Mitigating the Consequences of Violent Conflict: What Works and What Does Not?

OCTOBER 2012

The purpose of the second International Expert Forum, “Mitigating the Consequences of Violent Conflict: What Works and What Does Not?,” which was held at IPI on June 6, 2012, was to take stock of the consequences of ongoing violent conflict and means to prevent and reduce them, including peacekeeping operations and special envoys. The ambition was to identify patterns and formulate lessons learned and policy implications in the short, medium, and long term. The forum was divided into three sessions: mapping the trends and causes of violence against civilians; mapping the challenges and impact of peacekeeping This meeting note was drafted by operations; and mapping the challenges and impact of special envoys. Robert Muggah, principal at the SecDev Group and research director Introduction at the Igarape Institute, and Birger Heldt, director of research at the Identification of the causes and consequences of violence against civilians in Folke Bernadotte Academy. It war, post-war, and non-war settings is a growing global preoccupation across reflects the rapporteurs' interpreta - advocacy, policy, and research communities. Scholars from the public health tion of the discussion and does not and social sciences are mobilizing a range of technologies to bear witness to necessarily reflect the view of all the consequences of armed conflict—from passive surveillance and household participants. surveys to crowdsourcing and satellite mapping. These and other efforts are The International Expert Forum was beginning to give a clearer picture of the extent of human suffering in the originally launched at IPI in New midst of chronic violence. Moreover, a chorus of actors spanning the security York on December 15, 2011. It is a and development sectors—within and outside the United Nations—is calling joint collaboration of the Folke for a more concerted focus on the protection of civilians. Bernadotte Academy, IPI, the The introductory session of the second International Expert Forum was SecDev Group, and the Social opened by Susana Malcorra, chef de cabinet , of the Executive Office of the UN Science Research Council (SSRC). Secretary-General. She drew attention to the critical, if changing, role of the The second International Expert UN in preventing and reducing organized violence in armed conflicts and Forum was held at IPI on June 6, post-conflict settings. The UN lends moral consciousness and leverages wide- 2012. ranging experience in this regard; it has important convening powers; it has capacities to exercise its Good Offices; and it has a long experience obtained from setbacks and successes. It is also working with increasing coherence and coordination. Its comparative advantages include its legitimacy in contested spaces but also the wide range of agencies and instruments at its disposal from peacekeepers and peacebuilders to human rights, humanitarian, and develop - ment experts. The opening presentation emphasized the importance of putting national priorities and capacities first. The UN is attempting to rebalance the ways in which national and local capabilities and ownership are supported. The organization acknowledges the importance of reconstituting the social contract binding states and their citizens but also the centrality of host govern - ments and societies in organizing and managing the process. With over sixty 2 MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

years of experience working on issues of interna - communities. tional and internal armed conflict, the UN has • Harness knowledge and expertise of returning acquired a series of insights into how these diasporas, make sure they see their role in an objectives can be achieved. These include the need emerging country. to do the following: • Expand and solidify regional relationships and • Adopt multiple perspectives or lenses when partnerships. There is a need to strengthen or reading conflicts since there are many "truths" in create regional coordination mechanisms; trust determining their causes and consequences. in the region is important, and sometimes lack of • Privilege local ownership of the recovery agenda. trust is an important source of conflict to begin The UN should not want peace more than the with. Moreover, regional cooperation can assist in actors themselves, and the UN needs to successfully dealing with joint issues such as understand that local agents have the best infrastructure, environmental issues, etc. information. • Promote the empowerment of women and • Achieve a balance between attaining rapid protection from discrimination. Organized stability and security and addressing underlying sexual violence is sometimes a tactic of war, but causes. If security is elevated over justice, then few peace accords make a reference to it. We have reconciliation may prove more difficult and a long way to go in this regard. Moreover, we need security gains more fragile; meanwhile, processes to improve employment opportunities for to combat inpunity can generate instability. women. • Promote inclusive politics. Constitution-building The ensuing discussion ventured into areas such and institutional support are crucial for opening as coordination, data gathering, emerging threats up countries’ political space. and obstacles, and how the UN is assisting nations • Avoid looking at countries with a foreign in transitions. For instance, while the UN has taken mindset. Institution-building processes need to steps to enhance its capacity to deploy civilians, a be adopted to local conditions and cultures; major gap continues to be the UN’s capacity to institutions cannot be built in a couple of years. recruit, train, deploy, and manage civilian special - ists. Even more important, states affected by • Combine disarmament, demobilization, and chronic organized violence lack core capacities. reintegration (DDR) processes with reconcilia - There is a large need to build local civilian capacity tion (R) processes. to address the needs of societies in transition. More • Make security services the right size, and improve positively, there is some evidence of regional accountability. Security sector governance and entities and south-south alliances beginning to fill DDR must take place in the context of local the gaps, though much more investment is needed ownership, as it lays the foundation for a new in this regard. The example of IGAD’s work in social contract. The UN is well positioned to South Sudan was cited as a positive case. Timor- carry out such tasks. Leste is also widely regarded as a success story, and • Solve the DDR and security sector reform (SSR) we need to calibrate how to retain some presence so challenges. DD is often more successful than R; that Timor does not relapse. The UN is working making programs sustainable is of critical hard to improve this string of work and is importance. Often program designs are based on committed to working on issues like this during the available resources rather than actual needs. coming five years. • Consider the needs and aspirations of young The international system is not well equipped to people. This is of central importance, as manage contemporary threats. Sometimes it is illustrated by the events in the Arab world. We struggling with social, economic, environmental, need to understand this dynamic and adapt UN and peace and security challenges without taking programs accordingly. into due consideration that they are interconnected • Ensure that essential quick impact projects are yet totally different threats. The international rooted in the needs and priorities of local diplomatic architecture is still ill-equipped to address contemporary transnational threats related 3

to global financial market shocks, climate change, intentional violence and victimization at the sub- and a wide range of threats to peace and security. national level. This kind of diagnosis can serve at Indeed, sometimes the UN and other international least two purposes: providing a comprehensive entities struggle to meet these challenges in record of mass atrocities and violations of human isolation, not recognizing how their causes and rights post facto and helping to predict violence consequences can be related. The overall challenge dynamics. The insights are sobering and clarifying, is to find a way for the international community at as they correct long-held assumptions and large to deal with these threats, rather than relying anecdotal evidence on the prevalence of violence on unilateral responses alone. that have come to inform policy. The panelists set What has changed is not just the diversity and out a far-reaching agenda that raised a number of spatial character of peace and security risks, but fundamental questions about the definition of also their rapid temporal manifestation and spread. armed conflict and the implications of organized Some participants noted that traditional violence. approaches are fast being overtaken by events and The first session chaired by Dr. Robert Muggah becoming increasingly irrelevant. There is also a considered the global characteristics of organized need for early warning mechanisms to deal with violence. He discussed the main findings and these emerging threats, to allow for sufficient time insights from the recent research mapping out the to prevent and react. For example, the Arab Spring onset, duration, and intensity of conflict and non- highlights the ways in which previously marginal - conflict violence. What is increasingly recognized is ized groups—including youth and women— that a vast majority of the global burden occurs not emerged to challenge the status quo. One important in countries affected by armed conflict but in those question is how to create real participation for these that are ostensibly peaceful. More than 525,000 groups: employment is part of the answer, but it is persons are killed by intentional violence each year not enough. What is needed are ways to meaning - of which 55,000 die from combat-related causes in fully channel these groups’ energies in the right war. More than 395,000 persons are killed as a direction, to rebuild the social contract. result of homicide in non-war settings and another The UN is beginning to rethink its assumptions 21,000 from extrajudicial killings. Most violent and tool-kits and explore new ways and means of deaths are concentrated in Latin America and the working in societies confronting turbulence and Caribbean, as well as central and southern Africa, transition. It acknowledges that it is contending and there is a worsening situation in the cities of the with twenty-first century problems with twentieth south. The panelists reflected on what is “new” and century tools. It recognizes that the demands often “old” about contemporary organized violence. It outsize its capacities to deliver and that changes are was agreed that organized violence in a range of needed to increase its coordination and effective - “fragile settings” is increasingly simultaneous, ness on the ground. overlapping, and integrated, and as a result it is challenging our classification systems. Imputing Mapping the Challenges of intentionality or motive is challenging when there is a blurring of political and economic interests. Organized Violence in Many security, humanitarian, and development Contemporary Conflict: agencies are actively reflecting on what this Data and Trends changing face of violence means legally, conceptu - ally, and operationally. There has been a dramatic expansion in quantita - Sexual violence was described by Dr. Ragnhild tive and qualitative research on the costs of Nordås as one of the most significant challenges of organized violence over the past decade. The most our time. Indeed, the UN Secretary-General has comprehensive datasets are now used not just to repeatedly called for more data collection and measure the frequency and severity of deaths at the analysis of the incidence, trends, and patterns of national level on an annualized basis, but also to rape and other forms of sexual violence in examine spatial and temporal characteristics of situations of armed conflict. But there are difficul - 4 MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

ties in tracking sexual violence, and as such it tends include air attacks, mortars, vehicle bombs, suicide to be overlooked, misunderstood, and sometimes bombs, gunfire, execution, and execution with overstated: under-reporting as well as over- torture. For instance, it was found that air attacks reporting are common. There is also a real absence have the highest rates of killed women and of solid and reliable baseline data to allow for an children, indicating how indiscriminating such assessment of how much sexual violence actually attacks are. While such research does not allow for increases in times of war instead of just an assess - a determination of intentionality, it does offer ment of the absolute amount of such violence. If insights into the likely consequences (and determi - any real global assessment is to occur, more nation of proportionality) of particular weapons temporal, typological, perpetrator, and environ - systems. mental information needs to be collected, even if a Another kind of index being developed is called caution is warranted regarding intrinsic biases. We the “civilian targeting index,” which focuses on the need better data in order to make better policy. ratio of battle deaths among civilians as compared One promising research initiative described by to overall deaths. It attributes deaths arising in Dr. Nordås seeks to generate a comprehensive armed conflicts to specific armed groups of all cross-national dataset mapping out global trends in types—more than 500 worldwide. It then considers sexual violence. Partly financed by the Folke the extent to which groups are intentionally and Bernadotte Academy, the data include event-based systematically targeting civilians. Curiously, the information 1989-2010 and is designed to generate data suggest that most non-state armed groups information and analysis to shape early-warning (more than 60 percent) do not routinely target efforts and facilitate preventive interventions. The civilians. However, preliminary analysis suggests dataset considers sexual violence in many of its that the “duration” and “scale” of armed group forms (e.g., rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, involvement in a given armed conflict does seem forced abortion, sexual mutilation, and sexual correlated with the likelihood of increased targeting torture) occurring in armed conflicts of varying of civilians. Another finding is that the larger the intensity and with multiple actors (states and rebel scale of organized violence, the lower the relative groups). It also considers trends in post-conflict level of civilian targeting, suggesting that many settings. While preliminary, early results suggest groups are in fact adhering to the Geneva that only a minority of armed groups are involved Conventions. Another interpretation is the one in perpetrating sexual violence and that rates are suggested above for sexual violence: in intense often higher than anticipated at war’s end. This may armed conflicts, fighters are more focused on be because during intense armed conflicts, fighters survival and have fewer opportunities to exercise are more preoccupied with staying alive, and atrocities against civilians. therefore have fewer opportunities to exercise The discussant Dr. Chetan Kumar reflected on sexual violence. Anticipating these trends may help the changing nature of violence and the implica - to predict when and where sexual violence is more tions for programming and the considerable likely to occur. challenges associated with post-conflict transitions. Dr. Michael Spagat discussed the distribution and A key shift is a movement away from all-out intensity of fatalities and targeting of civilians in warfare and armed conflict to lower-level and wartime settings. New geo-referenced conflict data recurrent types of violence. Dr. Kumar drew is becoming available and present new opportuni - attention first to so-called “transitions”—a complex ties for micro-level—instead of national level— process of political, economic, and social change empirical research. Examining large event-based that falls between armed conflict and nonconflict. datasets such as the Iraq Body Count (IBC), Dr. Often it entails a series of recurrent and inter - Spagat has developed a set of basic ratios that he locking conflicts. In such settings, the objective and co-authors describe as “the dirty war index.” It may not be to “resolve” the conflict but rather to divides female and child victims killed in war contain and stabilize it. Yet, we still know little settings (the numerator) by all fatalities (the about the conditions for violence in transitions, and denominator) and parses them out according to the how to prevent violence. type of weapon involved. Types of killings classified 5

Dr. Kumar also singled out another type of do prevent and reduce violence and whether insecurity he described as “turbulence,” itself rooted alternate approaches were needed. For instance, in a combination of economic, social, and political DDR may make conflict less likely at the national factors. During such incidents localized social level, while at the same time making violence more protests may spiral out of control and assume prevalent at the local level. national proportions. Many policy makers and researchers working on A number of operational responses and practices peace and conflict issues are increasingly revisiting are required to address these transitions and their assumptions and examining the wider turbulences. Many of the required tools are signaled dynamics of organized violence. Questions were in the World Bank’s World Development Report raised regarding the extent to which violence 2011—including reform and the formation of against civilians is linked to strategic goals, and to broad and inclusive political coalitions to manage what extent it is ephemeral. It was also suggested change. Recent experience suggests that reforms that there is a need to look at different types of and reform initiatives can be instrumental in organized violence—one-sided, interpersonal, bringing security. Dr. Kumar emphasized the communal—and the extent to which they overlap. importance of supporting the formation of lead There is now much more data available for actors that can create coalitions capable of examining underlying trends and exploring cause delivering reforms rapidly: cohesive communities and effect relationships. At the same time it is are better at dealing with such challenges, though it important to define what kinds of violence we are is very challenging to achieve such coalitions. He talking about and analyzing so that we do not mix drew attention to the need to reorient attention to up these categories, which may have very different the importance of local governance, including local causes, dynamics, and solutions. It was also pointed law enforcement and local knowledge networks. out that detailed and geo-referenced data now Along with inclusive, resilient, and responsive being produced can be used to name and shame governance, Dr. Kumar highlighted other factors perpetrators, but that it also shows that most groups that can promote protection. For example, border do not carry out violence against civilians, and that control remains a major priority, one that requires women and children are the groups most exposed smarter border management. Likewise, community to deaths due to explosive weapons. Campaigns of level mediation is critical, including interventions sexual violence and mass atrocities are the that bring public security and civil society groups exception—not the norm—in armed conflicts. together. Ultimately, an integrated approach must prevail, one that is less palliative and more systemic Contemporary Challenges in nature. and Evolving Roles in The ensuing discussion highlighted the ways in UN Peacekeeping which the UN is beginning to recognize that fragility, transitions, turbulence, and other forms of Peacekeeping and peace support mandates have insecurity are a “new normal.” It highlighted the adopted an ever-expanding set of expectations good news that the UN is no longer the only actor related to the protection of civilians. They have in dealing with these challenges. An important shifted from being a specific set of actions advanced question raised concerned what the necessary next by the UN to monitor and enforce a ceasefire to a steps are for the UN. A reactive approach is insuffi - wider set of activities entailing a range of actors cient: once turbulence sets in, it is exceedingly from the UN to regional organizations with far- difficult to know where it is going to lead. As such, reaching expectations to promote the rule of law the UN needs to rethink its models. One partici - and justice. During the past twenty years a number pant suggested that it is important to avoid of UN-led and non-UN led peacekeeping piecemeal prevention and adopt instead a more operations have sought to promote humanitarian comprehensive approach to preventing and objectives, though few applied force to halt reducing conflict and organized violence. Others genocide and mass atrocities. UN operations are in questioned the extent to which SSR efforts can and that respect very different from non-UN led 6 MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

operations. partnership peacekeeping in terms of UN and non- This session chaired by Dr. Birger Heldt, featured UN operations, focusing on Africa. Williams noted the insights of practitioners and scholars regarding that the previous decade was one of good news in the impact of the UN’s peacekeeping operations in this respect, and that there are encouraging signs alleviating the consequences of war. It explored for the future. If partnership peacekeeping works, how UN peacekeeping has adapted to maximize its the international community will have more efforts and impact, including enhanced partner - options when it comes to protecting civilians. The ships with regional and sub-regional organizations issue is now how one can make this partnership on the ground and through joint operations, and to work even better. However, there is a lack of what extent these partnerships have been understanding about how to choose between successful. different types of partnerships. For instance, the UNAMID-UNISOM partnership has not been The first panelist, Ms. Erin Weir, reflected on the ideal. Williams suggested that in order for the evolution of the protection of civilians agenda both partnership to work, three challenges must be in New York and in the field where peace overcome: economic, technical, and political. In operations are underway. On the one side, there terms of the economic challenges, there is an appears to be considerable dynamism and innova - inequity in financial arrangements, which leads to tion in the use and deployment of protection tools one side financing the operations. A more effective and concepts in the area of protection of civilians. partnership requires more equal financial burden Yet, there are important conceptual gaps. One sharing. Turning to technical challenges, the concern relates to the limits of the use of force: inequality of military assets in quantitative and protection—not victory—is the objective. For qualitative terms, but also logistics and bureau - instance, use of force may lead to regime change cracy, hinders effective partnerships. Finally, (i.e., victory), although it was never intended. A political challenges are the most important ones second big gap concerns harm reduction: when and cover issues such as the following: force is used, things get broken. When is this acceptable? When is it really necessary to use force, - the indeterminate nature of Chapter 8 of the UN and what steps should be taken to make amends Charter in terms of what a strategic partnership when unintended consequences arise? should really entail; Ms. Weir pointed to some examples of the - the diversity of the world's regions and the operationalization of the protection agenda at the different natures of the challenges, meaning there field level. Regarding military tools, there is a is a need to reflect on how to create a partnership proactive approach being adopted by DPKO in system where all regions receive equal priority; eastern DRC and South Sudan due in part to - the lack of shared analysis, and a consequent lack increased expectations and pressure generated by of consensus on the conclusions from such the New Horizons report. Positive changes have analyses, and therefore also a lack of consensus been created by this, but the application has been regarding what courses of action to pursue; inconsistent across peacekeeping operations, partly - the lack of common concepts of what for logistical reasons. Yet, even though advances peacekeeping operations should entail; the AU have been made regarding the protection of has one concept, the UN has another, etc. For civilians, military force is not the answer. It is example, the AU deploys peacekeeping therefore important to examine civilian tools. One operations in ongoing conflicts and carries out example is the promotion of community liaison peace enforcement, whereas the UN's assistants—locally hired staff that speak the local peacekeeping operations have a much stronger languages, know all the facts on the ground, and focus on post-conflicts. link civilians to peacekeepers. However, these and Dr. Williams also described three, positive other actors can actually increase the vulnerability templates. First there are spearhead or vanguard of civilians and both short- and long-term strate - operations, where some type of Western coalition gies are therefore needed. paves the way for a UN operation, such as in Haiti Next, panelist Dr. Paul Williams considered or Timor-Leste. Second, in firefighting missions 7

Western forces play an enforcement role, examples intensive and ongoing dialogue among partners, of which include Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and shared standards, and improved interoperability, the DRC. Third and finally, there are the over-the- but that these issues are now dealt with in an ad hoc horizon operations—or out-of-area operations—in manner. Mr. Haeri emphasized the importance of that a region deploys troops in another region of keeping a distinction between what constitutes AU the world, such as the US Joint Task Force in Liberia and UN peacekeeping, as they are two different and the EU force in the DRC and Chad. Yet, and in types of peacekeeping. Dr. William’s assessment, many of these operations The second discussant, Ambassador Liberata constitute “band-aid” solutions. Mulamula, focused on what works instead of Dr. Williams continued to discuss what the AU focusing on negatives when it comes to organized and the UN want from partnerships. On the former violence and UN response. Ambassador Mulamula question it was suggested that the AU wants highlighted the centrality of national and local recognition as an important actor. But it also wants “ownership” in relation to UN peacekeeping— to become eligible for assessed economic means for though noted this was easier said than done. She peacekeeping operations from the UN, and it wants emphasized the importance of Africa, in particular, long-term UN support for the AU peacekeeping both owning its problems and owning its solutions: architecture. The UN, on the other hand, desires African solutions for African problems. And in partnerships in order to enhance its crisis response; reflecting on the ever changing and expanding to promote an approach that does not privilege mandates of UN peacekeeping, Ambassador Africa at the expense of other nations; and to Mulamula asked to what extent the UN is even ensure good value for money while remaining doing peacekeeping anymore: from a more narrow sensitive to the spirit and contents of the UN and traditional focus on enforcing ceasefires, there Charter. These different goals—or lack of a is an ever more wide-ranging agenda involving common vision and basic values—have resulted in peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace consolida - an ad hoc approach. tion. There are many practical challenges to The first discussant, Mr. David Haeri, indicated ensuring local ownership. On the one hand, it that history indicates that “success” is a political requires much more than simple consultations matter and is only afterwards shaped by the between the UN and AU partners. Indeed, the case military and civilian capability of troops and associ - of MONUC which, over the past decade shifted ated technical assistance. He emphasized the from a narrow mandate to enforce a ceasefire to the critical place of sustained and long-term commit - “protection of civilians” and “stabilization,” was ment from the UN together with international, described as a case in point. Ambassador Mulamula regional, and national engagement. And while UN called for a more collaborative approach than is peacekeepers are often regarded as guarantors of often described in theory and called for an transitions and of a sustainable peace, this has only approach that was more bottom-up and drew on been a feature since the early 1990s. Mr. Haeri local capabilities. Along with other panelists, stressed that it is difficult to quantify what works, Ambassador Mulamula noted emphatically that and what does not, when it comes to the protection there were few genuine partnerships. of civilians, and that there is a large need to think of It was noted by one participant that MONUC and unintended consequences. He also suggested that MONUSCO have been at the frontiers of R2P, and there is a need to build more expertise on DDR, maybe even have been experimental in terms of Rule of Law (RoL), and SSR, and more carefully protecting civilians. Moreover, it is not uncommon consider natural resources as drivers of conflicts. for peacekeeping operations to evolve towards The field-level protection of civilians was more enforcement, more nation building, and more described as a key problem for peacekeeping consolidation over time. From that perspective missions, and it was stressed that it is important to MONUC is not unique and, in fact, closely be honest about these issues and discuss them more resembles ONUC of the early 1960s or even but also have reasonable expectations of what can UNPROFOR of the early 1990s. In addition, there be achieved in these regards. Concerning partner - is in practice a division of labor in that the UN ships, it was stressed that there is a need to have focuses on post-conflict peacekeeping with 8 MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT elements of nation building, whereas non-UN Has impartiality (evenhandedly implementing the peacekeeping is much more likely to intervene peacekeeping mandate) been confused with during ongoing conflicts, while at the same time neutrality (doing nothing), and if so, has this adopting narrower, more traditional peacekeeping conceptual confusion hampered the discussion and tasks. While this may be due to the limited financial clarity of thinking? Has the responsibility to protect resources of regional actors, it raises the question of doctrine muddied the waters? How can troop whether there is a working division of labor among contributing countries be encouraged to enforce UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations. Such a the peace when they are not interested in doing so? division of labor was also suggested in the Brahimi At a minimum, panelists agreed that there is a need Report some twelve years ago. to go back to the original idea of peacekeeping as Among the UN operations, two stand out in founded in the aspiration of collective security. terms of their robust methods for addressing Indeed, its very structure is not designed to allow genocide and atrocities carried out by armed for “interventionist” activities, and the protection of groups. First is UNPROFOR in Bosnia that civilians mandate is without prejudice to the established protected zones, delivered humani - peacekeeping mandate. tarian aid, and on occasions used force beyond self defense. The second prominent example is The Role, Challenges, and MONUC, which may be said to be at the front line Tools of Special Envoys of robust proactive use of armed force by UN operations against armed groups spoiling the peace A critical instrument in the “protection” arsenal of and/or committing atrocities. UN operations have the UN is the special envoy. There are in fact rarely deployed for the stated primary task of multiple types of special envoys, the most protecting civilians from genocide or atrocities and prominent being Special Representatives of the used force beyond self defense to achieve those Secretary-General. The role of these envoys varies goals from the outset. Rather, the operations have in length of deployment, mandate, functional scope evolved. Close cases include UNAMID deployed in of their activities, and, to a considerable extent, 2007. While having a focus on protecting civilians their personal attributes and leadership styles. The from human rights abuses, it did not develop a final session, chaired by Mr. Youssef Mahmoud, robust practice of using force reactively or considered the experiences of special envoys and proactively. In contrast, multilateral non-UN some emerging research on the scale and distribu - interventions deployed primarily to halt ongoing tion of SRSGs and the effectiveness of their genocide/politicide and atrocities are rather interventions. The discussion was focused particu - common throughout history and include larly on their practical experiences and the critical INTERFET (Timor-Leste), EUFOR DRC/ role of their own background and the support ARTEMIS (DRC), RAMSI (Solomon Islands), systems they operated within. MIFH (Haiti), KFOR (Kosovo), among others. A The first speaker, Dr. Jamal Benomar, considered preliminary insight offered from these cases is that his own experiences as a special envoy. He multilateral interventions have worked well when emphasized that there is no handbook to guide robust and applied to small countries or territories mediation and dialogue. There are no clear resolu - and avoided siding with any of the conflict parties. tions, and there is no one single way to proceed: the Also, some kind of division of labor between UN scope and scale of intervention varies from place to and non-UN missions appears to have emerged. place. He also stressed that the UN is now starting The participants singled out some contradictions to develop mediation capacity and working to and challenges emerging in the course of the develop a handbook. Yet, it is occurring at a time presentations. For example, how can the UN when the UN role is ever more diminished in maintain a consent-based approach when the state mediation. is often a key perpetrator of organized violence Notwithstanding decades of special envoy against civilians? What is peacekeeping when there activity, Benomar stressed the importance of is no peace to keep? How can civilians be protected adopting humility and acknowledging the limited when the UN is expected to maintain impartiality? state of knowledge on what works and what does 9

not. He highlighted the importance of ensuring ality of SRSGs, their experience, their style, and the cultural continuity. He pointed to the challenges of way they work in teams and in relation to the UN. recognizing local compacts, agreements that may The final intervention by Mr. Giandomenico not always be in line with UN standards. In Picco considered the central place of agency in discussing the situation in Yemen, he noted the shaping the direction of peace agreements as well as multiple and overlapping conflicts and the the limitations of claims to “impartiality.” Mr. Picco importance of reading between them. But he also noted, along with others, that the world has stressed that the UN had certain advantages, changed. Mediation during the Cold War was more including being regarded as an honest, or at least straightforward. Since the 1990s, it has become impartial, broker and could also play a role in fiendishly more complex. Building on personal influencing more progressive norms in peace experience Mr. Picco stressed the importance of agreements. understanding the “narrative” of those involved in The next speaker, Dr. Manuel Fröhlich, consid - mediation and the importance of individual agency ered the findings of recent research on the role of and working relations with superiors in shaping the SRSGs in relation to peace processes. Dr. Fröhlich direction and outcomes of mediation. He also traced the evolution of special envoys and their highlighted the ways in which “minilateralism” has expansion. 1 He highlighted the growth of SRSG and come to shape mediation over the past two decades. HLA functions since the 1950s—from an average of In addition, Mr. Picco suggested that neutrality is ten to fifteen between 1950 and the 1980s to ninety- not important. Instead, the actors just need to know five in 2011. In fact, there have been roughly 358 which “camp” a mediator belongs: no actors want SRSGs (1946-2011) from ninety-nine different neutral mediators, and no mediator can be countries. The steep increases were attributed to completely impartial anyway. conflicts in Africa and transnational issues such as The ensuing discussion touched upon the issue of climate change. The top contributing countries for the division of labor among SRSGs, whether it is SRSGs included the US (53), Norway (27), Sweden time for a new agenda for peace, and what may be (24), UK (23), Algeria (18), India (18), Italy (18), the role of mediators in the future. In addition, the Pakistan (16), France (13), Switzerland (13), and challenges caused by the fragmentation of conflict Canada (13). It should be noted that in some cases, parties were discussed, in particular with regard to there were multiple SRSGs in a single country. whether the UN is equipped to deal with fragmen - Overall, most deployments of SRSGs were to tation and whether there are relevant lessons from Burundi, Cambodia, Cyprus, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, cases in the past that could be applied to current Liberia, Middle East, Somalia, Sudan, and Western and future cases of mediation. Sahara. Dr. Fröhlich also considered the particular Concluding Reflections influence of SRSGs on the incidence of armed conflicts. Although findings are temporary, he This International Expert Forum featured many noted a strong correlation between declining takeaways and key concepts, such as “coordination intrastate conflict and SRSG presence though could and coherence,” “social contract,” “band-aid,” not (yet) determine a causal effect. Indeed, he “partnerships,” “local micro-level data,” “dynamics stressed that structural factors (i.e., the environ - of violence against civilians,” “influence of local ment) are the most important (75 percent), but that conditions,” etc. For instance, research indicates SRSGs appear to play an important role. These that localized forms of violence are shaped by statistics suggest how little—or how much—one changes in the military balance of power. Civilians should expect SRSGs to achieve. He also noted that are often punished for perceived disloyalty. One there are other critical micro factors that determine implication, then, is that no matter how challenging the influence of SRSGs. These relate to the person - it may appear, the peacekeeping goal should be to

1 The first special envoy was Folke Bernadotte in 1948 based on a General Assembly Resolution and selected by the permanent five members of the Security Council. Next was Francesco Urrutia (1957) from Colombia in Israel/Jordan. Others in the 1960s included Adrian Pekt (Guinea),Johan Beck-Friis (Thailand), Eduard Zellweger (Laos), and Herbert de Ribbling (Oman). Also Pier Spinelli (Portugal) was requested to mediate in Jordan in 1964. The Secretary General came up with the concept of UN “presence” in lieu of peacekeeping force. 10 MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT create robustly defended ceasefires (even localized in documenting atrocities for tribunals but also ones) instead of siding with any conflict parties. for developing predictive modeling for preven - Historically this has decreased incentives for rebels tion and early warning. An outstanding to commit atrocities, since government forces are question, however, is how we get this informa - no longer considered an acute threat and territory tion into the hands of senior policy makers. is not at risk of being lost to the other side of the There was a consensus that many of the tools to conflict. It may also provide breathing room for an respond to organized violence need to adapt. unavoidable political solution to develop and for Most participants noted how narrow approaches third parties to pursue diplomatic options. to minimizing violence that emphasize peace The seminar highlighted how the landscapes of support and peacebuilding and enforcing organized violence are diffuse and dynamic. ceasefires are giving way to more transformative National-level assessments disaggregated by agendas promoting not just multidimensional year are increasingly being supplanted by sub- peacekeeping, but local ownership, governance, national assessments that offer more granular and architectures of peace. This evolving agenda and geo-spatial assessments. What they are will demand new forms of cooperation, a showing is a heterogeneous picture. Nonstate capacity to learn across different settings, and a armed groups are not necessarily widely commitment to monitoring outcomes. It will involved in killing civilians while state-based require partnerships that include regional groups are. Not all armed groups are involved in organizations. perpetrating sexual violence, but it appears that There was agreement that local ownership, such violence often persists well after conflicts local resilience, and enhanced partnerships end. It is critical that research continues to assess were essential but challenging. While these variations. peacekeeping approaches have made important The seminar raised questions about the defini - gains, it is still largely piecemeal and top down. tions and classifications for “armed conflict” A recurring question was how to ensure a more and signaled a new terminology to describe emphatic “regional voice,” while also managing organized violence. Indeed, panelists and major technical, economic, political challenges. participants alike raised important questions Participants agreed that reinforcing national and about what is “armed conflict,” “postconflict,” local capacities was central, and would present and “other forms of violence.” In some cases, one of the more important, if challenging, other expressions seemed more appropriate to priorities for the UN in the coming decade. capture the real dynamics on the ground, All of the presentations pointed to a major including “transitions,” “turbulence,” “instabi - dilemma facing contemporary efforts to prevent lity,” “fragility,” and other “situations of violence.” and reduce organized violence. On the one hand, A new nomenclature is emerging—one that has there are unprecedented opportunities for research, profound implications for how the international agency, and interventions. On the other, there are community thinks about responses. formidable transnational risks, complex interests, The seminar drew attention to new and and old and outdated assumptions and approaches. innovative forms of applied research. The question facing the security and development Researchers noted the rapid evolution of establishments is how to take advantage of these datasets that account not just for events over new opportunities while minimizing the risks. At a time, but also geo-spatial and environmental minimum, it will require acknowledging that the units of analysis. These datasets move beyond UN is not necessarily the only, much less the counting the dead and injured to account for a central, player. It will also require understanding wider range of victimization and variables how power is more widely distributed. Finally, it related to the types of weapons used in the event. will mean working proactively with regional They focus not just on armed groups’ presence partners and building coalitions across public and but also on their motivation and intentionality. private spheres. Such datasets have a potentially important role 11