World Bank Document

Document of The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized Report No. 2808

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT Public Disclosure Authorized

MAURITANIA DROUGHT RELIEF FUND PROJECT

(Credit 444-MAU) Public Disclosure Authorized

January 2, 1980 Public Disclosure Authorized

Operations Evaluation Department

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 meter 1.1 yards

1 kilometer 0.62 miles

1 hectare (ha) 2.47 acres

ABBREVIATIONS

CEAO Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest DRF Drought Relief Fund FAC Fonds d'Aide et Cooperation (French Aid Fund) FED Fonds Europeen Developpement (European Development Fund) GIRM Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania IDA International Development Association NCC National Coordinating Committee SEDES Societe d'Etudes pour le Developpement Economique et Social SONADER Societe National de Developpement Rural USAID United States Agency for International Development MRD Ministry of Rural Development FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

MAURITANIA DROUGHT RELIEF FUND PROJECT (Credit 444-MAU)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Preface ...... *...... *...... #*.. ***... i Basic Data Sheet ...... ii Disbursement Table ...... 0...... iii Highlights ...... *********...... *.. iv

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

I. Summary ...... % ...... 1

II. Main Issues ...... 7

A. Follow-up ...... 7 B. Selection and Additions of Subprojects ...... 8 C. Farmer Participation ...... 11

III. Conclusions . . .. 4...... 13

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

I. Regional Set Up ...... 15

II. The Mauritania Project ...... 30

III. Institutional Development and Performance ...... 44

Map

a - 1 -

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

MAURITANIA DROUGHT RELIEF FUND PROJECT (Credit 444-MAT)

PREFACE

This is a performance audit of the Mauritania Drought Relief Fund Project for which Credit 444-MAU was approved in November 1973 in the sum of US$2.5 million. The final disbursements in respect of this credit were made over early 1978 and the project was closed on June 30, 1978 with some US$40,000 still undisbursed.

The audit report consists of an audit memorandum prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated October 1979. The PCR was prepared by the Western Africa Regional Office. The audit memorandum is based on a review of the Appraisal Report (No. 229-WA) dated October 24, 1973, the President's Report (P-1312A) of the same date, the Credit Agreement dated December 7, 1973, and the PCR; corre- spondence with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on project issues as contained in relevant Bank files have also been consulted and Bank staff associated with the project have been interviewed.

On the basis of this abbreviated procedure, the audit finds the PCR comprehensive and accurate with respect to the project's principal achievements and shortcomings. The points discussed by the audit have been selected because of their importance to this as well as other African Drought Relief Fund Projects which include six projects in West Africa and two in East Africa. OED plans to issue a separate report evaluating the results of all these projects in the near future.

A copy of the draft report was sent to the Borrower on October 31, 1979. No comments, however, have been received. s PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT BASIC DATA SHEET

MAURITANIA DROUGHT RELIEF FUND PROJECT (CREDIT 444-MAU)

KEY PROJECT DATA

Appraisal Actual or Item Expectation Current Estimate

Total Project Cost (US$ million) 2.5 2.45 Underrun (1) 0.2 Credit Amount (US$ million) 2.5 2.45 Disbursed Date Physical Components Completed 06/30/76 03/31/78 Proportion Completed by Above Date ()- 100 Proportion of Time Overrun (for whole project - %) - 80 Economic Rate of Return (%) n.a. n.a.

OTHER PROJECT DATA

Original Actual or Item Plan Revisions Est. Actual

First Mention in Files or Timetable - - 10/09/72 Government's Application - - 10/09/72 Negotiations 09/17/73 - 09/17/73 Board Approval 11/13/73 - 11/13/73 Credit Agreement Date 12/07/73 - 12/07/73 Effectiveness Date 03/11/74 - 04/)8/74 Closing Date 11/15/76 02/28/78 06/30/78 Borrower Islamic Republic of Mauritania Executing Agencies Agriculture Livestock, "Protection de la Nature" (Forestry and "Genie Rural" (Irrigation and on- farm works)) Department Fiscal Year of Borrower Follow-on Project Name None

MISSION DATA 1/

Month/ No. of No. of Work- Date of Item Year Weeks Persons Weeks Report

Appraisal 06-07/73 2 4 8 10/24/73 Follow-up Appraisal 08/73 2 2 4 10/10/73 4 12 2/

Supervision I 12/73 1 - 1 1 01/07/74 Supervision II 06/74 1 2 2 07/26/74 Supervision III 01/75 1 1 1 01/31/75 Supervision IV 02/75 1 2 2 04/14/75 Supervision V 06/75 0.2 1 0.2 07/03/75 Supervision VI 12/75 0.4 1 0.4 02/01/76 Supervision VII 03/76 1 5 5 05/05/76 Supervision VIII 09/76 0.2 4 0.8 09/28/76 Supervision IX 11/76 1.6 1 1.6 12/20/76 Supervision X 01/77 1 1 1 02/26/77 Supervision XI 05/77 0.6- 1 0.6 06/15/77 Supervision XII 08/77 1 1 1 09/30/77 Supervision XIII 03/78 0.8 1 0.8 04/05/78 Supervision XIV 12/78 1 1 1 01/08/79 11.8 18.4 3/

COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES

Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Ouguiya (UM) (at appraisal: Communaute Financiere Africaine Franc (CFAF) - UMI CFAF 5)

Year: Appraisal Year Average Exchange Rate: US$1.00 UN 44.-5 Intervening Years' Average US$1.00 UM 44.8 Completion Year Average US$1.00 - UN 46.2

1/ All missions sent from Headquarters. 2/ Time spent in all 6 Sahelian countries, not only Mauritania. 3/ Time spent on this project plus on numerous other activities, including the Livestock Project (Credit 272-HAU), the subsequently dropped South East Rural Development Project, and preparation for the Urban and Rural Development Project. Time on Drought Relief Fund Project estimated at 11 workweeks.

- iii -

PROJECT PERFORM4ANCE ADIT REPORT

MAURITANIA DROUGHT RELIEF FUND PROJECT (Credit 444-1!AU)

DISBURSEMENT TABLE

(US$ '000 cumulative)

Period Appraisal Actual as % Ending Estimate Actual of Estimate

12/31/73 250 -

06/30/74 900 - - 12/31/74 1,700 200 12

06/30/75 2,000 200 10 12/31/75 2,250 631 28

06/30/76 2,375 957 41 12/31/76 2,500 1,151 46

06/30/77 1,151 - 12/31/77 1,758 -

06/30/78 2,148 - 12/31/78 2,416 -

06/30/79 2,445 09/30/79 2,445 f

1/ Approximately US$55,000 remain undisbursed. s

s - iv -

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

MAURITANIA DROUGHT RELIEF FUND PROJECT (Credit 444-MAU)

HIGHLIGHTS

The Drought Relief Fund Credit was designed to support an emergency program to overcome the dire effects of the Sahelian drought of 1972, the worst in 50 years and which followed the severe droughts of 1960 and 1970. The project in Mauritania was part of the Bank's regional operation which extended credit for similar projects in five other Sahelian countries. The purpose of the credits was to help people in the drought affected areas to restore their productive base by redeveloping their farms and herds.

At appraisal subprojects were still being prepared, as was true for the entire Relief Fund. Shortly after approval preparation for three subprojects -- rehabilitation and development of ten small irrigation schemes, inputs and transport for vegetable production and an investment program to speed up cattle reproduction at the Rosso Livestock Center -- were carried out. All of these encountered substantial delays in start-up due to problems of procurement and administrative procedures. A number of revisions in the credit ensued: technical assistance to improve management in the Ministry of Rural Development was added, the Rosso Livestock Center was dropped because of technical problems and a livestock pest control subproject was added. Finally, to complete disbursements after a delay of over 18 months, the remainder of the credit was used to purchase animal feed.

The project generally has achieved its primary objectives of helping people re-establish their farms and herds. However, the Government's organization and its administrative procedures have not been improved through the project as expected. An economic rate of return was not estimated at completion nor at appraisal due to the emergency nature of the project.

Other points of interest are:

- the National Coordinating Committee, a common element in all six Sahelian Drought Relief Fund projects, slowed down implementation considerably (PCR, paras. 70 and 72);

- subprojects selected may not have been the best (PPAM, paras. 27-37);

- v -

- participation of farmers and herders in construction of canals and other works was below expectations (PPAM, paras. 38 and 39); and

- economic and social environment was not fully considered in project design (PPAM, para. 41).

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

MAURITANIA DROUGHT RELIEF FUND PROJECT (Credit 444-MAU)

I. SUMMARY!/

1. Over the late 1960's and the first half of the 1970's, one of the most severe droughts on record impacted the six Sahelian countries. By 1972 millions of farmers and herders were destitute. International agencies had mounted food and health relief programs of major proportions. In early 1973, the Bank replied favorably in principle to individual and collective requests from the Sahelian countries and agreed to assist in drought allevia- tion efforts. Such efforts were to be designed to not only implement the immediate recovery of the Sahelian economy, but also assist with more permanent "drought-proofing".

2. Given the emergency circumstances, the project's design required considerable flexibility. The following basic principles were established:

- the project would be a regional operation, covering Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta;

- the project would consist of small specific operations, identification and approval of which would not necessarily be completed before submission of the regional credit to the Board for approval;

- in setting up standards for the subprojects' selection, the Bank limited the requirement of economic and financial justification to directly productive operations;

- Bank financial assistance would take the form of a line of credit extended to each respective Government. A revolving fund would be established for each as soon as the credits were effective and subprojects would receive 100% financing (exclud- ing taxes). Retroactive financing was also agreed;

- a three-layer organizational system was devised in each country: a coordinating committee for subproject implementation; a local financial institution (such as a development bank) for handling and keeping project accounts; and technical services for subprojects' implementation.

1/ Adapted from the PCR. - 2 -

3. In May/June 1973, an appraisal mission visited the region. The project was negotiated in the respective countries in September 1973, approved by the Board on November 13, 1973, and in the case of Mauritania declared effective on March 13, 1974. Agreement upon specific subprojects was reached as a result of Bank missions during late 1973 and early 1974.

4. As approved by the Board, the project's primary objective was to help drought-afflicted people re-establish their self-sufficiency by assisting them in re-developing and improving their farms and herds. Where possible such assistance was to provide permanent economic security as well. A second objective was to help governments set up organizational mechanisms to use efficiently the large volume of international financial assistance forthcoming as a result of the drought. The only target set was the completion of disbursements by mid-1976.

5. The Mauritania project, as approved by the Board in November 1973, comprised three subprojects:

(i) Small Irrigation Perimeter (CFAF 220 million; executing agency, Genie Rural). The subproject provided for the rehabilitation and extension of ten small irrigation schemes. The total area to be developed for rice production was estimated at 519 ha in the Senegal River Valley. The area to be rehabilitated was 274 ha and the area to be expanded 245 ha. The subproject was to improve upon and expand perimeters financed earlier by FAC, FED and Government.

(ii) Vegetable Production (CFAF 50 million; executing agency: Ministry of Rural Development). This subproject provided for the cost of agricultural implements, seeds, fertilizer and transport equipment for the continuation and expansion of production on 180 ha in three widely separated regions.

(iii) Rosso Livestock Center (CFAF 252 million; executing agency: Livestock Department) designed to speed up reproduction of cattle herds through construction of a cattle reproduction ranch and an irrigated forage crop near Rosso. It included irrigation development, rehabilitation of buildings, purchase of equipment and operating costs.

6. Several revisions took place in project content. In early 1974, the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) proposed that the services of technical assistants be financed by IDA under the project to reinforce the Minis- try and ensure better management of the IDA subprojects. IDA agreed in July 1974 to finance a new subproject called "Technical Assistance to the MRD" estimated to cost CFAF 50 million. This included the appointment of two expatriates as technical advisers, one sociologist and one economist, both -3 - to be hired from SEDES.1/ The sociologist was to study extension and land development problems, and prepare the by-laws for an autonomous rural development agency; the economist, on a shorter contract, would deal with rural development planning.

7. A second and major revision occurred with the elimination of the Rosso Livestock Center (subproject (iii) above), as its net benefit was proved highly questionable by a detailed feasibility study. In late 1976 it was agreed between GOM and the Bank that the US$1.1 million balance from this subproject would be re-allocated to: further funding of the small irrigation perimeters (US$500,000, subproject (i) above); further financing of the continuation of the vegetable production subproject (US$100,000, subproject (ii) above); and a new Livestock and Pest Control Subproject (US$500,000).

8. This newly introduced project had six components:

(i) Building of 10 small warehouses - to increase storage capacity for veterinary products and pesticides over the remote southern Mauritanian agricultural zone;

(ii) Purchase of pesticides and explosives - to increase the capability of the newly created Pest Control Service to fight locusts, birds and rats;

(iii) Vehicle operating costs to finance spare parts, fuel and oil for vehicles to be used in transporting veterinary products and pesticides;

(iv) Rural Development Experimental Center. Building of a small livestock center close to Nouakchott and purchase of animal feed in order to promote livestock production in the framework of a rural development plan of the Nouakchott surroundings;

(v) Poultry sheds. Building of two sheds for laying hens in order to improve the poultry center close to Nouakchott.

(vi) Later in April 1978, MRD proposed extra purchase of animal feed within the framework of the rural development center.

9. The total estimated cost of the three initial subprojects (including contingencies) was estimated at CFAF 522 million (US$2.5 million). The possibility of cost overruns or disruptions due to exchange rate fluctuations was

1/ Societe d'Etudes pour le Developpement Economique et Social - consulting firm. -4-

anticipated and a commitment was obtained from USAID to provide an additional CFAF 50 million (US$250,000) if necessary, and appropriate for feasibility studies. The major revisions in fund allocation did not change the total amount of funding, and the supplementary USAID funding for these subprojects was not required.

10. While the conditions of effectiveness were met reasonably quickly, subproject implementation was slow. The National Coordinating Committee (NCC) was officially established on December 6, 1973, a project account was opened in Treasury and effectiveness was officially declared on April 8, 1974. As in other Sahelian DRF projects, delays were encountered in the preparation of the legal documentation.

11. Scheduled for mid-1976 completion, the project was really only getting underway at that point. The ineffectiveness of the NCC, constant shifting of personnel, inter-Ministerial difficulties, and cumbersome administrative and financial procedures all contributed to the prolongation: Mauritania was also in a war-like situation during this period. There was a critical shortage of domestic resources to implement projects, particularly of skilled personnel in accounting and in the technical departments, and of recurrent funds and services, e.g. to operate transport. The administrative changes required to provide imported project inputs duty-free, also contributed to the delays. By June 1976, the scheduled completion date, less than half of the credit had been disbursed.

12. Following Bank intervention project implementation did improve, over late 1976 and 1977, numerous administrative bottlenecks were mitigated, and an expatriate coordinator was appointed (on a part-time basis) in late 1977. During this period the reorganization of subprojects and their financing occurred, and subproject implementation went forward with greater des- patch. Of major importance to physical implementation was a "cellule operationnel", a unit in the Ministry of Rural Development comprising younger, trained and energetic technocrats. They, in effect, became the coordinating and implementing agency.

13. By late 1977/early 1978 subproject status was as follows:

Small Irrigation Perimeters: The ten small rice areas irrigated from the Senegal River or Mauritanian tributaries (averaging less than 30 ha each) had been developed historically under FED, FAC and other bilateral financing, some dating back to 1966 and 1968.1/ Using FED financed consultants (Grontmij), the subproject was to rehabilitate 274 ha on 3 of the perimeters and extend the irrigated area by 245 ha on 8 of them. The initial

1/ Data from FAO/World Bank Cooperative Programme, Draft Report of the Mauritania Irrigation Sector Survey and Gorgol Project Preparation Miss- ion, Vol. I, Rome, May 26, 1976 (Report No. 15/76 MAU 3). - 5 -

and continuing administrative and financial problems; the cumbersome logis- tics, especially communications and transport; and the not uncommon inade- quacy or inappropriateness of equipment and inputs; all combined over time to prevent these targets being reached. So too did a nexus of land tenure and labor supply problems.

14. With the additional US$200,000 (reallocated from the Rosso Live- stock Center subproject) the consultants nonetheless made significant progress in 1975/76 and 1976/77. Some 134 ha were rehabilitated in 5 perimeters during the two seasons (out of 274 total); and 161 new ha were brought into production in 8 perimeters.1/

15. Vegetable Production: While some supplies were distributed in 1974 and 1975, few found their way to farmers/nomads in 1976. Distributed through the Agricultural Service of the Ministry of Rural Development, the IDA subproject became inextricably bound up with a similar and apparently larger USAID equivalent program, and with the Government's own "survival" operations. As indicated in the PCR, nearly 1800 kgs of seed were distributed during the 1975/76 - 1977/78 period; thousands of watering cans and hand implements (spades, rakes, etc.), and 22 tons of pesticides were delivered. It is impossible, on the basis of documentation available, to isolate the IDA subproject contribution from that of USAID. While the latter appears larger, IDA funding to the subproject, and the subsequent additional funding, did contribute to local food production for several thousands of farmers in several dozen scattered areas.

16. The Rosso Livestock Center: a feasibility study, paid for by the project, indicated that the Center, while not suitable for IDA financing, should continue as a research/experimental operation. The cost of its development was put at 120 m UM in 1976,2/ and donor financing was being sought. Meanwhile, its management has been assumed by SONADER since 1976.3/

I/ Data are not always consistent between reporting sources: these Grontmij data from their final report (Rapport Final a la fin de la troisieme campagne.... Arnhem, Aout, 1977, p. 5) were used in the supervision report dated April 5, 1979 and in the PCR. They differ markedly from Ministre du Developpement Rural data found in ibid, and from that Mini- stry's Evaluation de l'Annee 1976 et Prevision pour 1977, Nouakchott, 1977. Different again are data for the same period reported in the supervision report of October 4, 1977 (Annex 3, p. 1).

2/ SCET International, Note Relative au Programme et Aux Modalites de Transfert a la SONADER des Etudes, Realisations et Mise en Valeur de Diverse Operations d'Amenagements Hydro-Agricoles, July, 1976, p. 31. The report indicated a SONADER programme for 1976-1981.

3/ Ibid. -6-

17. Technical Assistance, Ministry of Rural Development. Initially designed to provide an agronomist and a horticulturist to the MRD, the Government amended this to a socio-economist and a short-term economist (both from SEDES). The former was initially to work on extension and land tenure problems, the latter with a particular view to the larger term regula- tion of the Senegal River. Once in place, he was also asked to prepare the statutes of a State Agricultural Development agency. In the event, he also became an important 'expediteur' of administrative and financial matters for the DRF Project.

18. Livestock and Pest Control. Developed to use the funds released by the elimination of the Rosso Livestock Center, and implemented by the "cellule operationnel", this subproject went well. Ten small aluminum warehouses to store veterinary products and pesticides were built in remote southern areas; 75 tons of pesticides and explosives, plus equipment, were distributed; and vehicle operating costs for the above activities were covered for one year.

19. The Rural Development Experimental Center, near Nouakchott, was constructed satisfactorily in 1977/78, and the subprojects' feed component utilized. Electricity, water and access roads, however, are still not provided (supervision report of January 8, 1979) as the promised CEAOI/funding is still not available. The poultry operation was implemented successfully and is being run well by the Livestock Department.

20. The Mauritanian DRF project was better supervised than the similar projects in the other five Sahelian nations. While data remain vague, it is clear that some thousands of farmers and "settling" nomads received temporary assistance with the production of vegetables and animal forage crops; and some hundreds of farm families produced more rice than otherwise on the small irrigation perimeters. Some of this latter investment, including a workshop, will be more permanent, and thus will meet the project's objective of "drought-proofing". So too should the infrastructure provided by the Live- stock and Pest Control subproject (store-houses, experimental center).

21. The "cellule operationnel", the Dutch consultants working on the small irrigation perimeters, the sociologist during his one-year stay, and the Bank's Livestock Project Manager who assumed part-time responsibilities for the DRF Project in its late stages, performed well. Appropriate Government committees and their staff were delayed in both formation and activity; accounts and financial matters were not handled in a way to permit proper audits; some project-provided supplies and equipment were non-traceable since they were mixed up with those of other donors. Maintenance of DRF project provided facilities is inadequate; and the continuation of recurrent input supplies (seeds, tools, pesticides, etc.), once the DRF project's supplies were finished, has received little attention.2/

1/ Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest.

2/ USAID has planned a continuation of the Vegetable Subproject for the end of 1979. - 7 -

II. MAIN ISSUES

22. These issues are addressed in the audit in more detail as they are relevant to continuing Bank project work in the Sahel. They concern follow up, the initial selection and addition of subprojects, and the nature of farmer/herder participation.

A. Follow-up

23. The vegetable seed and implement supply project, in conjunction with a complementary USAID program, was successful in providing some thousands of cultivators with the means to produce some or all of their own food and, in some cases, to produce a surplus for sale. While "drought relief" in a real sense, the subproject, although not by design, initiated a longer-term sedentarization process for those thousands of nomads who had lost much of their stock over the late 1960's and early 1970's -- even 1974 and 1976 were unfavorable years climatically. Location data on the subproject is weak, and there is no subproject location map in the documentation available. Nonethe- less, based on the locations providediY, at least half of the 6,300 families assisted by the subproject are in remoter, nomadic areas e.g. Atar. Some of these may have been oasis farmers, however, and many of the remaining 3,000, while in more southern agricultural areas, would be non-sedentarized animal owners.

24. It thus becomes important to ensure that assistance to these groups not only continues but also expands and deepens. The audit can find no records of this continuity, by the Bank or by other donors. Yet the problem is a basic one in the Sudan-Sahelian Zone from the Atlantic Ocean across to the Red Sea. The supervision mission of March 1976 recommended that "A follow-up program, including a realistic appraisal of the various vegetable schemes being implemented in Mauritania, should be established and presented for IDA's agreement by mid-May, 1976".2/ This proposal was not followed up.

25. The point has already been made in the Summary (para. 13) that it was difficult to reconcile data available on the size, expansion and rehabilitation of the small irrigation perimeters assisted under the project. That notwithstanding, considerable progress was made in 1976 and 1977. The supervision report of January 8, 1979 does not indicate what happened to these perimeters.

1/ See Progress Review of February 26, 1977, Annex 3.

2/ Supervision report dated May 12, 1976, Annex III, p. 7, para. 4.04. - 8 -

26. In June 1977, the Agriculture Department officially took over the extended and rehabilitated small perimeters, the Boghe workshop, seven equipped pumps and miscellaneous farm inputs provided under the project. SONADER, the state rural development agency supported by IDA, has taken over the management and maintenance of all small perimeters along the Senegal River. They also simultaneously assumed responsibility for five others, and obtained permission to develop four new perimeters.-Y In its report for the period January 1, 1978 - May 31, 1978, however, SONADER was still apparently in the rocess of acquiring funds from FAC and technical assistance from other donors.J/ Thus, while maintenance of these 10 perimeters may have occurred, it is by no means certain. Project documentation over the 2-year period mid-1977 to mid-1979 indicates no particular IDA concern for the continuation of these undertakings.--

B. Selection and Addition of Subprojects

27. In late 1973, discussions with the Mauritanian Government resulted in the first three subprojects being agreed upon and incorporated in the Appraisal Report (Report No. 229-WA of October 24, 1973). These were the small irrigation perimeters, vegetable production, and Rosso Livestock Center subprojects. Subsequently, the implementation of Rosso Livestock Center was dropped, and a multi-faceted Livestock and Pest Control subproject was added.

28. The audit has no particular quarrel with this selection of subprojects. It is worthwhile, however, to see them in the light of (a) what Bank staff had been recommending prior to the inception of the DRF project; and (b) the real needs of Mauritania under these drought-afflicted circumstances and at the time (not by hindsight).

29. A Bank mission had visited Mauritania in April 1972, supervising the MINFERA project, and also discussing potential projects for IDA financing. It was a 9-day mission, and the back-to-office report covered a wide range of investment possibilities in many sectors. In agriculture, opportunities were identified in wheat production (5,000 ha at Lac R'Kiz and 6,000 ha at Mendjena); rice production at Roghe (UNDP financed study of 1,000 ha

1/ SONADER, Perimetres Villageois Irrigues par Pompage - Rapport de Campagne de l'Annee 1977, Fevrier, 1978.

2/ SONADER, Rapport d'Activite January 1, 1978 - May 31, 1978 (typed mms.), p. 12. This report also indicates (p. 7) that SONADER is preparing a request to the Bank for the "amenagement et equipement de 30 petits perimetres le long du fleuve Senegal".

3/ Project staff indicate that IDA made representations to Government during supervision missions to cover the maintenance of the perimeters under the FED financed rice cultivation project and such maintenance was actually begun in mid-1977. -9-

ready end 1972); date palm project (1,000 ha south of Atar and also along the Senegal River); and banana plantations at Kaedi. In the case of both dates and banana, studies and research were available, and some infrastructure was already in place. Both FED and FAC had advanced the earlier stages of these activities. Gum arabic development was also discussed. Why these identified and rather firm subproject suggestions were no longer considered one year later when the DRF project package was being assembled remains a mystery. All would have been consistent with drought relief objectives, and were in a state of readiness equal to if not better than those eventually tendered one year later.!Y

30. Activities which develop water resources are the most basic element in alleviating the impacts of a drought, and providing a measure of "drought- proofing" for the future. Given the economic, demographic and social struc- tures of the peoples in the Sahel and northern Sudanian zones, the target populations of the DRF projects, there are two other sorts of activities which are especially appropriate to enable these peoples, severely afflicted, to regain their economic and social stability and income levels. These are activities which "save the calves" and, second, activities which encourage the protection, development and harvesting of gum arabic. The former permits an accelerated return to necessary herd size; the latter provides incomes on a broad base for the most destitute who have virtually no other income (real or cash) in times of severe drought.

31. Mauritania has as high a percentage of its population wholly or mainly dependent u on stock raising as has any other Sahelian nation, possibly up to two-thirds.!T/ Documentation available suggests that at least 35% and in some areas over 50% of all animals were lost during the late 1960's through 1972. Contrary to another DRF project-V the Mauritania project did not provide adequately for herd reconstitution. The Bank's Livestock Project (Credit 272-MAU), which became effective on April 1, 1972, includes well reconstruction, animal health provisions, and firebreaks to protect pastures; but did not contain a "save the calves" component, nor was such a component added subsequently.

1/ Projects staff do not agree with these comments. They point out that the irrigation projects suggested (wheat, rice) are distinctly out of line with the size of subprojects aimed at; each of them would absorb more than the entire DRF credit for Mauritania. As regards the gum arabic and date palm subprojects, they were discarded because Mauritanian forestry services did not have the capacity to execute such projects.

2/ Audit estimate; demographic/economic data do not exist to enable more accurate inter-country comparisons.

3/ Niger Drought Relief Fund Project (Credit 441-NIR). OED Report No. 2588 of July 2, 1979. - 10 -

32. It would have been, in the audit's view, a critical element in accelerating the restoration of numerous herds, building upon a traditional dry season custom of farmers taking calves, keeping them alive until the rains come, and selling them back to herders, who would have lost them in any case during the dry season and its heavy trekking.

33. Nonetheless, the closest the Mauritania DRF project came to such an effort was a feasibility study of one experimental center and the financing of another. However, these subprojects were and are quite divorced from the economy of the pastoralist. Yet during the September 1973 negotiations in Mauritania, and immediately thereafter, a "calf-saving" operation was a subproject candidate. "Another possibility discussed subsequently with FAO in Dakar was a veterinary and supplementary feeding program of young animals to reduce calf mortality"!! Once again, as in the case of other sound agricultural projects (para. 29 above), there was a lack of a comprehensive appraisal of development priorities. From project documentation it is impossible to ascertain why some components which in the audit's view held more promise to meet the objectives of the drought relief activities were dropped and substituted by other undertakings, which certainly had a high degree of economic priority but are less related to the problems caused by the drought.

34. Gum arabic development presents a similar story. All Sahelian nations harvest and export this forest product. Historically, Mauritania produces and exports a high quality gum, and in volume second only to the Sudan. Much of it is exported via Senegal (especially through Rosso) with France, the U.K. and the East European nations generally the largest pur- chasers. While data are weak, recorded export tonnages were 3,000-7,000 tons during the late 1960's and until 1972; these have dropped to 100-400 tons since then. 1/ As in other Sahelian nations, the drought saw many acacia stands killed either by lack of water, or by pastoralists using them as animal feed.

35. Niger's DRF Project contained a most successful gum promotion subproject, possibly the most successful production subproject of the two score production subprojects in the Sahelian drought relief program. Senegal's fire-fighting brigades, while protecting pastures, were also specifically to assist with the protection of gum stands, and did so. The Bank mission of April 1972 indicated that... "Since September 1971, SONIMEX has had a monopoly on the US$3.5-4.5 million annual exports of gum arabic. A possible IDA project would have to be preceded by an inventory of present reserves and a study of regeneration of the gum trees. Such a study for similar conditions has

1/ Memo to files on Mauritania Drought Relief Project, October 2, 1973, para. 2.

2/ Data from Bulletin Mensuel Statistique, Direction de la Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques, Government of Mauritania; Banque Centrale de Mauritania, Bulletin Statistique, No. 13, December 1978. - 11 -

been made in Senegal.... A gum arabic project would have important social aspects since the pickers belong to the most miserable social strata in Mauritania at the same time as SONIMEX is employing women (presently about 300) for its gum arabic operation, thus being virtually the only employer offering jobs to women in Mauritania" (BTO, May 16, 1972, para. 22).

36. Gum arabic was also discussed in 1974 in connection with the preparation of the Integrated Rural Development Project in the South-East. A Bank mission reports that... "With regard to gum arabic, the Director of Agriculture seemed somewhat reluctant to include this in the project. This needs to be discussed further. I was told that the former Director of Fores- try had prepared a study for a pilot project but I could not obtain a copy of the report".!/ Over two years later RMWA, still working on this rural development project, repeated its interest in including a gum arabic component, and a report indicates that the Director of Agriculture wanted to drop it as responsibility for such a project would not be under his Ministry. The FAC financed project feasibility study indicated severe and uncontrolled de- forestation in the area.l/ The current Development Plan's perspective for 1977 contained provision for an inventory study and regeneration of the gum forests. Financing was not available at that point, however, though it is understood by the audit that USAID is currently (1979) interested in such a project.

37. The fact remains that gum development should have assumed a natural priority in the Bank's DRF Project. It was successful elsewhere as a drought relief activity because grain and livestock produce sales were impossible, and many of the hardest hit and destitute would have benefitted from such activity. Across the zone Africa-wide, it has historically performed such a function, even in "normal" dry seasons. The Bank did not capitalize, as in the "save the calves", on a well-established process.

C. Farmer Participation

38. The PCR and other Bank documentation indicate the view that farmers and herders were enthusiastic about, and participated willingly in, the production subprojects. This is probably the case with the vegetable subproject where seed and implements were free. Participation on the small irrigation

1/ BTO and Full Report - Identification and Preparation Mission, January 18, 1974, para. 22.

2/ Comments on Feasibility Study for a Rural Development Project (Mauri- tania), March 1, 1976, para. 38. - 12 -

perimeters, however, is far less straightforward. Underlying what is, in fact, a highly fluctuating experience, are basic economic and social features which have a significant bearing on the design and institutional approaches to further similar projects.

39. The 10 irrigation perimeters reportedly had 1,251 "cooperateurs" in 1976.!/ These participants were to assist with the construction of canals and with other works, as well as to produce rice on their individual small holdings. It is difficult to determine just how small these holdings are. At Leboudou, for example, there are 220 farmers with only 33 ha available. At the other extreme is Dar-el-Baraka with 80 farmers and 216 ha available. The per-farmer range is 0.15 ha to 2.6 ha. The several reports available of the Dutch consultants implementing this subproject are quite explicit regarding the failure of farmers to turn out in sufficient numbers. Their report of September 1976, for example, states "The problem causing the greatest delay in executing the project is the absence of farmer participation in construction work. Farmers have a heavy work schedule during the year, leaving them little time for other activities. It was anticipated that 60-80 men would work 6-8 hours per day on the expansion program but the maximum so far has been 10 men working for 2 hours."I/ And in their final report one year later, the Con- sultants discuss the fact that while participation was satisfactory on several schemes, it was most inadequate on others, even to the point where Genie Rural equipment was not only delayed in its work, but eventually was forced to move to other perimeters without the work being done.-3/ A report, following a visit by consultant staff to four of these perimeters in early 1977, raises the same points.4/

40. The pirpose of these irrigation projects is to provide an off-season (dry season) food crop. The typical household in this region (and in the Gorgol area) attempts to guarantee its subsistence and earn cash, by diversi- fying its economic activity as broadly as possible. Animals are kept for milk and meat requirements and transport, and transport services are sold. Trading and wage labor (often in Senegal) are engaged in. Wood and charcoal are sold, and gum is harvested. The main food crop is generally millet or sorghum; this

1/ Grontmij International, Rapport a la fin de la deuxieme campagne. Projet "Consolidation et Extension des Petits Perimetres Irrigues", Arnhem, September 1976, p. 4.

2/ Grontmij International, Rapport a la fin de la deuxieme compagne Projet "Consolidation et Extension des Petits Perimetres Irrigues", Arnhem, September 1976, p. 4.

3/ Ibid, Rapport Final ... , Aout, 1977, p. 7.

4/ Situation du Project "Extension des Petites Perimetres" et compte rendu du voyage 14-19 Mars, 1977, Nouakchott, 24 Mars, 1977 (typescript). - 13 -

is a flood recession crop. During February-March, when rice should be trans- planted on the irrigated perimeters, the flood-recession crop must be harvested. The off-season rice crop only is popular, and the projects get the full participation of the farmers, only when the flood-recession crop is bad, for instance in 1976 when the Senegal River did not rise to its usual levels.

41. In addition, the rice plots are too small to provide enough food for a family. As pointed out in the FAQ/World Bank Irrigation Sector Report (p. 10), rice production costs are such that the net remaining for the farmer is less than the Government's minimum wage for unskilled labor. When all these elements are combined with the uncertainties of input supply, prices, pests and pump breakdowns, badly trained extension agents, mal-functioning cooperatives, crop diseases, and the like, it is hardly surprising that farmers are not particularly enthusiastic to supply their labor. Competent sociologists have been drawing attention to problems of labor constraints in West African agricultural systems for some time..Y A clear lesson for the Bank from this project is the need to structure future agricultural projects in such a way as to either accommodate to this traditional economic process or by-pass it entirely, In the light of ample experience, the latter would no doubt be preferable.

III. CONCLUSIONS

42. As in other Sahelian DRF projects, with the possible exception of Upper Volta, the Bank's insistence on a large inter-ministerial coordinating committee was inappropriate and unnecessary. This was especially so in the case of Mauritania where the initial Chairman was from a Ministry not directly concerned with subproject implementation.

43. The Bank and the Government of Mauritania had very little experience with one another (in 1972-1973) regarding rural development projects. It thus was particularly important for the Bank to spend time with Mauritanian officials explaining administrative, financial and other procedures. This was not done well, recognizing however the limited interest of some officials in the earlier years of the project.

44. The Bank had a variety of projects in its own "pipeline" to which it paid no apparent subsequent attention. These included a number of irrigation activities, gum arabic, and "save-the-calves" operations.

1/ See, for example, Jean Hochet, Perspectives et Exegencies Socio-Econo- miques du Developpement de 1'Agriculture Irriguee en Republique Islamique de Mauritanie (Basse et Moyen Valee du Senegal, Bassin du Gorgol), SEDES, Juin, 1972. - 14 -

45. The Bank recognized the priority development issues of this drought period; that is clear in the Appraisal Report and in other earlier documentation. The bulk of Mauritania's population was rendered destitute. While some farmers could eat again when the rivers returned to their normal peak flows and when sufficient rain fell (in the southern areas), the pastoralist would need years to rebuild his herds. The Bank and other donors had projects underway to assist pastoralists (well rehabilitation, pasture fire protection, veterinary medicines) prior to the worst drought period. Certainly the vegetable subproject was useful, complementing USAID's program. But a livestock component providing meat, poultry and dairy products for high income urban residents of Nouakchott can hardly be considered as drought relief for the one million destitute Mauritanians.

46. There are important lessons in the small irrigation perimeter subproject. The farming/pastoralist family has a mutually reinforcing, complicated, yet finely tuned agricultural system, developed over many generations, to ensure its survival from year to year. As with any system, one cannot expect to impinge upon one element without experiencing negative repercussions throughout the entire system (see paras. 38-41 above). The economic system is also constrained by historically sanctioned class dif- ferentiations, land ownership patterns and the like. For new projects (more perimeters, Gorgol, etc.) the Bank needs to consider economic facilities which while divorcing the farmer and his family from traditional systems, provide him with enough space and opportunity to feed himself and have some surplus, and do this reliably and predictably; he cannot adhere to the traditional system and be expected to allocate more labor to new ventures. - 15 -

MAURITANIA

DROUGHT RELIEF FUND PROJECT (Credit 444-MAU)

COMPLETION REPORT

I. REGIONAL SET UP

Introduction

1. The Drought Relief Fund Project was a regional operation whereby IDA extended six lines of credit totalling US$14.0 million to the Sahelian countries, divided among them as follows: Chad, US$2.0 million (Credit 445-CD); Mali, US$2.5 million (Credit 443-MLI); Mauritania, US$2.5 million (Credit 444-MAU); Niger, US$2.0 million (Credit 441-NIR); Senegal, US$3.0 million (Credit 446-SE); and Upper Volta, US$2.0 million (Credit 442-UV). The purpose was to help them restore their productive base, after the 1972 drought, within the next 18 to 24 months. Bank Group actual lending to these countries' agricultural sectors then consisted of 12 operations amount- ing to about US$49 million and the project, which was the first Bank-financed relief operation in the Sahel, accounted for a 20 percent increase in the regional allocation of IDA resources.

2. The Drought Relief Fund Credit of US$2.5 million (444-MAU) provided for Mauritania represented the second Bank Group operation in the country's agricultural sector. It was approved by the Board on November 13, 1973, on a regional basis, signed on December 7, and was declared effective on April 8, 1974.

3. This Report on the Mauritania Drought Relief Fund Project is based on findings by Bank supervision missions, completion papers prepared by various Departments responsible for implementing the project, and discussions held with Government during supervision missions in 1978 and 1979.

Background

4. In 1972, the most severe drought in over 50 years occurred in the Sahelian countries. This drought followed two other severe droughts in the region in 1968 and 1970. As a result then, there was a virtual failure of rainfed crops in the Sahel and there were also reduced yields in flood recession agriculture. In Mauritania, production of millet, which averaged about 75,000 tons in a normal year, fell to 12,000 tons.(less than one fifth of normal production) in 1972-73. In addition the drought's impact on Mauri- tania's livestock was disastrous.

5. Starting in late 1972, when the full extent of the catastrophe was becoming clear, bilateral and multilateral emergency relief operations were mounted. In November 1972, the President of Senegal, acting on behalf of OCAM, inquired whether the Bank would be prepared to consider participating in efforts aimed at alleviating Sahelian problems. In early 1973, the Bank - 16 -

recognized that while there was no need to participate in on-going emergency programs, which were adequately taken care of by other donors, there was, however, a need to help drought-affected people resume production through actions that could be set up quickly and would produce early benefits, like rural and stock water supply, small-scale irrigation, soil and water conser- vation and animal health. The Bank therefore replied favorzbly to President Senghor's request.

Project Design

6. Because of the extraordinary circumstances, the designing of the project, which took place from early to late 1973, was unusal. Flexibility was exercised within normal Bank guidelines and the following basic principles retained:

(a) Regional Scope. The project would be a regional operation, to be designed, negotiated and approved simultaneously for all six Sahelian countries.

(b) Project Content. In each particular country, the project would consist of small specific operations (or subprojects), identification and preparation of which would start, but not necessarily be completed, before appraisal or submission of the regional Credit to the Board for approval.

(c) Criteria for Subproject Selection. In setting up standards for subproject selection, the Bank exempted a number of potential operations from the requirement of economic and financial justification, which was limited to directly productive operations, like swamp and small-scale irrigation schemes. In order to be eligible for financing, other operations essentially had to help restore the productive base of drought-affected areas, generate benefits quickly, benefit a relatively large number of people and be demon- strably needed and supported by a local community which, in the case of land and water development, would be prepared to contribute to their costs, in cash or in kind.

(d) Financing. Bank assistance would take the form of a line of credit extended to each respective Government. To help speed up implementation and disbursements, the credit would prefinance a revolving fund, to be established for each project as soon as the Credits were effective. For the same reasons, retroactive financing might be granted; and

(e) Organization. It was decided to rely on existing insti- tutions as much as possible and a three-layer system was devised in each country consisting of (i) an ad hoc committee to coordinate subproject implementation; (ii) a local financing institution to handle and keep the project accounts; and (iii) technical services to implement the subprojects. - 17 -

Appraisal

7. In June/July 1973, an appraisal mission visited the Region. This, however, was no traditional appraisal since in fact the mission's assignment was to convey to Governments the approach the Bank envisaged for these operations, identify subprojects to be prepared for financing under the project, subject to IDA's approval, and assess institutional capability for project implementation. The mission received strong support in each country and confirmed that the project as conceived was feasible. The appraisal report essentially consisted of a regional analysis of the drought, a description of on-going efforts to alleviate its impact, a breakdown of subsectors where operations were envisaged under the project, a tentative list of national proposals for subprojects, details on project financing arrangements, organization and management, and finally, an outline of expected benefits.

Loan Committee, Negotiations and Board Approval

8. Issues raised by the Loan Committee included:

(a) the legality of prefinancing expenditures through a revolving fund: the Committee determined that such prefinancing would not conflict with IDA's Articles of Agreement, as long as evidence of proper application of credit proceeds was made available to IDA from time to time (i.e. on the replenishment of the revolving fund);

(b) the extent of farmers' contributions to subproject operation and maintenance costs; it was decided that such contributions could be made either in cash or in kind;

(c) the possible need for a contractual obligation from Governments to levy user charges, where necessary, on beneficiaries of similar subprojects financed by other donors; while it was agreed that every effort should be made to persuade Government of the wisdom of levying similar charges on the beneficiaries of other projects, the Loan Committee did not think it appropriate to impose a contractual obligation; and

(d) the payment of duties and taxes: the Region suggested that, if account were taken of the particular circumstances of the drought and its adverse effects on the economic base of the Sahelian countries, there was a strong case for departing from existing policies and recommending to the Board that IDA should be prepared to finance some taxes under the proposed projects. Also since, certain taxes were not always easily identificable, Governments were likely to be reluctant to grant exemp- tions from import duties and other taxes. Moreover, it was becoming common practice for certain other aid donors - 18 -

to finance 100% of the costs of projects including taxes in many African countries. The Committee took the view that, in principle, the Bank Group should adhere to its policy of not financing taxes out of funds provided under its credits. However, in practice, there would be cases where IDA would be unable to identify taxes included in the prices of goods and services financed under the proposed drought credits. A distinction was therefore made between imports specifically required for the projects, for which the Association eventually obtained Government's agreement on import tax exemption, and other items on which taxes were to be paid.

9. Negotiations took place in the respective countries -- at that time an unusual procedure -- in mid September 1973.

10. During a lengthy Board discussion, the Executive Directors, while welcoming the Bank's.quick response to regional needs and its flexible approach, including negotiating the Credits in each country, the use of development banks as financial agencies, the establishment of revolving funds, and other innovative aspects of the operation, expressed some concern over the relaxation of the Bank's usual standards for subproject selection and the risk of overgrazing through herd reconstitution made possible by the project. It was agreed that there should be some procedures for reporting back to the Board when subproject appraisal was nearly completed. This, however, was not followed up, because over-grazing did not become a problem during implementation.

Project Description

11. Objective and Targets. As approved by the Board, the project's primary objective was to help people in drought afflicted areas re-establish their self-sufficiency by assisting them in redeveloping and improving their farms and herds. A secondary objective was to help Governments set up organizational mechanisms to use efficiently the large volume of financial assistance forthcoming as a result of the drought. It was also hoped that an additional and major project benefit would be the demonstration of an efficient means of preparing, appraising, financing and implementing small-scale development projects. No specific target was set up other than the completion of IDA disbursements by mid to late (calendar) 1976, depending on the countries involved.

12. Subproject Content. At the time of Board approval, subprojects were still being prepared in all countries for subsequent approval by IDA. The tentative list, for Mauritania, of the subprojects envisaged at that time was as follows:

Mauritania - Rehabilitation and extension of 10 small irrigated schemes in the Senegal River Valley; - 19 -

- extension of irrigated vegetable production in three different areas of the country; and

- establishment of a fodder and cattle production center. - 20 -

II. THE MAURITANIA PROJECT

A. Preparation and Content

13. Subproject selection started in the first half of 1973 and by July 1973 Government had decided to submit two subprojects, estimated to cost (UM 60.75 million) (US$1.35 million) to IDA for financing. The projects were (i) rehabilitation and extension of small irrigation perimeters, and (ii) vegetable production. The Minister of Rural Development also proposed a third subproject involving Technical Assistance to Genie Rural aimed at assisting the latter in the execution of the irrigation subproject though this was not seriously considered, during the preparation and appraisal.

14. Preparation of the two subprojects was fairly well advanced at the time of the appraisal missions. Preparation for the irrigated perimeters had started well before the drought, though irrigation development had been on a small scale. 'The European Development Fund (FED) had been involved in financing maintenance of, and extension services in, the irrigation area before IDA involvement. To assure fast implementation it was agreed in May 1973 that a Netherlands consultancy group, Grontmij, which was involved in the FED financed project was asked to prepare the two subprojects. The preparation for the vegetable subproject was expected to be fast since it had already been started by Government with its own financial resources and financing from USAID.

15. In the second half of 1973 IDA missions discussed with Government, other subprojects which could be financed under the project. During Negoti- ations in September the Government proposed a third subproject involving a cattle reproduction ranch near Rosso.

16. The Mauritania project then as approved in November 1973 consisted of the following subprojects:

(i) Small Irrigation Perimeters (UM 49.5 million; executing agency, Genie Rural Development). The subproject provided for the rehabilitation and extension of ten small irrigation schemes. The total area to be covered was estimated at 519 ha in the Senegal River Valley. The subproject was to improve upon and expand perimeters financed earlier by FAC, FED and Government. The area to be rehabilitated was 274 ha and the area to be expanded 245 ha.

(ii) Vegetable Production (UM 11.25 million; executing agency: Agri- culture Department). This subproject provided for the cost of agricultural implements, seeds, fertilizer and transport equipment for the continuation and expansion on 180 ha in three regions of the country. - 21 -

(iii) Rosso Livestock Center (UM 51.75 million: executing agency; Livestock Department). The subproject was designed to speed up reproduction of cattle herds through construction of a cattle reproduction ranch and development of an irrigated forage crop near Rosso. It included irrigation development, rehabilitation of buildings, purchase of equipment and operating costs.

17. The total estimated cost of the three subprojects (including contingencies) was estimated at UM 112.5 million (US$2.5 million). The possibility of cost overruns or disruptions due to exchange rate fluctuations was anticipated especially in the Rosso livestock subproject and a commitment was obtained from USAID to provide an additional UM 11.25 million (US$250,000) to finance a feasibility study, but USAID pulled out of the project before the study was begun.

B. Implementation

Effectiveness and Start up

18. Conditions of effectiveness were the establishment of a National Coordinating Committee (NCC) 1/ and the opening up of a project account in the Treasury. These conditions were met by early 1974 but effectiveness - initially scheduled for March 11, 1974 - was on April 8, 1974 due to some delays in sending required legal documents to IDA.

19. Contracts for a feasibility study at Rosso, the technical assistance, supply of vehicles and equipment for construction were awarded in the first half of 1974 and approved by IDA. With the exception of the feasibility study, however, all the other subprojects encountered substantial delays in start up. Administrative procedures delayed the signing of a contract between GIRM and the Grontmij consultants for the Irrigation subproject. Also equipment ordered early in 1974 for the subproject arrived only in 1975 and operations did not start till late 1976. Though vehicles were ordered early for the vegetable subproject the Government did not submit any request for the purchase of necessary inputs. Thus, due to shortages in local supplies, procurement for this subproject was not possible before the 1975/76 growing season.

C. Revisions

20. In early 1974, the Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) proposed that IDA finance the services of technical assistants to reinforce the Ministry and ensure better management of the IDA subprojects. IDA accepted in July 1974 to finance a new subproject called "Technical Assistance to the NRD" estimated to cost CFAF 50 million (UM 12 million) including appointment of two expatriates as technical advisers (one sociologist and one economist) both hired from SEDES. The sociologist was to study extension and land development problems and the economist would deal with rural development planning.

1/ Created on December 6, 1973. - 22 -

21. The feasibility study of the Rosso Livestock center issued by SEDES by mid-1975 was reviewed by the FA0/Bank Cooperative Program which concluded that such a livestock research center was not economically or financially suitable for IDA financing because of the detailed technical support it would require. Consequently on February 26, 1976 a letter was sent to the President of the National Coordinating Committee to inform GIRM that the subproject should be terminated and the related available credit would be transferred to new more feasible subprojects and improvement of on-going subprojects.

22. Between March and December 1976, after a series of.consultations between IDA and GIRM on possible subprojects which were feasible for IDA financing, the two sides agreed in December 1976 on the following reallocation of the balance of the credit, which at this time was bout UM 49.5 million (US$1.1 million); (a) UM 27 million (US$600,000) was to be used to complete financing of the small irrigation perimeters (US$500,000) and the vegetable production (US$100,000) subprojects; (b) a new Livestock and Pest Control Subproject with five components, with a total estimated cost including an unallocated amount of U 500,000 of UM 22.5 million (US$500,000) were added.

23. The new operations were:

(i) Building of 10 small warehouses - to increase storage capacity for veterinary products and pesticides over the remote southern Mauritanian agricultural zone (estimated cost U 4 million);

(ii) Purchase of pesticides and explosives - to increase the capability of the newly created Pest Control Service to fight small locusts, birds and rats (estimated cost UK 5 million);

(iii) Vehicle operating costs to finance spare parts, fuel and oil for vehicles to be used in transporting veterinary products and pesticides (estimated cost U 3.6 million);

(iv) Rural Development Experimental Center - to provide buildings for a small livestock center close to Nouakchott and purchase animal feed in order to promote livestock production in the framework of a rural development plan of the Nouakchott surroundings (estimated cost UM 8.8 million); and

(v) Poultry sheds - to build two sheds for laying hens in order to improve the poultry center close to Nouakchott (estimated cost U 600,000).

24. In April 1978, when a balance was foreseen on the credit, MRD proposed extra purchase of animal feed within the framework of the rural development center. Thus when the project was finally completed it had five subprojects; including the three originally approved in November 1973 (but with a major reduction in the Rosso Livestock Center Subproject), a technical assistance subproject and six small operations under the title of a Livestock and Pest Control Subproject. - 23 -

D. Subproject Performance

Overview

25. At appraisal, project completion had been set at June 1976. By this date the original project had been modified and new subprojects were under discussion. Of the three subprojects which had been approved at appraisal, two (irrigation and vegetable production) remained intact by the original completion date, but neither had been completed. The Rosso Livestock center subproject had been reduced to a feasibility study which had been finished. By this date also the Technical Assistance subproject added in early 1974 had been completed. Disbursements stood at about 46% of credit amount and overall, the physical implementation of the project had been poor.

26. The Project was generally plagued by complicated and inefficient administrative and financial procedures, and this was reinforced by the revalries and the lack of coordination between different Ministries involved.

27. Until mid-1976 the project was carried out by both the Ministry of Rural Development and the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources within the framework of the National Coordinating Committee. The NCC was, at that time, presided over by the Minister of Health. He continued to act as president of the Committee even after-he had been designated Minister of National Defense and more pressing defence matters occupied most of his time. The complexity of this arrangement, added to the usual local complicated financial and administrative procedures explains most of the initial difficulties in implementing the project. Besides, the secretary and the accountant seconded to the NCC were ineffective and unable to handle the project accounts and disbursement procedures.

28. The Regional Vice-President in February 1976 sent a cable to the Government expressing his deep concern about the poor performance of the project and the interminable delays in execution. Government, in discussions with the May 1976 supervision mission, decided to take measures to revitalize the project. Within the next six months; (a) the NCC was reshuffled, (b) revolving funds were re-established for the various subprojects and (c) the Ministry of Rural Development was made responsible for execution of the project. By September 1976, an unofficial coordinating committee under the Ministry of Rural Development called "cellule operationnelle" had taken over the implementation of the project. This unit consisted of a small number of well-trained and highly motivated technocrats obviously aware of the weaknesses of the coordinating committee arrangement and therefore eager to remedy the situation.

29. The cumbersome financial and administrative procedures remained but the "cellule" succeeded in improving project performance, at least, in terms of physical implementation. Efforts were also made in the second half of 1977 to reorganize the project accounting and disbursement unit. - 24 -

This was quite successfully done under the supervision of the expatriate coordinator of the IDA Livestock Project (Cr. 273-MAU) who was designated by Government to monitor the project. The project remained on the problem project's list from July 1975 to September 1977.

Small Perimeter Subprojects (Executing Agency: Genie Rural; Consulting Firm; Grontmij)

30. Since 1964, Mauritania, had developed irrigated rice production along the lower parts of the Senegal River Valley in ten small perimeters. The operation and maintenance of these perimeters had been financed by FED through a Dutch consulting firm, Grontmij. The IDA financed subproject aimed at rehabilitating about 274 ha of the.existing irrigation works and expanding them by an additional 245 ha. In addition the subproject,was to finance access tracks to some of the perimeters and to rehabilitate a workshop at Boghe. The subproject was to be implemented with the assistance of staff from Grontmij (already in charge of the FED financed small perimeters extension project).

31. The Grontmij contract was approved by IDA in April 1974. However, the contract was only signed by Government in January 1975 owing to administrative delays in Mauritania. Equipments for the subproject were ordered in April 1974. These arrived in Mauritania in early 1975 but were not delivered by the suppliers until June 1975 about four months after arrival in Nouakchott. Most of the equipment however became operational only in January 1976. These substantial delays were caused by slow customs clearances, lack of coordination between the Ministries of Rural Development and Hydraulic Resources, and delays in payment to contractors and suppliers who therefore were reluctant to provide any equipment or material through the usual administrative procedures.

32. The small perimeters subproject therefore effectively got started only in January 1976. The three expatriate personnel provided by Grontmij (an- engineer, a technician and a consultant) were underutilized for most of 1975, since in addition to the delays in equipment supply, the ineffective NCC did not provide them with transport facilities or operating expenditures.

33. When the project was started, the quality of works suffered in the beginning from the poor facilities (vehicles, funds) and substantial delays in payment of salaries - up to six months. Because of measures taken by Government to revitalize the project in late 1976 (para 28) and the reallocation of an extra US$200,000 to the subproject, physical performance improved somewhat. There were however some delays resulting from: (a) use of equipment and vehicles by Government for purposes other than the project (including military use); (b) frequent breakdowns in Government-owned and rented machinery, (c) slow payment of the Grontmij consultants and (d) delays in replenishing the subproject revolving fund. Despite these problems in project execution the subproject was satisfactorily completed in August 1977 after rehabilitating 134 ha and extending the irrigated area by 161 ha. - 25 -

34. During the construction of the perimeters several farmers contributed manual labor in excavating canals. As the subproject progressed farmers became more and more eager to participate when the low rainfall resulted in poor yields from flood-recession and rainfed cultivation.

35. In June 1977, the Agriculture Department officially took over the extended and rehabilitated small perimeters, the Boghe workshop, seven equipped pumps and miscellaneous farm inputs provided under the project. SONADER, the state rural development agency supported by IDA, has taken over the management and maintenance of all small perimeters along the Senegal River. IDA should urge Government to supply the necessary funds for maintenance.

36. According to the final report of the Grontmij firm, issued in August 1977, the physical achievements of the subproject are as follows in ha;

Appraisal Estimate Implemented Rehabi- Extension Location tation 1975 1976' 1976 1977 Total R E. R E R E R E

Tiekane - 25 - - - 10 - 10 1/

Leboudou - 10 - - 20 17 20 17

Dar El Barka 216 - 55 - 55 - 2/

Olo-Ologo - 20 - - 6 20 6 20 3/

Nigorel Guidal - 20 - - - 20 - 20

Bakao 15 - 25 - 25 -

Sori Male - 20 - - - 16 - 16

Vinding 43 50 28 10 - - 28 10 1/

Rindiao - 50 - 20 - - - 20 4/

Diovol - 50 - 20 - 28 - 48

274 245 28 50 106 111 134 161

519 78 217 295

1/ Land ownership problems prevented further extension. 1/ Difficulties with the existing canal system, water pumping equipment and availability of farmers. 3/ Construction of a primary canal instead of piping necessary in addition to rehabilitation. 4/ Remainder of 30 ha was reserved for FED finaced KAEDI fattening farm. - 26 -

37. As indicated in the footnotes to the table, shortfalls in land development behind appraisal estimates were mainly due to land tenure problems and technical difficulties on some of the perimeters.

Vegetable Production Subproject (Executing Department - Agriculture)

38. This subproject aimed at expanding vegetable production through supply of small equipment, vehicles, seeds, fertilizers and pesticides in the Senegal River Basin and in the Oasis. It was supplemental to a vegetable project financed by USAID.

39. The vehicles for the Agricultural service were ordered in April 1974 and were delivered about a year later. Initial difficulties with procurement and administrative procedures, however, delayed the distribution of implements and seeds and the subproject got under way only for the 1975/76 season. The lack of local supplies and delays in ordering seeds limited the amount of seeds that could be distributed this first year of operation. However, the inputs were satisfactorily procured and distributed in 1976/77 and additional seeds were also supplied from residual funds in 1977/78. The project was completed in June 1977. USAID plans to resume distribution of inputs and implements under a new project in 1979.

40. Under the IDA subproject a total of 1,040 kg of vegetable seeds, 550 kg of forage seeds and 155 tons of potato seeds were distributed between 1975/76 and 1977/78. In addition several thousand watering cans and farm implements and 22 tons of pesticides were distributed. The inputs were provided through cooperatives and pre-cooperatives all over the country. The Agricultural Department was also provided with four front wheel-drive vehicles.

Rosso Livestock Center (Executing Department - Livestock Consulting Firm - SEDES, France)

41. The subproject consisted of the creation of an irrigated forage production center near Rosso covering 200 ha. The center was to be used to improve cattle nutrition during the dry season, and to test and demonstrate a stratified system of cattle production in the country. Funds were provided to develop infrastructure (including the building of a dam) and finance operating costs for one year. Technical assistance for the preliminary survey and management was to be financed by USAID.

42. The feasibility study was financed under the DRF Project (Cr 444-MAU) because USAID withdrew from the Project. It was carried out by SEDES, a French Consulting Firm, in 1974 and the full report was issued by mid-1975. The report was reviewed in October/November 1975 by the FAO/Bank Cooperative Program. The review concluded, after discussions in Washington, that the pilot operation envisaged was not suitable for World Bank financing. IDA suggested to Government that such Project could be proposed to a bilateral or multilateral agency able to provide not only direct project financing (investment 1976 US$3.53 million, annual operating cost US$330,000 without - 27 -

investment replacement) but also scientific support and technical assistance which were thought to be indispensable complementary measures. Because of the major changes in Project concept and scale IDA proposed to GIRM to terminate the subproject. Consequently the remaining funds were reallocated in December 1976 (Para 22).

Technical Assistance (Executing Department - Agriculture; Consulting Firm SEDES, Fran)

43. IDA accepted in early 1974 to finance, under the credit, Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Rural Development, comprising the appointment of one sociologist for a year and an economist for six months, both hired from SEDES. The sociologist was to advise the Minister of Rural Development on land tenure problems while the economist would advise him on rural development programming problems.

44. The contracts for the two consultants were approved by IDA in August 1974. The consultants started work immediately and by the end of one year, the sociologist had prepared the by-laws of a new Mauritania Rural Development Agency, a land tenure law to enable Government redistribute land to be improved by irrigation and the by laws of the Mauritania Cereal Office, "Office Mauritanien des Cereales - OMC". He also participated in project administration. The economist prepared several notes and memoranda on the economics of irrigated perimeters in Mauritania during his six month tenure. The subproject was completed by October 1975.

The Livestock and Pest Control Subproject (Executing Departments: Livestock, Agriculture, and "Protection de la Nature").

45. This subproject with five components, was approved by IDA in December 1976. It was to use the balance from the Rosso Livestock Center subproject to improve livestock production and pest control. The performance of the subproject was better than the others since it was coordinated by the "cellule operationalle" and the subproject also started at a time when Govern- ment had taken measures to revitalize the whole project (para 18).

46. Rural Warehouses. IDA approved in February 1977 a contract for construction of 10 small aluminium warehouses to store veterinary products and pesticides. The warehouses were to be built in the remote Southern Mauritanian agricultural region. Field construction started in mid-1977 because of delays in delivery of imported construction materials. The component was satisfactorily completed about March 1978.

47. Pesticides. This component which provided pesticides, small equipment and explosives for bird eradication was implemented by the crop protection service of the Ministry of Rural Development. 70 tons of chemicals, 5 tons explosives, 5,000 dusting bags and 5 mechanical dusters were purchased and distributed as scheduled. - 28 -

48. Vehicle Operating Costs. This component consisted of paying for fuels, oils, lubricants and spare parts for vehicles used in transporting veterinary products and pesticides. The supplies were purchased by negotiated contract and were distributed during one year beginning in November 1976.

49. Rural Development Experimental Center. This component provided for the construction of a 20 ha rural development experimental unit on the out- skirts of Nouakchott to cater for the increasing nunber of small irrigation plots used to grow vegetables, fruit, fodder and crops. In addition the component was to provide some feed for a Livestock component within the unit (111 head of cattle, 50 sheep and 50 goats).

50. Investment and operating cost plans were prepared in early 1977 and contracts approved by IDA in June 1977. The main building and fences were satisfactorily completed in March 1978 and by that time about 90 tons of feed concentrate had been supplied to the livestock. However the operation of the Center depended on the financing by CEAO (Economic Community of West Africa) of electricity and water mains to be connected to the Center and the construction of access roads to the center. At the time of project closing CEAO activity had not started. The Government, in May 1979, started alterna- tive arrangements to get USAID financing to connect the water and electricity and to improve the temporary access road.

51. Poultry sheds. This component consisted of building two poultry sheds for laying hens near Nouakchott. The contract for their construction was awarded to the same contractor who built the rural development experimental unit. The size of the sheds were slightly reduced just before construction began to take account of increasing costs. The sheds were satisfactorily completed by Jaunary 1978. The poultry center is currently well operated by the Livestock department.

Procurement and Construction

52. Due to the limited number of equipment purchases and construction works envisaged, no international competitive bidding had been planned. Local competitive bidding was used to award contracts for equipments under the small perimeter and vegetable subprojects, construction works under the poultry sheds and the rural experimental center components. Negotiated contracts were used for construction of the warehouses, purchase of pesticides, fuels and lubricants, and technical assistance to, the Ministry of Rural Development and the small perimeter subproject, and for the Rosso Livestock Center feasibility study. Local and international shopping were used for the other goods (like seeds and animal feed) purchased under the project.

53. Actual procurement followed the guidelines in the credit agreement. The procurement procedures were adapted to local conditions and the project's nature, and have been satisfactory despite delays in obtaining supplies owing mainly to the administrative set up in Mauritania. - 29 -

L Costs, Financing and Disbursement

Project Costs

54. As outlined in the table below, estimated total expenditure on the project was UK 110 million (US$2.445 million) slightly less than the original estimated total cost. Project Expenditures (In equivalent '000 US$ and '000 UM) I/

Adjusted Estimates Appraisal Estimates (February 1977) Final Expenditures ('000 US$) ('000 UM) ('000 US$) ('000 UM) ('000 UM) ('000 US$)

Small Perimeters 1,100 49,500 1,325 59,625 62,775 1,395

Vegetable Production 250 11,250 200 9,000 8,775 195

Rosso Livestock Center 1,150 51,750 120 5,400 4,635 103

Technical Assistance - - 95 4,275 4,995 111

Warehouses - - 90 4,050 4,005 89

Pesticides - - 180 8,100 4,590 102

Operating Costs - - 80 3,600 3,465 77

RDE Center - - 270 12,150 14,985 333

Poultry sheds - - 15 675 810 18

Animal feed - - 15 675 990 22

Subtotal 2,500 112,500 2,390 107,550 110,025 2,445 available as of Unallocated - - 110 4,950 30/06/78 2,475 55

Total 2,500 112,500 2,500 112,500 112,500 2,500

I/ US$1 - UM 45 - 31 -

Cost Structure

55. Detailed expenditure categories are available only for the small perimeter and vegetable subprojects and are as follows:

Small Perimeters ('000 US$)

Appraisal Actual Expenditure Estimates Expenditures Appraisal Estimates

Technical assistance 125 434 347%

Equipment 380 408 107

Pumps 50 84 168

BOGHE workshop 65 44 68

Materials 60 62 103

Salaries 114 128 112

Travel Expense 56 29 52

Operating costs 137 144 1/ 105

Inputs to farmers 70 62 89

Unallocated 43 -_-

1,100 1,395 127%

1/ Including heavy equipment renting. - 32 -

Vegetable Production ('000 US$)

Appraisal Actual % of Actual Estimates Expenditures Estimates

Vehicles 40 26 65

Small Equipment 74 102 53 Seasonal Inputs 120

Personnel - 5 -

Vehicle Operating Costs 16 62 388

250 195 78

56. The cost of the vegetable production subproject was substantially below appraisal estimates. This was because the agriculture department distributed less equipment and seeds than.foreseen at appraisal; also some of the equipment distributed had been supplied, under a former USAID project which had the same purpose as the subproject. The anall perimeter subproject however faced substantial cost overruns owing mainly to delays in procurement and the underutilization of the Grontmij technical assistance team (para 32) requiring therefore an extension of their contract.

Unit Costs

57. The cost per hectare of the small irrigation subproject was US$4,580 compared to an estimated US$1,990 at appraisal. The high final cost per ha was due to the cost of the technical assistance component as well as cost overruns from delays in procurement. Also, the appraisal estimate of the subproject cost had been too optimistic.

Financing

58. IDA financed a 100% of estimated project costs 1/ including allow- ances for civil servants partially seconded to the subprojects. Financing of civil servants was however not foreseen at appraisal. It should be noted that Government advanced US$500,000 to the project in early 1975 because the

1/ The cost of connecting water and electricity and improving the access road to the rural developnent experimental center was not included in the project costs. - 33 -

initial IDA disbursement of US$200,000 revolving fund had been misallocated in the treasury accounts. Government was later repaid when the accounts were sorted out. -The actual financing by subproject corresponds to the final expenditure categories in para 54 above.

Disbursements

59. Actual disbursements remained considerably behind schedule and total disbursements reached only 58% of appraisal estimate by late 1976, the date originally scheduled for project completion. Disbursement improved somewhat in 1977 and early 1978.when Government was more used to Bank disbursement procedures and project execution had been reorganized. Annex 1 gives a graph of estimated and actual disbursements.

Covenants

60. The main covenants in the Credit Agreement involved the establishment and maintenance of a National Coordinating Committee (NCC), participation of farmers in subprojects involving irrigation and land development and the keeping of separate project accounts in "the Treasury" to be audited each fiscal year.

61. Though the NCC was formed it was completely ineffective. There was no audit of project accounts during implementation and no audit has so far been received (paras 65 and 66 below). Otherwise all other provisions were met satisfactorily. - 34 -

III. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PERFORMANCE

Government Agencies and Departments

62. The NCC, established to coordinate the project performed very poorly. Personal rivalries between senior officials and the various ministries contributed to the ineffectiveness of the committee. After the general reorganization in December 1976 the "cellule operationalle", the unofficial coordinating committee (para 28) performed satisfactorily.

63. The Treasury kept project accounts but not in a manner useful for the project. This was partially because the secretary and accountant seconded to the NCC and which formed the Project accounting unit -were unable to handle the accounts and disbursements. There was a general misunderstanding of the operation of the revolving fund and this also accounted for some of the delays in disbursement.

64. The performance of the various Government departments was generally hampered by the cumbersome administrative procedures in Mauritania. The performance of the Ministry of Rural Development and its various departments was quite satisfactory towards the end of the project. Perhaps one of the most significant lessons to be learned from the performance of the NCC vis-a- vis the "cellule operationalle' is that national committees made up of mini- sters may be totally unsuitable for coordinating projects of this nature. However, motivated technicians would be more useful.

Accounts and Audit

65. The accounts of the small perimeters subproject were fairly well kept by Grontmij, the consulting agency. The project accounting unit was unable to keep any satisfactory accounts for the other subprojects and Grontmij had to keep these accounts also. Grontmij put all the accounts in order for 1976/77 but after their departure project accounting broke down again. When the project coordinator for the IDA financed Livestock Project (Cr. 273-MAU) was seconded to the project towards the end of 1977, some order was brought back into the accounts.

66. Because of the constant pressure put by supervision missions on Government to appoint an auditor, one was appointed in 1977. But the accounts were never audited. The project coordinator and 1978 supervision missions however worked towards a thorough internal audit of the accounts. It is unlikely that any external audit of project accounts would or can be performed at this time given the political conditions in Mauritania and the problems with the administrative structure.

Reporting

67. Reporting was good for the small irrigation perimeters supervised by Grontmij. Otherwise, there was inadequate reporting on all the other subprojects. The other consulting group SEDES provided copies of the by-laws - 35 -

and other documents on its technical assistance to the Ministry of Rural Development though there was no final report on this subproject. SEDES also provided a report on the Feasibility Study of the Rosso Livestock center. The reports on implamentation of the other subprojects were obtained during supervision missions which were reasonably frequent (see mission data).

Impact

68. Despite the considerable delays in project execution, the project generally had a positive impact in terms of fulfilling the primary objective of helping people re-establish their farms and herds. The achievements of the small irrigation subproject would also help in reducing the bad effects of future droughts. What was not achieved, however, was any improvement in Government's organizational mechanism. Though several departments in the Ministries of Rural Development and Hydraulic Resources have been involved, the cumbersome administrative procedures negated any gains that could have been made by these departments in terms of learning about efficient project implementation. The project was also not successful in setting up organizational mechanism to use effectively financial assistance coming from other donors as a result of the drought, though it helped establish a Rural Development Agency capable of implementing development projects.

69. The impact of individual subprojects is discussed below.

(a) Small Irrigation Perimeters. Through this subproject about 295 ha were brought under irrigation through rehabilitation and extension of perimeters. Paddy yields on these perimeters averaged 5 tons/ha where there were otherwise no yields or only yields of less than 2 tons/ha. The subproject also enabled farmers to grow rice on about 30% of the area during the off-season. Thus total rice production increased by about 360 tons in 1975/76 and 1,500 tons in 1976/77 as a result of the subproject. An estimated 900 farm families 1/ benefitted from the subproject, each of them increasing their gross annual income by about LIM 10,584 (US$235). In addition the BOGRE workshop served as the operational headquarters for the civil works on the perimeters. Thus the subproject met the project's primary objective of helping people re-establish their self sufficiency through improving their farms. The economic rate of return is estimated at 15.5%.

(b) Vegetable Production. The distribution of seeds and farming implements to farmer groups enabled the settlement of some drought ridden nomads around tube wells. The major impact of the subproject was that it reinforced the earlier

1/ The average family has about 5 members. - 36 -

USAID project to increase the ability and enthusiasm of farmers and settled nomads, to grow vegetables such as onions, carrots, cabbage, and tomatoes for their own consumption and local marketing. Though there is no reliable data it is estimated that between 5,000 - 10,000 gardeners benefitted from the subproject and they grow vegetable and forage over 75 - 150 ha. The yields average between 5 and 10 tons/ha, depending on the season. I

(c) Rosso Livestock Center: This produced a feasibility study for a Livestock center which can be financed by other donors.

(d) Technical Assistance. The subproject helped Government to establish a new rural development agency SONADER, capable of implementing agricultural developnent projects. It also helped with drafting land tenure legislation and establishing a Cereal Marketing Organization (OMC).

(e) Livestock and Pest Control: Though this subproject was added late it was useful in reducing the loss in income of farmers and herders in 1977/78. The Warehouses created an additional storage capacity of 143 tons for veterinary products and pesticides supplied to herders and farmers. The Pesticide component enabled the crop protection service to protect an estimated 6,000 ha of cereals from birds, 5,000 ha from rats and 4,500 ha from other pests. Thus.this component saved an equivalent of 1,000 tons of millet, about 17% of the production lost each year through depredators. The Vehicle Operating Cost Component was useful in ensuring quick and extensive distribution of veterinary products and pesticides. About 8 cooperatives benefitted 'from the poultry sheds built under the project since the sheds improved the capacity of the poultry center to import more chicken for sale to the cooperatives-. The Rural Development Experimental Center is not yet operational (para 43), but it is expected that it would help improve supply of meat and milk to Nouakchott where the population has increased as a result of the drought. During the construction period 250 cattle, 50 sheep, and 50 goats belonging to the livestock service were supplied with feed.

Bank Performance

70. The Bank recognized during preparation and appraisal the needs for; prompt subproject design, effective coordination and efficient channeling of funds, and a strong administrative capability. Subproject design was done satisfactorily but the Bank was however unable to ensure the smooth functioning of these various procedures of project implementation. In particular, one may question the decision of the Bank to rely on a National Coordinating Committee when a Bank preparation mission in August 1973 1/ had pointed out

1/ See Back-to-Office Report of Heinz B. Bachmann August 8, 1973. - 37 -

that an Inter-ministerial committee was more "likely to slow down rather than speed up project implementation" since the subprojects decided upon were to be executed through only two departments. The Bank however retained the committee (with 12 members), the president of which was not directly involved with the departments executing the project. 1/ And the ineffectiveness of the committee slowed down implementation considerably.

71. The need for closer supervision was recognized at the outset and during implementation. The frequency of supervision was adequate but internal rivalries in the coordinating committee and between various departments meant that recommendations made by supervision missions went unheeded. In retrospect the cable sent to Government by the Regional Vice President in December 1976 should probably have come earlier, since the reorganization following this cable, made subsequent supervision missions more effective.

72. The Project's impact, though delayed has justified Bank involvement. The main lesson to be learned is however in the preparation of such projects. The regional nature of the project meant that the same features were retained for all the six Sahelian countries. Given the peculiar nature of the administrative and budgetary set-up in Mauritania, one wonders if the Bank should not have considered modifying the implementation procedures for Mauritania, adjusting the procedures to the specific local conditions instead of insisting on a uniform system for all six countries. Thus in future it may be better for the Bank to approach even such special projects on a Country by Country basis (as is done for the Bank's normal projects) rather than in a schematic way.

Special Issues

73. The remaining issues concern the need for Government to ensure that the Rural Development Experimental Unit is completed in time, and that completed subprojects are adequately maintained. The construction of an access road, and connections of water and electricity to the center have not yet started. Since CEAO has failed to finance these components so far, IDA should encourage Government to get the USAID financing to complete the subproject.

74. SONADER has taken over the operation and maintenance of the small irrigation subproject. IDA should urge Government to provide SONADER with the means for effectively maintaining and improving the subproject. Govern- ment should also be asked to select a Department to be responsible for maintaining the warehouses and to provide the necessary funds.

1/ The decision to have inter ministerial committees for all the DRF projects in the six Sahalian countries had been made by the Bank during appraisal. - 38 -

Conclusions and Lessons

75. The project achieved its immediate aim of drought relief and provided farmers the means to better withstand future droughts through the small irrigation perimeters. The project has shown the willingness of the local population to help with measures aimed at improving their standard of living, as in the construction of canals. It also showed the possibility of diversi- fying the economic activities of the rural poulation. This was evidenced by the ready adoption of vegetable cultivation both for home consumption and for marketing. Several lessons to be retained are:

(a) the danger of preparing projects as a regional package. The project has shown that though it is possible to come up with a project package for a region, implementation problems may differ and should therefore be treated on a country by country basis;

(b) the importance of setting up and maintaining efficient coordination arrangements especially in a country like Mauritania where administrative bottlenecks are one of the main causes of delays in project implementation. The project has shown the difficulties of setting up interministerial coordinating committees when some of the ministries are not directly involved with execution and when the various ministries disagree on the implementation approach. The performance of the "cellule operationnelle" indicates that in such cases it may be better to give direct responsibility to technicians from the concerned departments, while the ministries not directly involved with execution are informed from time to time of the project's progress and of their responsibilities;

(c) the Bank Group should explain implementation and disbursement procedures to Government departments, at the latest, during the first supervision mission. In this Project, Mauritanian authorities should in particular have been briefed on the operation of the special revolving fund. Misunderstanding of its use caused considerable delays in the execution of the project;

(d) in selecting subprojects preference should be given to self- contained operations, implementation of which would not depend on financing of components by other donors. This applies to the Rural Development Experimental Center whose operation is still awaiting connection of electricity and water to be financed by another donor;

(e) the need for frequent and close supervision. In this respect, close IDA supervision probably saved the project; and

(f) the need to have strong project monitoring and accounting units and to enforce covenants relating to auditing of project accounts, Governments should be urged to improve accounting arrangements and IDA should be.stricter in ensuring that accounts are audited. BRD 14454

I ELA OF,EJBL' MAAURITANIA REPUBUOUE liLAMIÖLIE LE MAAURITANIE DROUGHT RELIEF PROJECT PROJET SECHERESSE Co,mpletiin Repo:rt Rapport D Acheverment

A L G E R A

MAIN VEGETABLEPRODUCTION AREAS/ PR INCPALESZONES DE MARAICHAGE

PAVEDROADSIROTESRSEVETUES GRAVELROADS/ ROUTESA GRA\IERE

--- TRACKS/ PISTES RAALWAY/CHEMNDEFER-A ISOHYETSN m / ISOHYETESEN.m ® NATIONALCAPITAL/CAPITALEDE LETAT Bir-MOrein REGIONALCAPITALS /CHEF - LIEU DE REGION REGIONALBOUNDARIES/ LIMITE DEREGIONS REGIONALNUMBER / NUMERODE REGION -- INTERNATIONALBOUNDARIES,FRONTIERES1 NDICATESTHE TERRITORYOF THE FORMERSPANISH SAHARA 249 (WESTERNSAHARMI!

Zoe ratt T R S F'déok

E-- G H A B A M A L I

NOUADHIBOU Ouane_-

AnTA gi eChti 202 0et Akjjoujt

Tochitt

NOUAKCHOTT

oudjéia

Oua0ata R'k Magta-ahjar eALEG Guerou ,Mederdra- -9N ROSSO abéa Ghabra 'IFFA-

Darel1Barka-L KAEDIber

Vin:-ng - . M am ------500 0 bEab 600

DAKAR Bake KiLOMETERS

of the (.ds of the epot0 whch 100 ched rhe no used a he bondar-esOs.on this mapdo noOI,. on thepa- of h, Wodd sant a s

1E° acceptanceof sehboud-nes