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RADIUS EAP Support

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RADIUS EAP Support RADIUS EAP Support The RADIUS EAP Support feature makes it possible for users to apply the client authentication methods within PPP (including proprietary authentication), which may not be supported by the network access server (NAS); to be accomplished through the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). Before this feature was introduced, support for various authentication methods for PPP connections required custom vendor-specific configuration and changes to the client and NAS. RADIUS EAP support allows authentication schemes, such as token cards and public key, to strengthen end-user and device authenticated access to their networks. • Finding Feature Information, page 1 • Prerequisites for RADIUS EAP Support, page 1 • Restrictions for RADIUS EAP Support, page 2 • Information About RADIUS EAP Support, page 2 • How to Configure RADIUS EAP Support, page 3 • Configuration Examples, page 5 • Additional References, page 6 • Feature Information for RADIUS EAP Support, page 8 • Glossary, page 9 Finding Feature Information Your software release may not support all the features documented in this module. For the latest caveats and feature information, see Bug Search Tool and the release notes for your platform and software release. To find information about the features documented in this module, and to see a list of the releases in which each feature is supported, see the feature information table. Use Cisco Feature Navigator to find information about platform support and Cisco software image support. To access Cisco Feature Navigator, go to www.cisco.com/go/cfn. An account on Cisco.com is not required. Prerequisites for RADIUS EAP Support Before enabling EAP RADIUS on the client, you must perform the following tasks: RADIUS Configuration Guide 1 RADIUS EAP Support Restrictions for RADIUS EAP Support • Configure an interface type and enter interface configuration mode by using the interface command. • Configure the interface for PPP encapsulation by using the encapsulation command. For more information on completing these tasks, refer to the “ Configuring Asynchronous SLIP and PPP ” module. Restrictions for RADIUS EAP Support When EAP is running in proxy mode, there may be a significant increase in the authentication time because every packet from the peer must be sent to the RADIUS server and every EAP packet from the RADIUS server must be sent back to the client. Although this extra processing causes delays, you can increase the default authentication timeout value by using the ppp timeout authentication command. Information About RADIUS EAP Support EAP is an authentication protocol for PPP that supports multiple authentication mechanisms that are negotiated during the authentication phase (instead of the link control protocol [LCP] phase). EAP allows a third-party authentication server to interact with a PPP implementation through a generic interface. How EAP Works By default, EAP runs in proxy mode. This means that EAP allows the entire authentication process to be negotiated by the NAS to a back-end server that may reside on or be accessed through a RADIUS server. After EAP is negotiated between the client and the NAS during LCP exchange, all further authentication messages are transparently transmitted between the client and the back-end server. The NAS is no longer directly involved in the authentication process; that is, the NAS works as a proxy, sending EAP messages between the remote peers. Note EAP can also run in a local mode; the session is authenticated using the Message Digest 5 (MD5) algorithm and obeys the same authentication rules as Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP). To disable proxy mode and authenticate locally, you must use the ppp eap local command. Newly Supported Attributes The RADIUS EAP Support feature introduces support for the following RADIUS attributes: Number IETF Attribute Description 79 EAP-Message Encapsulates one fragment of an EAP message, which includes the PPP type, request-id, length, and EAP-type fields. RADIUS Configuration Guide 2 RADIUS EAP Support How to Configure RADIUS EAP Support Number IETF Attribute Description 80 Message Authenticator Ensures source integrity of the message; all messages that are received with invalid checksums are silently discarded by either end. This attribute contains an HMAC-MD5 checksum of the entire RADIUS request or response message and uses the RADIUS server secret as the key. How to Configure RADIUS EAP Support Configuring EAP Perform this task to configure EAP on an interface configured for PPP encapsulation. SUMMARY STEPS 1. enable 2. configure terminal 3. ppp authentication eap 4. ppp eap identity string 5. ppp eap password [number] string 6. ppp eap local 7. ppp eap wait 8. ppp eap refuse [callin] DETAILED STEPS Command or Action Purpose Step 1 enable Enables privileged EXEC mode. • Enter your password if prompted. Example: Router> enable Step 2 configure terminal Enters global configuration mode. Example: Router# configure terminal RADIUS Configuration Guide 3 RADIUS EAP Support Configuring EAP Command or Action Purpose Step 3 ppp authentication eap Enables EAP as the authentication protocol. Example: Router(config-if)# ppp authentication eap Step 4 ppp eap identity string (Optional) Specifies the EAP identity when requested by the peer. Example: Router(config-if)# ppp eap identity user Step 5 ppp eap password [number] string (Optional) Sets the EAP password for peer authentication. This command should only be configured on the client. Example: Router(config-if)# ppp eap password 7 141B1309 Step 6 ppp eap local (Optional) Authenticates locally instead of using a RADIUS back-end server, which is the default. Example: Note This command should only be configured on the Router(config-if)# ppp eap local NAS. Step 7 ppp eap wait (Optional) Waits for the caller to authenticate itself first. By default, the client always authenticates itself before the caller does. Example: Note This command should only be configured on the Router(config-if)# ppp eap wait NAS. Step 8 ppp eap refuse [callin] (Optional) Refuses to authenticate using EAP. If the callin keyword is enabled, only incoming calls are not authenticated. Example: Note This command should only be configured on the Router(config-if)# ppp eap refuse NAS. RADIUS Configuration Guide 4 RADIUS EAP Support Verifying EAP Verifying EAP To verify EAP configurations on your client or NAS, use at least one of the following commands in privileged EXEC configuration mode: Command Purpose Displays information about the active lines on the Router# show users router. Displays statistics for all interfaces configured on the Router# show interfaces router or access server. Ensures that your configurations appear as part of the Router# show running-config running configuration. Configuration Examples EAP Local Configuration on Client Example The following example is a sample configuration for a client configured for EAP: interface Ethernet0/0 ip address 10.1.1.202 255.255.255.0 no ip mroute-cache half-duplex ! interface BRI0/0 ip address 192.168.101.100 255.255.255.0 encapsulation ppp no ip mroute-cache dialer map ip 192.168.101.101 56167 dialer-group 1 isdn switch-type basic-5ess ppp eap identity user ppp eap password 7 141B1309 ! ! ip default-gateway 10.1.1.1 ip classless ip route 192.168.101.101 255.255.255.255 BRI0/0 no ip http server ! dialer-list 1 protocol ip permit EAP Proxy Configuration for NAS Example The following example is a sample configuration for a NAS configured to use EAP proxy: aaa authentication login default group radius aaa authentication login NOAUTH none aaa authentication ppp default if-needed group radius RADIUS Configuration Guide 5 RADIUS EAP Support Additional References aaa session-id common enable secret 5 $1$x5D0$cfTL/D8Be.34PgTbdGdgl/ ! username dtw5 password 0 lab username user password 0 lab ip subnet-zero no ip domain-lookup ip host lab24-boot 172.19.192.254 ip host lb 172.19.192.254 ! isdn switch-type primary-5ess ! controller T1 3 framing esf linecode b8zs pri-group timeslots 1-24 ! interface Ethernet0 ip address 10.1.1.108 255.255.255.0 no ip route-cache no ip mroute-cache ! interface Serial3:23 ip address 192.168.101.101 255.255.255.0 encapsulation ppp dialer map ip 192.168.101.100 60213 dialer-group 1 isdn switch-type primary-5ess isdn T321 0 ppp authentication eap ppp eap password 7 011F0706 ! ! ip default-gateway 10.0.190.1 ip classless ip route 192.168.101.0 255.255.255.0 Serial3:23 no ip http server ! dialer-list 1 protocol ip permit ! radius-server host 10.1.1.201 auth-port 1645 acct-port 1646 key lab radius-server retransmit 3 call rsvp-sync ! mgcp profile default ! ! line con 0 exec-timeout 0 0 logging synchronous login authentication NOAUTH line 1 48 line aux 0 ine vty 0 4 lpassword lab Additional References The following sections provide references related to RADIUS EAP Support feature. Related Documents Related Topic Document Title Configuring PPP Authentication Using AAA “ Configuring Authentication ” module. RADIUS Configuration Guide 6 RADIUS EAP Support Additional References Related Topic Document Title Configuring RADIUS “ Configuring RADIUS ” module. PPP Configuration “ Configuring Asynchronous SLIP and PPP ” module. Dial Technologies commands Cisco IOS Dial Technologies Command Reference Security Commands Cisco IOS Security Command Reference Standards Standard Title None -- MIBs MIB MIBs Link None To locate and download MIBs for selected platforms, Cisco IOS releases, and feature sets, use Cisco MIB Locator found at the following URL:
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