Modern Nation Building and Political Participation during the XIX Olympiad in

Axel G. Elías Jiménez King’s College London, United Kingdom

Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Department of History

Final report for

the IOC Olympic Studies Centre

PhD Students Research Grant Programme

2016 Award 5 December 2016

In collaboration with Olympic Solidarity and

with the support of the Comité Olímpico Mexicano

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Table of Contents Abstract ...... 3 Key Words ...... 3 Executive Summary ...... 4 Introduction ...... 5 Seeking international visibility: Sport mega-events in 20 th Century Mexico ...... 7 Securing Olympism and the Modern Nation: The election of Mexico City ...... 8 Building Modern Mexico during the XIX Olympiad ...... 11 The student movement and Games of the XIX Olympiad ...... 19 Negotiating the Games: Imposition, Patriotism and Politics of Silence ...... 20 ‘Everything is possible in Peace’? ...... 29 ‘Olympic hangover’? Mexico City and the political legacies of the XIX Olympiad ...... 32 Conclusion ...... 34 Abreviations ...... 36 References ...... 36 Archives ...... 36 Bibliography ...... 37

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Abstract The 1968 Olympic Games were of great interest for the Mexican Government and the IOC. Both had interests behind their celebration. The IOC wanted to secure Olympism during a ‘shaken world’, whilst the Mexican government saw the Games as a platform to communicate that Mexico was a modern country ready for any project that it set eyes on. The preparation for the event went according to plan from October 1963 to ; however, the Mexican student movement unintendedly jeopardised these goals. The negotiation of the social unrest from July 1968 to , during the last period of Olympic preparations, highlighted the political divisions among the groups. This paper looks at sources from the IOC, government and the student movement to map the political discussions and negotiations among these three actors. The research touches on cultural diplomacy, nationalism, resistance, and security and surveillance. This research contributes to scholarships with two findings. Firstly, it found that IOC’s governance and politics of silence had a direct repercussion on the political participation of Mexico City’s citizenry; secondly, that besides governmental repression and fear, the protester’s patriotism, enhanced by the Olympic Games, was an element that allowed the Games to continue as planned.

Key Words Modern nation building, Cultural Diplomacy, Political participation, Governance and Governmentality

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Executive Summary The main goal of this research is to rethink how Olympic Games are implemented and the ways in which the host destinations are immediately impacted. Scholarship on the Olympic Games has focused on the International Olympic Committee, the local government, media and the global partners, but whilst it recovers an important aspect of the phenomenon by studying these actors, scholarship has overlooked a key player: the host population. This research includes Mexico City’s citizenry in the equation and considers that Olympic cycles are political arenas where the abovementioned actors engage in debates and discussions. Every Olympic Games preparation period has a consequence on each of the involved actors; however, the direct repercussion on the lives of the citizenry has been overlooked. This report mostly reflects the findings of four weeks of field work in Lausanne. The revision of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) archives in March 2016 was possible thanks to the grant from the Olympic Studies Centre. During this period, I reviewed files dedicated to the XIX Olympic Games and the Mexican IOC members, but I also had the chance to retrieve information from the digitised Collection. This revision allowed me to map IOC’s actions from 1963 to 1968. This report reflects the findings of this archival revision, and shows IOC’s actions during these years, but the report also includes material from Mexican archives to pinpoint and contrast the actions of the IOC with those from the Mexican Government and a sector of Mexico City’s citizenry (the student protestors). This research found that Mexico City’s citizenry was a significant actor in the implementation of the XIX Olympic Games, not only by engaging politically and showing signs of resistance during the Olympic year, but also by accepting the Olympic Projects from 1963 to 1968. The politics of silence of the IOC and the violent repression of the government in 1968 were important elements that explain how the XIX Olympic Games took place, but we also have to include Mexico City’s patriotism as part of the phenomenon. This research suggests that governments and Organising Committees appeal to national values and identity as part of the mega-event implementation on host destinations and that this has a direct repercussion in the political activity. The actions of local governments and the IOC can generate political turmoil and increase the political engagement of host populations. These report suggests that the history of Olympism goes beyond the outstanding athletic performances. The development of Olympism is also the history of host destinations and the actions they take.

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Introduction The Games of the XIX Olympiad were celebrated in Mexico City from the 12 th to the 27 th of October 1968. Despite the critique of the altitude and the size of the Mexican economy compared to previous hosts, among others, the sixteen days of competition were considered successful at the time because they witnessed impressive athletic performances from Bob Beamon, Věra Čáslavská and Leonid Zhabotinksy, among many others. Furthermore, the XIX Games were the scenario of events with great sociocultural transcendence such as the so called, “ salute” of Tommie Smith, John Carlos and Peter Norman. Nevertheless, beyond the Olympic venues, the XIX Olympiad was also very significant because it was the first to be celebrated in Latin America and in a developing country. Given these features, the decision of choosing Mexico City as the host of the 1968 Olympic Games was meant to be unique on its own terms, but the developments from 1963 to 1968 went beyond the expectations of the IOC and the Mexican government, and had a repercussion on Mexican political culture and Olympic history. This paper will go beyond analysing the Olympic Games solely and will analyse the XIX Olympiad as a six-year process (1962-1968). I am aware that Olympiad refers to a period of four years, but in this text I will use it to refer to the moment when the bid was placed in December 1962 until the closing ceremony in October 1968. I took this decision because using the concept of the ‘Olympic Games’ tends to highlight the competition period as the goal and disregards the build-up which is as important given the transformations that take place during those years. Scholarship requires studies of impacts and legacies, but also of immediate repercussions such as the political negotiations where the host population also participates. The scholarship on the XIX Olympiad, as in other scholarship of the Olympics prior to 1984, has focused on two actors: the IOC and the Mexican government. Given this focus, the scholarship has contributed greatly to international relations, tourism, economics and security studies, among others, where the IOC and the Mexican government are key players. Nevertheless, few authors have looked at the role that Mexico City’s citizens played during the Mexican Olympiad. As Claire and Keith Brewster noted: ‘Mexican student movement has had the effect of drawing almost all attention away from the Olympic Games themselves and what they meant for the Mexican people.’ 1 Beyond the IOC, local governments and from the eighties

1 Keith Brewster and Claire Brewster, 'The Mexican Student Movement of 1968: An Olympic Perspective', The International Journal of the History of Sport, 26 (2009), 814. 5

onwards the global partners; the host population, ‘the people’, the citizenry have been an actor in building Olympism.2 Including the host destination in these debates reshapes the scholarship. The XIX Modern Olympiad will be understood in this paper as a political arena where the IOC, Mexican government and Mexico City’s citizenry engaged in significant discussions around nationhood, political participation and Olympism. Including the citizenry as an actor allows us to reflect on a different side of the Olympics, one that goes beyond a cultural diplomacy strategy, and looks at the reception of the Olympics and the political participation it generated. Furthermore, given the fact that the 1968 Olympics were the first to present great- scale domestic political activity prior to the Games, its study will allow us to explore elements of critique of the Olympic Games by the host population. In this respect, the reflections of Michel Foucault around the concept of governmentality were crucial to rethink how Mexico City’s citizenry engaged with social unrest during the Olympiad.3 By including Mexico City’s citizenry as a significant actor in the XIX Olympiad (1962- 1968), this paper will revaluate the preparation, celebration and post-event periods and will add other elements in the discussions around country branding and cultural diplomacy, citizenship and democracy, security and surveillance, and Olympic resistance. This text is part of an academic research and is meant to reflect on these aspects, but it can also work as a document that raises awareness and can lead to rethinking public policies around sport mega-events. One of the necessary issues to work on is on reducing the negative political impacts that Olympic Games have on host destinations.

2 Scholars such as Joseph L. Arbena, Claire and Keith Brewster, Allen Guttmann, Alan Tomlinson and Kevin B. Witherspoon have provided significant perspectives by analysing the urban and economic policies that the alliance of the IOC and the Mexican government developed during the XIX Olympiad (a trend that the remarkable work of David Harvey promoted, David Harvey, 'The Conditions of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change', Nueva York, NY: Blackwell.[Links], (1989).); nevertheless, the actions that enabled Olympism within the Mexican population and which were are also part of the phenomenon have been overlooked, despite their immediate effects. For extensive research regarding cultural diplomacy see Joseph L Arbena, 'Hosting the Summer Olympic Games: Mexico City, 1968', Sport in Latin America and the Caribbean, (2002); Claire Brewster and Keith Brewster, Representing the Nation: Sport and Spectacle in Post-Revolutionary Mexico , (Routledge, 2013); Keith Brewster, Reflections on Mexico '68 , (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010); Luis Castañeda, 'Beyond Tlatelolco: Design, Media, and Politics at Mexico ′ 68', Grey Room, (2010); Allen Guttmann, The Games Must Go On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement , (Columbia University Press, 1984); Alan Tomlinson and Jonathan Woodham, Image Power and Space , (Meyer & Meyer Verlag, 2007); Kevin B Witherspoon, Before the Eyes of the World: Mexico and the 1968 Olympic Games , (Northern Illinois University Press, 2008). 3 In his Lectures at the College de France, Foucault spoke of power as an exercise not only imposed from above, but also accepted or rejected. This allowed me to consider the Olympic Games as a power exercise were not only the IOC and the local governments have a say, but were host populations can take an active role by accepting these claims. Michel Foucault and others, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège De France 1981-- 1982 , (Macmillan, 2005). 6

Seeking international visibility: Sport mega-events in 20 th Century Mexico On the evening of October 18 th , 1963, during the 60 th session of the IOC, Mexico City won the first round of elections to host the 1968 Games. The Mexican bid obtained 30 of the 28 necessary votes winning the elections by majority. The highly industrialised city of Detroit followed with 14, one France’s largest cities, Lyon obtained 12 and the Argentinian capital, Buenos Aires took 2. 4 On the following day, Mexico City’s inhabitants read the following headlines in their newspaper stands: ‘Mexico obtains the Olympic Games!’; ‘…international acknowledgement for the Mexican People’; ‘Mexicans offer a party to celebrate.’ 5 Mexico seemed to be in the spotlight. A year later, a similar reaction was perceived when Mexico was chosen to host the 1970 World Cup. The Mexican government and some individuals were deeply interested in communicating a positive image of Mexico to the world and by winning the elections to host these sport mega-events in a two-year period there were many interests at stake. 6 The Mexican government’s interest to host the Olympic Games can be traced back to1949, but Mexico’s interest in hosting the Games was finally successful in the sixties. By October 1963, Mexico had undergone two decades of economic progress and appeared as democratic for holding regular elections. The government and the hegemonic party behind it were proud of these achievements and were interested in communicating them and continuing in that path. José de Jesús Clark Flores and Marte R. Gómez were two of the main figures that persuaded members of the Mexican government to back the bid for the Olympic Games. José de Jesús Clark Flores was the chairman of the Mexican Olympic Committee and after returning

4 According to Ariel Rodriguez Kuri, the IOC also received bids from Cairo, Lausanne, Manila and Vienna, but Avery Brundage and other members of the IOC discarded them for unknown reasons. IOCA, Vil-1968, S/SD in Ariel Rodríguez Kuri, 'Ganar La Sede. La Política Internacional De Los Juegos Olímpicos De 1968', Historia Mexicana, 64 (2014), 247. 5 Selection taken from the XIX Olympic Games report and the National Archives in Mexico (AGN, Archivo General de la Nacion). AGN G2 DGIPS B901 ‘Prensa Latina’, F2, p. 69. References from archives are composed of the Name of the archive, AGN; the location and name of the collection, G2 DGIPS; Box number, B901; and lastly file, document number and further information, if available (‘Prensa Latina’, F2, p. 69). 6 The use of the sportive events was not exclusive of Mexico, other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile also placed several bids for sportive events to highlight their development throughout the 20 th century, but in the sixties only Mexico and Argentina had the capacity and interest in contending to hold the Games. Concerning the World Cup, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have all placed four World Cup bids (only behind Germany and Spain with 6 and 5 respectively); while for the Olympic Games, Brazil is one of the countries with more bids with five, whilst Mexico and Argentina have also had an intense participation with three and four. In addition, it is relevant to observe that economic issues have reduced the bids placed for these events (mostly after the eighties). It was until Brazil’s emergence in the 21 st century that the bids continued and were successful. Chile was an exception, as it did not place as many bids; however, it did host the World Cup in 1962. 7

from the 1952 Summer Olympic Games, he declared: ‘Helsinki gave Mexican sport something more valuable than utilitarian triumphs: It gave the exact route to achieve success.’7 Clark Flores thought he had found the ‘route to achieve success’ during the Olympic Games in Helsinki. Nevertheless, he was not able to strongly persuade the Mexican government until Adolfo López Mateos’ presidency (1958-1964). López Mateos was keen in using public festivities to communicate the uniqueness of Mexican development. The celebrations of the 50 th anniversary of the Mexican revolution, as well as the nationalisation of the electric industry in 1960 were key moments for López Mateos to deliver the message that Mexico had economic growth without having an authoritarian or military government. These conditions were considered the country’s exceptionality. When Clark Flores and Gomez proposed the Olympic Games as a ‘path to success’ during this period, the government agreed to this idea.8 The government saw itself as following a model that would transform the country into a developed one, and the Olympic Games were the perfect opportunity to do this.

Securing Olympism and the Modern Nation: The election of Mexico City Alongside the Mexican economic growth, relative political stability and the government’s increasing interest to hold the Games, the sixties were a fertile ground for the Mexican Olympic project given the geopolitical interplay that the country was able to capitalise. Concerning this perspective, there were at least two important factors that favoured the election of Mexico City: the displeased ‘Emerging forces’ that felt left out of international politics (including Olympic organisation); and the tension in Latin America after the Cuban Revolution in 1959. The XIX Olympiad, as others, was full of political interests and negotiations. The opening speech of the IOC Executive Board meeting in Copenhagen in February 1967 captured some of the main discussions that the IOC had during this period. In that session, Avery Brundage, stated that the most important problem of the IOC was to ‘maintain the authority and prestige of the IOC and the Olympic Movement’ while there was a growing threat of political interference.’ 9 Among the threats, the IOC had to deal with the Games of the New Emerging

7 Ariel Rodríguez Kuri, 'Hacia México 68. Pedro Ramírez Vázquez Y El Proyecto Olímpico', Secuencia, (2003), 41. 8 Jaime Pensado considers that the Mexican government perceived the economic growth and political stability as exceptional characteristics. Jaime Pensado, Rebel Mexico: Student Unrest and Authoritarian Political Culture During the Long Sixties , (Stanford University Press, 2013). 9 Avery Brundage, ‘Welcome’ in IOC, Executive Board Meeting , Copenhagen, February 1967, p. 1, IOCA CE19211984 1960-1969 1967-02-Copenhague. 8

Forces, the Afro-American threat to boycott the Games and the battle against the South African apartheid. By the time the elections for the 1968 Games took place, one the main threats were precisely the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO). This multi-sport event was scheduled to take place in Jakarta from November 10-22, 1963, just one month after the host destination elections for the of the XIX Olympic Games. According to the President of Indonesia, Dr Soekarno, who led the organisation of the GANEFO, these were against colonialism and imperialism, and would create ‘a force that will create a new world that nobody can resist.’ 10 Soekarno also explained that the goal would be achieved by gathering a ‘community of peoples, who want to be free, who want to be independent, who do not want to be exploited…’ 11 Soekarno had high expectations with the sport event and considered that sport was political. This openly political sporting event was against everything that Avery Brundage wanted for the IOC. 12 According to the formal invitation from the Indonesian government, the GANEFO were not aimed to replace the Olympics, but to complement them. Nevertheless, they challenged the IOC’s domain over international sport and included politics in the discussion table. This proved to be a challenge for the IOC, but also to the countries that aspired to host the Olympic Games in 1968. The Secretariat of Foreign Affairs in Mexico received the formal invitation to take part in GANEFO in 1963 and left the decision to the Mexican Olympic Committee. 13 In private correspondence, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Manuel Tello, warned the representative of the

10 The plan in the organisation was to have a vice president that represented each region (Africa, Europe, Asia and Latin America). General Direction of the Diplomatic Service to the Embassy of Indonesia, 31 August 1963, Archivo Diplomático Mexicano (ADM, Mexican Diplomatic Archive). ADM SFA-DCA, “Juegos GANEFO”, III/2888-5 11 In the invitations for the event it was stated that the objectives were to establish a strong Indonesian Republic, where ‘men would not exploit other men, and to create a new world-order of friendly brotherhood among nations.’ HE D. Soekarno, ‘Keynotes of President of Indonesia’ in Invitation for GANEFO, 29 April 1963, ADM SFA-DCA, “Juegos GANEFO”, III/2888-5. 12 For instance, the GANEFO were discussed under the broad theme of ‘the several cases of politics interfering with sport.’ IOC, Bulletin du CIO , Lausanne, 15 February 1963, p. 43. ADM DCA 56-1-1(1a), 1963-1966 Juegos Olímpicos México 68, B23-F56-1(1aP). 13 The Secretariat of Foreign Affairs considered the opinion of the ambassador of the United Arab Republic that Mexico should not compromise to the GANEFO since that would reduce Mexico’s chances to host the Olympics. This recommendation was sent to Clark and Gómez. Manuel Tello to Marte R. Gómez, 12 August 1963, ADM SFA- DCA, “Juegos GANEFO”, III/2888-5. 9

Mexican Olympic Committee in the IOC, Marte R. Gómez, to be careful of the decisions and opinions concerning GANEFO since there were political interests behind them. 14 The GANEFO were an important diplomatic affair. The Mexican Olympic bid was placed before the callings of GANEFO, the government was careful to not create a bad reputation in the IOC and endanger its possibilities to be elected. 15 The Mexican Olympic Committee and the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs planned wisely and decided to send athletes to compete in Indonesia, but only those in professional sports. By doing this, Mexico did not challenge the amateur character behind Olympism nor its aspirations to be elected host.16 This strategy seemed to be effective since it did not challenge the IOC’s domain in sport nor the invitation to be part of the Emerging Forces. Christopher Wagner considers that the GANEFO helped Mexico’s case and ‘appeared to challenge the self-assumed position of the IOC as the leader of world sports.’ 17 We can agree with Wagner that Mexico’s association as an ‘emerging force’ helped to obtain more votes in the elections. 18 Nevertheless, we also have to consider the hypothesis of Ariel Rodríguez Kuri that Mexico benefitted from being a ‘neutral’ country in the cold war conflict. The ‘east block’ favoured the Mexican bid against the possibility of having France or the organising the Games of the XIX Olympiad. As Pedro Ramírez Vázquez mentioned: ‘Mexico beat Detroit in the elections, and when the election was questioned, Los Angeles asked to substitute Mexico as a host. Nevertheless, since the eastern countries did not want the Games to be awarded to the

14 Marte R. Gómez considered that the GANEFO would not eclipse the Games. In his view, the countries excluded from the Olympics would not be missed and that accusing the IOC of imperialistic was false because they fought to keep their autonomy. Marte R. Gómez to Manuel Tello, 19 August 1963, ADM SFA-DCA, “Juegos GANEFO”, III/2888-5 15 Mexico did not take part in the preparatory conferences for the GANEFO competitions and did not take a clear position along the planning. The ambassador to Indonesia, Albarrán López, said that Mexico would take part in the GANEFO, but on the 30 th of August, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs communicated that Mexico would not have enough time to send athletes, but they would help Indonesia’s case to get reincorporated to the IOC. Mexico tried to stay ‘neutral’ and not endanger the relations it had with the ‘Emerging Countries’ nor with the IOC. Manuel Tello to Foreign Affairs, 30 August 1963, ADM SFA-DCA, “Juegos GANEFO”, III/2888-5. This news was also reported in Excelsior on the 29 th of August 1963, ‘El Comité Olímpico Mexicano ofrece mediar en el problema COI-Indonesia’; [Rosenzweig Díaz], Memorandum for the President, 31 July 1963, ADM SFA-DCA, “Juegos GANEFO”, III/2888-5 16 José Luis Laris to Clark Flores, 4 October 1963, ADM SFA-DCA, “Juegos GANEFO”, III/2888-5 17 Christoph Wagner, 'Representing the Nation: Sport and Spectacle in Post-Revolutionary Mexico (Book Review)', Sport in History, 33 (2013), 217. 18 The minutes of the 60 th session show that the GANEFO were still a topic of debate by 1968, Avery Brundage spoke against the ‘issues in regions such as Kenya, Central America, South Africa and Indonesia.’ International Olympic Committee, 'Minutes of the 60th Session' , (Baden-Baden: International Olympic Committee, 1963), (p. 68). 10

US, they gave us their full support. Issues of the Cold War.’ 19 In the end, the election of Mexico to host the XIX Olympic Games was multifactorial and included the cold war, the GANEFO discussions and the cultural diplomacy campaign carried by the Mexican government.

Building Modern Mexico during the XIX Olympiad Mexico’s successful path to obtain the Olympics formally began on December 7 th , 1962 when Mexico City’s mayor, Ernesto P. Uruchurtu, travelled to Lausanne to request the XIX Olympic Games. The request was submitted as a 180 page document titled ‘Mexico’ which contained ‘official documentation, answers to IOC’s questionnaire, a report on the existing venues in the city, medical opinions on the “effects” of altitude in athletes, an exposition of international events celebrated in recent years and a collection of and culture.’ 20 The bid book commenced with official documentation such as Uruchurtu’s formal request and letters from the presidency, ministers of the interior, education and tourism which showed full federal support. 21 In the first pages of the bid book, the invitation committee was able to give a clear message of the country and its intentions with the Games: ‘We are a developing country, we are building a modern country and precisely because of that, we don’t want anyone to destroy it […] México is spending, and will spend more if it was necessary, to organise the Games because they resemble the next step of our development.’ 22 This description was well received by IOC members since there was a threat of developing countries to hold their own multi-sport event, the GANEFO. Mexico was seen as a good option to balance that threat. 23 The ‘Invitation Committee for the Olympic Games’, led by José de Jesús Clark Flores and Marte R. Gómez, 24 was the group that represented Mexico in the bidding process to obtain

19 M.J. Ortega, T. Ragasol, and Museo de Arte Moderno, Diseñando México 68: Una Identidad Olímpica , (Museo de Arte Moderno, Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes, 2008), p. 30. 20 Organising Committee of the XIX Olympic Games, Official Olympic Report , (Mexico, 1969), p. 11.V. II 21 Lorenzo (Ed.) Carrasco, 'México Solicita, Xix Juegos Olímpicos' , ed. by Departamento del Distrito Federal (Mexico City: Litográfica Machado, 1962).[p. 6] 22 Organising Committee of the XIX Olympic Games, 'Olympic Bulletin' , (Mexico City, 1964), (p. 3). 23 We cannot forget that other factors such as personal relations also played a role in the election. For instance, on July 28 th , 1962, Avery Brundage was promoted to be the holder of the “Aguila Azteca.” This award was the highest award that a ‘non-national’ could receive. Manuel Tello gave the Award to Brundage in the ceremony. This action had a repercussion on the links of Brundage with the Mexican bid. Clark Flores to Antonio Carrillo Flores, Mexico City, 28 July 1966, ADM DCA 56-1-1(1a), Juegos Olímpicos México 68, B23-F56-1(1aP). 24 Committee, p. 69. Marte R. Gómez was born in Reynosa, Tamaulipas and studied to be a Hydro-agricultural Engineer in the National School of Agriculture. Gómez served the Mexican government as depute, senator, governor, agriculture and finance Secretary, and Mexican representative in France and Austria. By the time he took 11

the XIX Olympic Games.25 The ‘Invitation Committee’, as it was referred to in the correspondence, was in charge of persuading IOC members that the Mexican capital was the best option for the XIX Olympics. Clark and Gómez were ideal for the task since they had persuaded the city and federal government to back the Olympic bid. On 29 June 1963, a few months before the IOC elections, the federal government showed its compromise to the IOC members by officially creating the Organising Committee. The federal support ratified the authorisation given to Mexico City’s major to request the XIX Olympic Games.26 Mexico City was elected host of the 1968 Olympic Games in the first round of elections during the 60 th IOC session in Baden Baden. After the results were announced, Gomez and General Clark, who were in charge of the Mexican bid, ‘offered their thanks and formally pledged themselves to carry out all that had been promised.’ 27 Just after the elections, Avery Brundage was interviewed and he gave important insights behind the election of Mexico when he declared: ‘You must remember there are more than a score of Spanish-speaking countries and this will be a great inspiration to them. What helped Mexico was that it is one of the smaller- scale countries and some members felt they could do more for the Olympic movement on the whole by giving encouragement to such a country.’ 28 Mexico was chosen as a way to ‘inspire smaller-scale countries’ to continue supporting Olympism as managed by the IOC. Mexico was chosen to organise the XIX Olympic Games, but this did not mean that its projects and concerns were reduced to two weeks of athletic competition in October 1968; behind the Games there was a five-year preparation period in which the Mexican government and the IOC had expectations and goals. For the IOC it was an opportunity to expand and secure Olympism, but in order to do that they had to persuade people that choosing a developing country as the host was of benefit to all. For the government it was a chance to obtain

part in the organising committee, he was the chairman of Worthington of Mexico and member of the IOC. Games, p. 3. 25 Besides Clark and Gómez, the group was integrated by Alejandro Carrillo, Josué Sanz, Federico Mariscal, Manuel Guzmán, Eduardo Hay, Armando Moraila, Antonio Estopier and Lorenzo Torres. ABC B178, Ernesto P. Uruchurtu to Brundage, 7 December 1962. 26 The creation of the Organising Committee required the participation of several Secretariats. One of the most important aspects it highlighted was that the inclusion of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and the Interior would ‘facilitate the athletes and their teams to access and remain in the country legally.’ Furthermore, it stated that even though Mexico had the necessary elements to organise the Games, ‘it would include adaptations and constructions if found necessary for the best development of the Olympics.’ Diario Oficial. Organo del gobierno constitucional de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos , Saturday 29 June 1963, Volume CCLVIII, No. 51. 27 Committee, p. 69. 28 'Mexico City Picked over Detroit, Lyon and Buenos Aires for 68 Olympics', The New York Times, (1963). 12

international recognition and start a modern building project that would brand the whole country as modern and developed, and not only the capital. Fulfilling these goals was not easy and the government through the Organising Committee tried to appeal to all Mexicans to fulfil this goal. As expressed by the Chairman of the Organising Committee: ‘The commitment of these Games is not of the Government nor of a group, but of all Mexicans… The Mexican youth shall be the image of our country … that is their responsibility.’ 29 From the moment Mexico was elected the host of the XIX Olympic Games, there was international critique and therefore difficulty to fulfil some of the intended goals. The critical views questioned IOC’s decision, but also the Mexican nation building projects associated with the Games. A review of the international press from 1962 to 1968 shows that many believed Mexico was not qualified to host the Games. Whether it was Mexico City’s altitude or because of an incipient economic development, many believed that the host destination of the XIX Olympiad did not have proper conditions for the Games. This drove the Organising Committee to hold a continuous campaign to persuade the international and domestic publics that the XIX Games had everything to be successful. As The Telegraph reported: ‘Ever since they the XIX Games were granted … the Mexicans have found themselves obliged to defend the decision.’ 30 The ‘invitation committee’, led by Clark and Gómez, highly active for the election of Mexico as the Olympic city, had to be disintegrated in order to let the Organising Committee plan the Games for the following years. This was a political transformation in its own right because not all the people continued working in the official committee. Mexican president Adolfo López Mateos who had not taken part directly in the first group was appointed as the head of the Organising Committee in 1964. The most visible changes in this period came precisely from the communications department. Through regular publications, the Organising Committee tried to refute the critiques that the altitude of Mexico City endangered the athlete’s health and that the venues would not be finished in time, among others. The Organising Committee was keen on insisting that Mexico was fulfilling the protocols and would organise one of the best Olympics of modern times. As John Sayre reported, ‘Mexico is preparing to silence the sceptics and delight the world … Mexico will present an example of how to build a

29 ‘Asociación Nacional de Prensa Estudiantil’ AGN G7 COXIXJO B76-196. 30 The author referenced international issues with Mexico City’s thin air, the boycott of South Africa, the Afro- American threats, the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia and lastly the student movement. Donald Saunders, ‘Hopes now that XIX th Olympics will be “an Oasis of sanity”’, Daily Telegraph , 12 October 1968, IOCA 1968SOG C-J01-1986/2. 13

nation … Mexico CAN and WILL stage the Olympics and they will be one of the most exciting Games ever held.’ 31 The government was optimist during most of the preparation for the Olympic Games and tried to communicate it international and domestically. Miguel Alemán Velasco, director of the National Tourism Council in the sixties, declared in 1966 that as the host of the XIX Olympic Games, Mexico would ‘gain lasting international prestige’ and would take its place ‘among the great and important nations.’32 Alemán, along Heriberto Vidales, Raimundo Cuervo and Antonio Méndez were in charge of preparing a triennial project, 1966-1968, that communicated the meaning of the Olympiad for the population, as well as the ‘enormous sense of commitment’ that Mexican people had to consider and feel. 33 The team expressed that the XIX Olympiad was the basis for a new era, 34 and tried to fulfil three goals by educating the population: disseminating Olympic Sport in Mexico, establishing a sense of national responsibility and waking the ‘natural hospitality of Mexicans.’ 35 The triennial program proved to be successful and it began to be internalised soon. Mexican journalists increasingly repeated the messages that the triennial project aimed for as the Games approached. For instance, El Nacional published: ‘we must get ready to receive the whole world in our home and this means two types of preparation: the material and the spiritual. From these two, the spiritual is the most important, because the poverty of the host does not mean anything, if in their attitude, features, feelings, they express the pleasure of receiving guests.’ 36 The message was clear, the Olympics were an important commitment for the country, despite the scarcity, and everyone had to be involved in Mexico’s positive image. The planning for the 1968 Olympic Games began since Mexico City was elected, but its actions were not that visible. The construction of new venues and the changes in the city began in 1965, but the planning and the transformation of the citizenry had begun since 1963. The

31 John Sayre, ‘Preparing for the Olympics, Mexico surprises the sceptics’ in Pace , June 1966, p. 9, IOCA 1968SOG C-J01-1968/14 14181. Sayre also stated that the beyond the plans of the government, the youth was searching for ways ‘to extend the revolutionary principle to the sphere of human aims and motives.’ In his perspective, the student’s would learn how to modernise ‘mankind.’ Ibid. p. 24 32 Eddy Mulder (compiler), In those days. Olympic Games , Mexico, 12-27 October 1968, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, p. 21, IOCA 1968SOG C-J01-1968/14 206494 . 33 Felipe Bustamante, ‘Proyecto para crear en el pueblo conciencia Olímpica’, Novedades , 29 August 1965, AGN G2 DGIPS B429 F8. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. The project received the help of the Section of Educative Publicity and the National Council of Publicity 36 Editorial, ‘Preparativos Olímpicos’ in El Nacional , August 6, 1965, AGN G2 DGIPS B429 F8. 14

publications provide physical evidence of what the Organising Committee worked on, but also on its intentions. The Mexican government through the Organising Committee were interested in showing the ‘rich historical traditions’ of the country whilst showing the possibilities of a modern country in the future. According to the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, ‘The publications of the Organising Committee of the Games of the XIX Olympiad should reflect all organisation aspects of the Games… Attention will be placed in the cultural aspects, as much pre-Hispanic as current, and of Mexico’s life in general.’37 The Organising Committee printed two regular publications: the bimonthly ‘official bulletin’ and the ‘Olympic Newsletter’, delivered every fortnight. The latter had an image that took the whole centre page with the idea of making it collectible. The Newsletter was accompanied by a ‘Graphic Review’, a publication with many images that complemented the information of the two former. These publications were printed in French, Spanish and English and were handed to the IOC, NOCs (National Olympic Committees), ISF (international sport federations), NSF (National Sport Federations), cultural centres, universities, clubs, embassies and the press. During the first editions of these publications, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs decided where these would be distributed. 38 It was part of a cultural diplomacy strategy to improve the image of Mexico internationally. 39 Mexico’s diplomatic service was constantly promoting the Olympic Games in every country where Mexico had a consulate or embassy. 40 Nevertheless, after some time the Organising Committee took full responsibility of the distribution. The Organising Committee displayed what they considered the most characteristic features of the country. An analysis of these publications shows that the 20 th century was the most represented period. The colonial and the pre-Columbian period followed, and the 19 th

37 Luis Aleleyra Arroyo de Anda, Director of Arts and Culture, to Jesús Cabrera Muñoz Ledo, Director of Cultural Affairs of SRE, Mexico City, 22 January 1967, ADM B23 F60-1. 38 José S. Gallástegui to Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, Mexico City, 10 November 1966, ADM B23 F56-2. 39 Leobardo Reynoso to Manuel Carrillo, 28 July 1967, ADM SFA-DCA 65-3 1965-1968 Juegos Olímpicos México 68, XV/8217(2)1369. 40 Nevertheless, Pedro Ramírez Vázquez thought that this task was not always done as he envisioned. In 1967 he wrote to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs asking him about the lack of publicity in European airports since this was a great opportunity to advertise the Games. Pedro Ramírez Vázquez to José S. Gallástegui, Mexico City, 6 July 1967, ADM B23 F56-2. 15

century was the most ignored epoch. The organising committee’s intention was clear, Mexico’s heritage was important, but promoting a modern image of Mexico was fundamental. 41 The Mexican government and the Organising Committee used Conferences, newspaper reports, radio programs and flyers as a constant strategy to prepare Mexico City’s citizens for the Olympic Games. For the international perspective, however, they used the Olympic Newsletters and other publications as the main cultural diplomacy channels to communicate the Mexican progresses and Olympic development. The first Olympic Newsletter captured the importance of the Games for the Mexican government: ‘“This distinction is a new form of world recognition of Mexico’s progress and the importance of our great metropolis … It implies an obligation of the government, the inhabitants of Mexico City and the nation as a whole, to do whatever may be necessary to give the greatest possible brilliance to this event and offer unforgettable hospitality to those who will come to Mexico to attend the Games.’ 42 Once again, the text appealed to the ‘nation as a whole’ to support the organisation of the Games. This call was repeated over the years and it took an even greater impact when Ramírez Vázquez was appointed chairman of the Organising Committee. The ‘Program of Olympic Identity’ was created in this period and built their projects from where the publishing department had left the work. Beatrice Trueblood, a pioneer in graphic design from the United States, was appointed as the head of the program, 43 and worked directly with designers such as Eduardo Terrazas 44 and Lance Wyman.45 The idea was to promote a new image of Mexico, away from all stereotypes, as well as promoting the advances of the Organising Committee. 46

41 An image analysis of these publications showed that 183 images represented the 20 th century, 93 and 44 the colonial and pre-Columbian period respectively, and the 19 th century was only represented in 18. Publications found in the Private Archive of Pedro Ramírez Vázquez. 42 Organising Committee of the XIX Olympiad, Mexico Informs , 1964, p. [24] IOCA 1968SOG C-J01-1968/9. 43 Beatrice Trueblood met the Chairman of the Organising Committee, Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, while developing a book about the Museo de Antropología in Mexico City which Ramírez had designed. Trueblood was invited to the ‘Olympic Identity’ team when Ramírez Vázquez took the reins of Olympic organisation in 1966. Ortega, Ragasol, and Moderno, p. 48. 44 Eduardo Terrazas was involved in the project because he had worked with Ramírez Vázquez in the construction of the Mexican Pavilion for the 1964-1965 World Fair in Detroit. Terrazas stayed in Detroit and worked as a professor of architectonic design in the University of Columbia and as a graphic designer for George Nelson. Ibid. 45 Lance Wyman would later be involved on creating important logos in Mexico, such as the public underground system (metro), Hylsa, the Suburban train, among others. 46 According to José Luis Ortiz Téllez, Lance Wyman’s assistant during the XIX Olympiad, no one on their own was capable of generating as many projects for the Olympics; many students that drew or worked in publicity (the term Graphic Designer was not frequently used at the time). Trueblood supervised their work and was in charge of sending the proposals to the print. José Luis Ortiz Téllez, 'Acerca De La Creación Del Sistema De Diseño De Los Xix Juegos Olímpicos De México 1968' , (.925 Artes y Diseño, Revista de la facultad de artes y diseño plantel Taxco). 16

In retrospective, Terrazas and Trueblood consider that ‘Mexico 68 went far beyond a “graphic” identity.’ Their main goal was to ‘present Mexico’s vast and unique culture to the world.’ 47 The message was repeated across various supports such as publications, ads, media, among others. Trueblood and Terrazas would also mentioned that the Olympic Identity program did become the image of Mexico thanks to action and repetition. In their own words, they became Mexico: ‘“You are what you think”, “what you say”, “what you do”. We did become Mexico 68. Mexico could stage the games! Mexico could become Mexico 68 – a great fiesta capturing the spirit of a whole nation.’ 48 Newspapers and speeches were also an important part of delivering this message. For instance, in the state of nation address in 1968, president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz acknowledged that Mexico was not rich country, but it was full of hardworking people. Concerning the Olympic Games, the President mentioned: ‘we have undertaken great sacrifices and important expenditures so that all the necessary venues for the celebration of this mega international event are finished and ready to be used, as they already are.’ 49 There was excitement around the preparation Games given the international attention, but this was not obtained because of the economic outcomes of holding the mega-event. As José Irineo García mentioned: ‘In that time, there were no revenues, it was more like a house party where one spends everything one in order to have a nice party, nothing else mattered.’50 Most of the citizenry of Mexico City embraced the idea that the goal of the Olympic Games was to show the real image of Mexico to the world. Esmeralda Reynoso mentioned that there were a lot of journalists covering the event and what was happening around it, according to Reynoso, the Games made Mexico visible to the world. 51

47 Eduardo Terrazas and Beatrice Trueblood, 'This Is Not Mexico [Reply to Daoud Sarhandi’s Article ‘This Is 1968… This Is Mexico’] ' , (EYE magazine, 2016). 48 Ibid. 49 Furthermore, Díaz Ordaz would also declare: ‘We did not hesitate in any expenditure to fit the International Olympic rules, but we do not wish to exceed the cost of venues in other cities, in ours you won’t find greater luxury –genuine and truthful–, than that of the genius, knowledge, good taste and spirit of the hard work of Mexicans who thought, projected and built them.’ Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, ‘IV informe de gobierno’, 1 September1968 in Obras Públicas, Dirección General de Información de la Secretaría de Obras Públicas, Centro SCOP , Year 3, No. 4=31, October 1968, p. 7 50 García stated in his interview that the Olympic Games were not perceived as a money-making enterprise at the time. ‘En aquella parte no había ganancias entonces, pero era como una fiesta domestica que uno gasta todo lo que tiene para que la fiesta salga bonita y no interesaba más allá…’ José Irineo García (track and field judge) in discussion with the author, 6 July 2015 in Mexico City. 51 ‘Los Juegos Olímpicos estaban llenos de periodistas reportando el movimiento y lo que estaba pasando. Yo tengo periódicos italianos que hablan del 2 de octubre, del 68 y de todo ¿no? No con los titulares de aquí de México. Que 17

The communications in real time through radio and colour television in the sixties had an impact on the reflections on visibility, at least to the urban sector that experienced an increase in their capacity to acquire electronic equipment for their homes as a result of the economic growth of the country. An interviewed student movement leader mentioned the importance of receiving news quite quickly thanks to the technological advances. According to her, ‘Nuestro mundo’ showed various events, such as the Beatles playing ‘All you need is love’ for the first time to the whole world. This brought awareness that Mexico was being observed in real time all over the world.52 Beyond the global perception, the XIX Olympic Games caused excitement among Mexico City’s inhabitants. As José Irineo García mentioned, ‘We were proud to organise the Olympic Games and that everything went according to plan…. The government used time in TV and radio to persuade the people to clean their streets, to maintain the order, to paint their houses, in general terms, ‘that the city looked pretty.’ 53 Cuauhtémoc Lamas would add that the Games ‘demonstrated that Mexico had the capacity to hold Olympic Games, as it would later do with the World Cup, with good qualities and success.’ 54 The Olympic Games were a great opportunity to communicate images of the country to the rest of the world in real time. Mexico City’s citizenry was excited about these circumstances. Cuauhtémoc Lamas mentions that ‘everyone agreed that the Olympic Games were held here in

si puso a México en el mundo, sí, sí.’ Esmeralda Reynoso (student movement leader) in discussion with the author 17 July 2015 in Mexico City. 52 The interviewee also raised the question if this meant that people all over the world saw the contradiction between the motto ‘Everything is possible in peace.’ According to her, it must have had some sort of impact on how the people viewed the world. ‘Pero el caso es que en 1967 se hace un programa que para nosotros fue impactante, porque eso también fue muy importante, nos llegaban las cosas más rápido, se llamó ‘nuestro mundo’, donde hubo transmisiones de diferentes países y los estábamos viendo en el momento, fue la primera vez que, digo para ustedes que agarran el teléfono, se comunican a Londres y se están viendo, pero para nosotros ver el estreno de “All you need is love” de los Beatles y saber que los estábamos viendo en vivo fue… no tienes idea de la maravilla, eso hace un poco es la globalización, las cosas llegan más rápido y más directamente, antes tardaban mucho. En ese sentido, los deportistas de todos esos países que estaban aquí, estaban reportando el movimiento, no tengo la idea de cómo era en otros países de si ver la fiesta, porque además fueron las primeras olimpiadas donde se hizo la olimpiada cultural y que el slogan era ‘todo es posible en la paz’, entonces evidentemente yo no sé la repercusión en otros países, pero que algo debió haberles chocado, algo debió haber sido.’ Esmeralda Reynoso, 17 July 2015. 53 ‘‘No, lo que había era gran efervescencia entre toda la gente porque se sentía, o nos sentíamos orgullosos de organizar unos juegos olímpicos y que todo fuera en orden, que todo fuera bien hecho. Incluso los medios desplegaban mucho tiempo en radio y televisión para que la gente limpiara sus calles, que mantuviera el orden, que pintara sus casas, incluso, es decir, que se viera bonita la ciudad.’ José Irineo García, 6 July 2015. 54 ‘No, fíjate que no. Los juegos olímpicos demostraron que México tenía la capacidad para realizar unos juegos olímpicos, como posteriormente hizo con el mundial de fútbol, con buena capacidad y con buen éxito.’ Cuauhtémoc Lamas (security guard) in discussion with the author, 18 July 2015 in Mexico City. 18

Mexico’; and although we can question his perspective, because not everyone embraced the Games, we can agree that the student movement came to most as a disruption and as a surprise. 55

The student movement and Games of the XIX Olympiad The student movement began in the end of July 1968 after the police repressed several students during a demonstration in Mexico City’s central area. The constant and increasing repression reciprocally dissatisfied more students. From July to October 1968, high school and university students of Mexico City took to the streets, printed banners and flyers to show their discontent with the government. Their activities around the city attracted other students and sectors to join the struggle. By the first week of August, students created the Consejo Nacional de Huelga (CNH, National Strike Council) as a representative council for the movement. The CNH was comprised of representatives of the involved schools; it was the most important organised body behind the student movement. The student movement began in the end of July 1968 as a reaction to the excessive use of violence to control political demonstrations. The student movement had no visible connection to the Olympic Games. Nevertheless, the government and the IOC perceived it as a threat to their projects. This idea was strengthened by occasional comments of the students. For instance, student movement leader, Gilberto Guevara declared that Mexico was a ‘disguised dictatorship, to the interior and to the exterior´ and implied that the Olympics were just a scam to disguise the domestic issues. 56 The student movement began a few months before the planned opening ceremony and as a response the government ordered Mexico City’s riot police to control the student protests. 57 The increasing violence from these groups reciprocally increased the students’ activity. The fact that students communicated lines as the following pressured the government

55 ‘Sí mira aceptar los juegos olímpicos le dio una gran alegría al pueblo. Sí, de hecho, todos estaban de acuerdo que “los juegos olímpicos aquí en México”, era la primera vez y había mucho entusiasmo, mucha colaboración, mucho todo… mucho ánimo. Y pues nadie se imaginaba que unos meses antes de que llegaran los juegos olímpicos, hubo un pleito estudiantil.’ Cuauhtémoc Lamas, 18 July 2015. 56 AGN G2 DGIPS B482 F1 D233 (Gilberto Guevara on the Olympic Games) 57 According to Leopoldo Ramirez, the Mexican government was divided between those that looked for a positive solution, the “palomas (doves)” and the hard-wingers, the “halcones (hawks).” ‘…imagínate un sistema que tiene sexenios de existir, que se presenta muy sólido casi sin fisuras, por decirle así, y que de pronto el movimiento estudiantil da un vuelco en contra del autoritarismo que reinaba. Tomó por sorpresa a muchos políticos tradicionales, por eso nos dividimos en dos, nosotros las dizque palomas y ellos los dizque halcones.’ Leopoldo Ramírez Limón (Secretariat of the Presidency) in discussion with the author, Online Interview, 10 January 2016. 19

even more to eradicate the dissidence: ‘The world should know that the economic and political stability of Mexico is a myth.’ 58 At the time, the movement was labelled as a communist plot to discredit the country given the proximity of the Games. Although there were some militants of the Communist Party within the movement, not all who joined the student protests or the organisation of student demonstration had a clear political inclination. For Cuauhtémoc Lamas, ‘the movement came to a high point when… the unions, the students, all the schools, people from everywhere… marched from Chapultepec to National Palace.’ 59 Indignation seemed to be the element that gathered up to 500,000 in the biggest demonstration in Mexico City. Mexico City’s citizenry was divided regarding the student movement. Many people in Mexico City supported the students and was visible in the demonstrations; however, there were also many that did not support them. The latter showed their allegiance through correspondence and telegrams to the government, but also through the press. Javier Najera’s article captures one of the main interpretations. According to Najera, the protesting students were people ‘with exotic images and ideas’ that committed illegal acts. For Najera, the military interventions were just measures to stop the students from ‘conspiring and pressuring for the satisfaction of their demands.’ 60 According to these groups, violence was justified in the sake of a better nation during and after the Olympic Games. This belief proved to be an important element in the events that took place in October 1968.

Negotiating the Games: Imposition, Patriotism and Politics of Silence In the end of September 1968, the State Department of the United Stated considered that the Mexican Government was ‘“completely determined to restore order by any means”’ 61 The student movement lasted several months and the government was running out of options. The

58 Christopher Brasher and Hugh McILvanney, ‘Games men warn Mexico as civil war looms’, The Observer , 6 October 1968, p. 24, IOCA 1968SOG C-J01-1986/2. 59 ‘El movimiento tuvo una culminación, llegó en su momento más alto cuando todas las agrupaciones, comerciantes de Tepito y todos los lados, todos los sindicatos, los estudiantes, todas las escuelas, de todos lados, era una cantidad de gente tremenda, empezaron a marchar de Chapultepec al Palacio Nacional y las consignas que gritaban ya no eran solamente contra el jefe de policía si no ya en contra inclusive del presidente de la república y del secretario de gobernación.’ Cuauhtémoc Lamas, 18 July 2015. 60 Javier Nájera Torres, ‘El partido ante el movimiento estudiantil’ in El Universal , 26 September 1968, p. 2, AGN G2 DGIPS B1579B F5 D423. 61 State Department memo, 26 September 1968 in Kevin B. Witherspoon, ‘Repression of Protest and the Image of Progress (Mexico City 1968)’ in Vida Bajc, Surveilling and Securing the Olympics: From Tokyo 1964 to London 2012 and Beyond , (Springer, 2015), p. 122. 20

latter had experience dealing with dissidence and used the press to discredit the movement, the army and the military police to repress the protestors, and the secret police to disable the leaders of the movement. As Cuauhtémoc Lamas mentioned: ‘They did not only break up protests but they also imprisoned leaders. They locked them in the Military Fields… not only to the leaders, but to many and they kept them imprisoned for a long time before they were set free.’ 62 The increase of repressive measures that the abovementioned actors referenced was visible in Gustavo Diaz Ordaz’ State of the Nation Address on the 1 st of September 1968. Concerning the student movement, President Diaz Ordaz emphatically declared: The dilemma is irreducible: Should the police intervene or not? We have arrived to debauchery in the use of the mediums of expression and diffusion; we have enjoyed extensive freedoms and guarantees to manifest, ordered in certain aspects, but contrary to article 9 of the constitution; we have been tolerant until excessive criticism; but everything has its limit and we cannot allow to keep breaking the juridical order as it appears to the eyes of the whole world. 63

Díaz Ordaz emphatically declared that the protests would not be tolerated any longer and that there were legal grounds to use the army to control the protests. The army took some of the main spaces where students gathered and increased repressive measures; however, not many expected the government’s reaction on October 2 nd . On that tragic day, the army and the ‘Olympia battalion’ massacred the attendees of the student meeting in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in Tlatelolco. Many students and circumstantial spectators lost their life between panicking crowds and crossfire. Very few people were informed on what happened that day, but many now consider that it was a strategy from the Secretariat of the Interior and of the Presidency. As Cuauhtémoc

62 ‘…los granaderos eran brutalmente salvajes. No solamente deshacían manifestaciones si no que apresaban a los líderes. Los metían al campo militar. Eso les pasó a varios maestros, ferrocarrileros, no sólo a los líderes si no a muchos y les dieron mucho tiempo detenidos antes de ser liberados.’ Cuauhtémoc Lamas, 18 July 2015. Alonso Valles mentioned that the government tried to disseminate the idea that the students wanted to boycott the Games, harm the venues and even the athletes. ‘…el gobierno empezó a correr la noticia de que querían boicotear los juegos, querían agredir a los deportistas, querían impedir adelante con los juegos y pretendían que las delegaciones a sus países…Eso no era cierto, no pretendían boicotear ni mucho menos dañar físicamente a un deportista.’ Alonso Valles (Gymnast) in discussion with the author, 30 June 2015 in Mexico City. 63 [‘El dilema es pues, irreductible: ¡Debe o no intervenir la policía? Se ha llegado al libertinaje en el uso de todos los medios de expresión y difusión; se ha disfrutado de amplisímas libertades y garantías para hacer manifestaciones, ordenadas en ciertos aspectos, pero contrarias al texto expreso del artículo 9o constitucional; hemos sido tolerantes hasta excesos criticados; pero tiene su límite y no podemos permitir ya que siga quebrantando irremisiblemente el orden jurídico, como a los ojos de todo mundo ha venido sucediendo’ Camara de Diputados Mexico, 'Informes Presidenciales, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz' , ed. by Servicio de Investigación y Análisis (2006). 21

Lamas mentioned: ‘The Secretariat of the Interior considered that if people gathered again, it would be very dangerous. Therefore, the Secretariat, and everyone knows this, ordered a counterattack. There were many plans, but the most known one is when students were surrounded by the army in the Plaza de las Culturas .’ 64 Mexican newspapers did not go into detail about the massacre because the government controlled the paper supply and therefore the news content. Only a few of international journalists, many of which were covering the Olympics, wrote about the massacre. The massacre of Tlatelolco resulted in many dead, the figure is unknown until this day, but sadly it was not the only repressive measure as suggested by Lamas. Student movement, Esmeralda Reynoso, considered that the government implemented a regular tactic of continuous attacks to the student movement; many active students were disappeared or imprisoned.65 President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz believed that he took the best course of actions. Almost a decennium after the XIX Olympics, when Díaz Ordaz was appointed as ambassador of Spain in 1977, the ex-president declared that what he felt more proud of during his six years of presidency was solving the student movement in 1968 the way he did, because he was able to ‘save the country’ on time. The president angrily declared that the losses during the student movement were not significant compared to the successes achieved in the long run and Tlatelolco was just a ‘sad event in the history of the people.’ 66 Diaz Ordaz was not the only person that justified the repression. Many considered that it was necessary to stop the protests. For instance, Maria Luisa Nava mentioned: ‘Can you imagine the discredit of Mexico if the Games would have been cancelled? Besides, no one can take the Olympic Games not even the United States. Everything that is required around them, nobody can take them. Then he said [the president], we “we have to extirpate it from the root” and he did.’67

64 ‘Entonces la Secretaria de Gobernación vio que si se juntaba otra vez la cantidad de gente que se juntó, iba a ser muy peligroso. Entonces la SEGOB, y eso lo sabe todo el mundo, dio planes de contraataque, fueron muchos los planes que hizo, pero el que más fue conocido, fue cuando estaban reunidos todos los estudiantes en la plaza de las culturas fueron rodeados por el ejército.’ Cuauhtémoc Lamas, 18 July 2015. 65 ‘Yo creo que fue un proceso. Fue un proceso de golpeo continuo del gobierno, pues como te digo, sólo se habla del 2 de octubre, pero hubo una represión constante cada vez más fuerte y cada vez más dura, desde la última manifestación en agosto cuando entran los tanques eso ya iba en serio, o sea, no eran corretizas, era a matar.’ Esmeralda Reynoso, 17 July 2015. 66 Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, 'Press Conference as Appointed Ambassador to Spain' , (Mexico, Secretariat of Foreign Affairs,, 1977). 67 ‘¿Tú te imaginas el descredito de México de cancelar unos juegos Olímpicos? Aparte nadie puede agarrar unos juegos Olímpicos un mes antes, nadie, ni Estados Unidos, todo lo que se requiere alrededor de él, nadie lo puede 22

Nava’s testimony shows her belief that the Games were going to benefit the country and political activity was a threat that had to be eradicated. Curiously, even though the student protesters and their sympathisers did not agree with the violence, there were many students that considered that the political activity had to be interrupted given the proximity of the Games. Ultimately, the government was the one who ordered repression and tried to justify it; nonetheless, the IOC played a relevant role on how these events were handled, especially Avery Brundage. The Executive board met several times and discussed at great length ‘the difficulties which had arisen in Mexico City in connection with the demonstrations which have been broadcasted all over the world.’ In the session of October 6 th 1968, IOC Vice-President Clark Flores expressed his confidence in the Mexican people and ‘stressed that this was not a strictly Mexican matter but rather an international one.’ Clark Flores stated that the protests were happening all over the world and not only in Mexico and that the demonstrations were never meant to disturb the Olympic Games. 68 Clark’s intention was clear, he intended to minimise the student protests in order to assure IOC members that the Games would take place. Avery Brundage supported the ideas that Clark Flores expressed. Brundage was a firm believer that politics should not interfere with sport, and because of this, he did not publically speak about the political discussions in Mexico. Ever since Avery Brundage took the presidency of the IOC in 1952 he tried to keep what he considered political activity outside the IOC. Three years after he took office, the Charter was altered and included a special article against political demonstrations. The 1955 Charter stated: ‘Invitations must state that no political meetings or demonstrations will be held in the stadium or other sport grounds, nor in the Olympic Village, during the Games, and that it is not the intention to use the Games for any purpose other than the advancement of the Olympic Movement.’ 69 This section was present in the charter until 1974 and was written to express that the Games would not be used as a platform to deliver political messages. The IOC would not tolerate any demonstrations considered as political. agarrar. Entonces, dijo, “esto se tiene que sacarse de la raíz”, y de la raíz lo sacó.’ Maria Luisa Nava (Mexican Volleyball team member), 12 May 2016 in Mexico City. 68 The participants of the meeting felt it was necessary to obtain an ‘assurance from the government authorities that the Olympic Games could be staged peacefully.’ After the Chairman of the Organising Committee, Ramírez Vazquez, spoke to the members of the IOC, the latter had guarantees that the Games would be staged as planned. Brundage communicated the results of these discussions in a press conference aimed to calm the doubts about Mexico organising the Games. IOC Executive Board, ‘Other business’ in IOC, Minutes of the Executive Board Meeting , Mexico 30 September – 6 October 1968, p. 19 [It is important to notice that the minutes seemed to be written after the event since the issue with Tommie Smith and John Carlos were discussed.] 69 IOC, The Olympic Games Charter , Lausanne, 1955, p. 31. 23

A similar point was included in the section of Regional Games during this period: ‘There must be no extraneous events connected with the Games, particularly those of a political nature … The loud speaker must be used for sport purposes only and no political speeches are to be permitted. In fact, there must be no commercial or political intervention whatsoever.’ 70 These clauses appeared for the first time during Brundage’s presidency. 71 The latter tried to make the Games a peaceful period where political interests and hostilities would not be represented. In words of Avery Brundage: ‘At quadrennial intervals, the IOC arranges a friendly festival of Olympic sport designed to promote international amity and quite free from discrimination of any kind, racial, social, religious or political, an oasis in an over-charged and over-heated world .’ 72 Brundage repeated the analogy of the Olympic Games with an oasis several times during the XIX Olympiad. In August 1968, Brundage gave a press communique which showed more explicitly how he envisioned the Games as a period of peace where those seeking political changes had to renounce to their claims during the Olympic competitions in order to hold the ‘most priceless instrument of our present civilization’: The world, alas, is full of injustice, aggression, violence and warfare, against which all civilized persons rebel, but this is no reason to destroy the nucleus of international cooperation and good will have in the Olympic movement … we invite the youth of the world, who are certainly not responsible for its evils, to accept our regulations and to participate and we hope the youth of the world will accept … is it not the most priceless and powerful instruments of our present civilization? 73

Brundage was able to communicate these ideas beyond the IOC and the Mexican government adopted this idea as its own in the immediate months before the Games. This was not done because of shared ideas, but as a way to reach a common end. The government’s modern nation building strategies also required that the projects associated with the Games were not challenged by external political activity. Mexico had to make the best out of the international spotlight.

70 IOC, The Olympic Games, Fundamental Principles, Rules and Regulations, General Information , Lausanne, 1962, p. 90 and 92. 71 IOC, Rules and regulations for Regional Games , Lausanne, 1952, p. 7. 72 Avery Brundage in IOC, Newsletter , Lausanne, No. 11, August 1968, p. 345. [The highlighting is mine] 73 Avery Brundage to J. Liska (Associated Press) and J. Sainsbury (United Press), Chicago, Illinois, 23 August 1968, IOCA CAB 7609 24

Besides the attempt to have Games free of political demonstrations, Brundage promoted the idea of the Olympics as an ‘oasis in an overheated world.’ In a letter to Marte R. Gómez, Avery Brundage communicated that he was ‘very careful to avoid mentioning the disturbances in Mexico City, preceding the Games…’ 74 His silence appeared as if the IOC did not interfere with the Games, following the Olympic Charter; however, by not recognising the issues, his actions had a direct political repercussion in Mexico City. 75 Avery Brundage was not the only member in the IOC who tried to minimise the student movement in Mexico City. Giulio Onesti, one of the most active IOC members at the time, said that the Italian and Mexican protests were similar, and declared to the international press that the revolts were a worldwide phenomenon, but that he was sure that the youth would enjoy the festivity that the Games represented. 76 Brundage was better informed about the situation in Mexico City than Onesti, but they both minimised the political discussions in order to open way for the Olympic Games. One day after the Tlatelolco massacre, Brundage stated: ‘As guests of Mexico, we have full confidence that the Mexican people, universally known for their sportsmanship and great hospitality will join participants and spectators in celebrating the Games, a veritable oasis in a troubled world.’ 77 The testimonies of Brundage and Onesti showed that they both believed that when the Olympic Games were celebrated, people would embrace them and would forget about their political motivations. Both the IOC and the Mexican government benefitted from the idea

74 Avery Brundage to Marte R. Gómez, 11 September 1969, ADM DAC-92-2 B37 1970. This correspondence began as a debate about the inclusion of the black power salute in the Olympic Film of 1968. Brundage argued that if he had been silent about the student movement and its repression, there was no reason to include the 200 meter victory ceremony in the film’s final cut. 75 According to Liam Stockdale, the IOC and the Olympic Movement (and I would add FIFA and the World Cup) have been apolitically self-constructed, as well as impersonal and neutral. Nevertheless, despite their attempt to construct themselves as neutral and apolitical, we cannot deny that mega-events have altered the global order politically. Liam Stockdale, 'More Than Just Games: The Global Politics of the Olympic Movement', Sport in Society, 15 (2012), 840. Rachel Briggs, Helen McCarthy, and Alexis Zorbas, 'Days: The Role of the Olympic Truce in the Toolkit for Peace' , (London: Demos), (p. 39). 76 Armado Estrada Nuñez, ‘Sesionarán aquí los Comités Olímpicos’, Excelsior , 27 September 1968, IOCA 1968SOG C-J01-1986/3 206489. Onesti believed in a progressive evolution of the youth concerns instead of revolution and did not give a judgement of value of the Mexican movement because he thought that as a guest in Mexico, he had to respect the hosts. 77 Avery Brundage on behalf of the Executive Boards of the International Olympic Committee, 3 October 1968, ABC, Frederick Ruegsegger Documents, F11 D02. 25

of an Olympic peace, a truce. According to Ramírez Vázquez, the idea of the ‘truce’ around the Games was a Greek legacy that everyone accepted. 78 The violent repression and the way the government and the IOC handled it had a diverse reception. José Luis Ortíz Téllez worked in the ‘Olympic Identity’ program and considered that the group he worked with had a dilemma. ‘On one hand some drank wine and tequila, but on the other University students lost their autonomy. We were all in a disjunctive: Who were we working for? Were we part of the justice elite? Were we accomplices? Lots of questions, not many answers.’ 79 The governmental repression was one of the reasons that the student movement fought against; however, many were surprised of its actions on October 2 nd . The massacre has been considered as the turning point where students decided to not protest during the Games. Fear and shock were an important element in the pause of political activity during the Olympic month. As a student movement participant mentioned: ‘It is like when you realise that something that you never thought possible, just happens; that your country’s army comes to a pacific demonstration and starts to shoot…it just stuns you.’80 Ten days after the massacre, the opening ceremony of the XIX Games of the Summer Olympiad took place. As reported in a newspaper report collected from the National Archives in Mexico: ‘Despite everything, the Games will be held in bloody Mexico City.’ Beyond the headline, the newspaper captured in a few sentences the complexity of the reactions prior to the Games: ‘Mexico City shows a double life today. In the Olympic Village, athletes from all over the world are getting ready for a pacific competition. From the other side of the city, armed troops and bulletproof cars are camping around nine blocks of flats which turned into a

78 Ramírez Vázquez said that he respected the Greek Olympic heritage, and the truce was part of it. Pedro Ramírez Vázquez in Ortega, Ragasol, and Moderno, p. 44. 79 ‘México estaba en una algarabía contagiable. Por una parte se tomaba vino y tequila, por la otra los universitarios perdían su autonomía. Todos nosotros nos encontrábamos en medio de una disyuntiva: ¿para quién estamos trabajando?, ¿éramos parte de la elite justiciera?, ¿éramos cómplices? Muchas preguntas, pocas respuestas.’ Ortiz Téllez. From a different perspective, left wing artists and intellectuals, considered that the government had not acted correctly and reacted against it. Philosopher and diplomat, Leopoldo Zea spoke about the citizenry’s silence and the government’s violence: ‘…someone has to put an end on violence and cannot be the most violent, it cannot be the strongest gorilla … it has to be the strongest, but also the most rational, balanced, shouldn’t it be the State?’ Leopoldo Zea, ‘La violencia como política’, [Newspaper not reported] AGN G2 DGIPS B967 F3 D166 and Clark Flores to Zea, 30 January 1964, Mexico City, ADM B23 F56-2. 80 ‘Fue como cuando tú te percatas de algo que no habías supuesto que pudiera suceder, que es que tu ejercito de tu país llegue a una manifestación pacífica y empiece a disparar, bueno después, ya en ese momento la confusión era enorme, sepas que aparte había un grupo de paramilitares que estaba provocando, realmente jugando en este horror para que el ejército supusiera que había agresiones del lado estudiantil, sí te pasma.’ Maria Guadalupe Ferrer (student movement participant) in discussion with the author, 5 August 2015 in Mexico City. 26

battlefield.’ 81 As a matter of fact, there was tension in the air in October and diverse reading of the circumstances. Many students were fearful about the governmental repression, while government officials considered that there was a possibility that students tried to boycott the Games. Leopoldo Ramírez worked in the Secretariat of the Presidency and considered that the tension continued as the Games were inaugurated, in his words the fears were very diminished, but ‘there were still fears and angst.’ 82 Repression certainly had an impact on the student protests and the following of Olympic Protocols. Nevertheless, since early September, the students had already considered putting a pause on their political activity during the Olympic Games. The IOC did not have a Truce program at the time, but students spoke about the idea and how they were approached by the IOC. In a CNH flyer printed in October, the students expressed: Regarding IOC’s calling to the people of Mexico, we must insist that if the truce means no more violence from our part, we have never resorted to it; if it refers to the suspension of making use of our constitutional freedoms, we must say that we won’t resign to our rights with or without Olympic Games. We consider that if we have not intervened in the affairs of the Olympic Games, neither should the IOC intervene in ours. 83

Even though the idea of Olympic Truce appeared a few days before the Olympic Games, the students had already expressed that they did not want to boycott the Olympics. Another CNH flyer in October communicated: ‘As another sign that our purpose was not to subvert the public order, the CNH decided to take a unilateral truce of our democratic activities, public gatherings and demonstrations during the Olympics to avoid the characteristic clumsiness of the Government.’ 84 Their recurrent messages, however, did not seem to calm the doubts of the international press, IOC and the Mexican government. As Henry Giniger reported: ‘The trouble is not yet over, and although student leaders say they have no intention of sabotaging the

81 AGN G2 DGIPS B484 F2 D601-603 82 Leopoldo Ramírez Limón, 10 January 2016. ‘Sí, naturalmente siguió la tensión, claro ya muy disminuida, había una gran inquietud, había muchos temores, etc. Etc.,’ 83 Press Bulletin (CNH), October 1968, p. 2, AHUN B58 D94. This message was communicated because there was an understanding that the IOC required a period of 40 days without political demonstrations. ‘Students stated that all governments that host the Games must guarantee forty days of stability and political tranquillity before the competitions. “We must use this to create pressure and have our claims solved, but this does not mean that we are against the Olympic Games.’ Antonio Ortega, ‘Se pide diferir clases y exámenes. El consejo de Huelga dispuesto al dialogo con las autoridades’, Excelsior , 20 August 1968. 84 AHUN B58 D103 [ Tlatelolco: 2 de Octubre ] 27

Olympics to further their conflict with the Government, the Government is worried that some of the more extremist groups might try just that.’ 85 Vida Bajc considers that Mexico was quiet during the Olympic Games ‘not so much because its populace was content, but rather because it was too terrified to protest publicly.’86 This idea is well disseminated among scholars; however, this paper considers that we cannot only take in account the governmental repression as the element that allowed the Olympic Games to be held according to IOC protocols. We also have to consider national identity. Ever since the student movement began, many believed that it was a plot to discredit the country given the international attention received with the Olympics. This led the students to try to legitimise their demands, recognising the national interests and stating that the Games were not part of their struggle.87 Students constantly tried to persuade people that the movement was nationalistic and did not intend to harm Mexico’s image with the upcoming Games. The students internalised the idea that Mexico had to provide a good image with the Olympic Games in order to benefit in the future. This implied that their protests had to be paused during the Olympic Games. Their understanding of the Olympic Games as beneficial even led some to express after the massacre that ‘Gustavo Díaz Ordaz does not want Olympics.’ 88 This message considered that the President was against the idea of peace that was so central to Mexico’s positive image.89 The students respected the idea of the Olympic Games serving the country, and even though they did not intend to boycott them, they constantly referenced the Olympics in their communications. For instance, one of their flyers ‘awarded medals’ to the Mexican government for their actions. According to the students, the government was ‘First place in the massacre of

85 Henry Giniger, ‘Olympics 1968: Mexico City is ready’, in The New York Times , 6 October 1968. 86 Bajc, p. 110. 87 One of the first flyers of the student movement communicated: ‘Even though we know the great investment that the Olympic Games is unjustified in a country like ours where the needs of the population are great and urgent, the student movement has never tried to boycott the Olympic Games.’ ‘Manifesto to the students of the world’, 1 July 1968, p. 5, AHUN B58 D085. 88 AGN G2 DGIPS B484 F2 D357. 89 The occupation of Ciudad Universitaria in September upset writers, artists and professors, many of who signed a document that criticised the military occupation; the violation of individual guarantees and the University’s autonomy; the imprisonment of people, and in general the lack of democracy in the country. The document was signed by figures such as Emmanuel Carballo, Carlos Monsivais and Carlos Prieto, among many others, and was published in one of the most distributed Mexican newspapers: El Universal, AGN G2 DGIPS B967 F3 D3. A similar document was published a few days later by the professors from El Colegio de México that requested the release of prisoners, the end of the military occupation in Ciudad Universitaria and the return to a friendly atmosphere to solve the issues that the students were pushing forward in the political agenda. AGN G2 DGIPS B967 F3 D18. 28

young students by the army’, ‘First place in the repression of young students by the gorilla riot police’ and ‘First place in communicating lies’. The flyer concluded with the text: ‘Dear people: But these sports are not recognised by the IOC, so we suggest that the students and the Organising Committee send them to Vietnam so they can compete against armed people, not against unarmed students.’ 90 The flyer showed the students awareness of the international issues and traced comparisons with what occurred in Mexico. The students considered that although the government wanted to disseminate an idea of peace to the world, it presented violent conditions such as those observed in the . The idea that the Games had to be respected for the sake of Mexico’s future were not unique to the student movement. The Olympics were linked with patriotism. As Esmeralda Reynoso remembers: ‘There was then that nationalist pride that Mexico had to be seen as the best thing.’ This belief allowed the Games to be embraced as a platform to communicate the uniqueness of Mexico, but it also allowed the unwanted to be discarded and justified.91 The people that did not sympathise with the movement were happy to see that the students had been controlled, whilst the protestors considered that Mexico had to provide a good image abroad and their protests would be resumed after the Games. Student movement leader, Esmeralda Reynoso, spoke about this discussion in her interview: ‘…we [the CNH] had already planned to not affect [the Olympic Games]. That decision was already taken because it was something that everyone said: “what they want is to sabotage the Games”, well that had nothing to do with it. 92

‘Everything is possible in Peace’? The XIX Olympic Games were able to take place thanks to fear and repression, but also to patriotism. As Brian Glanville reported at the time, ‘the students themselves “look on the Olympiad with a favourable eye.’ 93 The students’ flyers proved Glanville right. Most students

90 AGN G2 DGIPS B482 F1 D115. 91 ‘Entonces había ese orgullo nacionalista de que se viera de México era lo máximo. Pues ante eso, yo siempre he dicho que es esconder bajo el tapete la porquería; que se vea que la casa está bonita y así lo ves en una familia y lo ves en un país. Cualquier pueblecito muerto de hambre, se endroga toda la familia para hacer la pachanga. Así somos.’ Esmeralda Reynoso, 17 July 2015. 92 ‘No bueno, lo que tienes que ver son dos cosas: una que nosotros teníamos ya planeado el hecho de no afectar. Esa decisión ya estaba tomada porque era algo que cantaban y decían en todos lados: ‘lo que quieren es afectar, sabotear, los Juegos’, pues para nada, y no se va a hacer nada. Eso por un lado y por otro lado, Toman la Ciudad Universitaria, toman el Politécnico, una agresión terrible en la calle y todos lados, y el 2 de octubre, o sea, ahí murió todo…’ Ibid. 93 Brian Glanville, ‘Why the Mexican students won’t stop the Olympics’, NN, 29 September 1968, IOCA 1968SOG C-J01-1986/2. 29

wanted Mexico to have a good image abroad and this was the ultimate idea why they never intended to continue their protests during the Olympic Games. As María Guadalupe Ferrer mentioned: ‘…nobody wanted to create a bad image of Mexico before the world, nobody, not even the students.’ 94 This widespread reaction in Mexico City drove Le Figaro to question if the Olympic Truce actually took place in Mexico or if people simply denied the political issues.95 Le Figaro reported an important process in Mexico City. After witnessing huge political discussions, the Olympic Games seemed to take over Mexico City. According to Cuauhtémoc Lamas: ‘Undoubtedly, people remained very unsatisfied, upset, upset about the acts and they protested in a thousand ways, in their testimonies, in the press, in television. They criticised the government for the excess, but the Olympic Games arrived, and the opening ceremony, and the movement was practically forgotten… temporarily.’ 96 We can add that although no major protests were held in Mexico during the Olympic Games, this did not mean that Mexico City’s citizenry forgot about the movement. Maria Guadalupe Ferrer remembers that many students attended the Games, but they ‘did not forget about the injustice in the country.’ 97 The resistance and opposition took other forms. For many of the student protestors, Mexico City’s citizenry embraced the Olympic Games without questioning them. For instance, Esmeralda Reynoso questioned: ‘How is possible to see so many people rooting with us and ten days after October 2 nd they are applauding?’98 Reynoso considered that there was a huge support for the student movement from diverse sectors of the population from July to October, but that when the Games began on October 12 th , everyone embraced the Games. Patriotism was in fact an element that allowed this behaviour to prevail. Nevertheless, the spectators that did not accept the government’s actions showed

94 ‘No fue específicamente una tregua, fue un pasmo, sobre todo provocado por la sorpresa. Digo, la indignación, el dolor, lo que quieras, pero el primer impacto sí te deja sin palabras.’, Maria Guadalupe Ferrer, 5 August 2015. 95 Roland Mesmeur, ‘Trêve Olympique’, Le Figaro , 7 October 1968, IOCA 1968SOG C-J01-1986/2. 96 ‘Indudablemente que la gente quedó muy insatisfecha, enojada, enojada con los actos y se manifestaban de mil formas, en declaraciones, en la prensa, en televisión. Criticaban al gobierno por los excesos, pero llegan los juegos olímpicos y la inauguración y prácticamente se olvidó, se olvidó del movimiento, por lo pronto.’ Cuauhtémoc Lamas, 18 July 2015. 97 ‘Es interesante para el que estudia movimientos sociales el pensar que muchas de las gentes, de los estudiantes que fueron a los Juegos Olímpicos no habían perdido de vista la injusticia en este país. Es interesante porque tú podrías decir ¿por qué no todos se resguardaron? ¿nadie fue? ¿por qué no se hacían alborotos afuera de los estadios? La represión fue horrible.’ Maria Guadalupe Ferrer, Mexico City. 98 ‘No, no, no, pero ahí no era el movimiento, era la gente, era la gente. Eso sí hay que considerar, así como al principio no teníamos mucho eco en la sociedad, al final teníamos mucho. Fue algo que personalmente nos golpeó mucho. Es decir ¿cómo es posible que estoy viendo que la gente se vuelca con nosotros y a los diez días del 2 de Octubre están aplaudiendo. Así es México, pero para unos chavos que los están viviendo por primera vez, fue brutal.’ Esmeralda Reynoso, 17 July 2015. 30

resistance by whistling at the President, while others such as Esmeralda Reynoso displayed untraceable signs of resistance by not engaging with the Games. Olympian Maria Luisa Nava even considered that the president’s life was in risk during the opening ceremony. Even though, no major scale demonstrations were held during the Olympic Games, the unhappy spectators displayed untraceable and permitted forms of resistance in the Olympic Venues by rejecting the political figures. Signs of resistance such as the whistling at governmental figures took a whole new dimension after the medal ceremony of the 200-meter dash. After John Carlos, Tommie Smith and Peter Norman protested while the anthem of the United States played. Students realised that the Olympic Games provided the opportunity for other discourses. Student movement participant, María Guadalupe Ferrer mentioned: ‘They did not raise their fist for the 68 movement, they vindicated the topic of the Civil Rights in the United States, but that made us feel part of the world, it made you recognise little signs and gave you a small hope.’ 99 Esmeralda Reynoso communicated a similar idea to Ferrer’s and added that it gave a sense of wellbeing when the athletes protested: ‘It was not our struggle, it was their thing, but somehow the fact that something did not properly work out or that someone spoke of a setting that was not ideal as presented in the Olympic Games was a bit exciting for us.’ 100 The IOC did not mention anything about the rejection of political figures; however, they discussed the so called “black power salute.” Avery Brundage tried to punish the athletes as much as possible to set an example for potential protestors and also tried to eradicate their expression from the Olympics. This was a huge object of discussion in the Olympic Film, because Alberto Isaac decided to leave the images of the ‘black power salute’ in the final cut. Brundage criticised this action because it challenged the politics of silence that he had followed. In Brundage’s perspective: ‘The use of pictures of the nasty demonstration against the Unit[ed] St[ates] flag by negroes… it has no more place in the record of the Games than the gunfire at

99 ‘Así es, pero tú de pronto ahí entendías ahí que de pronto aparecían ahí; ellos no levantaron el puño por el movimiento del 68, ellos reivindicaron el tema de los derechos civiles en Estados Unidos, pero entonces eso te hacía sentir parte del mundo, te hacía reconocer guiños, señales y te daba una esperanza pequeña, pero así, ¿no?’ María Guadalupe Ferrer, Mexico City, 5 August 215. 100 ‘Pero otro momento que fue emotivo para los que estuvimos en el movimiento del 68 fue cuando los corredores norteamericanos levantaron el puño. No era por nuestra lucha, era su rollo, pero de alguna manera el que algo no saliera bien o se hablara de que la situación no era tan ideal como se presentaba en unos juegos olímpicos fue un poquito de emoción para nosotros.’ Esmeralda Reynoso, Mexico City, 17 July 2015. 31

Tlatelolco…’ 101 Brundage tried denying the athlete’s protest from the Olympic records, but the Organising Committee did not back this decision. In Ramírez Vázquez’s opinion, there was no reason to leave out an event that had occurred during the Olympics, while there were many reasons to not include the protests that occurred before the event.

‘Olympic hangover’? Mexico City and the political legacies of the XIX Olympiad The XIX Olympic Games ended with many records broken and fantastic athletic performances. This helped to give the 1968 Games a sense of success. The spectators’ behaviour during the Olympics also helped the Mexican Case. On the closing ceremony, for instance, athletes and spectators joined in an enthusiastic celebration while thousands of mariachis played traditional Mexican songs. This actions made Brundage declare: ‘What a marvellous people and what a fabulous party’ to which Díaz Ordaz replied: ‘It is a marvellous people and the party has been very Mexican.’ 102 Beyond the festive environment described by Brundage, the Olympic Games and the build up to them had huge political consequences on the population. The IOC and the Mexican government favoured a period of exception during the Olympic Games and the immediate weeks before them. We can agree with Bajc that the Mexican Government and the IOC, as in all mega- events, tried to create a ‘maximally controlled environment.’ By minimising political demonstrations, the Mexican government and the IOC intended to ‘reduce complexity in order to minimize uncertainty.’ 103 This state of exception allowed the Games to be held according to protocol and it highlighted the goals that the IOC and the government had concerning the Olympic Games. The direct consequence of this construction was that Mexico City’s citizenry immediately resumed its large scale political activity after the Games were held. As José Irineo García referred to the post-event period: ‘… just as in a drunken night, it was after a week later that we thought, “well, what happened? Now how are we going to work this out? Will we go back to

101 Brundage to Ramírez Vázquez, ADM DAC-92-2 B37 1970. 102 Homero Bazán Víquez, ‘La Fiesta ha sido muy a la Mexicana…’ [newspaper and date not reported] IOCA 1986OG C-J01-1968/7 14406 103 Bajc, p. 23. 32

school?”’ 104 The way that the government and the IOC dealt with the implementation of the Olympic Games increased the political engagement of the population before and even more visibly after the Olympic flame stopped burning in the cauldron. As María Guadalupe Ferrer mentioned, this period ‘intensified the political activity in diverse expressions.’ Ferrer spoke about people engaging with the political system or even joining armed struggles. 105 The student movement had clear demands with their protests, but none of these were fulfilled immediately. Nevertheless, there were clear contributions to the political activity of Mexico City. The Olympic Games were a significant element because the enhancement of nationalism was reflected upon and engaged people with political activity beyond traditional political participation areas. We can agree with Esmeralda Reynoso that the events of did not directly open the way for a political transition in 2000. 106 The events of 1968 had a direct repercussion on the political organisation of Mexico City’s citizenry and on cultural aspects such as the open participation of women in politics and the redefinition of the family roles. In a country with no rotation of parties in the presidency, these were more significant changes. From IOC’s perspective, we can coincide with Kevin B. Witherspoon that the 1968 Olympic Games were a transition from ‘a genuinely peaceful international sporting event to one requiring ever more stringent security measures imaginable.’ 107 The events in the XIX Olympiad, along with those in the XX, changed the course of the Olympic Games and their implementation. The XX Olympiad shaped security around Olympic Games as a way to impede external threats, while Mexico 1968 showed the IOC that domestic issues could threaten the Games. The XIX

104 ‘Ahí termina todo e igual que cada borrachera, hasta la semana fue que se pensó “Bueno, ¿qué pasó? ¿Ahora cómo vamos a resolver? ¿Vamos a regresar a la escuela? ¿cómo vamos a solucionar todo eso?”’ José Irineo García, 6 July 2015. 105 ‘Entonces la represión del movimiento estudiantil, te lo digo porque es importante no mata al deseo de cambio en los estudiantes, no lo aniquila, lo intensifica en diversas expresiones, gente que trabajó en el movimiento obrero después del movimiento del 68, gente que se fue a la lucha armada, gente que se dedicó al tema político, pero también al tema de los derechos humanos. La idea de que a muchas personas se le abrieron los ojos, o ya los tenía abiertos, descubrías que simpatizaban con el anhelo de cambio pues eso era un gran aliciente.’ Maria Guadalupe Ferrer, 5 August 215. Esmeralda Reynoso coincided with Ferrer and also considered that many that felt deceived in 1968 took part in the guerrilla…’ Esmeralda Reynoso, 17 July 2015. 106 ‘El 68 no es como ellos lo cuenta, cuando dicen que con el 68 logramos la apertura democrática, yo digo ¡¿cuál?! Sin embargo, logramos muchos cambios en la sociedad.’ Ibid. 107 Kevin B. Witherspoon, ‘Repression of Protest and the Image of Progress (Mexico City 1968)’ in Vida Bajc (Editor), Surveilling and Securing the Olympics, from Tokyo 1964 to London 2012 and beyond , London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 124. 33

Olympiad proved to be a relevant variable in the transformations of the Olympic Charter after the IOC Congress in Varna 1973 as well as the IOC sessions in 1974.

Conclusion The XIX Olympic Games were meant to be of great significance for the IOC and the Mexican government. The IOC tried to secure Olympism and promote it among ‘smaller-scale countries’ by choosing Mexico as the host destination, while the Mexican government tried to disseminate a modern image of Mexico during a period of economic growth. The underlying message was that Mexico was capable of fulfilling any task it set eyes on and the Olympics were open to all. The apparent compatibility of these goals as well as the cold war tension made IOC members prefer Mexico City over Lyon, Detroit or Buenos Aires. The projects of the IOC and the Mexican Government were implemented rather smoothly from the moment Mexico was elected the Olympic destination in October 1963 until mid-1968. Nevertheless, the student movement that began in the end of July 1968 appeared as a threat. The Mexican government saw the protests as a challenge to the modern image that Mexico wanted to communicate to the world, especially during the Olympic year. For the IOC, the protests meant a disruption of the Olympic charter where no political demonstrations had to take place in the host destination. The XIX Olympiad worked as a political arena where the IOC, Mexican government and Mexico City’s citizenry discussed significant topics such as national representation, governance, security and surveillance, among others. The preparation for the Olympic Games increased the political divisions among these groups, but by doing so, it highlighted the active role of Mexico City’s citizenry and it increased its political participation. The most visible period of discussions was the Olympic month. The fast changing actions from the government and the IOC to secure the Games, received a similar response from the protesting students and Mexico City’s citizenry. The government implemented violent repression to control the protests and the IOC applied a politics of silence to secure the Olympic Games. As a response, students did not plan massive scale demonstrations, partly because of fear, but mostly because they considered their movement to be nationalistic. The protesting students, as most

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Mexicans, considered that the country had to provide a positive image to the world which would benefit everyone. Interestingly, this meant no political activity. The XIX Olympiad had a significant repercussion on the political participation in Mexico City. The student movement that began in this period was deeply influenced by the actions from government, but also from the IOC. For the Government, the XIX Olympiad was another step in the attempt to brand the country as modern, it did not prove to be the ultimate goal. For the IOC, the XIX Olympic Games changed security and surveillance drastically. The IOC discussed ways to avoid domestic threats such as the student movement in future Olympic destinations. This research suggests that the IOC and the local government, and in the last decades the involved companies, are not the only actors that shape Olympism. The host populations have a direct repercussion in how the Olympic Games are implemented. The Olympic Games tend to be considered as the goal, but the host destinations are transformed significantly from the moment the city is elected to host the Games until several years after these events take place. This research invites both scholars and IOC members to consider the role of host destinations in Olympism for future reflections.

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Abbreviations CNH Consejo Nacional de Huelga (National Strike Council) COXIXJO Comité Organizador de los XIX Juegos Olímpicos (Organising Committee of the XIX Olympic Games) DGIPS Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (General Direction of Political and Social Investigations) GANEFO Games of the New Emerging Forces IOC International Olympic Committee ISF International Sport Federations NOC National Olympic Committee

References

Archives Avery Brundage Collection (ABC) Archivo de Arquitectos Mexicanos (AAM, Archive of Mexican Architects) Archivo de la Palabra (ADP, Oral History Archive) Archivo Diplomático Mexicano (ADM, Mexican Diplomatic Archive of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs) Archivo General de la Nación (AGN, National Archives, Mexico) Archivo Histórico de la Universidad Nacional (AHUN, Archive of the National University, Mexico) Archivo Privado de Pedro Ramírez Vázquez (APPRV, Private Archive of Pedro Ramírez Vázquez) International Olympic Committee Archive (IOCA)

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21 Ariel Rodríguez Kuri, 'Hacia México 68. Pedro Ramírez Vázquez Y El Proyecto Olímpico', Secuencia (2003), 035. 22 Ariel Rodríguez Kuri, 'Ganar La Sede. La Política Internacional De Los Juegos Olímpicos De 1968', Historia Mexicana, 64 (2014), 243-89. 23 Liam Stockdale, 'More Than Just Games: The Global Politics of the Olympic Movement', Sport in Society, 15 (2012), 839-54. 24 Eduardo Terrazas, and Beatrice Trueblood, 'This Is Not Mexico [Reply to Daoud Sarhandi’s Article ‘This Is 1968… This Is Mexico’] ', EYE magazine, (2016) 2015 ]. 25 Alan Tomlinson, and Jonathan Woodham, Image Power and Space . Vol. 11 (Meyer & Meyer Verlag, 2007). 26 Christoph Wagner, 'Representing the Nation: Sport and Spectacle in Post-Revolutionary Mexico (Book Review)', Sport in History, 33 (2013), 216-19. 27 Kevin B Witherspoon, Before the Eyes of the World: Mexico and the 1968 Olympic Games (Northern Illinois University Press, 2008).

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