Credit Suisse US Financial Intelligence Equity Research Americas/United States S&P Global (SPGI) You Can’t Dent a Benchmark Rating: OUTPERFORM Target Price: $123 July 11, 2016 RESEARCH ANALYSTS Ashley N. Serrao, CFA Marcus Carney Research Analyst Research Analyst +1 212-538-8424 +1 212-325-1442 [email protected] [email protected] Photo: http://www.maris-interiors.co.uk/

DISCLOSURE APPENDIX AT THE BACK OF THIS REPORT CONTAINS IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES, ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS, AND THE STATUS OF NON-US ANALYSTS. US Disclosure: Credit Suisse does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. INITIATION REPORT RATING: OUTPERFORM PRICE (JUL 8 2016): $108.87 SPGI: You Can’t Dent a Benchmark TP: $123 Initiating with Outperform  Collection of Valuable Benchmarks; SNL Amplifies Capital IQ & Platts SPGI a Collection of High-Margin, Fast-Growing Businesses (2015 operating EBIT margins and forecasted 3-yr CAGR in percentage points) S&P Global boasts a collection of high margin and iconic brands with strong competitive 2015 op margin 3-yr CAGR forecast moats and/or secular tailwinds spanning ratings (S&P), indices (S&P Dow Jones) and 80% 16% commodities information (Platts). Ultimately, this translates to pricing power, more durable revs during a downturn and significant free cash flow generation. We expect the latter to be 60% 12% deployed towards buybacks, organic investments (fixed income indices, commodities 40% 8% benchmarks) and brand extensions via selective acquisitions (rolling up the fragmented commodities information industry under Platts). In a similar vein, the recent SNL acquisition 20% 4% amplifies the value of Capital IQ and Platts, with unique industry content that should drive pricing power, provide new industries to grow into and build differentiated content sets (real 0% 0% estate, media etc.) and boost margins in Market Intelligence towards 35%+. S&P DJI S&P Ratings Platts Mkt Intel SPGI  Ratings Revenue Mix less Cyclical than MCO; L/T Opportunities Attractive Less Cyclical Product Mix and Non-Transaction Activity Stabilize Revenues In our view, SPGI’s ratings business is better positioned to outperform Moody’s during a (2015 revenue mix by product and transaction type in percentage points) down-turn, given more relationship-based recurring revenues (54% of issuance revs vs. MCO SPGI 39% at MCO) and less exposure to more-cyclical structured products and high yield Gov t Gov t Struct Struct Trans 9% 12% issuance (21% vs. 28% at MCO). More broadly, the latter should drive a shallower down- 16% 19% Trans 46% HY cycle with strong refinancing pipelines also providing an offset. We are also bullish on the 61% 9% 21% international opportunity from the secular disintermediation of banks in the lending market in 28% HY Europe (even more so after Brexit), and continued maturation of emerging capital markets. 56% 9% 51% 16% IG 28% FIG With respect to the latter, we view the near-term opportunity as India (SPGI owns the Non 42% 17% Non IG FIG 54% leading ratings agency, CRISIL), with China being a much longer-term opportunity. 39% 40% 16% Other  SNL and Platts Growth Under Appreciated & Revenue Stabilizers Hedge Volatility 11% SNL and Platts are two underappreciated assets that can together grow at a 10-12% clip highly cyclical modestly cyclical less cyclical annually over the next few years, driven by a combination of pricing power and new content. Platts and SNL Underappreciated Growth Assets We are constructive on both brands rolling up their respective fragmented industries, further (Yr/yr revenue growth in percentage points) entrenching their content sets. Furthermore, trading revenues within Platts and the index 30% Platts SNL business (~5% of firm-wide EBITDA) provide a hedge against volatility and stabilize revenues. 22%  Risks to our Rating 19% 19% 20% 17% 17% 1) Cyclical downturn in issuance that offsets the strong refinancing pipelines 2) failure to 15% 14% integrate SNL and missing synergy targets 3) pricing regulation 4) market downturn in 12% 9% 9% indices that offsets organic growth and/or the counter-cyclical lift from trading volumes. 10%  Attractively Valued Multiple Growth Levers & Scarcity Value of the Business

We initiate our 2016-2018 estimates proforma for the sale of JD Power at $5.03, $5.74 0% and $6.61. Our $123 target price implies that shares can trade at 21x our 2017 estimates. 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates 1 SPGI Bull-Bear Scenario Implied TP: $123 Bull versus Bear

Implied TP: Implied TP: $136 $96

Bull Case ($6.19 2017 EPS) Bear Case ($5.07 2017 EPS) CS View ($5.74 2017 EPS) Backstory 22x 2017 P/E 19x 2017 P/E 21x 2017 P/E

SPGI has been a phenomenal stock, Issuance recovers from the early Issuance lower due to macro Issuance mixed due to macro outperforming the S&P 500 by 70% hitch in 2016; ratings revenue concerns; ratings revenue falls 0- concerns; ratings revenue grows over the past three years. Following grows mid-single digits for the 4% over the next two years. low-single digits 2016-2018. the divestiture of the lower-margin next two years. Ratings margins Ratings margins of 46%. Ratings margins of 47%. Education, Aviation Week and of 48%. Market Intelligence subscription Market Intelligence continues Construction businesses, the Market Intelligence grows mid- growth softer than expected strong subscription growth; SNL company is now a focused vendor of teens digits; SNL is effectively (mid-single digits); SNL is is effectively integrated EBITDA financial benchmarks, data & integrated, EBITDA synergies effectively integrated, EBITDA synergies realized and margins analytics. In conjunction with reduced realized and margins expand to synergies mostly realized and expand to 36% by 2018 legal costs, margins have expanded 37% by 2018 margins hover in the low 30’s nearly 900 bps since 2012, from Organic growth continues in S&P 31% to 40%. The company recently Asset appreciation bolsters In S&P DJI, asset price DJI, trading grows 3% a year, spent $2.2 billion to acquire leading strong organic growth, trading depreciation hits AuM, trading and overall revenues grow mid- financial data vendor SNL–a move volumes grow 4% a year, and volumes decline 2% a year, and to-high single digits annually initially met with skepticism, which overall revenues grow high single overall revenues grow low single Platts grows high single digits has since thawed as margins have digits annually digits annually and maintains mid-to-high-40’s expanded faster than expected Platts grows high single digits Platts grows mid single digits and margins within Market Intelligence. and maintains strong high-40’s posts margins in the mid-40’s Share count reduction of 6% margins Share count reduction of 5%

Share count reduction of 7%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

2 Key Charts

S&P a Top Global Credit Ratings Agency (CRA) SPGI Less Exposed to Issuance Downturn Due to More Stable Product Mix Shift (In percentage points Note: 2015 estimated) (2007 and 2015 ratings revenue mix by product in percentage points) 100% 2007 Gov t Gov t Struct 2015 14% 15% 14% 15% 16% 17% 20% 22% 13% 16% 13% 13% Other 80% 19% 9% 9% 12% HY 40% 40% 35% 39% 40% 40% Fitch IG 9% 60% 39% 39% 39% 34% 35% 35% 38% Struct 21% 23% 32% 48% 44% 40% 51% Moody's IG 28% FIG 21% 42% 17% 20% 40% 40% 40% 39% 40% 43% 42% 42% 40% 42% 40% 42% 42% Other S&P 6% 0% FIG HY Other 15% 11% 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 4% highly cyclical modestly cyclical less cyclical Market Intelligence–The Next Leg of the Story (Yr/yr revenue growth by quarter in percentage points) SNL Acquisition that Should Structurally Boost Market Intelligence Margins (Revenue in $ millions, mix of 2014 revenue by product, region and client in percentage points) 15% Financial Data & Analytics Global Risk Svcs Markets Intelligence $300 $10 $15 10% 5% $2 $200 0% CAGR 2003-2015: 21% -5% $100 -10%

-15% $0 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14 4Q14 1Q15 2Q15 3Q15 4Q15 1Q16 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015

S&P DJI ETF AuM A Leading & Fast Growing Index Benchmark Oil Price has Minimal Impact on Platts’ Revenues Given Mission Critical Products (ETF AuM in $ trillions, share of AuM in percentage points; 2016 data as of March 31st) (Platts revenues in $ millions, avg price of oil in $ as stated on right axis)

Other Nasdaq CRSP FTSE Russell MSCI Bloomberg S&P DJI $180 Platts revs Avg oil $120 $3,500 CAGR 2009-2016 $3,000 13% Industry: 16% 11% $150 $2,500 S&P: 19% $80 $2,000 12% $1,500 14% $120 $1,000 18% $40 $500 27% $90 $0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 $60 $0 1Q11 3Q11 1Q12 3Q12 1Q13 3Q13 1Q14 3Q14 1Q15 3Q15 1Q16 Source: Company data, SEC, Morningstar, Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse estimates 3 Table of Contents (Click on Wheel to Navigate Through Note)

Capital Management and Company Overview & Financial Statements Executive Compensation

Expense & Revenue Snapshot and S&P Ratings Mgmt. Guidance

Risk Factors S&P Global & Valuation Market Intelligence

Company History & S&P Dow Jones Indices Annotated Stock Chart S&P Global Platts

4 Company Overview & Executive Compensation SPGI Overview A Leading Provider of Benchmark Ratings, Indexing, Pricing, Data and Analytics

S&P Global (SPGI) provides ratings, benchmarks, data, and analytics services for the capital SPGI Revenue and Operating Margin Progression and commodity markets. The company operates in four reportable segments: Standard and (In $ billions, margin in percentage points on right axis) Poors (S&P) Ratings, which provides credit ratings for corporate, structured and public $6 C&C S&P DJ Indices 45% issuers worldwide; S&P Market Intelligence, which offers numerous data and analytics- Market Intelligence S&P Ratings based products through its three businesses: Financial Data & Analytics (Capital IQ desktop Op Margin $5 and data feeds), Global Risk Services (monetized ratings IP and credit modeling software) 40% and Markets Intelligence (proprietary equity and macro research); S&P Dow Jones Indices (DJI), provider of global index solutions, licensed OTC and exchange derivatives, index data $4 & analytics and home to both the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Average; and S&P 35% Global Platts (legacy Commodities and Commercial Markets, C&C), which provides global commodity reference prices, data and analytics and conference services. $3 Since 2010, SPGI (excluding McGraw Hill Education, which was sold to Apollo Global 30% Management in 2012) has grown revenues and profits at 6% and 8% 5-yr CAGRs, $2 respectively, and expanded operating margins 300 bps to 38%. 25% $1 The company has 20,400 employees working out of 96 offices in 30 countries worldwide, and trades on the NYSE under the ticker “SPGI”. $0 20% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

2015 Segment Revenue Mix 2015 Regional Revenue Mix 2015 Business Revenue Mix (In percentage points) (In percentage points) (In percentage points) Intl U.S. Asset-linked fees Subscription Non-subscription 100% 100% 6% S&P Ratings 20% 34% 45% 80% 43% 40% 80% 60% 54% 55% 60% 60% 62% JD Pow er 90% 90% 6% 40% 80% 40% Platts 66% 21% 60% 12% Market 57% Intelligence 20% 40% 20% 46% 32% S&P DJI 26% 25% 11% 10% 10% 0% 0% S&P Mkt Intel S&P DJI Platts SPGI S&P Mkt Intel S&P DJI Platts SPGI Ratings Ratings Source: Company data 6 SPGI Product Offerings A Diversified Suite of Benchmark Products

S&P Rating Services Market Intelligence S&P Dow Jones Indices S&P Global Platts

12% Platts % of 2015 44% 26% 11% Revenue 6% JD Power

Credit ratings on new issuance of Financial Data & Analytics— Benchmark indices across Reference prices, data and analytics corporate and government debt Capital IQ & SNL desktop suite, regions and asset classes, for the global energy, metals and instruments, bank loans and fundamental data & analytics, including the S&P 500 and Dow agricultural commodity markets structured finance debt direct data feeds Jones Industrial Average Events and conferences for the Business instruments Global Risk Svcs—research and Licensed index derivatives commodities sector Description data sold from S&P Ratings, (options, futures) both exchange- JD Power (consumer data and credit analytics traded and OTC analysis) to be divested 3Q16 Mkt Intelligence—macro and Index data and analytics single-stock research AuM mix: S&P 88%, DJI 12%

Moody’s, Fitch, DBRS, AM Best, Moody’s, FactSet, Bloomberg, MSCI, Markit, Morningstar, Thomson Argus, ICIS, OPIS, USDA, CRU

JCRA, Kroll, Morningstar, Egan- Thomson Reuters, Morningstar, IDC, Reuters, Bloomberg Competitors Jones Ratings Company, Euler IHS Hermes Rating, Feri EuroRating

Continued growth in global Growth outside the U.S. by Diversification of index offerings Investment in digital capabilities that fixed-income market activity addressing data gaps in key via asset class, geographies, and will enable its brands to become more Future markets investment strategies integrated in customers' workflows Opportunities expanding key data sets, tools Expanding fixed income offering Expanding its presence in selected and analytics and local presence in emerging markets and geographies markets

2015 46% Platts Operating 47% 24% 66% Margin 23% JD Power

% of 2015 14% Platts 51% 15% 18% Op Profit 3% JD Power

Source: Credit Suisse estimates and company data 7 Executive Compensation & Corporate Governance

x x Executive Officers Corporate Governance Metrics Name Position & Experience Age (Yrs) Tenure (Yrs) 2015 Comp Insider Ownership (% of Voting Rights)

Douglas L. Peterson President & CEO 58 3 $7,774,273 0.7% Former Chief Operating Officer, Citibank 0.6% John F. "Jack" Chief Financial Officer (left firm June 2016) 57 5 $2,844,690 0.6% Callahan Jr. Former Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Dean Foods 0.5% 0.4% John L. Berisford President, S&P Ratings 51 -- $2,480,279 Former EVP of Human Resources, McGraw Hill Financial 0.4% Michael A. Chinn President, Market Intelligence 52 -- $2,543,233 0.3% Former CEO, SNL Alex J. Matturi CEO, S&P Dow Jones Indices 52 8 $2,461,964 0.2% 0.1% Former CEO, SNL 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% Board of Directors CEO CFO Other Mgmt BOD Total Name Position & Experience Age (Yrs) Elected Term Ends 2015 Comp Compensation Metrics Charles Edgar "Ed" Non Executive Chairman, Non-Executive Chairman of the Board, KCG Holdings, Inc 67 2015 2017 $321,972 Haldeman Jr. Former CEO, Freddie Mac Named executive officers are paid in a base salary of $450,000- $1,000,000/yr plus annual cash incentive bonuses determined by a Winfried Franz W. Director, Chairman of JP Morgan Securities & the Financial Reporting Council, UK 74 1999 2017 $234,639 weighted combination of financial performance (70%) , which includes Bischoff Former Chairman, Lloyds Banking Group plc revenue growth, share performance and expense progress, and role- William D. "Bill" Green Director 62 2011 2017 $218,139 specific individual strategic goals (30%). Former Executive Chairman, Accenture Board Information Rebecca J. Jacoby Director, Senior Vice President, Operations of Cisco Systems, Inc 54 2014 2017 $207,639 Former CIO, Cisco Systems, Inc Staggered Board? No Hilda Margarita Ochoa- Director, Founder and Chairman of Strategic Investment Group 71 2004 2017 $231,639 Brillembourg Former Chief Investment Officer of the Pension Investment Division, World Bank Average Age 65 Douglas L. Peterson President & CEO 58 2013 2017 $7,774,273 Average Tenure (Years) 7 Former Chief Operating Officer, Citibank # of Independent Members 11 Michael "Mike" Rake Director, Chairman, BT Group plc 68 2007 2017 $234,639 Former Chairman, KPMG International Edward Barry Rust Jr. Chairman of the Board 65 2001 2017 $242,972 Other Considerations Former CEO, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company Kurt L. Schmoke Director, President, University of Baltimore 66 2003 2017 $220,139 Poison Pill? No Former Interim Provost, Howard University State of Incorporation New York Richard Edward "Dick" Director, Chairman, of Credit Suisse Holsings (USA) 63 2011 2017 $218,139 Thornburgh Former Vice Chairman, Corsair Capital LLC Source: Company data Sidney Taurel Director, Chairman Emeritus of Eli Lilly and Company 67 1996 2016 $233,139 Note: Excludes Neeraj Sahai and Lucy Fato, both of whom departed in FY2015 and were paid $5.0 million and $4.4 million for the year, respectively x Former President and CEO, Eli Lilly and Company x CEO Doug Peterson CFO Jack Callahan John Berisford, Pres. S&P Ratings Mike Chinn, Pres. Mkt Intel Alex Matturri, Pres. S&P DJI (2016 tgt comp: $7.5 million) (2016 tgt comp: $3.1 million) (2016 tgt comp: $2.2 million) (2016 tgt comp: $1.8 million) (2016 tgt comp: $1.9 million) LTIC: Long-term incentive compensation STIC: Short-term incentive compensation Indv Indv Indv Indv Strat Adj Rev Strat Indv Strat Strat Strat Adj Rev Goals Fixed 3% Goals Goals 4% 7% 13% 6% Goals Goals Adj Net Fixed 8% Biz ops Fixed 9% Fixed Biz ops 9% Fixed Adj Net Inc 25% Adj Rev Biz ops 9% 28% Adj Rev 29% 10% 27% Inc Base 2% 10% 10% 3% 12% STIC 13% STIC Base Adj Rev Adj Net STIC Base STIC Base STIC Base 23% 20% 25% 3% Inc 26% 28% Adj Net 29% 29% 30% 27% 7% Inc Adj Net RSUs 8% Inc LTIC 17% LTIC LTIC LTIC 8% LTIC 3-yr RSUs 64% 3-yr 56% RSUs 47% 43% 43% EPS 19% EPS 14% RSUs growth 13% growth 3-yr 3-yr 3-yr 12% LT JV RSUs 45% EPS EPS EPS Net Inc 5% growth growth growth 26% 39% 33% 30% At risk pay Secure pay 8 S&P Ratings S&P Ratings The Bedrock Business of S&P Global

 A Leading Global Credit Rating Agency  Key Driver of SPGI’s Stock, But Different from Moody’s At 42% share of industry revenue, S&P Ratings is a leading global Credit The importance of the ratings business is underscored by the strong correlation Rating Agency (CRA) and is the bedrock business of SPGI’s franchise, (75%+) with the stock price of both Moody’s and S&P Global. However, the comprising ~44% of revenues and 50% of EBITDA. The business derives its ratings business of these two CRAs are different–key differentiators are S&P’s revenues from offering credit opinions on a transactional basis (46% of revs), product mix less reliant on structured products and revenues having a greater maintaining a rating (surveillance), offering relationship-based pricing programs international (function of ownership of Indian CRA CRISIL) and non- for frequent issuers and deriving entity-level ratings. It is also the source for the transactional orientation (a strategic move by the company) vs. peer Moody’s. suite of information products sold by Global Risk Services within the Market Share Prices of CRAs Track Corporate Issuance Intelligence segment. Management is presently focused on expanding margins (Issuance volume in $ trillions, share price in $ as stated on right axis) in the business, and we see several opportunities for secular growth, including European disintermediation, public spending and growth of international debt $2.5 Corp Issuance MCO SPGI Correl w /issuance $120 markets. $2.0 MCO: 77% $100 SPGI: 78% $80 S&P Ratings Revenue and Margin Trends $1.5 (Revenue in $ billions, margin in percentage points on right axis) $60 $3.0 50% $1.0 Ratings revenue Op margin EBITDA margin $40 $2.5 CAGR 48% $0.5 5-yr: 7% $20 $2.0 3-yr: 6% 46% $0.0 $0 1-yr: -1% $1.5 1Q01 1Q03 1Q05 1Q07 1Q09 1Q11 1Q13 1Q15 44% $1.0 Slight Differences in Business Mix Make a Difference on the Margin Front (2015 ratings revenue mix in percentage points, revenue in $ billions) $0.5 42% Gov t S&P IG Gov t Moody's IG 9% $0.0 40% 42% 16% 40% 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Other Share of Total Industry Ratings Revenue 11% (In percentage points Note: 2015 estimated) $2.4 $2.3 100% FIG 16% 22% 13% 13% FIG 14% 15% 14% 15% 16% 17% 20% 19% 13% 16% Other 80% 17%

40% 40% Struct HY Struct HY 60% 40% 40% 39% 39% 39% 35% 34% 35% 39% 38% Fitch 35% 12% 9% 19% 9% 40% Moody's Transaction 46% Non-trans 54% Transaction 61% Non-trans 39%

20% 40% 40% 40% 39% 40% 43% 42% 42% 40% 42% 40% 42% 42% Non-U.S. S&P U.S. 57% Non-U.S. 43% U.S. 63% 0% 37% 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Source: Company data, SEC, Thomson Reuters, Dealogic, Credit Suisse estimates 10 S&P Ratings Framing the Margin Convergence Debate–What’s Structural?

 SPGI Closing the Gap to Moody’s Product Mix Shifts from Structured to Corporates Over Time (Revenue mix by product in percentage points) The opportunity for S&P to close the margin gap to Moody’s is a topic of

constant debate. After declining from 47% in 2008 to 41% in 2011, margins 100% CRISIL 21 20 19 19 19 rebounded sharply to 47% in 2015 as subsiding legal costs, headcount 16 25 22 /other 80% 21 21 17 14 12 11 34 reductions and a pick-up in issuance helped. Even then, S&P’s margins trail 44 27 49 Struct Moody’s by 400 bps–we attribute ~200 bps of the difference to S&P’s 60% Govt 8 7 6 ownership of Indian CRA CRISIL (~9% of revenues at 26% margins). And the 40% 6 7 11 10 9 5 7 10 8 10 2 7 FIG remainder to residual legal costs, S&P’s higher mix of non-transaction 3 2 revenues (lower incremental margins), smaller presence in high incremental 20% 4 HY Corp margin high yield/structured products and a larger share of supervisory 0%

analysts (most likely to be non-revenue producing). However, after rounds of IG Corp

2007 2009 2010 2012 2013 2015 2008 2009 2011 2012 2014 2011 2014 2007 2010 2013 2015 restructuring in 2014 and 2015, we expect this factor to have less of an 2008 SPGI MCO impact. CRISIL’s Margin Drag Greater than ICRA’s S&P Closing the Gap with MCO (Operating margins with and without consolidated Indian businesses in percentage points) (Ratings segment operating margins in percentage points) Drag Moody's S&P 60% 58% MCO w/ICRA Avg drag: MCO ex ICRA 40 bps 55% 53% 52% 51% 48% 54% 50% 47% 47% 47% 46% 46% 0.9% 44% 45% 45% 44% 44% 43% 42% 41% 50% 0.2% 0.4% 40% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 35% 46% 0.3% 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 3Q14 1Q15 3Q15 1Q16 Revenue Mix, Transaction/Non-Transaction S&P Supervision Declines from 2010 (In percentage points) (Number of ratings analysts as stated, analyst to supervisor ratio on right axis) MCO analysts S&P analysts Non-Transaction Transaction 1,400 20% 100% MCO % SA SPGI % SA 80% 43 42 38 38 39 41 51 47 54 54 65 64 61 63 56 54 60% 1,200 15% 40% 53 57 58 62 62 61 59 20% 49 39 44 46 46 46 35 36 37 1,000 10%

0%

2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015 2014 2009 2014 2009 800 5% MCO SPGI 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Source: Company data, SEC, Capital IQ, Credit Suisse estimates 11 S&P Ratings Framing the Margin Convergence Debate–What’s Cyclical?

 2016 Different than 2007; Setting the Stage–What’s Cyclical? Net Debt to EBITDA Levels Ticking Up in Developed World (Net debt to EBITDA ratio for non-financial corporates by region in multiple points) The current issuance cycle is markedly different than 2007, primarily due to mix U.S. Europe Avg of both issuance volume and ratings revenue. While all issuance is ultimately 3.0x cyclical, we differentiate by bucketing high-yield and structured products as highly 2.5x cyclical, given a higher probability of default. We view investment grade (IG) corporate issuance as less cyclical given a lower probability of default and more 2.0x reliable refinancing pipelines but acknowledge there isn’t upside here as non- 1.5x 1.5x financial corporate leverage levels are close to last cycle’s peak. We classify FIG 1.0x and PPI as modestly cyclical given more regulatory-driven and public-spending- driven capital needs. Comparing and contrasting 2007 to today, it is evident that 0.5x the highly cyclical bucket has been cut in half due to secular challenges facing -- the structured products market. Specifically, for S&P, the contribution to Jan-95 Jan-98 Jan-01 Jan-04 Jan-07 Jan-10 Jan-13 Jan-16 revenues from structured products shrank dramatically, from ~44% to 12% in This Cycle HY Still Volatile, Has the Most Downside this cycle. The slack here was more than made up for by an increase in (Quarterly issuance range and relative average issuance by cycle, indexed to 100) corporate bond issuance as low interest rates incentivized issuance here. Range (max - min) Avg Current

Business Mix by Type highly cyclical less cyclical highly cyclical less cyclical (Ratings revenue mix in percentage points) 2001-2008 2009-2016 Gov t Gov t 12% 9% 2007 Mix IG IG Struct 31% 23% 32% 19% Struct 48% 44% 54% 49% HY FIG HY Struct IG FIG IG Corp Govt HY HY FIG Struct IG FIG Govt IG 15% 21% Corp Corp Corp Other 6% FIG But a Large Refi Pipeline Ensures Continued Corporate Issuance 15% FIG HY HY (Corporate debt coming due by rating in $ trillions) 4% 15% 4% $2.5 AAA MCO SPGI 27% 31% 2015 Mix 36% % High yield AA Gov t Struct 38% Gov t Struct $2.0 9% 12% 42% A 16% 19% HY BBB 9% $1.5 35% 21% BB 28% HY 21% 33% 34% 30% B 56% 9% 51% $1.0 16% IG 28% FIG CCC 42% 17% IG FIG $0.5 CC 40% 16% C Other 11% $0.0 DD 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 NR highly cyclical modestly cyclical less cyclical Source: Company data, Dealogic, Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse estimates 12 S&P Ratings Framing the Margin Convergence Debate–Spreads and Brexit?

 The Global Angle & Spreads TTM IG Issuance and Average Spreads (TTM IG issuance volume in $ billions, TTM avg spread in percentage points on right axis) Spreads have widened recently, as Brexit (and the possible turmoil in the EU) TTM IG Vol TTM avg AAA AAA take a near-term toll on issuance—but this is not a Lehman moment, in our view $3.5 3.0% as the financial system is flush with liquidity thanks to regulatory driven capital $3.0 2.5% $2.5 accumulation (Basel, Solvency) and rigorous stress testing of financial 2.0% institutions. Drilling in on spreads–-while they have ticked a bit higher, they $2.0 1.5% remain comfortably below both crisis levels and the levels seen in early 2016 for $1.5 1.0% both the high yield and investment grade arena—and could tick lower in $1.0 response to various quantitate easing measures being discussed in Europe. $0.5 0.5% Looking at relative geographic exposure (after excluding the Indian non-ratings $0.0 0.0% businesses), there isn’t a lot of difference between the two franchises–they seem Jan-03 Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13 Jan-15 to be equally exposed to Europe across products. TTM HY Issuance and Average Spreads (TTM HY issuance volume in $ billions, TTM avg spread in percentage points on right axis) TTM HY Vol TTM avg CCC CCC Geographic Issuance Mix by Type and Geographic Revenue Mix $600 35% (2015 issuance and revenue mix n percentage points, ex. ICRA/CRISL non-rating revs) $500 30% 25% U.S. U.S. $400 Gov t Struct Gov t Struct 20% $300 22% 23% 22% 23% 15% $200 10% 32% 32% $100 53% HY 53% HY 5% 9% 15% 9% 15% $0 0% U.S. U.S. 61% Jan-03 Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13 Jan-15 63% IG FIG IG FIG 32% 15% 32% 15% European, U.S. CDS TicksUp, But Remains Near L/T Avg and Below Crisis Highs (Generic IG 10-yr European corporate CDS index price in basis points) MCO SPGI 250 Markit N. Amer 10-yr IG Corp CDS Current: ~130 bps Europe Europe ITraxx Europe 10-yr IG Corp CDS Avg Gov t Struct Gov t Struct 200 22% 23% 22% 23% 150 32% 32% 53% HY 53% HY 107 Intl. Intl. 100 9% 9% 37% 15% 39% 15% IG FIG IG FIG 50 32% 15% 32% 15% 0 Jun-04 Jun-06 Jun-08 Jun-10 Jun-12 Jun-14 highly cyclical modestly cyclical less cyclical Source: Company data, Dealogic, Bloomberg, Credit Suisse estimates 13 Now vs. Then—Stressing Issuance Framing Cycle Downside–We Estimate Trough Margins at 45%

Stressing to the 2008 Crisis Levels & Accounting for Refi Pipelines We See $0.28 EPS Downside to 2008 Stress Scenario  (Issuance in $ billions, pre-tax margins in percentage points, EPS in $ as stated) Stressing SPGI’s business after accounting for the business mix x x Stresed Refi (transaction/non-transaction) to 2008 levels produces a 16% hit to EPS, and 2015 Issuance EPS Offset from 2017 EPS implies a 42% pre-tax margin for the franchise. Layering in the contribution of Stressed to 2008 Drag Refi Pipeline Boost 2017 refinancing pipelines, which Moody’s CFO Linda Huber recently stated In $ billions In $ billions usually accounts for 50-70% of total issuance volume in a year, implies 45% IG -$994 -$0.51 $434 $0.21 pre-tax margins. With that said, crisis moments do tend to dent confidence and HY -$283 -$0.14 $349 $0.17 delay issuance—especially when it comes to high yield—but the important FIG -$138 -$0.02 $785 $0.08 Govt $4 $0.00 -- -- takeaway in our minds is the size of the pipeline. We also believe that central Struc -$318 -$0.08 -- -- banks around the world have been quick to respond with quantitative easing, 2015 EPS $4.69 $4.69 dampening volatility and falling interest rates. The former should continue to drive Stress impact -$1,730 -$0.75 $1,568 -$0.28 a thirst for yield and temper spreads. Implied EPS $3.94 $4.41 % of 2015 EPS 16% 6% xImplied pre-tax margin 42% 45% x SPGI’s Transaction/Non-Transaction Mix by Product (In percentage points) Non-Financial Net Debt-to-EBITDA Levels Ticking Up in Developed World… (Net debt-to-EBITDA ratio for non-financial corporates by region in multiple points) Non-transaction Transaction 100% U.S. Europe Avg World 3.0x 80% 50% 50% 2.5x 65% 60% 75% 80% 2.0x 40% 1.5x 1.5x 50% 50% 20% 35% 1.0x 20% 25% 0% 0.5x IG corp HY corp FIG Govt Struct -- Jan-95 Jan-98 Jan-01 Jan-04 Jan-07 Jan-10 Jan-13 Jan-16 Issuance Likely to Remain Elevated as Rates Stay at Generational Lows (Global debt issuance in $ trillions, key 10-yr rates in percentage points on right axis) Global EBITDA More Stable Than Pre-Crisis Levels but Falling (Total global EBITDA by region in $ trillions) $8 10% Total Issuance U.S. Germany UK Japan $7 $6 ROW Europe U.S. 8% $6 $5 $5 6% $4 $4 $3 4% $3 $2 $2 2% $1 $1 $0 0% Jan-95 Jan-98 Jan-01 Jan-04 Jan-07 Jan-10 Jan-13 Jan-16 $0 Source: Company data, Dealogic, Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse estimates Jan-88 Jan-93 Jan-98 Jan-03 Jan-08 Jan-13 14 S&P Ratings Framing Cyclical Downside–Softening High Yield & Structured Products CRA Coverage of CRA Share of Issuance CAGR 1-yr 3-yr CRA % of Revenue Rated Market Outstanding Ratings 5-yr 3-yr 1-yr Outlook Outlook

13% Other MCO 40% 96% 96% MCO 14% 33% Fitch IG Corp 12% SPGI 42% 2% 2% SPGI MCO SPGI 42% 0% 20% 40% 60% 5-yr 3-yr 1-yr

97% 1% 9% 96% 14% 33% -3% HY Corp 12% 9% -20% 42% 0% 20% 40% 60% 5-yr 3-yr 1-yr

97% 98% 4% 5% 16% 25% 21% FIG Corp 17% 22% 31% -5%

0% 20% 40% 60% 5-yr 3-yr 1-yr

98% 98% 16% 10%

Govt 36% -7% 9% 52% -10% -11%

0% 20% 40% 60% 5-yr 3-yr 1-yr

8% 9% 19% 2% 33% 19% Struct.

12% 91% 91% -1% 39% 5-yr 3-yr 1-yr 0% 20% 40% 60% Sources: Dealogic, SEC, Company data, Credit Suisse estimates 15 Now vs. Then—DCM Volume Framing Cyclical Downside–The Debt Issuance Cycle in Context

2016 Volumes Flat from Peak Levels Issuance Volumes Through the Cycle (Issuance volume in $ billions) (Issuance volume in $ trillions) x x $2.5 Average 2016 YTD vs. IG ROW 2016 YTD Peak 5-yr 10-yr 15-yr 2015 Peak 5-yr 10-yr 15-yr $2.0 APAC Issuance in $ billions $1.5 $1.0 IG 752 752 580 450 359 8% -- 30% 67% 110% EUR HY 196 245 221 175 150 1% -20% -12% 12% 31% $0.5 Corp 947 947 801 625 508 7% -- 18% 51% 86% $0.0 U.S. FIG 355 497 303 304 311 5% -29% 17% 17% 14% 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Govt 614 1,192 558 700 680 26% -49% 10% -12% -10% $0.6 ROW Struct 434 2,124 550 633 993 -20% -80% -21% -31% -56% HY U.S. 2,350 3,341 2,211 2,263 2,493 4% -30% 6% 4% -6% $0.4 APAC IG 444 536 405 350 282 39% -17% 10% 27% 58% HY 108 139 114 83 66 5% -22% -5% 31% 63% $0.2 EUR Corp 552 583 519 432 348 31% -5% 6% 28% 59% FIG 507 718 448 499 461 20% -29% 13% 2% 10% $0.0 U.S. Govt 574 588 520 460 386 40% -2% 10% 25% 49% 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Struct 87 540 84 116 178 -2% -84% 3% -25% -51% $1.5 FIG ROW Europe 1,720 1,865 1,571 1,507 1,372 28% -8% 9% 14% 25% $1.0 IG 753 753 628 436 317 21% -- 20% 73% 138% APAC HY 46 50 42 36 32 14% -9% 7% 25% 44% Corp 799 799 670 473 348 21% -- 19% 69% 129% $0.5 EUR FIG 455 455 364 290 223 18% -- 25% 57% 104% Govt 131 154 125 110 83 29% -15% 5% 19% 58% $0.0 U.S. Struct 114 161 112 90 86 -29% -29% 1% 26% 33% 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 15% -- 18% 56% 102% $2.0 APAC 1,498 1,498 1,271 962 740 Govt ROW IG 81 156 120 99 75 -17% -48% -33% -18% 8% $1.5 HY 34 53 42 35 29 8% -36% -18% -2% 20% APAC Corp 115 206 162 133 103 -11% -44% -29% -14% 12% $1.0 FIG 108 117 109 87 66 7% -8% -2% 23% 64% EUR $0.5 Govt 218 218 148 117 92 68% -- 47% 86% 137% Struct 16 33 14 16 15 9% -52% 12% 1% 4% $0.0 U.S. ROW 456 462 434 353 276 22% -1% 5% 29% 65% 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 $3.0 IG 2,029 2,029 1,733 1,335 1,032 17% -- 17% 52% 97% Structured ROW HY 383 479 419 329 276 4% -20% -9% 17% 39% $2.0 Corp 2,413 2,413 2,152 1,664 1,308 15% -- 12% 45% 85% APAC FIG 1,425 1,425 1,224 1,180 1,061 14% -- 16% 21% 34% Govt 1,536 1,866 1,352 1,386 1,241 36% -18% 14% 11% 24% $1.0 EUR Struct 651 2,778 760 855 1,272 -20% -77% -14% -24% -49% U.S. xGlobal 6,025 6,025 5,488 5,085 4,881 14% -- 10% 18% 23% x $0.0 Source: Dealogic, Credit Suisse estimates, Note: ROW = Rest of World. Note: Peaks may occur in different years 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 16 Now vs. Then—DCM Deal Counts Framing Cyclical Downside–The Debt Issuance Cycle in Context

2016 Deal Counts Down 1% from Peak Levels Issuance Counts Through the Cycle (Issuance count as stated) (Issuance counts in thousands) x x 5.0 Average 2016 YTD vs. IG ROW 2016 YTD Peak 5-yr 10-yr 15-yr 2015 Peak 5-yr 10-yr 15-yr 4.0 3.0 APAC Deal counts as stated 2.0 IG 551 782 560 494 456 -5% -30% -2% 11% 21% EUR HY 263 602 376 325 319 -11% -56% -30% -19% -18% 1.0 Corp 813 1,367 936 820 774 -7% -41% -13% -1% 5% 0.0 U.S. FIG 388 805 361 349 453 9% -52% 8% 11% -14% 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Govt 6,988 10,857 5,847 6,471 6,909 15% -36% 20% 8% 1% 1.5 HY ROW Struct 807 2,911 1,009 1,006 1,442 -25% -72% -20% -20% -44% U.S. 8,997 14,398 8,153 8,647 9,577 7% -38% 10% 4% -6% 1.0 APAC IG 485 746 641 517 435 -16% -35% -24% -6% 11% HY 248 373 297 236 226 -13% -34% -17% 5% 10% 0.5 EUR Corp 732 1,093 938 753 661 -15% -33% -22% -3% 11% FIG 1,012 1,253 1,034 1,039 1,037 -6% -19% -2% -3% -2% 0.0 U.S. Govt 841 968 853 771 711 -0% -13% -1% 9% 18% 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Struct 105 491 118 129 197 -24% -79% -11% -19% -47% 4.0 FIG ROW Europe 2,689 3,088 2,943 2,693 2,606 -8% -13% -9% -0% 3% 3.0 IG 3,612 3,612 2,806 1,920 1,445 32% -- 29% 88% 150% APAC HY 188 342 192 212 228 9% -45% -2% -11% -18% 2.0 Corp 3,799 3,799 2,998 2,132 1,673 30% -- 27% 78% 127% EUR 1.0 FIG 1,580 1,676 1,556 1,336 1,105 -6% -6% 2% 18% 43% Govt 361 406 383 349 266 -3% -11% -6% 3% 36% 0.0 U.S. Struct 310 328 275 234 249 2% -6% 12% 32% 24% 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 15.0 APAC 6,049 6,049 5,212 4,051 3,292 15% -- 16% 49% 84% Govt ROW IG 188 488 325 249 192 -42% -62% -42% -24% -2% 10.0 HY 53 140 85 91 87 14% -62% -37% -42% -39% APAC Corp 241 599 409 340 280 -35% -60% -41% -29% -14% FIG 162 292 233 201 159 -19% -44% -31% -19% 2% 5.0 EUR Govt 461 461 370 290 234 19% -- 25% 59% 97% Struct 38 278 44 97 104 -23% -86% -12% -60% -63% 0.0 U.S. ROW 903 1,238 1,057 928 777 -11% -27% -15% -3% 16% 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 5.0 IG 4,835 4,835 4,332 3,180 2,528 14% -- 12% 52% 91% Structured ROW HY 751 1,169 950 865 860 -6% -36% -21% -13% -13% 4.0 Corp 5,586 5,702 5,281 4,045 3,388 11% -2% 6% 38% 65% 3.0 APAC FIG 3,142 3,310 3,184 2,925 2,753 -5% -5% -1% 7% 14% 2.0 Govt 8,651 11,613 7,453 7,882 8,120 12% -26% 16% 10% 7% EUR Struct 1,259 3,923 1,446 1,467 1,992 -20% -68% -13% -14% -37% 1.0 xGlobal 18,638 18,777 17,364 16,319 16,253 6% -1% 7% 14% 15% x 0.0 U.S. Source: Dealogic, Credit Suisse estimates, Note: ROW = Rest of World. Note: Peaks may occur in different years 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 17 The International Opportunity European Bank Disintermediation

 Disintermediation of European Banks in Early Stages  A +$2.00 Long-Term Opportunity The onslaught of regulation in the post-crisis era structurally reduced the While Europe does have more ratings competition than the U.S., we see the capital efficiency of holding loans on a bank’s balance sheet. The problem big three ratings agencies emerging as winners in the non-financial corporate has been more acute in Europe, given the historical tendency of European bond arena (for more on the European competitive landscape, please see non-financial corporates to satisfy 80%+ of their funding needs by borrowing our industry report). Assuming that European non-corporate financial from banks—in stark contrast, non-financial American corporates obtain funding were to mirror the United States, we estimate a $2.00+ long-term nearly all their funding from the public bond market. Consequently, as banks EPS opportunity from such a shift. That said, this is a long-term opportunity in Europe curb their appetite to lend, non-financial corporates increasingly that will take decades to fully materialize; in the meantime, we estimate each turn to the bond market for funding, and have doubled their share of 1% shift from loans to bonds should boost EPS by $0.02-$0.03, assuming outstanding debt since 2008. We expect this trend to accelerate over the S&P continues to rate 95% of corporate bonds in the region. next few years as European banks continue to rationalize their business portfolios in a bid to boost ROEs higher, and as the ECB’s recently High European Non-Financial Corporate Bond Coverage for S&P announced $92 billion/month bond-buying programme ramps up—one (Percent of total rated debt by ratings agency in percentage points) criteria of the new program is that the ECB can only purchase rated debt, SPGI MCO increasing the benefit to CRAs. 100% A Striking Contrast–U.S. and European Non-Financial Debt Markets 95% (Non-financial corporate debt composition as of 4Q15 in percentage points) U.S. Europe 90% Bonds Loans Bonds Loans 16% 85% 2% 98% 84% 80% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Europe Mirroring the U.S. Bond-to-Loan Share Means +$2.00 EPS Over Time European Non-Financial Corporates Increasingly Using Bonds Over Loans (Issuance in € billions, revenue in $ millions, EPS in $ as stated) x x (amount outstanding in € trillions, bond share of total debt outstanding in percentage points) % of Gap to U.S. Closed € 6 Bonds Loans % Bonds 17% 5% 10% 20% 50% 75% 100% Issuance in € billions, revenue and income in $ millions 15% € 5 Issuance upside €209 €419 €838 €2,095 €3,142 €4,190 13% Implied bond-to-loan ratio 20% 24% 33% 57% 78% 98% Revenue opportunity 81 161 323 806 1,210 1,613 € 4 11% Net income 30 60 121 302 452 603 EPS $0.11 $0.23 $0.46 $1.14 $1.71 $2.28 9% x x € 3 7% € 2 5% 3Q98 3Q00 3Q02 3Q04 3Q06 3Q08 3Q10 3Q12 3Q14 Source: ECB, ESMA, Federal Reserve, Dealogic, Credit Suisse 18 The International Opportunity EM Capital Markets Maturation Opportunity Has Numerous Obstacles

 Developing Market Maturation Is a Sizeable Opportunity But…..  ….Realization of the Opportunity Has Numerous Obstacles Another long-term opportunity for corporate issuance lies in the maturation of The emerging market opportunity is undoubtedly large. In fact, we estimate credit markets in the developing world. Looking at ratios of non-financial that if developing regions mirrored the NFCD to GDP ratio of the developed corporate debt (NFCD) outstanding to GDP across countries, we find that, world, that would theoretically drive $0.90 in EPS—closing the gap to the while increasing since the early 2000’s, many developing regions still have U.S. would mean $2.22. However, it is paramount to understand realization room to grow relative to the developed world. SPGI has positioned the firm to of that opportunity has a number of hurdles: capitalize on this secular opportunity by taking stakes in numerous CRAs 1. Some regulators prohibit direct ownership by foreign entities thereby around the world or acquiring them outright. Key acquisitions and limiting direct participation in rating local debt. e.g. China, which alone partnerships include CRISIL (India, 2005), Taiwan Ratings Corp (Taiwan, comprises 70% of global EM volume 2005), Maalot (Israel, 2008), RAM (Malaysia, 2011) and BRC Investor 2. Established local credit rating agencies who often dominate the local Services (Colombia, 2014). The company has yet to find a partner in China. market e.g. Dagong in China Developing World Credit Markets Have Room to Grow 3. Immature local debt markets, which foster reliance on bank lending (Non-financial corporate debt outstanding-to-GDP as of 2014 in percentage points) 4. Underdeveloped bankruptcy regulation that encourages ratings shopping NFCD to GDP U.S. Developed countries and does not adequately protect creditors 40% Closing the Gap with the Developed World a $0.90 EPS Opportunity 30% 29% (Non-financial corporate debt outstanding in percentage points, EPS in $ as stated) x x % of the Difference Between Current and Developed Mkts 20% 16% 25% 50% 75% 100% 18% 10% Implied NFCD-to-GDP ratio in percentage points 10% 5% 5% Developing Africa and ME 6% 10% 14% 18% 2% Developing APAC 16% 17% 17% 18% Developing Europe 8% 11% 15% 18% 0% Developing LATAM 8% 11% 15% 18% Developing APAC Developing Developing Developing Developing Africa Developing countries 12% 14% 16% 18% countries LATAM Europe and ME Average annual EPS impact in $ Developing Africa and ME $0.07 $0.14 $0.21 $0.28 NFCD Rising in the Developing World Developing APAC $0.04 $0.07 $0.11 $0.15 (Non-financial corporate debt outstanding to GDP in percentage points) Developing Europe $0.05 $0.10 $0.15 $0.20 Developing LATAM $0.07 $0.14 $0.21 $0.28 20% Developing countries $0.23 $0.45 $0.68 $0.91 Dev eloped x x countries China Alone ~70% of Developing Market Issuance 15% Dev eloping (Mix of developing market DCM issuance in percentage points) APAC 100% Other 10% Dev eloping 80% Turkey Europe Mexico 60% Dev eloping 5% Brazil LATAM Exhibit: Show the ratios of the above buckets over 40% Russia time–line chart Dev eloping 0% Af rica and ME 20% India 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 0% China Source: Company data, BIS, Dealogic, Capital IQ, Credit Suisse estimates 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 19 The International Opportunity We Are Most Constructive on India in the Near-Term

 India—Framing the Local Market  A Look at the Assets After Europe, we see India as the most promising opportunity for the U.S. Drilling into the local credit agency landscape, S&P currently owns a 68% publicly-traded CRAs. The Indian corporate bond market is still in its infancy, stake in leading Indian CRA CRISIL (annual revs of ~$214 million), and has boasting a NFCD-to-GDP ratio of only 1% vs. other emerging economies been increasing it gradually since entering India in 1996. Similarly, in 2014, (10% average) and the developed world (18% average). Though current Moody’s upped its stake in peer ICRA to 50.1% (annual revs of $53 million). issuance trends are uninspiring, we expect the corporate bond market to Both these Indian companies are not entirely focused on ratings, with deepen in the coming years, aided in part by government reforms around offerings in outsourcing, consulting and research. Looking at the revenue bankruptcy protection and continued GDP growth. and margin trajectory, it is clear that, while margins are similar, CRISIL is much larger, adding to the drag on S&P margins noted earlier. India’s Corporate Debt Market has Room to Grow (NFCD outstanding-to-GDP as of 2014 and GDP forecast in percentage points) CRISIL Revenue and Estimates (In ₹ billions, 2016-2018 are consensus estimates ) 50% Non-Financial Corporate Debt -to-GDP Ratio ₹ 25 Advisory Research Rating 40% 40% 29% Op margin Margin est ₹ 20 2015 Mix 35% 30% 22% Ratings: 31% 18% 16% ₹ 15 20% 13% Research: 64% 8% 30% 6% 5% 5% 4% ₹ 10 Adv isory : 5% 10% 2% 1% 25% 0% ₹ 5 US FR CHN EM UK RUS BRZ EM EM DEU EM IND APAC LATAM EUR MEA ₹ 0 20% 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017E 10% GDP Forecast, 2016-2021 8% ICRA Revenue and Estimates 8% 6% 6% 6% (In ₹ billions, 2016-2018 are consensus estimates ) 3% 3% ₹ 6 Rev est Outsourcing 40% 4% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% Consulting Ratings/Research 2% 1% 1% 2015 Mix Op margin Margin est 35% ₹ 4 0% Ratings & Research: 57% US FR CHN EM UK RUS BRZ EM EM DEU EM IND Consulting 9% 30% APAC LATAM EUR MEA ₹ 2 Outsourced: 10% Indian Corporate Issuance Prof /IT: 23% 25% (In $ billions, 2016 annualized) ₹ 0 20% $50 HY IG 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017E $40 Margin Profiles of Indian Businesses Similar (2015 operating margins of CRISIL and ICRA in percentage points) $30 $20 40% 34% 31% 31% $10 30% 18% $0 20% 14% 7% 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 10% 3% 0% Rating Research Advisory Ratings Outsourced Consulting Prof/IT & Research /Info Svcs Svcs Source: Company data, BIS, IMF, Dealogic, Capital IQ, Credit Suisse estimates CRISIL ICRA 20 S&P Global Market Intelligence S&P Market Intelligence Leading Provider of Data & Analytics to Off-Trading-Floor Clients

 Leading Provider of Data & Analytics  Strategic Focus on Growing FD&A And Global Risk Services The newly-rebranded Market Intelligence (MI, formerly S&P Capital IQ) Strategically, the business evolved from being a conduit to distribute S&P ratings segment is a market-leading provider of data and analytics, targeted primarily information to include myriad financial data since the acquisition of Capital IQ–we at the off-trading-floor market (research, financial advisors, asset identify 4 key stages in the evolution of the segment. Looking ahead, expect management). The business has grown at a fast clip, posting an 8% CAGR FD&A and Global Risk to drive growth, with Markets Intelligence troughing in since 2010. Pro forma for SNL, we expect the segment to contribute 30% 2016 as headwinds stabilize post the repositioning of equity research. to annual company revenues and 15% to operating profit. MI operates in – Capital IQ—2004-2008. With the acquisition of Capital IQ, S&P three sub-segments: Financial Data & Analytics (FD&A, 67% of segment combined its leading corporate fundamental database Compustat and revenue), which includes the Capital IQ and SNL desktop solutions, content across fixed income, equities, indices and mutual funds to create Leveraged Commentary and Data (LCD) and bulk data feeds; Global Risk an intuitive desktop technology solution for financial professionals. Services (26%), which provides ratings research and data (from S&P Subsequent efforts centered on deepening the content offering. Ratings), and quantitative credit modeling solutions; and Markets Intelligence – Growth—2008-2013. Stability of revenues through the financial crisis (7%, not to be confused with the segment’s name), offering market and reinforced the strategic value of the business. Thus, investments were equity research. made to expand the sales force and open international offices. The Market Intelligence a Steadily-Growing Business with Expanding Margins portfolio was fine-tuned via acquisitions (Markets.com) to focus on the (Revenue in $ billions, margins in percentage points on right axis) faster-growing FD&A and Global Risk offerings, while the Markets SNL Mkt Intel Op margin EBITDA margin $1.5 30% Intelligence portfolio saw exits/sales (Vista) of slower-growing products. CAGR 2010-2015 (ex. SNL): 8% – Margin Optimization—2013-2015. With a formidable investment cycle $1.3 25% nearing an end, product/headcount rationalization continued and margins $1.0 expanded, given favorable revenue mix shift towards the higher-margin 20% FD&A and Global Risk Svcs businesses. $0.8 Includes $85m – SNL & Risk Services—2015-present. In an effort to continue to (4 mos) of SNL $0.5 15% deepen content, the firm acquired SNL, a leading provider of industry- 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 specific fundamental information and data with a forte in financials and energy. S&P also appointed Martina Cheung to oversee the Financial Data & Analytics, Global Risk Services Dominant Business transformation of Global Risk Services into a top-three risk vendor. (Mkt Intelligence revenue mix by business pro forma for SNL in percentage points) Largest Businesses Also the Fastest-Growing—FD&A & Risk Lead the Way 100% Mkt Intelligence Global Risk Svcs Financial Data & Analytics (Yr/yr revenue growth by quarter in percentage points) 12% 11% 9% 9% 7% 15% Financial Data & Analytics Global Risk Svcs Markets Intelligence 80% 26% 31% 30% 30% 31% 10% 60% 5%

40% 0% 61% 61% 67% 57% 59% 1Q14 2Q14 3Q14 4Q14 1Q15 2Q15 3Q15 4Q15 1Q16 20% -5%

0% -10% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 -15% Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates 22 S&P Market Intelligence Broad Spectrum of Data & Analytics Solutions

Financial Data & Analytics Global Risk Services Mkt Intelligence 61% of revenue ($805m) 31% of revenue ($409m) 8% of revenue ($106m) 4-yr CAGR: 8% 1-yr : 7% 4-yr CAGR: 6% 1-yr : 8% 4-yr: 0% 1-yr: -4% Browser-delivered data and analytics tools and Distributor of research, data, and analytics from S&P Market and equity integrated bulk customized data feeds Ratings, and quantitative credit modeling & data solutions research

Portfolio & Risk Real-Time Solutions and Credit Ratings—Ratings Credit Ratings Global Market Analytics—Powered by R² Feeds—Desktop and multi- and historical default data Research—Across rated Intelligence—Multi-asset latency data delivery issuers portfolio commentary

Fixed Income Pricing & Credit Analytics—Credit Equity Research—Global Valuation—Global fixed scoring models, default equities research income pricing capabilities probabilities, market signals

Fundamental Company Productivity/Workflow Data—Archive of public and Tools—Presentations, private company data company screens, drill-down

Non-subscription Credit-related products 35% Real-time/trading data 25% Fundamental data 20% 10% PRD 10%

Multi-Modal Delivery

Web Portals Data Feeds Real-Time Ultra-Low Latency Mobile Social Media Distribution Partners

Fin. advisors 4% Diverse Client Base Portfolio mgmt 5% Research 32% Sales 21% Traders 20% IB 11% IR/Exec 7%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates Note: not pro forma for SNL or sale of CMA 23 S&P Market Intelligence—Financial Data & Analytics Framing the Competitive Landscape–the Big 4 Desktop Vendors

Framing the Landscape–The Big 4 Desktop Vendors Multi-Dimensional Market Composed of On- and Off-Trading Activity by Buy and Sell Side  (As stated) We divide the financial desktop arena into three silos, with the sell-side sitting in the middle flanked by institutional and corporate buy-side clients. Buy-Side Institutional Sell-Side Buy-side Corporate The desktop stations are central to both the on- and off-trading floor Investment Banking Investor Relations Off financial ecosystems, through facilitation of communication between Private Market Funds M&A Advisory Trading (e.g. VC, PE) Corporate Development Floor market participants, information dissemination and tools to support financial Capital Markets Investment Managers Corporate Treasury On analysis. Information can alternatively be delivered directly to clients via Sell-side Research Trading data feeds, rather than through desktop platforms. Competitively, Floor FactSet and Capital IQ both target the off-trading floor community, with Buy-Side Sales & Trading Portfolio Managers FactSet known for buy-side portfolio analytics and Capital IQ having a Sales loyal investment banking following. Thomson and Bloomberg also target Trading Desks Corporate Treasury Trading the trading community offering transaction platforms, with strong suits in Buy-Side commodities, money markets and FX (Reuters/FXall) for the former and Traders Trading Desks equities and fixed income (government/corporate bonds) for the latter. In addition, Bloomberg has established strong network effects with its chat system, while Thomson is entrenched in corporate infrastructure as the largest data feed provider. Both are also dominant news vendors. Inter-Dealer Markets S&P Capital IQ FactSet Bloomberg Thomson Reuters (proforma for SNL)

4% 5% 33% 24%

Share of Global Market Data Revenue

5-Yr. Growth 9% 9% 5% -3%

2015 Operating Margin 34% 30% ~40% 18%

79,000 (Capital IQ) 403,000; Terminals/User 63,000 328,000 80,000 (SNL) 130,000 on Eikon Portfolio mgmt Private company Messenger; Fixed Income Middleware; FX & Unique Assets analytics financials Data; SEF Fixed Income EMS

Source: Company data, Burton Taylor, Credit Suisse estimates 24 S&P Market Intelligence—Financial Data & Analytics Strategy Centered on Desktop Penetration–Capital IQ and SNL Gaining Share

 Capital IQ/SNL Are Gaining Share Globally  Deepening Off-Trading Floor Presence Shapes FD&A Strategy At ~60% of segment revenues growing at an 8% 4-yr CAGR, FD&A is both the 2004-2010. Since acquiring Capital IQ in 2004 to enhance delivery of largest and fastest-growing business within the MI segment, and also one of the proprietary equity (Compustat) and credit (S&P) data, SPGI invested heavily to largest global financial data vendors (5.7% of the market, pro forma for SNL). expand capabilities and further penetrate the $20 billion off-trading floor market. The $26 billion financial market data industry has grown at an 3% CAGR since From its roots in single-stock fundamental data, FD&A expanded into portfolio 2010, driven primarily by pricing increases and growth of niche data vendors. analytics first with quant firm ClariFI in 2007, later crossing into multi-asset class While Bloomberg and Thomson continue to dominate the landscape ( portfolio and enterprise risk analytics with R² Financial Technologies in 2012. The accounting for ~60% of global spend), Capital IQ, catering to ~79K users, has anti-trust requirements for the 2008 Thomson Reuters merger allowed Capital IQ steadily gained share (130 bps since 2010) by investing to deepen content in to acquire a copy of Reuters Estimates and Research-On-Demand, accelerating it’s traditional desktop offering, pricing competitively and building out nascent the firm’s proprietary efforts to build a database of Street estimates and marking products, such as data feeds. SNL, who boasts ~80K users and is the firm’s the firm’s foray into the after-market research business. latest and most significant content acquisition ($2.2 billion) has also gained 2010-present. Moreover, in 2010, the firm bolstered this offering with the shared rapidly–50 bps since 2010. purchase of TheMarkets.com, a third-party provider of equity and fixed income Global Market Data Revenues research, earnings models and estimates to the buy-side. During this time, (In $ billions; market share in bubbles in percentage points Note: no SNL data before 2010) organic build-out of content continued, with the addition of U.S. and European Capital IQ SNL Other FactSet Thomson Reuters Bloomberg private company data in 2008 (the universe of which more than doubled by 2013), and Brazilian, Australian and Indian private company data in 2014, which $30 Capital IQ data begins 4.3% 4.7% 4.9% 5.1% 5.7% solidified Capital IQ’s leading position with investment banking and private equity 0.4% 0.4% 4.0% 0.3% 0.3% clients. The 2012 QuantHouse acquisition added low-latency data feed $20 0.2% capabilities, enabling the firm to compete more aggressively in the $12B real- time data market alongside TR and Bloomberg, and further positioned the FD&A $10 suite as a “one-stop shop” for off-trading-floor financial professionals. The recent SNL acquisition continues the focus on acquiring differentiated industry content. $0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Off-Trading Floor Revenues by Vendor Industry User Counts by Vendor (In $ millions; off-trading floor share of total revenues in percentage points) (In thousands) Media Risk & Compliance $10 On-Trading Floor Off-Trading Floor 130 Eikon Users 403 $8 400 328 $6 300 $4 200 59% $2 67% 96% 85% 80 100 79 63 $0 Bloomberg Thomson Reuters FactSet (pro forma) S&P Capital IQ (pro 0 forma) Source: Company data, Burton Taylor, Credit Suisse estimates Thomson Reuters Bloomberg SNL Financial S&P Capital IQ FactSet Note: FactSet data pro forma for Portware; S&P data pro forma for SNL Financial 25 S&P Market Intelligence—Financial Data & Analytics We Peg the Total Addressable Market (TAM) at $21-$24 Billion

 FD&A Total Addressable Market (TAM) of ~$21-$24 Billion As noted, the total financial data market (on-and off-trading floor) tops $26 billion in annual revenue, but we peg FD&A’s addressable market closer to $21-$24 billion—the firm is primarily focused on the off-trading floor market but also has some trading solutions (primarily real-time data feeds) and a minimal risk & compliance presence. S&P does not have an in-house news offering, but offers news from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters. In addition, the franchise does not generate transaction revenues from executing trades (the largest component of the “other” product bucket). Furthermore, the impending divestitures of Credit Market Analysis (CMA) and S&P Securities Evaluations (SPSE) will likely diminish opportunities in the pricing and reference data space. In the areas in which they compete, FD&A is outpunching industry growth and taking share.

FD&A’s Total Addressable Markets and Growth Rates by Product FD&A’s Total Addressable Markets and Growth Rates by User (Share of total market revenue by product, market in $ billions) (Share of total market revenue user, market in $ billions) Industry Capital IQ Industry Capital IQ

Other IB IB Other IR News Pricing & Ref erence Risk PMs Fin Exec Pricing & Adv s PMs data Ref erence Real Gov t Media data Research $2.9 Time & Real IR $5.2 Trading Sales Time & $0.7 Exec $0.7 Research $23.6 Trading Fin $21.3 Adv s Research Traders Research Port Traders Mgmt Port Sales Mgmt

addressable market non-addressable market addressable market non-addressable market 4-yr CAGR by Product 4-yr CAGR by User (In percentage points) (In percentage points) Industry CapIQ 14% 25% Industry CapIQ 12% 12% 19% 20% 10% 9% 9% 8% 15% 8% 7% 6% 11% 5% 6% 10% 8% 9% 9% 7% 7% 4% 6% 6% 4% 5% 3% 3% 3% 2%2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% IB Port Res Trad Sales Fin Govt IR Media Risk Other Real Time Port Mgmt Res. PRV data News Other mgmt Advs /Exec & Reg Source: Company data, Burton Taylor, Credit Suisse estimates 26 S&P Market Intelligence—Financial Data & Analytics Strong Sell-Side Following with Sticky & Growing Products

 Strong Sell-Side Following  Sticky Products Delivered via Desktops and Data Feeds Competing primarily on customizability, breadth and cost, Capital IQ has Drilling down into the products, Capital IQ’s desktop business can be grown dramatically since its acquisition in 2004, primarily by adding new thought of as ~$550 million (pro forma for SNL) and $300 million related to users. The solution has proven to be especially popular with the sell-side enterprise data feeds. Both businesses are fairly sticky, and have been (research analysts and investment bankers), and also gained traction as a outpacing industry revenue growth since 2010. We expect SNL/Capital IQ provider of data-feeds for the sales and trading functions. The product has to continue to take share, displacing entrenched larger incumbents. The seen limited traction within the wealth/asset management sphere, trailing desktop business is known for both its intuitive web browser based delivery titans Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters, and portfolio analytics heavyweight and private company data and now also boasts specialized content from SNL FactSet. We expect the recent trend of investment banks better-aligning across a variety of industries making the offering even more integral to the usage with desktop functionality/cost will continue to drive mix shift away research process. In a similar vein, the technology and infrastructure from the likes of Bloomberg towards more specialized vendors like Capital investments required to support the installation of real-time feeds (a $12.7 IQ/SNL. billion market) makes switching a costly and painful proposition.

The Business is Heavily Sell-Side Focused Growth Trends Imply Share Gains in All Products Save Portfolio Analytics (Subscription revenue mix ex. Global Risk Svcs by user in percentage points) (CapIQ revenues in $ millions, industry revenues in $ billions on right axis, growth in %)

100% IR/Exec 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 8% 80% Fin Advisors $300 0% $15 21% 23% 22% 21% 21% 9% PMs 60% $200 $10 21% 22% 21% 20% 20% Sales 40% 12% 7% $100 6% 9% $5 Traders 5% 32% 31% 31% 32% 32% 20% Research $0 $0 10% 10% 10% 11% 11% 0% IB/Corp Fin Real-time Portf Research PRD Real-time Portf Research PRD 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Analytics Analytics CapIQ Industry Capital IQ’s Top and Bottom Market Positions by Share and Top Competitors FD&A Gains Share in Static Real-Time Market (Revenue share in percentage points, rank as stated) x x (Industry revenue in $ billions, FD&A share in percentage points) Type Share Rank Top Competitors by Market Share $13.6 RT/Trading data revenue FD&A share 2.5% Top Market Positions #1 Share #2 Share #3 Share Investment banking 9% 4 Thomson Reuters 30% Bloomberg 22% Factset 11% $13.2 2.2% 2.3% Research 8% 4 Thomson Reuters 25% Bloomberg 21% Factset 19% 2.1% Fixed Income S&T 4% 3 Bloomberg 57% Thomson Reuters 11% Market Intelligence 4% $12.8 2.1% 2.1% PRD 4% 4 Bloomberg 29% Thomson Reuters 11% Markit 11% 2.0%

Corporates 4% 3 Bloomberg 20% Moody's Analytics 4% Market Intelligence 4% Thousands $12.4 1.9% Lowest Market Positions 1.6% Portfolio managers 1% 7 Bloomberg 32% Thomson Reuters 21% Factset 12% $12.0 1.7% Retail wealth mgmt 1% 5 Bloomberg 28% Thomson Reuters 22% IDC 2% Real time trading/data 2% 3 Bloomberg 35% Thomson Reuters 31% Market Intelligence 2% $11.6 1.5% Traders 2% 4 Bloomberg 36% Thomson Reuters 28% IDC 4% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Sales 2% 3 Bloomberg 38% Thomson Reuters 30% Market Intelligence 2% x x Source: Company data, Burton Taylor, Credit Suisse estimates 27 S&P Market Intelligence—Financial Data & Analytics The SNL Opportunity

 SNL Overview–The Fastest Growing Financial Information Vendor  Synergy Targets Reasonable–We see 30% EBITDA margins by 2019 SNL is a specialized sector-focused provider of unique data and analytics, We expect management to successfully achieve the $100 million synergy such as bank branch coverage maps, power plant details, cable consumption target (70% cost, 30% revs) in EBITDA by 2019 (1/3rd in 2016 alone). trends etc. Predominantly focused on U.S. banking products, the company Expense efficiencies include eliminating redundancies in management, has diversified rapidly in recent years and caters to clients spanning leading content collection, IT and sales. The ~$30 million revenue-driven synergies, financial institutions, investment managers, media companies, consultancies should emanate from two areas: 1) leveraging MI’s extensive global sales and commodities producers worldwide. The business model is largely force and track record of international growth to sell SNL’s products in the subscription-based, boasts a 5-yr average retention rate of 94% and has near-term and 2) product development leveraging SNL’s detailed, sector- been growing at a 21% CAGR since 2003 supported by select acquisitions. focused data and analytics and both MI and Platts’ technology, data and scale over the next few years. We are especially bullish on international SNL Revenue Growth, Product Mix and Client Mix growth. All in, we see no reason why the franchise can’t approach or exceed (Revenue in $ millions, mix of 2014 revenue by product, region and client in percentage points) 30% EBITDA margins via organic growth and price increases, particularly as $300 $10 $15 management shifts focus to growing enterprise licenses. We also expect $2 more acquisitions to be made to enhance the industry specific content, $200 especially in media and real estate. CAGR 2003-2015: CapIQ Has a Proven International Track Record 21% $100 (CapIQ revenues in $ millions, industry revenues in $ billions on right axis, growth in %) CapIQ Industry EBITDA Margins 5-yr CAGR 5-yr CAGR $0 14% 38% 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 12% 40% RE 12% Product Geography 10% 28% 28% Media 9% 10% 30% 8% APAC 8% 7% 6% Metals/ 2% 20% 6% 4% mining Amer 4% 6% Banks 10% 91% 1% 52% 2% EUR Energy 0% 7% 0% 15% Americas EMEA APAC CapIQ FDS TRI Ins. 10% 2019 SNL EPS Upside Could be ~$0.40 60% Mkt Intel SNL (Estimated 2019 SNL EPS using 2015 share count and tax rate) 48% x x Client Mix Revenue Growth 40% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 31% 29% 30% $0.26 $0.27 $0.28 $0.29 $0.31 $0.32 $0.33 $0.34 24% 32% $0.28 $0.29 $0.30 $0.31 $0.33 $0.34 $0.35 $0.36 17% 19% 20% 16% 16% 34% $0.30 $0.31 $0.32 $0.33 $0.35 $0.36 $0.37 $0.38 36% $0.32 $0.33 $0.34 $0.35 $0.37 $0.38 $0.39 $0.41 38% $0.33 $0.35 $0.36 $0.37 $0.39 $0.40 $0.41 $0.43

EBITDA Margins EBITDA 40% $0.35 $0.36 $0.38 $0.39 $0.41 $0.42 $0.44 $0.45 0% x x IB Corp/Govt Other Fin Inst. Asset Mgrs Source: Company data, Burton Taylor, Credit Suisse estimates 28 S&P Market Intelligence—Global Risk and Markets Intelligence Positioning Global Risk to be a Market Leader

 Global Risk Well-Positioned Given Ratings’ Market Position  Markets Intelligence—Softer Prospects, LCD Move May Necessitate The newly-coined Global Risk Services business (formerly Credit Risk Further Rationalization Solutions) houses the firm’s monetized ratings research, data and analytics At 8% of revenues and a -4% 4-yr CAGR, the Markets Intelligence research offering, not unlike MCO’s Research, Data & Analytics (RD&A) business. business is the smallest and weakest segment in the group. Headwinds here This business, alongside FD&A, has been a key growth driver for the MI began in 2009, with the expiration of the Global Research Analyst segment due to steady demand for the firm’s RatingsXpress (data feeds, Settlement. Consequently, major sell-side research shops were no longer data management) and RatingsDirect (ratings IP-driven analytics, research) required to offer independent research to clients, structurally decreasing products. Revenues and growth here lag peer MCO due to MCO’s broader demand for independent products like Markets Intelligence. The reduction in and more integrated offerings, but management explicitly cites a goal to demand for equity research and subsequent revenue deterioration drove transform the business into a market leader. Core to this strategy is divestitures (Vista, Financial Communications) and product closures (FMR). leveraging underutilized risk capabilities within CRISIL and SNL to enhance Softness in equity research performance is occasionally offset by strength offerings and fill product gaps relative to the market. We do not expect within the Global Markets Intelligence and Leveraged Commentary and Data anything transformative here, and management does not plan to enter the (LCD) products, but, in 1Q16, management moved the stronger LCD software/enterprise risk management space (like MCO), but we look for product to Financial Data & Analytics (thus removing a key offset to continued steady mid-single-digit growth going forward, given consistent sustained weakness). While we believe the current divestiture pipeline (CMA, demand for their products, S&P’s cachet within the credit markets and JD Power, S&P Securities Evaluation) and ongoing SNL integration efforts incremental opportunities from CRISIL/SNL risk capabilities. will occupy focus near-term, if weakness here persists, we expect further divestitures and product closures during a phase of increased focus on SPGI’s Monetized Ratings Offering Smaller than MCO’s but Can Keep Growing growing margin enhancing businesses. (Annual revenue of segment in $ millions, CAGR in percentage points) $800 4-yr CAGR SPGI Global Risk Svcs MCO RD&A Divestitures MCO:9% (Key MI divestitures in $ millions) $600 x x SPGI: 6% Date Company Description Price Revs Key divestitures in $ millions $400 Mar-07 S&P Mutual Fund data Fund-level data $55 -- May-09 Vista Research Fundamental research $10 -- $200 Oct-13 Financial Communications Content delivery -- -- TBD Credit Market Analysis Credit pricing and data -- $16 TBD S&P Securities Evaluations Credit pricing -- -- $0 x x 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates 29 S&P Dow Jones Indices (S&P DJI) Indexing 101: Competitive Landscape A Competitive Industry Fragmented Within Asset Sleeves Index Providers by Asset Class and Region

Market Share by Firm ETF AUM Equities Fixed Income Alternatives Commodities FX Smart-Beta Other Global Regional S&P/Dow Jones 27.2% Bloomberg 17.7% MSCI 14.4% FTSE RusselI 12.5% CRSP 11.1% Nasdaq 3.6% Markit 3.4% Nikkei 2.7% Stoxx 2.3% WisdomTree 1.4% DAX 0.8% Morningstar 0.5% NYSE 0.3% BofA Merrill Lynch 0.4% JPMorgan 0.4% Hang Seng 0.8% Solactive 0.2% Citi 0.1% Research Affiliates 0.0%

Equity Index-Linked ETF AUM Fixed Income Index-Linked ETF AUM Alternative Index-Linked ETF AUM (In $ trillions) (In $ trillions) (In $ billions)

Total AuM: Total AuM: Total AuM: Nasdaq Other $2.4 trillion $0.7 trillion $24 billion Markit Other S&P Dow NYSE Jones ICE FTSE Indices S&P Dow Russell Jones Indices Nikkei Bloomberg FTSE Bloomberg CRSP Russell Nasdaq MSCI Other JPMorgan

Source: Morningstar, Bloomberg, Credit Suisse estimates Note: Market share data as of Mar-16 31 S&P Dow Jones Indices Top Global Indexer With a Product-Focused Business Model

 The Top Global Index Provider S&P DJI the Top ETF Index Provider (Share of ETF AuM in percentage points; 2016 data as of March 31st) S&P Dow Jones Indices (S&P DJI) is a 73/27 joint venture with CME formed 100% Other in 2011 that united institutionally-focused S&P with retail-oriented Dow Jones. 9% 8% 9% 9% 10% 9% 10% 10% Markit The offering provides performance measurement benchmarks for trillions in 8% 80% 8% 8% 8% 10% 11% 11% 11% assets (~$7+ trillion benchmarked to S&P 500 alone), and is the largest 14% 15% 13% Nasdaq 14% 14% 13% 13% 12% 60% licenser of underlying intellectual property to exchanges (S&P options/futures), CRSP ETF sponsors (27% market share) and indexers managing $3 trillion in assets. 22% 24% 21% 22% 15% 14% 15% 14% 40% FTSE Russ 14% 15% 17% 18% The business has grown at a 15% CAGR over the past three years, and 14% 14% 16% 15% MSCI contributed 11% of revenues and 17% of EBITDA in 2015 given robust 68% 20% 30% 31% margins. Going forward, top-line growth will be crucial–we see several avenues 26% 24% 26% 25% 27% 27% Bloomberg 0% that can drive mid-to-high single digit growth: 1) new products and pricing S&P DJI increases; 2) secular shift from active to passive; 3) asset class and 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 international expansion; and 4) smart beta index growth.  A More Product-Focused Business Model than MSCI S&P DJI—A Highly-Scalable High-Margin Business While both MSCI and S&P DJI boast similar EBITDA margins, it is important (Revenue in $ millions, margins in percentage points) to appreciate the differences in business models. MSCI drives a more data- focused model, with subscriptions comprising ~65% of revenues, while $800 S&P DJI revenue EBITDA margin Op margin 70% SPGI follows a more investment-product-focused model, with asset- CAGR linked/transaction revenues comprising ~50% of revenues. The different $600 5-yr: 17% 65% 3-yr: 15% business models provide MSCI with a more durable/recurring revenue $400 1-yr: 8% 60% stream more reliant on new clients and price increases for growth, while SPGI’s model grows with assets, but is more susceptible to assets under management and volume fluctuations. All in, while data is the heart of any $200 Dow Jones 55% joint venture indexing business, we believe monetizing the intellectual property via volume and asset-related growth is easier and more scalable than relying on new $0 50% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 customers and price increases. S&P DJI ETF AuM Growth Has Slightly Outpaced the Industry S&P Derives More Revenues from Assets and Transactions than MSCI (ETF AuM in $ trillions, share of AuM in percentage points; 2016 data as of March 31st) (2015 index business revenue mix in percentage points) Other Nasdaq CRSP FTSE Russell MSCI Bloomberg S&P DJI MSCI $3,500 S&P CAGR 2009-2016 $597m $559m Asset- 13% linked $3,000 Subscr Industry: 16% 11% 35% $2,500 S&P: 19% 21% $2,000 12% Asset- $1,500 14% linked $1,000 18% 55% $500 27% $0 Subscr Trans Trans 1% 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 25% 63% Source: Company data, Morningstar, Bloomberg, Credit Suisse estimates 32 Indexing—Framing Cyclical Downside Complex Generally Sees Inflows During Stressed Environments S&P ETF Net Flows Through the Business Cycle (ETF Flows in $ billions; Note: proforma for Dow Jones Indices)

$80

S&P DJI Scare

$70

Rate

Debt Debt Ceiling

Ebola Ebola Scare

Euro Euro Crisis I

Euro Euro Crisis II TaperTantrum

$60 Financial Crisis

$50 China/EM China/EM Growth Scare

$40

$30

$20

$10

$0

-$10

-$20

-$30 1Q09 1Q10 1Q11 1Q12 1Q13 1Q14 1Q15 1Q16

Source: Bloomberg, Credit Suisse estimates 33 S&P Dow Jones Indices Favorable Secular Trends; Organic Growth Healthy but Trailing Peers

 Growth of Indexing, Globalization & Smart Beta  S&P DJI Losing Share Given Equity & U.S. Bent SPGI is exposed to three key secular trends: (1) the shift from active to Drilling into the ETF business, which accounts for vast majority of asset- passive investing–PWC forecasts passive assets will reach $23 trillion by based fees (55% of segment revenues), at 23% share, S&P DJI is the 2020, while Blackrock estimates ETF assets reach $6 trillion over the same largest ETF index provider in the market. Despite the firm’s industry-leading period; (2) the globalization of investing and continued shift away from home- position, the firm has lost 200 bps of market share since 2014, primarily to country allocations–in the U.S. alone, since 2007, $850 billion has flowed out Barclays (better fixed income footprint) and MSCI (better international of domestic funds as $500 billion has flowed into international funds; (3) the footprint). With that said, organic growth has averaged in excess of 10% rise of smart beta, a passive investment strategy that uses alternative over the past three and five years, but one year growth rates are challenged, weightings to adjust risk-reward–Blackrock estimates that smart beta ETF as sovereign-related outflows have taken their toll. assets will reach $2.5 trillion by 2020 (11% average organic growth, 2015- 2020). S&P DJI ETF Family Slightly Outpacing Industry Growth Indexed Assets Expected to Reach 22% of Global AuM in 2020 (ETF AuM in $ trillions) (Assets in $ trillions; CAGR (in bubbles) in percentage points) $1.0 DJI S&P $120 5-yr CAGR 2012 2020 $102 $0.8 DJI: 18% $80 $66 $64 $0.6 $50 $0.4 S&P: 19% $40 $23 $6 $13 $7 $0.2 $0 $0.0 Active Alternative Index Total 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 3% 9% 15% 6% Despite Leading Position Industry Growth Lags Peers U.S. Net New Clash Flows—Away from Domestic, Towards Foreign (In percentage points) (In $ billions; AuM on left axis, net flows on right axis) 30% 5-yr 3-yr 1-yr $600 Domestic Foreign 20% $200 10% -$200

-$600 0% S&P DJI Barclays CRSP MSCI FTSE Nasdaq Total -$1,000 Russell Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13 Jan-15 Organic Growth by Asset Class Smart Beta Assets Growing at a 27% CAGR 2009-2015 (In percentage points) (AuM in $ billions, count as stated on right axis) 5-Yr 3-Yr 1-Yr % AuM 50% $600 Smart Beta AuM Number of Smart Beta ETFs 1,000 1% 40% 800 $400 30% 4% 600 Billions 20% 95% 400 $200 10% 200 0% $0 0 Equity Fix Inc Comm. Total 1Q09 1Q10 1Q11 1Q12 1Q13 1Q14 1Q15 1Q16 Source: PWC, ICI, Morningstar, Bloomberg, Credit Suisse estimates 34 S&P Dow Jones Indices Reducing Reliance on S&P 500 via Innovation & Asset Class/Global Growth

 Reducing Reliance on S&P 500 but Still a U.S. Centric Franchise  Smart Beta–Leveraging the Core to Innovate S&P DJI has innovated to reduce reliance on the flagship S&P 500 index “Smart beta”, or factor-based index construction, has been the fastest over the years by introducing sector, smart beta, fixed income and growing silo of the index industry as of late, with assets growing at a 27% international indices. In fact, the S&P 500 index today comprises 43% of CAGR since 2009, handily outpacing non-smart beta asset growth of 20%. ETF AuM, down from 72% in 2003. With that said, much of the innovation Presently, S&P DJI is 3rd in the smart beta space, behind CRSP and has still been U.S.-centric, as the franchise diversified by adding market cap FTSE/Russell, but smaller providers have taken share in recent years— based (S&P MidCap 400, S&P Small Cap 600) and sector-based (SPDR namely Nasdaq (via acquisitions of Mergent and Dorsey Wright), ETFs series) indices. All in, U.S.-oriented indices comprise ~56% of ETF WisdomTree (via self-indexing) and MSCI (via currency-hedged indices). AuM today and ~94% of non-ETF AuM. Despite these trends, management is upbeat about future growth here— through their “build from the core” strategy, S&P DJI plans to take core indices (such as the S&P 500) and re-weight or filter based on desired Diversifying the ETF Franchise Away from the S&P 500 Index metrics/outcomes to develop myriad smart beta offerings. (Index AuM mix by year in percentage points) Smart Beta Has Grown Rapidly in Recent Years (ETF AuM in $ billions; share of industry flows in percentage points on right axis) 2003 2015 80% 72% $150 SPDJI smart beta AuM % of smart beta flows 50%

60% 40% 43% $100 40% 30% 19% 14% 20% 9% 9% 11% 20% 5% 5% 5% 4% $50 1% 3% 0% 0% 10% S&P 500 U.S. Smart Other U.S. Intl Other Fixed Sector Beta SPDJI Income $0 0% 1Q09 1Q10 1Q11 1Q12 1Q13 1Q14 1Q15 1Q16 The Franchise Remains U.S. Centric New Entrants Erode Smart Beta Share of Incumbents (Total AuM mix by geographic focus in percentage points) (Share of smart beta ETF AuM in percentage points) 100% 100% Other 7% 8% 8% 9% 6% Other 80% 8% 8% 6% 9% Wtree 95% 10% 10% 9% 8% 32% 29% 28% 27% MSCI 90% Global 60% 25% 24% 24% 23% NDAQ 85% 40% 32% 31% 29% Canada 27% 26% 27% 26% 26% FTSE/Russ 80% 20% CRSP U.S. 22% 24% 23% 23% 22% 21% 20% 21% S&P DJI 75% 0% 1Q09 1Q10 1Q11 1Q12 1Q13 1Q14 1Q15 1Q16 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Source: Morningstar, Bloomberg, Credit Suisse estimates 35 S&P Dow Jones Indices Equity Centric, but Innovating to Grow Fixed Income

 Expansion of Asset Classes–Fixed Income Bloomberg the Top Bond ETF Index Vendor by a Wide Margin (Market share of bond ETF AuM by index provider in percentage points) S&P DJI has invested in recent years to broaden its presence beyond the industry-leading equity franchise (95% of AuM) into fixed income (2%) and Total AuM: alternatives. Going forward, we view fixed income as a key driver of growth. Markit $0.7 trillion While SPGI can’t topple Bloomberg, we think the company can leverage the cachet of the S&P 500 brand to launch new products and sustain the double- ICE digit organic growth the firm’s family of fixed income indices enjoyed in recent S&P Dow Jones Indices years and win market share. We also expect SPGI to entertain acquisition Bloomberg opportunities with a strict focus on ROIC. The fixed income arena has seen a FTSE Russell lot of consolidation (including Bloomberg’s recent acquisitions of UBS and Other JPMorgan Barclays’ index properties), as banks shed their fixed income indices to conform with IOSCO principles and avoid conflicts–the remaining properties of size include JPMorgan’s and Citi’s. Fixed Income Average Organic Growth by ETF Index Vendor (In percentage points) S&P DJI Is an Equity Centric Franchise (ETF AuM in $ billions, as of Mar-16) 30% 5-yr 3-yr 1-yr Other Alternative Fixed Income Equity 100%

80% 20%

60%

40% 10% 20%

0% 0% S&P DJI CRSP Bloomberg MSCI FTSE Russell Other S&P DJI Bloomberg FTSE Russell Markit Total Bank-Owned Index Properties ETF AuM Mutual Fund Ex. Bloomberg, S&P Gaining Share in Fixed Income ETFs Bank Sold to… Year ($bn) AuM ($bn) (Market share of fixed income ETF AuM ex. Bloomberg in percentage points) Goldman Sachs (GSCI) S&P 2007 $60 -- 100% Other UBS (AusBond, Commod.) Bloomberg 2014 $220 $102 NDAQ Barclays (Lehman) Bloomberg 2015 $495 $3,334 80% BAML HSBC Markit 2016 -- -- JPM

JPMorgan -- $12 $400 60% S&P BofA Merrill Lynch -- $13 $720 FTSE Citi -- $3 $330 Markit 40% Deutsche Bank -- $1 -- 1Q09 1Q10 1Q11 1Q12 1Q13 1Q14 1Q15 1Q16 Note: est. AuM at time of sale, or Mar-16 if not sold Source: Company data, Morningstar, Credit Suisse estimates 36 S&P Dow Jones Indices International Growth Via a Network of Exchange Relationships

 Partnering with Local Exchanges  Derivatives Revenue—Secular Growth & Revenue Stabilizer International index growth remains a key focus for SPGI. To this end, the Comprising 25% of S&P DJI revenues, fees and royalties based on trading firm supplemented its suite of global indices with local country specific volume of listed and OTC index derivatives are a key and growing revenue stream products (often in partnership with local exchanges leveraging their brand, that runs counter-cyclical to asset-based fees during market sell-offs (as volume knowledge of local investor needs and distribution). Recent deals include the tends to pick up with volatility). Key licensees include CME (S&P futures and New Zealand Stock Exchange (2015), BM&F Bovespa (2015) and Bolsa options on futures) whose licensing agreement expires in 2017 (but has an option Mexicana de Valores (2014). In that the U.S. accounts for 85% of SPGI’s to renew for 10 years) and CBOE (S&P and VIX options), whose contract was ETF assets (compared to ~50% of global market cap), we see plenty of renewed through 2032-2033. We believe these contracts will continue to be opportunity abroad for SPGI to expand offerings and like the exchange renewed, as CME is a partner in the S&P DJI joint venture, CBOE derives a partnership approach. With that said, it is important to note that MSCI is a significant amount of revenue from its index options, and the challenge of building well established benchmark for global portfolios, and will continue to be a scale/liquidity in similar products if these licenses were to go to a rival. The latter fierce competitor. should give S&P DJI pricing power in the long-run.

S&P DJI Extending Global Reach ADV of Most S&P Derivatives Picks Up After 1Q12 Exchange JV Partner Partner Listing Agreement (ADV of S&P-linked derivatives contracts in millions, CME S&P futures on right axis) TMX | TMX Group Canada CME1 | CME Group US CBOE | Chicago Board Options Exchange US CME S&P options SPX options 1.4 3.5 BMV | Bolsa Mexicana de Valores Mexico VIX options CME S&P futures BVL | Bolsa de Valores de Lima Peru 1.2 3.0 MILA | Mercado Integrado Latinoamericano LatAm 1.0 2.5 BM&F BOVESPA Brazil BSE2 | Bombay Stock Exchange India 0.8 2.0 NSE | National Stock Exchange of India India 0.6 1.5 CSE | Colombo Stock Exchange Sri Lanka 0.4 1.0 HKEx | Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing Hong Kong KRX | Korea Exchange S. Korea 0.2 0.5 JPX | Japan Exchange Group Japan 0.0 0.0 ASX | Australia Securities Exchange Australia 1Q09 1Q10 1Q11 1Q12 1Q13 1Q14 1Q15 1Q16 NZX | New Zealand Exchange New Zealand VIX Derivatives Provide Volatility Hedge for the Business International Index Assets (VIX in index points, ADV of VIX options in millions on right axis) (ETF AuM by top non-U.S. regions in $ billions) 60% VIX options VIX $60 Emerging Markets Global Developing Markets 40% $50 20% $40 0% $30 -20% $20 -40% $10 -60% $0 1Q12 3Q12 1Q13 3Q13 1Q14 3Q14 1Q15 3Q15 1Q16 1Q09 1Q10 1Q11 1Q12 1Q13 1Q14 1Q15 1Q16 Source: Company data, CME, ICE, Bloomberg, Morningstar, Credit Suisse 37 S&P Global Platts S&P Global Platts Another High-Margin Benchmark Business Embedded in Global Markets

 Fast Growing Commodities Information With 45%+ op. margins Platts’ Business Mix by Product (2013 revenue mix in percentage points) With the impending divestiture of J.D. Power (expected 3Q16), the legacy Commodities & Commercial Markets (C&C) segment will become S&P Conferences, consulting, other 4% Global Platts—a leading provider of essential commodities markets Real-time Market data feeds benchmark pricing, data and analytics to over 10,000 clients in 180 Newsletters / reports info 52% 27% countries worldwide. The franchise has grown at a 14% CAGR since 2010, 18% and we peg operating margins ~45%. Organic growth efforts have been complemented by strategic acquisitions to diversify away from petroleum/power and gas (~90% of segment revenues) and into metals, sugar, natural gas and shipping. Today, the business derives 90% of its  Strong Competitive Position in Energy Markets revenues via subscriptions (90%+ retention rates) with the balance primarily Platts is the leading price reporting agency (PRA) in the energy markets–-we trading licensing fees for contracts on the ICE and Singapore Exchange. Key estimate Platts commands approximately 70% of the revenue market share revenue segments include market data feeds (52%), newsletters and reports between the top 3 oil & energy PRAs. The information the firm provides is (27%) and real-time pricing assessments and market news (18%). mission-critical and centers on flagship benchmarks Brent crude oil and Henry Hub natural gas. In fact, a 2011 IOSCO report highlighted the firm as “firmly entrenched” in the contractual fabric of the energy industry, noting Platts Drives Margins Higher in Legacy C&C Segment that even the firm’s strongest critics are reluctant to stop using them given (Revenue in $ billions, margin in percentage points on right axis) legacy contracts priced using Platts. This notion of stickiness is reinforced by $1.0 C&C other Platts C&C op margin 40% retention rates in excess of 90%.

$0.8 Platts the Dominant PRA Among Energy Specialists 35% (Market share of estimated 2015 revenue in percentage points) $0.6 30% $0.4 OPIS 25% 9% $0.2 Sale of Aviation unit

$0.0 20% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Platts 71% Platts’ Business Mix by Commodity (2013 revenue mix in percentage points) Argus Petrochemicals 5% 20% Metals & Ag 5%

Petroleum Power & Gas 68% 22%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse 39 S&P Global Platts Another High-Margin Benchmark Business Embedded in Global Markets

Platts Not Overly Reliant on the Energy Cycle Reference Pricing Competitive Landscape  (As stated) Despite the business’ focus on energy, Platts is not overly exposed to the Firm Energy Metals Agriculture Freight Chemicals energy cycle, in our view due to the subscription nature of the business Platts      (90% of revenues). While the rate of subscription growth may slow in the Argus Media      event of a prolonged downturn, recent revenue trends illustrate clients still TSI  need pricing data and information to trade whether prices go up or down. IHS/McCloskey  The Baltic Exchange   This is especially true for governments who use reference pricing data for ICIS   taxes and budgeting, a process that becomes even more critical during time Reuters      of stress. In fact, periods of volatility provide an extra kick to revenues as IHS/OPIS  derivative trading volumes increase (10% of revs). Ultimately, demand for Rim Intelligence Co.  Platts is more a function of global energy consumption, which continues to APPI APPI  rise, thereby driving more physical trading of oil worldwide. Looking ahead, C1 Energy  USDA   we expect growth to be driven by increased derivative trading volumes, the DTN  incorporation of pricing and analytics into stress-testing, business planning WPI/US Grains  and risk governance and modest price increases (2-3%). London Metal Exchange  Oil Price has Minimal Impact on Global Physical Trading Volumes… London Bullion Market Association  (Avg barrels traded per day in millions, avg price of oil in $ as stated on right axis) London Silver Market Fixing Limited  Not a possible target CRU Group    60 Mn barrels per day Avg oil $140 55 $120 Market Data Competitive Landscape 50 $100 (As stated) 45 $80 Firm Energy Metals Agriculture Freight Chemicals 40 Platts $60      35 Wood Mackenzie    $40 30 Nexant  25 $20 Bloomberg  20 $0 Tecnon OrbiChem  1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2013 MMSA  …and Even Less on Platts’ Revenues PetroChem Wire  (Platts revenues in $ millions, avg price of oil in $ as stated on right axis) Rystad Energy  190 Platts revs Avg oil $140 GlobalData  170 $120 ame group   Metal Bulletin 150 $100  Hannon Westwood  130 $80 Aupec  110 $60 Not on market 90 $40 70 $20 50 $0 1Q11 3Q11 1Q12 3Q12 1Q13 3Q13 1Q14 3Q14 1Q15 3Q15 1Q16 Source: Company data, BP, Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse 40 Company History & Annotated Stock Chart SPGI History The company that would one day become S&P Global traces its origins to the 1860's, to the H.V. and After a century of growth and expansion, the 2000's brought radical change to the company and its H.W. Poor Co., publisher of comprehensive financial information on U.S. railroad companies. The other industries. Though S&P remained the largest CRA through two downturns, heightened regulatory companies that would come to form SPGI have equally storied histories—Standard Statistics was scrutiny following both the Enron/WorldCom bankruptcies and the 2008 financial crisis expanded the founded in 1906, W.C. Platt began publishing National Petroleum News in 1909 and McGraw Hill officially-recognized NRSRO competitive landscape and increased the level of reporting required to Publishing was formed in 1917. Growth came quickly to the individual companies, as Poor Co. maintain that status. An onslaught of lawsuits in the wake of the financial crisis also harried the expanded its offering into credit ratings by 1916 (followed by Standard Statistics in 1922), McGraw Hill company, culminating in over $1.5 billion in legal settlements. The acquisition of Capital IQ in 2004 acquired several smaller publishing companies and went public in 1929, and Platts established itself boosted the company's nascent analytics offering, which now accounts for nearly a quarter of the early on as the industry benchmark for oil prices following a landmark transaction between Standard company's revenue. In indices, the rapid growth of ETFs offered opportunities to diversify the revenue Oil, Royal Dutch Shell and Anglo Persian Oil. base and market indices to a different set of asset managers and clients, and the joint venture with In the ensuing decades, the company as we know it today began to take shape—in 1941 Standard Dow Jones in 2012 solidified the company's position as a premiere index provider worldwide. Platts Statistics and Poor Co. merged to form S&P, and, in 1953, McGraw Hill acquired Platts. Though S&P expanded its pricing benchmark status to U.S. gas and power through the acquisition of FT Energy. had been calculating stock market indices since 1923, in 1957 the company would launch what would In 2011, the company announced its Growth and Value Plan—after years of lagging revenues and become the premiere U.S. stock market index, the S&P 500, firmly establishing itself as a provider of operating margins in the education business, a comprehensive review determined that splitting that stock market benchmarks as well as credit ratings. The enviable competitive position of S&P soon business (McGraw Hill Education, or MHE) from the financial services business would best optimize drew the attention of the perennially acquisitive McGraw Hill, who purchased the company in 1966. growth and shareholder value. Over the next two years, the company would sell the MHE unit to Apollo The 1970's were a time of upheaval for the firm and the industry, as the use of credit ratings expanded Global Management for $2.4 billion, acquire several small analytics companies to bolster the Capital IQ dramatically and the industry practice of charging issuers, rather than investors, for ratings information offering, revitalize the company's expense structure (achieving $175 million in expense saves) and developed. Platts launched daily telex-delivered commodity reports, the precursor to its real-time data install Doug Peterson as President and CEO of the newly-formed company. and news service, and Vanguard introduced the first retail index mutual fund tracking the S&P 500, Following the successful execution of the Growth and Value Plan, the firm turned its focus towards the allowing retail investors the opportunity to easily buy into the broad market. future with its 2014 Growth and Performance goals, targeting revenue and EPS growth, margin The 1980's and 1990's saw further expansion, both in products and geographies. Throughout the expansion, strong FCF generation and robust capital return. To this end the firm divested its decades, the company opened offices in Europe, Japan, Australia, Argentina and Russia. Platts Construction and Aviation units within C&C, is in the process of selling JD Power (to close in 3Q16), launched the first real-time commodity data and news service and U.S. gas spot indices, S&P indices and acquired SNL Financial to further expand its Capital IQ capabilities. To signify the evolution of the launched the SPDR, the first U.S. ETF, and the types of rated credit products exploded from simple company and its focus on capital markets and financial products, in April of 2016, the company corporates and munis into international debt, ABS, CMBS, CDO, and covered bonds. changed its name to S&P Global, trading under the ticker “SPGI.” 2005 2008 1979 Expands 1984 Acquires American into Dubai, 2012 1917 controlling 2010 Express Platts S. Africa 2013 1868 1909 1953 1966 stake in S&P McGraw Hill 1929 fails in launches and Israel Jack 1990 CRISIL, a Indices Begins HV and HW WC Platts Publishing McGraw Hill McGraw Hill attempt of first real- 1998 Callahan, McGraw Hill 1997 leading forms joint trading on Poor Co. founds Company acquires acquires hostile time news S&P opens Jr. named 2015 IPOs on S&P opens Indian venture with the NYSE founded National founded Platts S&P takeover of and market office in S&P enters CFO NYSE office in ratings Dow Jones as SPGI Acquires Petroleum McGraw Hill info service Australia Argentina Russia agency SNL News Financial

1928 1941 1957 1968 Platts oil price Standard S&P launches JD Power 1984 1985 2009 1906 established as Statistics, Poor the S&P 500 1993 1998 2004 2005 2011 2012 1916 founded S&P opens S&P opens SEC 2013 global Co. merge to index Standard offices in offices in S&P launches Harold Acquires Acquires JD publishes Announces Sells MHE to Douglas Poor Co. benchmark form S&P Statistics Europe Japan the SPDR, the McGraw III Capital IQ Power new rules Growth & Apollo Global Peterson begins issuing after Standard founded first US ETF named governing Value Plan, Mgmt for $2.4 named credit ratings Oil, RDS and CEO NRSROs outlining billion President on US Anglo-Persian spinoff of and CEO corporate transaction MHE bonds Source: Company data, Credit Suisse IPO/ Acquisiton New Product/Major Deal New Region Management/ Strategy Change 42 SPGI Annotated Stock Chart

x x 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Market Statistics Annual Share Price Returns Mkt Cap ($bn) Shares EV/EBITDA Dividend Div Yield FY1 P/E FY2 P/E Short Int. SPGI -34% -45% 48% 11% 26% 29% 45% 15% 12% 4% $26.9 264.6 14.5x $1.32 1.3% 19.7x 17.5x 1.2% MCO -48% -43% 35% 1% 29% 51% 58% 24% 6% -10% $17.3 194.3 11.8x $1.39 1.6% 19.6x 17.4x 3.2% CLGX ------$3.3 88.9 12.8x -- -- 17.3x 15.7x 0.9% DNB 8% -12% 11% -1% -7% 7% 58% -0% -13% 15% $4.3 36.3 13.4x $1.85 1.6% 16.1x 15.1x 3.2% EXPN -34% 9% 42% 30% 10% 12% 14% -2% 10% 10% $16.7 957.8 12.6x $0.40 2.3% 18.6x 17.1x -- FDS -1% -19% 51% 44% -6% 2% 25% 31% 17% -5% $6.3 40.9 16.8x $1.66 1.1% 24.0x 21.5x 5.9% IHS 53% -38% 46% 47% 7% 11% 25% -5% 4% -6% $7.5 67.4 16.0x $0.00 0.0% 17.8x 16.2x 1.4% MORN.O 73% -54% 36% 10% 12% 7% 25% -16% 25% -3% $3.3 42.9 12.3x $0.79 1.0% 25.5x 23.1x 0.3% MSCI.K 54% -54% 79% 23% -15% -6% 41% 9% 54% 3% $7.1 96.5 16.5x $0.80 1.1% 25.7x 21.5x 1.2% TRI 1% -26% 14% 19% -25% 14% 35% 10% -3% 5% $29.3 752.3 11.0x $1.34 3.4% 19.0x 16.7x 1.0% VRSK.O -- -- 11% 13% 18% 27% 29% -3% 20% 1% $13.0 168.2 16.8x -- -- 24.9x 22.4x 2.3% S&P 500 4% -38% 23% 13% -0% 13% 30% 11% -1% -0% $18.0 ------2.6% 17.7x 15.5x -- XLF -19% -54% 17% 12% -17% 28% 35% 15% -2% -7% $16.7 744.0 62.6x $0.37 1.7% ------

$120 MHFI S&P 500 MHFI P/E as % of S&P P/E Avg MHFI P/E as % of S&P P/E 240%

Jul 2007 Aug 2011 Dec 2014 Jul 2006 Italy begins probe into whether NRSROs come under criticism SEC publishes report 220% Raises FY guidance on for ratings policies during the CRA ratings caused unusual alleging NRSROs of $100 Jan 2006 strong ratings demand subprime mortgage crisis movements in Italian securities preferential treatment Falls on lower markets to issers, failure to guidance due to adhere to internal 200% challenging education Jul 2006 Oct 2007 policies environment 3Q06 earnings beat on State of Conn. Aug 2015 S&P performance, Feb 2013 $80 Feb 2005 subpoenas CRAs for Fears of 180% expense control Facing widening investigation into Revises FY EPS guidance subprime ratings global ratings policies by states and DoJ down due to headwind from policies and errors economic acquistions slowdown 160% Sept 2008 hammer Sept 2004 $60 Further allegations of stocks Acquires Capital IQ for $200 negligence related to million 140% subprime ratings surface

$40 120%

Feb 2015 100% Settles outstanding Dept of $20 Justice cases for $1.5 billion Feb 2007 Jul 2009 80% SEC proposes rules to CalPERS brings suit against Apr 2010 May 2013 increase competition among MCO, MHFI for losses related U.S. govt calls for further Begins trading as a separate NRSROs to mis-rated securities NRSRO regulation post-crisis company under the ticker MHFI $0 60% 1-Jan-01 1-Jan-02 1-Jan-03 1-Jan-04 1-Jan-05 1-Jan-06 1-Jan-07 1-Jan-08 1-Jan-09 1-Jan-10 1-Jan-11 1-Jan-12 1-Jan-13 1-Jan-14 1-Jan-15 1-Jan-16 x x Source: Company data, Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse 43 Risk Factors & Valuation Risk Factors Main Risks: Cyclical Slow-Down, Dependency on Technology Significant risk factors to our valuation may include the following:  Market/issuer risk. SPGI is subject to general economic conditions and the volatility of S&P’s Share Price Highly Correlated to Corporate Issuance global financial markets. A portion of SPGI’s ratings revenue is transaction-based, and therefore (Quarterly corporate issuance in $ trillions, share price in $ as stated) dependent on the number and volume of securities issued in the capital markets. As such, any $2.5 Corp Issuance SPGI $120 indication of market volatility or adverse conditions could reduce investor demand for such securities or the issuers’ willingness/ability to issue them, which in turn could materially reduce $2.0 $100 Correl w /issuance issuances for which the company could provide ratings for. Additionally, issuers of debt $80 securities may choose to issue securities which are either rated only by competitors, by non- $1.5 78% traditional parties (such as financial advisors), or may forego a rating altogether. $60 $1.0  Reliance on electronic infrastructure. Many of the firm’s data/analytics products and $40 services are delivered electronically, and clients rely on their ability to process transactions $0.5 rapidly and deliver substantial quantities of data over electronic networks. Infrastructure or $20 network failures (due to defective software, security breaches, human error) may impair the $0.0 $0 company’s ability to deliver on this expectation and diminish the company’s reputation with 1Q01 1Q03 1Q05 1Q07 1Q09 1Q11 1Q13 1Q15 clients. S&P’s Ratings Revenue Even Moreso  Acquisition/synergy risk. SPGI has made several acquisitions to expand its business, (Quarterly corporate issuance in $ trillions, ratings revenue in $ millions) most recently the $2 billion acquisition of SNL Financial. As such, failure to meet the expected synergies and strategic objectives thereof could limit any anticipated benefits from such deals. $2.5 Corp Issuance SPGI $700 Correl w /issuance $650 $2.0  Legal/regulatory risk. Following the financial crisis SPGI and other ratings agencies were 89% $600 under heightened regulatory scrutiny and had several lawsuits leveled against them for losses incurred based on ratings and methodology. Though industry regulation is now in place and the $1.5 $550 company has settled or won a majority of the lawsuits, concentrated default rates or other $500 systemic issues that might cast doubt on the credibility of the company and its ratings could $1.0 $450 again increase legal and regulatory burdens. Furthermore, in recent years Platts and the PRA $400 $0.5 industry has also received scrutiny from regulators, but we view this as manageable as well—as $350 of last update the firm is compliant with the IOSCO audit requirements, and we view any more $0.0 $300 stringent regulation here as unlikely given the high degree of fragmentation of commodities 4Q09 4Q11 4Q13 4Q15 regulators worldwide EPS Sensitivity to Issuance Volumes  Client consolidation/staff reduction. A majority of the company’s subscription-based (In $ millions, EPS in $ as stated) clientele is in the financial industry—following the 2008 financial crisis the industry saw x x increased consolidation and staffing reductions. To the extent that this continues or accelerates, Base -5% -10% -15% -20% the firm’s subscription revenues may be impacted by lower renewal rates or the loss of major In $ millions, EPS in $ as stated clients due to mergers/acquisitions. Transaction revenue 966 918 869 821 773 Subscription revenue 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,330  Intangible asset composition. Goodwill and other intangible assets comprise a majority of Ratings revenue 2,296 2,248 2,199 2,151 2,103 the firm’s non-cash assets. The company tests goodwill and intangible assets with indefinite Pretax income 1,053 1,031 1,009 987 964 lives for impairment annually, as well as when events or changes in circumstances signal that Net income 727 711 696 681 665 impairment occurred, but such a charge could have a material adverse effect on SPGI’s Ratings EPS $2.75 -$0.06 -$0.12 -$0.17 -$0.23 business, operating results and financial condition. % 2016 EPS impact -- -1% -2% -4% -5% x x

Source: Company data, Dealogic, Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse estimates 45 Valuation A Strong Free Cash Flow Generator

We view the SPGI business model as a strong free cash flow generator. As such, we value shares of SPGI shares using a discounted free cash flow model supported by price-to-earnings multiple analysis. Underpinning our $123 target price is ~4% revenue growth from 2016-2021 with modest increases in the company’s expenses—we expect this to drive a 6%-plus free cash flow CAGR over the next five years. In the intermediate term, we expect annual revenue growth to moderate to 4%, modestly outpacing expense growth. All in all, we expect this to equate to 4% free cash flow growth, maintaining this pace over the longer-term. Our DCF model also incorporates a 10% discount rate. We believe our discount rate takes into account the risks associated with the company's overall business model. We support our DCF analysis with price-to-earnings multiples. SPGI shares currently trade at 21x our 2016 and 18x our 2017 EPS estimates

DCF Sensitivity Matrix $ as stated, weighted average cost of capital and terminal growth rate in percentage points) $115.82 8.4% 8.9% 9.4% 9.9% 10.4% 10.9% 11.4% 11.9% 2.0% $148.51 $136.21 $125.60 $116.37 $108.27 $101.10 $94.71 $89.00 2.5% $154.19 $140.72 $129.23 $119.32 $110.69 $103.10 $96.38 $90.39 3.0% $160.91 $146.00 $133.43 $122.70 $113.44 $105.35 $98.25 $91.95 3.5% $169.01 $152.25 $138.34 $126.61 $116.58 $107.91 $100.35 $93.68 4.0% $178.95 $159.79 $144.16 $131.18 $120.22 $110.84 $102.73 $95.64 4.5% $191.44 $169.03 $151.17 $136.60 $124.48 $114.23 $105.46 $97.86 Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

46 Expense & Revenue Snapshot and Management Guidance Revenue Snapshot Growth Driven by Market Intelligence and Platts x x Revenues Revenue Description, Drivers & Outlook 2016-2017E Revenue Evolution 2008-2016E Note: 2016 excludes JD Power

S&P Ratings . Revenue: Fees from rating issuers and issuance, corporate credit estimates, issue/issuer surveillance $6.0 C&C S&P DJI Market Intelligence S&P Ratings Drivers (45%) . : Client base, number of instruments on which ratings are issued, issue and transaction type . Outlook: Expect to grow 3-4% annually due to pricing increases and activity $5.0 2008-2016 CAGR: 4% $4.0 Mkt Intel . Revenue: Subscription fees, fees for bespoke projects (risk analytics, research) Drivers $3.0 (26%) . : Client base, subscription renewals, pricing increases . Outlook: 5-6% growth annually $2.0 S&P DJI . Revenue: Subscription/licensing fees, fees based on indexed assets, royalties based on trading volume $1.0 (11%) . Drivers: Client base, AuM, trading volume . Outlook: 5-6% growth annually $0.0 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Platts (legacy . Revenue: Subscription fees, licensing fees Revenue Mix 2015 C&C) (18%) . Drivers: Client base, subscription renewals, pricing increases . Outlook: 5-6% annually S&P Ratings 45% Ratings to decline 7% in 2016, recover modestly in 2017 Market Intelligence to grow 12-14% as SNL contributes to growth here S&P DJI to grow 7%, benefitting from secular tailwinds of a shift to passive investing and trading C&C 18% volumes Market 1.4 Intelligence S&P DJI 26% Platts to grow high-single digits 11%

Geographic Mix: 2015 Revenue by Type Share of Ratings Revenue by Asset Class Non Transaction Transaction 100% Corporates FIG Govt Structured CRISIL/other 2015 U.S. 80% 34% 34% 38% 39% 40% 39% 60% 2014

ROW 60% 2013 5% 2012 40% 66% Asia 66% 62% 61% 60% 61% 2011 11% 20% 2010 Europe 0% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% x 24% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 x Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates 48 Expense Snapshot x x Expenses Expense Description, Drivers & Outlook 2016-2017E Expenses Evolution 2010-2016E $3.5 Total Depreciation SG&A Opex . Expense: Compensation and benefits, information technology and misc operating expenses Opex (49%) . Drivers: Number of employees, IT usage $3.0 . Outlook: ~30% of revenues, growth in-line with revenue $2.5

Thousands $2.0 S&G Exp . Expense: Compensation and benefits, legal expense, restructuring charges . Drivers: Number of employees $1.5 (46%) Outlook: . ~25% of revenues, growth in-line with revenues $1.0 . Expense: Depreciation of assets $0.5 Depreciation . Drivers: Acquisition activity and lease/equipment purchases $0.0 Outlook . : ~$90-$100 million annually 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Opex . Expense: Amortization of drfinite lived intangible assets SG&A Amortization . Drivers: Acquisition activity Expense Mix 2015 Depreciation . Outlook: ~$90-$100 million annually Amortization Opex Total 2% 49% Operating expense to grow 5-7% with business expansion Depreciation 3% SG&A to drop 20% in 2016 and 2% in 2017 as legal expenses abate Depreciation and amortization to each be $90-$100 million, higher than historical trends due to the SNL acquisition

S&G Exp 46%

Segment Expense Mix Cash vs Non-Cash Mix: 2015 Segment Operating Margins S&P Ratings Market Intelligence S&P Ratings Market Intelligence S&P DJI CC&M 70% 100% S&P DJ Indices C&C 60% 80% 50% Cash 60% Non-Cash 95% 40% 5% 30% 40% 20% 20% 10% 0% 0% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2012 2013 2014 2015 x x

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates 49 Management Guidance x x x 2016 Guidance In $ millions, EPS in $ as stated Revenue growth Mid to high single-digit Interest expense ~$160 million Adjusted operating profit margin increase ~50 bps* Adjusted tax rate ~31% Adjusted diluted EPS $5.00 - $5.15 (incl. JD Power, $0.13-$0.14) Capital expenditures ~ $140 million Adjusted unallocated expense $145-150 million Free cash flow ~ $1.3 billion Deal-related amortization ~$98 million Regular annual dividend per share $1.44 xpx x x 1Q16 Earnings Call Barclays America Select Conference n Top 2016 priority is SNL integration--tremendous progress made on synergy targets n Mgmt confident they will be able to restore their CMBS business post-moratorium, and are well- positioned to build out global structured business overall n Expect Platts growth to moderate throughout the year due to stress in energy companies n See growth opportunities in both developed and developing markets, building out networks in (Platts has grown at 14% 5-yr CAGR, 90% of revenue is energy/oil & gas) LATAM and APAC--China an area of focus long-term n Adjusted earnings now exclude deal-related amortization n Looking to retool frequent issuer pricing within ratings

n Overall 2016 guidance remains unchanged, and includes JD Power, SPSE, and CMA (all n Excited about the progress made integrating SNL and CapIQ Revenues pending sale). Guidance will be updated when deals close /Earnings n JD Power (assuming mid-year sale) and SPSE sale (assuming end of 3Q16 close) to dilute n SNL can increase prices double-digits every year and maintain high retention rates EPS by $0.13-$0.14. Expect to offset this with repurchases n JD Power (assuming mid-year close) would be $176m in 2016 revenue, SPSE (assuming end n Global Trading Svcs in Platts 10% of business, but growing fast--looking to build it out in the of 3Q16 close) would be around $30m coming years, as it provides highly profitable incremental growth n Within CapIQ, client penetration is important--more interested in the levels of customer acceptance than pricing, though pricing is something they evaluate constantly n Looking to reevaluate frequent issuer programs within ratings n Market Intelligence margins to stay within the 1Q range (~30%)--synergies are part, but not all, n Looking to more thoughtfully connect and integrate parts of the company to drive long-term of this improvement productivity n Still guiding to 1.3 of $100m SNL synergies (mostly expense-driven) to be realized in 2016 n Doing a lot to simplify and automate global processes within ratings; looking at being more selective with headcount additions in a more adverse issuance environment n Interest expense to remain elevated due to SNL debt n Close to a more "steady-state" legal expense--don't see anything of the size or magnitude they dealt with post-crisis n Expense control--not willing to give up investment in the business, more looking to appropriate n Giving some thought to splitting CRISIL reporting between ratings and CapIQ given the Expenses staffing levels business model n Goal within the ratings business is to steadily improve margins; not targeting nearest n Market Intelligence margins in the hgih-20's/low-30's, will drift higher as synergies are realized competitor, however n On pace to achieve the $140m run-rate cost savings by the end of 2016

n Should not expect any more expense items like the $24m impairment seen in 1Q

Capital n Still expecting $500m in buybacks in 2016; will use $700m of proceeds from JD Power sale for n Following current divestitures, mgmt sees themselves as done rationalizing (though still may Mgmt n Methodicallybuybacks also putting to offset more deal debt dilution on the balance sheet; have flexibility with short-term debt to n Stillramp expecting down small, $500m non-core in buybacks businesses) in 2016; will use $700m of proceeds from JD Power sale for n Globalpace buyback issuance activity to be -2% lower than 2015 levels n Issuancebuybacks weaknessalso to offset a temporary deal dilution issue--the refi pipeline provides stable issuance trends over the next few years--still feel good about FY outlook n Over the next 5 years the level of HY debt maturing increases each year, boding well for refi Macro activity Trends n See TLAC needs as driving elevated FIG issuance; structured to be down 4-9%, US public n Thoughdown 8-12%, structured intl public is weaker, up. mgmt sees possible strength in covered bonds, CMBS, and n Expecttraditional the ABS ECB 2H16 bond-buying program to have a positive impact on issuance and perhaps loan x activity Source: Company datax 50 Management Guidance Close on EPS, Margin Expansion Beats Expectations

Revenue Growth Guidance Range vs. Actuals Expense Growth Guidance Range vs. Actuals (Guidance range relative to actuals in percentage points) (Guidance range relative to actuals in percentage points) Growth guidance Actual revenue growth Growth guidance Actual expense growth 104% 104% 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 102% 102% 100% 100% 98% 98% 96% 96% 94% 94% 92% 92% 90% 90% 4Q12 2Q13 4Q13 2Q14 4Q14 2Q15 4Q12 2Q13 4Q13 2Q14 4Q14 2Q15

EPS Guidance Range vs. Actuals Operating Margin Expansion Guidance Range vs. Actuals (Guidance range relative to actuals in percentage points) (Guidance range relative to actuals in percentage points) EPS guidance range Actual EPS GAAP op margin guidance Actual expense growth 104% 120% 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 102% 100% 100% 80% 98% 60% 96% 40% 94% 92% 20% 90% -- 4Q12 2Q13 4Q13 2Q14 4Q14 2Q15 4Q12 2Q13 4Q13 2Q14 4Q14 2Q15

Tax Rate Guidance Range vs. Actuals Capex Guidance Range vs. Actuals (Guidance range relative to actuals in percentage points) (Guidance range relative to actuals in percentage points) Tax rate guidance Actual Capex guidance Actual 104% 160% 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 103% 140% 102% 120% 101% 100% 100%

99% 80%

98% 60% 4Q12 2Q13 4Q13 2Q14 4Q14 2Q15 4Q12 2Q13 4Q13 2Q14 4Q14 2Q15 Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates 51 Capital Management & Financial Statements Capital Management High FCF Generation Boosts Capital Return Potential

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Cash Flow from Operations $924.0 $730.0 $782.0 $1,209.0 $195.0 (-) Capex -$92.0 -$96.0 -$117.0 -$92.0 -$139.0 Free Cash Flow $809.0 $658.0 $665.0 $1,117.0 $56.0 (-) Stock-based comp $77.0 $90.0 $96.0 $100.0 $78.0 FCF less Stock-Based Comp $732.0 $568.0 $569.0 $1,017.0 -$22.0 FCF conversion 89% >100% 48% >100% 5% FCF less Stock-Based Comp conversion 80% >100% 41% >100% -2% GAAP Change in Cash -$1,017.0 -$416.0 -$1,092.0 $617.0 -$887.0 Capital Management Share Buybacks $1,500.0 $295.0 $978.0 $362.0 $974.0 Share Issuance -$139.0 -$299.0 -$258.0 -$193.0 -$86.0 Net Buybacks $1,361.0 -$4.0 $720.0 $169.0 $888.0 Dividends $296.0 $984.0 $308.0 $326.0 $363.0 Return to Shareholders $1,657.0 $980.0 $1,028.0 $495.0 $1,251.0 % of CF from operations >100% >100% >100% 41% >100% Capex $92.0 $96.0 $117.0 $92.0 $139.0 R&D $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 Acquisitions $194.0 $177.0 $47.0 $71.0 $2,396.0 Investment for Growth $286.0 $273.0 $164.0 $163.0 $2,535.0 % of FCF ex. stock comp 35% 41% 25% 15% >100% Debt Repayment $0.0 -$400.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 (-) Debt Issuance $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $2,674.0 Return to Debtholders $0.0 $400.0 $0.0 $0.0 -$2,674.0 % of FCF ex. stock comp 0% 61% 0% 0% <-100%

$5.0 Debt Repayments Capex Acquisitions Dividends Buybacks

$4.0

$3.0

$2.0

$1.0

$0.0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates Note: Includes Broadcasting until 2011, Aviation Week and McGraw Hill Education until 2013, Construction until 2014 53 Capital Management Key Acquisitions and Divestitures x x Date Acquisition Divestitures Value Revenue Price/Sales Segment Description Acquisitions and divestitures as stated, value and revenue in $ millions Apr-16 J.D. Power $1,100 $315 3.5x S&P Global Platts Global marketing information services Apr-16 Ace Conferences & Events ------S&P Global Platts Industry conference and event services Mar-16 Commodity Flow Limited $7 -- -- S&P Global Platts BI service for the global waterborne commodity and energy markets Mar-16 S&P Securities Evaluations -- $100 -- S&P Mkt Intel Credit pricing Mar-16 Credit Market Analysis -- $16 -- S&P Mkt Intel OTC credit pricing and data Jul-15 SNL $2,225 $255 8.7x S&P Mkt Intel Sector-specific data & analytics Jul-15 Petromedia -- $5 -- S&P Global Platts Up-to-date news, daily prices and analysis on the global shipping and oil markets May-15 NADA Used Car Guide -- $5 -- S&P Global Platts U.S. retail, loan, trade-in and auction used-vehicle values Mar-15 Minerals Value Services $2 -- -- S&P Global Platts Pricing and industry data for iron ore and steelmaking industries Oct-14 BRC Investor Services $6 -- -- S&P Ratings provider of credit ratings based in Bogota Sep-14 McGraw Hill Construction $320 $173 1.8x S&P Global Platts Data & news on the construction industry Jul-14 Eclipse Energy Group AS -- $8 -- S&P Global Platts Data and analysis on the European gas, power and global liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets Apr-14 Korrelate, Inc. $1 -- -- S&P Global Platts Online consumer market analysis Oct-13 RAM Holdings Berhard ------S&P Ratings Credit ratings, research and advisory services in Malaysia Oct-13 Financial Communications ------S&P Mkt Intel Content delivery services Jul-13 Aviation Week, Inc. -- $47 -- S&P Global Platts Aerospace industry publication Jun-13 CRISIL Limited $208 $187 1.1x S&P Ratings Indian credit ratings, outsourced analytics, consulting and advisory Nov-12 McGraw-Hill Education, Inc. $2,647 $2,400 1.1x S&P Global Education-related digital and print content Oct-12 Kingsman SA ------S&P Global Platts Price information and analytics for the global sugar and biofuels markets Jul-12 Credit Market Analysis $46 $16 2.9x S&P Mkt Intel OTC credit pricing and data Jun-12 Coalition Development ------CRISIL Analytics provider Apr-12 QuantHouse -- $16 -- S&P Mkt Intel Low-latency data & distribution Feb-12 R² Financial Technologies $16 $3 5.3x S&P Mkt Intel Advanced risk and scenario-based portfolio analytics Nov-11 TRIS Corporation Limited ------S&P Ratings Thailand credit ratings (5% stake) Nov-11 Automotive Forecasting Division ------S&P Global Platts Division of JD Power Oct-11 McGraw-Hill Broadcasting $212 $96 2.2x S&P Global Platts Media content and distribution Jun-11 Steel Business Briefing Limited -- $12 -- S&P Global Platts News, pricing and analytics for the global steel market Dec-10 Bentek $39 $12 3.3x S&P Global Platts Energy market analytics Sep-10 TheMarkets.com -- $60 -- S&P Mkt Intel Fundamental data, earnings models & estimates Sep-10 Pipal Research $13 $8 1.6x CRISIL KPO research Oct-09 BusinessWeek $5 $100 0.1x S&P Global Platts Business news and information May-09 Vista Research Inc. ------S&P Mkt Intel Subscription-based market data and fundamental research Oct-08 Reuters Estimates and Research ------S&P Mkt Intel Fundamental data and estimates Apr-08 Umbria ------S&P Global Platts Consumer-generated media research services Feb-08 Case-Shiller Home Price Indices ------S&P DJ Indices Home price indices Dec-07 Maalot ------S&P Ratings Israeli ratings agency Sep-07 IMAKE Consulting and ABSXchange ------S&P Mkt Intel Structured products modeling, data and software May-07 ClariFI, Inc. ------S&P Mkt Intel Quantitative portfolio analytics Feb-07 Mutual Fund Data Business $55 -- -- S&P Mkt Intel Fund-level data Dec-06 Heale Financial Ltd. ------S&P Mkt Intel Equity and pension fund-level data Sep-06 Automotive Resources Asia Ltd. ------S&P Global Platts Asian automotive market strategy and business development Apr-06 E Source Companies LLC ------S&P Global Platts Energy usage research and advisory Mar-06 POWER Magazine ------S&P Global Platts Magazine about the global power generation industry Nov-05 Healthcare Information Group ------S&P Global Platts Healthcare industry business intelligence and marketing Sep-05 Corporate Value Consulting ------S&P Mkt Intel Corporate financial advisory services Sep-05 Taiwan Rating Corporation ------S&P Ratings Taiwanese credit ratings agency Mar-05 J.D. Power ------S&P Global Platts Global marketing information services Mar-05 Vista Research Inc. ------S&P Mkt Intel Subscription-based market data and fundamental research Feb-05 ASSIRT Pty Ltd. ------S&P Mkt Intel Australian fund data Jan-05 Standard & Poor's Securities, Inc. ------S&P Mkt Intel Research services Sep-04 Capital IQ $200 -- -- S&P Mkt Intel Web-based financial data May-04 CBI Energy Conference Business ------S&P Global Platts Energy conference and event services xMar-04 J.J. Kenny Drake ------S&P Mkt Intel Municipal bond data and inter-dealer brokerage x Total $7,102 Source: Company data, Capital IQ, xAverage 2.9x Bloomberg, Credit Suisse x 54 Income Statement

S&P Global Financial Earnings Model 1.11 1.24 1.224 1.117 4.692 1.198 1.356 1.175 1.178 4.909 5.531 6.392 Ashley N. Serrao, CFAAshley (212) N. 538-8424 Serrao, CFA (212) 538-8424 (December year end, dollars in millions, except per-share data) Credit Suisse '10-13 annuals ex. broadcasting, education, construction & aviation week FY FY FY FY FY 2015 FY 2016 FY FY FY 2013/ 2014/ 2015/ 2016/ 2017/ 2018/ 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2015 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2016 2017 2018 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Operating EPS $1.82 $2.03 $2.65 $3.22 $3.88 $1.11 $1.24 $1.22 $1.12 $4.69 $1.20 $1.39 $1.22 $1.22 $5.03 $5.74 $6.61 S&P Ratings Services 1,695 1,767 2,035 2,274 2,455 606 658 587 578 2,428 552 613 562 560 2,286 2,316 2,367 12% 8% -1% -6% 1% 2% S&P Market Intellligence 916 1,031 1,124 1,170 1,237 320 324 356 405 1,405 407 414 419 426 1,666 1,836 2,024 4% 6% 14% 19% 10% 10% S&P Dow Jones Indices 273 323 388 493 552 143 148 156 151 597 151 168 167 162 648 697 744 27% 12% 8% 9% 8% 7% S&P Financial Services 2,828 3,058 3,478 3,861 4,158 1,048 1,108 1,076 1,110 4,342 1,087 1,171 1,123 1,123 4,503 4,749 5,035 11% 8% 4% 4% 5% 6% Platts 343 419 489 550 602 161 162 166 167 656 177 175 178 182 713 778 848 12% 10% 9% 9% 9% 9% Commercial 248 285 303 291 291 64 72 82 97 315 ------4% -0% 8% ------S&P Global Platts 591 704 792 841 893 225 234 248 264 971 254 262 178 182 876 778 848 6% 6% 9% -10% -11% 9% Intersegment elimination -56 -63 -69 -76 -86 -21 -22 -23 -24 -88 -23 -24 -25 -25 -97 -100 -100 11% 13% 2% 10% 3% -- Revenue (ex. Education) 3,419 3,762 4,270 4,702 5,051 1,273 1,342 1,324 1,374 5,313 1,341 1,433 1,301 1,305 5,379 5,527 5,882 10% 7% 5% 1% 3% 6% Intersegment elimination ------86 -21 -22 -22 -15 -80 -23 -22 -22 -22 -89 -88 -88 -- -- -7% 11% -1% -- Operating-related expenses ------1,564 1,627 406 406 407 453 1,672 457 473 438 448 1,816 1,843 1,957 -- 4% 3% 9% 1% 6% Unallocated expense ------148 30 35 33 32 130 31 37 38 38 144 130 130 -- -- -12% 11% -10% -- Selling and general expenses ------1,631 3,168 333 332 470 443 1,578 330 327 304 306 1,267 1,237 1,265 -- 94% -50% -20% -2% 2% Depreciation ------86 86 22 22 20 26 90 18 16 17 16 67 63 62 -- -- 5% -26% -6% -2% Amortization of intangibles ------51 48 11 11 17 28 67 24 24 24 25 97 92 87 -- -6% 40% 45% -5% -5% Total expenses 2,427 2,724 3,152 3,332 4,929 772 771 914 950 3,407 829 840 783 795 3,247 3,235 3,371 6% 48% -31% -5% -0% 4% EBITDA ------1,507 256 534 604 447 478 2,063 554 633 559 550 2,296 2,447 2,660 -- -83% 706% 11% 7% 9% EBIT 992 1,038 1,118 1,370 122 501 571 410 424 1,906 512 593 518 509 2,132 2,292 2,511 23% -91% 1,463% 12% 7% 10% Interest expense, net 82 76 81 59 59 16 16 30 40 102 40 40 40 40 161 171 192 -27% -- 73% 58% 6% 12% Other (income) loss -11 -13 -52 12 9 -- -11 -- -- -11 ------123% -25% -222% ------EBT 921 975 1,089 1,299 54 485 566 380 384 1,815 472 553 477 469 1,971 2,121 2,319 19% -96% 3,265% 9% 8% 9% Income tax 336 364 388 425 245 156 185 99 108 547 149 171 148 145 614 686 746 10% -42% 123% 12% 12% 9% Income from continuing operation 585 611 701 874 -191 329 381 281 276 1,267 323 382 329 324 1,358 1,435 1,573 25% -122% -763% 7% 6% 10% Net income from continuing operations attributable-17 -19to noncontrolling-50 interests-91 -102 -26 -28 -29 -28 -112 -29 -28 -28 -28 -113 -110 -110 82% 12% 10% 1% -3% -- Net income attributable to MHFI (continuing568 operations)592 651 783 -294 303 353 252 248 1,156 294 354 301 296 1,245 1,325 1,463 20% -138% -494% 8% 6% 10% Discontinued operations, net -- -- -209 592 160 ------383% -73% ------Net income -- -- 491 1,466 -13 329 381 281 276 1,267 323 382 329 324 1,358 1,435 1,573 198% -101% -10,130% 7% 6% 10% Net loss (income) from discontinued operations-- attributable-- to noncontrolling-4 1 interests 18 ------125% 1,700% ------Net income attributable to MHFI (total) -- -- 438 1,376 -116 303 353 252 248 1,156 294 354 301 296 1,245 1,325 1,463 214% -108% -1,100% 8% 6% 10% Reconciliation to Operating Basis Operating net revenues 3,412 3,762 4,270 4,702 5,051 1,273 1,342 1,324 1,374 5,313 1,341 1,433 1,301 1,305 5,379 5,527 5,882 10% 7% 5% 1% 3% 6% Intangible amortization ------11 -11 -17 -27 -66 -24 -24 -24 -25 -97 -92 -87 ------47% -5% -5% Expense adjustments -13 -41 -171 -198 -1,703 6 30 -118 -54 -136 -14 ------14 -- -- 16% 760% -92% -90% -- -- Operating expenses 2,414 2,683 2,981 3,134 3,226 767 790 779 869 3,205 791 816 759 770 3,136 3,143 3,284 5% 3% -1% -2% 0% 5% Operating EBITDA 1,009 -- 1,341 1,705 1,959 528 574 565 531 2,198 568 633 559 550 2,310 2,447 2,660 27% 15% 12% 5% 6% 9% Operating EBIT 1,009 1,092 1,341 1,568 1,825 506 563 545 505 2,119 550 617 542 534 2,243 2,384 2,598 17% 16% 16% 6% 6% 9% Operating EBT 927 1,016 1,260 1,497 1,757 490 547 515 465 2,017 510 577 501 494 2,082 2,213 2,406 19% 17% 15% 3% 6% 9% Income tax adjustments 6 16 65 81 337 -2 -8 51 25 66 12 7 7 8 35 -- -- 25% 316% -80% -48% -- -- Income taxes 342 380 453 506 583 154 177 150 133 614 161 179 155 153 648 686 746 12% 15% 5% 6% 6% 9% Discontined Operation -- -- -209 592 -178 ------383% -130% ------Non-controlling interest adjustment -17 -19 -52 -90 -103 -26 -28 -29 -28 -111 -29 -28 -28 -28 -113 -110 -110 73% 14% 8% 2% -3% -- Operating net income 568 617 755 901 1,072 310 342 336 304 1,292 320 370 318 313 1,321 1,417 1,550 19% 19% 20% 2% 7% 9% GAAP Basic EPS $1.84 $1.98 $2.33 $2.85 -$1.08 $1.11 $1.28 $0.93 $0.92 $4.26 $1.11 $1.34 $1.16 $1.17 $4.78 $5.42 $6.30 22% -138% -494% 12% 13% 16% GAAP Diluted EPS $1.82 $1.95 $2.29 $2.80 -$1.06 $1.10 $1.28 $0.92 $0.91 $4.21 $1.10 $1.33 $1.15 $1.16 $4.74 $5.37 $6.23 22% -138% -496% 13% 13% 16% Discontinued ops ------$2.04 -$0.64 ------Operating EPS $1.82 $2.03 $2.65 $3.22 $3.88 $1.11 $1.24 $1.22 $1.12 $4.69 $1.20 $1.39 $1.22 $1.22 $5.03 $5.74 $6.61 21% 20% 21% 7% 14% 15% Basic share count 309.4 298.1 278.6 274.5 271.5 273.5 273.1 271.3 268.5 271.6 265.0 263.3 259.2 253.4 260.2 244.3 232.2 -1% -1% 0% -4% -6% -5% Dilutive securities 2.8 5.5 6.0 5.3 4.7 2.8 2.6 3.1 3.6 3.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.5 -12% -11% -36% -27% 14% -- Diluted share count 312.2 303.6 284.6 279.8 276.2 276.3 275.7 274.4 272.1 274.6 267.2 265.5 261.4 255.6 262.4 246.8 234.7 -2% -1% -1% -4% -6% -5% Shares outstanding, eop 308.0 276.0 279.0 271.0 272.0 273.7 272.5 270.3 266.0 266.0 264.5 262.1 256.2 250.7 250.7 237.8 226.6 -3% 0% -2% -6% -5% -5% Anti-dilutive options ------

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates 55 Balance Sheet

S&P Global Financial Earnings Model Ashley N. Serrao, CFA (212) 538-8424 (December year end, dollars in millions, except per-share data) Credit Suisse '10-13 annuals ex. broadcasting, education, construction & aviation week FY FY FY FY FY 2015 FY 2016 FY FY FY 2013/ 2014/ 2015/ 2016/ 2017/ 2018/ 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2015 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 2016 2017 2018 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Balance Sheet Cash and equivalents 1,526 835 760 1,542 2,497 1,176 1,720 1,441 1,481 1,481 1,600 1,635 2,419 2,022 2,022 1,508 1,524 103% 62% -41% 37% -25% 1% Short-term investments 22 29 1 18 ------6 6 ------1,700% ------Accounts receivable, net of allowance for973 doubtful accounts702 954 949 932 992 1,063 986 991 991 978 ------1% -2% 6% ------Inventories 275 ------Deferred income taxes 281 110 117 108 363 329 203 203 109 109 110 ------8% 236% -70% ------Prepaid and other current assets 298 128 127 227 174 191 227 206 206 206 189 ------79% -23% 18% ------Assets held for sale -- 2,508 1,940 97 ------503 503 571 ------95% ------Total current assets 3,375 4,312 3,899 2,941 3,966 2,688 3,213 2,836 3,296 3,296 3,448 ------25% 35% -17% ------Prepublication costs, net 365 ------Property and equipment, net of accumulated522 depreciation373 368 249 206 200 208 237 270 270 251 ------32% -17% 31% ------Goodwill 1,887 1,104 1,438 1,409 1,387 1,365 1,383 2,968 2,882 2,882 2,869 ------2% -2% 108% ------Indefinite-lived intangible assets ------Copyrights - net ------Other intangible assets, net 616 427 1,081 1,033 1,004 986 977 1,881 1,522 1,522 1,488 ------4% -3% 52% ------Asset for pension benefits -- -- 98 261 ------36 36 ------166% ------Other non-current assets 282 404 168 168 208 209 232 241 177 177 205 ------24% -15% ------Total assets 7,047 6,620 7,052 6,061 6,771 5,448 6,013 8,163 8,183 8,183 8,261 8,529 8,568 8,557 8,557 9,069 9,696 -14% 12% 21% 5% 6% 7% Notes payable ------Accounts payable 392 223 249 210 191 181 181 211 206 206 168 ------16% -9% 8% ------Accrued royalties 114 ------Accrued compensation and contributions498 to retirement415 plans 453 423 410 201 264 320 383 383 193 ------7% -3% -7% ------Short-term debt -- 400 457 -- -- 365 -- -- 143 143 472 472 472 472 472 472 472 ------230% -- -- Income taxes currently payable 24 33 158 15 ------56 56 ------91% ------Unearned revenue 1,204 1,187 1,229 1,268 1,323 1,356 1,387 1,453 1,421 1,421 1,458 ------3% 4% 7% ------Deferred gain on sale-leaseback ------Accrued legal and regulatory settlements ------1,609 68 23 104 121 121 ------92% ------Other current liabilities 449 392 457 402 434 408 385 417 372 372 488 ------12% 8% -14% ------Liabilities held for sale -- 719 664 54 ------206 206 203 ------92% ------Total current liabilities 2,681 3,369 3,667 2,372 3,967 2,579 2,240 2,505 2,908 2,908 2,982 ------35% 67% -27% ------Long-term debt 1,198 798 799 799 799 799 1,494 3,489 3,468 3,468 3,469 3,469 3,469 3,469 3,469 3,728 4,328 -- -- 334% 0% 7% 16% Deferred income taxes ------Liability for postretirement healthcare and --other benefits------Pension and other postretirement benefits436 511 529 264 333 319 285 278 276 276 267 ------50% 26% -17% ------Deferred gain on sale-leaseback ------Deferred income taxes -- -- 56 206 ------23 23 ------268% ------Other non-current liabilities 440 358 351 266 323 352 369 377 345 345 353 ------24% 21% 7% ------Total other liabilities 2,074 1,667 1,735 1,535 1,455 1,470 2,148 4,144 4,112 4,112 4,089 ------12% -5% 183% ------Total liabilities 4,755 5,036 5,402 3,907 5,422 4,049 4,388 6,649 7,020 7,020 7,071 8,001 7,831 7,615 7,615 7,164 6,690 -28% 39% 29% 8% -6% -7%

Redeemable noncontrolling interest -- -- 810 810 810 810 810 810 920 920 920 ------14% ------Total equity 2,292 1,584 840 1,344 539 589 815 704 243 243 270 529 737 941 941 1,904 3,006 60% -60% -55% 287% 102% 58% Total liabilities and equity 7,047 6,620 7,052 6,061 6,771 5,448 6,013 8,163 8,183 8,183 8,261 8,529 8,568 8,557 8,557 9,069 9,696 -14% 12% 21% 5% 6% 7% Book value per share $7.44 $5.74 $3.01 $4.96 $1.98 $2.15 $2.99 $2.60 $0.91 $0.91 $1.02 $2.02 $2.88 $3.75 $3.75 $7.72 $12.80 65% -60% -54% 311% 106% 66% Tangible book value per share -$0.69 $0.19 -$6.02 -$4.05 -$6.81 -$6.44 -$5.67 -$15.33 -$15.64 -$15.64 -$15.45 ------33% 68% 130% ------Cash held outside the U.S. ------85% 70% -- 90% 90% ------

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates 56 Statement of Cash Flows

S&P Global Financial Statement of Cash Flows Ashley N. Serrao, CFA (212) 538-8424 (December year end, dollars in millions, except per-share data) Credit Suisse FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY 2015 FY 2016 FY FY FY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 1Q Q2 Q3 Q4 2015 1Q Q2 Q3 Q4 2016 2017 2018 Net Income 1,027 819 750 852 934 492 1,466 -13 329 382 281 276 1,268 323 354 301 296 1,274 1,325 1,463 (+) Depreciation 113 150 138 125 93 93 86 86 22 21 21 26 90 18 16 17 16 67 63 62 (+) Amortization of intangibles 48 58 53 46 33 48 51 48 11 12 17 27 67 24 24 24 25 97 92 87 (+) Amortization of prepublication costs 240 270 270 246 ------(+) Depreciation & amortization 401 478 461 417 126 141 137 134 33 33 38 53 157 42 40 41 41 164 155 149 (+) Stock compensation expense 125 -2 22 66 77 90 96 100 18 19 18 23 78 14 21 20 20 75 83 88 (+) Other operational items -324 -352 -346 -229 -365 -193 -293 -377 72 120 -7 -392 -207 33 ------33 -- -- (+) Change in working capital 487 234 443 352 152 200 -624 1,365 -1,801 -102 211 591 -1,101 -279 60 80 15 -124 -75 -75 Operating Cash Flow 1,716 1,177 1,330 1,458 924 730 782 1,209 -1,349 452 541 551 195 133 475 442 371 1,421 1,488 1,626 (-) Capital expenditures -230 -131 -92 -115 -92 -96 -117 -92 -16 -26 -32 -65 -139 -16 -43 -39 -52 -150 -149 -147 (-) Acquisition, net -87 -48 -- -364 -194 -177 -47 -71 -2 -- -2,391 -3 -2,396 -7 -- 1,100 -- 1,093 -- -- (-) Investments, net -- -- -25 2 -6 27 -17 15 -1 -6 4 -1 -4 -1 ------1 -- -- (-) Other -254 -254 -162 -120 21 -- 51 83 -- 14 -- -- 14 ------Investing Cash Flow -570 -433 -279 -597 -271 -246 -130 -65 -19 -18 -2,419 -69 -2,525 -24 -43 1,061 -52 942 -149 -147 (-) Cash dividends paid -278 -280 -281 -292 -296 -984 -308 -326 -94 -91 -89 -89 -363 -96 -95 -93 -91 -375 -362 -362 (+) Issuance of capital stock 147 41 25 50 139 299 258 193 57 16 4 9 86 31 ------31 -- -- (-) Repurchase of capital stock -2,213 -447 -- -256 -1,500 -295 -978 -362 -110 -164 -227 -473 -974 -226 -300 -625 -625 -1,776 -1,750 -1,700 (+) Senior notes, net 1,189 ------400 ------690 1,984 -- 2,674 ------259 600 (-) Short term debt, net -2 70 -70 -- -- 457 -457 -- 365 -365 -- 143 143 329 ------329 -- -- (+) Other 36 -5 -9 -35 -3 18 -258 33 2 -13 -38 -7 -56 -27 ------27 -- -- Financing Cash Flow 68 -621 -335 -533 -1,660 -1,305 -1,743 -462 220 73 1,634 -417 4,184 11 -395 -718 -716 -1,818 -1,853 -1,462 (+) Exchange Rate Effect 17 -48 22 -12 -10 5 -1 -65 -44 37 -35 -25 -67 -1 ------1 -- -- Cash Summary Cash Beginning of Period 353 394 469 1,207 1,523 832 757 1,539 2,494 1,173 1,717 1,438 2,494 1,478 1,597 1,635 2,419 1,478 2,022 1,508 (+) Cash Generated 41 75 738 316 -1,017 -416 -1,092 617 -1,192 544 -279 40 -887 119 37 784 -397 544 -514 16 Cash at End of Period 394 469 1,207 1,523 832 757 1,539 2,494 1,173 1,717 1,438 1,478 1,478 1,597 1,635 2,419 2,022 2,022 1,508 1,524 Free Cash Flow GAAP Free Cash Flow 1,486 1,046 1,238 1,343 812 584 665 1,117 -1,365 426 509 486 56 117 432 403 319 1,271 1,338 1,479 GAAP FCF per share $4.31 $3.28 $3.96 $4.30 $2.67 $2.05 $2.38 $4.04 -$4.94 $1.55 $1.85 $1.79 $0.20 $0.44 $1.63 $1.54 $1.25 $4.84 $5.42 $6.30 Profitability trends Stock amortization % of rev 1.8% -0.0% 0.4% 1.1% 1.9% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.7% 1.5% 1.0% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.5% 1.5% D&A as a % of rev 5.9% 7.5% 7.9% 6.9% 3.2% 3.3% 2.9% 2.7% 2.6% 2.5% 2.9% 3.9% 3.0% 3.1% 2.8% 3.2% 3.1% 3.0% 2.8% 2.5% Capex % of rev 3.4% 2.1% 1.6% 1.9% 2.3% 2.2% 2.5% 1.8% 1.3% 1.9% 2.4% 4.7% 2.6% 1.2% 3.0% 3.0% 4.0% 2.8% 2.7% 2.5%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates 57 Disclosures Companies Mentioned (Price as of 08-Jul-2016) relative to the analyst's coverage universe which consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector, with Outperforms representing the most attractive, Neutrals the less attractive, and Underperforms the least attractive investment opportunities. For Latin American and non-Japan Asia stocks, ratings are Bank of America Corp. (BAC.N, $13.17) based on a stock’s total return relative to the average total return of the relevant country or regional benchmark; prior to 2nd October 2012 U.S. and Canadian ratings Barclays (BCS.BA, $21.75) CBOE Holdings Inc. (CBOE.OQ, $67.64) were based on (1) a stock’s absolute total return potential to its current share price and (2) the relative attractiveness of a stock’s total return potential within an analyst’s CME Group Inc. (CME.OQ, $98.9) coverage universe. For Australian and New Zealand stocks, the expected total return (ETR) calculation includes 12-month rolling dividend yield. An Outperform rating is CRISIL (CRSL.BO, Rs1994.85) assigned where an ETR is greater than or equal to 7.5%; Underperform where an ETR less than or equal to 5%. A Neutral may be assigned where the ETR is between - Citigroup Inc. (C.N, $41.98) 5% and 15%. The overlapping rating range allows analysts to assign a rating that puts ETR in the context of associated risks. Prior to 18 May 2015, ETR ranges for Copam (COPM.LS, €27.96) Outperform and Underperform ratings did not overlap with Neutral thresholds between 15% and 7.5%, which was in operation from 7 July 2011. Corelogic (CLGX.N, $40.22) Deutsche Bank (DBKGn.F, €11.804) Restricted (R) : In certain circumstances, Credit Suisse policy and/or applicable law and regulations preclude certain types of communications, Dun & Bradstreet (DNB.N, $123.82) including an investment recommendation, during the course of Credit Suisse's engagement in an investment banking transaction and in certain other Euler Hermes (ELER.PA, €71.71) Experian (EXPN.L, 1449.0p) circumstances. Factset Research Systems Inc. (FDS.N, $161.02) Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (GS.N, $150.38) Not Rated : Credit Suisse Equity Research does not have an investment rating or view on the stock or any other securities related to the company at HSBC (HSBC.N, $30.51) this time. ICRA (ICRA.BO, Rs3897.45) IHS (IHS.N, $113.97) Not Covered (NC) : Credit Suisse Equity Research does not provide ongoing coverage of the company or offer an investment rating or investment view International Business Machines Corp. (IBM.N, $154.46) on the equity security of the company or related products. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM.N, $61.83) MSCI (MSCI.N, $79.45) Markit Ltd. (MRKT.OQ, $32.03) Volatility Indicator [V] : A stock is defined as volatile if the stock price has moved up or down by 20% or more in a month in at least 8 of the past 24 Moody's Corporation (MCO.N, $96.73, NEUTRAL, TP $99.0) months or the analyst expects significant volatility going forward. Morningstar (MORN.OQ, $81.38) NASDAQ Group Inc. (NDAQ.OQ, $65.88) Analysts’ sector weightings are distinct from analysts’ stock ratings and are based on the analyst’s expectations for the fundamentals and/or valuation of Oracle Corporation (ORCL.N, $40.87) S&P Global (SPGI.K, $108.87, OUTPERFORM, TP $123.0) the sector* relative to the group’s historic fundamentals and/or valuation: Thomson Reuters Corporation (TRI.N, $40.89) Verisk Analytics Inc. (VRSK.OQ, $83.4) Overweight : The analyst’s expectation for the sector’s fundamentals and/or valuation is favorable over the next 12 months. Market Weight : The analyst’s expectation for the sector’s fundamentals and/or valuation is neutral over the next 12 months. Underweight : The analyst’s expectation for the sector’s fundamentals and/or valuation is cautious over the next 12 months. Disclosure Appendix *An analyst’s coverage sector consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector. An analyst may cover multiple sectors. Important Global Disclosures Credit Suisse's distribution of stock ratings (and banking clients) is: I, Ashley N. Serrao, CFA, certify that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect my personal views about all of the subject companies and securities and (2) no part of my compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this Global Ratings Distribution report. Rating Versus universe (%) Of which banking clients (%) 3-Year Price and Rating History for Moody's Corporation (MCO.N) Outperform/Buy* 55% (42% banking clients) Neutral/Hold* 35% (17% banking clients) Underperform/Sell* 10% (40% banking clients) MCO.N Closing Price Target Price Restricted 0% Date (US$) (US$) Rating *For purposes of the NYSE and NASD ratings distribution disclosure requirements, our stock ratings of Outperform, Neutral, and Underperform most closely correspond 10-Dec-13 73.09 87.00 O * to Buy, Hold, and Sell, respectively; however, the meanings are not the same, as our stock ratings are determined on a relative basis. (Please refer to definitions above.) 07-Feb-14 80.02 95.00 An investor's decision to buy or sell a security should be based on investment objectives, current holdings, and other individual factors. 07-May-14 81.98 97.00 30-Jun-14 87.66 102.00 Credit Suisse’s policy is to update research reports as it deems appropriate, based on developments with the subject company, the sector or the market 08-Sep-14 95.50 NR that may have a material impact on the research views or opinions stated herein. * Asterisk signifies initiation or assumption of coverage. Credit Suisse's policy is only to publish investment research that is impartial, independent, clear, fair and not misleading. For more detail please refer to Credit Suisse's Policies for Managing Conflicts of Interest in connection with Investment Research: http://www.csfb.com/research-and- analytics/disclaimer/managing_conflicts_disclaimer.html Credit Suisse does not provide any tax advice. Any statement herein regarding any US federal tax is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be OUTPERFORM NOT COVERED used, by any taxpayer for the purposes of avoiding any penalties.

3-Year Price and Rating History for S&P Global (SPGI.K) Target Price and Rating Valuation Methodology and Risks: (12 months) for Moody's Corporation (MCO.N)

SPGI.K Closing Price Target Price Method: Our $99 target price is based on 20x our 2017 EPS estimate, reflective of historical analysis of trading multiples and present growth Date (US$) (US$) Rating expectations. Our Neutral rating reflects expected performance relative to peers, as we believe that the firm is presently operating at peak 10-Dec-13 73.81 86.00 O * margins, and the pro-cyclical transaction-oriented ratings business model could pressure margins in the event of a downturn. 07-May-14 76.07 95.00 08-Sep-14 85.20 NR Risk: Risks to our Neutral rating include: 1) Corporate issuance debt boom that complements strong refinancing pipelines and MCO’s exposure to the ratings business 2) stronger than expected Analytics margin expansion 3) stronger than expected pricing power * Asterisk signifies initiation or assumption of coverage. Target Price and Rating Valuation Methodology and Risks: (12 months) for S&P Global (SPGI.K)

Method: Our $123 target price is based on 21x our 2017 EPS estimate, reflective of historical analysis of trading multiples and present growth expectations. 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