Buddhism and Religious Diversity

PERRY SCHMIDT-LEUKEL Buddhism and Religious Diversity A Response to Rita Gross Rita Gross, a practicing Buddhist (in the Tibetan tradition) and a professor emerita of religious studies, well known in the Buddhist and academic world, inter alia for her ground-breaking work in the field of Buddhist feminism (Gross 1993), has recently published a substantial monograph on Buddhism’s attitude to religious diversity (Gross 2014b). The book was preceded by two significant articles (Gross 2005 and 2011) which contained, though in much more con- densed form, the same basic thesis as the book: Buddhism sees religious diversity as normal and hence as not problematic. In this respect, according to Gross, Buddhism is different from other religions, especially from Christianity and Islam. There are, however, two major ambiguities about her thesis. The first relates to the nature of the thesis: Does it express (1) an essential norm (true/genuine Buddhism regards religious diversity as unproblematic), (2) a regulative ideal (Buddhism should regard religious diversity as unproblematic), (3) “advice” (it would be possible and good for Buddhism to regard religious diversity as unproblematic), or (4) a historical statement (Buddhism usually regarded religious diversity as unproblematic1)? As I read her various statements, she seems to shift between all four of these possible meanings. The second ambiguity re- fers to the exact content of her thesis: Gross seems to presuppose that if 1 Though in her review Gross (Gross 2014a) tends to make such a claim, she is more hesitant in her book, even if this book is not on the history of Buddhism’s interfaith relations. Gross rightly states that in the case of Buddhist inclusivism “the inevitability and naturalness of religious diversity is not really acknowledged” (Gross 2014b: 93). But she stumbles on the question of how representative such an inclusivistic stance has been. On one and the same page she writes that it is found “often,” “sometimes” (note 4) and “extensively in Mahayana Buddhist polemics” (Gross 2014: 93). In relation to Christian views “about the depth of human flaws and failings,” she suggests that the Buddhist view of the “basic goodness” of human nature “may well be much more conducive to improving human flourishing and human society” (Gross 2014b: 329). This might indicate that she herself takes an inclusivistic approach not only towards other religions but also other forms of Buddhism like Pure Land Buddhist schools that are less optimistic about human nature. A full analysis of her own position, however, would require a far more extensive study of her work. 109 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 25 (2015) 1 something is seen as “normal” it is also regarded as unproblematic. This, however, is far from evident. Many of the evils in life are quite normal. According to Buddhism, suffering is (in most cases) an evil, but a very normal one. Buddhism promises liberation from things like transitory existence (old age, disease, death), attachment, ego-centeredness, delusion—all of them, also from a Buddhist perspective, rather “normal” phenomena of human life but never- theless something from which liberation is sought. Hence, if it is stated that Buddhism sees religious diversity as “normal,” this does not automatically imply that Buddhism regards religious diversity as unproblematic or even as good. Perhaps it is seen as “normal” and as evil, for example, as part of the most fundamental evil of delusion. In Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 24/2, Rita Gross published an extensive review (Gross 2014a) of my four-volumes anthology on Buddhism and Re- ligious Diversity (Schmidt-Leukel 2013). Although she admits the possible benefit of this collection for academic research (Gross 2014a: 270), her overall assessment amounts to a sharp criticism. As the editor who collated and in- troduced the texts in this anthology, I am grateful to the editors of this journal for granting me the opportunity of replying to Gross’ criticism. As I try to show, her critique most probably emerges from the fact that much of the material presented in these four volumes is at odds with her own position on Buddhism and religious diversity. My response to her review is thus more than merely a defence against her criticism (though it is this as well). It is also in- tended as a contribution to the discussion on whether Buddhism—like any other major religion—may also be in need of, and would benefit from, a substantial and self-critical review of its own attitude to other religions and to religious diversity as such. In detail, Rita Gross’ main points of criticism are: (1) “Quite a number of the historiographical and sociological articles were authored by people who do not seem to understand Buddhism very well” (Gross 2014a: 270). (2) “Furthermore … the most relevant information about Buddhism and its interactions with other religions with which it has shared a historical stage is still lacking” (Gross 2014a: 270). She even holds: “One would not learn much of the basic historical information I sup- plied in this review even after reading all 1437 pages of all four volumes” (Gross 2014a: 270). (3) In particular, the first volume, which deals with Buddhism’s relation to Eastern Religions “does little to enhance our understanding of Bud- dhism’s relationships with other religions of India and East Asia” (Gross 2014a: 270). (4) She repeatedly criticizes the inclusion of specific articles as, for example, Anagarika Dharmapala’s view of Buddhism’s self-understanding in relation to religious diversity (Gross 2014a: 266), Maurice 110 BUDDHISM AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY Walshe’s chapter on his (Buddhist) view of Christianity (Gross 2014a: 260, and Izutsu’s (Buddhist) view of the Islamic doctrine of the “unity of existence” (Gross 2014a: 262). (5) At various places (Gross 2014a: 253, 256, 266) Gross criticizes, particularly in relation to volumes one and four, the anthology for too often having non-Buddhist scholars presenting the Buddhists’ voices rather than Buddhists themselves. Before addressing these criticisms, it will be helpful to point out the overall structure of the four volumes because this is not always adequately rendered in Gross’ review. Volumes one to three deal with Buddhism’s relation to specific non-Buddhist religions: religions that later became summarized as “Hindu- ism,” other forms of Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, Korean Shamanism, and Shintoism (vol. one); Christianity (vol. two); and Islam and Judaism (vol. three). Volume four deals with Buddhist views of religious diversity as such and Buddhism’s self-understanding in the face of religious diversity. “Bud- dhism” is, of course, not treated as a monolithic entity. The four volumes are very clear not only about the diversity of different Buddhist traditions and schools (and school-specific features) but also about the huge variety of positions taken within some of these schools. Particularly in relation to Buddhist views of Christianity (vol. 4), a broad spectrum of TheravƗda, Zen, Tibetan, Pure Land, Nichiren, and Chinese Buddhist perspectives are involved. Similarly, volume four presents Buddhist perspectives from early pre-Ma- hƗyƗna Buddhism, from “modern” (19th century) Buddhism—as shaped by the new category of “religion” (chapters 70 and 71)—and from contemporary TheravƗda Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism, Nichiren Buddhism, Zen and Pure Land Buddhism. The basic structure of the work is thus not geographic (as Gross frequently suggests) but is organized along the religions involved. In a number of cases however, there is a significant overlap between these tradition-specific perspectives and geographic location. Buddhism’s relation to the various forms of Hinduism is, of course, primarily a matter of earlier Indian forms of Buddhism (MahƗyƗna and non-MahƗyƗna) and Sri Lankan (ignored by Gross) TheravƗda Buddhism, and not that much a problem for, Zen or Pure Land Buddhism, for example, although there is some connection: One thing that the material collected in volume one clearly demonstrates is that the perception of other religions by later forms of Buddhism was significantly influ- enced by early Buddhism’s perception of rival faiths (Vedic Brahmanism and rival ĝrama৆a groups)—something that apparently escaped Gross’ attention entirely but is clear from the chapters themselves and from the detailed introduction. The introductions provided at the beginning of each volume (more or less ignored by Gross) not only explain the reasons behind the selection of the material but also how the altogether 86 chapters are thematically interlinked. But let me now address Gross’ critique in more detail. The declared aim of the whole collection is to present Buddhist perspectives (note the plural!) on other 111 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 25 (2015) 1 “religions” (the problems of this category are addressed in both the “General Introduction” and in various chapters of the anthology). Only 36 of the 86 chapters are authored by non-Buddhists (although I’m not fully clear about the supposedly non-Buddhist authors’ religious affiliation in each single case). If the chapters provide historical overviews on specific periods and/or forms of Buddhist approaches to or interaction with other religions, the emphasis in almost all cases is clearly on the Buddhist side. Rita Gross criticizes the work for presenting Buddhists’ voices are too often presented by non-Buddhist scholars rather than Buddhists themselves. In a number of cases, however, this was inevitable: there are simply not enough Buddhist scholars who have done extensive research (and above all not in the English language) on wider areas of Buddhism’s relation to other faiths. If they were available (as in the case of the overview chapter on Buddhism and Islam by Alex Berzin) they have been included. Gross complains, polemically,2 that, particularly in volume four, which deals with the internal Buddhist discourse on religious diversity in general, some chapters are written by non-Buddhists.

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