Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 97

1

and do not in any way represent the views of the Croatian Ministry of Defence or any other entity of the Croatian the of entity any other or Defence Ministry of Croatian the views of the any way represent in not do and government. Disclaimer: the views expressed here are solely those of the author in his private capacity, based on public information, in his private capacity, based on author the of are solely those views expressed here Disclaimer: the

1 resilience KEY WORDS: hybrid warfare, hybrid threats, , , vulnerabilities, societal national security strategy, conclusion, the paper proposes some recommendations, including the concept of societal resilience, including the concept of societal resilience, conclusion, the paper proposes some recommendations, related to ways to counter hybrid threats. vulnerabilities of the targeted state and society, the paper addresses some of Croatia’s widely widely some of Croatia’s the paper addresses vulnerabilities of the targeted state and society, into consideration in a threat assessment. As a recognized weaknesses that should be taken (and current) Croatian NSS published in 2002. This paper aims to provide incentives for potential (and current) Croatian NSS published in 2002. This paper aims to provide incentives for potential development, particularly NSS used in Croatia’s adaptations to the approach and methodology hybrid warfare.to relation in adversary hybrid the Assuming that exploit the to heavily tends The development of the new National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Republic of Croatia, begun Croatia, begun the Republic of of Strategy (NSS) National Security the new development of The different security environment compared to the first in November 2016, takes place in a radically Abstract Drazen Smiljanic Security Strategy in the Hybrid Threats Threats in the Hybrid Strategy Security Context Development of the Croatian National National of the Croatian Development DOI 10.1515/cirr-2017-0022 XXIII (80) 2017, 97-129 2017, XXIII (80) ISSN 1848-5782 UDC 355.02(497.5) Croatian InternationalCroatian - CIRR Review Relations Zakon , and the , 2 ), the Croatian Homeland War lasted from lasted War Homeland Croatian the ), (MoD Croatia 2010) to develop a new strategy but none but strategy new a develop to 2010) Croatia (MoD

o pravima hrvatskih branitelja iz Domovinskog rata i članova njihovih obitelji njihovih članova i rata Domovinskog iz branitelja hrvatskih pravima o 5 August 1990 until 30 June 1996 (Croatian Parliament 2004). According to the Act on the Rights of Croatian Defenders of the Homeland War and Members of their Families ( Families their of Members and War Homeland the of Defenders Croatian of Rights the on Act the to According 2 shown that disturbances of the vital societal functions and violation of vital societal functions the disturbances of that shown especially those on the Eastern flank. Russian politics towards and against , especially since 2014, have concepts, clearly recognized in Russian foreign policy members, behaviour NATO several for challenge unexpected an since as appeared 2014, and the emergence of hybrid threats and concepts, commonly known of and the emergence as hybrid warfare. While in terms power, NATO’s superiority has remained unchanged, of the new operating political, military and economic importantly, the Alliance’s capacities have provided, and still provide, a robust deterrent capability. However, NATO’s military and technological superiority has been challenged with the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis degree, has represented an important guarantee that Croatian security Croatian that guarantee important an has represented degree, capabilities. defence Most would also be defended by multinational 2000s complacency regarding in particular, has been marked by relative risks related to lesser a direct to EU the of and NATO, of membership extent, great a To Croatia. conventional threats against the Republic of of security is perceived in Croatia, as well as from the changed security changed the from as well as Croatia, in perceived is security of environment. The period since the end of the Homeland War The need for a redefinition ofvery notion the in how changes arguably stems from institutions related the concept of national security and and the related institutions” and defining a security system that is in line with line in is that system security a defining and institutions” related the and changes (HINA 2016). external political and economic recent internal and have been made begun effort, latest The document. endorsed an with finalized was them of in November 2016, calls for “redefining the concept of national security in which the Croatian Parliament, as the highest political and legislative Parliament, as the highest in which the Croatian on fundamental national and accepts political views institution, determines security issues” (Croatian Parliament 2002). Since then, a handful of efforts The first, and current, National Security Strategy (NSS) of the documentconceptual “a as published in 2002, endorsed and Croatia was Republic of Introduction

XXIII (80) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 98 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 99 one of in many countries . prevent hybrid threats from being effective. being from hybrid threats prevent has recently been recognized factor for mitigating societal vulnerabilities the most efficient ways to Societal resilience (Cederberg and Eronen 2015a), as well in NATO and the EU, as the key the most efficient national defence measures should include a reduction of societal vulnerabilities. Societal resilience arguably represents states, like Croatia, even under the umbrella of NATO or as a member of the who matter no that, argue We immunity. their increase to have EU, the adversary could be, revisionist or rival state(s), state or non-state actors, While the traditional elements of state power remain relevant, the smaller the relevant, remain power state of elements traditional the While is facing and will face in the coming period. Systems thinking may help holistically, in approaching national security focusing more on reducing one’s own vulnerabilities. and how. We also propose use of the systems approach (systems thinking), (systems approach systems the of use propose also We how. and which is useful in handling the complexity that Croatia’s national security them. The developers of a national security strategy, in designing their them. The developers of a national models, should recognize the paradigmatic environment and the objects of what changes should be protected (i.e. secured) in the security Being a complex phenomenon, hybrid warfare and related concepts Being a complex phenomenon, in a holistic approach that require of threat the types represent conceptualization, planning, organizing and exercising the response to and societal vulnerabilities. and military power of the Alliance is collective defence activation of of threshold the under sneaks that being challenged by behaviour state exploiting primarily 5), Article Treaty Atlantic North (e.g. mechanisms achieve its political goals. The Ukraine crisis revealed that complacency, the even time for for NATO members, is over and that the political state actors, as was the case before. Damage to the critical infrastructure the to Damage before. case the was as actors, state conditions, favourable may, under living conditions aimed at deteriorating allowing it to to submit to the aggressor, the attacked country force malicious acts against the key societal functions and critical infrastructure critical infrastructure and functions societal key acts against the malicious non- only the not state actor, of the tool a very powerful could become important instruments of their operating concept. Apparently, the Russian Russian the Apparently, concept. operating their of instruments important objectives were directed at undermining the country’s the ability potential aggressor. to The Ukrainian resist example also demonstrated that the infrastructure capability to perform its functions were among the most the among were its functions capabilitythe infrastructure perform to is, which are largely inherent in largely inherent are is, which security (1948), as cited in Ikenberry and Slaughter and Ikenberry in cited as (1948), 3 Papers, Princeton University, dated 20 August 1948. The definition by George Kennan refers to his Comments on the General Trend of U.S. Foreign Policy, George F. Kennan F. George Policy, Foreign U.S. of Trend General the on Comments his to refers Kennan George by definition The 3 and its defence from external threats was amongst the highest priorities was amongst external threats and its defence from (or “ends”) of most national security strategies at the time. In general, threat of interference, from foreign powers.” This kind of perspective was foreign from of interference, threat very influential, particularly among the real politics scholars, until the end state The 1990s. the of end the until precisely more period, War Cold the of (2006: 14), national security is “the continued ability or serious interference, life without its internal of development the pursue of the country to strategy will give the national security most of its relevance. strategy will give the national security Kennan George to According individual nation-state member of the international system”. Finally, the of concept the with “security” and “national” terms the association of that “the combination of national interests with strategic culture, and a culture, national interests with strategic of “the combination that country’s understanding of what its security concerns should be, leads to the identification of what the idea of national security will mean for an perspectives on what national what perspectives on the respective strategic culture of each nation state. Stolberg explains Alan Stolberg (2012: 12) found that different nations have different The national security strategy threat assessment. Finally, we propose ways to counter hybrid to strategic planning and the including an expanded approach threats, resilience. concept of societal implications of weaknesses the recognized widely Croatia’s of some hybrid address also We security. threat environment for Croatia’s in any key security and defence into consideration that should be taken national In the following sections, we analyse the notion of national security and the hybrid warfare concept with related terms. After that, we examine Theoretical framework Theoretical

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 100 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 101 In general, security institutions have to evolve and to be 4 “(1) a certain (achieved or planned) state of security, (2) a functional area of operations for various security institutions security various for operations of area functional a (2) security, of state planned) or (achieved certain a “(1) together linked institutions, security actual the (3) and goals security achieving of field the in efforts social all with along within an established relations system” (Croatian Parliament 2002). The Croatian National Security Strategy 2002 comprises under the term national security of the Republic of Croatia: Hybrid threats, hybrid operations, hybrid warfare, ambiguous warfare, 4 The hybrid warfare concept The hybrid warfare to societal (MoD 2010) and human security. to societal (MoD Finland 2010) and Threats and challenges recognized recently as expanding it national security, to approach in the additional challenge “hybrid” represent an became more challenging, the response model started to evolve from became more challenging, the model. the departmental towards the interagency 2002). The changed post-Cold War security environment, with new threats new with environment, security War post-Cold changed The 2002). additional focus on internal security, and challenges, necessitated an consequently involving the crisis management concept. As the threats 2001 terrorist attack and the subsequent anthrax mailings on US soil. These soil. US on mailings anthrax subsequent the and attack terrorist 2001 events changed the United States’ calculus of national interests and led (Newmann Security Homeland of Department the of establishment the to In the USA, for instance, the most obvious paradigm change related to the to related change paradigm obvious most the instance, for USA, the In security apparatus after the Cold War happened with the 11 September Besides functions and national security encompasses the state security, institutions. transformed to be able to ensure the state’s function to provide security. development (Bilandžić 2015, 2017). development (Bilandžić He argues that security is achieved once both components exist. Some national aspect of important most the that argue scholars in Croatia social and economic for a precondition it represents security is that makes a distinction between security in an “objective sense”, as the sense”, as the in an “objective security distinction between makes a absence of fear. sense”, as the in a “subjective of threats, and absence a “nation’s plan for the coordinated use of all the instruments that defend pursue objectives as military—to as well power—non-military of state (1952) Wolfers Arnold 624). 2007: (Doyle interest” national its advance and it may be said be said it may substantially strategies security that national represented are just some of the of the just some are 5 Hybrid warfare: a case study, NATO a case study, NATO Hybrid warfare: suggests, hybrid warfare can be seen as “a concept of concept as “a seen be can warfare hybrid suggests, or professionally trained to address. However, he claims that the grey-zone wars are not wars, per they se, are “as much the as outgrowth of strategies aimed at exploiting the West’s legalist (Echevarria 2015: 17). view of war and its inherent restraints” its objectives outside the normal scope of what military strategists and campaign planners are legally authorized Antulio Echevarria analyses the Ukraine conflict and concludes that Russia exploited the ambiguity to accomplish 5 are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare.” This and psychological pressure moral create a sense of intends to approach on enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population. In that context, (2014: 5), for instance, argues that, from the Russian wars new-generation as a result, mind and, main battle-space is the perspective, “the during the Cold War (Mansoor 2012; NATO STO 2017). recognized What as new, has however, is been the use of digital media for information operations at local, regional and even international levels. Janis Berzins so-called Russian hybrid warfare does not seem to represent of warfare. Most of the elements, such new or revolutionary in the history anything as the use of “fronts” or proxies, were present in earlier conflicts, even Contrary to some claims (Barno 2013, 2014; Cederberg and Eronen 2015b), Eronen and Cederberg 2014; 2013, (Barno claims some to Contrary Does the hybrid warfare concept represent of type a new warfare? We dedicate the following sections to discussing some important questions important some discussing to sections following the dedicate We related to the hybrid warfare concept. the hybrid warfare concept is applied (which is more an act). concept is applied (which is more the hybrid warfare or a theory of warfare.” We also adopt the term “hybrid adversary” for as threats” “hybrid and concept warfare hybrid applying the actor an before environment security exist in the that and trends potential actors implications rather than a strategy an operational concept, operations, or perhaps, existing in open source literature on an adequate name for this topic, this for name adequate an on literature source open in existing we will consider it as a concept. Namely, as the recently finished NATO STO’s (2017: 2) research SAS-127 warfare-related derivative for convenience, to align with the common common align with the to convenience, derivative for warfare-related use of the term. Additionally, without intending to reargue the debate recently recently formulated expressions related to the hybrid warfare topic. subject the warfare is often of hybrid the concept literature, the broader In of semantic debate. We will employ the term “hybrid” and the ordinary non-linear non-linear warfare, shadow war or grey-zone wars

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 102 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 103 security strategy as it has a profound impact on ways (usually the need and should not be underestimated just because, once emerged, it emerged, once just because, be underestimated not and should looks similar to what we have seen before. It is particularly important to national in the properly threat hybrid warfare the of assessment approach tolerant and willing to cope with a very fluid, changing and transformative and changing fluid, very a with cope to willing and tolerant and perception judgement challenges our course, of concept, The theme. desired deterrent effect. be the hybrid warfare concept, we must we talk about when Therefore, This surprise also stems from a complacency in our (i.e. the Euro-Atlantic region) economic and military power which, arguably, has not had the argue that our (i.e. Western) struggle concept lies to in the fact describe that Russian foreign policy the behaviour since 2014 hybrid warfare and capabilities. legal norms our strategic surprise to a certain represents and tools, prioritized and, when possible, integrated, skilfully applied to achieve political objectives without escalating into armed conflict. We Even though a discernible pattern of its characteristics exist, the hybrid principles, methods of as a set seen be rather should concept warfare decision-makers claim that they adapted their capabilities to (Gerasimov 2013; Bartles 2016). behaviour in international relations Western Hybrid warfare does Russian- not a not is exist warfare hybrid that thesis as the adopt We an West. the or Russia institutionalized concept in either generated theory of warfare and it is worth mentioning that Russian concept? What is the in relation role to the of Russia hybrid warfare improvement. In the case of Russia, the instruments of state power have domains, sequentially different on used comprehensively, focusing been or at the same time. Another characteristic that represents novelty is the coordinated use of all of use coordinated the is novelty represents that characteristic Another a general for which also accounts at low levels, state power of instruments web web portals or social media groups and may even include leafleting to address. the home information may be disseminated by means of television stations, websites/ stations, television of means by disseminated may be information is primarily a “strategy of influence, not of brute force,” aimed at of the enemy system—and not “breaking the internal coherence et al. 2016: X). about its integral annihilation” (Conley “unvirtuous cycle of the Russian influence”. “unvirtuous cycle of the Russian on the exploitation of is “Corruption the lubricant […] concentrating networks of influence”. state resources to further Russia’s The networks constitute the vital element of Russia’s doctrine which “Russia has cultivated an opaque network of patronage across the across patronage of network opaque an cultivated has “Russia region that it uses to influence and direct decision-making”, a web that “resembles a network flow model”, which the authors call an • • • in distinguishing this type of warfare from the more traditional, where more the this type of warfare from in distinguishing lack of political consensus on the future of the society, corruption, inefficient corruption, society, the of future the on consensus political of lack on dependency and energy resources natural lack of law enforcement, foreign states, etc.). This aspect seems to be the most important element Obviously, the methods described society, divided above socially conflicts, internal governance, (e.g. vulnerabilities focus primarily on societal Russia’s influencein Central and Eastern Europe. findings Their used may be as the basic elements to describe Russia’s foreign policy behaviour methods. related to the use of hybrid warfare A good example of this is the report International Studies by (Conley et the al. 2016) Center which provides key for findings on Strategic and Nevertheless, a strategic foresight perspective. general in a more hybrid warfare must consider development, analysis, which is a part of NSS general is grounded on a deep understanding of the historical context the of understanding deep a on is grounded general (NATO STO 2017). to assess a threat actor within that actor’s own context. To this end, it is critical that the analysis of hybrid warfare’s characteristics in the context of the Russo-Ukraine conflict and Russia’s foreign policy behaviour in To properly approach the hybrid warfare concept, it is extremely important it is extremely concept, hybrid warfare approach the To properly also go beyond the purely military but affect armed forces in terms of in terms forces armed but affect military purely the go beyond also instruments other with integration level of and agility, responsiveness their power). of state for an integrated, whole of the government approach) and means (that

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 104 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 105 (RST) determined that 6 with the Ukraine National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS). The RST comprised researchers from nine NATO and partners’ nations and the research was conducted in partnership in conducted was research the and nations partners’ and NATO nine from researchers comprised RST The 6 which could include both state and non-state actors aimed at achieving which could include both state and non-state actors aimed at achieving a common political goal” (Mansoor 2012: 2). The primary trigger for a society and its economy, critical infrastructure and other instruments of instruments and other critical infrastructure society and its economy, the state power. Peter R. Mansoor describes hybrid warfare as “conflict involving military forces and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists), and asymmetric means of violence. This approach apparently did not and asymmetric means of violence. perspective, let alone include go beyond the tactical and operational The fact is that the definitions and our understanding of the concept evolve concept the of understanding our and definitions the that is fact The was warfare hybrid crisis, Ukraine the Before characteristics. its reveal we as mostly described as conflict comprising a combination of conventional sponsored activities against Ukraine. sponsored activities against Ukraine. there was little value in looking at the definition of hybridwarfare as part of its work. The RST rather decided that the greatest value would come from focusing on understanding the modalities of Russian and Russian- beyond its purely military or defence dimension. beyond its purely military or defence The NATO STO (2017) Research Specialist Team hybrid warfare may create a risk of not encompassing it comprehensively, hybrid warfare may create is comprehended concept the that ensure least to at still useful, is that doing Even though we agree that any attempt to create a strict definition of understanding of the hybrid warfare concept contains. understanding of to defineHow the hybrid warfare concept? Sea or ISIL’s ability to mobilize people with a fractured identity. However, Russian foreign policy behaviour comprises most of what the broadest It has to be emphasized that Russia is not the only actor in contemporary examples, Similar methods. warfare hybrid uses that relations international to a certain extent, may be seen in ’s behaviour in China the South (i.e. armed forces) was used primarily as a means of threat. primarily as forces) was used (i.e. armed Ukraine Ukraine crisis therefore brought a new dimension to understanding the of dimension the crisis, during the non-coercive concept: hybrid warfare the concept emerged as preponderant while the hard (kinetic) power a territory and a battle (i.e. war fighting) are the main paradigm. The time and was and time over domains. The document domains. The document Bi-SC input to a new NATO new a to Bi-SC input own to articulate the parameters of hybrid of parameters the articulate to those posed by adversaries, with the ability the posed by adversaries, with those The document aimed document The . understood as being applied as being applied “any adversary that simultaneously understood by “Hybrid threats can be characterized as a mixture of coercive and coercive of mixture a as characterized be can threats “Hybrid subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological, information), ranging from intelligence and cyber operations through economic through operations and cyber intelligence from ranging hybrid By employing forces. conventional of use the to pressure tactics, the attacker seeks to and subversive methods” coercive by applying both opponent undermine and destabilize an (EEAS 2015: 2). “Hybrid warfare can be more easily characterized than defined and various covert of use controlled and centrally designed as a non-military means, by military and/or tactics, enacted overt perception of hybrid warfare’s definition evolved threats, initially to support its Stratcom and EU Military Staff (MS), and later and (MS), Staff Military EU and Stratcom its support to initially threats, to provide for the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats. Some of the definitions are: The EU has developed several policy documents that describe hybrid employs weapons, irregular tactics, a tailored mix of conventional behaviour at the same time and battlespace to and criminal terrorism, (Hoffman 2014). obtain their political objectives” The mainly to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means means employ conventional and non-conventional to simultaneously 2). of their objectives” (NATO 2010: adaptively in pursuit of the potential of the potential implications their within defines hybrid threats as “ threats facing NATO and recognize future areas capability development in NATO. The that intention was also to might inform determine the commanders and lower-level military political authorities higher-level In 2010, NATO developed the document hybrid countering to contribution military the for concept capstone threats engagement in the Ukraine crisis (Giles et al. 2015). et al. crisis (Giles Ukraine in the engagement renewed discussion on the character of this concept was actually Russia’s Russia’s actually was concept this of character the on discussion renewed

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 106 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 107 the political narrative or to radicalize, recruit and 4). for hybrid threats” (EC 2016: actors can be vehicles direct proxy ambiguity with the intention to hinder decision-making processes. processes. hinder decision-making to with the intention ambiguity control social media to using campaigns, disinformation Massive actors actors to achieve specific objectiveswhile remaining below the emphasis an usually is There hostilities. organized open of threshold and on generating target vulnerabilities of the exploiting the on which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state non-state or by state manner a coordinated in be used can which adversaries in shaping the contemporary the security NATO members’ perspective, they are closely environment. connected to Russian From Arguably, hybrid warfare methods are a reality and are in use by Implications of hybrid threat context for Croatia’s for Croatia’s context Implications of hybrid threat national security comprehensiveness that goes beyond the military domain (i.e. beyond an attempt to describe it as warfare). new nor as old or known as the some existing authors definitions, claim. especially However, those many articulated of before 2014, lack lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests”. lethal means to compel the enemy entirely neither is therefore as hybrid warfare concept labelled The submit to one’s will” but rather were “using all means, including armed military and non-military, and lethal and non- force, force or non-armed defined by military means; even more, it may not involve the military at all. Liang and Xiangsui (1999: 7) acknowledged the new principles of war armed force to compel the enemy to that were no longer about “using colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, in 1999. Their main argument was was argument main Their 1999. in Xiangsui, Wang and Liang Qiao colonels, be primarily a struggle longer world would no modern that warfare in the Definitions of the hybrid warfare concept related to the Ukraine crisis are of descriptions comprehensive most the of One exist. that ones only the not senior Chinese two by made was globalization of age the in warfare such the world”. One world”. the to as part of a bigger puzzle in Consequently, the question worth worth question the Consequently, 7 is rather seen is rather , Croatia is not perceived by its highest political levels, at least president Milorad] Dodik and Russia [...] Russian that interference through weapons, there through tactics, would through be and disinformation campaign.” intelligence, through information “Russia has been very much see in these hybrid strong warfare connections [...] between [Republic and of we Srpska‘s the Alliance. Furthermore, it recognizes Russia’s aggressive actions and its demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by the threat and use of force as “a source of regional instability [that] fundamentally challenge the Alliance, peace.” have damaged Euro-Atlantic security, and threaten our long-standing goal of a Europe whole, free, and at NATO’s Warsaw Summit communiqué (para. 5) explicitly describes hybrid attacks as one of the security challenges for challenges security the of one as attacks hybrid describes explicitly 5) (para. communiqué Summit Warsaw NATO’s follow the Soviet example to represent a kind of “saviour of kind a represent to example Soviet the follow 7 in Ukraine but lie in “the international status and socio-political system of Russia” (Kreutz 2015: 67). The Russian President Putin often has no aspirations want to his country to global leadership and does not stresses that which regional instability may have significant implications for Croatia’s main the that believe to reasonable is it that assume We security. national developments only not are Russia and West the between relations in issues Apparently officially, as a target itself but neighbourhood, explicitly labelling Russian involvement: neighbourhood, explicitly labelling In an interview with Defense News National (Judson Security 2016), Forum, during the the Halifax Croatian Kitarović expressed her President views on current Mrs threats in Croatia’s Kolinda immediate Grabar sound perspective on it. sound perspective Although we are not able to produce a reliable intelligence report related report intelligence reliable a produce to able not are we Although Croatia, of Republic the against Russia of activities specific or potential to relatively a create to may help sources open from information some Croatia’s regional security environment and the role the role and security environment regional Croatia’s of Russia answering is is answering is hybrid warfare that the fact does how affects a reality national security? Croatia’s foreign policy behaviour (NATO 2016). (NATO behaviour policy foreign

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 108 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 109 the region of South-Eastern Europe and the Western 8 relations should respect each other’s interests” (President of Russia of (President interests” other’s each respect should relations 2014). “We do not have any claims to world leadership. The idea that Russia is seeking some sort of exclusivity is false [...] we are simply that all from the premise proceeding international participants in for NATO member countries in Central and Eastern Europe (NATO 2017). The direct result of that is NATO’s Readiness Action Plan which, among other things, comprises “assurance measures” 8 aggression (Holmes 2015). Recent events in Macedonia where, according where, Macedonia in events Recent 2015). (Holmes aggression to Janusz Bugajski (2017), the prospects Russian’s for Macedonia’s entry goal into NATO and the is EU, but even “not more only to diminish demanded that the EU and NATO do more to respond “hybrid to warfare” the approach Russian and to counter the rising threat of Russian politicians in that area of Europe openly warned about Russian objectives Russian about warned openly Europe of area that in politicians and the need for NATO to respond more forcefully. One example is the President Mr. Pleveneliev, who views Bulgarian expressed by the former 2014 more loudly, 2014 more Some influence. Russian to susceptible more even is particular, in Balkans, Although the countries in Eastern, Central and North Europe expressed their concerns and worries about Russian foreign policy behaviour after these relations militarily. On the contrary, Russia may and does focus on the EU. destabilizing the unity of NATO and returned to the presidency in 2012. On the other hand, Russia is aware of its weaknesses capabilitiesin terms of power and compared to the West and is not expected to deteriorate relations with it to escalate Russia’s far reaching agenda of “corralling as many possible” former (Besemeres 2016: vassals 15) back into as its sphere of influence through Vladimir Putin since Mr evident more has become means coercive apparently, Ukraine. apparently, Ukraine. Middle Asia, and intends to block the enlargement of NATO and EU to its “near abroad”. It is therefore reasonable to expect that Russia’s primary interests lie in countries like Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and, On the other hand, it is evident that Russia positions itself as a power, Eurasian trying to increase its influence in the regions of North Africa and Discussion Club in October 2014: 2014: in October Club Discussion example example is his speech at the plenary meeting of the Valdai International Hybrid was that it is imperative to it was that journalist, the banking systems in the region are fragile and are region systems in the banking the journalist, societal vulnerabilities in Croatia that are usually not taken seriously into taken usually not are that Croatia societal vulnerabilities in and illustrative assessment of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities weaknesses, and illustrative assessment of the strengths, and threats (SWOT analysis) of the national Republic security. A of particular emphasis Croatia in this related assessment was to given to its understand ourselves, since every weakness and vulnerability may be ourselves, since every weakness and vulnerability understand exploited. The results of the analysis that follows represent a generalized One of the conclusions of NATO implications NATO a case study, warfare: STO’s (2017) activity SAS-127 Republic of Croatia A generalized assessment of strengths, weaknesses, weaknesses, assessment of strengths, A generalized of the analysis) (SWOT opportunities and threats a controlled crisis in the Balkans would give Russia bargaining chips, and deniability. may be used for bargaining via pressures (e.g. threatening to pull large deposits), controlled crisis, etc. As argued by Financial Times Ivan Krastev (2015), the A more subtle way of influencing political and economicthe region dynamicsis the financial domain, in where the fragility of banking systems encouraging countries to copy Brexit, arguing that a break-up of the EU in the Western Balkans. could trigger a war to be a major factor in the regional stability. This is confirmed by Mr Jean Claude Juncker’s blunt warning to Donald Trump (Barber 2017) against Current developments in the Western Balkans show a growing trajectory for strategy enlargement an lacked has EU the Unfortunately, instability. of Western Balkan countries since 2007. Nevertheless, the EU is still believed (Kirillova 2017). (Kirillova weakness weakness and intensifies Russia’s influence”, might be a good example of that influence in place. The case of Macedonia is justan extension of the influence Russia already has inplace in Serbia and Republika Srpska menacingly to turn the Balkans into a conflict zone that illustrates Western Western illustrates that zone conflict a into Balkans the turn to menacingly

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 110 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 111 resulting in growing social growing in resulting 9 10

Political clientelism (crony corruption (Bilandžić 2015) capitalism) and systemic political Unsustainable public finances, including excessive dependence of exaggerate consequently which transfers, state on population the Stulhofer 2016; Lausic 2017) government spending (Buric and Low effectiveness of the legal system the active working population of Croatia to other, more prosperous more other, to Croatia of population active working the EU countries) Low national economic performance inequalities personnel and capability) Inadequate and insufficient legal and doctrinal basishybrid strategies to counter of emigration depopulation, (ageing, trends demographic Negative national level (including crisis management) national level (including for addressing hybrid warfare Lack of legal and political means Armed forces entirely dependent on professionals (reserve forces in terms of augmentation force not adequately maintained for Capable armed forces and law enforcement system Capable armed Lack of appropriate interagency (inter-sectorial) cooperation at Membership of NATO and EU of NATO and Membership Relatively high level of national cohesion (no tensions) extremists or other ethnic/separatists, • • • • • • • • • • • • Ibid. may sound soothing but doesn’t change the fact that the Croatian economy is far from being exemplary. performing economies in 2016 (Tartar et al. 2016). The fact that , Finland and are in the same group same the in are Switzerland and Finland Japan, that fact The 2016). al. et (Tartar 2016 in economies performing The Bloomberg prediction “Meet 2016’s Worst Economic Performers”, puts Croatia in a group of the ten worst

10 9 Weaknesses Strengths consideration during the development of a threat assessment. of a threat the development during consideration 11 of conflict over the borders 12 and economic transition violent extremism/radicalism, organized crime, illegal/uncontrolled migrations, possible terrorism) Political and societal tensions in the neighbourhood (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina): weak states, unfinished processes of political Clash of geopolitical interests of the outer Balkans, with a potential spill-over states in the Western Negative security trends in the neighbourhood (potential for the need to develop a comprehensive government approach to approach government a comprehensive develop to need the national security consists neighbourhood Croatian in transition, the Besides countries democracies of consolidated institutions and agencies institutions about Parliament) the in parties (political consensus national Existing High level of energy import dependency energy level of High Irrationality of territorial organization and hypertrophy of state • • • • • • • Croatia imports 72 per cent of its energy consumption; most of it (91 per cent) refers to fossil fuels (Matutinovic 2014). consumption; most of it (91 per cent) refers Croatia imports 72 per cent of its energy NATO uses this term in describing the strategic military perspectives, including the impact of geopolitical trends on security environment, referring to “Spill over of conflict from neighbouring countries along NATO borders,conflict over interstate access to resources, state-on-state conflict including Article V situations, resource wars, frozen conflict, new spheres of influence” (NATO ACT 2015: 15).

11 12 threats and attacks apparently do not fit automaticallyhas led many small umbrella. This kind of uncertainty collective defence under NATO’s respond to hybrid threats or attacks rests with the targeted nation” or attacks rests with the targeted respond to hybrid threats (NATO 2016: para.72). However, the Declaration promises that “NATO is hybrid The campaign”. hybrid a of stage any at Ally an assist to prepared also give cause for concern. Although NATO membership provides an essential deterrent capability Warsaw against Summit conventional Declaration states threats, that “the NATO’s primary responsibility to The above assessment shows that, aside from external conditions global and regional (the security environment), Croatia’s internal challenges Threats (Challenges) Opportunities

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 112 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 113 The threshold concept for threshold concept The show the inadequacy of the military military the inadequacy of show the . Besides capable it is and relevant armed forces, approach from the current traditional one to deal approach from the current are implemented are instrument of national power able to respond to them. different a particular warfare principles warfare as with more or less conventional and asymmetric threats that comprise that asymmetric threats and less conventional or with more an armed attack or/and armed conflict. The instabilities in which hybrid The organization of a robust national defence to cope with hybrid threats hybrid with cope to defence national robust a of organization The requires a Ways to counter hybrid threats Ways of security measures used to protect the essentials of the society of the of security measures used to protect deterrer. as a means of dissuading the deterred from aggression, since the costs as a means of dissuading the deterred straightforwardness the with increase harm creating of aggressor the for and by smaller forces assess very important to identify and vital the of the society, functions works case that in Resilience them. in resilience building and safeguarding an independent study, and are currently the topic of the NATO Science and Technology Organization project SAS-131 which the national armed forces in place provide. In this view, the sum of sum the view, this In provide. place in forces armed national the which while the national forces provide the allied provides the deterrence forces arguably deserve concept and deterrence The threshold the threshold. premise of denying the aggressor the ability the achieve its goals swiftly the aggressor to premise of denying and at low cost (i.e. before NATO’s Article V has been activated). In a deterrence the is considered threshold the context, multinational alliance countries (e.g. , and Finland), joined by , started developing the threshold concept, which is conceptualized under the 297). Deterrence depends upon psychological effects three and criteria: must capability, fulfil commitment and communication 2008: 50). (Lonsdale Considering Russia as a potential threat, some Scandinavian deterred by employing traditional deterrence strategies. This is particularly This strategies. traditional deterrence by employing deterred the case with non-state actors (Clarke, Gearson and Shaud 2009: 295– of the European continent, closer to Russia geographically, it is generally issue is, and The measures. deterrence focus on additional to put an may be threat all types of nor all adversaries that neither acknowledged, NATO countries, particularly those at the northern and southern “vignette” “vignette” southern and northern the at those particularly countries, NATO Sustainability principles and practices in all three aspects Design of the processes and systems of the early warning, its setup Design of the processes and systems of the early warning, inter-sectorial, an (i.e. integrated an on based maintenance, and a whole of government) approach. of intimidation. The idea of war as a struggle between two armies armies two between as a struggle idea of war The of intimidation. exercised military responses Consequently, apply here. not does policy security appropriate most or first the not are forces NATO by 2015: 1). and Mölling tool” (Major “In hybrid conflicts, armed forces are nota primary toolto exert scenario a create to means as a serve rather they force: military functions): We argue that the concept of ways of responding to hybrid threats should threats hybrid to responding of ways of concept the that argue We vulnerability process of assessment of the comprise, at least, a continuous of national security (including the vulnerability of the vital societal certain degree, with the Homeland Security System Act (MoD Croatia 2016). Croatia (MoD Act System Security Homeland the with degree, certain and escalation, recognition of the stages of its development anddevelopment its of stages the of recognition escalation, and conceptualization of potential ways towards conflict resolution. In Croatia, and is expected to be developed, to athis capacity does not yet exist the nature of the conflict in the contemporary international environment, emergenceits affect that factors the of awareness an including efforts are not enough any more” (Cederberg and Eronen 2015a: 2). efforts are not enough any more” a comprehensive understanding ofPrevention of hybrid threats requires multi-pronged hybrid threat demands that defence planners engage multi-pronged hybrid threat all parts of society in defensive efforts. Intergovernmental or interagency be integrated, based on effective interaction among the various state various the among interaction effective on based integrated, be bodies (i.e. ministries, governmental agencies and institutions, agencies, security and armed and law enforcement forces). Even more, “the As already described, hybrid warfare may affect various spheres of the threats and challenges should such society. Countering life of a state or with other instruments of power to respond adequately to challenges to adequately respond to power of instruments other with hybrid warfare concept. stemming from the Military organization as an instrument a means that has to be integrated be seen more and more as therefore, of the national power should,

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 114 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 115 successfully. be implemented (goals, objectives) juxtaposed against a fixed a against juxtaposed objectives) (goals,

(the world or a set of external conditions). This approach then approach This conditions). external of set a or world (the

An integrated model of using/sharing all national capabilities—all capabilities—all national all using/sharing of model integrated An available forces and the means to employ them efficiently and rationally. threats, as well as threats and challenges that usually belong to usually belong challenges that and as well as threats threats, management. the scope of crisis Societal Societal resilience developed and supported as a higher level of defence to ensure effective and efficient response to hybrid state’s state’s key policy and strategic documents to provide societal “immunity”. (economic, (economic, social and environmental) implemented in the environment itself nor the internal state of an organization (a nation) is fixed is nation) (a organization an of state internal the nor itself environment and the concept of extended sectors of security. In the complex security environment (Wijkman 2015), neither the already been recognized and some new approaches proposed: for example, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde see, (1998) regarding securitization force, in a dialectic of wills” (Heuser 2010: 27). This approach, however, exclusively and assumes orients the focus of strategy planning outwards have trends changing The exclusive means. as the force use of the In international politics, strategy is usually perceived as “a comprehensive “a as perceived usually is strategy politics, international In actual use of or threat political ends, including the pursue to try way to environment attaining the interests subject of a strategy for development assumes the 6). 1983: Overholt and (Ascher environment fixed the of constraints the to The traditional approach to strategic planning considers an organization interests fixed of set a through environment Strategic planning in the contemporary security planning in the contemporary Strategic The recommendations above require careful strategic planning and careful strategic planning and above require The recommendations on a societal level to coordinated efforts

be argued , pre-empt, mitigate and respond to what , pre-empt, mitigate . Moreover, although not the sole actor in the sole actor the not although . Moreover, 13 recognize activities it is too late.” Therefore, it is important to be able to recognize to able be to important is it Therefore, late.” too is it In its most basic definition, a systems approach is “a line of thought in the management field which stresses the interactive nature and interdependence of external and internal factors in an organization” (WebFinance Inc. 2017). interactive nature and interdependence of external and internal factors in an organization” (WebFinance Inc.

13 and promote what we hold dear. aware). Indicators are also helpful in constructing an image of the state decision to protect environment on which we can make a reliable of our watch to ensure we can have an appropriate answer to disturbances. to we can have an appropriate answer ensure watch to Indicators link us to the world, since only by reading the right indicators can we cope with our dynamic environment (that is, be situationally The more complex our environment is, the more indicators we have to is, the more environment our complex more The Systems approach strategies suggests that an advanced strategic culture, as well as strategy strategic culture, strategies suggests that an advanced has yet to be built. and policy development capacity, and a highly developed strategic culture, which is another challenge, as challenge, which is another culture, and a highly developed strategic there that fact The defence. national Croatia’s for opportunity, an as well is a gap of 15 years (i.e. 2002–2017) between the two national security This approach to strategic planning requires highly competent expertise requires highly competent This approach to strategic planning process, highly capable conventional military forces (including Special Operations Forces) remain a core component of national deterrence in a hybrid threat context. to raise awareness, to raise awareness, may be very subtle that when facing a competent hybrid threat actor, once the problem is the problem once actor, threat hybrid a competent that when facing recognized sources different many data from combine activities and hostile of signs the As the NATO STO (2017: 20) RST’s final report suggests, “it can threat context—the internal state (the strength, cohesion vs vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities, vs cohesion strength, (the state internal context—the threat etc.) directly relates to the ability to affect with disturbances. threats and dealing it or in countering shaping the environment, either in and and static. More importantly—and this specificallymatters in the hybrid

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 116 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 117

. society its capacity to achieve its capacity to regarding of indicators. The systems approach (systems sets The system itself (the current state of the system). state of the itself (the current The system or observer. or objectives of the operator The interests, needs, 2. 1. Corruption of dependencies on the import of commodities and energy- and commodities of import the on dependencies of Corruption political and social destabilization) in the country attacked. Besides the exploit cognitive and affective domain, an adversary may well intend to social disruptions. further lead to inequalities that socio-economic existing its goals through influences, manipulationdestructive processes (supporting of public identity projects perception of a and provoking and/or and extremism, inciting separatism population, the of particular part aggression, it may be exposed to powerful informational, psychological, psychological, powerful informational, exposed to it may be aggression, cultural and other aggressor influences. The aggressor pursue can In the hybrid threat environment, a society is, at the same time, an object an time, same the at is, society a environment, threat hybrid the In of aggression and a force that counters aggression. As an object of defending against hybrid threats defending against hybrid The role of society and societal resilience in of society and societal resilience The role means, as well as internal and external environment of a state and means, as well as internal and external nations and the world in the coming decades (Arnold and Wade 2015). enables the integration of ways andThe systems approach, in this context, approach in designing and executing national strategic planning, which and executing national strategic approach in designing should encompass both thinking) may arguably be very useful in handling the complexity facing an assessment of the system itself, through the perspective of addressing the system itself, through the perspective an assessment of vulnerabilities and weaknesses. We therefore propose the systems second set (pursuing political ends), while the and analysed only usually considered first (the system itself) is comprise also should set first the fact, In second. the in described ends the Arguably, the majority of national security strategies are focused on the needed for the system to cope with the challenges from the environment, environment, the from challenges the with cope to system the for needed by: determined Hartmut Hartmut Bossel (1996) argues that there are two basic sets of indicators “At its most general level, resilience is understood as the capacity to capacity the as understood is resilience level, general most its “At from efficiently and quickly back’ ‘bounce and withstand absorb, and property natural a both be to considered is It perturbation. a complex of array improved within a broad can be quality which ecosystems, infrastructures, adaptive systems including critical good governance.” societies and economies through internal capacities and capabilities as the way to deal with these capacities and capabilities way to internal as the One important aspect of resilience is that it acknowledges uncertainty and complexity as a contemporary condition. However, it emphasizes Strategy (2016) also comprises the networks and services and the resilience of the EU’s democracies. resilience of critical infrastructure, societal resilience to our East and South” is defined asone of the top five priorities for the EU’s external action. Besides references to resilience in the context of resilient societies, states and democracies, the EU Global societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and internal from withstanding and recovering thus societies to reform, building the “state and in the same document, external crises”. Moreover, Societal resilience is not only a dynamic and relational concept but also a also but concept relational and dynamic a only not is resilience Societal profoundly political one. It is a focus of the EU and, as stated in its Global Strategy (2016: 23), the resilience deals with “the ability of states and traumatic events (e.g. natural disaster). We chose the description from point: Zebrowski (2016: 4) as the starting Most definitions of resilience outline one or more perspectives, but comprise but perspectives, more or one outline resilience of definitions Most in general reactive recovery (e.g. the cyber-attack) and/or stability after transformative. Societal resilience tends to ensure that society can face from any disturbance and crisis. and quickly recover In general, as defined by Markus Keck and PatrickSakdapolrak (2013), capacities: coping, adaptive comprises three societal resilience and fields. This contributes to societal resilience against threats and challenges challenges and threats against resilience societal to contributes This fields. hybrid threats. particularly against security environment, the from coming therefore therefore critical to identify the causes of the state’s weaknesses and to impacts negative decrease to situation the improve to policies implement and develop ways to enhance resistance of such influences in various generating generating products may also be a source of societal vulnerability. It is

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 118 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 119 is on contingencies. However, it does not contain all the challenges the all contain not does it However, contingencies. on Dealing with mass casualties Disruptions in availability of public financing Disruptions in availability of public and water resources Disruptions in availability of food Disturbances in public information and communication systems Disruptions in public utilities systems and transport logistics Disruptions in civil transportation systems Disturbances in financial and payment Serious disturbances in health and welfare of the population Serious disturbances in health and Disturbances in energy supply Disturbances in power supply order Severe disturbances in border people movement) security (including uncontrolled phenomena Major accidents and extreme natural Political, economic and military pressure (from an external actor) and military pressure (from an Political, economic government services Disturbances in critical social endangers criminality that radicalism and other Terrorism, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • to cultural (e.g. structural corruption), legal (e.g. effectiveness of the legal the of effectiveness (e.g. legal corruption), structural (e.g. cultural to The list above comprises some of the most vital functions to society and focused mentioned in the list of Croatia’s vulnerabilities, as some of them belong list adapted from MoD Finland’s Security Strategy for Society (2010) and Stoykov (2016): the threats and challenges that should be taken care of in the societal in the societal be taken care of that should and challenges the threats in the following may be found Croatia, for relevant framework, resilience therefore therefore encompasses more actors (e.g. civil preparedness, as case is in NATO’s the approach) and a broader spectrum of resources a than traditional, defence-related approach to national security. Some of problems problems rather than external intervention (Juncos 2017). Resilience are of are issues as they may provide an exploitation opportunity opportunity exploitation an may provide they as below. adversary. hybrid are given address hybrid threats adequately. address hybrid threats adequately. Expanding the missions of existing state institutions in the sector (i.e. security new authorities for intelligence and counterintelligence agencies and armed forces, boosting strategic communication) or creating new organizations. hybrid threats. This includes improved public-privateThis includes cooperation hybrid threats. on security and development and modernization of civilian military capabilities. and to frameworks and innovative legal concepts of Development approaches progressively accompanied by whole-of-society by accompanied progressively approaches a resilient society. at managing risks and building strategies aimed resources and capabilitiesdifferent the of of Concentration stakeholders (primarily the state’s instrument of power but also that of the society, the private sector and individual citizens) to counter Dealing with unknown unknowns (“black swans”). This comprises the comprises This swans”). (“black unknowns unknown with Dealing that effects or events circumstances, anticipate future necessity to predict and plan for. are impossible to comprehensive of proactive government-led Development • • • • • might be exploited by an opponent, including legal, policy, diplomatic, including legal, might be exploited by an opponent, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, socio-cultural A hybrid adversary seeks to vulnerabilities analyse across all domains that to important therefore exploit the weaknesses of society. It is Conclusion and recommendations (2016) It is therefore important to define how societal resilience may become a Yanakiev from adapted proposals, Some threats. hybrid counter to means particular importance particular for the system) system) or economic (e.g. energy security) aspects. These

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 120 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 121 relevance and approaches to the topic for the Croatian national security relevance and approaches to the topic for the Croatian strategy. This paper analyses hybrid warfare almost exclusively through the through almost exclusively warfare analyses hybrid paper This the enlighten to was research the of scope the since perspective Western of power, the resilience of the whole society (e.g. societal immunity) and response to hybrid threats. needed to ensure deterrence against is for ensuring territorial defence, protection of sovereignty and deterrence, for ensuring territorial defence, protection power of instruments state other with conjunction in used be to need they Besides threats. the state instruments to respond adequately to hybrid With regard to means to respond to hybrid threats, while the traditional means (conventional armed forces) may still be valid as an instrument on organizational interests (e.g. inadequate. - national environment) values security regional and and global interests) (e.g. and environment the interconnection of different components which together form a more form which together components of different interconnection the makes Complexity thus threat. and multidimensional multifaceted planning - which focuses exclusively traditional approach to strategic Hybrid threat, as a potential, or hybrid warfare, as an act, is a complex phenomenon. It is complex as it results from the convergence and but also different qualities of an organization, threats), a community or a state. related to cyber be it a company (e.g. countering this type of threat and challenge requires not only different only different not and challenge requires threat this type of countering organization), and (structures means and concepts) and (strategies ways often requires political (e.g. policy) measures as well as some paradigm changes (e.g. cultural and structural adaptations). Therefore, awareness should be raised that policy/strategic level on the decision-makers among strategy should incorporate measures to reduce vulnerabilities that may that vulnerabilities reduce to measures incorporate should strategy by a potential be exploited presented approach adversary. The hybrid vulnerabilities that could prevent the creation of an appropriate response response an appropriate of creation the prevent could that vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities (societal) reduce to is step follow-up A threats. hybrid to to develop joint contingency plans. Besides that, any relevant (grand) and and law enforcement. Such a gap analysis should also include legal

, (Accessed 26 New York: John

, 44(2015): 669–678. 44(2015): , https://www.ft.com/ The war on the rocks the on war The Military Review: The . Acton: The Australian 1st ed. , 96(1): 30–37. (Accessed 15 September 2016). (Accessed 12 January 2017). , 19 March [online]. Available at: Strategic planning and forecasting: Strategic planning http://vijesti.hrt.hr/276465/otvoreno- . National Defence Academy of Latvia http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/the- [TV program] Croatian Radio-Television 1, Procedia Computer Science Computer Procedia A difficult neighbourhood. Essays on Russia and . Foreign Policy Foreign . , 24 March [online]. Available at: Available [online]. March 24 , Otvoreno Russia’s new generation warfare in Ukraine—implications Russia’s warfare new generation 16 March, 22:30. Available at: nacionalna-sigurnost-na-ispitu-31 Defence Academy of Latvia. East-Central Europe since World War National University Press. II Professional Journal of the U.S. Army for Latvian defence policy Centre for Security and Strategic Research. Riga, Latvia: National (Accessed 15 September 2016). [online]. Available at: shadow-wars-of-the-21st-century/ content/938452b6-1072-11e7-a88c-50ba212dce4d March 2017). America’s future http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/19/silicon-iron-and-shadow/ political risk and economic opportunity. economic political risk and Willey & Sons. Financial Times systems approach. systems approach. Bilandžić, M., 2015. Besemeres, J. F., 2016. Berzins, J., 2014. Bartles, C. K., 2016. Getting Gerasimov right. Barno, D., 2014. The shadow wars of the 21st century. the wars of shadow The 2014.D., Barno, Barno, D., 2013. Silicon, iron, and shadow: three wars that will define Barber, L., 2017. Juncker tells Trump to stop ‘annoying’ praise for Brexit. Ascher, W. and Overholt, W. H., 1983. H., W. Overholt, and W. Ascher, Arnold, R. D. and Wade, J. P., 2015. A definition of systems thinking: a Bibliography

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 122 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 123 , . The Kremlin The , 31 August (Accessed 12 http://cepa.org/ , 9(1): 1-10. , 40(4): 361–483. Centre for European European for Centre 1(1996): 193–218. Security: a new framework a new Security: https://media.defense.gov/2017/ http://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/ Deterrence in the twenty-first century – https://www.soa.hr/UserFiles/File/Strategy_ Strategic Security Analysis Geneva Centre for Security Policy Security for Centre Geneva Financial Theory and Practice Financial Theory , 10 April [online]. Available at: Nacionalna sigurnost Hrvatske: od egzistencijalne egzistencijalne od Hrvatske: sigurnost Nacionalna (Accessed 10 January 2017). . [pdf]. Available at: Available [pdf]. . . Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. The Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia no. 33/2002 no. Croatia of Republic the of Gazette Official The . Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International (Accessed 19 January 2017). , J., 2017. Russia’s new Macedonia offensive. Macedonia new Russia’s 2017. J., , Europe Studies. security. [pdf]. Available at: Apr/05/2001727306/-1/-1/0/B_0118_DETERRENCE_TWENTYFIRST_ CENTURY.PDF playbook: understanding Russian influence in Central and Eastern Global-insight/Wake-up-West!-The-Era-of-Hybrid-Warfare-Is-Upon- Us note. In: Cain, A. C. ed. proceedings against hybrid threats? us. is upon warfare [online]. Available at: inertia in Croatia? inertia in Croatia? for analysis Policy Analysis EuropesEdge/Russias_new_Macedonia_off ensive April 2017). Lecture given by Prof. Bilandžić at the Dominican monastery, Split, on 18 January 2017. Croatia and Assessment, Environmental Modeling ugroženosti do izvoznika sigurnosti i faktora međunarodne stabilnosti međunarodne faktora i sigurnosti izvoznika do ugroženosti Croatian Parliament, 2002. Strategy for the Republic of Croatia’s national Conley, H. A., Mina, J., Stefanov, R. and Vladimirov, M., 2016. Clarke, M., Gearson, J. and Shaud, J. A., 2009. Post-conference briefing Cederberg, A. and Eronen, P., 2015b. Wake up, West! The era of hybrid Cederberg, A. and Eronen, P., 2015a. How can societies be defended Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J., 1998. Buric, I. and Stulhofer, A., 2016. In search of the egalitarian syndrome: cultural syndrome: egalitarian the of search In 2016. A., Stulhofer, and I. Buric, Bugajski Bossel, H., 1996. Deriving indicators of sustainable development. Bilandžić, Bilandžić, M., 2017. http://www. (Accessed (Accessed 15 London: The Royal The Official Gazette of Gazette Official The European Commission, http://eeas.europa.eu/ , 4(2007): 624–629. http://www.statewatch.org/

Shared vision, common action: a action: vision, common Shared . Medford, MA: Tufts University Global Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier (Military- Voyenno-Promyshlennyy (Accessed 20 February 2017). (Accessed 28 December 2016). December 28 (Accessed . [online]. Available at: , 26 February [online]. Available at: . European External Action Service, Council of the , 5(1):16–20. . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Public Administration Review Public Administration The evolution of strategy—thinking war from antiquity to G-DAE Working Paper No. 00-04: “basic principles of . Food-for-thought paper “Countering Hybrid Threats” ST Hybrid Threats” paper “Countering Food-for-thought sustainable development” Development and Environment Institute. the present vpk-news.ru/articles/14632 Russian challenge. the report: House Chatham Institute of International Affairs. top_stories/2016/280616_global_strategy_en.htm September 2016). science is in the foresight). Industrial Courier) 15 September 2016). foreign Union’s European the for strategy global a Europe, stronger and security policy Infinity Journal 8887 2015 INIT European Union, [pdf]. Available at: news/2015/may/eeas-csdp-hybrid-threats-8887-15.pdf countering hybrid threats “EU Playbook”. 11034/16 Domovinskog rata i članova njihovih obitelji. njihovih članova i rata Domovinskog no. 174/2004. of Croatia the Republic problems. Republic_of_Croatia.pdf Heuser, B., 2010. Harris, J., 2000. Giles, K., Hanson, P., Lyne, R., Nixey, J., Sherr, J. and Wood, A. eds., 2015. Gerasimov, V., 2013. Ценность науки в предвидении (The value of EU Global Strategy (EUGS), 2016. EEAS, 2015. Echevarria, A. J., 2015. How should we think about “grey-zone” wars?. EC, 2016. Joint staff working document EU operational protocol for Doyle, R. B., 2007. The U.S. national security strategy: policy, process, Croatian Croatian Parliament, 2004. Zakon o pravima hrvatskih branitelja iz

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 124 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 125

, , https:// Financial EBLnews (Accessed http://www. Independent https://www.ft.com/ . Princeton, NJ: Princeton http://www.independent. https://eblnews.com/news/ , 67(1): 5–19. , 26(1): 1–18. , 24 January [online]. Available at: Forging a world of liberty under law: liberty under of a world Forging , 28 July [online]. Available at: Erdkunde Accessed 12 November 2016). Accessed 12 November (

(Accessed 12 February 2017). European Security (Accessed 12 April 2017). Euromaidan Press , 29 November [online]. Available at: The war on the rocks

. , 14 January [online]. Available at: and-the-kremlins-hybrid-war-in-the-balkans/#arvlbdata 12 April 2017). Times learned and ways forward. in the Balkans. http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/01/24/plans-for-a-great-serbia- defensenews.com/articles/interview-president-of-croatia-kolinda- grabar-kitarovic pragmatist turn?. University, Woodrow Wilson School of Affairs. Public and International Defense News co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-plans-a-hybrid-warfare- campaign-aimed-at-destabalising-europe-says-bulgarian- president-a6734981.html U.S. national security in the 21st century warfare-vs-hybrid-threats/ destabilising Europe, says 14 Bulgarian November [online]. President. Available at: 6 croatia/croatia-starts-drafting-national-security-strategy-4285 20 January 2017). (Accessed threats warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political- 3 November [online]. Available at: Krastev, I., 2015. The Balkans are the soft underbelly of Europe. Kirillova, K., 2017. Plans for a “Great Serbia” and the Kremlin’s hybrid war Keck, M. and Sakdapolrak, P., 2013. What is social resilience? Lessons Juncos, A. E., 2017. Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: a Judson, J., 2016. Interview: President of Croatia Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic. Ikenberry, G. J. and Slaughter, A., 2006. A., Slaughter, and J. G. Ikenberry, Holmes, L., 2015. Russia plans a ‘hybrid warfare’ campaign aimed at Hoffman, Hoffman, F., 2014. On not-so-new warfare: political warfare vs. hybrid HINA, HINA, 2016. Croatia starts drafting national security strategy. . SWP Ministry (Accessed 3 (Accessed 18 . Beijing: PLA Literature PLA Beijing: . , 4 February [online]. . Paris: Editions Payot & Payot Editions Paris: . Understanding modern Understanding , 23 December [online]. . New York: Cambridge Stiftung Wissenschaft und http://www.cryptome.org/ . New York: Algora Publishing. . New York: (Accessed 12 February 2017). (Accessed 12 February Unrestricted warfare Unrestricted La guerre hors limites La guerre Hybrid warfare: fighting complex opponents complex fighting warfare: Hybrid Slobodna Dalmacija Slobodna Sustainability perspectives from the European http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/novosti/biznis/ https://www.morh.hr/en/news/press-releases/6610- . Zagreb: IDIZ and Heinrich Boll Stiftung. pp. 277–293. . Zagreb: IDIZ and Heinrich Boll Stiftung. Russia’s place in the world Russia’s (Accessed 10 October 2016). Edition in French: Liang, Q. . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . Cambridge: Cambridge University of Defence of the Republic of Croatia of Republic the of Defence of Available at: national-security-strategy-draft-presented.html February 2017). Marinović, J. D. eds. semi-periphery and Mansoor, P. R. eds. R. P. Mansoor, and present the to world ancient the from University Press. pp.1–17. warfare as leitmotifs. defence and deterrence, Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments No. 22. and Xiangsui, W., 1999. W., Xiangsui, and de poche, l’édition 2006. Rivages pour l’édition eds. D. C. Walton, and C. Tuck, I., Speller, J., clanak/id/466144/dramaticno-upozorenje-ina-bi-mogla-postati- recept-za-novu-katastrofu at: Available House. Publishing Arts and cuw.htm za novu katastrofu”. Available at: content/2287ba66-8489-11e4-bae9-00144feabdc0 2017). February MoD Croatia, 2016. Commission launches work on drafting national MoD Croatia, 2010. National Security Strategy draft presented. Matutinovic, I., 2014. Industrial policy for sustainability. In: Domazet, M. and M. Domazet, In: sustainability. for policy Industrial 2014. I., Matutinovic, Mansoor, P. R., 2012. Introduction: hybrid warfare in history. In: Murray, W. Major, C. and Mölling, C., 2015. A hybrid security policy for Europe: resilience, Europe: for policy security hybrid A 2015. C., Mölling, and C. Major, Lonsdale, D. J., 2008. Part I strategy. In: Jordan, D., Kiras, J. D., Lonsdale, D. Lonsdale, D., J. Kiras, D., Jordan, In: strategy. I Part 2008. J., D. Lonsdale, Liang, Q. and Xiangsui, W., 1999. W., Xiangsui, and Q. Liang, Lausic, F., 2017. Dramatično upozorenje: “Ina bi mogla postati recept Kreutz, A., 2015. Kreutz, A.,

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 126 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 127 . , http:// http:// . Norfolk, VA: (Accessed 20 Ministry of Defence Ministry of Defence NATO SACEUR and . [online]. Available at: (Accessed 20 March https://www.morh.hr/en/ , 62(Special Issue): 126–137. (Accessed 10 January 2017). (Accessed 10 January , [online]. Available at: NATO (Accessed 7 January 2017). (Accessed 7 January http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/ (Accessed 12 February 2017). 12 February (Accessed , 24 October [online]. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia of Republic the of Defence of Ministry (Accessed 30 March 2017). , [online] (last updated 10.55 AM on 29 March Framework for future alliance operations future for Framework NATO SAS-127 Hybrid warfare: a case study, NATO implications NATO study, case a warfare: Hybrid SAS-127 SAS-121 Hybrid warfare research specialist team on hybrid on team specialist research warfare Hybrid SAS-121 Public Administration Review . NATO Science and Technology Organization Activity Final Final Activity Organization Technology and Science NATO . President of Russia , [pdf]. Available at: 2017). security. Club. en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860 Report. Activity Report. NATO Science and Technology Organization NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation. NATO Headquarters Supreme Allied warfare texts_133169.htm www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm February 2017). SACT events/2010/20100826_bi-sc_cht.pdf July 2016. 2017). Available at: http://www.defmin.fi/en/publications/strategy_documents/the_ security_strategy_for_society hybrid threats. countering to contribution about-us/243-morh/hrvatsko-vojno-uciliste-kategorija/idde/idde- news/13732-commission-launches-work-on-drafting-national- security-documents.html Finland. Government Resolution 16.12.2010 security documents. documents. security 24 November [online]. Available at: President of Russia, 2014. Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Newmann, W., 2002. Reorganizing for national security and homeland NATO STO, 2017. STO, NATO NATO STO, 2016. STO, NATO NATO ACT, 2015. NATO, 2017. Readiness action plan. NATO, 2016. NATO Warsaw Summit communiqué. Press release on 9th NATO, 2010. Bi-SC input to a new NATO capstone concept for the military military the for concept capstone NATO new a to input Bi-SC 2010. NATO, MoD Finland, 2010. Security strategy for society. http:// Political . Sofia, , 14- Bulgaria, Sofia, . (Accessed 20 NATO (North Atlantic Atlantic (North NATO . [online]. Available at: (Accessed 20 February 2017). February 20 (Accessed NATO (North Atlantic Treaty (North NATO (Accessed 12 January 2017). Building resilience in a globalised Building resilience in a globalised world , 11 January [online]. Available at: CD&E Annual Conference Annual CD&E

The business dictionary , 67(4): 147−165. Concept Development and Experimentation Annual Experimentation and Development Concept

How nation-states craft national security strategy strategy security national craft nation-states How The value of resilience: securing life in the twenty-first Bloomberg . Sofia, Bulgaria, 14-16 November. . Sofia, Bulgaria, 14-16 November. . Brussels, , 30 September [online]. Available . Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies . New York: Routledge. https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/event/conference/building-a- Conference century Science Quarterly in countering hybrid warfare. Organization), In: (European Commission), conference at: resilient-europe-in-a-globalised-world March 2017). http://www.businessdictionary.com performers. www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-11/meet-2016-s- worst-economic-performers-flirting-with-disaster Institute Monograph. Institute societal resilience against hybrid threats. In: Organization), Treaty 16 November. documents Zebrowski, C., 2016. Yanakiev, Y., 2016. Conceptualizing the role of societal resilience Wolfers, A., 1952. “National security” as an ambiguous symbol. Wijkman, A., 2015. An increasingly complex and vulnerable world. In: EC WebFinance Inc., 2017. Tartar, A., Saraiva, C. and Li, C., 2016. Meet 2016’s worst economic Stoykov, Stoykov, M., 2016. Expert assessment: national capabilities for protecting Stolberg, Stolberg, A., 2012.

XXIII (80) - 2017 Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 128 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (80) 66 - -2017 2012 129 ) is the Head [email protected] ( on sustainability as the driving principle of shaping the modern the shaping driving principle of as the sustainability on sustainable defence. national security strategy and currently a PhD student at the University of Defence Czech Republic, in in the field of defence economics, focusing the national security and defence (strategic foresight analysis, of management strategic development, strategy/concept the national defence and leadership development). He is coordinator in NATO’s Science and Technology Organization. Technology and Science NATO’s in coordinator His research activities are focused on the key aspects of Smiljanic is an active military officer and a lecturer in Defence Defence in lecturer a and officer military active an is Smiljanic Economics at the Croatian Military Academy whose current national Croatian of responsibility the comprises assignment (Director) (Director) of the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies at the Croatian Defence Academy in Zagreb, Croatia. Colonel Drazen Smiljanic Drazen