada crítica del concepto y de su Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua, Asociación aplicación. (pp. 396–439). Instituto Mexicano Nacional de Empresas de Saneamiento. 105pp. de Tecnología del Agua. Conservacion o deterioro: El impacto de las politicas publicas Cortez Lara, Alfonso Ándres. 2005. “¿Hacia enMerino las instituciones Perez, Leticia. comunitarias 2004. y en los una gestión binacional deProblemas aguas fronterizas socio- en usos de los bosques en Mexico laambientales cuenca caja y experienciasdel Río Colorado?”. organizativas In: Vargas. en S.las and cuencas E. Mollard de México (eds.), . Mexico D.F.: Secretaria de Medio Ambiente y Recursos (pp. 331–355). Instituto Naturales, Instituto Nacional de Ecologia, Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua. Consejo Civil Mexicano para la Silvicultura Sostenible. 336 pp. Domínguez, Judith. 2012. “Gobernanza urbana del agua:Gobernanza los problemas del agua:por resolver un desafío en las Milman, Anita D. and Christopher A. Scott. actual.ciudades Hacia latinoamericanas”. una mirada crítica In: Murillo del concepto Licea, 2010. “Beneath the surface: intranational yD. de (ed.), su aplicación institutions andEnvironment management and of Planning the United C: GovernmentStates — Mexico and Policytransboundary Santa (pp. 255–296). Instituto Cruz aquifer”. Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua. 28(3): 528 – 551. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

31 Water and Ecosystems: Water Ciencia Resources Management in Diverse Ecosystems PesqueraMorán-Angulo, Ramón Enrique. 2012. “La andINWEH Providing (Ed.), for Human Needs pesca: Observatorio del ecosistema”. 20: 67–73. . UNU-INWEH/ UNESCO-MAB-IHP International Workshop, Murillo Licea, Daniel. 2012. “La trampa de la Hamilton, Ontario (Canada). gobernanzaGobernanza del agua. del Problemas agua: un deldesafío traslado actual.del concepto Hacia auna la aplicación”.mirada crítica In Murillo del concepto Licea, Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2007a. “Participación de la yD. de (ed.), su aplicación Comisión Nacional del Agua en el tratamiento de aguas residualesRegion y Sociedad en la Cuenca Lerma- (pp. 79–114). Instituto Chapala: Estadísticas federales y realidades Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua. estatales”. XIX(39): 55–76. El agua potable en México: Historia reciente,Olivares, actores,Roberto procesos and Ricardo y propuestas Sandoval (eds.). Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2007b. “Construyendo 2008. puentes entreEconomía, la política Sociedad ambiental y Territorio y la política . de tratamiento de aguas en la cuenca Lerma- Asociación Nacional de Empresas de Agua y Chapala”. Saneamiento, A.C. 6(24): 995–1024. La pesca en el Lago de Patzcuaro. Arreglos institucionalesOrtiz Paniagua, y Carlos política Francisco. pesquera: 2004. 1990-2004 Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2009. “Arreglos institucionales para el saneamiento de aguas . residuales en México. Un caso de estudio en la Unpublished Masters thesis, El Colegio de la cuenca Lerma-Chapala”.Gestión del In: agua: Sandré una Osorio, visión I., Frontera Norte, Tijuana. comparativeR. L. do Carmo, entre S. Vargas-Velázquez México y Brasil and N.B. Guzmán (eds.), Osorio, Helder and Arturo Lara. 2012. . Jiutepec, “La tragedia de los anti-comunes en la International Association for Morelos: Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del construccion del conocimiento del genoma the Study of the Commons: First Thematic Agua. Conferencehumano”. In on the Knowledge Commons Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2012a. “Governing Canadianwastewater: Association A cross-regional of Latin analysisAmerican within and (pp. 1–27). Louvain, Belgium: International Caribbeanthe Lerma-Chapala Studies river basin in Mexico”. In: Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC). (CALACS) 2012. Kelowna, BC: Canadian Association of Latin American Ostrom, Elinor. 2010. “Beyond markets and American Economic Review and Caribbean Studies. states: Polycentric governance of complex economic systems”. Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2012b. “Shifting 100: 1–33. paradigms in water governance: Questioning the validity of river basin councils as an Ostrom, E. 2011. “Background on the Canadian The Policy Studies Journal integrated water resources management Institutional Analysis and Development Association of Geographers strategy”. Paper presented at Framework”. 39(1): (CAG) 2012. 7–27. Aid, Incentives, Waterloo, ON, Canada: Canadian Association of andOstrom, Sustainability: Elinor, Clark An Gibson, Institutional Sujai ShivakumarAnalysis Geographers. and Krister P. Andersson. 2001. of Development Cooperation. Evaluation Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2012c. “Arreglos institucionales dentro de la cuenca Lerma- . Chapala: Una visión desde la política Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish International ambiental”. In: Sánchez Rodríguez, M., J. de Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Los estudios del J. Hernández López, J. M. Durán Juárez and 389pp. agua en la cuenca Lerma-Chapala-Santiago. Agricultura,A. Torres Rodríguez industria (eds.), y ciudad. Pasado y Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2005. “Applying the presente Institutional Analysis and Development framework to wastewater management policy (pp. 347–360). Guadalajara, Jalisco y in the Lerma-Chapala River Basin”. In: UNU- Zamora, Michoacán. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

32 Polycentric Water Governance in Mexico: Beyond the Governing- by-river-basin-councilPacheco-Vega, Raul. 2013a. Model Palerm Viqueira, Jacinta. 2003. “La organizaciónAgua, socialmedio de ambiente los regantes y desarrollo en el río . Paper presented enNexapa, el siglo estado XXI de Puebla”. In: Ávila García, at 2013 Meeting of the Latin American Studies P. (ed.), Association (LASA). Washington D.C.: Latin (pp. 347–362). Michiacan, Geographies American Studies Association. Mexico: El Colegio de Michoacán. Secretaría of Wastewater: A Comparative Analysis de Urbanismo y Medio Ambiente. Instituto ofPacheco-Vega, Urban Sanitation Raul. Governance2013b. in the Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua.Organizational Mexican Municipalities of Aguascalientes Strategies in Water Shortage Situations: (Aguascalientes) and León (Guanajuato). MexicanPalerm Viqueira, Self-administrated Jacinta. 2000. Irrigation Systems.

Paper presented at the 2013 Meeting of Paper presented at Eighth Biennial Conference the Association of American Geographers, of the International Association for the Study Los Angeles, California, USA: Association of of Common Property (IASCP), Bloomington, American Geographers. Indiana, May 2000. Pacheco-Vega, Raul and Fernando Basurto. Palerm Viqueira, Jacinta, María Rivas, Claudio 2008. “Instituciones en el saneamiento de Ávalos Gutiérrez and José Luis Pimentel aguas residuales: reglas formales e informales Revista Mexicana de Sociología Equihua. 2004. “Capacidad autogestiva para en el Consejo de Cuenca Lerma-Chapala”. la administración de sistemas de riego: la 70(1): 87–109. El agua en México vista desdeteoría lay problemáticasacademia externas”. In: Jimenez, Pacheco-Vega, Raul and Obdulia Vega. 2008a. B. and L. Marin (eds.), “Los debates sobre la gobernanza del agua: (pp. 371–387). Mexico D.F.: Hacia una agendaLa Gestin de investigación de Recursos Hidráulicos: en México”. Academia Mexicana de Ciencias. In: Soares, D., S. Vargas-Velázquez and R. Participación ciudadana en el manejo del agua: Realidades y Perspectivas (Tomo I) Paré, Luisa and Carlos Robles. 2000. Nuño (eds.), una nueva relación entre la ciudad y el campo (pp. 57–86). en el sur de Veracruz Jiutepec, Morelos y Guadalajara, Jalisco: Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua / , 185–195. Unpublished Universidad de Guadalajara. manuscript. Pacheco-Vega, Raul and Obdulia Vega. 2008b. Robson, James P andJournal Gabriela of Lichtenstein. Latin American 2013. “Current trends in Latin American “Retos y perspectivas en materia de políticaEl Agua de Geography commons research”. Potabletratamiento en México: de agua Historia y saneamiento Reciente, en Actores, México”. In: Olivares, R. and R. Sandoval (eds.), 12(1): 5–31. Procesos y Propuestas Relaciones: Estudios de historiaRoth Seneff, y sociedad Andrew. 2002. “Bienes comunales (pp. 173–186). México, y autogobierno local”. D.F.: ANEAS (Asociación Nacional de Empresas , XXIII: 11–15. de Agua y Saneamiento). El ejido como institución de acción colectiva Schroeder Gonzalez, Natalia Mariel. 2006. Pahl-Wostl, Claudia, Georg Holtz, Britta en el manejo de los ecosistemas de la región Kastens and Christian Knieper. 2010. de Chamela-Cuixmala, Jalisco Environmental“Analyzing complex Science water & Policy governance regimes: . Instituto de The Management and Transition Framework”. Ecologia, A.C. El 13: 571–581. co-manejo pesquero en México: Fortalezas doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2010.08.006 yZepeda debilidades Domínguez, del concepto José Alberto.2010. Palerm Viqueira, Jacinta. 1999. “Detrás de los . Centro reglamentos formales: distribución del agua IX Congreso Nacional de Irrigación Interdisciplinario de Ciencias Marinas entre regantes autogestivos en situaciones de (Cicimar-IPN), La Paz, Baja California Sur. escasez”. In: (Vol. 1999). POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

Rompiendo paradigmas Gobernanza de los bienes comunes y ciudadanía en las políticas forestal y de conservación3 Mexicanas Leticia Merino Pérez Rompiendo paradigmas: Gobernanza de los bienes comunes y ciudadanía en las políticas forestal y de conservación Mexicanas Leticia Merino Perez1

Síntesis

Retomo3 en el texto algunas de las aportaciones más relevantes de la obra de Elinor Ostrom, considerando el contexto en que emergieron: la polémica con la tesis de la universalidad de la “Tragedia de los Bienes Comunes”. Reviso diversas rupturas de la obra de Ostrom con los paradigmas sobre la relación sociedad naturaleza, dominantes en las ciencias sociales y en las políticas de conservación y manejo de los recursos naturales: el paradigma de la propiedad privada o pública como panaceas, la visión de los derechos de propiedad acotados a los derechos de alineación; el paradigma de la elección racional y las posiciones neo-malthussianas sobre la relación sociedad naturaleza. Analizo las implicaciones políticas y conceptuales de estas rupturas y de propuestas: el potencial de la propiedad colectiva como base de arreglos institucionales para la conservación, la propiedad vista como “conjunto de derechos” que generan incentivos y responsabilidades con la sustentabilidad de los bienes; la posibilidad de cooperación, gobernanza y sustentabilidad en contextos de recursos naturales utilizados, incluso en condiciones de densidad demográfica relativamente alta. Busco aplicar este esquema al análisis de la gestión de recursos forestales en el Sur de México, área con fuerte presencia indígenaPalabras Clave: Gobernanza, bienes comunes, acción colectiva, comunidades, panaceas, paradigmas, derechos de propiedad, políticas públicas

Abstract

I reflect on what I consider to be some of the key contributions of Elinor Ostrom’s work, taking into account the scholarly context in which it emerged – the debate over the validity of Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” argument. I also review diverse ruptures of Ostrom´ s work with some of the traditional paradigms with regards to Nature-Society relationships, still dominant in the social sciences and frequently referenced in policy discourses—privatization and state control as institutional panaceas for nature´s conservation; the concept of property and property rights reduced to alienation rights; and, “rational choice” theory and neo-Malthusian conservation proposals as self evident givens. I analyze some of the policy and theoretical implications of Ostrom’s conceptual proposals, such as: the potential for collective property and associated institutional arrangements to enable conservation; property as a “bundle of rights” that create incentives and responsibilities towards sustainable resource uses; and, the viability of cooperation, governance and sustainability in contexts where natural resources are used, even under conditions of relatively high population density. I try to apply these lessons to the analysis of the experience of use and governance of forest in Southern Mexico, with its significantKey words: indigenous Governance, populations. common resources, collective action, communities, panaceas, paradigms, property rights, public policies

1 International Association for the Study of the Commons Investigadora, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales (IIS) de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) y Presidenta de la (IASC). Email: [email protected]

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36 “Ningún problema puede ser resuelto desde el mismo nivel de conciencia que lo creó” tierras comunales permitieron una enorme expansión de las haciendas dedicadas a 2 Albert Einstein plantaciones orientadas al3 mercado mundial INTRODUCCIÓN sobre las antiguas milpas dedicadas al consumo de los pueblos. La concentración de la tierra y la riqueza generaron niveles de miseria mayores que los existentes durante Un tema seminal en la obra de Elinor la colonia (Warman, 2003). La recuperación Ostrom es la crítica a la tesis que sostiene de las tierras comunales fue el reclamo más la universalidad de la tragedia de los bienes sentido del movimiento social que sacudió utilizados o poseídos colectivamente, al país durante la primera década del S.XX. planteada por Hardin en 1968, que sostiene El reparto de tierras durante 1930-1970 que los usuarios de estos bienes nunca son fue eje de estabilidad política. En los 1980 capaces de coordinarse y evitar su destrucción más de 60% de las tierras del país y más de (Ostrom, 1990). Hardin ilustró esta propuesta 65% de sus áreas forestales4 eran propiedad utilizando el caso hipotético de destrucción de comunidades locales . Las tierras de de un pasto comunal en Inglaterra Medieval. comunidades forestales—en muchos El análisis históricocommons de la enorme tragedia casos indígenas—se encuentran en áreas de las comunidades rurales a partir del montañosas y de selvas, de difícil acceso y “cercado”commoners de los “ ” quedó fuera de su valor agrícola marginal que por siglos fueron horizonte. Entre los siglos XIII al XVII miles regiones de refugio para los sobrevivientes de “ ” fueron expropiados de los y prófugos de la colonización europea y más medios de vida con que tradicionalmente tarde de la expansión del capital nacional e contaban. Su expulsión masiva de las tierras internacional. ancestrales, sin más opciones que la ocupación como mano de obra sobre-explotada, incluso El planteamiento de Hardin extendió el semi-esclavizada que requerían la industria, ámbito del discurso sobre los bienes comunes el comercio marítimo y las colonias inglesas del campo de la economía al de la ecología, en Norte América, y la violenta represión a sumando una nueva culpa a lo comunitario: su resistencia han sido calificadas como uno la responsabilidad de destruir la naturaleza. de los “grandes crímenes de la modernidad” Este postulado hacía eco con la percepción del (Linebaugh and Rediker, 2001). acelerado deterioro ambiental, emergente en los 1960 y 1970 entre el público de los países El discurso de búsqueda de eficiencia como industrializados, luego de la publicación de los justificación de la expropiación, acumulación textos de Carson (1962), Ehrlich (1968) y del y concentración de antiguos bienes comunes, Informe “Los límites del crecimiento” (1972). acaecidos en distintas latitudes, se convirtió La pérdida de los bosques tropicales del en prontamente ideología que identifica mundo es uno de los temas ambientales que a lo comunitario con los obsoleto y a la desde los 1970 ha recibido mayor atención privatización de los bienes comunes con el global. Desde la perspectiva de la TBC las progreso; para la que los dramáticos costos causas del deterioro forestal son la ausencia sociales de esa exclusión son el precio y/o inestabilidad de los derechos de propiedad necesario de la modernidad. Fuera de Europa en los países “en desarrollo”, donde se ubican esta ideología y las políticas consecuentes la mayoría de las selvas del planeta; asociado se nutrieron en abismales inequidades a la pobreza allí prevaleciente. La aceptación sociales y en el racismo imperante en las paradigmática del diagnóstico de Hardin se sociedades coloniales. En México del siglo XIX funda en gran medida en su simplicidad. En las reformas liberales de privatización de las contextos académicos disciplinarios donde

2 3 Henequén, caña de azúcar, algodón, café, tabaco. 4 Cultivo tradicional de maíz, frijol, calabaza y vegetales semicultivados. Comunidades agrarias y ejidos (Warman, 2000)

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

37 impera la dificultad de asumir la complejidad mientras los funcionarios gubernamentales de los procesos socio-ambientales, la tesis y agentes de mercado son omnipotentes de Hardin pareciera auto-evidente: “cuando para solucionar los retos de gestión de los los recursos son limitados, las decisiones más diversos bienes, resulta autoritario racionales para cada individuo dan lugar a un y excluyente (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, dilema irracional para el grupo… por lo que Janssen and Anderies, 2007). La valoración todos los recursos poseídos en común son, o de las capacidades de gestión de sociedades serán eventualmente sobre-explotado…, las auto-organizadas y la crítica a los esquemas causas… son la libertad y el crecimiento de la de gestión totalitarios, son centrales en su PARADIGMASpoblación” (Hardin, Y PANACEAS 1968). axiología, influida por su larga colaboración con Vincent Ostrom y por la tradición Tocquevilliana de valoración de la cooperación ciudadana como base de la gestión pública. Dos décadas después de la publicación de la Esta axiología fue para Ostrom una rica fuente Teoría de los Bienes Comunes (TBC), E. Ostrom de preguntas de investigación e hipótesis, no (1990) reconoce la relevancia del problema generadora de respuestas dogmáticas. planteado: gran parte de los recursos de los que dependen las sociedades contemporáneas Al tomar distancia de los discursos basados en enfrentan riesgos de tragedias similares a la el sentido común y las panaceas académicas de la metáfora de Hardin, aunque de mayor y políticas, insiste en la necesidad de que la trascendencia. Sistemas naturales clave del construcción teórica y política estén basada medio ambiente global, numerosos bienes en investigación empírica rigurosa y multi- culturales y de conocimiento e importantes método, comprometida con el reconocimiento medios de información y comunicación de la complejidad y la inter-disciplina (Ostrom, dependen de acción y gestión colectivas, 2009; Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom, 2010). sujetas a potenciales fallas. Ostrom no niega Contra lo que puede suponerse, el extenso la realidad de estas fallas sino el carácter análisis de experiencias de éxitos y fallas de inevitable que Harin les atribuye. Señala el cooperación a partir de fuentes históricas, error metodológico y conceptual de construir de campo y de experimentos económicos modelos explicativos universales con sustento (Cárdenas, 2009; Poteete, Janssen y Ostrom, empírico endeble, manejando los modelos 2010) no condujo a Ostrom a proponer lo como realidades, generalizando excesivamente comunitario como una nueva panacea; sí a condiciones y explicaciones particulares, reconocer el peso de los actores locales en sobre-simplificando los procesos que se los procesos de apropiación y protección de pretende comprender. Considera la tesis los bienes comunes, en el éxito o fracaso del de la “TBC” más como una ideología sobre gobierno de los bienes comunes, aún en los esquemas de derechos y toma de decisiones casos de bienes o procesos de gran escala ideales, que como un marco explicativo. Una como la regulación climática, vista como ideología a partir de la cual se han impuesto resultado del “anidamiento” de sistemas de alrededor del mundo esquemas de control PARADIGMAS,distintas escalas. PANACEAS, PROPIEDAD Y estatal y de privatización como panaceas CONSERVACIÓN institucionales. Ostrom comparte con Hardin el interés por la resolución de problemas. Sus empeños A partir de la crítica de la universalidad de la académicos buscan contribuir a generar “TBC”, Ostrom problematiza otros paradigmas elementos para comprender y evitar tragedias prevalentes en los análisis sobre las relaciones de los bienes comunes y de las comunidades sociedad-naturaleza. Cuestiona la noción de que dependen de ellos. Desde la perspectiva propiedad y la falla inevitable de la propiedad de Ostrom, el supuesto de que la mayoría de colectiva, que se percibe a menudo como los usuarios de bienes comunes están siempre ausencia de propiedad y sinónimo de acceso atrapados en la imposibilidad de cooperar, abierto asociados con frecuencia, al deterioro POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

38 de los bienes. Su concepción cuestiona las las decisiones sobre el uso y control de los nociones de propiedad de los distintos polos bienes. Asume plenamente el valor de la del espectro político. Define a la propiedad certeza de los derechos de propiedad para colectiva como “propiedad privada colectiva”, generar perspectivas de largo plazo en el uso en la que—a diferencia de la propiedad pública y protección de los recursos, pero identifica —existen titulares reconocidos de derechos y a la propiedad colectiva como un régimen de responsabilidades respecto a los bienes, y bajo propiedad capaz de generar certeza. Encuentra la cual al igual que en regímenes de propiedad que en muchos contextos los derechos de privada individual—los titulares poseen uso y decisión crean sentido patrimonial, derechos de excluir a los no propietarios, perspectivas e incentivos de largo plazo; impidiendo el libre acceso abierto. mientras que los derechos de alienación no resultan indispensables en todos los casos En la crítica de Ostrom a Hardin, se señala para crear compromisos con la sustentabilidad la confusión generada por el uso indistinto de los bienes, sino que en algunos contextos de las categorías de “bienes comunes” y generan incertidumbre y vulneran la gestión propiedad colectiva. (Schlager y Ostrom, 1992; colectiva de bienes de “acceso común”. Ostrom et.al., 2001; Ostrom, 2009; Potetee, Jansen, Ostrom, 2011). Los tipos de bienes La aplicación de este marco a un gran número se definen: por los costos de excluir usuarios de casos, así como un amplio meta-análisis potenciales del acceso a los bienes y por el (Potetee, Jansen, Ostrom, 2011) llevan a nivel de “rivalidad” (implicaciones que el concluir que ningún régimen de propiedad es uso de los bienes tiene en el uso potencial de garantía de conservación de los recursos, ni nuevos usuarios), (Ostrom 1990). Reconoce se asocia invariablemente con su deterioro. cuatro tipos de bienes: públicos,5 de uso Existen tanto casos de bienes comunes (acceso, o acervo) común , tarifa y privados. naturales (y culturales) conservados, como Esta tipología permite visibilizar los retos casos de bienes comunes deteriorados en que enfrentan el gobierno y uso sostenido regímenes de propiedad pública, privada de distintos bienes. Estos retos derivan de individual y colectiva. La explicación del éxito o las formas en que la apropiación (uso) de los fracaso de la gestión colectiva y la construcción bienes se lleva a cabo y de los costos de su de esquemas de gobernanza de los bienes mantenimiento y protección (provisión). Las comunes requiere atender a la distribución de presiones de apropiación tienden a ser más derechos entre actores, a las desigualdad del importantes para los bienes de alta rivalidad: acceso a derechos, poder y activos (Ostrom privados y de uso común. Las presiones de 2009) y a los incentivos para un determinado provisión resultan más relevantes para la tipo de uso e inversión en reglas y acciones de conservación de bienes de difícil exclusión: protección. públicos y de uso común. De ahí que los bienes de uso común, como la mayoría de los En distintas áreas forestales de África, sistemas y recursos naturales, sean los bienes Asia y América Latina existen altos niveles potencialmente más vulnerables. Por otra de deforestación en tierras públicas parte los regímenes de propiedad se refieren a concesionadas a empresas madereras los titulares de la propiedad: los individuos y el externas con incentivos de maximizar el Estado. uso de los recursos en el corto plazo (White and Martin, 2002). Las tierras de propiedad Ostrom cuestiona la noción6 generalizada privada—individual o colectiva—no son que reduce los derechos de propiedad a inmunes al deterioro en ausencia de incentivos los derechos de alienación , destacando para su uso sustentable y altas7 tasas de la importancia de los derechos de acceso, descuento de la conservación . Estos son exclusión, uso y capacidad de participar en los motivos de la sustitución de selvas por 56 “Common pool resources”, 7 Compra, venta, renta, hipoteca. Frecuentemente como resultado de políticas públicas y demandas de mercado.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

39 plantaciones de soja en terrenos privados certificadas por el FSC en México, las10 de la Amazonia y el Chaco en Sudamérica reservas indígenas “extractivistas” en la y del deterioro de los bosques comunales Amazonia brasileña, los bosques comunitarios en Papua-Nueva Guinea concesionados a dedicados al uso doméstico en condiciones empresas transnacionales. Durante los años de alta presión demográfica y pobreza en 1970-2000 muchas comunidades mexicanas la India y Nepal y los bosques sagrados del optaron por deforestar en respuesta a los Sahel Africano (Larsson, Barry, Dahal and subsidios a la expansión de la ganadería y Pierce Colfer, 2010) hablan del potencial de agricultura en tierras forestales; en ausencia la propiedad colectiva para la conservación. de incentivos para conservar (en contextos de En estos casos los factores determinantes en vedas generalizadas al uso de los bosques). las dinámicas de deterioro o conservación Actualmente la minería de es un factor han sido la equidad de la distribución de central de destrucción forestal en América derechos entre actores sociales, la estructura Latina. En México las concesiones mineras de incentivos a que da lugar y su “anidamiento en zonas montaña se incrementaron en 30% en los sistemas de gobernanza” locales y entre 2006-2012, incluyendo terrenos donde nacionales. algunas comunidades han establecido8 áreas de conservación comunitaria. Durante la mayor parte del siglo XX, México fue el único país en el mundo donde la Los bosques públicos conservados propiedad forestal comunitaria contaba presentan muchas veces condiciones de con reconocimiento legal, a pesar de que baja densidad de población, valoración continuamente los derechos de propiedad ciudadana y capacidades financieras de comunitarios han sido vistos como obstáculos los gobiernos. Son los casos de distintos para intereses públicos y de empresas parques nacionales en los Estados Unidos, privadas. Entre los 1950 y 1980 los bosques Canadá y Europa Occidental, o de las comunitarios fueron concesionados a Reservas de la Biósfera de Calakmul y Tikal empresas externas para la extracción en las zonas turísticas de la selva maya en comercial de madera, convirtiéndose en México y Guatemala. La conservación de importantes activos para las finanzas públicas bosques públicos se ha logrado a partir de y fuente de fáciles ganancias para esas la participación social con base en prácticas empresas. En los años 1980, como resultado de gobernanza tradicional en los bosques de la movilización de las comunidades de los cantones suizos en los Alpes, en los forestales, concluyeron oficialmente bosques municipales del Totonicapan en las concesiones. A partir de los 1990 al Guatemala; o en las selvas de propiedad extenderse la preocupación por los servicios nacional concesionados a comunidades eco-sistémicos de los bosques, la propiedad locales para su aprovechamiento y comunitaria ha sido tratada como causa certificados por el Forest Stewardship Council central del deterioro forestal. Los diagnósticos en el Petén Guatemalteco, cuya capacidad suelen ignorar los impactos de las políticas para contener la expansión9 de la ganadería que durante décadas promovieron el y de cultivos ilícitos de enervantes en la cambio de uso del suelo o expropiaron a las selva es hoy mayor que las Áreas Naturales comunidades de derechos de uso, decisión y Protegidas en esa región. Las propiedades exclusión, imponiéndoles concesiones y vedas privadas—individuales o familiare—en al uso de los bosques. En muchos casos estas Finlandia y Austria, han producido madera políticas llevaron a las comunidades a percibir de manera sostenida durante generaciones. los derechos de propiedad forestal como Las comunidades productoras forestales inciertos.

8 El área de conservación de Capulalpam, Oaxaca, de altísima biodiversidad, donde nacen abundantes manantiales fue concesionada en 2005 a una minera canadiense; a pesar de que esta comunidad cuenta con amplio reconocimiento por su compromiso con la conservación9 y con la certificación de buen manejo forestal del FSC. 10 Mariguana y amapolas utilizadas para la producción de opio y morfina. Donde se recolectan resinas, nueces.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

40 PANACEAS, COOPERACIÓN, GOBERNANZA Y CONSERVACIÓN Para Ostrom los individuos actúan de manera diferente en distintos contextos: tienden a comportarse de manera competitiva y La segunda gran ruptura de Ostrom con el oportunista en condiciones de mercado, pensamiento económico convencional es pero aprenden normas de interacción, y el cuestionamiento de la universalidad del utilizan racionalidades distintas en diferentes paradigma de la “elección racional”, de la contextos. (Ostrom y Walker; 2003). La búsqueda del beneficio económico individual acción colectiva no está dada, su construcción como móvil exclusivo de la conducta social. implica costos y dilemas significativos. Asumir Las implicaciones del paradigma del individuo riesgos de cooperar requiere credibilidad como “maximizador racional” rebasan las del compromiso de los pares, visiones fronteras de la academia. En diversos análisis compartidas sobre los bienes colectivos y Ostrom alerta contra el riesgo de panaceas las presiones a que están sujetos; acuerdos políticas basadas en el supuesto de la sobre las reglas que sustentan la cooperación, incapacidad de cooperación, que conducen evidencia del cumplimiento de los otros y persistentemente a prescripciones de de la preservación de los bienes como fruto concentración de derechos en manos de unos de esos esfuerzos. Estas no son condiciones cuantos. La contraparte de 11los esquemas de espontáneas sino construidas a partir de la concentración de derechos es la privación de interacción, la agencia, los esfuerzos sociales derechos sobre los bienes comunes naturales y políticos; que pueden estar ausentes o o culturales, de carácter local o regional para presentes en distintas medidas en diversos la mayoría de sus usuarios, incluyendo a los casos. La crítica del modelo del “dilema grupos que dependan de ellos, valoran su del prisionero” (Ostrom, 1990) reconoce presencia y conocen sus dinámicas. el valor que tienen para la cooperación el conocimiento previo entre los actores Sin negar el papel de los mercados y los (reputación) y la comunicación al interior estados en la vida social, la investigación de de los grupos. Aprender a confiar a partir Ostrom muestra repetidamente resultados de la experiencia colectiva, es clave para la 13 inesperados, incluso perversos de la superación de los “dilemas de lo colectivo” imposición unilateral de panaceas, que califica (Cárdenas, 2007). Ostrom asume que las como disfuncionales: concentración de poder12 tragedias de lo colectivo son extensas: “cuando y de beneficios en élites, inequidad social las decisiones que se toman de forma anónima toma de decisiones ajenas a las condiciones la sobre-explotación es mayor que la prevista y necesidades locales, destrucción o por los modelos teóricos” (Ostrom, 2009), “saturación” (Ostrom, 2007; Cárdenas, 2007) sin embargo en su visión hay espacio para el de la institucionalidad local y de las formas “optimismo racional”: la evidencia muestra de cooperación comunitarias, obstaculizando que cuando los usuarios tienen posibilidad de paradójicamente la destrucción de los bienes diseñar sus propios esquemas de monitoreo comunes que se quiere proteger. Panaceas y sanción y discutir “cara a cara” sobre sus que resultan en actores locales carentes de visiones, conflictos y reglas, los resultados de capacidades y/o incentivos para proteger la cooperación son casi “óptimos” (Ostrom los bienes y actores externos empoderados, 2009). Otras condiciones que favorecen la con capacidades de acción local insuficientes acción colectiva en torno a la gestión de los e inadecuadas y posibilidad de abuso bienes comunes son: un nivel relevante de de los bienes, en casos de los mercados dependencia de los bienes, de modo que dominados crecientemente por corporaciones existan incentivos para construir y aplicar internacionales (Dauvergne, 2008). reglas colectivas con perspectivas de largo

11 12 Junto a la gran concentración creada por los mercados globales y la globalización de la orientación de las políticas ambientales. 13 Que Richard Wilkinson y Pikett propone considerar como un “mal público” (Wilinson and Pickett, 2010). Estos dilemas derivan de la contradicción entre la búsqueda de beneficios individuales y los posibles beneficios colectivos.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

41 plazo; bajos costos de la cooperación y la técnicas y de gobernanza ha tenido un conservación, ausencia de abuso de los bienes papel fundamental. En distintos periodos colectivos basado en inequidad e impunidad 14 algunas políticas públicas, organismos no que erosionan drásticamente el capital social gubernamentales y agencias de cooperación de los grupos. Los liderazgos y las políticas y conservación internacionales han apoyado15 son pueden contribuir a movilizar la agencia el desarrollo de capacidades comunitarias . grupal y acercar visiones, promoviendo Entre las lecciones aprendidas de estas prácticas de comunicación, construcción iniciativas destacan; el valor del respeto institucional y espacios de resolución de y apoyo al capital social y gobernanza conflictos. (Ostrom, 1990). comunitarias, como sostén de las empresas colectivas y las iniciativas de conservación de La gestión centralizada impera en las agendas los bienes comunes forestales. La importancia de las agencias multilaterales y en las de promover visiones compartidas de políticas nacionales, a pesar de la evidencia los territorios y recursos comunitarios y de su frecuente inviabilidad (Ostrom, 2007). desarrollar reglas basadas en el consenso Siguiendo esta inercia, las políticas de para el gobierno de los bienes comunes. conservación, pago por servicios ambientales El reconocimiento de las comunidades y mitigación del cambio climático suelen locales y sus espacios de organización como imponer a las poblaciones rurales del “Sur interlocutores y contrapartes necesarios de Global” costos desproporcionados de la las políticas públicas de sustentabilidad16 y protección de los bienes “comunes globales”, conservación. Un estudio reciente revela en contextos nacionales donde el desarrollo la existencia de estrecha correlación entre de incentivos, el aprendizaje adaptativo y las actividades y medida de protección y la ciudadanización de la conservación son conservación de los bosques, con el nivel de incipientes. En México el gobierno federal organización y confianza en las comunidades mantiene fuertes derechos de regulación sobre y el desarrollo de actividades productivas los bosques que se traducen en una marcada forestales. (Merino y Martínez, 2013; sobre-regulación, a pesar de las escasas Merino 2012). También se encontró que en capacidades gubernamentales de vigilancia comunidades con mayor capital social, con y sanción de los usos forestales ilegales. ingresos y empleo17 forestales, las presiones Las actividades de producción y vigilancia sobre los bosques son menores. comunitarias enfrentan fuertes exigencias y costos, mientras que los usos ilegales La sustentabilidad de bienes comunes de prevalecen con alto nivel de impunidad importancia regional y nacional (las cuencas (Merino y Ortiz, 2013) hidrológicas) o global (el sistema clima, la biodiversidad, los océanos o la atmósfera) Durante las pasadas tres décadas, en algunas no implica que para su gobernanza basten regiones de México, a partir de las luchas los derechos y la actuación de los estados contra las concesiones, diversas comunidades nacionales o las agencias internacionales. En forestales han desarrollado experiencias tanto se trata de sistemas complejos, cuyas de buen manejo y uso de los bosques. Los condiciones son frecuentemente resultado bosques y la inversión comunitaria para de la “anidación” de bienes comunes y la producción forestal son hoy nuevos de prácticas de menor escala (bosques, activos comunitarios. En la construcción y pesquerías, prácticas agrícolas y ganaderas consolidación de estas iniciativas el esfuerzo en territorios específicos, patrones regionales por el desarrollo de capacidades locales de consumo de energía y consumo) su

14 15 Capital social entendido como: confianza, redes y normas (Ahn y Ostrom, 2003). Destacan el Programa de Conservación y Manejo Forestal Comunitario, el de Conservación Indígena de la Biodiversida, el Corredor Biológico16 Mesoamericano y el Consejo Civil Mexicano para la Silvicultura Sustentable entre otros. 17 Con base en entrevistas en 102 comunidades Se consideraron indicadores de presión: la presencia en las áreas forestales de incendios, plagas, cultivos ilícitos y extracciones ilegales.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

42 gestión requiere esquemas de gobernanza de densidad demográfica, escasez y pobreza complejos, capaces de responder a presiones se han generado también experiencias de y condiciones de bienes de distintos tipos y cooperación para la construcción de nuevos escalas, cuyo manejo requiere la coordinación bienes comunes: represas para captar agua de actores, ubicados en distintas escalas, de lluvia en la región Nahua de Guerrero;19 con diversos intereses, percepciones y cooperativas rurales de crédito popular , derechos; sistemas de gobernanza que Ostrom creación de empresas comunitarias para: la caracteriza como “policéntricos (Ostrom, producción orgánica de café, miel, maíz, frijol, 2012).POBLACIÓN, POBREZA Y madera, muebles, agua de manantial, resinas, CONSERVACIÓN artesanías, flores, hongos, para su certificación y comercialización, y para la prestación de servicios de turismo comunitario, Un tercer paradigma cuestionado por Ostrom construcción de escuelas, bibliotecas y centros se refiere a la supuesta la relación unívoca de internet financiados con recursos de entre el crecimiento de la población y la comunidades campesinas pobres. pobreza y la destrucción de la naturaleza. El envejecimiento de las poblaciones y el Uno de los ejes de argumentación de la “TBC” despoblamiento de las regiones—crecientes es el riesgo apocalíptico del crecimiento en el campo en México y Sudamérica—tienen demográfico—que se supone es siempre a menudo como consecuencia la debilidad exponencial. Si bien las poblaciones humanas local para proteger y restaurar áreas ejercen presión sobre los sistemas naturales forestales, cuerpos de agua, fauna silvestre y de los que dependen en gran medida los suelos, recursos que enfrentan20 ya sean usos pobres rurales del mundo, en sus decisiones ilícitos o presiones naturales . En algunas y prácticas de uso y manejo de los recursos regiones de baja densidad demográfica, los naturales influyen18 los incentivos y las bienes comunes han sido deteriorados como instituciones , que a su vez dependen de la resultado de prácticas de ganadería extensiva, valoración, percepción y conocimiento local agricultura industrial21 con alto uso de insumos de los ecosistemas por parte de los actores químicos22 y agua , de cultivos ilícitos y sociales, del nivel de confianza existente entre crimen. ellos y de los costos de oportunidad de la Dos importantes análisis recientes sobre sustentabilidad. el cambio ambiental global exponen como Desde los años 1990 la investigación empírica patrones de relación población-naturaleza encontró que las relaciones población- determinantes de este proceso: una fuerte pobreza-conservación distan de ser lineares relación entre los altos niveles de consumo y se caracterizan por su complejidad. Se han y producción globalizados y la destrucción documentado experiencias de conservación de los bienes comunes ambientales globales y sustentabilidad en condiciones de pobreza y locales (Dauvergne, 2008; Merino, 2013), y alta densidad poblacional: en bosques de y una fuerte relación negativa entre el India y Nepal; en el Totonicapan Guatemalteco nivel de desigualdad social, el capital social y en la Sierra Nahua-Totonaca de México. y la disposición a asumir compromisos Además de la densidad de población y su ambientales (Wilkinson and Pikett, 2010). pobreza, estos casos tienen en común: alta Más allá de cierto nivel de desarrollo, dependencia y valoración de los recursos el crecimiento de la economía tiende a forestales, clara percepción de su escasez, incrementar la desigualdad y el consumismo derechos locales de uso y regulación, y fuertes —fuente clave de presiones ambientales. tradiciones de gestión local. En contextos Estas propuestas demandan análisis y 18 19 Las instituciones se definen como patrones de interacción que a fuerza de repetirse se instituyen. 20 Promovidas por la Asociación Mexicana de Uniones de Crédito en contextos de alta marginación. 21 Cuya magnitud e incertidumbre se han incrementado a partir de los procesos de Cambio Ambiental Global. 22 Los suelos y cuerpos de agua del Valle Central de California se encuentran entre los más contaminados en los Estados Unidos. Frecuente en los estados de Guerrero, Michoacán, Durango y Chihuahua en México.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

43 políticas conservación de mayor complejidad Nobel de Economía paradigmático que y diversidad que aquellas que consideran reconoció la importancia global del gobierno el ejercicio de los derechos de los pobres, de los bienes comunes, con certeza el Premio como opuesto a la conservación, enfocadas Nobel de Economía que ha generado mayor en criminalizar o impedirles el uso de los alegría alrededor del mundo. Elinor Ostrom territorios naturales. falleció el 11 de Junio de 2012 dejando como herencia un impulso formidable de renovación Propongo una redacción alternativa para dar a la investigación socio-ambiental, basado mayor claridad: Estas propuestas demandan en nuevas formas de práctica académica análisis y políticas conservación de mayor y de pensar la acción social, así como una complejidad y diversidad que aquellas extensa comunidad académica y activista enfocadas en criminalizar o impedir el uso comprometida con la continuidad de su legado de los territorios naturales a los habitantes de búsqueda de equidad y práctica cotidiana locales por considerar el ejercicio de sus Rdeeferencias la democracia. CONCLUSIONESderechos como opuesto a la conservación.

Foundations of Social Capital. Ahn, T.K. y Elinor Ostrom (eds). 2003. La Teoría de la Acción Colectiva busca rebasar Cheltenham, UK: los esquemas ideológicos sobre la gestión de Edward Elgar Publishing. los bienes, reformulando las preguntas sobre The Community Forests of Mexico: Bray, David, Leticia Merino y Deborah Barry. su gobernanza, reconociendo la complejidad Managing for Sustainable Landscapes 2005. de los sistemas socio-ambientales que analiza. . Austin, Propone: sustituir los debates sobre las TX: Texas University Press. La virtudes o lastres intrínsecos a los regímenes experiencia de las comunidades forestales de de propiedad por cuestionamientos en torno MéxicoBray, David y Leticia Merino. 2004. a las condiciones que permiten a los grupos superar los dilemas de la acción colectiva; . Instituto Nacional de Ecología, Ciudad Dilemas de lo investigar los factores que favorecen la de México. Colectivo: Instituciones, Pobreza y Cooperación regulación local adaptada a condiciones socio- enCárdenas, el Manejo Juan Local Camilo. de Los 2009. Recursos de Uso ambientales únicas y favorecer la construcción Común de sistemas de gobernanza policéntricos capaces de asumir los retos de gestión de . Universidad de Los Andes, Facultad de sistemas complejos. La respuesta no son las Economía, Bogotá. Silent Spring comunidades vistas como panacea; los estados y mercados tienen papeles importantes en Carlson, Rachel. 1962. . New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.The Shadows of esta construcción, pero generalmente el peso Consumption: Consequences for the Global de la comunidad local es determinante en Environment.Dauvergne. Peter. 2008. el éxito o fracaso de la gestión de los bienes comunes. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute for Technology. The Population Bomb Coherente con el espíritu de optimismo racional, Lin Ostrom fue practicante Ehrlich, Paul. 1972. . New convencida de la acción colectiva académica, York: Ballantine Books. Science durante más de 40 años cientos de Hardin, Garret. 1968. “The tragedy of the estudiantes, y académicos visitantes de más commons”. 162(3859): 1243-1248. de 40 países participamos en el hoy llamado “Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop for ForestsLarson, forAnne People. M., Deborah Community Barry, Rights Ganga and Ram Political Theory and Policy Analysis”. En ForestDahal yTenure Carol J.Reform Pierce Colfer (eds). 2010. 2009 Lin fue distinguida con el “Sveriges . London, UK: Earthscan. Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel Nóbel”. Un Premio Linebaugh, Peter y Marcus Rediker. 2001. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

44 The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic. Ostrom, Elinor, Marco A. Janssen, y John M. Anderies. 2007. “Going beyond panaceas”. Boston, MA: Beacon PNAS 104:15176-15178. Press. Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary The Limits of Growth MethodsOstrom, Elinorfrom Experimental y James Walker Research (eds). 2003. Meadows, Donella, Garry Madoc, J. Randers y William Behren. 1972. . . New New York: Universe Books. York: Russell Sage Foundation. Merino, Leticia. 2013. “Conservation and forest Community Ostrom, Elinor,The Thomas Drama ofDietz, the CommonsNives Dolsak, Actioncommunities for Conservation: in Mexico: MexicanAn ongoing Experience struggle Paul C. Stern, Susan Stonich y Elke U. Weber over forest property rights”. En, (eds). 2001. . , Washington, D.C.: The National Academies editado por Luciana Porter-Bolland, Isabel Press. Governing the Commons: Ruiz-Mallen, Claudia Camacho-Benavides, y The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Sussanah McCandless. New York: Springer ActionOstrom, Elinor. 1990. Books. Encuentros y Desencuentros: La política forestal . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Merino, Leticia y Gabriela Ortiz. 2013. en tiempos de transición política Press. Working Together: Collective Action, . Miguel Ángel thePoteete, Commons, Amy, MarcoMultiple Janssen Methods y Elinor in Practice Ostrom. Porrúa e Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales 2010. de la UNAM, Ciudad de México. . A Vuelo de Pájaro: Las condiciones de las Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press. comunidadesMerino, Leticia con y Anabosques Eugenia templados Martínez. en México 2013. Schlager, Edella y Elinor Ostrom. 1992.Land . Economics“Property rights regimes and natural Comisión Nacional para el Uso y Conocimiento resources: A conceptual analysis”. Conservación o de la Biodiversidad, México, 2013. 68(3): 249-262.El siglo XX en el campo Deterioro. El impacto de las políticas públicas en México: Siglo de luces y sombras enMerino, las comunidades Leticia. 2004. y en los bosques de México Warman, Arturo. 2000. . Fondo de . Cultura Económica: CiudadLos indiosde México. mexicanos Instituto Nacional de Ecología, Ciudad de en el umbral del milenio México. Warman, Arturo. 2003. . Fondo de Cultura Ostrom, Elinor. 2012. “Green from the Económica: Ciudad de México Who grassroots”. Publicado electronicamente por Owns the World’s Forests? Proyect Syndicate ‘A World of Ideas’, en Junio White, Andy y Alejandra Martin. 2002. 12 de 2012. Disponsible en: http://www. Forest Tenure and project-syndicate.org/commentary/green- Public Forests in Transition. Washington, from-the-grassroots Beyond Markets and D.C.: Forest Trends / Center for International States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Environmental Law. EconomicOstrom, Elinor. Systems 2009. The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for EveryoneWilkinson, Richard y Kate Pickett. 2010. . Nobel Prize Lecture, given on December 8, 2009, Stockholm, Sweden. . London, UK: Penguin Books.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

An Assessment of Community Management of Traditional Woodland Enclosures (Hiza’ti) in the Highlands4 of Eritrea Bereket Tsehaye Haile An Assessment of Community Management of Traditional Woodland Enclosures (Hiza’ti) in the Highlands of Eritrea Bereket Tsehaye Haile1

Abstract

In rural4 Eritrea, people’s lives are closely linked to local natural resources. Villages in the hiza’ti highlands of Eritrea have a long-standing tradition of forest and woodlands management. The system (traditional woodland enclosure), which is practiced by systematically restricting grazing and biomass harvesting, is one example. However, efforts to understandhiza’ti such traditions and assess their effectiveness as management systems have been limited. This research explores how communities manage their traditional woodland enclosures ( ) and assess their effectiveness, through qualitative research conducted in the village of Lamza. Four focus group discussions were conducted in addition to several key informant and household-head interviews. Ostrom’s Design Principles for commons management were then used to analyse the robustness of the management regime. The study found that the village held a strong attachment with their natural resources and traditions of managing the local woodland. The community played a major role in protecting and monitoring their enclosure, with a mutual monitoring and sanctioning system that was commensurate with the benefits that villagers drew from the woodland enclosure. Analysis shows that the hiza’ti system fulfills most of Ostrom’s design principles through a robust set of institutional arrangements. However, the study identified potential threats to Design Principles three and seven, particularly in relation to interferencebaito from lower level government institutions that may affect collective choice among the villagers, as well as other actors that threaten to weaken the autonomy of the village assembly ( ) and their right to organise. Keywords: Traditional woodland enclosure (Hiza’ti), Common Pool Recourses (CPRs), Ostrom, Design Principles, Eritrea

1 School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK, Email [email protected]

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

48 INTRODUCTION

traditional practices and evaluate their effectiveness. This study thus looks to assess Eritrea is an agrarian state located in the the current role played by local communities horn of Africa. From a total population of 6.2 in managing woodland enclosures and to million people (July 2013 estimate), 80% of appraise the effectiveness (robustness) Eritreans depend on traditional agriculture, of their management using the criteria characterised by rain-fed subsistence farming developed by Nobel Laureate, Elinor Ostrom. and a pastoral livestock system relying While Garrett Hardin (1968) suggested primarily on family labour (NSEO and ORC that communal resources will inevitably Marco, 2003; Sibhatu, 2006). In rural areas, suffer overexploitation unless transferred to people interact daily with their natural private or government ownership, he failed environment, and have acquired significant to recognise that commons can be managed knowledge in the use and management of by a group of users with exclusive rights to their shared (communal) resources. If such regulate the resource under customary tenure resources are utilized without regulation, arrangements, with effective local institutions they are exploited on “a first-come, first- enabling user access to be regulated. It was served” basis (Gebremedhin et al. 2003), Ostrom’s work, The usefulness possibly resulting in their eventual depletion. in particular, that and validity Communities tackle the problem of openly challenged overexploitation by crafting local institutions the limitations of of Ostrom’s to regulate and ensure the sustainable use of Hardin’s thesis design these communal resources. and argued for principles solutions beyond Several villages in the highlands of Eritreahiza’ti state or private have been have a management system in place for property (Ostrom shown in their hiza’titheir forests and woodlands called 1990). (traditional woodland enclosure). The application in system is practiced by systematically Due to the complex CPR studies interactions that restricting grazing and biomass harvesting. over the past The main objective is to enhance the natural link society and regeneration of thosehiza’ti native species that environment, two decades. contribute to sustaining local community analysing the livelihoods. The system is believed to effectiveness of have started when a shortage of firewood common property and pastoral resources began toHiza’ti impact rural regimes is no communities, and rules were established easy task (Ostrom 2007). Most of the ‘success to ration their use (FAO 1997). are factors’ are site specific, while Agrawal (2001) managed and monitored by local communities, argued that the variables that determine the with monitoring taking place either through success of Common Pool Resource (CPR) a rotational scheme that each household institutions are numerous, correlated and is obliged to participate in, or by hiring interrelated. Nonetheless, some common permanent guards whose salaries are paid attributes are shared by many successful collectively (Sibhatu 2006). common propertyGoverning management the Commons systems (Ostrom 1990; Tucker 1999). In her ground- Despite the rich tapestry of grassroots forest breaking work, , management practices evident in Eritrea, Ostrom (1990) pointed to eight general design government policymakers have, on the whole, principles characteristic of successful CPR ignored them. The top-down approach of institutions (Table 1). According to Ostrom, deploying government-appointed forest a design principle refers to “an essential guards and enacting strict regulation is still element or condition that helps to account for the predominant management approach in the the success of these institutions in sustaining country, with minimal efforts to understand the CPRs and gaining the compliance of POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

49 Design Principles

Clearly defined boundaries and users Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions Collective choice arrangement;

those affected by operational rules should be allowed to participateMonitoring; and modify the rules. monitors who actively audit common pool resource conditions and users’ behaviourGraduated are sanctions; users and/or are accountable to them. sanctions to violation increase proportionally relative to the severityConflict ofresolution crimes mechanism; Low cost, readily accessible and rapid mechanism to settleRights conflicts to organise; rights and legitimacy of users to devise their own institutions is recognisedNested Enterprises by outsiders Table 1: Design principles that(for characterise CPRs that long areenduring part CPR of larger institutions. systems) (Source: Ostrom 1990:90)

generation after generation of appropriators resource management tradition and limited to the rules in the use” (1990: 90). Rather government involvement. Lamza is located than acting as a checklist for deciding the about 8km south of the national capital of robustness of local institutions, the design Asmara, and had a resident population of 430 principles are better understood as guides to (128 households) in 2012. help analyse the relative success or failure of institutional arrangements for CPRs (Ostrom Four focus group discussions were conducted, 1999). numbering between 4 and 6 participants per group and representative of adult men and The usefulness and validity of Ostrom’s design women of different ages. Each focus group also principles has been shown in their application contained participants representing a variety in CPR studies over the past two decades. Cox of socio-economic backgrounds. To help et al. (2010) analysed 91 such studies and provoke discussion on a range of issues related found that Ostrom’s design principles are to the access, management and protection well supported empirically. The principles of their enclosures, several exercises were also have their limitations, with some (e.g., carried out, including resource mapping, plant Singleton and Taylor 1992; Tucker et al. resource valuation, and seasonal resource 2007) arguing that issues such as external availability. In-depth interviews (with open socioeconomic factors and urban connections ended questions) were also conducted have not been adequately considered given with the village administrator and other their clear impact on CPR management selected village elders. To obtain a detailed METHODOLOGYregimes. understanding of how individual households interact with resources from the enclosure, and abide by set rules, a semi-structured questionnaire was also conducted with ten For this study, qualitative research was (8 male and 2 female) randomly selected used to assess the management of Eritrea’s household heads. traditional woodland enclosures. The village of Lamza was selected due to its strong The data collected were analysed against POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

50 Map 1: Location of Lamza, Eritrea (Cartography by Marcel Morin)

hiza’ti Ostrom’s design principles. The strength of the road, which leads to the village, bisects the system in fulfilling the criteria of each hiza’tienclosure. Each side is open in turn for grazing EVALUATINGdesign principle THE was HIZA’TIthen evaluated. SYSTEM for approximately two months each year. The USING OSTROM’S DESIGN PRINCIPLES is rich in planthiza’ti species. Elders estimate that there are 35 types of tree and shrub hiza’ti species withinhiza’ti the .

The system in Lamza was established How does the system perform against about 120 years ago. It was widely held that Ostrom’s Design Principles for community- a community leader named Kentiba Zere had Designbased natural Principle resource 1: Clearly management? defined initiated the practice of restricting access to boundaries and users local woodlands in fear that Italian soldiers (Eritrea was a colony of Italy at the time) hiza’ti would cut down trees for timber. Subsequent The has clear boundaries, both in terms administrators continued to restrict access to of resource and resource users. Distinctive these areas, devising several rules and bylaws hiza’ti features such as a river, a basaltic dyke and to help govern resource use and access. The other features separate Lamza’s from village has several specialised grazing areas the land of neighbouring villages. Village for small ruminants, for suckling sheep and hiza’ti houses form the southern border. Use rights goats and freehiza’ti grazing areas for all kinds of livestock. Compared to these other grazing of any resource within the belong solely lands, the area is strictly managed and to residents of Lamza village. Since everyone reservedhiza’ti mainly for oxen. knows each other very well, it is very easy for users to identify one another. Residence status The is located north of the village and is gained by birth or through marriage to a covers about 130 ha (Map 2). The dry-weather resident, and non-residents are prohibited POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

51 Map 2: Map of Lamza (Reconstructed from FGD resource mapping)

hiza’ti hiza’ti from accessing the . Lamza residents cut any more than is needed. Similarly, rules do not share resources within the with exist around the collection of firewood.negdet Every any neighbouring village—in this way, what villager is allowed to collect dry fallen wood is managed and by who is clear to community three times a year: mid-March for (a Designmembers. Principle 2: Congruence between religious festival); around Newacacia Year; etbaica and, at appropriation and provision rules / local Easter. In addition, for funerals and weddings, conditions three bundles of seraw tree ( ) are permitted, although for weddings the hiza’ti bridegroom’s family’s quota can include a couple of extra bundles for firewood during The opening and closing of the hiza’ti the honeymoon. coincides withhiza’ti the farming season. Only oxen are allowed to graze inside the . Each The operational rules that govern the side of the is grazed for two months a appropriationhiza’ti (use) of resources fit the local year; with one side of the hiza’ti open from situation in the village, and it is this ability the beginning of May to the middle of July, of the to meet the specific needs of hiza’tiand the other side opening at the end of July villagers thathiza’ti appear to be the crucial factor and closing at the end of September. The behind its effective protection. If benefits plays a major role in the recuperation from the area were not commensurate of sick or injured oxen and castrated calves, with the efforts required to protect and which are allowed to graze even during the manage it, local people would not be so closed season, pending special permission diligent in their stewardship of the resource. from the village administrator. It is strictly The study showed that residents believe the prohibited to take firewood or grass from the rules to be both fair hiza’tiand legitimate. Indeed, enclosure to sell in nearby towns. Users are all respondents were satisfied with current only permitted to take what is needed for their management of the and want future household consumption. For example, under administration of the enclosure to be left to supervision, villagers are allowed to use local the community. Moreover, they agreed that trees to make farm tools. However, villagers without rules to govern access, the resources know which branch is suitable for a specific within the enclosure would be severely tool, and guards ensure that users do not degraded. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

52 The fact that only a limited number of oxen Designrelevance Principle and autonomy 4: Monitoring can be diluted. and less destructive activities (e.g. carving farm tools, bee keeping, grazing of sick oxen etc.) are permitted is indicative that hiza’ti Every resident is under the obligation to the operational rules in place are tied to monitor and safeguard the and to bring the capacity of the resource to regenerate. rule-breakers to the attention of the guard These rules not only prevent outsiders from or the village council. Residents are always accessing the area but also regulate use-rate attentive to movements within the enclosure among eligible members, pointing to clear and able to quickly spot and report unlawful congruence between appropriation and activities. Designprovision Principle rules. 3: Collective choice baito arrangement One guard is officially appointed by the village , who also decide how much each household should contribute to the guard’s hiza’ti Though no separate institution exists for salary. On the top of his base salary, fines managing the or woodlands, there is a levied also go to the guard, making their pay roughly equivalent to that of a university- traditional administration system in LamzaBaito educated government employee and thus Adithat manages several activities in accordance with local customary laws. This is called attractive in an area where wages are generally (village assembly) and is the space where low. This helps to minimise the opportunity cost for guards, who have to forego the income important and divisive issues canbaito be debated baito Abo guasa and decided upon, including the management they could potentially earn from farming. The also appoints an (father of of local natural resources.hiza’ti The devises laws, ensures the equitable allocation of herders), who is responsible for overseeing resources from the and settles any the activities of both guards and herders, and conflicts over resource use and allocation. holds power to enforce punishments and hiza’tilisten to the appeals of those charged. The In Lamza, every inhabitantbaito has the right to most common transgressions in relation to the participate and give his or her opinion in the are grazing out of season and illegal tree village baito. The has both judiciary cutting. Generally, all residents follow the rules and legislative elements. In this way, the and most culprits are outsiders. According appointment of new guards, the amount of to the village administrator, this is because (or any modifications to) a guard’s salary, and the resources of neighbouring villages were the contribution of each household towards depletedzeraa long ago. that salary, takes place at these meetings. The system is used in monitoring and Each participanthiza’ti has the right to raise, discuss and debate issues related to the operational safeguardinghiza’ti the area. This allows the guard to rules of the , and together craft and pass seize all livestock found to be grazing illegally new bylaws. Decisions are made based on inside the . The owner haszeraay to pay a fine consensus. to get the livestock back. For this reason the guard is commonly known as ‘ ’, which Althoughhiza’ti the baito system allows resource means “one who seizes livestock.” Besides users to modify operational rules affecting his power to seize livestock, the guard is also the , study participants did point to entitled to levy penalties to any offender the potential threat from government-ledbaito in accordancebaito with village bylaws. If the administrative structures that have the offender refuses to pay, the guard takesAbo him/guasa potential to interfere in the system and her to the to be judged by the village impose new baitorules that do not necessarily administrator and elders. Here, the reflect the needs of local communities. This is plays a key role in enforcing any punishment. because the is a customary rather than If the offender is from a neighbouring village statutory structure, and so without continued and refuses to pay the fine, the village recognition from government agencies their administrator takes the case to the offender’s POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

53 baito Design Principle 6: Conflict Resolution Mechanism village . He will accuse him/her based on the ‘law of the fathers’, which is highly baito respected in the area. Neighbouring villages hiza’ti The village listens to and settles conflicts. know that Lamza residents are very serious It is rare that a resident of Lamza will appeal about the system and thus often afraid to the nearby Ministry of Agriculture office of not only the guard but also Lamza residents. baito with regards to a resource-related conflict. The fact that monitoring is carried out by While Lamza’s is capable of settling resource users, means that mutual monitoring conflicts vis-à-vis resource use within the is extremely important. A quasi-voluntary village, respondents revealed that for issuesbaito form of compliance based around the idea of ‘I involving neighbouring villages, it is the ‘law will if you will’ is highly visible, and the reason of the fathers’, in combination with the why so few law breakers come from within the system, that creates access to what Ostrom Designcommunity. Principle 5: Graduated Sanctions refers to as “rapid, readily accessible and low cost local mediation” (Ostrom 1990). When this does not suffice, government agencies are hiza’ti asked to get involved. Punishments and sanctions designed to help Acknowledging the role of elders and local regulate the system have evolvedmelelik overtime. Fifty years ago, the punishment authorities in mediating conflicts and the for any illegal action was about nine importance of a low-cost justice system, the (about five kilos) of cereals per shepherd. government recently introduced ‘community Today, the punishment is based around courts’, whose decisions are officially monetary fines and tied to the rules being recognised by higher-level courts. The contravened:• presence of ‘community courts’ increase the 2 capacity of the village baito to settle conflicts, 10 Nakfa per cattle and 5 Nakfa per and again this is reflective of a strong internal • sheep/ goat for illegally grazing out of Designmediation Principle procedure. 7: Rights to Organise season 100 Nakfa for illegally cutting trees with • hiza’ti an axe Study participants said that government 25 Nakfa for illegally collecting dry and interventions in the management fallen wood with bare hands system have been minimal and generally In general, penalties and sanctions are limited to the provision of seedlings and graduated and increase based on offender technical assistance. While villagers view intent, degree of damage caused, and the their management system as largely self- offender’s past record. Generally, offences sufficient, with villagers holding the right in relation to grazing fall into one of two to devise their own rules, it is also true that Wererta they are held accountable to an official inter- categories. The first is unintentional damage village- institutional arrangement known as (known as ), typically when livestock memihidar kebabi, which typically comprises that’s browsing at the periphery of the of 3-4 neighbouring villages. The decisions of enclosure enters without being noticed by memihdar kebabi the baito prevail only if it does not contradict the herder. Though a punishable offense, it is the verdicts of . considered lessHasya serious and so the punishment less severe. Other categories cover deliberatehiza’ti At state levels, the Eritrean Forestry and illegal entry ( ), or when a herder Wildlife Conservation and Development intentionally leads his livestock into the Proclamation (No 115/2006; article 24) out of season. Since he is doing this knowingly, states that “communities… may utilize any the fine is much higher (usually double). naturally growing trees in accordance with the

2 1 Nakfa is equivalent to approximately USD$15

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54 management plan in which the government that Ostrom (1990) developed to characterise will have a role to play in the technical robust commons institutions and management assistance as required”. This proclamation systems. allows villagers to practice self-management The study provides an illustration of how in their woodland and/or woodlots, but3 within a framework of state ownership . The Ostrom’s Design Principles have stood the test Proclamation also states that government of time (Cox et al. 2010) as a tool to assess CPR can enter into agreement with community management, where trust and reciprocity is members where appropriate, for the crucial to sustaining collective action in the hiza’ti purpose of sustainable forest management, management of shared resources. afforestation and reforestation, protection of However, while the system of commons wildlife, watershed management and the like. management appears robust and successful in Both land and forest proclamations give terms of resource sustainability, this study also recognition to community-based resource shows how tenuous certain aspects of the system management and limit the ability of can be (in this case, the arrangements around government to interfere in situations where collective choice and the right to self-organise) stable management scenarios are being because of their dependence upon supportive achieved through customary means. However, government policy—a situation that can easily the power of local people to exercise their change with political upheaval at the state rights is not absolute and remains contingent level and/or the influence of evolving market upon it being in line with government policy economies. of the day. The State’s role in providing Yet despite the threat of upheaval, this study oversight is not, therefore, an immediate also shows how important it is to properly threat but still open to misuses of power that assess the effectiveness of local resource could potentially (andhiza’ti unilaterally) reduce the management efforts ahead of instituting benefits that Lamza residents receive from any kind of external intervention that could Designresources Principle within the 8: Nested. Enterprises fundamentally change a system’s dynamics. In this case study from Eritrea, locally-crafted hiza’ti institutional arrangements, evolved over many decades, have enabled a sustainable resource Given that the system is not part of a management system based around customary larger CPR, Ostrom’s eighth design principle practices and norms. At the heart of this was not included in this study. CONCLUSIONS system is a degree of autonomy that provides resource users with the political space to craft operational and collective choice rules—a situation that requires continued statutory This study reports on a community in the recognition and the kind of tenure security Eritrean highlands, holding a long tradition that incentivizes local people to use and of communal resource management, which protect the resource over the long-term. has developed a set of comprehensive village References bylaws to enable the sustainable use of biologically diverse woodland enclosures of livelihood importance to local people. The Agrawal, Arun. 2001. “Common property study finds that these bylaws, or operational World Development institutions and sustainable governance of rules, play a major role in protecting, resources”. Managing Forests 29: 1649-1672. as monitoring and enhancing the regenerative Common Property capacity of these enclosures, and appear to Arnold J.E.M. 1998. fulfil most of the design principles (Table 2) . Food and Agricultural

3 Land Proclamation (No 58/1994) declares a fundamental change to the customary tenure system and proclaims all land to be property of the state in which villages are allowed to ‘continuous use and control’ of their communal land including woodlands.

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55 Ostrom’s Design Principles Fulfilled / Not fulfilled

Clearly defined boundaries and users Fulfilled Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions Fulfilled Collective choice arrangement Fulfilled but potentially threatened by interference of government institutions Monitoring Fulfilled Graduated sanctions Fulfilled Conflict resolution mechanism Fulfilled Rights to organise Fulfilled but dependent on future government interventionscontinuing to Table 2: The woodland management system and Ostrom’sbe Design supportive Principles of self-organisation hiza’ti The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. Forestry Paper 136. Rome, Italy. . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Self-Governance and Cox, Michael and Tomas Villamayor. 2010.Ecology “A Forest Resources andreview Society of design principles for community- Ostrom, Elinor. 1999. based natural resource management”. . CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 15(4): 38. Available from: http:// 20 www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/ Ostrom, Elinor. 2007. “A diagnostic approach art38/[AccessedPre Investment April, 2012] Study on Forestry and Wildlife Sub-Sector of Eritrea; Technical for going beyond panaceas”. PNAS 104(39): An Institutional Approach CooperationFAO. 1997. Program (TCP) 15181-15187 to Appropriation and Provision in the Commons: Sibhatu, Adam. 2006. . Food and A Case study in the Highlands of Eritrea Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. Rome, Italy. . Graduation thesis in AgricAdmin, University of Gebremedhin, Jhon and Girmay Tesfay. 2003. Stellenbosch. South Africa Environment“Community naturaland Development resource management: Economics The case of woodlots in Northern Ethiopia”. Singleton, SaraJournal and Michael of Theoretical Taylor. Politics1992. 8: “Common property, collective action and 129-148. community”. Science 4(3): 309-324. Hardin, Gareth. 1968. “The tragedy of commons” 162(3859): 1243-1248. Tucker, Catherine. 1999.Fletcher “Common Journal property of Soil and Water Developmentdesign principles Studies and development in a ConservationNegassi, Amanuel, Manual Bo forTengnas, Eritrea: Estifanos Some Case Honduran community”. StudiesBein and Kifle Gebru. 2002. XV. Available online: http://fletcher.tufts.edu/praxis/archives/xv/ . RELMA, Technical Report Series, 23. Tucker.pdf [Accessed June, 2012) Nairobi, Kenya Tucker, Randolph and Edwin J. Castellanos. National Statistics and Evaluation Office 2007. “Institutions, biophysical factors and (NSEO). 2003. Eritrea Demographic and Governing the Commons: history: an integrativeHuman Ecology analysis of private and Health Survey 2002. Calverton, Maryland, USA common property forests in Guatemala and Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Honduras”. 35(3): 259-274. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

56 Governing the Commons Through Customary Law Systems of Water Governance The Case of5 the Marakwet Elizabeth Gachenga Governing the Commons Through Customary Law Systems of Water Governance The Case of the Marakwet

Elizabeth Gachenga1

Abstract5 The resilience of customary law systems of natural resource governance in many parts of the world lends credence to Ostrom’s theory on the governance of commons. Ostrom argued that resource users who enjoy relative autonomy in the design of rules for governing and managing common-pool resources, frequently achieve better2 economic (as well as more equitable) outcomes than when experts do this for them. In support of this theory and acknowledging that most common pool resource governance regimes are based on a customary law system, Bosselman has sought to demonstrate a3 link between customary law systems and positive outcomes for sustainable development. Using a case study of the customary law system of water governance of the Marakwet community of Kenya, this paper tests and builds on the design principles4 and tools developed by Ostrom, to study normative institutions in a dynamic environment. The paper proposes an analytical framework that helps identify the features that strengthen customary institutions and ensure their adaptability and resource sustainability. This exercise illustrates the parallels between commons governance and customary law governance Keywords:of natural resources. commons, common pool resources, customary, law, natural resource governance, irrigation system, sustainability, sustainable development, property, water

Plate 1: The River Embobut, which is the source of the irrigation furrows used by the Marakwet people. (Photo credit: Elizabeth Gachenga)

1 Elizabeth Gachenga (PhD) is a law lecturer and researcher at Strathmore Law School in Nairobi, Kenya. This paper is based on research2 undertaken as part of her doctoral research at the University of Western Sydney. Email [email protected] (Ostrom 1990); (Agrawal and Gupta 2005); (Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000); (Tang and Ostrom 1993); (Schlager and Ostrom 1992);3 (Ostrom and Basurto 2011) 4 (Bosselman 2005) (Ostrom and Basurto 2009)

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58 THE CONCEPTS OF CUSTOMARY LAW AND COMMON POOL RESOURCE communities have crafted/developed over GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS an extended period of time. Although it is true that these systems are often closely related to long-standing activities of resource- Common pool resource (CPR) governance dependent people, customary law constitutes systems refer to the various models of norms a more dynamic reality. In this paper, the term and institutions used by communities to ‘customary law systems’ refers to the norms manage the use of a shared resource. The and institutions whose moral authority and field of CPR governanceGoverning gained the Commons: popularity The in force emanates from the contemporary as Evolutionthe 1990s of following Institutions the forpublication Collective of Action Elinor well as traditional culture, customs, religious Ostrom’s book: 5 beliefs, ideas or practices of the people to 7 . whom it applies, rather than from the state. Her work provided a highly insightful critique Notions such as ‘community-based’, ‘informal’ into the theoretical foundations of prevalent or ‘local’ forms of governance are used policy on natural resource governance, and regardless of their antiquity or association motivated a reconsideration of the two- with tradition. In this context, customary dimensional approach to the ‘problem’ of law systems of resource governance are limiting the governance of common pool understood as a popular normative pattern resources to state or ‘market’ (through reflecting the common understanding of valid privatisation) solutions. compulsory rights and obligations relating to the resource. Most of the work done in the area of CPR governance has been contextualized Customary law systems for natural resources in economics and more specifically in governance provide an ideal opportunity institutional economics. However, since for investigating the emerging theories on the publication of Ostrom’s book, legal commons’ governance in a legal context. This property theorists have also demonstrated is because most customary law systems of an interest in the conclusion she drew; natural resource governance are based on a that tragedy is not a necessary fate for all CPR governance system. In recognition of this, commons. Consequently, in legal property Ørebech et al (2005) have sought to explore literature, there is a growing appreciation the implications of commons governance of successful institutional arrangements for research on customary law, suggesting a the management of commons that do6 not link between customary8 law and sustainable fall within the two-dimensional framework development. This paper contributes to of private property or state control. Despite these efforts by exploring how Ostrom’s work reference by legal property theory to Ostrom’s on commons can be applied to customary work, its practical implications have not been law systems for water resource governance. widely researched in the context of law. This Focusing on a case study of the Marakwet paper seeks to explore one such application by people of western Kenya, and by applying investigating the linkages between the work of Ostrom’s work to Ørebech et al’s research Ostrom and colleagues on the commons, and into customary law systems, I propose an customary law governance systems for natural analytical framework to help identify the resources such as water. main features of successful customary law systems for natural resource governance. The Modern legal frameworks tend to associate paper confirms that parallels do exist between customary law systems with the traditional the salient design principles identified by norms and practices that local and indigenous Ostrom and others as indicators of successful

56 (Ostrom 1990) 7 (Rose 1986) 8 This definition is adapted from that of the International Council on Human Rights Policy. See (Policy 2009) 43. (Ørebech et al. 2005)

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59 commons institutions and features of resilient responsible for management of the furrows customary law systems of governance. Above and thus knowledgeable on customary all, it establishes that customary law systems law norms and institutions for water that enjoy autonomy over the design of rules governance in the community. The objective and norms, and which are open to adaptation of the focus group discussion was to provide and change, are more likely to result in background information on the furrows, positive sustainable resource governance their management, and allow for an in-depth MARAKWET’Soutcomes. CUSTOMARY LAW analysis of the Marakwet’s customary law SYSTEM FOR WATER GOVERNANCE system for water governance. Under this customary law system, women do not have a direct role in the management The Marakwet community of Kenya have a of the irrigation system. This research tradition of customary law 9and governance nevertheless sought to obtain the views of that predates colonial rule. The community’s female members of the community and to customary law also forms the backbone of determine the extent of their participation in a robust water resource governance regime the design and implementation of customary based on an irrigation system that runs along rules for water governance. A focus group more than 40km of the Marakwet Escarpment10 discussion was thus organised with both from south of Arror to north of Tot. The a selection of older and younger women. community practices a form of hill furrow The stratification of age groups was useful irrigation common in East Africa, described to determine if perspectives around the as a slope off-take irrigation system. The perceived roles of women in water governance irrigation furrows of the Marakwet, which had changed over time. date back to the initial occupation of the Data was also collected from randomly community in the valley, more than 200 selected water users with the aid of semi- hundred years ago, are the main source of structured questionnaires. Forty-three water freshwater resources both for agricultural users, consisting of men and women of and domestic use. As the country’s oldest different ages and from different households, customary irrigation system, the Marakwet’s were interviewed. Interviews were also water governance system thus provides an conducted with the local chief of the area, an excellent case for analysis of a customary law official working in the Eldoret Water Services systemMethodology of water resource governance in Kenya. Company (ELDOWAS) and a representative of the Lake Victoria North Water Services Board The(LVNWSB) Marakwet’s Office inCustomary Eldoret. Law System for The primary data used for this case is based Water Governance on a field study conducted from November 2010 to February 2011. A qualitative research methodology was used that combined various Among the Marakwet community, it was data collection methods, including semi- clear that customary law continues to play structured interviews, three focus group a central role in societal life. In the case of discussions, and participant observation. The water resource governance, customary law population sampled came from Sambalat, the constitutes the primary regulatory framework area of Marakwet that borders West Pokot. for managing shared water resources. The participants of the first focus group Community members demonstrated a keen discussion were purposefully chosen knowledge of their customary water resource from among clan council elders who are governance system. The clan elders in charge

9 10 This is evidenced by the early accounts of the Marakwet’s law and custom. For example (Beech 1921) (Watson, Adams, and Mutiso 1998)

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60 of furrows explained that the origin of the community members. system dates back more than two centuries. Although the clan council in charge of According to oral histories, the first four the furrows are viewed as custodians of furrows, belonging to the Lakeno, Kapterit, customary law on water resources, the Shaban and Kabishoi clans, were constructed design, implementation and modification in 1882. Construction of the furrows was of the rules is carried out through a broad triggered by drought in the region. Irrigation consultative process. Consequently, rules furrows were considered the only means by are subject to negotiation and modification which to bring water from the Embobut River to people on the valley floor, which lies more with relative ease. For instance, most of the than 1000m below the escarpment. water users interviewed talked about the rule that stipulates how households whose An important feature of Marakwet’s customary male members do not contribute to furrow water governance system is that it is entirely maintenance and repairs are not entitled home grown or autochthonous, with the to water provided by the irrigation system. norms that underpin the system developed However, before this rule is implemented, solely by the community. In the case of local there is a consultative process in which the water law, the rules governing development offender is given an opportunity to present and use were designed by the clan elders, his case. Depending on the reason for in consultation with the wider community, default, other sanctions may be applied to following construction of the furrows. This avoid punishing the entire household, such autonomy in design (both in terms of rules as a monetary fine. Young clan members and their implementation) is considered unavailable for furrow work due to school or sacrosanct. One discussant expressed the work commitments outside of the community centrality of autonomy in the following way, may substitute their physical labour with ‘There is no law that will come to tell us who monetary compensation. will or how we will use the water. The water is for us and for our children from11 our elders. No This type of rule modification can be seen as one will tell us how to use it’. a response to emerging circumstances. While based largely on norms and practices that Although ultimately geared towards conservation and sustainability of the water date back many years, there are still changes resource, the scope of their customary that the rule system of the Marakwet has water law is relatively broad and includes undergone in recent times. For instance, the directives on the use of land and other custodian of the customary law system was natural resources. While the rationale for traditionally a group of clan elders selected on crafting rules is often based on environmental the basis of their age and thus knowledge and indicators, the connection between rules and experience of the furrow system. However, ecological conditions is not always evident. recognising the value of formal education, the For instance, some of the rules and norms are community has begun to allow some younger encoded within a sacred religious system that community members to join the clan council. include taboos and prohibitions associated While obviously lacking in experience, with the felling of trees, the contamination younger members are often very resourceful of furrow water, or the requirement to plant and savvy in their relations with external indigenous trees, which are regarded as organisations and donor agencies, as well as sacred, around rivers and streams. In the holding greater knowledge of (potentially course of discussion with village elders, it useful) new technologies. was confirmed that the underlying objective of these rules is to conserve water resources and foster a sense of respect for water among

11 Focus Group Discussion with Clan Elders and Representatives of Furrows Council (Marakwet District- Kenya, February 10 2010)

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61 REVISITING THE DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINABLE COMMONS MANAGEMENT AND THEIR present but also continue to be relevant in the future. In other words, a system that has the APPLICATION TO CUSTOMARY LAW capacity to adapt to changing conditions. Given SYSTEMS that the social, economic and ecological factors that impinge upon and influence natural resources use and management are in a state As noted in the introduction, Ostrom’s of constant flux, any ideal system of resource Governing the Commons illustrated how management needs to be capable of adapting different communities develop rule-based itself to18 such changes, whether anticipated institutional arrangements for the sustainable or not. This is what Ostrom and Basurto management of their shared natural (2011) were pointing to when stating that CPR resources. Ostrom’s analysis culminated in governance systems, in order to be successful, the identification of eight design principles need to have a tested capacity19 for adaptability that appeared characteristic of successful12 and openness to change; typically by commonsSalient Features management of Successful regimes. CPR means of a normative system that exhibits Systems and their Application to Resilient substantial variety in its rules, with changes Customary Law Systems in rules driven by institutional memory as well as socio-economic20 and/or environmental change. One of the fundamental observations made As a result of their genesis and nature, by Ostrom is that appropriators who enjoy customary governance systems also tend relative autonomy from government or towards versatility and flexibility in the other external actors in the design of their sense that rules and institutions reflect institutional arrangements are more likely 13to the prevalent social, economic, cultural, develop sustainable management regimes. political and ecological21 circumstances in Such autonomy ensures that the users of the which they operate. To this extent, such resource play a role not only in the design systems contain an inherent adaptive but also the modification of the rules that mechanism that makes them suitable for regulate access and use. The case studies also natural resource management. However, as demonstrated that CPR governance systems noted by Bosselman, not all customary law with collective choice arrangements (that systems integrate this22 adaptive management allow individuals affected by operational strategy effectively. A successful customary rules to participate in their modification)14 law system will recognise the structure of often result in positive outcomes. Apart adaptations that it has made in the past and from participating in rule modification, the it is this that offers an effective vehicle for users in these successful CPR systems are also making changes to existing rules, encourages charged15 with the implementation of those fine-grained rules that can be modified rules , as supported by subsequent research without having to modify the entire system, that analysed multiple16 communal irrigation and has23 a meaningful feedback mechanism in systems in Nepal. place. Based on the work of Ostrom and others, Bosselman’s principles of resilient customary Ørebech et al (2005) argued that adaptability law systems are comparable to the design is also an indispensable characteristic of principles identified by Ostrom and built upon success17 in any complex resource management by others, and the synergy that exists between system. Adaptability relates to the inherent the two will be looked at in more detail in the capacity of a system not only to deal with the following section. 12 17 13 (Ostrom 1990) 18 (Bosselman 2005) 245 Commission 1986) for the Australian Aborigi- 14 (Ostrom 1990), 101 19 (Ørebech et al. 2005) nal experience and (Pradhan 2002)409-446 for 15 (Ostrom 1990), 93 20 (Ostrom and Basurto 2011) 22experience from India 16 (Ostrom 1990), 94 21 (Ostrom and Basurto 2011), 336 23 (Bosselman 2005) (Ostrom and Basurto 2011) See for example (Australian Law Reform (Bosselman 2005)

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62 An Analytical Framework for Identifying Successful Customary of this framework, knowledge management Law Systems of Natural Resource signifies the capacity of the normative system Governance to identify the insights and experiences necessary to develop rules that result in the sustainable governance of common Figure 1 encapsulates some of the main pool resources. Knowledge management contributing factors that lie behind the success thus implies the capacity to capture the of customary law systems for natural resource accumulated experiences of responses to governance. Departing from the premises environmental, socio-economic or other types put forward by Ostrom and building on of change. It is this record of past experiences Bosselman’s work, the framework identifies that forms the basis for institutional memory five main indicators of successful systems all and a repository of knowledge that is of which are dependent on users enjoying maintained for the purposes of improving the some level of autonomy in system design and system down the road. 1. Knowledge Management System implementation. An insight into the importance of this feature was gained during fieldwork among the Marakwet. Through focus group Both Ostrom’s and Ørebech’s work point discussions, the responses of water users, to the need for a rational process for the and the observations of the researcher, it was development and modification of rules in evident that an implicit system existed for order for any normative CPR governance accumulating knowledge of the conditions framework to work effectively. Based on affecting water resources and associated insights drawn from the Marakwet case study, rule system. Most interview respondents this paper recognises this crucial feature and demonstrated knowledge of the origin of develops it further. the furrow system in response to prolonged drought in the valley and of their water First, any successful customary system for rules. The rationale for the rules and their governing a CPR needs to have a record (oral relation to past experiences was not always or written) of how the system works under evident as respondents often associated different conditions and that this knowledge non-compliance of the rules with taboos and experience ought to be institutionalised. and religious sanctions. However, as noted The term ‘knowledge management’ is used in the focus group discussions, clan elders to denote this characteristic. For purposes explained that the objectives of water rules Knowledge Stratification of Rules Management System Rule system sufficiently Oral or written record of stratified to allow for partial working of system in different modification conditions

Autonomy

Feedback Mechanism Inherent Right information of current Modification operation Procedure

Figure 1: Framework for Analysing Successful Customary Law Systems of Water Resource Governance

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63 were the preservation of water resources, informal social learning mechanism can be environmental conservation, or the socio- observed in the community habits of the 2.economic Feedback welfare Mechanism of local people. Marakwet, whereby customary norms are crafted, implemented and enforced by means of member consultation—further aided by a A second feature characteristic of successful physical space, the Sambalat trading centre, customary law systems is the presence of a which acts as a hub for irrigation users to feedback mechanism. A successful system 3.share Inherent experiences. Rule Modification Procedure must have ways of ensuring that accurate information is promptly fed back into the system and that information24 then used in the Bosselman developed this feature by building decision making process. This mechanism upon Ostrom’s work on rules and game theory is dependent on the knowledge management in the context of institutional arrangements26 for system, which ensures that relevant natural resource management. It concerns information is captured and used to drive the a procedure by which any given resource rule appropriate adaptation of resource rules and system can be improved and thus ensure its institutions. continued relevance in the context of changing The Marakwet’s customary water governance circumstances. It is both considered an 27 system provides clear evidence of this. The essential attribute of system sustainability flexibility of rules on water and land use point and requires the maintenance of an open- to their adaptation to ecological conditions. minded attitude to rule making by those For instance, while commercial mango involved—thus assuring congruence between farming was not a traditional practice among rules in use and local conditions. the community, many women are currently As noted, Marakwet’s customary water involved in growing mangoes that are proving governance system, while based on traditional successful given their higher tolerance to norms and institutions, continues to evolve the increasingly dry climate. Further, some to adapt to changing circumstances. For of the respondents indicated that they are instance, the incorporation of younger men testing the feasibility of farming green gram into the clan elder council responsible for commercially, along with other non-traditional irrigation furrows is one important example crops that require less water. The customary of institutional flexibility that allows for rule law rules on farming and use of irrigation 4.modification Stratification when of needed.Norms water have consequently been adapted to allow for commercial farming and changes in cultivation practices. One of the necessary conditions for designing The Marakwet case thus points to the an effective feedback mechanism is a rule importance of an effective feedback system that is sufficiently stratified. Bosselman28 mechanism and suggests that successful refers to this feature as ‘fine graininess’, and customary law systems need to include involves rules that can be easily modified; that a wider base of knowledge inputs that partial changes can be made without having encompass not only environmental change to affect the entire system. Although this but economic and social shifts also. As Ostrom feature guarantees the sustainability of the and Basurto (2011) note, the success of any rule system rather than the sustainability of such system is also dependent on an enabling the resource system, resource sustainability is environment that facilitates learning25 from closely associated with a resilient governance the success and failure of others. Such an system that exhibits institutional adaptive

24 26 (Bosselman 2005) 27 (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994) 28 (Ostrom and Basurto 2011) (Bosselman 2005) POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

64 capacity. A system with a great potential to governance are interested in a similar deliver sustainable development outcomes institutional framework albeit one where the would be useless if it were to fail in its actual basis of authority rests in informal rather operation as a rule system—for example, than formal/statutory norms and institutions a system whose design requires an entire and where the focus is the relationship that overhaul each time a single rule is changed. connects actors and their environment to those rules. Given these parallels, Ostrom’s While most rules of the Marakwet’s water pioneering work on commons management resource governance system were broadly provides a set of most useful insights into the defined, implementation take places through operation of resilient customary law systems consultation with all water users, which The centrality subjects rules to negotiation and also allows for the governance them to be modified with relative ease. For of common pool of autochthony instance, while there are clear rules on clan resources, such for building as the irrigation allocation of water resources from the furrow resilient systems, the elders explained that these rules system of the could be altered to grant more water29 resources Marakwet. customary to those families in greater need. In other The centrality of law systems words, discretion is sometimes used in the autochthony for application of rules, but this occurs without confirms building resilient having to change the major institutions that Ostrom and customary law 5.fall Autonomy under customary law. systems confirms Basurto’s Ostrom and observation Basurto’s (2011) that, in Lastly, as was noted in the work of Ostrom observation that, and Basurto (2011), evidence from research in places where places where on irrigation systems from different countries commoners enjoy commoners around the world has clearly demonstrated autonomy in CPR enjoy autonomy that the autonomy of resource users to design, rule design there operate and modify rules governing the water is an increased in CPR rule resources they use and depend on, ensured likelihood for design there is better and more equitable outcomes. This positive outcomes. an increased finding resonates strongly with the analysis As noted, while of the customary law system of the Marakwet, the origin of likelihood where the community itself develops norms. customary for positive The operation and implementation of rules law systems is outcomes. is thus in the hands of resource users, with often linked to such autonomy in rule design regarded as past traditions inviolable. LESSONS FROM OSTROM FOR and customs, CUSTOMARY LAW SYSTEMS the systems themselves must continue to evolve in response to This paper confirms the parallels that exist changing environmental and socio-economic between CPR governance systems and circumstances. Consequently, Ostrom and customary law governance systems. While Basurto’s tool for analysing ever-changing the former focus on the normative structures commons governance institutions also (rules in use) for managing shared resources, provides a most useful framework for the customary law systems for natural resource analysis of customary law governance systems.

29 (Focus Group Discussion with Clan Elders and Representatives of Furrows Council (Marakwet District- Kenya, February 10 2010) 2010)

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65 As is the case with successful CPR Hess, Charlotte and ElinorLaw Ostrom. and Contemporary 2003. management systems, customary law systems Problems“Ideas, artifacts and facilities: Information as a must also contain mechanisms to ensure common pool resource. adaptability to changing circumstances if 66:111-145. Perfect Order: they are to persist. The analysis presented Recognizing Complexity in Bali in this paper lends credence to Ostrom’s Lansing, J. Stephen. 2006. central thesis that ‘tragedy’ is not a necessary . Princeton: outcome for commons scenarios and by Princeton University Press. extension customary law systems for natural Okoth-Ogendo, HWO. 2008. “Managing resource governance. As demonstrated the agrarian sector for environmentalEnvironmental by the analysis of Marakwet’s customary Governancesustainability”. in Kenya: In: Okidi, Implementing C., P. Kameri-Mbote the water governance system, autochthonous Frameworkand Migai-Akech Law (eds), or home grown normative and institutional frameworks for governing CPRs, providing : East African Educational they can successfully adapt in the face of Publishers Ltd. Sustainable Development change, can produce positive and sustainable by Means of Market Distribution Mechanism Ørebech, Peter. 1996. Rresourceeferences outcomes. . Paper presented at ‘Econometrics of Environment and Transdisciplinary’ First Agrawal, Arun and Krishna Gupta. 2005. International Conference, April 10-12, 1996 at “DecentralizationWorld and participation: Development The Lisbon, Portugal. governance of common pool resources in Nepal’s Terai”. 33 Ørebech, Peter and Fred Bosselman. 2005. (7):1101-1114. The “The place of customary law in democratic Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws societies”. In: Ørebech,The Role P., of F. Customary Bosselman, Law Australian Law Reform Commission. 1986. inJ. Bjarup, Sustainable D. Callies, Development M. Chanock and H. . Vol. Petersen (eds), 1, ALRC 31. : Cambridge, UK: Journal of the Royal African Cambridge University Press. SocietyBeech, Mervyn W.H. 1921. “Sketch of Elgeyo law and custom”. Ørebech, Peter, Fred Bosselman,The Role of Jes Customary Bjarup, 20(79). LawDavid in Callies, Sustainable Martin Development Chanock and Hanne Petersen (eds). 2005. Bosselman, Fred. 2005. “Adaptive resource . Cambridge, management through customary law”. In: The Role of UK: Cambridge University Press. CustomaryØrebech, P., Law F. Bosselman, in Sustainable J. Bjarup, Development D. Callies, M. Chanock and H. Petersen (eds), Ørebech, Peter, and Fred Bosselman. : 2005. “The linkage between sustainable Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. development and customary law”.The In: Role Ørebech, of CustomaryP., F. Bosselman, Law in J. Bjarup,Sustainable D. Callies, Development M. Cheserek, Grace. 2005. “Indigenous knowledge Chanock and H. Petersen (eds), in water and watershedTopics management:of Integrated : Watershed‘Marakwet’ Management conservation – strategies Conference and Cambridge, UK: CambridgeGoverning University the Commons: Press. Proceedingstechniques. FWU, The Evolution of Institutions for Collective ActionOstrom, Elinor. 1990. , Nairobi, Kenya. . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Durette, Melanie. 2010. “A comparative approach Press. Crafting Institutions for to indigenous legal rights toEnvironmental freshwater: Key and Self-governing Irrigation Systems Planninglessons for Law Australia Journal from the United States, Ostrom, Elinor. 1992. Canada and New Zealand”. . Calfornia: 27: 296. ICS Press 112pp. 66 POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM The Evolution of Institutions: Toward a New MethodologyOstrom, Elinor and Xavier Basurto. 2009. Schlager, Edella and ElinorLand EconomicsOstrom. 1992. “Common property and natural resources: A . SSRN eLibrary. conceptual analysis”. 68(3): 249-252. Ostrom, ElinorJournal and of Institutional Xavier Basurto. Economics 2011. “Crafting analytical tools to study institutional Stump, Daryl. 2010. “Ancient and backward change”. or long-lived and Sustainable? The role of the 7(Special Issue 03): 317-343. Worldpast in Development debates concerning rural livelihoods Rules, Games, and Common- and resource conservation in Eastern Africa”. poolOstrom, Resources Elinor, Roy Gardner and James 38(9): 1251-1262.The Walker. 1994. Governance and Management of Irrigation : Ann Arbor, MI: University of Systems:Tang, Shiu An Y Institutional and Elinor Ostrom. perspective 1993. Michigan Press. 392pp. When Legal Orders Overlap: . ODI HumanInternational Rights, Council State and on Non-stateHuman Rights Law Policy Irrigation Management Network Paper. (ICHRP). 2009. London, UK: Overseas DevelopmentHill Irrigation: Institute. Water . and Development in Mountain Agriculture Versoix, Switzerland: ICHRP Legal Pluralism Vincent, Linden. 1995. and Unofficial Law in Social, Economic and . PoliticalPradhan, Development Rajendra (ed.). 2002. London, UK: Overseas Development Institute. . Paper presented Watson, Elizabeth E, William M Adams at the Thirteenth International Congress, and Samuel K Mutiso. The 1998. Geographical “Indigenous Journal Vol. 1., Chiang Mai 7-10 April, 2002: ICNEC irrigation, agriculture and development in Kathmandu. Marakwet, Kenya”. 164(1): 67-84. Rose, Carol. 1986.The “The University comedy of Chicagothe Lawcommons: Review Custom, commerce and inherently public property”. 53(3): 711-781.

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Researching Complex Governance Arrangements Elinor Ostrom’s Legacy for Research Methods and the Analysis of Institutional Design Derek Kauneckis Researching Complex Governance Arrangements 6 Elinor Ostrom’s Legacy for Research Methods and the Analysis of Institutional Design Derek Kauneckis1

Abstract

Many of our most threatened natural resources involve complex interactions with human and technological systems, each with their own rule structures that govern interactions within and across systems. The complexity of governing systems characterized as networked commons, multi-level nested institutional arrangements, socio-technological commons, and ecological knowledge production systems challenge our existing analytic toolbox. The study of these complex systems face multiple methodological and theoretical challenges, such as how to examine the multi-scale nature of institutional arrangements, dealing with the influence of endogenous and exogenous change on systemic-level properties, accounting for the variety of incentives and behavior of diverse social agents, understanding the impact of different nested structures of decision-making, and determining the influence of the configuration of networked interactions. Researchers and practitioners who seeks to understand the structure and function of complex governance systems often begin with Elinor Ostrom’s seminal work on the commons, and more recent research on socio-ecological systems. This article traces how Ostrom’s substantial body of research informs continued efforts to develop research tools for understanding the governance of complex systems. It begins with early work on the co-production of public goods in urban systems, traces her evolving thought on the critical role of institutions, and continues with recent research into developing a framework for the analysis of socio-ecological systems. The article highlights the centrality of Ostrom’s research for understanding increasingly complex natural resource systems and the co-evolution of management arrangements. It concludes by proposing that Ostrom’s work should not be seen as limited to the study of the commons per se, but rather represents the beginning of a new science of governance. Keywords: Complex Systems, Governance, Institutional Analysis and Development, Methodological Approaches, Natural Resource Management

1 Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Nevada, Reno. Email: [email protected]

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70 Understanding Governance in Complex Systems in Economics, the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework had already emerged as a major Governing theoretical the Commons: approach The in Many of our greatest natural resource Evolutionpublic policy of Collective analysis. ActionThe seminal work of management and conservation challenges Elinor Ostrom, involve highly complex systems that include (1990) has been combinations of ecological systems, resource cited over 16,000 times (Google Scholar) in utilization and management, and increasing almost a thousand different journals that technological infrastructure and interventions vary in subject matter from engineering to in natural processes. One of the hurdles facing eco-criticism, mathematics to music, and those involved in researching effective policy information sciences to cellular biology is the need to develop methodologies to study (Web of Science). Citations (Figure 1) have resource systems that involve multi-scale increased steadily year on year since its interactions, dynamic change and threshold initial publication, pointing to the increasing effects, heterogeneous social agents, and relevance of Ostrom’s work. Policy multi-level governance arrangements. While Matters different disciplinary approaches offer insight This contribution to the special issue of into various aspects of these systems, the examines the intellectual development research community at large has yet to adopt of a theoretical approach known as the a broad enough theoretical lens that is able to “Bloomington School of Institutional Analysis capture the system as a whole. Yet, progress and Development” (Aligica and Boettke 2009), is being made in untangling linkages and along with recent work on the socio-ecological causality in these complex systems, and at the system (SES) framework (Ostrom 2009). It forefront of this has been the work of Elinor outlines how this body of work has garnered Ostrom and colleagues at The Vincent and theoretical relevance for so many divergent Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory fields of inquiry, and ends with discussion of and Policy Analysis. its role in the future of research on resource governance systems. The article traces early The work of Elinor Ostrom has had a profound work on the management of large-scale water influence on the study of environmental systems and the co-production of public goods resources and, more broadly, on public in urban local governance systems, the role of policy and public goods dilemmas. Long institutions and collective action, and Ostrom’s before being awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize later endeavors developing a framework for

Figure 1: Citations by Year (Web of Science)

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

71 the comparative analysis of socio-ecological district as a ground water basin systems (SES). Governing the Commons management enterprise and (6) the development of a management plan In the spirit of , I involving the coordinated action attempt to discern “common principals” and of several public water agencies… the qualities that have allowed Ostrom’s work (Ostrom, 1965: xvii). to resonate across so many fields, and better understand how her legacy, as well as that of The work begins with the nature of the her husband, Vincent Ostrom, has helped set problem, both in terms of the physical Tthehe foundations Development for new ofareas the of inquiry. Ostrom resource under study as well as the market/ governance failures associated with the Framework current system. Considerable effort is expended toward laying out the multitude of different private and public organizational Those aware of Elinor Ostrom’s contribution actors involved in water management. to rational choice theory might be surprised Public Collective action organizations are prominent. Entrepreneurship:to know her dissertation a case studyat UCLA in ground was water The focus on public entrepreneurship marks basinfocused management on public entrepreneurship. the beginning of an implicit model of how individuals are able to create new institutions is primarily a qualitative in order to prevent damage from overuse of case study analysis based on documentary the resource in certain situations. Based on material. As in later work, her dissertation work by Vincent Ostrom (Ostrom, Tiebout includes chapters on such non-political and Warren, 1961), the important distinction topics as “Topography” and “Seasonal and between production and provisioning Cyclic Variation in Precipitation”, which she arrangements is made, allowing for a subtle used in order to develop an explanation yet important differentiation of the role of public entrepreneurship around water of formal government organizations and management. A vision of what would evolve that of inter-organizational relationships. 25 years later into the Institutional Analysis Constitutional arrangements become an and Development framework is found in the explanatory variable in understanding summary of that dissertation: the outcome of the particular case her dissertation considered. The work is rich in …strategies of those who functioned discussions on property rights to land and as public entrepreneurs are examined water, legal structures and litigation, voting in a case study which involves (1) the rules and sanctions, forums for negotiating organization of a water producers’ water sharing arrangements and resolving and users’ associations to function conflict, and attempts to understand how as a forum for the consideration of these endogenous systems are able to adapt common problems, (2) the creation as the economic uses of water and changing of a municipal water district to technologies shift over time. provide a supplemental surface supply, (3) the use of litigation The dissertation foreshadows a long career to achieve a limited pro-rata investigating collection action problems rationing of the local ground water by concluding with the statement, “Every resources, (4) the development of society faces the task of finding appropriate institutional arrangements to test institutional means for providing the goods the effectiveness of a fresh-water or beneficial consequences desired by barrier against the sea and to place members of that society and avoiding the a prototype barrier into operation harms or adverse consequences resulting from along a one-mile section of the competition among individuals for the limited exposed coastline, (5) the design and quantities... This task may be accomplished creation of a water replenishment in a variety of different ways involving some POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

72 combination of individual effort and initiative Elinor’s participation in this work had led to on the one hand and centralized direction and a jointly authored piece entitled “A Political control on the other.” (Ostrom, 1965: 588- Theory for Institutional Analysis” (1971). 589). The articulation of institutions as the critical factor in successful common pool resource Research activity during her early career was management was then fully articulated in focused on investigations into urban service the 1977 paper, “A Theory for Institutional delivery, inter-organizational arrangements, Analysis of Common Pool Problems”, which the size and allocation of responsibilities incorporated insights from the wide variety of among local governments, and involvement in systems the Ostroms had studied in order to the debate over urban consolidation. At this develop a framework for analysis. point, her approach is firmly rooted in the public choice school of thought (Ostrom and Throughout the 1980s, a large of body of Ostrom 1971;The Ostrom Calculus 1972; of Consent Ostrom, Smith empirical research highlighted international et al. 1975). Public choice theory, based on case studies of successfully managed Buchanan’s , provided commons, which were then analyzed to the theoretical foundations for those finding enable identification of shared governance that empirical evidence countered the belief characteristics that appeared to form that organizational centralization would generalizable principles. TheGoverning results inspired invariably lead to improved efficiency. In the Commonseight design principles reported in developing their own method for measuring Ostrom’s best known work, urban service delivery, Ostrom and colleagues , which in turn spurred the rejected any single measure of performance development of a cottage industry of such as efficiency, and called for a plurality of researchers who sought to apply and modify measures in order to capture the complexity the principles by means of empirical case in these highly localized and heterogeneous study work (Agrawal 2002; Kauneckis and systems (Ostrom 1973; Ostrom, Ostrom et Imperial 2007; Quinn, Huby et al. 2007; Cox, al. 1977; Ostrom, Parks, 1979). The central Arnold et al. 2010). Elinor Ostrom continued theme emerging from this body of research to experiment with and develop new was that highly complex management systems methodological approaches for understanding are by necessity organized into smaller units the impact of institutions both at the micro- of responsibilities that correspond to local level of individual behavior and the macro- conditions, and often have overlapping and level of landscapes. Experimental methods even redundant responsibilities. While these were increasingly incorporated to better could appear inefficient and cumbersome understand the foundation of trust and to an outside observer, they have evolved to reciprocity that lay Elinor Ostrom effectively address local problems (Ostrom at the foundations continued to and Whitaker 1973; Ostrom 1976; Ostrom, of cooperative Parks et al. 1978). behavior (Ostrom, experiment Gardner et al. with and Building upon this work, Elinor Ostrom turned 1994), and remote to developing a more general theory of how sensing technology develop new institutions impact both citizen participation and geographic methodological and individual behavior (Ostrom, Parks et al. information approaches for 1978). These questions were considered in the systems were used context of the complex common pool resource to link institutions understanding problem that characterized the governance of and collective action the impact of Southern California’s water, which had been to landscape-level institutions. the focus of her doctoral work. The connection effects (Ostrom and between institutions and common pool Nagendra 2006; resources had its roots in the work of Vincent Evans, York et al. Ostrom on water and natural resource politics. 2008). POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

73 By bringing her work on institutional analysis natural systems (water and transportation and development together with that of infrastructure). Focusing on the origin of order colleagues (Berkes, Folke and Colding 1998, and the structure of governance arrangements, 2003) on social-ecological systems (SES), Elinor’s work (as well as that of her husband, Ostrom was able to further our understanding Vincent) is the logical starting place to help of complex governance systems (Ostrom us understand how natural resources might 2009). This work, in particular, focused on the be managed in an increasingly fragile global presence of local self-governing systems that ecosystem. are able to achieve sustainable management of resources and outlined 10 subsystem variables From her extensive body of work, there are associated with successful management. The common themes that point to its applicability framework provided a comprehensive list of across a broad range of fields and its role variables associated with resource governance as a foundation for the next generation of and specific details on the utilization of scholarship on resource governance. While not terminology related to interactions between having the pretense to offer a comprehensive Wsocialhy institutionsHAS OSTROM and naturalHAD such systems. a analysis, a reading of the literature suggests profound impact on the study of the following characteristics as being particularly pertinent: (1) highly localized governance? empirical work; (2) contextualized knowledge balanced with generalizable principles; (3) empirical research rooted in big theory; (4) I began with the assertion that scholarship methodological pluralism; and, (5) complex on the governance of complex systems often problems with diverse complex solutions. begins with the work of Elinor Ostrom. HighlyEach aspect localized is discussed empirical in more work detail below. But what are the characteristics of this body of research that have led to such a deep and lasting impact among both the academic research community as well as Elinor Ostrom’s research used empirical practitioners in the field? Large scale urban evidence to challenge our assumptions about groundwater systems, police service delivery, how complex systems function. Academics and coupled socio-ecological systems are all develop their own sets of simple cognitive complex management arrangements, often heuristics based on disciplinary training with multiple overlapping organizational and expertise to understand complex jurisdictions and responsibilities, diverse systems through research. For example, sets of social agents with claims and counter- there is a continued line of thinking in water claims on resources and the arrangements management circles that creating an agency through which they are managed, and layers with authority over an entire watershed will of legal, technological and social interactions necessarily lead to improved management, across which governance arrangements despite the fact that such policy actions are are negotiated. It is often reported that rarely feasible and there is little evidence the Elinor Ostrom’s principle contribution was outcomes generated are any better. In work on in understanding how the tragedy of the climate adaptation, the focus continues to be commons could be avoided. However, any on national policy despite the most interesting such view constitutes a narrow reading of a innovations taking place at local and regional much larger body of work. The central puzzle levels. By focusing on how citizens and local that motived her was how human beings are resource users themselves were able to deal able to develop governance arrangements with the challenges faced in the management for creating order in enormously complex of complex systems, Ostrom provided an systems, sometimes of their own design empirical test of our assumptions about the (such as urban services or political systems), relationship between people and natural at other times natural (environmental resources, and pointed the way to developing commons), or combined technological- better theory in the process. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

74 The wide array of field locations in which details that may provide the next theoretical the Ostrom approach was developed also Empiricalpuzzle. research rooted in big theory provides the entry point for researchers from other disciplines. Water engineers interested in understanding how built systems Part of Ostrom’s ability to achieve that fail to provide the services for which they balance between contextual knowledge and are designed, invariably stumble across the generalizable theory was an underlying Ostromian framework that shows just how awareness of the big theoretical questions. important governance arrangements are While it is rare (except in her later work) for understanding outcomes. Conservation for Ostrom to make explicit theoretical biologists, intrigued by the presence of extant statements, some of the biggest questions forests in communally managed areas adjacent facing social science underlie her studies on to private agricultural lands, can access neighborhoods in Indianapolis, irrigation research that helps to explain the impact of systems in Nepal, and common pool resource tenure arrangements and their impact on the lab-based experiments. Are human beings ecological system. While the natural tendency inherently cooperative or competitive? Is of academic researchers is to migrate toward human behavior fundamentally rational? What the most theoretical of our disciplinary has allowed us to create human-made systems journals, the very broad base of diverse of such dazzling complexity as modern journal outlets and continual engagement with urban areas, airplanes and the internet? Is the world of practice that Ostrom contributed self-governance possible when individuals to and actively encouraged, has helped to exhibit such varying preferences, desires generate a broader audience for the theory and demands? What mechanisms do we and dialogue across disciplines. Contextualized knowledge balanced with have available that will allow us to maintain generalizable principles healthy ecosystem services with increased human demands? Anyone who considers such questions eventually comes across evidence While fieldwork provides “ground-truthing” to help answer them in Ostrom’s body of for theoretical assumptions, the Ostrom Methodologicalresearch. pluralism approach is about generating broad principles that can test scientific hypotheses. Studies of complex systems tend to be approached One of the lasting contributions of Elinor and from two perspectives, by those who seek Vincent Ostrom is a strong and dedicated generalizability and thus omit inconsistent commitment to methodological pluralism (see data from the final analysis, and those who Poteete, A., M. Janssen, and E. Ostrom, 2010). are so focused on the intricacies of a single This legacy is, in part, due to the training of system that they are unable to offer theoretical Vincent Ostrom as a political theorist and lessons that extend beyond their particular Elinor Ostrom as a political economist, but case. Approaches rooted in Ostrom’s work also emerged because of the very nature of the are able to achieve that careful balance of problems they investigated and the inability of capturing the details of a specific system any single method to capture the information while looking for those broad generalizable they sought for analysis. patterns of behavior. Inconsistencies in specific cases become new hypotheses to be Elinor Ostrom’s scholarly pursuits took in tested later in the field, the detail-rich case fieldwork and ethnography, statistics and studies become raw material to be carefully formal modeling, experimental methods coded into spreadsheets and analyzed for both in classroom settings and in field discernible patterns. The lessons for the rest of locations around the world, systems and us working on complex governance systems is agent-based modeling, and analysis with to pay attention to the enormous laboratory of remote sensing and geographic information constantly evolving systems around us and the systems (GIS). It is a challenge to think of POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

75 any single researcher who has employed of policy dilemmas require policy responses so many diverse methods in their scientific that are likewise multi-layered and scaled at inquiry. This methodological pluralism the appropriate levels. This was an enormous played a big part in Ostrom’s balancing of challenge to the traditional modes of policy contextual knowledge and generalizable analysis, which prefer simple answers to theory (Ostrom 2002). It emerged for very complex questions, and to disciplinary theory pragmatic reasons, given that no single that rewarded parsimony over complexity. method of inquiry was able to address the Ostrom proposed that the solutions to complex questions raised in the cycle of investigations diverse problems could be found in similarly and the new puzzles that emerged. How could complex diverse governance arrangements questions about individual-level behavior be T(Ostromowards 1995; a newOstrom science 2007). of addressed without experimental methods governance? in laboratory settings that were able to eliminate the effect of contextual variables? How can one understand the impact of cooperative behavior and collective action The legacy of the Ostroms, both Elinor among groups without comparative studies and Vincent, cannot possibly be covered of community characteristics? How can the in this short essay. The ability to carefully impact of human behavior on the physical disaggregate different units of analysis in landscape be understood without determining complex multi-tiered systems, develop a ecological change through remote sensing rich body of theory on the interconnections data? There was also a cautious modesty between human and natural system, and in not over-extending the applicability of recognize the linkages between scales of evidence from one setting into another. The governance are just some of the key lessons complexity inherent in each setting required they offer those of us researching resource careful analysis, not the creation of a new governanceVincent systems.and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in set of simple assumptions to replace former Political Theory and Policy Analysis misapplied generalizations (Ostrom 2000; The includes ComplexOstrom 2001). problems require diverse and a welcoming statement on the webpage that complex solutions the research conducted there focuses on how, “governance institutions can be crafted to enhance human well-being, while promoting One of the dominant themes in Ostrom’s democratic principles and sustainable research was how the dizzying variety of resource management”, and it remains one institutional arrangements—evolved over time of those rare intellectual centers of true to deal with the multitude of collective action interdisciplinary research. problems at multiple scales—represented the outcome of continued experimentation The significance of the Ostroms’ research and evolution, and that attempts to simplify is such that it will likely underpin future the institutional landscape tended to weaken scholarly endeavors to improve our collective effective governance. She considered understanding of ecological systems, human complexity in governance as testimony to behavior and governance systems. Many of the human innovation and creativity, not as focal areas of their work, such as institutional fragmentation and a barrier to improved analysis, trust, reciprocity, emergent systems, efficiency and more effective policy. A theme networks, and coupled dynamics are themes that emerged in her PhD research, and that that are not confined to any single discipline. permeated subsequent work on municipal As we grapple with the generation of new public services, was that external measures of knowledge to better understand and manage a local system are unlikely to reflect the needs a rapidly changing world and adapt academic and preferences of local users. She understood training to reflect new research challenges, that the multi-scale and multi-level nature the work of the Ostroms offers a unique POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

76 Economies of Landscape Change model of inquiry to follow. In the same 89: 111–29. way we understand a physical landscape Kauneckis, Derek and Mark Imperial. 2007. to incorporate multiple overlapping and International “Collaborative watershed governance in Lake interacting systems (geological, hydrological, Journal of Organizational Theory and Behavior Tahoe: An institutional analysis”. ecological, atmospheric, etc.), the Ostroms allow us to envision and investigate the way 10: 503–46. Public Entrepreneurship: in which human-environment governance A Case Study in Ground Water Basin systems function. Rather than research that ManagementOstrom, Elinor. 1965. differentiates into academic specializations, we can begin to envision a new science . PhD diss., University of of human governance—one that draws California, Los Angeles. on insights from multiple disciplines, and SocialOstrom, Science Elinor. Quarterly 1972. “Metropolitan reform: is directed toward understanding the Propositions derived from two traditions”. institutional and organizational structures 53: 474–93. through which we interact with the natural and manmade systems around us. Elements Ostrom, Elinor.Policy 1973. Studies “The Journal need for multiple of such an approach are beginning to develop, indicators in measuring the output of public agencies”. 2: 85–92. and trans-disciplinary research centers such Public Productivity as the Center for the Study of Institutional ReviewOstrom, Elinor. 1976. “Multi-mode measures: Diversity at Arizona State are beginning to From potholes to police”. gain prominence. The Ostrom legacy offers a 1: 51–58. Governing the Commons: body of canonical literature to seed not only The Evolution of Collective Action new areas of inquiry, but also the potential to Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. . Cambridge, Rdevelopeferences a new science of governance. UK: Cambridge University Press. Ostrom, Elinor. 1995. “DesigningProperty complexity Rights in to govern complexity”. In: Hanna, Susan and Agrawal, Arun. 2002. “Common resources and a Social and Ecological Context Mohan Munasinghe (eds.), institutional sustainability”. In: Ostrom, Elinor, The Drama of (pp. 33–45). Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolsak, Paul Stern, Susan the Commons Stockholm and Washington, D.C.: The Beijer Stonich and Elke Weber (eds), International Institute of Ecological Economics (pp. 41-86). Washington, D.C.: and the World Bank. National Academy Press. Political Science and Politics Challenging Institutional Analysis and Ostrom, Elinor. 2000. “The danger of self- Aligica, Paul and Peter Boettke. 2009. Development: The Bloomington School evident truths”. 33: 33–44. . London, UK: Routledge. Linking Ostrom, Elinor. 2001. “Decentralization and Social and Ecological Systems: Management Challengesdevelopment: to Democracy: The new panacea”. Ideas, Involvement In: Dowding, PracticesBerkes, Fikret and Social and Carl Mechanisms Folke. 1998. for Building andKeith, Institutions John Hughes and Helen Margetts (eds.), Resilience (pp. 237–56). New York: , Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Palgrave Publishers. University Press. Ostrom, Elinor. 2002. “Some thoughts about Cox, Michael, Gwen Arnold and Sergio Political Science and Politics shaking things up: Future directions in Villamayor Tomas. 2010. “A review of design Ecology and Society political science”. principles for community-based natural 35: 191–92. resource management”. PNAS 15: 502–38. Ostrom, Elinor. 2007. “A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas”. 104: 15181– Evans, Tom, Abigail York and Elinor Ostrom. Political 87. 2008. “Institutional dynamics, spatial organization, and landscape change”. Ostrom, Elinor. 2009. “A general framework POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

77 Science Publius for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological Ostrom, Vincent. 1973. “Can federalism make a systems”. 325: 419–22. difference?” 3: 197–237. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool ResourcesOstrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner and James Ostrom, VincentAlternatives and Elinor for DeliveringOstrom. 1977. Public Walker. 1994. Services:“Public Goods Toward and Improved Public Choices”. Performance In: Edward . Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Savas (ed.), Press. , (pp 7-49). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Ostrom, Elinor and Harini Nagendra. 2006. “Insights on PNASlinking forests, trees, and people Ostrom, Vincent, Robert Warren andAmerican from the air, on the ground, and in the PoliticalCharles Tiebout.Science Review 1961. “The organization of laboratory”. 103: 19224–31. government in metropolitan areas”. 55: 831–42. Ostrom, Elinor, Roger ParksPolice andStudies Gordon Working Together: Collective Whitaker. 1978. “Some evidence on the effects Action,Poteete, the Amy, Commons, Marco Janssen and Multiple and Elinor Methods Are of police agency size”. 1: 34–46. inOstrom. Practice 2010. the Lilliputs in Metropolitan Policing Failures? Ostrom, Elinor and Dennis Smith. 1975. . Princeton: Princeton University Press. Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Department of Political Science, Quinn, Claire, Meg Huby, Hilda Kiwasila Indiana University 1-25. and Jon Lovett. 2007. “Design principles and common pool resource management: Ostrom, Elinor and Gordan Whitaker. 1973. An institutional approach to evaluating “Does local community control of police make Journal of Environmental community management in semi-arid a difference? Some preliminary findings”. Management Tanzania”. American Journal of Political Science 17: 84:100–113. 48–76. The Political Theory of a Compound Republic Web of Science. 2013. Citation Search “Title: Ostrom, Vincent. 1971. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of . Lincoln: University of Collective Action, Author: E. Ostrom”, Accessed Nebraska Press. 4/10/2013. Ostrom, Vincent and Elinor Ostrom.Public 1971. Administration“Public choice: AReview different approach to the study of public administration”. 31: 203–16. Ostrom, Vincent and Elinor Ostrom. 1971. “A political theory forResource institutional Management analysis”. in theIn: GreatButrico, Lakes Frank Basin A., Joseph Touhill and Ira A. Whitman (eds.), (pp. 173–86). Lexington: D. C. Heath.

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78 Advancing Algonquin Recognition and Participation in Forest Management in Québec,7 Canada Rosanne Van Schie Advancing Algonquin Recognition and Participation in Forest Management in Québec, Canada Rosanne Van Schie1 Abstract7 The work of Elinor Ostrom was, in part, oriented towards understanding and promoting institutional arrangements crafted by local appropriators of common pool resources (CPRs). She examined and analyzed many cases “to develop a series of reasoned conjectures about how it is possible that some individuals organize to govern and manage CPRs and others do not” (Ostrom 1990). She was an advocate of “true” collective action, underpinned by a set of principles to address CPR dilemmas, such as “coping with free-riding, solving commitment problems, arranging for the supply of new institutions, and monitoring compliance with sets of rules.” Wolf Lake First Nation (WLFN) is an Algonquin community in Canada that occupies traditional lands in what are now the provinces of Québec and Ontario. This paper examines Wolf Lake’s struggle with “true” recognition and participation in the management of forest CPRs under the Province of Québec’s new Sustainable Forest Development Act (SFDA). The paper argues that Québec’s lack of recognition of Aboriginal Title and Rights deprives the community of their right to self- determination and equality in managing such resources. Yet, as Elinor Ostrom herself enjoyed pointing out, “people don’t like to be suckers!” The paper thus explores how changes to the international principles of Forest Stewardship certification offers communities such as WLFN an opportunity to address the inequitable distribution of forest resources and the limited role of Algonquin peoples in forest management on their own unceded territories. Keywords: Aboriginal Rights and Title, Algonquin, Collective Action, Commons, Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), Human Rights, Québec, Sustainable Forest Management

Plate 1: Algonquins, Jim St Denis and Chris Wabi peel birch bark to craft a birch bark canoe. (Photo credit: Mark Grandlouis)

1 Economic Development Advisor for Wolf Lake First Nation. Email: [email protected]

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80 “If we are not at the table, are we on the menu?” Chief Harry St Denis, Algonquin Nation of Wolf Lake during a presentation to the Commission on Agriculture Energy and Natural Resources with regards to Bill 57, the Occupation of Forest Land in Quebec and the Constitution of Forest Management Corporations. Quebec City, Quebec, 2009.

INTRODUCTION

The traditional territory of the Algonquin Nation includes the entire Ottawa River On March 23, 2010, the members of the watershed straddling the Canadian provinces National Assembly of the Province of Québec, of Québec and Ontario. Canada, gave unanimous assent to the Sustainable Forest Development Act (SFDA), The community of WLFN is made up of which changed the way that public forests 205 people, living not on reserve lands are managed throughout the province. Key but traditional lands within the Provinces orientations of the new regime include of Québec and Ontario, where they assert science-based ecosystem management, Aboriginal Rights and Title as recognized by integrated land and resource management, the Canadianthe Occupation Constitution. of Forest The Land First in QuebecNation is regionalization and certification. Although andin opposition the Constitution to Québec of Forest officials Management following Bill forests lie at the heart of First Nation culture Corporations57 ( and livelihoods, the SFDA was created in order to govern common pool forest resources ), which was crafted without through the constitution of regional forest adequate aboriginal consultation and rights management corporations—a process that provisions. Criticism is leveled at a ‘sustainable would dilute First Nation representation and forest development’ act that continues to rights. Mahingan Sagaigan deprive their people of equitable distribution Wolf Lake First Nation (WLFN), or of forestlands and legitimate participation in , is one of ten communities their governance. For WLFN, a key component representing the Algonquin Nation in Canada. of self-determination is a forest commons

Map 1. The Algonquin Nation (Cartography by Marcel Morin)

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81 framework that enables the community worth of responsibilities for livelihoodIn Review to participate in the management of forest security, cultural identity, territoriality, and resources without compromising their long- biodiversity (Van Schie and Haider, ). held values, rights and title towards customary Algonquins have developed culturally distinct lands or their independence as a sovereign ways to assess changes in their environments, people. In appearing before the Commission using such assessments to adjust their in 2009, Chief Harry St Denis of the WLFN resource use and occupation. As Roark-Calnek demanded that the community’s full spectrum (2013) notes, Algonquin knowledge should of rights and title be recognized rather than be recognized, considered, and actively disenfranchised through the development of incorporated into the monitoring of ecosystem new forest legislation. His requests on behalf and socioeconomic health. However, while of WLFN were demonstratively ignored. international frameworks such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Elinor Ostrom has suggested that respect, trust recognize the benefits of using Aboriginal and reciprocity are among the preconditions knowledge for natural resource management needed to move “beyond the tragedy of the and conservation, there is currently no commons”—crucial to building the social room within the Québec Sustainable Forest capital needed to create workable property Development Act (SFDA) to make use of rights (Ostrom 1998; Ahn and Ostrom traditional ecological knowledge in this way. 2008). This paper examines the historical devaluation of the role played by Algonquin For several years, WLFN has prioritized long- peoples in Québec forest management, the term strategies to restore ecosystem health damage this has caused, and how this needs through alternatives to government- and to change. It is the work of Elinor Ostrom and industry-led intensive forestry operations. other commons scholars that could help to These include eco-tourism and renewable inform such change in Québec, and specifically energy projects, along with improved forest Ostrom’s (2008) call for diversity in natural management planning and conservation. resource institutions in order to match the All such initiatives are based on a model social-ecological complexity of the commons. of self-determination and a history of In addition to helping fix historical injustices, traditional knowledge and land governance the creation of diverse institutional landscapes (Van Schie and Haider, In Review). As would improve the current conditions for Dr. Sákéj Henderson, of the University of First Nation recognition and participation in Saskatchewan’s Native Law Centre, states, DIVERSITYQuebec’s forest IN commons. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION “Pursuing self-determination will allow AND ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE First Nations people to be as they truly are, as opposed to how they have been re- created by Crown governments through such mechanisms as the Canadian Indian Act” Traditionally, Algonquin peoples’ social, HISTORICAL(Henderson 2010). CHANGES TO ALGONQUIN political and economic organization was based around watersheds, which served as FOREST LIVELIHOODS their transportation corridors and family land management units (St. Denis 2009). Speck (1915) notes how members of each From the late 1800s onwards, the regional regional band traditionally held a territory in economy around Wolf Lake was focused common, and this collectively held tenure was on extractive timber harvest and later recognized in alliance with other bands. Today, pulp and paper production. To facilitate ten Algonquin bands are recognized under the the development of a forestry industry, Canadian Indian Act, nine in Quebec and one Québec gave ‘open access’ to First Nation in Ontario. Together they form the Algonquin lands, including those of WLFN, so that Nation, a people who regard themselves as forest companies could maximize yields and ‘keepers of the land’, with ‘seven generations’ create more jobs. By the early 1900s, WLFN POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

82 traditional livelihoods came under severe development of the Québec Sustainable pressure not only from forestry but also from Forest Development Act (SFDA), which came farming, mining and trapping. Algonquin into effect in April 2013. Among the main property rights were flagrantly ignored during changes introduced, the Québec Ministry expansion of these activities (Morrison 2005), of Natural Resources (MNR) was given as were the inherent ‘conservation’ practices responsibility to develop a sustainable forest of the WLFN—the ‘seven generations’ management strategy (SFMS) and sustainable obligation to ensure all environmental forest management regulation (SFMR), along resources were sustained over the long term. with tactical integrated forest development Indeed, beaver and other fur-bearers were and operational plans. The new Act also brought to near local extinction by the 1920s. ABORIGINALintroduced the conceptTITLE ANDof ‘local RIGHTS forests’. AND More contemporary forestry operations FOREST DEVELOPMENT IN QUEBEC surrounding WLFN have been based on a ‘roving system’ that logs in different areas from year to year, based on stand age and distance from the mill. Ostrom (2008) referred to this Despite much rhetoric and fanfare, the SFDA as ‘roam and steal’ resource management, still sees decision-making power remain firmly arguing against it by simply stating that if, “you in the hands of the Minister, while First Nation use something year after year it just might just communities, forestry communities, forestry disappear”. Regional forestry tenures continue workers, theTML municipalities Daily and the regions to physically displace WLFN members, while only need to be consulted prior to a ministerial resource revenues flow directly to the forestry decision ( , May 24, 2013–No. 63). companies and to the government in taxes. Wyatt et al. (2010) state that aboriginal For WLFN, like most First Nation communities peoples in Canada present a particular in Canada, this brings issues of ‘privilege and case in relation to citizen involvement in oppression’ to the fore, issues over which they forest governance, given specific legal rights historically have had very little control or that need to be recognized in consultation means to object. processes (House 1998, Natcher 2001, Newman 2009, Pesselac-Ross and Potes It wasn’t until the mid-1980s that forest 2009). In this way, aboriginal peoples are company practices in Québec came under ‘not just another stakeholder’ but expect to be increased public scrutiny. Civil society groups consulted on a ‘nation to nation’ basis (Smith began to demand that the forestry industry 1996, Stevenson and Webb 2003). be held more accountable and both public and private industrial forests subject to In 2008 and 2009, WLFN, the Algonquin greater regulation. New forestry laws and Nation Secretariat, the Assembly of First environmental best practices were applied Nations of Québec and Labrador, and and organizations emerged with an explicit numerous other First Nations, made interest in sustainable forest management submissions to the Québec National certifications and forest conservation. Despite Assembly’s Commission on Labour and this, and the work of certification programs Economy to have their aboriginal rights and such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), title recognized in what is now the SFDA. public concern about the sustainability of Appearing before the Commission in 2009, the province’s forest management remained. Chief Harry St Denis of the WLFN stated that: Things came to a head in December 2007, when 400 industry, union, native, outfitter, Our experience with the internal and government representatives attended bureaucracy of the MNRF leaves us wary the first ‘Summit for the Future of the Quebec of Bill 57 resting these types of project Forest Industry’. Among the conclusions development decisions or approvals drawn was a need for greater consolidation, in the hands of a Chief Forester, MNRF innovation, as well as co-operation with or a regional CRE Committee. As such, local communities. The summit led to the there is the outstanding question for POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

83 us: If we are not on the table, are we on Chief St Denis’s message was clear—if a the menu? I think it’s important that government-to-government relationship Bill 57 recognizes our aboriginal rights is not recognized then WLFN would not and treaty rights. And I think it’s going participate. The Commission could have to be very difficult for us to be equal focused on the political process as a way participants, given the, you know, the to address the conditions within the draft regionalization. And so, what does that legislation that undermined Aboriginal mean for the future, you know? Is it going rights and title recognition. Instead, after to be like that for any major project that completion of the Commission hearings, the the First Nations want to realize, that Government of Québec stuck with Aboriginal the mayors can simply say: No… and rights exclusions and other than removing it’s always been our position that our the requirement within the Act for First relationship is with the Crown, not with Nations to obtain permits for firewood, the, you know, with the mayors. At first, Québec ignored all First Nation requests to the relationship is with the federal Crown structure Aboriginal rights provisions as and, since the federal Crown has passed per current Canadian Supreme Court case the, you know, passed the responsibility law. Continuing the institutional culture of for lands and managing lands to the Aboriginal misrecognition and devaluation, provincial Crown, well, now that’s our... the current version of the SFDA simply our relationship now with the provincial “takes account” of First Nations “interests, Crown, and we don’t want to see that values and needs” (section 6), which are then further diluted... for it to be a relationship limited in scope and content by being tied to with, you know, with the table of mayors, “domestic, ritual or social activities pursued who don’t necessarily have, you know, by the community” (section 40). Decision First Nations’ interests at heart. But in making support for WLFN economic rights this case we are put in a very difficult and self- determined interests within their situation, and it’s something that we just Aboriginal Title territory is not included cannot accept. in the forest legislation, thus exacerbating – CAERN-6 page 24, Quebec National continued problems of social and economic Assembly September 2009 inequality.

Plate 2: Chief Harry St Denis expresses his opposition to Bill 57 at the Québec National Assembly’s Commission on Labour and Economy 2009.

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84 DEVELOPING PROTOCOLS FOR BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY MEANINGFUL CONSULTATION THROUGH POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM

In light of the above, how does the Government of Québec begin to meet the Today, Canadian Indian lands, whether consultative expectations of Wolf Lake and on-reserve or traditional territories, are other First Nations? The starting point must subject to a federal fiduciary duty and as be in recognising that Algonquins, like all such, the Province of Québec, like any other First Nations in Canada, began with both Canadian province or territory, is party to rights to their territories and rights as people the Government of Canada’s Comprehensive governed under customary laws. As Roark- Claims and Self-Government policies and Calnek (2013:13) explains, “Mutuality, respect processes. These set the framework for and consultation are integral to Algonquin negotiations around the extinguishment of social and political organization on a number First Nations’ Aboriginal Title and Rights. of levels: family to family, band to band, Diabo (2012) explains: and nation to nation. From an Algonquin perspective, the current consultation process Not only are these federal policies should be harmonized with that expectation.” inconsistent with the pre-existing The Algonquins have never relinquished sovereignty and constitutional the rights to their territory or their rights protection of Aboriginal and Treaty as Anishinabe people. Yet neither have they Rights, which Canadian First been hostile in the face of persecution from Nations have fought and struggled outside powers. Indeed, they enjoyed many for over the centuries, but these co-operative arrangements in the early federal policies are in breach of beginnings of what is now Canada. They were internationally recognized human allies with the French and assisted in the rights of Indigenous Peoples. exploration, settlement and development of Nouvelle France. They then signed treaties Even the best intentioned efforts of the of Peace and Friendship and the Royal Constitution Act (Section 35) and subsequent Proclamation with the British between 1760- Supreme Court decisions in Canada are estranged when it comes to Québécois 1764, asIn co-operative Review agreements to protect their peoples and territory (Van Schie and provincial policies, which consider that all negotiations take place under the paternalistic Haider, Constitution) and acknowledge Act their rights. In 1982, the Government of Canada framework of the federal comprehensive passed the , within which claims policy rather than co-sovereign Section 35 recognizes and affirms “existing” arrangements. Consequently, Ministries aboriginal and treaty rights in Canada. and their agents fail to listen to and support the bio-cultural and economic interests of Because of this history, WLFN has told the communities such as WLFN as partIn Review of a Government of Québec that the answer meaningful forestry consultation or planning lies in coming together under a meaningful onlyprocess (Van Schie and Haider, ). consultation protocol—one that allows When government officials presume that both parties to speak on a government-to- they can make authoritative rules, then government basis. WLFN believes that the sustaining a self-organized regime becomes SFDA can be amended so as to recognize and very difficult (Johnson and Libecap 1982). respect the ‘wide spectrum’ of aboriginal rights and title. If this doesn’t happen, This brings us back to Ostrom’s work, which First Nations will continue to be treated as provides an insight into what may be needed mere ‘stakeholders’ without regard to their to move things forward. In 2008, she talked constitutional status and internationally about how governments should ‘evolve recognized human rights as indigenous institutional diversity’. What this refers to peoples (Diabo 2013). in the Québec case is the adaptation of the POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

85 existing mono-cultural institution and/or the of the Québec government and FSC certified fostering of new institutional arrangements forestry companies to First Nations in order that recognise aboriginal rights and title thus to ensure continued compliance with FSC empowering communities to enter into co- Principle 3 in the FSC Great Lakes St. Lawrence operative schemes—schemes that respect and National Boreal Standards prior to the and recognize First Nation rights, values and Québec Sustainable Forest Development Act priorities even when different to those of taking effect on April 1, 2013.” The motion dominant society. As Ostrom (2008) stated, was passed and the Québec Tenure Transfer “We have got to understand the institutional Transition Team (QTT-TT) was developed. FSC diversity that is out there, because if we are Canada then commissioned a Gap Analysis actually going to protect biodiversity and not Report (August 2012), prepared by Sara just have simple systems where there are Teitelbaum and Stephen Wyatt, that analyzed many species interacting we have to have local the gaps and synergies that exist between knowledge that is rich about those ecologies. the authority of the Québec regime and FSC So we have to have institutions that match the forest management requirements (GLSL complexity of the systems that are evolved and National Boreal Standards). Specifically and those systems have to be complex, so my related to the rights of aboriginal peoples, motto will be, ‘Build enough diversity of the the following principle and criteria were world and allow multi-tier systems at multiple highlighted:Principle #3: Indigenous peoples’ scales so that you don’t have an uniform rights top down panacea that is predicated to cure everything and instead of curing it, kills it.’” It is this kind of respectful multi-tier system The legal and customary rights of that could provide WLFN with the political indigenous peoples to own, use and space to work in partnership with industry manage their lands, territories, and and government agencies. However, it remains resources shall be recognized and to be seen whether the Québec SFDA can be respected. reformed to recognize traditional ecological 3.1 Indigenous peoples shall control knowledge and other legal specificities of forest management on their lands First Nations land use, and allow the kind of and territories unless they delegate institutional diversity that Ostrom calls for to control with free and informed flourish. THE IMPACT OF THE FSC consent to other agencies. CERTIFICATION TRANSFER AND NEW PRINCIPLES 3.2 Forest management shall not threaten or diminish, either directly or indirectly, the resources or tenure rightsSites of indigenousof special cultural, peoples. Under the new SFDA legislation, all industry- ecological, economic or religious 3.3 held FSC certificates in Québec were intended significance to indigenous peoples to transfer from industry to government in shall be clearly identified in 2013 (Ministère de ressources naturelles - cooperation with such peoples, and MRN). In 2011, at the FSC Canada Annual recognized and protected by forest General Assembly, WLFN tabled a motion managers pertaining to the Québec transfer plan, which [emphasis added]. was seconded by the National Aboriginal Forestry Association. It proposed, “FSC 3.4 Indigenous peoples shall be Canada shall establish a Québec regional compensated for the application working group process with participation of their traditional knowledge from FSC Canada, Québec government, regarding the use of forest species FSC certifiers, FSC certified companies and or management systems in forest interested First Nations, as soon as possible, operations. This compensation shall to clarify the obligations and responsibilities be formally agreed upon with their POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

86 free and informed consent before conditions”. While more work is obviously forest operations commence. needed, the FSC’s newly aligned international certification standards could be a foundation In 2012, MRN reiterated its intent to assume towards broader legislative reforms of forest companies’ FSC Forest Management the SFDA in Québec—presuming that the certificates for 30 million hectares of forest Québec government does not replace the FSC lands and developed a Protocol for Forest framework with its own lesser version or Management Certificate Transfer, which was industry abandons FSC certification under the approved by FSC International. However, burdenCONCLUDING of evolving REMARKS compliance. in 2013, the Quebec government decided to transfer responsibility back to the forest Deepening Democracy companies. They cancelled the Forest Institutional Innovations in Empowered Management Certificate Transfer Protocol and ParticipatoryIn his preface Governanceto entered an agreement with the Quebec Forest Industry Council that would enable industry , Wight notes that, to remain the FSC certification applicant and “nurturing clear-sighted understandings of certificate holder under the new SFDA. what it would take to create social institutions free of oppression is part of creating a In 2015, FSC International will improve and political will for radical social changes align its certification standards in accordance to reduce oppression”. Moving forward with a set of new principles and criteria with ‘true’ (sustainable forest) management being developed around key articles of the actions in Québec will require partnership United Nations Declaration on the Rights with First Nation communities like Wolf of Indigenoushave the Peoples right to(UNDRIP). participate This in UN Lake, but for this to happen, political will is decision-makingDeclaration makes clear that Indigenous needed to end First Nation discrimination and peoplesfree, prior and informed consent carry out amendments to SFDA policy and and that States must obtain legislation. their before adopting and implementing legislative or After a long history of oppression, it is time administrative measures that may affect them that aboriginal communities like WLFN (Hill Sloan 2008). Given this situation, local are able to establish a common vision of forest companies find themselves in a rather sustainable forest management through uncertain position when trying to retain their co-sovereign relationships. If Québec and forest certificate on WLFN lands, precisely the federal governments continue to play a because WLFN asserts Aboriginal Title version of what Ostrom (1990) described and Rights but have yet to be meaningfully as “the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game”, which acknowledged or consulted by MNR with forces First Nation’s to take a disempowered regards to their forestry plans. An opportunity role in a forest regime to which they do not thus exists through FSC for WLFN and subscribe, it is likely that costly legal and other First Nations in Québec to work with international forest certification challenges government and local forestry companies will ensue. As long as mainstream society to implement aboriginal principles and continues to devalue First Nation peoples and criteria outside the scope of the current SFDA their historical knowledge of complex eco- legislation. systems, we will not succeed in developing truly sustainable forest management practices It is here that Elinor Ostrom’s work on in Canada. It is for this reason that First Nation collective action theory offers further communities like WLFN will continue the lessons and guiding principles. As Ostrom struggle for recognition and participation (2009:11) noted, when resource user groups in the management of Québec’s forest work side-by-side, “they may have back up commons—a struggle that will hopefully arrangements that enable them to utilize each encourage other collectives to strive for the other’s resource under commonly understood kind of participatory, democratic governance POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

87 Empowered Participatory Governance arrangements that Ostrom pushed so hard for (pp.225- in both her scholarship and advocacy. 237). London, UK: Verso. Comments Regarding the Government of Quebec’s Interim This case highlights the struggles that First GuideAlgonquin for Consulting Nation Secretariat. First Nations 2011. (Updated Nations face in managing their commons, Version 2008) especially in the face of competing and often very powerful interests. For WLFN, as well . April 5, 2011. Available as other First Nations in the Province and in at: http://www.defendersoftheland.org/ Canada more generally, a key component of story/235 their struggle for self-determination concerns Ahn, Toh-Kyeong and Elinor Ostrom. 2008. development of a forest commons framework “Social capital and collectiveThe action”.Handbook In: of that enables communities to participate in the SocialCastiglione, Capital Dario, Jan W. van Deth and management of local forest resources without Guglielmo Wolleb (eds.), compromising long-held values, rights and . New York: Oxford University title or their independence as a sovereign Press. 744pp. Bio-cultural people. Elinor Ostrom’s work offers guidance Community Protocols: A Community Approach Bavikatte, K. and H. Jonas. 2009. to Wolf Lake, industry, and government alike, to Ensuring the Integrity of Environmental Law by helping forest actors envision what a and Policy collective action partnership requires, both . Montreal, Canada: Natural Justice in terms of institutional change as well as an and UNEP. enabling policy/legislative environment. In the spirit of Ostrom’s undimmed optimism, this Borrows, John. 1997. “Wampum at Niagara: paper shows that despite the myriad of issues The Royal Proclamation, Aboriginal Canadianand Treaty legal Rights in and tensions to be negotiated, the opportunity Canada:history and Essays self-government”. on Law, Equity, In: and Asch, Respect for for First Nations to partner with industry on a DifferenceMichael (ed.), more equitable footing, based on key articles of the United Nation Declaration on the Rights . Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press. of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and key Canadian Council of Forest Ministers. Available criteria of the Forest Stewardship Council at: http://forestierenchef.gouv.qc.ca/images/ (FSC) is apparent. This would be a critical stories/BAFD/accueil/en/Assessment_of_the_ step in developing resource management State_of_Forests.pdf approaches that challenge and ultimately begin to erode Canada’s institutionalized Diabo, Russell. 2013. Conversations with culture of Aboriginal misrecognition and author. economic inequality. Proposed revisions Forest Stewardship Council Canada. Available to FSC Principle 3, based on UNDRIP, will at: https://ca.fsc.org/quebec-tenure- provide communities like WLFN a means to transfer.245.htm Uncertainty in Québec’s increase their influence over land use without Forests, Logging and Sawmilling Journal Frigon, Martine. 2012. extinguishing their rights or devaluing who . they are as a people. This reflects the true July/August 2012. Available at: http://www. definition of sustainable forest management forestnet.com/LSJissues/july_august_2012/ and a growing international consensus that uncertainty.php Bill 57- forests should be managed to meet the social, Sustainable Forest Development Act, Chapter economic, ecological, cultural and spiritual II-Government Provisions ofSpecific Québec. to Native2009. Communities Rneedseferences of present and future generations. . Québec Official Publisher. Protected Areas in Québec: A Lifelong Heritage. Government of Québec. 2008. Abers, Rebecca N. 2003. “CyclesDeepening of reform in Porto Alegre and Madison”. In: Fung, Archon Québec City, Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Québec. Pursuing Self and Erik Olin Wright (eds.), Henderson, Sákéj. 2011. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

88 Determination. Land use policy Presentation made to Assembly the duty to consult: A misrepresentation of the of First Nations - Special Chiefs Assembly, aboriginal landscape”. 18(5): December 2011, Ottawa, Ontario. 113-122. Sustainable Development WLFN memoire to the Commission on and the Tragedy of the Commons LabourHendrickson, & Economy Barbara regarding and Rosanne the Working Van Schie. Ostrom, Elinor. 2008. Document2008. ‘The Occupation of Forest Land . Stockholm in Québec and the Constitution of Forest Whiteboard Seminar, Stockholm Resilience Management Corporations’. Centre TV: http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=ByXM47Ri1Kc Québec, Canada. Ostrom, Elinor. 2009. “Design principles of Available at: robust property-rightsProperty Rights institutions: and Land What Policies. have http://www.mddep.gouv.qc.ca/biodiversite/ we learned?” In: Ingram, Gregory and Yu-Hung reserves-bio/reservebio_tableau.pdf First Nation Consultation Framework Project Hong (eds.), ReportHill Sloan Associates Inc. (Consultants). 2008. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective . Presented to The National Centre For ActionOstrom, Elinor. 1990. First Nations Governance.

House, David R. “Aboriginal claimsThe Forestry and the . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University forestry industry: Claims processes and recent Press. Chronicle Assessment of the State of Forests and Québec’s developments in the courts”. PerformanceQuébec Chief in Forester’s Sustainable Office. Forest 2008. Management 74(3): 334-342. Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global 2000-2008 GovernanceHumphreys, David. 2006. . Roberval (Québec). . London, UK: Earthscan. Roark-Calnek, Sue. 2013. Cultural Impacts Québec Amerindians and Assessment. Document prepared for Wolf Lake InuitInterministerial of Québec. Interim Support guide Group for on consulting Aboriginal First Nation and Eagle Village First Nation- theConsultation. Aboriginal 2008. communities Kipawa, Quebec. The Last Panda . Gouvernement Schaller, George B. 1994. . du Québec. Available at: www.autochtones. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. gouv.qc.ca, under the “Publications and Schlosberg, David. 2004. “Reconceiving documentation”. Environmental Politics environmental justice: Global movements Johnson, Ronald N. andAmerican Gary D. Economic Libecap. Review 1982. and political theories”. “Contracting problems and regulation: The 13(3): 517-540. case of the fishery”. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 SFU Center for Education, Law and Society 72(5): 1005–23. Towards Conservation and How it Affects Aboriginal Issues in Canada and Justice: Options for Collaborative Efforts Today(CELS). 2011. byLynch, IUCN Owen to Address J. 2011. Human Rights Concerns and Complaints Related to Conservation (p. 9). Available at: http://cels.sfu.ca/ Aboriginal Participation Initiatives teachingApproaches/royal-proclamation.pdf in Forest Management: Not Just Another Smith, Peggy. 1997. . Paper presented at the Sharing Stakeholder: NAFA Position Paper. Power Conference, Whakatane, Aotearoa (New

Zealand), January 2011. Cultural Heritage National Aboriginal Forestry Association, Morrison, Jim. 2005. “Algonquin history in the Pikwàkanagàn, Ontario. The Role Ottawa River watershed”. In: of Indigenous Peoples in Biodiversity Sobrevila, Claudia. 2008. (pp. 17-32). Accessed June 7, 2013 at: http:// Conservation: The Natural but often www.thealgonquinway.ca/pdf/algonquin- Unforgotten Partners history.pdf . The International Bank Natcher, David C. 2001. “Land use research and for Reconstruction and Development, The POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

89 World Bank. Available at: TML Daily. 2013. “Whose Resources? Our http://siteresources.worldbank.org Resources! Who Decides? We Decide!” May INTBIODIVERSITY/Resources 2013, No. 63 RoleofIndigenousPeoplesinBiodiversity National Round Table on the Environment, Conservation.pdf and the Economy.Climate 2011. Prosperity, “Paying the price: Speck, Frank G.American 1915. “The Anthropologist family hunting The economic impacts of climate change for band as the basis of Algonkian social Canada”. In: Report 04: p. organization”. 17(2): 112. National Round Table. 289-305. Fish Out of Water Van Schie, Rosanne and Wolfgang Haider. In St. Denis, Chief Harry. 2009. . review. “Indigenous-based approaches to APTN Series. InterINDigital Entertainment territorial biodiversity conservation: A case (Ottawa Ontario) Joe Media Group (Calgary Conservation and Society study of the Algonquin Nation of Wolf Lake”. Alberta) Mamiwinni FSC Forest Management Tenure Transfer in Teitelbaum Sara and Stephen Wyatt. 2012. Adisokan: The Algonquin Story Quebec Summary of Gap Analysis Report Wolf Lake First Nation. 2010. . Historical and . Forest Cultural Interpretive Kiosk, Quebec, Canada. Stewardship CouncilLiving (FSC), Proof: Toronto, The Canada. Essential Data-Collection Guide for Indigenous Use and Wyatt, Stephen, Jean-François Fortier and Tobias,Occupancy Terry. Map 2010. Survey Catherine Martineau-Delisle. 2010.”First . Vancouver, Canada: Nations’ involvementThe Forestry in forestChronicle governance in Union of BC Indian Chiefs. Quebec: The place for distinct consultation processes.” 86(6): 730- Tobin, Brendan. 2009. “Setting protection 741. of TK to rights: Placing human rights and Geneticcustomary Resources, law at the Traditional heart of TKKnowledge governance”. Wyatt, Stephen. 2008. “First Nations, forest andIn: Kamau, the Law: Evanson Solutions C and for AccessGerd Winter and Benefit (eds.), lands andCanadian “aboriginal Journal forestry” of Forest in Canada: Research Sharing From exclusion to co-management and beyond”. (pp. 101-119) London, UK: Earthscan. 38(2): 171-180.

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90 From Theory to Practice A Decade of Co-managing Pasture and Other Natural Resources8 in Mongolia Hijaba Ykhanbai and Ronnie Vernooy From Theory to Practice A Decade of Co-managing Pasture and Other Natural Resources in Mongolia Hijaba Ykhanbai1 and Ronnie Vernooy2 Abstract8 Elinor Ostrom’s work has been the principal inspiration for a number of research and development initiatives in Mongolia aimed at designing, testing and assessing viable forms of natural resources co-management that build on traditional nomadic practices. One such initiative, begun in 1999, introduced co-management in four different ecosystems of the country. It was based on the hypothesis that under Mongolian state ownership of pastureland and private ownership of livestock, a co-management system—with clear roles and responsibilities among herders, their communities and local governments—could offer a means to reduce the pasture degradation and overgrazing that had been increasing in intensity over recent decades. Based on the results and lessons learned from fifteen years of participatory action research, the efforts at these four sites demonstrate that if all stakeholders strongly support co-management it can be a tool to overcome the “tragedy of the commons.” For this to happen, appropriate policies and legal support is needed to enable local- and multi-level collaboration. Introducing sustainable management methods such as pasture improvements, combined with new livelihood options, including the production and marketing of local products, can reduce the degradation of pastures, contribute to better livelihoods and recover the cost of environmental externalities. Keywords: Ostrom, co-management, Mongolia, pasture, natural resources

1 2 Director of Environment and Development Association “JASIL” Email: [email protected] Genetic Resources Policy Specialist, Bioversity International. Email: [email protected]

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92 INTRODUCTION

initiatives aimed at designing, testing and assessing viable forms of so-called co- Pasture management systems in Mongolia management of natural resources, which cannot be characterized as open access build on and further develop traditional systems; rather, their features are more akin to nomadic practices in the country. Our applied those of a common property regime (Ostrom research efforts can be counted among 1990). In the context of Mongolia, Ostrom’s these initiatives. Starting in 1999, a multi- work on common property institutions disciplinary research team was formed with has been used to introduce, put in practice members from two Mongolian ministries, and assess co-management strategies three universities and two non-government and community-based natural resource organizations. In each of the four project sites, management (Ykhanbai et al. 2004). Common we partnered with members of district-level pool resources exist where one person’s use co-management teams, including the district of a resource subtracts from another’s, and governor and other officials, herder leaders where it is often necessary, although difficult and representatives of civil society, such and costly, to exclude other users outside as teachers. We promoted co-management the group from using the resource (Ostrom arrangements based on the hypothesis 1990). Around the world, the work by Ostrom that clear roles and responsibilities among and colleagues has been instrumental in all stakeholders, including herders, their contextualizing and critiquing Hardin’s communities and local governments, working “tragedy of the commons” argument. This is under Mongolian state ownership of pasture also the case for Mongolia (Ykhanbai 2011, land and private ownership of livestock, Vernooy 2011). would help reduce the pasture degradation and overgrazing that had been increasing at The work of Ostrom and others has been an alarming rate It has been important for identifying the shortcomings of (Ykhanbai et al. Ostrom’s work “tragedy” thinking. However, the alternative 2004) (Photo 1). that has been theory they put forward has been criticized for Environmental not paying enough attention to the dynamic degradation the principal nature of (local) history and for embracing was taking inspiration a “deductive model of individual decision- place parallel making and rational choice to explain the ways to the erosion for several in which different types of property rights of traditional Mongolian arrangements emerge and change over time” customary research and (Johnson 2004: 409). Central to the criticism practices as a of their work has been a political economy new Mongolian development approach that focuses on the role of rights, state structure initiatives aimed negotiated access, and conflict over resources, and associated at designing, including an analysis of socio-economic and governance gender inequality, and inclusion and exclusion process emerged, testing and in relation to natural resources. Such a rights- influenced by assessing or entitlements-based approach centres contemporary viable forms of on relations between natural resources theories of (management) and poverty. natural resource so-called co- management. We acknowledge the important contributions management made by both of these theoretical schools Our efforts have of natural and their relevance to a Mongolian context, been largely resources... as illustrated by our own research during the inspired by one of last fifteen years. It has been Ostrom’s work Ostrom’s (1990) that has been the principal inspiration for main insights, several Mongolian research and development i.e., that there POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

93 Plate 1: Overgrazing has affected many regions of Mongolia (Photo credit: Hijaba Ykhanbai)

are many indigenous institutions that have regular face-to-face interactions are endured for centuries in the sustainable paramount, and both effective monitoring management of natural resources and that mechanisms and viable short-term livelihood there is much to learn from them. As she improvement options developed. argued, under the right conditions, the people in a community who enjoy an interdependent But local level action alone is not enough. relationship with their natural resource Legal and policy support is also critical base, can organize and govern themselves to in order to scale-up co-management (by continue to obtain joint benefits despite all involving more herders and stakeholders temptations to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise that operate at higher levels). Introducing act opportunistically. In 1999, we began sustainable management methods, such the journey to see what promise local-level as pasture improvements, small-scale arrangements held in a rapidly changing agricultural production techniques, water Mongolia. conservation methods, and community- based forest management, through a process In this article, we will summarize our attempts of collaborative learning involving the to introduce, test, and institutionalize co- active participation of all, can reduce the management in Mongolia. As such, our work degradation of pastureland and cover the represents one of several initiatives in the country to find novel, feasible applications cost of environmental externalities. However, of Ostrom’s work (1990, 2009), in particular in Mongolia, where severe poverty and concerning the design principles she identified resource mismanagement is commonplace, as being associated with sustainable commons co-management did not begin in a wholly management. Based on in-depth fieldwork endogenous fashion. External facilitation that took place across the country between and technical and financial support were 1999 and 2013, our results demonstrate instrumental in mobilizing herders and other that if all stakeholders strongly support co- stakeholders to take part in a novel example management, then it can be a tool to overcome of collective action. This kind of facilitation the “tragedy of the commons.” For this to has perhaps not received as much attention as happen, the roles and responsibilities of it deserves, and that includes the writings of stakeholders need to be clearly established, Ostrom and colleagues. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

94 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF NOMADIC PASTORALISM IN MONGOLIA market economy principles. Following the privatization of livestock in 1992, herders increasingly relied on ownership of shelters In Mongolia, pastureland has always been a to claim de facto rights to the surrounding shared resource. From ancient times to 1959, campsites and pasture (Fernández-Giménez herders all over the country practiced some 2002). form of customary land use with variations according to local conditions. Historically Eighty percent of Mongolia is covered by (until 1921), open rangeland and pastureland grassland, home to about 250,000 herders were under the control of feudal officials, and 36 million horses, cattle, sheep, goats, and clans, and tribal groups. The Khalka Djurm camels. Half of the country’s population of [literally: the Code of Act for all Khalka 2.78 million depends directly or indirectly on people; the Khalka making up the majority livestock production, which contributes more of Mongolians], enacted in 1709, defined the than 20 percent of the country’s GDP (National codification of customary law on the steppe. Statistics office of Mongolia 2012). What Late in the eighteenth century, neighborhood these numbers fail to tell, however, is just how groups enacted formal regulations, and much nomadic pastoralism is a way of life long-distance movements across territorial for many in Mongolia. For centuries, herders boundaries were prohibited in some cases. have roamed the grasslands “following our Herder groups or family clans tended to use animals,” as the herders’ adage goes, building, ranges in the vicinity of their seasonal camps packing, and rebuilding their traditional gers, and traditional rights were widely recognized or tents, to make their living from nature’s and respected. The enforceability of rights to bounty. But making a living from herding campsites was greatest when herders had used is not easy. The country’s per capita GDP is the same campsite for years or generations. among the lowest in Asia, with poverty and Campsites were widely recognized as the hardship common features in many rural areas common property of a given herder clan and cities alike. Since 2006, rural poverty has known as khot ail. The khot ail comprises one been on the increase, despite several years of to eight households which camp together for macro-economic growth (National Statistical at least one season and cooperate in livestock Office of Mongolia 2012). Some herders have production activities, e.g., herding, shearing, benefitted from the growth, but most have not. transport, fodder preparation. They are mostly Increasingly, the ancient lifestyle of nomadic related by blood or marriage, but occasionally pastoralism is under threat. comprise different groups brought together. The ultimate size of the group is usually More than a decade ago and before climate limited by the local pasture capacity, water change discourse emerged in development availability and the resulting number of debates, herders first observed and animals that can be maintained. commented on the impacts of climate change and the increase inzdud severe weatherzdud events During the early years of the Soviet period like storms, droughts, and extremely harsh (1921-1990), herders were forced to adopt winters, known as . The 2010 was commune-style management in which one of the worst ever, resulting in the death of production goals, herding operations and approximately 8.5 million livestock animals husbandry practices were established by or 20 percent of the national herd. Seven Soviet command for specific groups of hundred and seventy thousand herders were herders. This was followed by the full-fledged affected, with 43,500 herders left without a collectivization of all resources from 1959 single animal. 164,000 lost morezduds than half to 1990. From 1990 to the present, after the of their livestock (United National Mongolia withdrawal of the Soviet Union, subsequent country team 2010). Previous in 1999- governments developed policies and laws to 2000 and 2000-2001 had already killed over allow a transition from a centrally planned three million animals, or a little over ten per system to one based on democratic and cent of the total herd. While climate events POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

95 had decimated many herds, overgrazing has resource base more effectively. The increasing also been a problem, resulting in degradation degradation of the natural resource base, of already scarce natural resources. Up to widespread biodiversity loss and climate 30 percent of Mongolia’s grassland biomass change impacts—all observed in Mongolia— production has been lost over the past 40 are such that action is required at levels years. At the same time, the Gobi desert, which beyond that of the individual household or dominates the southern half of the country, group of households. has been steadily expanding north at a pace of We introduced co-management of pasture CO-MANAGEMENT150 kilometers every 20IN years.PRACTICE resources in Mongolia at the end of the 1990s in a number of pilot sites across the country (Map 1), including the dry steppe Traditionally, herders use pastureland region, the forest steppe areas, and the high according to certain kinship relationships, Altai Mountains (Ykhanbai and Enkhbat combined with the sharing of a common 2006). Our efforts addressed the challenge area that they move around in accordance of environmental degradation through a with continuously evolving community sumscombination of participatorysums and action- arrangements. Co-management builds oriented field research in three districts or on these systems, but adds new features. (there are 330 in the country) of Co-management brings together formally three provinces or aimaks: Khotont (district) organized herder groups, government and of Arkhangai (province), Deluin of Bayan- researchers. It is based on the observation Ulgii, and Lun of the Central province.sum Later, in that the limited capacity of herders and 2008, we expanded activities to a main forest local government to sustainably manage ecosystem by selecting Batsumber , also pasture resources can be complemented by in the Central province. These four districts the participation of other stakeholders at represent various herding systems that can various levels. Together, they can manage the be found in the country’s major eco-regions

Map 1: Pilot Co-management sites. Source: Hijaba Ykhanbai 2011. (Cartography by Marcel Morin)

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96 (steppe, mountain-steppe, steppe-forest, and management) group; to set up a community forest). They also represent different forms fund; to involve young people in community of social organization based on history, socio- activities as a way to train the new generation economic conditions and ethnic background of herders; and, to make useful information (see map). (for example, related to markets and prices, Co-management processes establish related to weather dynamics) available effective roles and responsibilities for through newspapers and other means of the stakeholders who manage, directly Co-managementcommunication. Design or indirectly, livestock (privately owned), land and water (state owned), and other natural resources (e.g., wildlife). The main The research team developed a holistic stakeholders are herders and herder groups, and bottom-up research and development local leaders, local government authorities, approach combining insights from pasture/ and the state. In the case of transitional rangeland ecology, livestock management and economies such as Mongolia’s where the breeding, natural resource economics and role of the state is being redesigned through rural sociology (including gender analysis). complex processes of political consultation, Methods used included resource mapping, negotiation and struggle, the implementation vegetation monitoring, surveys and interviews, of co-management approaches requires participant observation as well as methods both time and a clear stipulation of what from participatory action research (Ykhanbai the government will and will not do to 2011). Since no examples were available for support such agreements (Ykhanbai et al. how to introduce and test novel approaches 2004, Ykhanbai 2011). Implementing co- for collaborative management and learning in management includes activities that address Mongolia, the team adopted an experimental, material, socio-economic and institutional “learning by doing” approach. New ideas and dimensions of pastoral livelihoods and methods were implemented at the field level associated vulnerabilities. They cover the in the four sites, then systematically monitored sumdrafting (discussion, negotiation) and signing and evaluated. These ideas and methods were of co-management agreements with the adapted as the work progressed; over time, the and local governors and its members to methodological basket expanded and the team ensure access to community pasture areas. became more experienced in using it. This makes use of site-appropriate seasonal pasture shifting methods at the community Participatory rural appraisal tools used at the level to allow for the restoration of degrades start allowed herders and other stakeholders grassland; to protect wells and rivers, or to better understand one another and identify accumulate snow and rain water (in small opportunities to work together. Herders reservoirs); to clear forest, using stumps and government staff jointly identified and or dried branches for fuel use, and forest discussed local priority problems using restoration or transplantation of trees from resource and area mapping, historical analysis, densely wooded area; and to create salt- social network analysis, problem matrix marshy areas as a drinking source for livestock scoring, among others. The herders also (Vernooy 2011). described and analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of their pasture management Co-management also requires the practices, the pros and cons of their seasonal development of a variety of skills: to design pastures, and the challenges related to the and formulate contracts with community use of water sources, public services and members; to register each family and infrastructure. Priority issues identified by the members as belonging to the community and herders during these assessment exercises (co-management) group; to register forest were different in accordance with the different and other natural resources in the community ecological and socio-economic characteristics area as belonging to the community and (co- of the study sites. Women played an active POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

97 Plate 2: Women and men herders speak out about co-management.(Photo credit: Hijaba Ykhanbai)

role and were supportive of proposed co- management ‘community’ based on the notion management measures—envisioning the of collective consultation and planning and improved livelihoods that could result and informed by traditional social and cultural how their needs and interests could be more relationships (photo 2). The majority of meaningfully involved. herders expressed a strong interest and effectively decided to combine forces to create Over time, the co-management communities such co-management communities, with six became a useful learning mechanism to adopt of Ostrom’s design principles appearing to and adapt new practices of herding and underpin1. their initial establishment: farming, forms of decision-making and service provision. After some experiences were built Clear group boundaries but based on the up, insights and lessons were generated and 2. flexibility to bring new members in at when feasible, “translated” to national level any time; policy suggestions/recommendations through Rules governing the use of common direct involvement of research team members 3. goods adapted to local needs in policy and law making processes. The and conditions; experiences and lessons learned from the four Assurance that those affected by the sites have served to formulate and implement 4. rules can participate in modifying several new policies and laws concerning the rules; natural resources management. For example, 5. A local system that effectively monitors lessons learned from pasture co-management the behavior of community members; were more recently used to develop forest 6. The use of graduated sanctions to co-management policy and law. In addition, correct rule breakers; and, at local levels there have been important Accessible mechanisms for dispute changes in how the government operates and resolution. Theimplements role of co-managementpolicies and laws. communities Women played an active role from the beginning and, after many years of top-down governance, perceived that they were now In our applied research, after the first being given a chance to let their voices be participatory meetings and discussions heard and taken seriously (Ykhanbai et al. were held at the local level, the herders then 2006b). It was the wealthier herders that were consulted with each other about the possibility less enthused and less willing to join these of forming a new kind of natural resources ‘communities’ and the co-management system. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

98 These herders thought they had nothing to for seasonal pasture and forest are clearly discuss “on equal terms” with their poorer agreed to (and specified on topographic counterparts, who typically had less access to maps), all regulatory measures described good pasture land and whose voices were not and rights and responsibilities concerning normally heard in decision-making arenas. It protection and use rights identified. The took time for them to understand how they co-management agreements are evaluated could also benefit from improved pasture annually and, if necessary, revised and re- management. approved. These are tri-party contracts that stipulate the rights and obligations between The research team proposed that the herders and the co-management community; communities be made up of herders who between the co-management community and live in the same area, watershed, mountain, the bag (sub-district) governor; and between or valley, residing close to a commonly the co-management community and the sum used pasture, and willing to restore their governor.Sum traditional pasture management system. Local herders would be formally recognized as the The (district) Level Co-Management custodians of the pasture and forest resources Team consists of representatives of all and associated water resources. The herders stakeholders. These teams aim to facilitate themselves appreciated this approach, happy and monitor co-management arrangements that their kinship and clan bases would be among the concerned stakeholders.sum They recognized. Thesenukhurlul discussions resulted in are also responsible for the scaling-up of the widespread formation of formal herders’ co-management activities in the . A communities ( ) i.e., groups of some team, usually 8-14 strong, brings together 10–15 herding households in selected areas, representatives of herder and community with management goals to include livelihood groups, non-government organizations, improvements, shared labor and improved local governors, local school and other pasture and naturalkhot resourcesail management.sakhalt leaders, and the researcher group. The team ailCommunity members agreedneg to nutgiinkhan operate as an normally meets twice a year, or more if economic unit ( ), a social unit ( deemed necessary. It discusses the sum level ) and an ecological unit ( ), co-management activities and consensual with common interests drivingnukhural collective decision-making process. Each year, activities efforts to improve pastoral livelihoods and are evaluated and, based on the results, new conservation in Mongolia. The would annual plans discussed, drafted and agreed be mobile in time and space as they follow upon. their animals in the search of green pastures. Ostrom’s eighth and final design principle The second step in the formation of the new builds responsibility for governing the community groups was the establishment common resource in nested tiers from the of workable relationships with authorities lowest level up to the entire interconnected and agreement as to the actions necessary to system. This was put into practice step by step make co-management work. In this way, the through subsequent stages of the research seventh of Ostrom’s design principles was put process. After several years of building in place: rule-making rights of community up experience at the community level, co- members are respected by outside authorities. management communities formed sum level All communities of herders will sign associations. These associations worked to contracts with local government on pasture promote novel rotational grazing schemes, use, according to the Land Law (2002), the introduction of more productive grassland Environmental Protection Law (2005), Forest species, intensified hay and fodder production, Law (2007) provisions, and according to the and better coordinated livestock movements new Community-Based Natural Resource throughout the season (Vernooy 2011; Management Procedure, developed by the Ykhanbai et al. 2006a; Ykhanbai 2011). The team in 2006. In these contracts, boundaries associations also promote a range of income- POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

99 Plate 3: Discussing a fodder experiment. (Photo credit: Ronnie Vernooy)

generating activities, such as joint hay and season to season, and are heavily dependent fodder making, hunting, vegetable growing, on the weather. Their livelihoods are centered making hand-made felt, quilted rugs and other on livestock-dependent income sources, handicrafts, making farm carts for community and yet they must deal with scarce natural need and for sale, harvesting forest products, resources, which, in many parts of the and the processing and marketing of dairy country, have become seriously degraded. products. More recently, some co-management After the ‘opening up’ of Mongolian society groups have initiated the establishment of and economy in theand early 1990s, herders community shops where local products can have become both more independent be sold at greater profit than through sales (individualized) more vulnerable as via middlemen. Since 2011, co-management protection by the State was withdrawn groups have also started to integrate localized (employment, social security, health care, weather forecasting data in their operations education services were no longer certain) through the novel use of information and and the country moved quickly to a free communication technologies. The data allows market development model. Parallel to great herders to improve their decision making societal change, the impacts of climate change for key livelihood activities throughout the have become more visible, first observed and year. Herders have made multiple use of felt by herders about a decade ago. In the last these forecasts, such as the timing of pasture decade, severe weather events, in particular rotation, planting and harvesting of crops, storms, drought, and extremely harsh winters making hay and fodder (Photo 3), and the have been on the rise. The unpredictability of planning of seasonal movement (Vernooy, such events, even for a largely nomadic society CONCLUSIONSYkhanbai and Tsogt 2013). where vulnerability is a part of everyday life, has become a major issue facing many in the country.

The challenges of managing the risk that Based on more than ten years of Mongolian nomadic pastoralists face are experimentation and experience, the co- numerous and complex. Herders move from management efforts we have helped to POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

100 instigate have led to more productive 2013). This lesson from the field points to pastureland, healthier herds, and increased how collective action theory and entitlements incomes at the pilot sites. The co-management theory can converge in practice. results and lessons learned have also led to changes in national policies and As we have argued elsewhere (Vernooy 2011), laws governing forests, water use, and Mongolia could serve as an inspiring example environmental practices. A survey carried to other countries in the region. Neighboring out in 2011, indicates that in some areas co- countries in Central Asia, currently undergoing management has helped to reduce the loss of a similar process of transition, have started animals due to the disastrous winter of 2009- to study and learn from the Mongolian 2010. It was the devastation that that winter experience to overcome their own “tragedy of caused that increased awareness among many the commons.” Researchers in Kyrkyzstan and herders of the necessity to adapt conventional Kazakhstan are trying to adapt Mongolia’s co- practices. Co-management was seen as one management practices to the more sedentary possible way forward. This year (2013), our forms of pastoralism found there. In several collective efforts will culminate with the villages, herder-farmers, formerly belonging allocation of pastureland to organized herders to state farms, have come together with local communities being included in the draft government representatives to establish Land Law the Mongolian Parliament is set to small management groups to jointly plan approve in its spring session. This represents sustainable forms of livestock management, a great opportunity to legalize traditional land while maintaining individual ownership of use rights of herders in Mongolia. resources. Yet when we began this applied research, Yet despite the early successes and potential it was Elinor Ostrom’s insights about for replication elsewhere, effective adaptation viable forms of collective action and design practices and institutions are still urgently principles for the equitable and sustainable of need in Mongolia. Co-management was management of the commons that inspired introduced across the country as a response us to work directly with herders, government to changing ecological, socio-economic and staff and other stakeholders. One very political conditions, and to reduce pressure important lesson that we learned was that on the natural resource base. Co-management for co-management to work, it is essential takes considerable time and effort to be for herders’ livelihoods to be improved in introduced, tested and integrated into local very concrete ways, particularly in the short practice as well as national policy/law; only term given the time it often takes to observe after ten years of experience are we beginning and reap the benefits from improved natural to see how collective action for natural resource management practices. This can be resource management can strengthen the achieved through creating and maintaining adaptability of herders and improve their sustainable access and use of resources futures. A start, however, has been made, and beyond pastures, in particular for those it seems apparent that risk can be managed more vulnerable of households. Examples more effectively for nomadic societies through include the introduction of technologies that joint actions and efforts, especially in light of add value to local produce (dairy and felt the high interdependency of people with their products in particular), that establish small- natural resource base. Mongolian herders, scale garden plots (potatoes, vegetables), that never afraid of exploring new terrain, are create new forms of market access at local showing the way. Their involvement, along and national levels, and that provide novel with that of other stakeholders, represents credit, veterinary and meteorological services. a third way of co-management, not totally More recently, experimentation with localized dependent on the state, yet neither totally weather forecasting services show promise to dictated to by the market. It is a ‘way’ that, strengthen the foresight capabilities of herder we feel, is very much a practical realization of households and communities (Vernooy et al. many of Ostrom’s ideas and recommendations. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

101 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Vernooy, Ronnie.The 2011.Solutions “How Mongolian herders are transforming nomadic We acknowledge the financial and technical pastoralism”. 2(5): 82-87. support of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada (1999- Vernooy, Ronnie,The Solutions Hijaba Ykhanbai and Jamba 2012) and the contributions made by all the Tsogt. 2013. “Mongolia’s nomadic weather Mongolian team members who contributed readers”. 4(1). Available at: http://thesolutionsjournal.com/node/2261Community-based Co- their ideas, time and energy. Hijaba Ykhanbai, management of Natural Resources in Mongolia: formerly with the Ministry of Nature, Ykhanbai,Ten Years of Hijaba. Experience 2011. Environment and Tourism, coordinated the research and former IDRC program officers, . Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia: John Graham and Ronnie Vernooy, provided ADMON Publishing House. scientific and project management support Ykhanbai, Hijaba, Bulgan Enkhbat, Ulipkan through regular field visits to all research Beket, Ronnie Vernooy and John Graham. sites, training of research team members, 2004. “Reversing grassland degradation and facilitation of workshops and conferences Mountain Research improving herders’ livelihoods in the Altai and joint writing and publication activities. Development Mountains of Mongolia”. Opinions expressed in this article are those of 24 (May 2004): 96-100. Rtheeferences authors only. Ykhanbai, Hijaba and BulganCommunities, Enkhbat. 2006. Securing Pastoralism Livelihoods“Co-management and Natural of pastureland Resources: in Action Mongolia.” in Post-socialist Mongolia: Herders’ Livelihood ResearchIn:. Tyler, andStephen Policy R Change(ed.), in Asia StrategiesBulgan, Enkhbat. in the Context 2010. of Climate Change and Market Uncertainties (pp. 107– 128). Bourton on Dunsmore: ITDG / Ottawa: . MS thesis, Chiang Mai, International Development Research Centre. Thailand: Chiang Mai University. Ykhanbai, Hijaba, B. Narantulga, Ts. Odgerel, B. Fernández-Giménez, Maria, E. 2002. “Spatial Binye and Ronnie Vernooy. 2006a. “Unlearning and social boundaries and the paradox of Human Ecology old habits: An evaluation of CBNRM capacity pastoral land tenure: A case study from development in Mongolia”. In: Campilan, postsocialist Mongolia”. 30(1): Using Evaluation Dindo, Arma Bertuso, Wayne Nelles and 49-78. for Capacity Development: Community- basedRonnie Natural Vernooy Resource (eds.), Management in Johnson, Craig.Development 2004.”Uncommon and Change ground: Asia The ‘poverty of history’ in common property discourse”. 35(3): (pp. 221-242). Los Baños, Philippines: 407-434. International Potato Center-UPWARD. Mongolia Statistical Yearbook National Statistics Office of Mongolia. 2012. Ykhanbai, Hijaba, Ts. Odgerel, Bulgan Enkhbat . Ulaanbaatar, and B. Naranchimeg. 2006b. “Herder women Mongolia: National Statistics Office of speak out: Towards more equitable co- Governing the Commons: Mongolia. managementSocial and of grasslandsGender Analysis and other in Natural natural The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Resourceresources Management: in Mongolia”. LearningIn: Vernooy, Studies Ronnie and ActionOstrom, Elinor. 1990. Lessons(ed.), from Asia . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University (pp. 181-206). New Delhi, Press. India: Sage / Ottawa, Canada: International Ostrom, Elinor.Science 2009. “A general framework Development Research Centre / Beijing: China for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological Agriculture Press. systems”. 325(5939): 419–422. Mongolia Dzud Appeal United National Mongolia Country Team. 2010. . Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia: United Nations. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

102 Recognition of the Role of Collective Action among Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in the Convention on9 Biological Diversity Diego Pacheco Recognition of the Role of Collective Action among Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in the Convention on Biological Diversity Diego Pacheco1

Abstract9

The Eleventh Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (COP 11 of the CBD), held in Hyderabad-India (8-19 October 2012), made an unexpected posthumous tribute to Elinor Ostrom by recognizing the importance of collective action and self-organized institutions in natural resource governance. This proposal was made by the Plurinational State of Bolivia, and Parties negotiating at the COP11 have considered that the Bolivian proposal enriches the current framework of the CBD. The COP11 declared its support for the underlying concept promoted by Elinor Ostrom, summarized in her own words as “we will all be the poorer if local, self-organized institutions are not a substantial portion of the institutional portfolio of the twenty-first century” (Ostrom, 1994). This paper explores the context of such recognition for both developing and developed countries in the context of the CBD and future implications for the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components. Keywords: conservation of biodiversity; common-pool resources; collective action; self-governing institutions.

1 Rector of the University of the Cordillera (Universidad de la Cordillera-La Paz, Bolivia). Head of the Bolivian delegation at the CBD and alternate head at the UNFCCC. Email: [email protected]

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104 Introduction

twenty-first century, the Bolivian delegation suggested reviewing the major insights of The Eleventh Conference of the Parties of Elinor Ostrom and particularly the role of the United Nations Convention on Biological collective action and institutional development Diversity (COP 11 of the CBD), held in in local organizations. Hyderabad-India (8-19 October 2012), has recognized in several of its decisions the The process of negotiation undertaken by theoretical contribution of Elinor Ostrom. In Bolivia resulted in an explicit recognition particular, in the development of the second from signatory countries to the CBD of the generation theories of collective action, by research outcomes of Elinor Ostrom on identifying the importance of self-organized common property theory and, in particular, institutions in natural resource governance. her claim that self-organized institutions The need to incorporate the theoretical play an important role in biodiversity contribution of Elinor Ostrom in the discussion conservation and sustainable use. Therefore, of the CDB was raised by the delegation of the CBD decided to move forward the process the Plurinational State of Bolivia, stating that for recognizing that the collective action of indigenous peoples and communities have indigenous and local communities be included been ignored as the main stewards of Mother as part of a conceptual framework regarding Earth and nature, whilst public and private biodiversity and development. Furthermore, resources have been identified as the only that it should be considered in the contributors to the conservation of biological establishment of baseline information and the diversity. In order for the CBD to recognize reporting framework for the mobilization of the importance of self-organized institutions financial resources oriented towards achieving for conserving biological diversity and the the CBD’s Aichi Biodiversity Targets (http:// sustainable use of its components in the www.cbd.int/sp/targets/).

Plate 1: The author presenting at the Workshop “Scaling up Biodiversity Finance: Summary from a Dialogue Seminar held in Quito, Ecuador 6-9 March 2012”, organized by the Resilience and Development Programme (SwedBio) at Stockholm Resilience Centre and SCBD. Hyderabad, 9 October 2012. (Photo credit: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bolivia)

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105 The CBD subsequently declared its support “payment for environmental services”. for the underlying concept promoted by Elinor Ostrom that, in her own words, “we A high-level panel on Global Assessment of will all be the poorer if local, self-organized Resources, charged with implementing the institutions are not a substantial portion of Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, the institutional portfolio of the twenty-first has stated that several hundreds of billions of century” (Ostrom, 1994). As Elinor Ostrom dollars (US) a year will be needed to achieve herself would probably have wanted, India the Aichi targets (UNEP, 2012). The CBD is thus become the place where collective action thus struggling to identify sufficient public of self-organized institutions was recognized and private sector financial flows to help by the international community as playing meet their stated biodiversity conservation a critical and prominent role in meeting the goals and objectives, and to this end they have objectives of the CBD. developed a set of indicators for resource mobilization and a preliminary reporting This paper explains how and why the framework to measure and determine how Plurinational State of Bolivia, using Ostrom’s conservation funding can be sourced and lead, succeeded in having the role of collective used. Yet in this most pragmatic of strategies, action recognized and incorporated into the contributions being made by indigenous the CBD via the Convention’s conceptual people and local communities are overlooked framework, the indicators of resource and thus our basic understanding of the mobilization, and in the preliminary reporting economy of biodiversity incomplete. With the framework of financing for biological diversity. role of collective action by indigenous and As a result, indigenous peoples’ and local local people’s institutions ignored, their role communities’ institutions will no longer be in conserving biodiversity and ensuring the invisible on this particular stage but rather a sustainable use of its components is rendered constitutive part in the future history of global largely invisible on this most global of policy THEconservation TRADITIONAL policy. VIEW OF THE CBD stages. REGARDING THE CONTRIBUTION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND LOCAL The Economy of Ecosystems and Biodiversity, COMMMUNITIES or TEEB (UNEP, 2009), was developed as a global framework to better address some of these issues – based on the idea that by expanding markets into nature, and assigning Until COP11 took place in Hyderabad in economic value to a range of ecosystem 2012, international negotiations about services, positive incentives could be created biodiversity conservation were understood as for conserving biodiversity components being primarily driven by public and private (TEEB, 2010). For the proponents of TEEB, financial incentives. The role of collective this approach stimulates the environmental action and stewardship of indigenous and awareness of policy makers by following local peoples’ institutions in the conservation the rationale of the dominant political and and use of biodiversity was largely ignored. economic capitalist model (Ibid.). For the This reflected the position taken by developed Bolivian government, however, this is simply countries that looked to shift most of their the first step towards the commodification of responsibility for conserving biological nature, and subsequently its trade in financial diversity onto the shoulders of the developing markets (Bolivia 2013). world. This was partly due to the fact that these States could no longer allocate The Plurinational State of Bolivia challenged significant amounts of public financing for this the interpretation of the CBD that it was the purpose. Instead, private funds needed to be private and public sectors that formed the mobilized through the economic valuation of two mutually exclusive parts of the economy ecological biodiversity and using the approach of biodiversity, advocating instead for an of “payment for ecosystem services” or approach that would also recognize the POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

106 collective action of indigenous peoples and through markets. In the case of common-pool local communities. They were also adamant resources, exclusion may not be feasible given that such recognition extend to both monetary the costs of denying users access. In such and non-monetary elements—a crucial cases, it is necessary to have recourse to some distinction in light of current emphasis of form of collective action so that sanctions can developed countries on prioritizing only the be used to prevent overuse. economic valuation of ecosystem services and to strengthen the role of the private sector Since environmental functions mostly in mobilizing finance for conservation and encapsulate public or common-pool resources, stemming biodiversity losses. In order to markets are arguably poorly placed to capture the distinctive nature of public, private contribute significantly to biodiversity and collective action, Bolivia suggested a focus conservation and the sustainable use of its on institutional economics and, in particular, components. The CBD attempted to give the views held by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom markets a prominent role at a time of financial concerning the distinctive nature of goods and crisis in the public sector of developed services, and to Elinor Ostrom’s research on countries, and yet given the distinctive OSTROMIANcollective action ENLIGHTENMENT: and common-property THE theory. characteristics of biodiversity-related goods and services this is not the most appropriate ROLE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION BEYOND approach. Rather, there appears a clear need MARKETS AND STATES to broaden the conceptual framework of the TEEB to include the collective action of indigenous people and local communities According to Vincent and Elinor Ostrom there because of the Convention’s primary concern are more than private and public goods and with biodiversity and thus common-pool services. Specifically, four types of goods and resource management issues. services can be identified according to their distinctive characteristics of jointness of use, When referring to environmental goods or consumption, and exclusion, namely: public and functions, such as those performed and goods, private goods, common-pool resources provided by biological diversity, it is important and toll goods (see figure below: types of to recognize that common-pool resources are goods) (Ostrom, 2002). characterized by the difficulty in excluding others from their use or consumption. This According to the Ostroms (2002), most can result in a threat to the resource through governmental services constitute a public overuse and, if unchecked, eventual depletion, good and the patterns of organization that or what is known as the “tragedy of the can mobilize coercive sanctions are necessary commons”. Theories of collective action, for the operation of a public economy or however, have concluded that individuals governmental institutions. For private are capable of self-organization through goods and services, for which exclusion is the mobilization of collective action, and feasible, alternative use should be organized crafting appropriate institutions and rules to Jointness of Use or Consumption

Alternative Use Joint Use Feasible Private goods Toll Goods Exclusion Common-Pool Public Goods Infeasible Resources Table 1: Types of Goods and Services. Source: Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, 2002

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107 sustainably manage their shared resources stronger recognition of and support (Ostrom, 1990). In this sense, the collective for community-based approaches action of indigenous peoples and local to pursuing the human benefits of communities becomes an additional key area biodiversity conservation, including to consider in conserving biodiversity as a food security and poverty alleviation. common-pool resource. While we are aware of the critical role of local communities in the stewardship The lesson here for conservation is that there and sustainable management of natural is much more at work than a simple dichotomy resources, we often tend to take their between markets (private) and state regulated efforts for granted. Not only do I (public) economies, and that recognition of think that we need to acknowledge local people’s collective action in developing this important contribution to the sustainable resource management institutions conservation and sustainable use of is critical. As Elinor Ostrom stated (1994: 1): biodiversity, I am also convinced that The twenty-first century is just there is a lot that we can learn from around the comer. Will the local, their approaches. (Opening remarks self-organized communities that have at the COP 11 of Braulio Ferreira, governed and managed many natural Executive Secretary of CBD). resource systems continue into the The Executive Secretary of the CBD, and next century? Or will they slowly Parties negotiating at the COP11, concurred disappear—relics of a dying past? So many have disintegrated during that the Bolivian proposal enriched the the past century that some scholars current framework of the CBD. It received worry that they will all be destroyed. additional and explicit support from the Will all common-property institutions Indian Government and other Parties to the be taken over by states or by markets? HOWConvention. the CBD WILL incorporate Can indigenous resource governance collective action INTO ITS and management regimes really FRAMEWORKS cope with the problems of a modern age? Are these locally developed institutions, which rely on knowledge The COP11 took a consensus decision to acquired over time, effective, or does add the collective action of self-organized modern science provide better ways institutions for the conservation and use of of managing local resources? biodiversity to the existing roles being played During the Informal Dialogue on CBD strategy by public and private finance. This implies that for resource mobilization, held in Geneva in the reporting framework, previously limited to September 2012, and then at COP11 of the public and private funding, must now undergo CBD, held a month later, the Plurinational State a review process in order to incorporate some of Bolivia suggested an alternative approach form of valuation of the collective action of that was built around many of the theoretical indigenous people and local communities in and applied lessons generated by Ostrom’s biodiversity conservation, and that this would groundbreaking scholarship—specifically the include both monetary and non-monetary role that collective action by indigenous people aspects. and local communities can play in helping to Nevertheless, this is simply the first step achieve stated biodiversity targets. In doing so, in recognizing the prominent and critical the Bolivian proposal strengthened the current framework of action of the CBD. The proposal role of collective action by indigenous received support at multiple levels, including and local communities, and how that can the following remark: lead to self-organized institutions for the sustainable management of natural resources I believe we need to promote and a reduction in the acceleration of the POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

108 destruction of valuable natural resources. The action including by indigenous second step is to develop a methodological and local communities and non- approach to effectively evaluate (monetary market based approaches for the and non-monetary) local and indigenous achievement of the CBD objectives; efforts alongside those of public and private and requests the Executive Secretary finance. This is needed before the reporting to prepare for that review, based on framework can be formulated worldwide information received from Parties on as part of the CBD reporting process. The its application, funding needs, gaps conceptual framework developed by Elinor and priorities. (Paragraph 23. XI/4. Ostrom around common property governance Review of Implementation of the looks set to contribute greatly to this endeavor. Strategy for Resource Mobilization, This task will be undertaken by the Expert including the establishment of Group on Biodiversity for Poverty Eradication CONCLUSIONtargets). and Development, as follows: The Expert Group on Biodiversity for Poverty Eradication and Development The Bolivian government is clear that will “Develop a conceptual framework collective action is of critical importance and guidance on how to assess the in the assessment of monetized and non- role of collective action and the efforts monetized efforts towards biodiversity of indigenous and local communities conservation and use. It is a view that has in conserving biodiversity, garnered support from a number of other considering the critical role of Parties to the Convention. An appropriate indigenous and local communities methodology will demonstrate in quantifiable in the stewardship and sustainable terms the contribution of developing countries management of natural renewable to the conservation of biodiversity and how resources, including exploring the that contribution is split between collective role of non-market-based approaches action, and public and private financial flows. in this endeavor. (Paragraph 4(d). This is not withstanding the more qualitative Elements of terms of reference for contribution that collective action makes with the Expert Group on Biodiversity for respect to the vision and principles of many Poverty Eradication and Development developing countries, by means of valuing XI/22, Biodiversity for poverty the role played by indigenous and local eradication and development). communities in the conservation of global biodiversity. The third step needed to effectively incorporate the role of collective action For the Bolivian delegation at the CBD, the in the reporting framework of countries insights of both Vincent and Elinor Ostrom for conservation financing is related to were critical in enabling them to successfully the work being carried out by the Ad Hoc negotiate the recognition of collective action Open-ended Working Group on the Review of indigenous peoples and local communities of Implementation of the Convention, as in the Convention. It was the Ostrom’s established in the following COP11 decision: pioneering research and theory-building that Requests the Ad Hoc Open-ended has provided a scientific foundation to enable Working Group on the Review of Bolivia and others to promote the role of self- Implementation of the Convention governing institutions of indigenous peoples at its fifth meeting to further and local communities among biodiversity review the preliminary reporting conservation negotiators and policy-makers, framework as well as the baseline and thus ensure that their presence becomes information for each of the targets, ever more visible as the twenty-first century including the role of collective unfolds. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

109 References The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Ecological and Economic Conceptual framework for the FoundationsTEEB. 2010. Intergovernmental Policy-Science Platform on BiodiversityBolivia. 2013. and Ecosystem Services . London and Washington: Earth Scan. TEEB-The Economics of . La Paz, Ecosystems and Biodiversity for National Bolivia: Ministerio de GoverningRelaciones the Exteriores. Commons: andUNEP. International 2009. Policy Makers-Summary: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Responding to the Value of Nature Ostrom,Action Elinor. 1990. . Geneva: . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University UNEP. Press. Neither Market nor State: Governance of Common Pool Resources in the UNEP. 2012. “Review of implementation of the Twenty-FirstOstrom, Elinor. Century 1994. strategy for resource mobilization, including the establishmnent of targets”. Document , Washington, D.C.: IFPRI. presented at the COP11 of the Convention of Ostrom, VincentPolycentricity and Elinor Ostrom. and Local 2002. Public Biological Diversity, Hyderabad, India, October Economies“Public goods and public choices”. In: Michael 8-19, 2012. McGinnis (ed.), (pp75-106). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

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110 Are Ostrom’s Design Principles Sufficient10 for Design? Arun Agrawal and Jesse Ribot Are Ostrom’s Design Principles Sufficient for Design? Arun Agrawal1 and Jesse Ribot2

Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) design principles for on the principles to evaluate sustainable common pool resource institutions have found forestry among the Algonquin of Canada in a receptive10 audience among both researchers the context of inadequate state commons and decision makers (Design Principles). Using management policies. Nagendra, Ghate a set of 14 studies of long-term commons and Rao (this volume) show how the IFRI governance, reflecting on resources that database launched by Ostrom has been ranged from forests to fisheries to irrigation, essential for demonstrating the potential Ostrom condensed in simple, everyday for self-governance of resources in India’s language ten key features associated with the forests and cities. Pacheco (this volume) long-term survival of resource institutions. applies the principles to show the viability Applied in many analytical investigations of self-organized indigenous institutions for to understand how resource commons are sustainable biodiversity use, which Bolivia is managed, these Design Principles have arguing should form a central application of repeatedly emerged as being relevant to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). effective resource governance (Alidina 2005, Gachenga (this volume) shows their utility Dayton-Johnson 2000, Lane 1998). Although in analyzing adaptability of customary law Ostrom herself did not view the Design water management in Kenya. From Mexico, Principles as being sufficient for effective Pacheco-Vega (this volume) explores how governance, she did view them as essential Ostrom’s principles have been used by the elements that help account for the success country’s commons scholars to fight Hardin’s of institutions (1990:90). The regularity tragedy narratives, while Merino (this volume) with which scholars have found some subset show how they can assist in developing a of these principles to stand the acid test of better understanding of the relationship that empirical application suggests that they are indigenous Mexican society has with nature. a convenient starting point for analyzing Finally, Kauneckis (this volume) takes a resource governance. more theoretical approach to examine how the Design Principles have influenced more A number of the studies included in this recent research on, and analysis of, commons special issue demonstrate again, using institutions. examples from diverse settings and resource types, that the elements of Ostrom’s design Each of these studies finds the elements of principles are present across enduring Ostrom’s framework present and in operation commons — and of great use in their in their cases. The authors use the Design evaluation. Ykhanbai and Vernooy (this Principles to assess areas of strength and volume) use them to analyze co-management weakness in the commons systems they are arrangements for community-state-market studying. The principles are thus a clear Mongolian pastoral systems, while Haile anchoring point to analyze whether an existing (this volume) shows how they help assess institutional arrangement has the features traditional hiza’ti forest enclosures in that will likely lead to positive commons Eritrea. Van Schie (this volume) draws management outcomes. They also enable

1 2 Professor, School of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan. Email: [email protected] Professor of Geography and Director of the Social Dimensions of Environmental Policy Initiative, University of Illinois. Email: [email protected]

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112 analysts to assess institutional configurations They appear to be concrete principles of and make preliminary judgments about design. But they are far too abstract to whether a given common-pool resource guide specific judgments about the kind of institution is likely to endure. In conjunction institutions that will yield positive outcomes with her later work (Ostrom 2011), they help in a given context. Applying them to design sort through a bewildering variety of real- new institutions requires recourse to other world contexts, institutional arrangements, elements in Ostrom’s oeuvre. By themselves, user group characteristics, and resource the Design Principles are not enough to features to enable systematic thinking about move from the abstract to the specific, from the governance of commons. They bring principle to practice. researchers a long way towards understanding An example will make the point clearer. the interactions among users, resources, Consider the design principle related to institutions, and outcomes. local enforcement of rules. As an abstract Thus, we agree that Ostrom’s Design Principles summary of whether local populations have enable researchers, and also practitioners, the right and the power to enforce the rules to identify and assess existing commons. In for using and managing the commons, the principle turns out to be quite useful. Scholars this postscript, however, we ask a differentdesigning question: In what ways and to what extent are examining any specific commons dilemma can the Design Principles also useful in examine the facts of the case to assess whether new institutions to govern the commons? the powers of enforcement are locally vested, Ostrom’s distillation of regularities in and analyze the association between this institutional empirics is a tour de force when abstract principle and outcomes of interest. it comes to moving from the concrete to the Local enforcement can be viewed as being abstract. But to what extent is this distillation present if there Ostrom’s of key governance features also adequate to are local guards, distillation of or if the rules for design new institutions and organizations regularities in to manage the commons—to move from the enforcement are abstract principles to concrete functioning locally devised, or institutional commons? if the guards are appointed locally empirics is a This is no idle question. Part of the lure of the in specialized tour de force Design Principles is precisely their relevance roles, or if specific when it comes to practice. Since the middle of the 1980s, local individuals governments in developing countries have are selected to moving from pursued scores if not hundreds of distinct permanently the concrete to decentralization measures to devolve control as guards, or if the abstract. But over forests, irrigation systems, pastures, and households that fisheries to local users. Hundreds of NGOs rely on a resource to what extent is have sought to involve local communities in sequentially this distillation... managing resources. And given the simplicity monitor and also adequate with which the Design Principles are stated, enforce rules, or the hope is evident that project managers, if guards are paid to design new decision makers and policy analysts in NGOs by locally raised institutions and and in government agencies can use them to resources, and organizations shape new resource management institutions indeed, for many and revise existing institutions for better other versions to manage the outcomes. of what makes commons... enforcement local But, as stated, the Design Principles do not (Agrawal and provide sufficient guidance to design new Waylen 2013). But projects for managing common pool resources. it is quite unclear POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

113 Functioning what the choice for Lankina 2008). commons, and local enforcement should be when it If the Design Principles are not useful by the specificity comes to deciding themselves to decide about how to design of each of their which of these new resource governance institutions, for what might they then be useful when it operating choices makes the most sense comes to designing institutions and resource elements, in translating management organizations? We offer three emerge through the principle of answers. a negotiated local enforcement Firstly, it is useful to recognize that the design into practice. By iterative social principles are not, nor perhaps were they itself, this design intended to be, a blueprint for institutional endeavor. principle is not design. They are better viewed as heuristic enough to know devices or guidelines about where to start what to do in when crafting new institutions or choosing any given effort existing institutions for resource governance. to design the enforcement mechanism in a project. Secondly, even if the Design Principles cannot be translated directly into a concrete design Nor is it of use to say that any one of these for managing a resourcenot system, they are specific choices will do. Indeed, the specific extremely useful to decide what resource choice that local users and mangers made managers should do when crafting when deciding on enforcement was likely institutions. It may be hard to decide how a result of many other factors that are not exactly sanctionsnot should be graduated.reverse But, a part of the suite of Design Principles: a designer can avoid creating a sanctioning income and wealth of users, stratified social system that is graduated or that is statuses among users (e.g. caste, class, graduated. Or, even if the choice of what to do gender), available assets and capitals, levels to make enforcement local throws open more of literacy, group size, nature of the resource doors than it may be possible for a project system, value of harvested units, possibilities designer to explore, it certainly allows the of accessing higher-level decision makers, designer to close a large number of doors. levels of conflict among users—and the list Knowing what not to do is extremely useful. goes on. Indeed, choices over any particular It narrows down the field of possibilities design principle are likely similarly affected by drastically for anyone interested in creating other features of the user group, the resource, and implementing a program of resource the macro-governance context, and other management. institutional choices. Ostrom’s approach of identifying abstract institutional features Finally, one might argue that the Design as Design Principles is extremely useful Principle are not and should not be used to when it comes to analyzing the institutional substitute for the inventiveness that local characteristics associated with resource users and managers necessarily display in outcomes. It is less effective when it comes to iteratively selecting from among a multitude converting design principles into institutional of possibilities the ones that are useful for choices, combining and aggregating different them. Viewed thus, the abstraction inherent institutional choices into an institutional in the design principles is simultaneously arrangement, and judging which institutional a plea for faith in the capacities of the local arrangement is best suited for the social and users and managers. It is not necessary to seek ecological conditions and dynamics in which to make them more concrete or to develop institutions play a regulating and moderating the knowledge necessary for making them role. The principles do not inform us about applicable across a wide variety of contexts. the politics and constraints that shape The urge towards concretization may be the institutional choices (Ribot, Chhatre and natural managerial impulse. But it is perhaps POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

114 References better to sound a note of caution whereby the requisite concreteness for a given situation Limits to Governance is best left to those who depend on resources Agrawal, Arun and Kerry Waylen. 2013. locally and whose lives and fates are bound . Paper presented at the up more intimately with the fate of local 2013 DOPE Conference, March 30, Lexington, common pool resources than might be the Kentucky. case for some distant project designers and Alidina, H.M. 2005. “Local levelCoastal fisheries institutional engineers. Managementmanagement in Diani-Chale, Kenya: Current status and future directions”. Common property management institutions— 33(4):459-470. from oligopsonies to pastoral systems—are constantly emerging and changing. Existing Dayton-Johnson, J. 2000. “DeterminantsJournal of of commons management systems can be Developmentcollective action Economics on the local commons: A evaluated and perhaps even guided using model with evidence from Mexico”. Ostrom’s design principles. But functioning 62(1):181-208.Custodians of the commons, and the specificity of each of Commons: Pastoral Land Tenure in East and Lane, Charles R., (ed.). 1998. their operating elements, emerge through West Africa a negotiated iterative social endeavor. We . London, UK: Governing Earthscan. the Commons: believe Elinor Ostrom would have agreed Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action with this conclusion. It is a corollary of the Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. overarching argument about polycentric . governance that is emblematic of Elinor and New York: Cambridge University Press. Vincent Ostrom’s work. Ostrom, Elinor.Science 2011. “A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems”. 325: 419-422. Ribot, Jesse, Ashwini Chhatre and Tomila Lankina. 2008. “InstitutionalConservation choice and and Society recognition in the formation and consolidation of local democracy”. 6(1): 1-11

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115

Un son para Lin Ostrom Caña Dulce11 y Caña Brava 11

Plate 1: (Photo credit: Leticia Merino Pérez)

Un son para Lin Ostrom Caña Dulce y Caña Brava

ELINOR OSTROM, te vemos niña, vulnerable, inerme, sin que lo adverso te merme ni te haga soltar los remos, de tu entereza aprendemos que nunca hay que claudicar que hay que aprender a luchar, que hasta lo más conflictivo tiene algo de positivo que hay que hacer fructificar

ELINOR OSTROM, tu infancia no fue una dulce empanada: señalada, criticada, víctima de la arrogancia… ¡nada apagó la fragancia de la flor que siempre fuiste!: de cara al sol, nunca triste, a fuerza de pundonor revertiste a tu favor los golpes que recibiste POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

118 ELINOR OSTROM,¡qué vivo sentimos tu corazón!: confianza, cooperación, el accionar colectivo… cada concepto un motivo para dedicarte una aria, generosa, visionaria, descubriste cómo fluye ¡y el poder que constituye la fuerza comunitaria!

ELINOR OSTROM, lograste ser nuestra, ser mexicana y fue tu grandeza humana lo mejor que nos legaste, no es el Nobel que ganaste lo que te da eternidad, es tu firme voluntad y el no andarte por las ramas ¡es tu inteligencia en llamas y tu generosidad!

ELINOR OSTROM, pudiste demostrarle a todo el mundo el generador profundo de energía que descubriste: en cada individuo viste no un dato aislado, un guarismo, sino comunitarismo y poder transformador frente al monstruo predador que es el neoliberalismo

ELINOR OSTROM, tu vida resplandece con tu muerte mujer sabia, mujer fuerte, ¡invencible!, ¡decidida!, no es ésta una despedida porque viva seguirás nunca te has ido, ¡aquí estás! y el memorial que te hacemos sólo hace que te nombremos ¡y que te queramos más!. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

119 Caña Dulce y Caña Brava

nace como grupo en el año 2008; debido a la necesidad de interpretar la música que sus integrantes han heredado. El son jarocho les significa un lenguaje común de donde afloran las más diversas emociones a través del amplio colorido poético y musical propio del son tradicional veracruzano. La agrupación ofrece al público una sonoridad definida por las voces femeninas de sus integrantes y muestra una faceta del son jarocho en la cual las mujeres toman un papel importante en esta cultura ya que la música generalmente ha sido interpretada por los hombres. La agrupación se ha presentado en diversos foros y festivales nacionales e internacionales, llevando así su música a países como Canadá, Estados Unidos, Venezuela, Sudáfrica, Corea y Turquía. Adriana Cao Romero, Arpa y Voz Raquel Palacios Vega, Jarana y voz Valeria Rojas, Percusión y Voz Alejandro Loredo Ramírez, Guitarra de Son

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120

Photo Credits

Raymond Aquino Macapagal, Front cover Josie Chummog gathering harvested rice stalks, Batad, Ifugao, Philippines (2011). MFCC, MWHCPD, Assistant Professor, Center for Aroha Te Pareake Mead, International Studies, University of the Philippines - Diliman, Email [email protected] Cover inset Elinor Ostrom. Chair, IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic & Social Policy and Director, Maori Business, School of Management, Victoria University of Wellington. Email [email protected] Raymond Aquino Macapagal, Back cover Golden paddies ready for harvest at the UNESCO World Heritage Batad Rice Terrace Cluster, Banaue, Ifugao, Philippines (2011). MFCC, MWHCPD, Assistant Professor, Center for International Studies, University of the Philippines - Diliman, Email [email protected] Raymond Aquino Macapagal, Page 10 Women harvest each other’s paddies, Batad, Banaue, Ifugao, Philippines (2011). MFCC, MWHCPD, Assistant Professor, Center for International Studies, University of the Philippines - Diliman, Email [email protected] Foundation for Ecological Security - FES Page 11 Elinor Ostroms’s visit to Chintamani, Karnataka, India. James Robson,

Page 23 Zapotec communal lands, Oaxaca, Mexico. Visiting Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, University of Redlands, United States of America and member of IASC. Email [email protected] Raymond Aquino Macapagal, Page 34 Women doing the harvesting by hand, Batad, Banaue, Ifugao, Philippines (2011). MFCC, MWHCPD, Assistant Professor, Center for International Studies, University of the Philippines - Diliman, Email [email protected] James Robson, Page 35 Heading home with the corn harvest, San Juan Evangelista Analco, Oaxaca, Mexico. Visiting Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, University of Redlands, United States of America and member of IASC. Email [email protected] 47, 57, 68 Agnès Joignerez, AQUATERRE Pages 46, Farmers working in the highland ricefields near Andringtra National Park, Madagascar. (Natural Resources & Development), Madagascar, James Robson, Email: [email protected] Page 69 Communal lands, Central Andes of Peru. Visiting Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, University of Redlands, United States of America and member of Rosanne Van Schie, IASC. Email [email protected] Page 79 Economic Development Advisor for Wolf Lake First Nation. Ronnie Vernooy Email: [email protected] Page 91 Mongolia. , Genetic Resources Policy Specialist, Bioversity International. James Robson Email: [email protected] Page 103 View across communal territory of Ayaccocha, Central Peru. , Visiting Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, University of Redlands, United States of Rucha Ghate America and member of IASC. Email [email protected] ( Page 111 Women working during a village meeting, Nagendra, India. Raymond Aquino Macapagal, Page 116 A man Bimmangon Chummog) carrying the rice bundles home, Batad, Banaue, Ifugao, Philippines (2011). MFCC, MWHCPD, Assistant Professor, Center for International Studies, University of the Philippines - Diliman, James Robson, Email [email protected] Page 117 Harvesting pitaya roja on Zapotec communal lands, Oaxaca, Mexico. Visiting Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, University of Redlands, James Robson, United States of America and member of IASC. Email [email protected] Page 121 Agroforestry system, Chinantec cloud forest, Oaxaca, Mexico. Visiting Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, University of Redlands, United States of America and member of IASC. Email [email protected] POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

122 Commission on Environment, Economic and Social Policy (CEESP)

CEESP Themes The work of the Commission is progressed CEESP Theme on Environment, through six Themes, two Specialist Groups Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment and three Taskforces. Three of these Themes/ (TEMTI) SGs are established across other IUCN Commissions. Together they form the diverse perspectives and experiences of the CEESP Objective: provide practical and enabling membership that implement the CEESP information, and relevant policy options Programme priorities: on issues lying at the intersection between economics and environmental and social Development and promotion of a sustainability.CEESP Theme on Culture and Conservation conservation ethic that supports diverse (TCC) knowledge systems and values, delivers rights-based and equitable conservation with improved governance of natural resources Objective: improve knowledge, policy and tangible livelihoods benefits, and and practice through linking cultural and links biological diversity with the cultural biologicalCEESP Theme diversity. on Governance, Equity and dimensions of nature conservation with a Rights (TGER) focus on the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities.

Increased use of rights-based approaches Objective: promote better understanding to natural resources management and and action on the practice and theory of governance that promotes social and governance of natural resources, equity, and cultural equity, indigenous and community humanCEESP Themerights. on Sustainable Livelihoods governance, sustainable livelihoods and (TSL) human security.

Nature based solutions to global challenges Objective: improve coherence and (climate change, conversion of forests coordination among initiatives for and farm-land to biofuels projects, food biodiversity conservation, poverty eradication sovereignty, poverty, inequitable economic andCEESP sustainable Them on livelihoods. Environment, Conflict and and social develop-ment) are underpinned by Security (TECS) economic policies that reinforce sustainability, social equity and environmental integrity.

Enhanced capacity of civil society, Objective: focuses on the intersection governments and the private sector to between environmental governance, ensure corporate so-cial and environmental environmental change and conflict and accountability and reduce the negative impact how this impacts on multiple dimensions of of industries on climate change, bio-cultural security. diversity and food security. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

123 CEESP Theme on Social and Environmental Specialist Group on Sustainable Use and Accountability of the Private Sector Livelihoods (SULi) — a joint CEESP/SSC (SEAPRISE) Specialist Group

Objective: enhanced capacity of civil Objective: highlighting the importance society, governments and the private sector of wild species for providing community to ensure corporate social and environmental benefits; analysing and communicating accountability and reduce its impact on climate change. best-practice in aspects of sustainable use; Inter-commission Themes/ promoting innovation in adaptive responses Specialist Groups to the challenges of sustainable use; and developing practical tools and approaches CEESP Theme on Indigenous Peoples, Local to support sustainability and resilience in Communities, Equity & Protected Areas resource use. (CEESP & WCPA) In addition to the themes and specialists groups above, CEESP has established OBJECTIVE: improved governance of taskforces on Biofuels, Bio-Cultural protected areas through equitable sharing of Conservation, REDD++ and Indigenous costs and benefits and appropriate recognition Peoples. CEESP is actively developing a global ofThe governance Specialist types. Group on Indigenous youth network together with other IUCN Peoples, Customary & Environmental Law Commission Young Professional Groups, & Human Rights (SPICEH) of CEESP/CEL and fostering greater opportunities for intergenerational partnerships with CEESP and IUCN through the CEESP Youth and Objective: focus on indigenous people and Intergenerational Partnership Group. human rights & the intersection of customary and environmental laws.

This journal is printed on 300gsm Silk-hd Matt (Fsc Mix 70% Certified) and 130gsm Fresh Zero Silk Carbon Neutral (Fsc Mix 70% Certified).

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

124 CEESP, the IUCN Commission on The International Association for the Study Environmental, Economic and of the Commons (IASC), founded in 1989 as Social Policy, is an inter-disciplinary The International Association for the Study network of professionals whose mission is to act as a source of association devoted to understanding and advice on the environmental, improvingof Common institutions Property (IASCP), for the managementis a nonprofit economic, social and cultural factors of resources that are (or could be) held that affect natural resources and or used collectively by communities in biological diversity and to provide developing or developed countries. The guidance and support towards Association’s goals are: to encourage effective policies and practices in exchange of knowledge among diverse environmental conservation and disciplines, areas, and resource types; to sustainable development. foster mutual exchange of scholarship and practical experience; and, to promote appropriate institutional design.