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New York University Annual Survey of American Law New York of American Law University Annual Survey
nys69-2_cv_nys69-2_cv 9/22/2014 8:41 AM Page 2 (trap 04 plate) Vol. 69 No. 2 Vol. New York University Annual Survey of American Law New York University Annual Survey of American Law New York ARTICLES TOWARD ADEQUACY Sarah L. Brinton SHOULD EVIDENCE OF SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS AFFECT ATTORNEYS’ FEES AWARDS? Seth Katsuya Endo A LOOK INSIDE THE BUTLER’S CUPBOARD: HOW THE EXTERNAL WORLD REVEALS INTERNAL STATE OF MIND IN LEGAL NARRATIVES Cathren Koehlert-Page NOTES EXPERTISE AND IMMIGRATION ADMINISTRATION: WHEN DOES CHEVRON APPLY TO BIA INTERPRETATIONS OF THE INA? Paul Chaffin WHAT MOTIVATES ILLEGAL FILE SHARING? EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES Joseph M. Eno 2013 Volume 69 Issue 2 2013 35568-nys_69-2 Sheet No. 1 Side A 10/28/2014 12:36:12 \\jciprod01\productn\n\nys\69-2\FRONT692.txt unknown Seq: 1 23-OCT-14 9:10 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW VOLUME 69 ISSUE 2 35568-nys_69-2 Sheet No. 1 Side A 10/28/2014 12:36:12 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT HALL Washington Square New York City 35568-nys_69-2 Sheet No. 1 Side B 10/28/2014 12:36:12 \\jciprod01\productn\n\nys\69-2\FRONT692.txt unknown Seq: 2 23-OCT-14 9:10 New York University Annual Survey of American Law is in its seventy-first year of publication. L.C. Cat. Card No.: 46-30523 ISSN 0066-4413 All Rights Reserved New York University Annual Survey of American Law is published quarterly at 110 West 3rd Street, New York, New York 10012. -
Cisco SCA BB Protocol Reference Guide
Cisco Service Control Application for Broadband Protocol Reference Guide Protocol Pack #60 August 02, 2018 Cisco Systems, Inc. www.cisco.com Cisco has more than 200 offices worldwide. Addresses, phone numbers, and fax numbers are listed on the Cisco website at www.cisco.com/go/offices. THE SPECIFICATIONS AND INFORMATION REGARDING THE PRODUCTS IN THIS MANUAL ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. ALL STATEMENTS, INFORMATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS MANUAL ARE BELIEVED TO BE ACCURATE BUT ARE PRESENTED WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. USERS MUST TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR APPLICATION OF ANY PRODUCTS. THE SOFTWARE LICENSE AND LIMITED WARRANTY FOR THE ACCOMPANYING PRODUCT ARE SET FORTH IN THE INFORMATION PACKET THAT SHIPPED WITH THE PRODUCT AND ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN BY THIS REFERENCE. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE SOFTWARE LICENSE OR LIMITED WARRANTY, CONTACT YOUR CISCO REPRESENTATIVE FOR A COPY. The Cisco implementation of TCP header compression is an adaptation of a program developed by the University of California, Berkeley (UCB) as part of UCB’s public domain version of the UNIX operating system. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1981, Regents of the University of California. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER WARRANTY HEREIN, ALL DOCUMENT FILES AND SOFTWARE OF THESE SUPPLIERS ARE PROVIDED “AS IS” WITH ALL FAULTS. CISCO AND THE ABOVE-NAMED SUPPLIERS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THOSE OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OR ARISING FROM A COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE, OR TRADE PRACTICE. IN NO EVENT SHALL CISCO OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY INDIRECT, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, LOST PROFITS OR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO DATA ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THIS MANUAL, EVEN IF CISCO OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. -
IPFS and Friends: a Qualitative Comparison of Next Generation Peer-To-Peer Data Networks Erik Daniel and Florian Tschorsch
1 IPFS and Friends: A Qualitative Comparison of Next Generation Peer-to-Peer Data Networks Erik Daniel and Florian Tschorsch Abstract—Decentralized, distributed storage offers a way to types of files [1]. Napster and Gnutella marked the beginning reduce the impact of data silos as often fostered by centralized and were followed by many other P2P networks focusing on cloud storage. While the intentions of this trend are not new, the specialized application areas or novel network structures. For topic gained traction due to technological advancements, most notably blockchain networks. As a consequence, we observe that example, Freenet [2] realizes anonymous storage and retrieval. a new generation of peer-to-peer data networks emerges. In this Chord [3], CAN [4], and Pastry [5] provide protocols to survey paper, we therefore provide a technical overview of the maintain a structured overlay network topology. In particular, next generation data networks. We use select data networks to BitTorrent [6] received a lot of attention from both users and introduce general concepts and to emphasize new developments. the research community. BitTorrent introduced an incentive Specifically, we provide a deeper outline of the Interplanetary File System and a general overview of Swarm, the Hypercore Pro- mechanism to achieve Pareto efficiency, trying to improve tocol, SAFE, Storj, and Arweave. We identify common building network utilization achieving a higher level of robustness. We blocks and provide a qualitative comparison. From the overview, consider networks such as Napster, Gnutella, Freenet, BitTor- we derive future challenges and research goals concerning data rent, and many more as first generation P2P data networks, networks. -
Simple Plotter Documentation Release 0.0.0
simple_plotter Documentation Release 0.0.0 Thies Hecker Mar 30, 2020 Contents: 1 Getting started 3 1.1 Desktop..................................................3 1.2 Android..................................................3 1.3 Configuration options..........................................4 1.4 Requirements...............................................4 1.5 Source code...............................................4 2 User guide 7 2.1 Overview.................................................7 2.2 Defining an equation...........................................7 2.3 Creating a plot..............................................8 2.4 Adjust the plot appearance........................................8 2.5 Constants.................................................9 2.6 Plotting curve sets............................................ 10 2.7 Plot labels................................................ 11 2.8 Load, save and export.......................................... 12 2.9 Advanced usage............................................. 12 3 Licenses 17 3.1 simple-plotter............................................... 17 3.2 simple-plotter-qt............................................. 18 3.3 simple-plotter4a............................................. 18 3.4 simple-plotter4a binary releases (Android)............................... 18 4 Contributing 43 4.1 Concept.................................................. 43 4.2 Package versions............................................. 43 4.3 Building conda packages........................................ -
A Fog Storage Software Architecture for the Internet of Things Bastien Confais, Adrien Lebre, Benoît Parrein
A Fog storage software architecture for the Internet of Things Bastien Confais, Adrien Lebre, Benoît Parrein To cite this version: Bastien Confais, Adrien Lebre, Benoît Parrein. A Fog storage software architecture for the Internet of Things. Advances in Edge Computing: Massive Parallel Processing and Applications, IOS Press, pp.61-105, 2020, Advances in Parallel Computing, 978-1-64368-062-0. 10.3233/APC200004. hal- 02496105 HAL Id: hal-02496105 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02496105 Submitted on 2 Mar 2020 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. November 2019 A Fog storage software architecture for the Internet of Things Bastien CONFAIS a Adrien LEBRE b and Benoˆıt PARREIN c;1 a CNRS, LS2N, Polytech Nantes, rue Christian Pauc, Nantes, France b Institut Mines Telecom Atlantique, LS2N/Inria, 4 Rue Alfred Kastler, Nantes, France c Universite´ de Nantes, LS2N, Polytech Nantes, Nantes, France Abstract. The last prevision of the european Think Tank IDATE Digiworld esti- mates to 35 billion of connected devices in 2030 over the world just for the con- sumer market. This deep wave will be accompanied by a deluge of data, applica- tions and services. -
Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2003 an Analysis of Gnunet And
Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2003 An Analysis of GNUnet and the Implications for Anonymous, Censorship-Resistant Networks Dennis Kügler Federal Office for Information Security, Germany [email protected] 1 Anonymous, Censorship-Resistant Networks • Anonymous Peer-to-Peer Networks – Gnutella • Searching is relatively anonymous • Downloading is not anonymous • Censorship-Resistant Networks – Eternity Service • Distributed storage medium • Attack resistant • Anonymous, Censorship-Resistant Networks – Freenet – GNUnet 2 GNUnet: Obfuscated, Distributed Filesystem Content Hash Key: [H(B),H(E (B))] • H(B) – Content encryption: H(B) – Unambiguous filename: H(E (B)) H(B) • Content replication – Caching while delivering – Based on unambiguous filename • Searchability – Keywords 3 GNUnet: Peer-to-Peer MIX Network • Initiating node – Downloads content • Supplying nodes – Store content unencrypted • Intermediary nodes – Forward and cache encrypted content – Plausible deniability due to encryption • Economic model – Based on credit Query A Priority=20 B – Charge for queries c =c -20 B B - – Pay for responses 4 GNUnet Encoding • DBlocks DBlock DBlock ... DBlock – 1KB of the content – Content hash encrypted • IBlocks IBlock ... IBlock – CHKs of 25 DBlocks – Organized as tree – Content hash encrypted IBlock • RBlock – Description of the content – CHK of the root IBlock RBlock – Keyword encrypted 5 The Attacker Model • Attacker – Controls malicious nodes that behave correctly – Prepares dictionary of interesting keywords – Observes queries and -
Digital Fountain Erasure-Recovery in Bittorrent
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI BERGAMO Facoltà di Ingegneria Corso di Laurea Specialistica in Ingegneria Informatica Classe n. 35/S – Sistemi Informatici Digital Fountain Erasure Recovery in BitTorrent: integration and security issues Relatore: Chiar.mo Prof. Stefano Paraboschi Correlatore: Chiar.mo Prof. Andrea Lorenzo Vitali Tesi di Laurea Specialistica Michele BOLOGNA Matricola n. 56108 ANNO ACCADEMICO 2007 / 2008 This thesis has been written, typeset and prepared using LATEX 2". Printed on December 5, 2008. Alla mia famiglia “Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” “That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat. “I don’t much care where —” said Alice. “Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,” said the Cat. “— so long as I get somewhere,” Alice added as an explanation. “Oh, you’re sure to do that,” said the Cat, “if you only walk enough.” Lewis Carroll Alice in Wonderland Acknowledgments (in Italian) Ci sono molte persone che mi hanno aiutato durante lo svolgimento di questo lavoro. Il primo ringraziamento va ai proff. Stefano Paraboschi e Andrea Vitali per la disponibilità, la competenza, i consigli, la pazienza e l’aiuto tecnico che mi hanno saputo dare. Grazie di avermi dato la maggior parte delle idee che sono poi confluite nella mia tesi. Un sentito ringraziamento anche a Andrea Rota e Ruben Villa per l’aiuto e i chiarimenti che mi hanno gentilmente fornito. Vorrei ringraziare STMicroelectronics, ed in particolare il gruppo Advanced System Technology, per avermi offerto le infrastrutture, gli spa- zi e tutto il necessario per svolgere al meglio il mio periodo di tirocinio. -
Antifragile White Paper Draft 3.Pages
Piracy as an Antifragile System tech WP 01/2015 July 2015 Executive Summary Attacks on the piracy economy have thus far been unsuccessful. The piracy community has not only shown resilience to these attacks, but has also become more sophisticated and resilient as a result of them. Systems that show this characteristic response to ex- ternal stressors are defined as antifragile. Traditional centralized attacks are not only ineffective against such systems, but are counter-productive. These systems are not impervious to attacks, however. Decentralized attacks that warp the connections between nodes destroy the system from within. Some system-based attacks on piracy have been attempted, but lacked the technology required to be effec- tive. A new technology, CustosTech, built on the Bitcoin blockchain, attacks the system by turning pirates against each other. The technology enables and incentivizes anyone in the world to anonymously act as an informant, disclosing the identity of the first in- fringer – the pirate uploader. This internal decentralized attack breaks the incentive structures governing the uploader-downloader relationship, and thus provides a sus- tainable deterrent to piracy. Table of Contents Introduction to Antifragility 1 Features of Antifragile Systems 1 Piracy as an Antifragile System 2 Sophisticated Pirates 3 Popcorn Time 5 Attacking 5 Antifragile Systems 5 Attacking Piracy 5 Current Approaches 6 New Tools 6 How it Works 7 Conclusion 7 White paper 01/2015 Introduction to Antifragility Antifragility refers to a system that becomes bet- ter, or stronger, in response to shocks or attacks. Nassim Taleb developed the term1 to explain sys- tems that were not only resilient, but also thrived under stress. -
Downloading Copyrighted Materials
What you need to know before... Downloading Copyrighted Materials Including movies, TV shows, music, digital books, software and interactive games The Facts and Consequences Who monitors peer-to-peer file sharing? What are the consequences at UAF The Motion Picture Association of America for violators of this policy? (MPAA), Home Box Office, and other copyright Student Services at UAF takes the following holders monitor file-sharing on the Internet minimum actions when the policy is violated: for the illegal distribution of their copyrighted 1st Offense: contents. Once identified they issue DMCA Loss of Internet access until issue is resolved. (Digital Millennium Copyright Act) take-down 2nd Offense: notices to the ISP (Internet Service Provider), in Loss of Internet access pending which the University of Alaska is considered as resolution and a $100 fee assessment. one, requesting the infringement be stopped. If 3rd Offense: not stopped, lawsuit against the user is possible. Loss of Internet access pending resolution and a $250 fee assessment. What is UAF’s responsibility? 4th, 5th, 6th Offense: Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Loss of Internet access pending resolution and Higher Education Opportunity Act, university a $500 fee assessment. administrators are obligated to track these infractions and preserve relevent logs in your What are the Federal consequences student record. This means that if your case goes for violators? to court, your record may be subpoenaed as The MPAA, HBO and similar organizations are evidence. Since illegal file sharing also drains becoming more and more aggressive in finding bandwidth, costing schools money and slowing and prosecuting alleged offenders in criminal Internet connections, for students trying to use court. -
Shedding Light on Mobile App Store Censorship
Shedding Light on Mobile App Store Censorship Vasilis Ververis Marios Isaakidis Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany University College London, London, UK [email protected] [email protected] Valentin Weber Benjamin Fabian Centre for Technology and Global Affairs University of Telecommunications Leipzig (HfTL) University of Oxford, Oxford, UK Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT KEYWORDS This paper studies the availability of apps and app stores across app stores, censorship, country availability, mobile applications, countries. Our research finds that users in specific countries do China, Russia not have access to popular app stores due to local laws, financial reasons, or because countries are on a sanctions list that prohibit ACM Reference Format: Vasilis Ververis, Marios Isaakidis, Valentin Weber, and Benjamin Fabian. foreign businesses to operate within its jurisdiction. Furthermore, 2019. Shedding Light on Mobile App Store Censorship. In 27th Conference this paper presents a novel methodology for querying the public on User Modeling, Adaptation and Personalization Adjunct (UMAP’19 Ad- search engines and APIs of major app stores (Google Play Store, junct), June 9–12, 2019, Larnaca, Cyprus. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 6 pages. Apple App Store, Tencent MyApp Store) that is cross-verified by https://doi.org/10.1145/3314183.3324965 network measurements. This allows us to investigate which apps are available in which country. We primarily focused on the avail- ability of VPN apps in Russia and China. Our results show that 1 INTRODUCTION despite both countries having restrictive VPN laws, there are still The widespread adoption of smartphones over the past decade saw many VPN apps available in Russia and only a handful in China. -
Internet Infrastructure Review Vol.27
Internet Infrastructure Vol.27 Review May 2015 Infrastructure Security Increasingly Malicious PUAs Messaging Technology Anti-Spam Measure Technology and DMARC Trends Web Traffic Report Report on Access Log Analysis Results for Streaming Delivery of the 2014 Summer Koshien Inte r ne t In f r ast r uc t ure Review Vol.27 May 2015 Executive Summary ———————————————————3 1. Infrastructure Security ———————————————4 Table of Contents Table 1.1 Introduction —————————————————————— 4 1.2 Incident Summary ——————————————————— 4 1.3 Incident Survey ——————————————————— 11 1.3.1 DDoS Attacks —————————————————————— 11 1.3.2 Malware Activities ———————————————————— 13 1.3.3 SQL Injection Attacks —————————————————— 16 1.3.4 Website Alterations ——————————————————— 17 1.4 Focused Research —————————————————— 18 1.4.1 Increasingly Malicious PUAs —————————————— 18 1.4.2 ID Management Technology: From a Convenience and Security Perspective ————— 22 1.4.3 Evaluating the IOCs of Malware That Reprograms HDD Firmware —————————————————————— 25 1.5 Conclusion —————————————————————— 27 2. Messaging Technology —————————————— 28 2.1 Introduction ————————————————————— 28 2.2 Spam Trends ————————————————————— 28 2.2.1 Spam Ratios Decline Further in FY2014 ————————— 28 2.2.2 Higher Risks Despite Lower Volumes —————————— 29 2.3 Trends in Email Technologies ——————————— 29 2.3.1 The DMARC RFC ————————————————————— 29 2.3.2 Problems with DMARC and Reporting —————————— 30 2.3.3 Use of DMARC by Email Recipients ——————————— 30 2.3.4 Domain Reputation ——————————————————— 31 2.3.5 -
Threat Modeling and Circumvention of Internet Censorship by David Fifield
Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship By David Fifield A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Professor Deirdre Mulligan Professor Vern Paxson Fall 2017 1 Abstract Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship by David Fifield Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California, Berkeley Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Research on Internet censorship is hampered by poor models of censor behavior. Censor models guide the development of circumvention systems, so it is important to get them right. A censor model should be understood not just as a set of capabilities|such as the ability to monitor network traffic—but as a set of priorities constrained by resource limitations. My research addresses the twin themes of modeling and circumvention. With a grounding in empirical research, I build up an abstract model of the circumvention problem and examine how to adapt it to concrete censorship challenges. I describe the results of experiments on censors that probe their strengths and weaknesses; specifically, on the subject of active probing to discover proxy servers, and on delays in their reaction to changes in circumvention. I present two circumvention designs: domain fronting, which derives its resistance to blocking from the censor's reluctance to block other useful services; and Snowflake, based on quickly changing peer-to-peer proxy servers. I hope to change the perception that the circumvention problem is a cat-and-mouse game that affords only incremental and temporary advancements.