Buddhism and Religious Diversity

PERRY SCHMIDT-LEUKEL

A Response to Rita Gross

Rita Gross, a practicing Buddhist (in the Tibetan tradition) and a professor emerita of religious studies, well known in the Buddhist and academic world, inter alia for her ground-breaking work in the field of Buddhist feminism (Gross 1993), has recently published a substantial monograph on Buddhism’s attitude to religious diversity (Gross 2014b). The book was preceded by two significant articles (Gross 2005 and 2011) which contained, though in much more con- densed form, the same basic thesis as the book: Buddhism sees religious diversity as normal and hence as not problematic. In this respect, according to Gross, Buddhism is different from other religions, especially from Christianity and Islam.

There are, however, two major ambiguities about her thesis. The first relates to the nature of the thesis: Does it express (1) an essential norm (true/genuine Buddhism regards religious diversity as unproblematic), (2) a regulative ideal (Buddhism should regard religious diversity as unproblematic), (3) “advice” (it would be possible and good for Buddhism to regard religious diversity as unproblematic), or (4) a historical statement (Buddhism usually regarded religious diversity as unproblematic1)? As I read her various statements, she seems to shift between all four of these possible meanings. The second ambiguity re- fers to the exact content of her thesis: Gross seems to presuppose that if

1 Though in her review Gross (Gross 2014a) tends to make such a claim, she is more hesitant in her book, even if this book is not on the history of Buddhism’s interfaith relations. Gross rightly states that in the case of Buddhist inclusivism “the inevitability and naturalness of religious diversity is not really acknowledged” (Gross 2014b: 93). But she stumbles on the question of how representative such an inclusivistic stance has been. On one and the same page she writes that it is found “often,” “sometimes” (note 4) and “extensively in Mahayana Buddhist polemics” (Gross 2014: 93). In relation to Christian views “about the depth of human flaws and failings,” she suggests that the Buddhist view of the “basic goodness” of human nature “may well be much more conducive to improving human flourishing and human society” (Gross 2014b: 329). This might indicate that she herself takes an inclusivistic approach not only towards other religions but also other forms of Buddhism like Pure Land Buddhist schools that are less optimistic about human nature. A full analysis of her own position, however, would require a far more extensive study of her work.

109 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 25 (2015) 1 something is seen as “normal” it is also regarded as unproblematic. This, however, is far from evident. Many of the evils in life are quite normal. According to Buddhism, suffering is (in most cases) an evil, but a very normal one. Buddhism promises liberation from things like transitory existence (old age, disease, death), attachment, ego-centeredness, delusion—all of them, also from a Buddhist perspective, rather “normal” phenomena of human life but nevertheless something from which liberation is sought. Hence, if it is stated that Buddhism sees religious diversity as “normal,” this does not automatically imply that Buddhism regards religious diversity as unproblematic or even as good. Perhaps it is seen as “normal” and as evil, for example, as part of the most fundamental evil of delusion.

In Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 24/2, Rita Gross published an extensive review (Gross 2014a) of my four-volumes anthology on Buddhism and Re- ligious Diversity (Schmidt-Leukel 2013). Although she admits the possible benefit of this collection for academic research (Gross 2014a: 270), her overall assessment amounts to a sharp criticism. As the editor who collated and in- troduced the texts in this anthology, I am grateful to the editors of this journal for granting me the opportunity of replying to Gross’ criticism. As I try to show, her critique most probably emerges from the fact that much of the material presented in these four volumes is at odds with her own position on Buddhism and religious diversity. My response to her review is thus more than merely a defence against her criticism (though it is this as well). It is also in- tended as a contribution to the discussion on whether Buddhism—like any other major religion—may also be in need of, and would benefit from, a substantial and self-critical review of its own attitude to other religions and to religious diversity as such.

In detail, Rita Gross’ main points of criticism are: (1) “Quite a number of the historiographical and sociological articles were authored by people who do not seem to understand Buddhism very well” (Gross 2014a: 270). (2) “Furthermore … the most relevant information about Buddhism and its interactions with other religions with which it has shared a historical stage is still lacking” (Gross 2014a: 270). She even holds: “One would not learn much of the basic historical information I supplied in this review even after reading all 1437 pages of all four volumes” (Gross 2014a: 270). (3) In particular, the first volume, which deals with Buddhism’s relation to Eastern Religions “does little to enhance our understanding of Bud- dhism’s relationships with other religions of India and East Asia” (Gross 2014a: 270). (4) She repeatedly criticizes the inclusion of specific articles as, for example, Anagarika Dharmapala’s view of Buddhism’s self-understanding in relation to religious diversity (Gross 2014a: 266), Maurice 110 BUDDHISM AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

Walshe’s chapter on his (Buddhist) view of Christianity (Gross 2014a: 260, and Izutsu’s (Buddhist) view of the Islamic doctrine of the “unity of existence” (Gross 2014a: 262). (5) At various places (Gross 2014a: 253, 256, 266) Gross criticizes, particularly in relation to volumes one and four, the anthology for too often having non-Buddhist scholars presenting the Buddhists’ voices rather than Buddhists themselves.

Before addressing these criticisms, it will be helpful to point out the overall structure of the four volumes because this is not always adequately rendered in Gross’ review. Volumes one to three deal with Buddhism’s relation to specific non-Buddhist religions: religions that later became summarized as “Hindu- ism,” other forms of Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism, Korean Shamanism, and Shintoism (vol. one); Christianity (vol. two); and Islam and Judaism (vol. three). Volume four deals with Buddhist views of religious diversity as such and Buddhism’s self-understanding in the face of religious diversity. “Bud- dhism” is, of course, not treated as a monolithic entity. The four volumes are very clear not only about the diversity of different Buddhist traditions and schools (and school-specific features) but also about the huge variety of positions taken within some of these schools. Particularly in relation to Buddhist views of Christianity (vol. 4), a broad spectrum of TheravƗda, Zen, Tibetan, Pure Land, Nichiren, and Chinese Buddhist perspectives are involved. Similarly, volume four presents Buddhist perspectives from early pre-Ma- hƗyƗna Buddhism, from “modern” (19th century) Buddhism—as shaped by the new category of “religion” (chapters 70 and 71)—and from contemporary TheravƗda Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism, Nichiren Buddhism, Zen and Pure Land Buddhism. The basic structure of the work is thus not geographic (as Gross frequently suggests) but is organized along the religions involved. In a number of cases however, there is a significant overlap between these tradition-specific perspectives and geographic location. Buddhism’s relation to the various forms of Hinduism is, of course, primarily a matter of earlier Indian forms of Buddhism (MahƗyƗna and non-MahƗyƗna) and Sri Lankan (ignored by Gross) TheravƗda Buddhism, and not that much a problem for, Zen or Pure Land Buddhism, for example, although there is some connection: One thing that the material collected in volume one clearly demonstrates is that the perception of other religions by later forms of Buddhism was significantly influ- enced by early Buddhism’s perception of rival faiths (Vedic Brahmanism and rival ĝrama৆a groups)—something that apparently escaped Gross’ attention entirely but is clear from the chapters themselves and from the detailed introduction. The introductions provided at the beginning of each volume (more or less ignored by Gross) not only explain the reasons behind the selection of the material but also how the altogether 86 chapters are thematically interlinked.

But let me now address Gross’ critique in more detail. The declared aim of the whole collection is to present Buddhist perspectives (note the plural!) on other 111 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 25 (2015) 1

“religions” (the problems of this category are addressed in both the “General Introduction” and in various chapters of the anthology). Only 36 of the 86 chapters are authored by non-Buddhists (although I’m not fully clear about the supposedly non-Buddhist authors’ religious affiliation in each single case). If the chapters provide historical overviews on specific periods and/or forms of Buddhist approaches to or interaction with other religions, the emphasis in almost all cases is clearly on the Buddhist side. Rita Gross criticizes the work for presenting Buddhists’ voices are too often presented by non-Buddhist scholars rather than Buddhists themselves. In a number of cases, however, this was inevitable: there are simply not enough Buddhist scholars who have done extensive research (and above all not in the English language) on wider areas of Buddhism’s relation to other faiths. If they were available (as in the case of the overview chapter on Buddhism and Islam by Alex Berzin) they have been included. Gross complains, polemically,2 that, particularly in volume four, which deals with the internal Buddhist discourse on religious diversity in general, some chapters are written by non-Buddhists. Of the 20 chapters in volume four, only 4 are authored by people who are presumably3 not Buddhists. I cannot see that their summaries of Buddhist inclusivisms (K.B. Kiblinger), positions in the PƗli canon (O. Freiberger), the writings of the 19th-century Japanese Buddhist Inoue Enryǀ (J.Ɩ. Josephson), of the Nichiren Buddhist tradition (J. Stone), would seriously interfere with the basic intention of the book to present authentic Buddhist perspectives.

This, however, is questioned when Gross states that “[q]uite a number of the historiographical and sociological articles were authored by people who do not seem to understand Buddhism very well” (Gross 2014a: 270). Reading this statement, one might wonder who these uninformed people, lacking seriously in the understanding of their subject, are, and why I, as editor, decided to include such incompetent people (perhaps because my own understanding of Buddhism is not very sound?). These scholars include, among others, Ernst Steinkellner, Uma Chakravarti, John Clifford Holt, Jamie Hubbard, Arthur Wright, T.H. Barett, Imre Hamar, Timothy Brook, James H. Grayson, Mark Teeuwen, Fabio Rambelli, Hans-Joachim Klimkeit, Kitsiri Malagoda, Whalen Lai, John Newman, etc.—all of them highly reputable scholars, widely known for their expertise in their subject areas based on their own extensive research and all free from any anti-Buddhist bias. So what does it tell us about Gross’ own understanding of Buddhism if she states that “a number of” these scholars “do not seem to understand Buddhism very well”? This sweeping, unjustified,

2 “… one would think that contemporary normative Buddhist comments about religious diversity should be authored by Buddhists” Gross 2014b, 266. 3 The chapter by Paul Williams originates from the time when he was still a Ge- lugpa Buddhist. Richard Hayes (also known as DayƗmati DharmacƗrƗ) is a Buddhist and Quaker. I am not sure about the religious affiliation of J.Ɩ. Josephson and J. Stone.

112 BUDDHISM AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY and unjustifiable statement apparently indicates that Gross operates with a highly normative understanding of what Buddhism genuinely, truly, essentially is or has to be and how, accordingly, Buddhism relates to other religions. If so- ber and sound socio-historical research contradicts her views, the reason must therefore be a lack of understanding on the part of the researchers. But has Gross herself done socio-historical research in those areas? Her publications, including her recent monograph, do not give any evidence that she has.

All the more baffling is her next point of critique: “[o]ne would not learn much of the basic historical information I supplied in this review even after reading all 1437 pages of all four volumes” (Gross 2014a: 270). The question of how much “basic historical information” is supplied in her review and how much of it is found in the substantial historical overviews contained in these volumes and written by some of the most outstanding experts is something every reader can easily check for him-/herself. This point of critique displays a shocking degree of disconnect with reality—“shocking” because it does not at all reflect the standard of Gross’ own previous scholarly work. Again, I suppose, the most likely explanation for this is that the broad historical evidence about Bud- dhism’s actual relation to and assessment of other religions, as provided in this anthology, is at significant variance with Gross’ idealized image.

This would also explain, at least in part, her fourth point of criticism: the selection of articles.4 In relation to volume four, Gross writes: “One wonders, for example, why Anagarika Dharmapala’s rambling, highly inaccurate ac-

4 It is hard to say—and one may only speculate—why she criticizes the inclusion of such important (and famous) essays such as those of Maurice O’C. Walshe in volume two and Toshihiko Izutsu in volume three. Both are written by Buddhists who defend a rather positive view of the religious other, even to the extent of suggesting common metaphysical ground. Walshe, well known for his translation of the DƯghanikƗya and also a renowned expert in Christian mysticism, presents his view that Buddhist and Christian concepts of transcendence reflect different interpretations of the same ultimate reality (cf. Schmidt-Leukel 2013, vol. 2: 126-44). Izutsu is one of the very few Buddhist scholars who gained an in-depth understanding of Islam and wrote (in addition to his works in Islamic Studies) also on Zen Buddhism. In his article included in the anthology, he presents his central theory that MahƗyƗna Buddhism, Daoism, and VedƗnta share significant ontological positions with the Islamic teaching of the “unity of existence” (wahdat al-wujúd) (cf. Schmidt-Leukel 2013, vol. 3: 109-28). Gross dismisses his article with the argument “that very little of its content even involves Bud- dhism,” that a “great deal is said about Vedanta” but “one should not assume that by writing about Vedanta, one has written about Mahayana Buddhism” (Gross 2014b: 262). Perhaps her schoolmaster’s approach to this fine and rare scholar of Zen and Islam (or is her critique targeted at the editor?) might be due to her rejection of the idea that MahƗyƗna has indeed as much in common with VedƗnta, Daoism, and Islam, as Izutsu holds. But even then this would hardly be a reason to exclude a piece like this.

113 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 25 (2015) 1 count of other religions, with a few equally inaccurate comments about Buddhism’s superiority thrown in, was included” (Gross 2014a: 266). If one edits an anthology with the intention to include a broad spectrum of charac- teristic Buddhist views (on Buddhism and religious diversity as such, as in volume four) with a focus on the debates within contemporary strands of Bud- dhism like TheravƗda, Tibetan Buddhism, Sino-Japanese MahƗyana, a voice like that of Anagarika Dharmapala (1864-1933) can hardly be left out. As any- one familiar with TheravƗda is fully aware, Dharmapala is the by far most in- fluential and significant figure in the formation of modern TheravƗda’s self- understanding. Of course, his highly exclusivist position is not at all in line with Gross’ understanding. But does this mean that Dharmapala’s understanding of Buddhism was “inaccurate”? And does this mean that he should have been left out? It would certainly be unacceptable if TheravƗda views of religious diversity were represented only by him. But this is not the case. The collection contains such diverse TheravƗdin positions as that of Gunapala Dharmasiri (as exclusivistic as Dharmapala), K.N. Jayatilleke’s famous (but hard to get) essay recommending an inclusivistic approach, samples from the inner TheravƗda debate on his views (Y. Dhammavisuddhi, Lily de Silva) plus two samples from BuddhadƗsa’s pluralistic approach. But it is only the latter whom Gross mentions—ignoring the wide spectrum of TheravƗda Buddhism presented in that volume.

Such a broad neglect of views that are at odds with her own or her suggestion that it would be better not to include them in an anthology like this, displays an attitude toward the subject matter that is not in line with scholarly virtues. Un- fortunately, this attitude is typical of much of her extensive review: With very few exceptions (e.g., D.T. Suzuki), Rita Gross usually ignores those Buddhist perspectives collected in the four volumes which clearly display that Buddhists had and have in fact far more difficulties with other religions than her romanticized understanding of Buddhism would permit. Moreover, she blames scholars who present such views and the corresponding historical facts as lacking in understanding.

Many examples could be given to illustrate this observation. I will confine myself to four. First, in her review Gross widely ignores the various aspects of the long standing tension between Buddhism and different forms of Hinduism. She focuses on mutual influence that did take place but does not even mention the many fields of conflict (like the sharp Buddhist opposition to Brahmanism, to Hindu forms of theism, or to the caste system—which Buddhism had to op- pose because, as a k܈atriya, the Buddha was not, according to Brahmanism, entitled to teach the Dharma—or the Buddhist supersessionism expressed in the Buddhists’ claim to be the “true Brahmins”), all treated in the various con- tributions to the first half of volume one. She does not address the highly con- flictual situation in Nepal and especially in Sri Lanka, where forms of Hindu- Buddhist symbiosis exist next to violent forms of Hindu-Buddhist conflict. 114 BUDDHISM AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

Second, in relation to Chinese religions, Gross highlights the strong evidence of fertile mutual inspiration between Buddhism and Chinese religions but ignores all the evidence—included in the anthology—of sharp conflict, also violent in part. The two chapters (15 and 16) that address the transition from a harsh exclusivistic Buddhist attitude towards Daoism and Confucianism of the 4th-Huayen patriarch, Chengguan (‘Daoism and Confucianism lead to hell’) to a very moderate form of inclusivism in the writings of his immediate suc- cessor, the 5th patriarch, Zongmi, who some of the moral teachings of Daoism and Confucianism an element of truth (though at the lowest level in the standard Buddhist hierarchization of teachings), do not catch her interest. Third, in relation to the massive anti-Islamic passages in the KƗlacakra Tantra, Gross points out that these find a spiritualized interpretation in some later sections of the text. But she ignores the next chapter in volume three that shows that a non-spiritualized understanding of the anti-Islamic statements in the KƗlacakra Tantra continued to be seen as valid and was applied to very concrete Muslim ethnicities. Again, Gross commends “Charles Keyes’ very informative article” about Buddhist-Muslim relations in South Thailand because it shows that “(t)ensions seem to be based more in politics than conflict over religion” (Gross 2014a: 261). But she bypasses the evidence, even that of the icono- graphic sort, that these tensions were accompanied by a full-blown Buddhist demonization of Muslims as the “sons of Mara,” which is also given by Keyes.

Fourth, Gross cannot ignore entirely the fact that Buddhism is involved in a range of violent conflicts with an interreligious dimension. But she touches upon this only indirectly, in passing, and, perhaps worse yet, with apologetic overtones. Buddhist reactions to Christianity, Hinduism (Gross 2014a: 256), or Islam (Gross 2014a: 265) became “negative” when Buddhists felt “threatened” by them. Certainly, Buddhists who argue for the use of violence against Hindus and Muslims in Sri Lanka or Muslims in Thailand, Myanmar, and Ladakh do so because they perceive themselves or the Dharma under threat.5 But this is a common feature of religious justification of interreligious violence, present in all religions and usually used by both sides involved in such conflicts. Can we, or do we have to, assume that Buddhists were always “innocent” in such conflicts, that no threat to others ever emerged or emerges from Buddhism ? The answer, once more, depends on whether by “Buddhism” we mean a construct that is by definition non-threatening or the real Buddhism we find in practice and in theory (for Buddhism’s sacred scriptures are by no means free from any religious justification of violence).6 Every religion that claims the universal

5 In relation to the war in Sri Lanka this has been convincingly demonstrated in Bartholomeusz 2002. 6 On Buddhism and violence, see, e.g., Seikǀ 1994, Schmithausen 1996, Victoria 1997, Bartholomeusz 2002, Buddhismus und Gewalt 2003, Schmidt-Leukel 2004, Zimmermann 2006, Jerryson, Juergensmeyer 2010, Jerryson 2011, Jenkins 2013.

115 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 25 (2015) 1 and exclusive truth of its own teachings or even the unique superiority of its own teachings constitutes a potential “threat” to all others. For this claim im- plies that, ideally, all false or inferior teachings should disappear. After the final conversion of the Hindus to Buddhism and after his ultimate defeat of the Muslims, the Buddhist saviour figure Kalkin Cakrin will, according to the KƗlacacra Tantra, fill everyone on earth with the true religion, which is MahƗyƗna. The threat that Buddhism constituted to Brahmanism was felt by the Brahmins when AĞoka (3rd century BCE), the first monarch in India ruling over nearly all of the subcontinent, adopted Buddhism and used it to humiliate the Brahmins and restrict their power by making part of their religious duty (the animal sacrifice as prescribed in the Vedas) illegal. It is no wonder that Brahmanically inspired anti-Buddhist pogroms in India began immediately after AĞoka’s Maurya dynasty.

Moving beyond Gross’ critique of the anthology (and my defence against her critique), I would finally like to address two points that Rita Gross raises in her review that are highly pertinent to the larger debate on Buddhism and religious diversity: (a) Gross’ historical claim that “[f]or millennia, Asian Buddhists have co-existed with religious others as neighbors” (Gross 2014a: 271), “more or less harmoniously” (Gross 2014a: 254), and did not, in contrast to Islam and Christianity, “spread on waves of military or economic expansion” (Gross 2014a: 271); (b) Gross’ rejection of the “exclusivist/inclusivist/pluralist” typology as less fitting to Buddhism in favour of the view “that our primary ob- ligation is simply to understand religious others rather than to evaluate them,” which “is much more in line with Buddhist sensibilities” (Gross 2014a: 266f).

(a) Although Gross’ wording “more or less” indicates some flexibility in her judgement, it is evident that on her view interreligious co-existence, as far as Buddhism is involved, was significantly “more” harmonious than “less.” She further illustrates her view by claiming that Buddhists “did not achieve a religious monopoly in the areas to which they spread” (Gross 2014a: 271). But how correct are these claims? If we look at today’s major TheravƗda Buddhist countries (Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos), we must state that there were periods in all those regions when both TheravƗda and MahƗyana forms of Buddhism flourished. But TheravƗda finally gained a “religious monopoly” over all other forms of Buddhism in those areas. From Nandasena Mu- diyanse’s carefully documented study one can learn about the several centuries of long, tense, and violent conflict between TheravƗda Buddhism and the rival MahƗyƗna and Tantric schools that once existed in Sri Lanka until TheravƗda achieved the monopoly it now enjoys. We find the whole spectrum of what is usually involved in such conflicts, like the assassination of rival religious leaders, burning of their scriptures and large-scale suppression (Mudiyanse 1967:1-11). It would be worth studying in more detail how TheravƗda gained its religious monopoly over other forms of Buddhism in other TheravƗda countries. It seems that TheravƗda became dominant in Myanmar under Sri 116 BUDDHISM AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

Lankan influence through rather brute political force. And TheravƗda became dominant in other South East Asian countries also with the help of wars fought by Burmese rulers in the name of the Buddha, known as “Buddhist imperial- ism” (Freiberger and Kleine 2011: 62f).

The relationship between Buddhism and Hinduism in Sri Lanka has been extremely tense in the past and is still so—as is all too well known—up until today. All too often, Buddhists followed the idea, as expressed in the PǌjƗ- valiya, a work from the 13th century, that “(t)his island of Laৄka belongs to the Buddha himself; it is like a treasury filled with the Three Gems. Therefore the residence of wrong-believers in this Island will never be permanent.… Laৄka is suitable only for Buddhist kings” (Schmidt-Leukel 2013, vol. 1, 16). Cam- bodia too knows of a long history of mutual rivalry between Buddhism and Hinduism with a number of violent features. Hinduism did not survive, and in the 19th century through political force and under Thai influence TheravƗda orthodoxy was made dominant and normative over against other forms of Buddhism (Freiberger and Kleine 2011: 70f). In India, however, it was Bud- dhism that lost to Hinduism as a result of the long history of a power struggle between these two on all levels. As one representative of a number of other In- dian historians, I may quote R.C. Hiremath: “Thus, Hinduism completely ab- sorbed Buddhism, and caused it to disappear from the land of its birth” (Hiremath 1994: 98).

There is well established evidence of tensions and conflicts, including violent conflicts, between different Buddhist schools in other parts of the Buddhist world as well. In Japan different MahƗyƗna schools have not only been involved in harsh polemical struggles but in violent combat more than once. In Tibet, the dominant Gelugpa school supressed the Jonang school of Dölpopa l. In the 17th century their teachings were forbidden (because of a supposedly heretical interpretation of “emptiness”), their scriptures burnt, and their monas- teries confiscated. While a full history of violent conflicts between different Buddhist schools still needs to be written, there is, unfortunately, more than enough evidence that it has been much less peaceful and harmonious than Gross seems to admit. I will not repeat here the various forms of struggle between Buddhism on the one hand, and Daoism and Confucianism on the other hand, as this is fully documented in volume one of the anthology. Nevertheless, what is special about China and really good news is that here, after various violent experiences during the first millennium CE, the second millennium was to a large extent shaped by the idea that Daoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism need each other and could and should live together in terms of fruitful and creative exchange. Yet it appears that it was the state that had to convince all three religions of this.7

7 In addition to the masterly overviews given in the articles by Arthur Wright and

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So what about Gross’ statement that Buddhism, in contrast to Christianity, “was not spread on waves of military or economic expansion” (Gross 2014a: 271)? As has been stated, the implementation of TheravƗda in a number of South Asian countries was certainly supported by political force, including military means. And so was the establishment of Buddhism in Mongolia at the end of the 16th century (Kollmar-Paulenz 2003). But what about the compara- tive part involved in Gross’ claim? In modernity, Christianity was certainly spread beyond Europe on waves of military or economic expansion. But how successful was this? Christianity became dominant only in those parts of the world where it encountered primal forms of religion and culture, as in parts of Africa, Australia, the Americas, and parts of the Philippines. But colonial expansion did not lead to a Christian religious monopoly or dominance in those parts of the non-European world that were already dominated by other major religions like Hinduism, Islam, or Buddhism. The only Buddhist country, for example, in which Christianity gained significant ground was Korea. There is plenty of evidence that this was so because Korea did not suffer from Western Christian but from Japanese Buddhist colonialism. It was the soli- darity of Korean Christians with their nation against Japan that contributed de- cisively to the surprising growth of Christianity in this country, while the Japanese attempt to enforce Japanese Buddhist schools and their institution on Korea caused tremendous damage to Korean Buddhism. In the case of Korea, Christianity spread on the “waves of military or economic expansion,” but this expansion was that of Buddhist Japan and not that of Christian nations. Maybe we can leave it at that as proof that Gross’ construction of religious expansion is too simplistic and too much coloured by her romanticized image of Bud- dhism.

(b) A central aim of the anthology is to show that there is not just one Buddhist stance on religious diversity but several. Somewhat simplifying, one may say: Buddhist views of other Buddhist teachings have been and still are mostly inclusivistic, while Buddhist views of non-Buddhist teachings were initially mostly exclusivistic but, particularly in MahƗyƗna Buddhism, often became inclusivistic. Already in India some MahƗyƗna scriptures and authors regarded Hinduism as containing elements of truth, though undoubtedly in a way inferior to Buddhism. Later on, this inclusivistic attitude was also applied to Dao- ism and Confucianism and at still later stages sometimes to Islam, Christianity, and Judaism as well, although in all those cases there are also significant examples of continuing exclusivistic attitudes. Pluralistic understandings, which would regard at least some non-Buddhist teachings as containing a path of salvation that is as valid as the Buddhist one, are hard to find in the past

Timothy Brook in volume one of the anthology (cf. Schmidt-Leukel 2013, vol. 1: 206- 33 and 290-317), see also Gentz 2013.

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(even in China!) but are seriously considered by very few Buddhist thinkers in the present.

It appears that Rita Gross dismisses this picture on the basis of two arguments. First, the classification of exclusivistic, inclusivistic and pluralistic attitudes does not really fit the Buddhist approach, which, she claims, largely abstains from any assessment of the religious other. Second, because the classification grew out of a Christian exclusivistic perspective, which—at least in the form of “hard-core exclusivism”—is “foreign to our ethical values” (Gross 2014a: 267).

Yet how foreign is “exclusivism” to Buddhism? In her review, Gross admits that the strand of Buddhism found in the Lotus Sǌtra and in Nichiren’s school “is as exclusivist as anything in religions more characterized by exclusivism, but I have always regarded this strand of Buddhism as quite anomalous, rather than as representative of Buddhism as a whole” (Gross 2014a: 254). I disagree. The Lotus Sǌtra’s approach to other forms of Buddhism is clearly inclusivistic, regarding them as lesser vehicles leading to lesser salvific goals (the enlightenment of an arhat or pratyekabuddha) but not to the highest goal of full Bud- dhahood. In this respect, the position of the Lotus Sutra is similar to that of Mark Heim who suggests that non-Christian religions may lead their adherents to lesser eschatological goals.8 The question of non-Buddhist religions is not a main topic in the Lotus Sǌtra. Within the Nichiren tradition, an exclusivist attitude became more prominent, but in recent times this tradition also developed inclusivistic attitudes (both developments are documented in the anthology). Gross presents her assessment of Buddhism as non-exclusivist as almost non- falsifiable: When forms of exclusivism are found in Buddhism, which even Gross regards as exclusivistic, she evaluates them as not truly or not typically Buddhist. But exclusivistis positions were present in Buddhism right from the start. In an earlier publication Gross claims that in the PƗli canon the Buddha “is not represented as proclaiming that his teachings are superior to all others or necessary for everyone to adopt” (Gross 2011: 150). This is demonstrably false. One proof to the contrary is found in the very prominent passage of the Buddhist version of the blind-born men and the elephant. Far from being an illustration of Buddhist pluralism, the parable is told in the PƗli canonical text UdƗna (6:4-6, 10)—by the Buddha—to show the blindness of the rival teach- ers of his time: “The wanderers of other sects, bhikkhus, are blind, unseeing. They do not know what is beneficial, they do not know what is harmful. They do not know what is Dhamma, they do not know what is not Dhamma” (U- dƗna 6:5; Ireland 1997: 90). Their partial and limited understanding of reality

8 This is a strange insofar as Heim is considered to be a leading representative of the so-called “acceptance model,” which Gross sees as closer to Buddhism than exclusivism, inclusivism, or pluralism (see Gross 2014b: 266f.).

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is insufficient to achieve liberation from saۨsƗra (UdƗna 6:6). The light of the other teachings is like that of “glow worms,” but the Buddha’s is like the sun: “The glow worm shines as long as the sun has not risen, but when that il- luminant arises, the glow worm’s light is quenched and shines no more. Even so, the wanderers shine only as long as Fully Awakened Ones do not appear in the world” (UdƗna 6:10; Ireland 1997: 93). Another prominent place would be the famous PƗli canonical MahƗparinibbƗna Sutta where the Buddha explicitly states that the other schools at his time are devoid of the Dhamma and the No- ble Eightfold path and hence no degree of enlightenment is found in them (DƯghanikƗya 16:5:26f). Should the Buddha’s exclusivism be another example of an anomaly in Buddhism or of an insufficient understanding of Buddhism? Well, perhaps by “hard core exclusivism” Gross means only teachings like the dreadful idea, found in large parts or Christianity (and some parts of Islam), that there is something like eternal, irreversible damnation. Although the stay in Buddhist hells is unimaginably long, it is never conceived of as eternal. In that respect, Gross would be right. And this clearly entails that there is usually more soteriological hope and confidence in Buddhism than in most parts of Christianity and some parts of Islam. Yet while rebirth in hell, according to .Buddhism, is not everlasting, existence in saۨsƗra is potentially unending And in a few MahƗyƗna scriptures it is assumed that some beings, the so-called icchantikas, are deluded to such an extent that, despite all efforts of the Bud- dhas and Bodhisattvas, these beings can never be saved. But this is, indeed, a minority position in Buddhism. This observation, however, may hold an important clue for understanding why Buddhist attitudes to other religions— despite an exclusivistic or inclusivistic basis—could still be more relaxed than Christian approaches. Buddhist belief in reincarnation entails the possibility that someone who rejects the truth of Buddhism in this life may nevertheless in some future life find his/her way to the truth. This type of confidence was not available to Christians, although they could—and presumably at times did— rely on God’s grace as saving those who never heard or had even rejected the Gospel.

What can we say then about Gross’ view that abstention from any evaluation of religious others “is much more in line with Buddhist sensibilities than any of the alternatives on the exclusivist/inclusivist/pluralist scale” (Gross 2014a: 267)? Gross has a point insofar as numerous Buddhist texts advise the monks not to involve themselves in doctrinal disputes with people of other schools. This, however, does not imply that Buddhist texts abstain from any judgement or evaluation of the religious other. On the contrary, the conviction that the others are wrong is usually the reason why one should not engage in “disputes”—otherwise such talks would not be regarded as “disputes.” Yet what is much more important is that the assessment of the religious other is in some cases inevitable because it is a logical implication of certain crucial teachings. If, for example, it is held—as in TheravƗda-Buddhism—that there cannot be more than one fully developed Buddha at the same time within one world 120 BUDDHISM AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

-system (e.g. MajjhimanikƗya 115:12-19; A۪guttaranikƗya 1:15:10; DhƯghani kƗya 19:1-14.), this entails that there cannot be more than one valid sa۪gha at the same time (cf. the discussion in Milindapañha 4:6:4-10). Thus, if other religions claim to teach a valid path of salvation and to constitute valid salvific communities, their claims must be wrong by implication. As can be seen from the internal TheravƗda debates documented in volume four of the anthology (more or less ignored by Gross), this argument explains why some TheravƗdins hold that individuals (as pratyekabuddhas; PƗli: paccekhabuddhas) may achieve salvific insight but not through other religious dispensations.

So, if assessment of the salvific claims of other religions are inevitable (out of logical reasons) on the one hand and on the other hand have in fact played a major role in Buddhism’s view of the religious other, I cannot see why it should be illegitimate to classify such assessments along the line of the three logically possible options: (1) exclusivism, i.e., the salvific claim of only one religion is valid; (2) inclusivism, i.e., the salvific claims of more than one religion are valid to some extent, but that of one is superior to all others; (3) pluralism, i.e., those of more than one are valid and none is superior to all others so that some are equally valid.9 It is important to see that exclusivistic and inclusivisitic positions are usually connected with a negative assessment of religious diversity as such. Exclusivism perceives the other religion as wrong because it differs from one’s own, and inclusivism sees it at as deficient to the extent it differs. Hence, in both cases, difference, and therefore diversity, is assessed negatively. Only pluralist positions try to combine the perception of difference with the assessment of equal validity and are thus capable, at least to some extent, of developing a positive understanding of religious diversity. The application of this typology in the analysis of Buddhist positions can thus help to uncover stances that could otherwise remain hidden—and I cannot help feel- ing that, all too often, the classification is rejected precisely to escape such critical uncovering.

As the texts collected in the four volumes show, whether authored by Bud- dhists or by historians of Buddhism, Buddhists had and often still have difficulties with religious diversity. This has a number of different reasons, and exclusivistic or (to a lesser extent) inclusivistic doctrinal stances constitute one reason. But the anthology also shows that Buddhism has the resources for developing pluralistic approaches, which, however, requires taking a critical—a self-critical—position on certain aspects of its own tradition. Such a self- critical attitude, however, is prevented if one cultivates the idealized view that

9 Logically, there is only one other option left: (4) naturalism, i.e., no salvific claims by any religion are valid. This, however, is a non-religious option which is not available in interreligious assessmenst. For the logical discussion of the classification, see Schmidt-Leukel 2005.

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Buddhism never had any serious problem with religious diversity, and if it did, it was simply not true Buddhism. Such an approach makes it very difficult to discern the religious factors in those current interreligious conflicts that involve Buddhism. How necessary such an analysis is can be seen from the il- luminating report by Georg Evers in the same issue of Studies in Interreligious Dialogue (Evers 2014). Rita Gross has demonstrated how much needed and beneficial—yes even “ wholesome” (kauĞalya) in the Buddhist religious sense of the term—it is to face the reality of Buddhism’s stance on the gender issue and not to live with an idealized image of it, which would simply claim that Buddhism had no difficulty with gender difference. What prevents her from taking a similar stance on the question of Buddhism and religious diversity?

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