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Negative Interpretation Biases Precede the Onset of Psychosis

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Negative Interpretation Biases Precede the Onset of Psychosis Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Behavior Therapy 50 (2019) 718–731 www.elsevier.com/locate/bt Negative Interpretation Biases Precede the Onset of Psychosis Jenny Yiend King’s College London Paul Allen King’s College London Natalie D. Lopez King’s College London Irina Falkenberg King’s College London Department of Psychiatry & Psychotherapy, Philipps-University Marburg, Germany Huai-Hsuan Tseng King’s College London Philip McGuire King’s College London psychosis, and could therefore contribute to its development. This study investigated whether a negative interpretation Biased interpretation mechanisms could be a new target for bias was present in people at high risk for psychosis. People clinical intervention in the early phase of psychosis. with an At Risk Mental State (ARMS; n = 21), patients with First Episode Psychosis (FEP; n = 20), and healthy controls (n = 20) performed three tasks, each of which was designed Keywords: interpretation bias; psychosis; at-risk mental state; to measure interpretation bias. Both ARMS and FEP cognitive vulnerability participants showed an attenuated positive bias compared to controls. These findings extend previous results investi- COGNITIVE BIASES ARE DEFINED as “the selective gating interpretation bias in psychosis by showing that processing of pathology congruent information that interpretative biases are present before the onset of might confirm a pathological belief” (Savulich, Shergill & Yiend, 2012, p. 516). More specifically, interpretation bias is defined as “a consistent We thank Yuanyuan Huo, Damla Irez and Katie Davis for tendency to interpret emotionally ambiguous stimuli, assistance with data collection; George Savulich for assistance with situations, or events in a negative (or positive) preparation of the tasks and Josie Parkhouse for assistance in ” formatting the manuscript. Philip McGuire acknowledges support manner (Lee, Mathews, Shergill, & Yiend, 2016, from the NIHR Biomedical Research Centre for Mental Health at p. 26). Such biases may contribute to causing and KCL and SLaM, London UK. The views expressed are those of the maintaining psychopathologies (Yiend, 2010) authors and not necessarily those of the NHS. Address correspondence to Dr. Jenny Yiend, PO 63, Institute of through an explicit, plausible pathway. The sug- Psychiatry, King’s College London, De Crespigny Park, London, gested mechanism, when applied to psychosis, is that SE5 8AF; e-mail: [email protected] an enhanced tendency to select paranoid material for 0005-7894/© 2018 Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapies. further processing (be it via attention or interpreta- Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. tion bias) is likely to lead to an artificially increased interpretation bias in psychosis 719 perception of risk of personal harm in the environ- beliefs themselves. Given the potential etiological ment, which will enhance and maintain the matching importance of these pathology-congruent biases, symptoms, and in turn will promote further biased they called for further research to investigate processing. A cycle of reciprocal causation has been pathology-congruent information processing in suggested, and the closer the match between the psychosis. disorder and the focus of the bias, the more potent The present study compared At-Risk Mental State the effects are likely to be. (ARMS) participants and First-Episode Psychosis Most recently, this putative causal role of (FEP) patients with healthy controls. FEP is defined pathology-congruent biased processing is supported as those who have, or are currently experiencing, a quite directly by manipulation studies (e.g., studies first episode of nonorganic psychosis, which includes using cognitive bias modification [CBM] techniques) “episodes of schizophreniform, manic and depressive showing that altering these biases in interpretation psychoses, puerperal psychoses and acute and results in changes to symptoms or proxy symptoms transient psychoses amongst others” (Macmillan, (e.g., in anxiety: Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, 2007, p. 1). FEP is therefore a clinical psychosis Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006; Mathews, Ridgeway, patient group in the early stages of the illness. The Cook, & Yiend, 2007; Yiend, Mackintosh, & inclusion of the FEP group served, first, to replicate Mathews, 2005). A recent review of meta-analyses andextendthefindingsofSavulich, Shergill, and of CBM studies is informative about effects on Yiend (2017), who examined a chronic clinical anxiety and depression (Jones & Sharpe, 2017), but psychosis sample and reported negatively biased additional psychopathologies, such as perfectionism interpretation, specifically related to paranoid and eating disorders, have also been investigated material in patients compared to matched healthy (e.g., Yiend, Savulich, Coughtrey, & Shafran, 2011; controls. Second, the FEP group provided a clinical Yiend, Parnes, Shepherd, Roche, & Cooper, 2014). patient sample against which to benchmark the This research is being translated into therapies that extent of biased interpretation in our preclinical seek to alleviate clinical symptoms; therefore, a better ARMS group. understanding of these biases in psychosis may ARMS are those who have not yet experienced ultimately result in improvements to treatment and their first episode of psychosis but are at risk of prognosis. developing a psychotic illness. In this study, this Psychosis research has focused on cognitive was defined as displaying one of the following deficits at the global level, such as impairments in characteristics outlined in the Comprehensive attention, motor skills, working memory, and Assessment of At-Risk Mental State (CAARMS; executive function (e.g., Fioravanti, Bianchi, & Yung et al., 2005) measure: attenuated psychotic Cinti, 2012; O’Carroll, 2000). These deficits are a symptoms, brief limited intermittent psychosis, or prominent feature of psychosis and reflect generic having a vulnerability to psychosis such as a first- impairments in cognitive abilities. In light of the degree relative with psychosis or a schizotypal complexity and variability of the psychotic symp- personality disorder combined with a decline in tom profile, there is a call for a single-symptom functioning for over a month at some point in the approach to psychosis research. This involves past year. The inclusion of this group was to test the researching one putative causal factor at a time causal relationship between interpretation biases and examining the specific symptom it is believed to and clinical psychosis. Within the literature ARMS trigger (Freeman, 2011). This, it is argued, allows groups are typically used to investigate the devel- the development of more effective forms of opment of highly predictive vulnerability markers treatment that target specific psychotic traits. for FEP, as these features commonly present prior Cognitive biases allow us this level of specificity to illness onset (Knowles & Sharma, 2004). In the as they focus on specific cognitive domains, such as present context we expected that if interpretation interpretation, attention, and reasoning (Blanchette bias is a causal factor in the development of & Richards, 2010). Savulich et al. (2012) reviewed psychosis, then the ARMS group should display the literature on paranoia-relevant interpretation in this bias in comparison to matched healthy psychosis. They concluded that despite evidence controls. suggesting that paranoia and paranoid psychosis is More broadly, focusing on the prodromal phase associated with selective avoidance of threat, of illness in psychopathology research is important generally reduced “data gathering” and negative for at least three reasons. First, there is a clear interpretations of hallucinations that elicit distress, precedent, based on previous prodromal research, there has been relatively little research examining that mechanisms (such as interpretation biases) the selective information processing biases of the previously reported in clinical samples should be sort that might support or exacerbate the paranoid observable in the prodromal stages of an illness 720 yiend et al. (e.g., Iacoviello, Alloy, Abramson, & Choi, 2010). paranoid groups endorsed nonparanoid interpreta- Therefore, we predicted that the characteristics of tions more than paranoid interpretations, with both psychosis, including interpretative bias, would be groups displaying an adaptive interpretation bias. present in the prodromal group. Second, as outlined This tendency was significantly weaker in the high- above, if a mechanism (here interpretation bias) than the low-paranoid group, suggesting a pattern does indeed contribute to the onset and mainte- of interpretation bias consistent with the mainte- nance of a clinical disorder, then it must also be nance of associated pathology. present in the prodromal state, since any causal A second task, the Scrambled Sentences Task factor must precede its effect. Although demon- (SST), measured the same mechanism (interpretation strating this would not be conclusive evidence of a of emotional ambiguity) but used single sentence causal role, it would be consistent with this stimuli. Participants viewed a string of mixed-up proposition. More important, failure to observe words and had to unscramble them to create a the putative causal mechanism in the prodromal meaningful sentence with two different possibilities, stage would lead to a definitive rejection of its one having a benign meaning and the other a hypothesized
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