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The Design of Rijndael: AES - the Advanced Encryption Standard/Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen
Joan Daernen · Vincent Rijrnen Theof Design Rijndael AES - The Advanced Encryption Standard With 48 Figures and 17 Tables Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York Barcelona Hong Kong London Milan Paris Springer TnL-1Jn Joan Daemen Foreword Proton World International (PWI) Zweefvliegtuigstraat 10 1130 Brussels, Belgium Vincent Rijmen Cryptomathic NV Lei Sa 3000 Leuven, Belgium Rijndael was the surprise winner of the contest for the new Advanced En cryption Standard (AES) for the United States. This contest was organized and run by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) be ginning in January 1997; Rij ndael was announced as the winner in October 2000. It was the "surprise winner" because many observers (and even some participants) expressed scepticism that the U.S. government would adopt as Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data an encryption standard any algorithm that was not designed by U.S. citizens. Daemen, Joan, 1965- Yet NIST ran an open, international, selection process that should serve The design of Rijndael: AES - The Advanced Encryption Standard/Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen. as model for other standards organizations. For example, NIST held their p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1999 AES meeting in Rome, Italy. The five finalist algorithms were designed ISBN 3540425802 (alk. paper) . .. by teams from all over the world. 1. Computer security - Passwords. 2. Data encryption (Computer sCIence) I. RIJmen, In the end, the elegance, efficiency, security, and principled design of Vincent, 1970- II. Title Rijndael won the day for its two Belgian designers, Joan Daemen and Vincent QA76.9.A25 D32 2001 Rijmen, over the competing finalist designs from RSA, IBl\!I, Counterpane 2001049851 005.8-dc21 Systems, and an English/Israeli/Danish team. -
A Quantitative Study of Advanced Encryption Standard Performance
United States Military Academy USMA Digital Commons West Point ETD 12-2018 A Quantitative Study of Advanced Encryption Standard Performance as it Relates to Cryptographic Attack Feasibility Daniel Hawthorne United States Military Academy, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/faculty_etd Part of the Information Security Commons Recommended Citation Hawthorne, Daniel, "A Quantitative Study of Advanced Encryption Standard Performance as it Relates to Cryptographic Attack Feasibility" (2018). West Point ETD. 9. https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/faculty_etd/9 This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by USMA Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Point ETD by an authorized administrator of USMA Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD PERFORMANCE AS IT RELATES TO CRYPTOGRAPHIC ATTACK FEASIBILITY A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Computer Science By Daniel Stephen Hawthorne Colorado Technical University December, 2018 Committee Dr. Richard Livingood, Ph.D., Chair Dr. Kelly Hughes, DCS, Committee Member Dr. James O. Webb, Ph.D., Committee Member December 17, 2018 © Daniel Stephen Hawthorne, 2018 1 Abstract The advanced encryption standard (AES) is the premier symmetric key cryptosystem in use today. Given its prevalence, the security provided by AES is of utmost importance. Technology is advancing at an incredible rate, in both capability and popularity, much faster than its rate of advancement in the late 1990s when AES was selected as the replacement standard for DES. Although the literature surrounding AES is robust, most studies fall into either theoretical or practical yet infeasible. -
Low-Latency Hardware Masking with Application to AES
Low-Latency Hardware Masking with Application to AES Pascal Sasdrich, Begül Bilgin, Michael Hutter, and Mark E. Marson Rambus Cryptography Research, 425 Market Street, 11th Floor, San Francisco, CA 94105, United States {psasdrich,bbilgin,mhutter,mmarson}@rambus.com Abstract. During the past two decades there has been a great deal of research published on masked hardware implementations of AES and other cryptographic primitives. Unfortunately, many hardware masking techniques can lead to increased latency compared to unprotected circuits for algorithms such as AES, due to the high-degree of nonlinear functions in their designs. In this paper, we present a hardware masking technique which does not increase the latency for such algorithms. It is based on the LUT-based Masked Dual-Rail with Pre-charge Logic (LMDPL) technique presented at CHES 2014. First, we show 1-glitch extended strong non- interference of a nonlinear LMDPL gadget under the 1-glitch extended probing model. We then use this knowledge to design an AES implementation which computes a full AES-128 operation in 10 cycles and a full AES-256 operation in 14 cycles. We perform practical side-channel analysis of our implementation using the Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) methodology and analyze univariate as well as bivariate t-statistics to demonstrate its DPA resistance level. Keywords: AES · Low-Latency Hardware · LMDPL · Masking · Secure Logic Styles · Differential Power Analysis · TVLA · Embedded Security 1 Introduction Masking countermeasures against side-channel analysis [KJJ99] have received a lot of attention over the last two decades. They are popular because they are relatively easy and inexpensive to implement, and their strengths and limitations are well understood using theoretical models and security proofs. -
Investigating Profiled Side-Channel Attacks Against the DES Key
IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems ISSN 2569-2925, Vol. 2020, No. 3, pp. 22–72. DOI:10.13154/tches.v2020.i3.22-72 Investigating Profiled Side-Channel Attacks Against the DES Key Schedule Johann Heyszl1[0000−0002−8425−3114], Katja Miller1, Florian Unterstein1[0000−0002−8384−2021], Marc Schink1, Alexander Wagner1, Horst Gieser2, Sven Freud3, Tobias Damm3[0000−0003−3221−7207], Dominik Klein3[0000−0001−8174−7445] and Dennis Kügler3 1 Fraunhofer Institute for Applied and Integrated Security (AISEC), Germany, [email protected] 2 Fraunhofer Research Institution for Microsystems and Solid State Technologies (EMFT), Germany, [email protected] 3 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Germany, [email protected] Abstract. Recent publications describe profiled single trace side-channel attacks (SCAs) against the DES key-schedule of a “commercially available security controller”. They report a significant reduction of the average remaining entropy of cryptographic keys after the attack, with surprisingly large, key-dependent variations of attack results, and individual cases with remaining key entropies as low as a few bits. Unfortunately, they leave important questions unanswered: Are the reported wide distributions of results plausible - can this be explained? Are the results device- specific or more generally applicable to other devices? What is the actual impact on the security of 3-key triple DES? We systematically answer those and several other questions by analyzing two commercial security controllers and a general purpose microcontroller. We observe a significant overall reduction and, importantly, also observe a large key-dependent variation in single DES key security levels, i.e. -
Hardware Performance Evaluation of Authenticated Encryption SAEAES with Threshold Implementation
cryptography Article Hardware Performance Evaluation of Authenticated Encryption SAEAES with Threshold Implementation Takeshi Sugawara Department of Informatics, The University of Electro-Communications, Tokyo 182-8585, Japan; [email protected] Received: 30 June 2020; Accepted: 5 August 2020; Published: 9 August 2020 Abstract: SAEAES is the authenticated encryption algorithm instantiated by combining the SAEB mode of operation with AES, and a candidate of the NIST’s lightweight cryptography competition. Using AES gives the advantage of backward compatibility with the existing accelerators and coprocessors that the industry has invested in so far. Still, the newer lightweight block cipher (e.g., GIFT) outperforms AES in compact implementation, especially with the side-channel attack countermeasure such as threshold implementation. This paper aims to implement the first threshold implementation of SAEAES and evaluate the cost we are trading with the backward compatibility. We design a new circuit architecture using the column-oriented serialization based on the recent 3-share and uniform threshold implementation (TI) of the AES S-box based on the generalized changing of the guards. Our design uses 18,288 GE with AES’s occupation reaching 97% of the total area. Meanwhile, the circuit area is roughly three times the conventional SAEB-GIFT implementation (6229 GE) because of a large memory size needed for the AES’s non-linear key schedule and the extended states for satisfying uniformity in TI. Keywords: threshold implementation; SAEAES; authenticated encryption, side-channel attack; changing of the guards; lightweight cryptography; implementation 1. Introduction There is an increasing demand for secure data communication between embedded devices in many areas, including automotive, industrial, and smart-home applications. -
Blockchain Beyond Cryptocurrency Or Is Private Chain a Hoax Or How I Lose Money in Bitcoin but Still Decide to Get in the Research
Blockchain Beyond Cryptocurrency Or Is Private Chain a Hoax Or How I Lose Money in Bitcoin but still Decide to Get in the Research Hong Wan Edward P. Fitts Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering Sept 2019 In this talk: • Blockchain and trust • Different kinds of blockchain • Cases and Examples • Discussions First Things First https://images.app.goo.gl/JuNznV8dZKTaHWEf9 Disclaimer Block and Chain https://youtu.be/SSo_EIwHSd4 https://youtu.be/SSo_EIwHSd4 Blockchain Design Questions • Who can access data: Private vs. Public • Who can validate data/add block: Permissioned vs Permissionless • Consensus to be used: Trade-off among security and efficiency. https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwinjN2s7_DkAhXlmeAKHXxhAIUQjRx6BAgBEAQ&url=ht tps%3A%2F%2F101blockchains.com%2Fconsensus-algorithms-blockchain%2F&psig=AOvVaw23pKh4qS8W_xgyajJ3aFl9&ust=1569669093339830 Bad News First • “Private blockchains are completely uninteresting… -- the only reason to operate one is to ride on the blockchain hype…” Bruce Schneier Tonight we will talk about cryptocurrencies… .everything you don’t understand money combined by everything you don’t understand about computers…. Cryptocurrencies: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO) https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/02/blockchain_and_.html http://shorturl.at/ahsRU, shorturl.at/gETV2 https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=images&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwj- https://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2017/11/Trustp72L7vDkAhVjQt8KHU18CjsQjRx6BAgBEAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wbur.org%2Fonpoint%2F2017%2F11%2F20%2Fwho-can-cropped.jpg-you- -
Impossible Differentials in Twofish
Twofish Technical Report #5 Impossible differentials in Twofish Niels Ferguson∗ October 19, 1999 Abstract We show how an impossible-differential attack, first applied to DEAL by Knudsen, can be applied to Twofish. This attack breaks six rounds of the 256-bit key version using 2256 steps; it cannot be extended to seven or more Twofish rounds. Keywords: Twofish, cryptography, cryptanalysis, impossible differential, block cipher, AES. Current web site: http://www.counterpane.com/twofish.html 1 Introduction 2.1 Twofish as a pure Feistel cipher Twofish is one of the finalists for the AES [SKW+98, As mentioned in [SKW+98, section 7.9] and SKW+99]. In [Knu98a, Knu98b] Lars Knudsen used [SKW+99, section 7.9.3] we can rewrite Twofish to a 5-round impossible differential to attack DEAL. be a pure Feistel cipher. We will demonstrate how Eli Biham, Alex Biryukov, and Adi Shamir gave the this is done. The main idea is to save up all the ro- technique the name of `impossible differential', and tations until just before the output whitening, and applied it with great success to Skipjack [BBS99]. apply them there. We will use primes to denote the In this report we show how Knudsen's attack can values in our new representation. We start with the be applied to Twofish. We use the notation from round values: [SKW+98] and [SKW+99]; readers not familiar with R0 = ROL(Rr;0; (r + 1)=2 ) the notation should consult one of these references. r;0 b c R0 = ROR(Rr;1; (r + 1)=2 ) r;1 b c R0 = ROL(Rr;2; r=2 ) 2 The attack r;2 b c R0 = ROR(Rr;3; r=2 ) r;3 b c Knudsen's 5-round impossible differential works for To get the same output we update the rule to com- any Feistel cipher where the round function is in- pute the output whitening. -
ASIC-Oriented Comparative Review of Hardware Security Algorithms for Internet of Things Applications Mohamed A
ASIC-Oriented Comparative Review of Hardware Security Algorithms for Internet of Things Applications Mohamed A. Bahnasawi1, Khalid Ibrahim2, Ahmed Mohamed3, Mohamed Khalifa Mohamed4, Ahmed Moustafa5, Kareem Abdelmonem6, Yehea Ismail7, Hassan Mostafa8 1,3,5,6,8Electronics and Electrical Communications Engineering Department, Cairo University, Giza, Egypt 2Electronics Department, Faculty of Information Engineering and Technology, German University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt 4Electrical, Electronics and Communications Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering, Alexandria University, Egypt 7,8Center for Nanoelectronics and Devices, AUC and Zewail City of Science and Technology, New Cairo, Egypt {[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] } Abstract— Research into the security of the Internet of Applications have different requirements for the Things (IoT) needs to utilize particular algorithms that offer cryptographic algorithms that secure them, varying in the ultra-low power consumption and a long lifespan, along with throughput needed, the extent of immunity against attacks, other parameters such as strong immunity against attacks, power consumption, the area needed on-chip, etc. The lower chip area and acceptable throughput. This paper offers Internet of Things (IoT) focuses mainly on low-power an ASIC-oriented comparative review of the most popular and implementations of security algorithms. This is because powerful cryptographic algorithms worldwide, namely AES, most of them are related to autonomous applications or 3DES, Twofish and RSA. The ASIC implementations of those embedded systems applications (i.e. an ultra-thin sensor algorithms are analyzed by studying statistical data extracted system [2] embedded inside clothes or biomedical from the ASIC layouts of the algorithms and comparing them to determine the most suited algorithms for IoT hardware- applications). -
Development of the Advanced Encryption Standard
Volume 126, Article No. 126024 (2021) https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.126.024 Journal of Research of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Development of the Advanced Encryption Standard Miles E. Smid Formerly: Computer Security Division, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, USA [email protected] Strong cryptographic algorithms are essential for the protection of stored and transmitted data throughout the world. This publication discusses the development of Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 197, which specifies a cryptographic algorithm known as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The AES was the result of a cooperative multiyear effort involving the U.S. government, industry, and the academic community. Several difficult problems that had to be resolved during the standard’s development are discussed, and the eventual solutions are presented. The author writes from his viewpoint as former leader of the Security Technology Group and later as acting director of the Computer Security Division at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, where he was responsible for the AES development. Key words: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES); consensus process; cryptography; Data Encryption Standard (DES); security requirements, SKIPJACK. Accepted: June 18, 2021 Published: August 16, 2021; Current Version: August 23, 2021 This article was sponsored by James Foti, Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The views expressed represent those of the author and not necessarily those of NIST. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.126.024 1. Introduction In the late 1990s, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) was about to decide if it was going to specify a new cryptographic algorithm standard for the protection of U.S. -
State of the Art in Lightweight Symmetric Cryptography
State of the Art in Lightweight Symmetric Cryptography Alex Biryukov1 and Léo Perrin2 1 SnT, CSC, University of Luxembourg, [email protected] 2 SnT, University of Luxembourg, [email protected] Abstract. Lightweight cryptography has been one of the “hot topics” in symmetric cryptography in the recent years. A huge number of lightweight algorithms have been published, standardized and/or used in commercial products. In this paper, we discuss the different implementation constraints that a “lightweight” algorithm is usually designed to satisfy. We also present an extensive survey of all lightweight symmetric primitives we are aware of. It covers designs from the academic community, from government agencies and proprietary algorithms which were reverse-engineered or leaked. Relevant national (nist...) and international (iso/iec...) standards are listed. We then discuss some trends we identified in the design of lightweight algorithms, namely the designers’ preference for arx-based and bitsliced-S-Box-based designs and simple key schedules. Finally, we argue that lightweight cryptography is too large a field and that it should be split into two related but distinct areas: ultra-lightweight and IoT cryptography. The former deals only with the smallest of devices for which a lower security level may be justified by the very harsh design constraints. The latter corresponds to low-power embedded processors for which the Aes and modern hash function are costly but which have to provide a high level security due to their greater connectivity. Keywords: Lightweight cryptography · Ultra-Lightweight · IoT · Internet of Things · SoK · Survey · Standards · Industry 1 Introduction The Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the foremost buzzwords in computer science and information technology at the time of writing. -
Episode 230: Click Here to Kill Everybody
Episode 230: Click Here to Kill Everybody Stewart Baker: [00:00:03] Welcome to Episode 230 of The Cyberlaw Podcast brought to you by Steptoe & Johnson. We are back and full of energy. Thank you for joining us. We're lawyers talking about technology, security, privacy, and government. And if you want me to talk about hiking through the rain forest of Costa Rica and just how tough my six-year-old granddaughter is, I'm glad to do that too. But today I'm joined by our guest interviewee Bruce Schneier, an internationally renowned technologist, privacy and security guru, and the author of the new book, Click Here to Kill Everybody: Security and Survival in a Hyper-Connected World. We'll be talking to him shortly. For the News Roundup, we have Jamil Jaffer, who's the founder of the estimable and ever-growing National Security Institute. He's also an adjunct professor at George Mason University. Welcome, Jamil. Jamil Jaffer: [00:00:57] Thanks, Stewart. Good to be here. Stewart Baker: [00:00:58] And David Kris, formerly the assistant attorney general in charge of the Justice Department's National Security Division. David, welcome. David Kris: [00:01:07] Thank, you. Good to be here. Stewart Baker: [00:01:08] And he is with his partner in their latest venture, Nate Jones, veteran of the Justice Department, the National Security Council, and Microsoft where he was an assistant general counsel. Nate, welcome. Nate Jones: [00:01:23] Thank you. Stewart Baker: [00:01:25] I'm Stewart Baker, formerly with the NSA and DHS and the host of today's program. -
Bruce Schneier 2
Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives Witness Disclosure Requirement - "Truth in Testimony" Required by House Rule XI, Clause 2(g)(5) 1. Your Name: Bruce Schneier 2. Your Title: none 3. The Entity(ies) You are Representing: none 4. Are you testifying on behalf of the Federal, or a State or local Yes No government entity? X 5. Please list any Federal grants or contracts, or contracts or payments originating with a foreign government, that you or the entity(ies) you represent have received on or after January 1, 2015. Only grants, contracts, or payments related to the subject matter of the hearing must be listed. 6. Please attach your curriculum vitae to your completed disclosure form. Signatur Date: 31 October 2017 Bruce Schneier Background Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist, called a security guru by the Economist. He is the author of 14 books—including the New York Times best-seller Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World—as well as hundreds of articles, essays, and academic papers. His influential newsletter Crypto-Gram and blog Schneier on Security are read by over 250,000 people. Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, a Lecturer in Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the Tor Project, and an advisory board member of EPIC and VerifiedVoting.org. He is also a special advisor to IBM Security and the Chief Technology Officer of IBM Resilient.