THE ART OF CHINA’S THREE WARFARES: CHINESE PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES

BELINDA LEI GOVT-474 PROFESSOR KARBER SPRING 2015

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Abstract

The overall purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of China’s modern warfare strategy through the lens of Chinese ancient philosophies, with the aim of understanding China’s motives and behaviors as it steadily gains more influence in the global arena. Unlike the U.S., China has no systemic international relations theory to dictate the viewpoints of the Chinese Communist Party. And, as China continues to rise both economically and militarily while the U.S. is arguably in a decline,1 a need for understanding China on a deep, psychological level became important. For this reason, as I began my own studies on Chinese warfare in the Fall of 2014, I realized the lack of understanding and information about modern Chinese military strategy. What began as an essay about China’s Three Warfares transformed itself into an analysis of how different Chinese philosophies have influenced its development. Now, in the Spring of 2015, I have added a more in- depth analysis of the connections between Chinese philosophies and the Three Warfares, including a new section about the I-Ching, and updated sections about the influence of the Warring States Period and current events related to the Three Warfares. From the I-Ching to Confucianism that has driven China’s strategy in the 21st century, my hope is that my research will be able to contribute to the growing number of information about China, and explain China’s actions in recent years.

1 Edward Luce, Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press ;, 2012. In his book, Edward Luce argues that America is slowly losing its power in the global arena and how

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Table of Contents

Introduction ...... 5-7

Background ...... The Warring States Period ...... The I-Ching “Book of Changes” ...... Taoism ...... The I-Ching and Taosim ......

Confucianism ...... 4-5 Confucian Thought ...... 5-6 Confucianism and I-Ching ...... 5-6 Confucianism and China’s Strategic Culture ...... 5-6 Confucianism and Soft Power ...... 8 Guanxi and Yizhan ...... 9-10 Confucianism and Politics ......

Sun Tzu and The Art of War ...... 10 Sun Tzu and the Tao of Power ...... 11-12 Sun Tzu and the I-Ching ...... 11-12 The Art of War and its Enduring Influence ...... 12-13

Sun Tzu vs. Confucius ...... 14-16

Confucian Influences on Sun-Tzu ...... Sun-Tzu vs. Confucius Similarities ...... Sun-Tzu vs. Confucius Differences ...... The Three Warfares ...... 16-17 Psychological Warfare ...... 17-18 Legal Warfare ...... 18-20 Media Warfare ...... 20-22 The Three Warfares Case Study: Anti-Secession Law ...... 22-23 The Three Warfares Case Study: Taiwan Re-unification ...... Lei4

Dangers of the Three Warfares ...... 23-24

Confucius and the Three Warfares ...... 24-26 Legal and Media Warfare and Confucian Soft Power ...... 26-27 Confucius as a Media Warfare Weapon ...... 27-28

Sun Tzu and the Three Warfares ...... 29-30 Sun Tzu’s Influence ...... 30-31 Psychological Warfare and Deception ...... 32

Moving Forward ...... 32-33

Conclusion ...... 33-34

Figures

Figure 1: Influence of Pre-Qin Philosophies ...... 6 Figure 2: Map of the Warring States of China ...... 8 Figure 3: Early Confucianism, 200 ...... 14 Figure 4: Chinese Guanxi ...... 18 Figure 5: The Five Factors of the Art of War ...... 23 Figure 6: Sixth “Contention” Hexagram, I-Ching ...... 26 Figure 7: Seventh “The Army” Hexagram, I-Ching ...... 27 Figure 8: Sun Tzu vs. Confucius ...... 33 Figure 9: China’s Three Warfares ...... 36 Figure 10: China’s Nine-Dash U-shaped Line in the South China Sea ...... 39 Figure 11: South China Sea “Map” ...... 47 Figure 12: China’s Three Warfares: Connections to Confucianism ...... 51 Figure 13: China’s Three Warfares: Connections to Sun-Tzu ...... 56

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Introduction Sun Tzu once wrote that “all warfare is based on deception.” China has certainly taken this quote to heart. In 2003, the Central Military Commission Committee of the Chinese Communist Party began endorsing what is now known as the “Three Warfares.”2 The Three Warfares, otherwise known as political warfare, consists of psychological warfare (using different methods to destroy psychological resistance), media warfare (using the media to change public opinion), and legal warfare (using the law to gain support from the domestic and international community).3 Since its reveal, information about the Three Warfares has become increasingly more complex and concerning. China is the largest foreign holder of U.S. debt, the second country, next to the US, with the most GDP, and the country with the largest army in the world. Coupled with reports of China engaging in economic warfare against the U.S., the idea of China launching legal, psychological, and media warfare is extremely alarming.4 The U.S. needs to take action against China’s war strategy. In order to form an effective counter strategy, the U.S. needs to fully understand the motives, ideas, and concepts that are driving the Three Warfare strategy through its Pre-Qin philosophers, in particular, Sun Tzu and Confucius. Without complete comprehension and knowledge of the Three Warfares and its development, the US sets itself at a precarious stage of losing a war—without ever realizing it. In this essay, I will analyze how Confucius and Sun Tzu’s ideas have influenced the development of China’s Three Warfares. I will also focus on how the I-Ching impacted Taoism and thus, Confucianism and Sun Tzu’s ideas. Since the

2 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 11. 3 "舆论战、心理战、法律战三大战法加速战争胜利." (Media, Psychological, and Legal Warfare: Three Types of Warfare that Increases the Effectiveness of War) Sina. March 8, 2008. Accessed October 5, 2014. http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2005-03-08/10245297499s.shtml [Translated by Belinda Lei] 4 Kevin Freeman, "China's Three Warfares Goes Further Than Anyone Can Imagine." Global Economic Warfare. May 31, 2014. Accessed November 10, 2014. Freeman, a global financial consultant commissioned by the Pentagon, argues that China is currently at war with America in a hidden way-- through economic means. Lei6

founding of Confucianism around the late Spring and Autumn period and Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” during the Warring States Period (475-221 BCE), Confucius and Sun Tzu’s philosophies have become inextricably connected to all areas of Chinese society, including militarily.5 6 By extension, the I-Ching, or “The Book of Changes,” and Daoism, which were precursors to Confucianism and The Art of War, contributed to the development of the two schools of thought (See Figure 1).7

Figure 1: Influence of Pre-Qin Philosophies

I-Ching

Confucianism Taoism

Sun-Tzu

This essay is broken into four parts in an effort to outline the relationship between the Three Warfares and Confucius. In the first section, I present background on the history and philosophies that influenced Confucianism and Sun- Tzu. In the second portion, I will then discuss Confucian ideas and Sun Tzu’s military

5 Subrata Saha, China's Grand Strategy from Confucius to Contemporary, S.l.: Bibliogov, 2013, 3. 6 Both Ideologies balance of realism and idealism has allowed it to have an enduring relevance in Chinese society 7 Edward L. Shaughnessy, Unearthing the Changes Recently Discovered Manuscripts of the Yi Jing (I Ching) and Related Texts, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, 282. Lei7

techniques in depth. Afterwards, I will outline the Three Warfares: psychological, legal, and media warfare. Lastly, I will discuss the links between Confucius, Sun Tzu, and the Three Warfares. Understanding the philosophy behind China’s Three Warfare strategy will help de-escalate the potency of the Three Warfares and decrease China’s increasing hegemony in Asia.

Background

In this section, I will be setting up my analysis of Confucianism, Sun-Tzu, and the Three Warfares by giving a brief overview of the history and philosophical influences prior to the Confucianism and The Art of War’s creation. The turmoil of the Warring States Period fostered a lot of thoughts about the existence of war, good governance, and civilian safety. The I-Ching and Taoism, both created before Confucianism and The Art of War,8 influenced the development of Confucianism and Sun-Tzu’s military strategies.

The Warring States Period The Pre-Qin era, particularly the Warring States Period (475-221 BCE), significantly influenced Chinese philosophy and formed the foundations for Chinese military thought.9 In 221 BCE, Qi Shi Huang Di, leader of the northwestern state of Qin brought the entire Chinese world “All Under Heaven,” effectively ending the over 100 year long Warring States Period (475 BC - 221 BC).10 Prior to Qi Shi Huang Di ending the century long war, rich philosophies were developed during the Warring States Era. The Warring States Period saw China split into multiple states continuously fighting for power (See Figure 2).

8 It is necessary to note that while Taoism came before Confucianism, it was only shortly before and existed simultaneously with Confucianism during the Warring States Period. 9 Chen Tien, Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern, Oakville: Mosaic Press ;, 1992, 22. 10 Pines, Yuri. Envisioning Eternal Empire Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Era. Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2009, 1. Lei8

Figure 2: Map of the Warring States of China11

The Warring States Period is arguably the most important period in China’s history because it is what, through bloodshed, heroism, hardship, and turmoil, set the foundation for thousands of years of Chinese dynastic rule—influencing China’s leadership even today. Hundreds of scholars drew experiences from the tumultuous period and used their wisdom to create works and philosophies to influence and create a more harmonious society. Some of these works were more abstract, like the Tao Te Ching, others were more pragmatic like Sun Tzu’s Art of War. Regardless, all of them became interconnected upon the idea of good leadership and stability. Superficially, studying an era that was thousands of years ago and then applying it to modern society seems like a large projection of philosophical

11 Fig. 2, Brian Hoffert, The Warring States of China. Digital Image. Available from: http://bhoffert.faculty.noctrl.edu/HST330/Map.WarringStates.png Lei9

influences. However, just like how Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War continues to influence Western international relations theory today, particularly for the realists, studying the Warring States Period illuminates much of the same axioms that result from war.12 Because the majority of Chinese traditional military philosophy was developed before the establishment of the Qin Dynasty, most military works since then have been ones either contributing to the theories of the Pre-Qin period or analyzing them. As a result, much of analyzing Chinese military philosophy today needs to be emphasized during the Pre-Qin era.

The I-Ching “Book of Changes” The I-Ching is one of China’s oldest books and the precursor of Confucianism and Sun Tzu. Both Confucianism and Taoism, and thus Sun Tzu’s Art of War by extension, were strongly influenced by the I-Ching, otherwise known as the “Book of Changes” or Yijing.13 The I Ching originates from the early Chou dynasty around 1000 BCE.14 The I-Ching is a divination manual that was created during the Western Zhou period (1046-771 BC).15 It has four fundamental sets of ideas with a cycle of three hundred and sixty states of opportunity. 360 is the number of days in a lunar year, which symbolize completeness. The sixty states are in sixty major configurations with six hexagrams each. Each hexagram stands for a specific element of life.16 On the surface, the I-Ching seems to be a mere fortune-telling handbook, but, it is also a book based upon strategic thought that pushes individuals to lead more rational and effective lives. Much of China’s decision-making process in

12 Xuetong Yan and Daniel Bell, "Pre-Qin Philosophy and China's Rise Today." In Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011, 202. 13 Richard Wilhelm, a well known theologian and translator of The I-Ching says in his I-Ching translation’s introduction that it is a “small wonder” that both Confucianism and Taoism have their “common roots” in the I-Ching. 14 Edward L. Shaughnessy, Unearthing the Changes Recently Discovered Manuscripts of the Yi Jing (I Ching) and Related Texts, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, 282. 15 Thomas Cleary, Translation of Mastering the Art of War by Zhuge Liang and Liu Ji. Boston: Shambhala, 1989, 17. 16 Ibid. Lei10

the past thousands of years has received influence from the I-Ching in some way, shape, or form. By the time of the Warring States period, the I-Ching had already become a widely available resource throughout China.17 As a result, as ideas were developed during this time, the I-Ching naturally became an influential piece for shaping the period’s ideas.18

Taoism The Tao Te Ching was written by Lao-Tzu during the sixth century B.C.E, preceding both Confucius and Sun-Tzu, and became known as a major Taoism piece. Taoism forms one of the three pillars of Chinese thought (Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism).19 While it is widely debated whether Lao-Tzu truly existed or not, the Tao Te Ching continues to have a deeply intertwined history with Chinese philosophy.20 Lao-Tzu’s philosophy of Tao, or, “the Way” is portrayed as the right or proper course. 21The “Way” is abstract, and models itself after nature, which as a result, produces contradictions.22 The Tao, or “The Way” is not meant to be understood immediately by the ordinary person. According to the Tao Te Ching:

“When superior officers hear about the Tao, They exert themselves to practice it. When ordinary officers hear about the Tao, It sometimes seems to be present, sometimes absent.

17 Edward L. Shaughnessy, Unearthing the Changes Recently Discovered Manuscripts of the Yi Jing (I Ching) and Related Texts, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, 282. 18 While analyzing Confucianism and Sun-Tzu, I will also be including the influences that the I-Ching has had on the respective philosophies. 19 Alan Chan, "Laozi," Stanford University. December 15, 2001. Accessed November 22, 2014. 20 Here, it is important to differentiate between Lao-Tzu’s philosophical Taoism and the Taoism that is seen as an organized religion today. In the religion, Lao-Tzu is worshipped as a deity. 21 In Confucianism, Tao is also a central philosophy, but in a more literal sense. In Confucius’ Tao under Heaven, it refers to how something is done to achieve morally good ends, rather than how life should be ordered in Daoism. 22 Jiefu Xiao, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy: Main Currents of Thought from Myth to Mao. San Francisco: Foreign Language Press, 2012, 68. Lei11

When inferior officers hear about the Tao, They uproariously laugh at it.”23

The Tao, as found within the I-Ching, serves to explain an ultimate essence of the universe that is not tangible. Taoism isn’t about the legalistic rationality or the Western liberalism, rather, it stresses living as a “man among men” that emphasizes interpersonal relationships and conduct.24 Specifically, during the Warring States Period, Taoism offered an alternative to the war and strife; it called to abolish the current world order and lead a peaceful and harmonious life. “Abandon sageliness and discard wisdom; then the people will benefit a hundredfold. Abandon humaneness (ren) and discard righteousness (yi), then the people will return to filial piety (xiao) and fraternal love (ti).”25 The Tao Te Ching later went to heavily influence the development of Sun-Tzu’s strategies in The Art of War.

The I-Ching and Taoism The I-Ching served as the foundation to Taoism. The I-Ching is abstract and expresses how there is no grand Creator, rather, there is a state of “being,” similar to Taoism. Its preoccupation with understanding the patterns of nature and the harmony found within it became what is known in Taoism as Tao or “The Way.” “The Way” is controlled by two polar forces know as yin and yang. The opposing force of yin and yang is what makes up the constantly moving but solid reality.26 In fact, the iconic yin and yang symbol often associated with Taoism was first seen in the I-Ching.27 The I-Ching stresses the organic nature of the universe and how it is a

23 Wang Chen, The Tao of War: The Martial 'Tao Te Ching' Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2003, Pg. 172 24 William H. Mott, and Jae Chang Kim. The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture Shih vs. Li. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 8. 25 Taode Jing: 19. 26 There are sixty four lines found within the I-Ching text. The yang lines are solid while the broken lines are considered yin. 27 Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching; Or, Book of Changes. [3d ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967. Lei12

force that seeks to be understood yet cannot be immediately done.28 It refers to the science of mastering change, one of the basic facts of life. The Tao Te Ching, the major work of Taoism, also explains such a fact. The book says that the Tao is able to “endure” being “trodden” and be “unchanging.” If the Tao can be named, then it cannot be the Tao. The Tao is undefined according to the I-Ching and Taoism.29

Confucianism30 Confucianism can best be described as an ethical and philosophical system that has permeated Chinese society since its founding by the Chinese philosopher, Confucius (孔夫⼦), around the late Autumn and Spring Period.31 His teachings are consolidated in The Analects (论语), the most sacred Confucian thought based literature, by Confucius’ disciples following his death. Confucianism is known for its emphasis on nonviolence, benevolence, responsibilities, and sometimes, sacrifices, to preserve societal order and harmony.32 Confucianism, while not an organized religion, is often grouped with dominant religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. It can be thought of as an all-encompassing way of living, or a philosophy that can be worshipped as a religion. In East Asia, regardless of whether someone is a Daoist, Buddhist, Muslim, or Christian, people can still define themselves as Confucians.33 Unlike many other beliefs, the spread of Confucianism in East Asia was more voluntary than forced by

28 Josh Fleet, "The I Ching: A Biography (EXCERPT)," The Huffington Post, Accessed March 31, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/09/the-i-ching-a-biography-excerpt_n_1387911.html. 29R.L. Wing, The Tao of Power: A Translation of the TaoDe Ching by Lao Zi. New York: Broadway Books, 2001. 30 A note on connecting Chinese philosophical influences and modern warfare: When studying Chinese philosophies and how it applied to the Chinese modern warfare, the ideas must be viewed upon as principles rather than rules. These philosophies after all, developed over a thousand years ago in a time where much of the technology and economic interdependence today was unthinkable. 31 Other reports state that Confucius was alive during the beginning of the Warring States Period (475- 221 BCE). 32 Roger T. Ames, Sun-tzu: The Art of Warfare (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), 85. 33 Tu Weiming, "Confucianism," Encyclopedia Britannica Online. January 1, 2014. Accessed November 10, 2014. Lei13

conquest. China, Japan, Vietnam, and Korea in particular were heavily influenced by regimes with Confucian traditions (See Figure 3).34 Japan in the early 20th century is the best example of a modern Confucian state. It used Confucius’ ideas of familial piety to promote the emperor as the “father of the state.”35 On the other hand, because of Confucianism’s wide span of influence and thousand year long history, it has also transformed and adapted to geographic locations extensively. For example, the emergence of Neo-Confucianism and New Confucianism both rejected certain qualities of Confucius while adding on new ones to support the ideological movement.36 Nevertheless its philosophy has influenced East Asian society for the past 2,000 years and serves as a source of inspiration for human, societal, and governmental interactions.37

34 Ibid. 35 Jeffrey Richey, "Confucianism," Patheos, Accessed November 25, 2014. http://www.patheos.com/Library/Confucianism/Historical-Development/Exploration-Conquest-Empire- (incl-violence-persecution)?offset=1&max=1. 36 For the purposes of this essay I will only be looking at Confucianism as defined by The Analects and not the varying forms that emerged throughout the centuries. 37 Ibid. Lei14

Figure 3: Early Confucianism, 200 BC38

Today, The Analects is consistently cited in modern day speeches, especially by China’s current President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping.39 However, Confucianism, while revered and widely quoted, even serving as the fundamental school of thought for the Han dynasty, has not always held the prestige that it sees today. In fact, Confucianism was only revived again in the past two decades. Under Mao, Confucianism was consistently under attack for hindering the modernization of China.40 Mao believed Confucian ideology was hindering China’s growth. On the other hand, a thousand year long influence over Chinese thought and

38 "Confucianism." GO.HRW.COM. Accessed November 25, 2014. http://go.hrw.com/hrw.nd/gohrw_rls1/pKeywordResults?ST9 Confucianism. 39 "习得修身篇," (Xi’s Idioms) People’s Daily, May 8, 2014, Accessed November 10, 2014. [Translated by Belinda Lei] China’s People’s Daily published a full page article analyzing every single Confucius reference that President Xi Jinping had used since he came into power as China’s leader. 40 "Sun Tzu and the Art of Soft Power," The Economist, December 17, 2011. Accessed November 8, 2014. Lei15

societal culture cannot simply be erased by one leader. Confucianism is inextricably tied to China’s history and identity. As a result, the current Communist Party must outwardly reject Confucianism as a school of thought to respect their founder’s legitimacy, yet must also acknowledge that Confucianism is a useful way to relate and manipulate Chinese and international society.

Confucian Thought Confucius’ main tenets can be broken up into the concepts of li, the rituals within a society, ren, the goodness of the human spirit, and de, the moral force of a person. Li, ren, and de all group together to fit in to the ultimate concept of rendao, the way of humanity that becomes aligned with Heaven. In The Analects, a collection of Confucian sayings and ideas compiled by his students,41 Confucius is quoted stating: “The man of high ideals, the humane person, never tries to go on living if it is harmful to humaneness. There are times when he sacrifices his life to preserve humaneness.”42 “Humaneness,” or ren, refers to the human experience of altruism. In other words, people should treat each other with compassion and love. Ren implies embracing humility and is also essential to maintaining the paradigm of the extended family. Each person has a societal role to play within the context of the family. Consequently, the family unit serves as the basic fabric of society. Li is what serves as the vehicle, through customs and rituals, for ren. Li focuses on the societal aspects of benevolent conduct while ren expresses the moral and spiritual aspects of behavioral conduct. De, or virtue, is simply the amount of moral spirit a person has to create benevolence in the world.

41 Four Associates (sipei) arose under the careful guidance of Confucius duing the Warring States Period: Yan Hui (Yan Yuan 511-480 BCE), Zenzi (Zeng Shen 505-435 BCE), Zisi (Kong Ji 402 BCE), and Meng Zi (Meng Ke, 372-289 BCE). These four associates came to define the development and influence of Confucianism for the next thousand years. Xinzhong Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 71. 42 Ibid, 15:3. Lei16

Additionally, in another Confucian work, The Doctrine of the Mean, the Confucian idea of a “Mean” is stressed. The Mean is the core balance between Yin (negative, or feminine energy) and Yang (positive or masculine energy).43 The right path to follow is always the middle path between the two extremes. When applied to warfare, from an offensive perspective, soft power falls between hard power and inaction. It progresses China’s interests without resorting to physical violence— something that benevolent Confucian thought avoids. When the Mean is achieved, harmony and equilibrium are able to coexist.

Confucianism and The I-Ching According to Richard Wilhelm, a missionary in the early 1900s that lived in China for 25 years, Confucianism has “common roots” in the I-Ching.44 In particular, The Analects probably embodies fragments antedating Confucius and were “treated in commentary by [Confucius] and his school.”45 Confucius had his disciples study the I-Ching and make judgments about the different hexagrams representing aspects of life. Furthermore, the Confucian school’s main elements of the Universe, Heaven, Earth, and Man is reflected in the hexagrams of the I-Ching. While Lao-Tzu based his Taoist teachings around the Tao of Heaven and Earth, Confucian’s chose to focus on the Tao of Man.46

Confucianism and China’s Strategic Culture Confucianism is based upon a humanistic outlook of the world. Confucian said that if people were to return back to traditional values, values that stress family and righteousness, order would be restored. As a result, many people also believe even with China’s rise, Confucian culture will promote a grand strategy focused on

43 Confucius, The Doctrine of the Mean. 44 Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching; Or, Book of Changes. [3d ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967. 45 Wilhelm, 260. 46 Cheng, Man, and Mark Henessy. Cheng Man-chʻing: A Simplified Explanation of Man and His Culture. Berkeley, Calif.: Frog, 1995., p 137 Lei17

peace and harmony.47 The Great Wall of China is meant to illustrate China’s strategic culture: it functions as a defensive weapon against invaders rather than an offensive weapon. It is pacifist, anti-military, and defensive, just like Confucianism. However, while there are pacifist-related sayings within Confucianism, that does not mean Confucianism as a whole is pacifist. There are pacifist tendencies to Confucianism, but in a scenario that is deemed appropriate, Confucian tenets can bolster aggressive military tactics. When Confucianism and politics are combined, as in the Three Warfares, Confucianism justifies much of China’s expansionist and influential policies.

Confucianism and Soft Power Confucian scholars believe the only way to establish a Chinese world is through an outward radiation of Chinese cultural influence—separating itself from other Chinese philosophical figures.48 Confucian thought implies that cultural influence is greater than military influence, or, soft power is greater than hard power. Consequently, Confucianism has always been directly linked to China’s soft power strategies and hence, as will be mentioned later, China’s media and legal warfare strategies.

Guanxi and Yizhan Two centralizing Confucius ideas, guanxi and yizhan, can be seen in China’s soft power policies (See Figure 4). Guanxi, literally “relationship” in Chinese, is the concept of reciprocal relationships. It refers to the personal relationships between people and the social exchanges and obligations that people have towards one another. Guanxi emphasizes a balance of power amongst peers.49

47 Yuan Wang, Harmony and War Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011, xiii. Scholar Yuan Wang argues in his book that Confucian pacifism has led the country to be less aggressive. 48 Hsu Chuo-yun, “Applying Confucian Ethics to International Relations,” Journal of Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 5 (March/April, 1991), pp. 15-31. 49 Subrata Saha, China's Grand Strategy from Confucius to Contemporary, S.l.: Bibliogov, 2013, 2. Lei18

For instance, if someone wants to build good guanxi with a person, they would do a favor for that party with the understanding that the other party would reciprocate the favor. The greater number of favors, the greater number of guanxi accumulated. In the figure below, the differences between guanxi and normal business relationships is evident in the final circle.

Figure 4: Chinese Guanxi50

Guanxi is clearly about equality within a relationship. In modern Chinese society, someone with good guanxi will have a good social status. In a wider context,

50 Geddie, M.W., DeFranco, A.L. & Geddie, M.F. (2002). From Guanxi to customer relationship marketing: how the constructs of Guanxi can strengthen CRM in the hospitality industry. Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Marketing, pp. 19. Lei19

a society based upon guanxi will lead to stabilized bilateral relationships and multilateral organizations. It is instrumental in influencing the creation of the

“harmonious society” (和谐社会) concept under former Chinese President Hu Jintao51

The second concept, yizhan, refers to the idea of righteous warfare. In other words, it is China’s idea of active defense. Yizhan is the justification of war by the oppressed against the oppressor. For example, yizhan can be applied to China’s aggression towards Japan in the East China Sea. Its deep emphasis on Japan’s World War II crimes, from the Nanjing Massacre to Japan’s attempts to erase the incident from its textbooks,52 has created justification for increasing Chinese aggression in the East China Sea. In addition, the U.S. is becoming vulnerable to China’s yizhan philosophy. In 2008, China released a White Paper stating that the US, by selling arms to Taiwan, is creating national security issues for China.53 The U.S. , by indirectly harming China’s national security, stages itself as a potential Chinese enemy. Therefore, under the logic of yizhan, China would have the prerogative to create a hostile environment for the US in an effort to defend itself.

Confucianism and Politics Confucius believed that all successful governments must have a self- disciplined leader to rule society in a loving manner. Politics are simply a mechanism for moral persuasion. Confucius doctrine highlights that “people are the foundation of the country.” 54 People are fundamental to politics and power. Monarchs have an obligation to protect their people.55 In addition, all monarchs should have de, or virtue. The more de that a leader has, the more respect he will

51Ibid, 3. 52 Yinan He, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,” 6-7. 53 Subrata Saha, China's Grand Strategy from Confucius to Contemporary, 3. 54 Weiming, Tu. "Confucianism." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. January 1, 2014. Accessed November 10, 2014. 55 "On the "People First" Diplomacy in China." In Participation and Interaction the Theory and Practice of China's Diplomacy, edited by Jinjun Zhao, by Canrong Jin and Shiqiang Liu. Singapore: World Scientific Pub., 2012. Lei20

gain. As a result, de allows the monarch to refrain from using force while maintaining state order.56 Confucius stressed that sovereignty is indivisible.57 In order to have a stable government, a ruler’s power cannot be challenged. He proclaims:

“When good government prevails in the empire, ceremonies, music, and punitive military expeditions proceed from the emperor. When bad government prevails in the empire, ceremonies, music, and punitive military expeditions proceed from the princes.” 58

Specifically, in a “good government” the emperor conducts and executes all the decisions, both military and societal. In a “bad government,” power stems from the princes who divide the power amongst themselves and the emperor; there is no central figure. If power was diversified amongst state officials, chaos would fall upon society. Therefore, there should be political monism. Political power needs to be centralized under the monarch. Applied on an international level, China believes becoming a global leader is a form of good governance, highlighting its Sino- centrism.59 China’s Confucian view of Sino-centrism can be highlighted in its tendencies to hack American news sources and search specifically for hot topic issues that may damage the Chinese image. Christopher Ford of the Hudson Institutes says China has “a sort of conceptual imperialism, at least in aspiration, suggesting that it is a Chinese strategic objective to control the world’s discourse about China.”60 China

56 Confucius, The Analects, 2:1. 57 Confucius experienced a lot of political instability in his region and most political conflicts stemmed from state administrators holding too much power. 58 Ibid, 16:2. 59 Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-making: Confucianism, Leadership and War, (London: Routledge, 2007), 19. 60 Max Fisher, "New Sinocentrism: The Ideology That May Be Driving China to Hack Foreign Media," Washington Post, February 1, 2013. Accessed April 5, 2015. Lei21

feels justified to use media warfare against negative statements about Chinese leaders. Asia is connected to China and as a result, everything related to Asia must be monitored. Lastly, the idea of the Mean can also be applied to world order. China believes that power is skewed too much towards the West.61 Based upon the Mean, power must be rebalanced to reach equilibrium. A “new world” must be built based upon the principles of the Mean and in order to establish a “new world,” it involves challenging the existing one.62 As a result, China has to challenge the U.S., the existing dominant power. If China withdraws from establishing this new world order, it would “depart from the Mean and turn itself into a polar power, which would cause confrontation between the dominant power [the U.S. ] and itself, the rising power.”63 Thus, Confucian political thought, while stressing benevolence and virtue, also justifies why there should be more aggressive approaches towards the West. China, by increasing its power and decreasing the West’s, will be creating the harmonious world order that the Confucius Mean stresses.

Sun Tzu and The Art of War The appearance of Sun Tzu, formally named Sun Wu, and his famous work, The Art of War, or bingfa, appeared during the middle of China’s Warring States Period (403-221 B.C). Sun-Tzu is regarded as the first Chinese military strategist in Chinese history.64 He outlines a practical approach towards warfare in The Art of War. His book emphasizes a need to take an objective approach towards all matters

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/02/01/new-sinocentrism-the-ideology- that-may-be-driving-china-to-hack-foreign-media/. 61 Ibid. 62 Mingjiang Li, Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009, 92-94. 63 Mingjiang Li, Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009, 95. 64 Jiefu Xiao, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy: Main Currents of Thought from Myth to Mao. San Francisco: Foreign Language Press, 2012, 36. Lei22

of war. However, the exact time and publication of The Art of War is still widely debated by historians, with some even claiming that Sun Tzu did not exist at all. Instead, skeptics believe that The Art of War is a compilation of generations of Chinese military strategy.65 Regardless of the skepticism, like Confucianism, Sun Tzu’s ideas and copies of his book have spread across all of China and into the neighboring countries of Korea and Japan. It reached the West in the 18th century, where it is believed that Napoleon was the first Western leader to employ Sun Tzu’s tactics.66 According to The Art of War, war is beyond simply using brute force; rather, war is achieved by producing submission.67 The most important element of The Art of War is that by heavily emphasizing strategy, it can allow a disadvantaged army in terms of size and resources to gain victory over a formidable opponent. Specifically, the Art of War is governed by five factors (See Figure 5 below): Moral law, Heaven, Earth, the Commander, and Method and Discipline.68

65 "The Art of War." History.com. January 1, 2010. Accessed November 24, 2014. http://www.history.com/topics/the-art-of-war. 66 Ibid. 67 David Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 16. 68 Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” Chapter 1: Laying Plans. Lei23

Figure 5: The Five Factors of the Art of War69

These five factors can determine whether or not someone will win a war. Neglecting any one of the five factors may hand a serious advantage to the enemy. All factors, such as time, space, leadership, and control must be considered during war. In the picture above, the five-element diamond represents the five factors of war. The four central elements surrounding the diamonds represent the four directions that need to be considered during war. The elements “fuse the current external conditions with current set internal capabilities, providing a static of a position at a given point of time.”70 Warfare is comprised of multiple disciplines.

69 Source: "Sun Tzu's Diagrams." The Science Of Strategy from Sun Tzus The Art of War. Accessed November 25, 2014. http://scienceofstrategy.org/main/content/sun-tzus-diagrams.

70 "Sun Tzu's Diagrams." The Science Of Strategy from Sun Tzus The Art of War. Accessed November 25, 2014. http://scienceofstrategy.org/main/content/sun-tzus-diagrams. Lei24

Sun Tzu and “The Tao of Power” Before discussing Sun-Tzu’s philosophy and influence further, it is necessary to mention the important philosophical influences on the development of “The Art of War,” the Tao Te Ching and the I-Ching. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War has many dualistic qualities that can be found in the Tao Te Ching. One of the Tao Te Ching’s most apparent influential concepts over Sun Tzu is the idea of wu wei. Wu wei, meaning non-action, is one of the core concepts that creates harmony to achieve the Way. Wu wei advocates for flexibility and finding order within disorder. In simpler terms, it embodies a “go with the flow” type of thought process. Sun Tzu writes, “simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.”71 Like wu wei, it is necessary to adopt flexible tactics depending on each situation. Another similarity found between the Tao Te Ching and Sun-Tzu is one of Sun Tzu’s most famous and strategic quotes, “Those who win every battle are not very skillful— those who render an army completely helpless without fighting are best of all.”72 Winning without fighting is true victory. Based upon following the Tao, Sun-Tzu only believed in the use of force when it was necessary. Several of the Tao Te Ching’s concepts, such as creating dynamic and complementary interactions, resonate closely with Sun Tzu’s characterization of turning the unorthodox into the orthodox and the orthodox into the unorthodox.73 For instance, similar to how yin and yang are opposing forces that make up reality in Taoism and the I-Ching, war must be achieved through balance and proportionality; if you want to use total force in war, then the entire society must be involved. Tao to Sun-Tzu, could be an instrument of war: understanding the Tao of the enemy will lead to understanding their strategic thought. The military use of the Tao can be developed further by looking at Sun-Tzu’s central idea, deception. In the Tao

71 Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” Chapter 5: Energy. 72 Ibid, Chapter 3: Planning a Siege. 73 Ralph D. Sawyer, The Tao of Deception: This History of Unorthodox Warfare in China, New York: BasicBooks ;, 2007, 55. Lei25

Te Ching, this idea of war based upon deception is echoed: “Direct the military with surprise tactics.”74 Lao Tzu influenced Sun Tzu’s understanding of flexibility and deception in war.

Sun-Tzu and the I-Ching According to Thomas Cleary, a renowned East Asian expert, while The Art of War “includes the cultural within the martial; the I Ching includes the martial within the cultural.”75 Many linkages can be identified between The Art of War by Sun-Tzu and the I-Ching. When comparing the two works, the sixth and seventh hexagrams of the I-Ching need to be focused on in particular. They stand for “Contention” and “The Army” respectively. Contention shows internal desire and outward strength (See Figure 8). In an abstract sense, it refers to the position that one is to take towards an argument. One may express contention when one is resisting oppression. However, there must be sincerity in the contention. The ancient Chinese philosopher Cheng Yi and well-known analyst of the I-Ching once said, “Without sincerity and truthfulness, contention is merely intrigue and leads to misfortune.”76 Contention has to be genuine. The general theme of “Contention” also mentions how “it is beneficial not to cross great rivers.” You have to be wary and take precautions rather than become reckless. You have to know your arena. In The Art of War, it says, “If you do not know others and do not know yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.”77 Without sincerity, there will be a lack of balance and a loss of pragmatism, which in the I-Ching, Confucianism, and The Art of War alike will lead to destruction. Consequently, in “Maneuvering Armies,” Sun-Tzu says, “To be violent at first and

74 R. L. Wing, The Tao of Power: A Translation of the TaoDe Ching by Lao Zi. New York: Broadway Books, 2001. 75 Cleary, Thomas. Translation of Mastering the Art of War by Zhuge Liang and Liu Ji. Boston: Shambhala, 1989, 15

76 Thomas F. Cleary, The Art of War: Complete Texts and Commentaries, Boston: Shambhala, 2003, 195 77 Ibid, 22. Lei26

wind up fearing one’s people is the epitome of ineptitude.” In addition, in “Fire Attack”: “A government should not mobilize an army out of anger, leaders should not provoke war out of wrath. Act when it is beneficial, desist if it is not.” 78 Leaders should contain a contentious but pragmatic attitude during war in both the I-Ching and The Art of War.

Figure 6: Hexagram Six “Contention”, I-Ching79

The Sixth Hexagram, or “Sung” represents Contention or Conflict. It is formed by the trigrams Heaven over Earth.

The seventh “Army” hexagram represents the beginning of mobilization (See Figure 9). The I-Ching says, “The army is to go forth in an orderly manner. Otherwise, doing well turns out badly.”80 Structure and order needs to be created in order for a successful campaign to be constructed. In The Art of War, Chapter 9, “The Army on the March” details strategic implications for what leads to a successful army. Advice such as “soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory.”81 Structure and discipline is necessary to establish trust and peace between

78 Ibid, 18. 79 Wilhelm, Sung/Conflict, 6. 80 Cleary, 33. 81 Sun Tzu, Chapter 9: 43. Lei27

the civilian government, the army, and the people. In addition, Cheng Yi also explains how “The Army” hexagram expresses an element of humanism. “If it is employed in the best possible way, the army can accomplish works and make the world peaceful. It is for this reason that rulers entrust generals with important mandates time and again.82 Sun Tzu, in turn, mentions that the army “advances without seeking glory, retreats without avoiding blame, only protecting people, to the benefit of the governments as well, thus rendering valuable service to the nation (“Terrain”).83 84

Figure 7: Seventh Hexagram “The Army”, I-Ching85

The 7th “The Army” hexagram, otherwise known as Shih, is formed by the trigrams Earth over Water. It represents how without an army, a country is completely vulnerable.

82 Cleary, 37. 83 Cleary, 37. 84 It is necessary to not that much of this information found within Thomas Cleary’s Introduction in Translation of Mastering the Art of War by Zhuge Liang and Liu Ji is also found within his other books including The Art of War: Complete Texts and Commentaries. 85 Wilhelm, 139. Lei28

The Art of War and its Enduring Influence Concise, sophisticated, and practical, “The Art of War,” while written during ancient times, is still utilized by militaries, academics, and even businesses around the world.86 Written against the backdrop of a China divided into six or seven states in a struggle for supremacy, The Art of War, gives a systematic guide that advocates for unconventional war tactics and unpredictability.87 The Art of War is broken into thirteen essays ranging from “Laying Plans” to “Offensive Strategy” that details universal principles of war. Each essay has contributed to modern warfare, not just Chinese warfare, in some shape, way, or form. For instance, one U.S. Army publication even begins with Sun Tzu’s quote, “attack the enemy where he is most unprepared, and act when you are not expected.”88 Sun Tzu’s ideas extend beyond its Chinese origins. Modern strategies have also been completely modeled after Sun Tzu’s tactics. For instance, Sun Tzu’s “Offensive Strategy” essay was the inspiration for a Stanford think tank titled, “The Nuclear Strategy of Sun Tzu.”89 Additionally, during World War II, the Soviet Union actively translated The Art of War from Chinese to Russian and listed it as an important military science course. In the 1950s, Marshal Liu Bocheng, the then President of the Chinese Military Academy summarized the essence of the book in the following way:

1. Strategic Considerations 2. Posture of Army 3. Extraordinary and normal forces

86The Art of War has recently seen a resurgence in popularity with books from “The Art of War for Managers,” to media references by socialite Paris Hilton. See Bogner, Elizabeth. "THE ART OF WAR - Sun Tzu." Business Insider. May 17, 2011. Accessed November 23, 2014. http://www.businessinsider.com/the- art-of-war-sun-tzu-2011-5. 87 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Sunzi", accessed November 23, 2014,http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/573664/Sunzi. 88 Hanzhang Tao and Shibing Yuan, Sun Tzu's Art of War the Modern Chinese Interpretation. New York: Sterling Innovation, 2007, 13. 89 Ibid, 13. Lei29

4. Void and actuality 5. Initiative and flexibility in employing troops 6. Use of spies 90

Liu Bocheng’s interpretation of Sun Tzu suggests that Sun Tzu is considerably more focused on strategy and underhanded techniques than the amount of resources someone would have. Using resources to its maximum potential is more important than the resources themselves. Each essay in the The Art of War has enjoyed a long history of recognition because of the adaptability and pragmatic qualities of Sun Tzu’s essays. The strategies’ versatility is able to complement the constantly changing faces of warfare. Today, The Art of War techniques continue to be acknowledged as powerful enough to transform a war, increase wisdom, and influence society as a whole.

Sun Tzu vs. Confucius Sun Tzu’s views towards operations of warfare, strategies, and tactics of fighting are very similar to Western military strategy, particularly that of Clausewitz. Clausewitz emphasized creating a “fog of war” that involved employing different deceptive tactics to wither away the enemy. However, The Art of War still shares Confucian influences on a philosophical level.91

Confucian Influences on Sun-Tzu Because Confucius came before Sun-Tzu during the Warring States Period, Confucian teachings also had influence over Sun-Tzu. In particular three important Confucian ideals came to shape Sun-Tzu’s approach to warfare: Shih, Hsing, and Li.

90 Ibid, 17. 91 Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-making: Confucianism, Leadership and War, 22. Lei30

Shih means the “strategic configuration of power.”92 It is a critical and highly complex concept in the Art of War. 93 Shih and Tao are also interconnected. You can only have Shih if there is a strong Tao, or a right way for the people. In many ways, the idea of Shih is perhaps even more abstract than Tao. It refers to the essence of dynamic power that emerges from a combination of “men’s hearts, military weapons, and natural conditions.”94 It is meant to express a form of power and influence. In battle, shih strategy seeks to deceive the enemy by creating confusion. It is not direct and is not expected. In The Art of War, Sun-Tzu specifically points to this idea of shih in Chapter 5 on “Energy” where using shih is comparable to “rolling trees and rocks:

“One who uses shih sets people to battle as if rolling trees and rocks. As for the nature of trees and rocks—When still, they are at rest. When agitated, they move. When square, they stop. When round, they go. Thus the shih of one skilled at setting people to battles I like rolling round rocks from a mountain one thousand jen high.”95

Everything will naturally fall into place if you have strong shih, just like how round rocks can easily roll down a hill. In addition to shih there is also li. Similar to the Confucius li, li is the pragmatic rights and duties of citizens. For example, expected citizen behavior during ceremonies is considered li. In war, generals practice good li by administering fair rewards and punishments while keeping his army content and strong.96 The army in turn practices good li when they serve their generals with

92 Sawyer, 61. 93 After a variety of translations, analysis, theorizations of circumstances, force and strength, there is still no perfectly accurate way to describe Shih. Perhaps the most straightforward way to think about Shih is simply as an advantage. Sawyer, 60. 94 Mott, William H., and Jae Chang Kim. The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture Shih vs. Li. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 11. 95 Sun Tzu, V. 96 Griffith, 64. Lei31

loyalty and courage. Li is useful when targeting the enemy because it helps to determine the different motives and aspirations of the opposing side to help accurately create an offensive and defensive strategy. Lastly, the Confucian element of Hsing in The Art of War represents the execution and recruitment of armed forces. With the appropriate conditions such as weaponry, troops, and natural conditions, Shih can be obtained through Hsing.97 98 The combination of Li, Hsing, and Shih, all contribute to Sun Tzu’s Taoist-Confucian war strategy and culture.

Sun-Tzu vs. Confucius Similarities A conspicuous similarity between Sun Tzu and Confucius is the definition, or lack thereof, of what constitutes war. While there is no clear definition of what constitutes war between Sun Tzu and Confucius, there is a clear belief in engaging only in just war. To Confucius and Sun Tzu, just war would be considered in three different scenarios: 1) War carried out by central authorities for offenses by smaller government officials 2) Revolutionary war where the central government was no longer able to serve the people 3) War between two rulers.99 100 Confucians have quoted from Mencius on the second revolutionary war: “He who outrages the benevolence proper to his nature is called a robber; he who outrages righteousness is called a ruffian. The robber and ruffian we call a mere fellow. I have heard of the

97 Hsing and Shih are often confused with one another. It is necessary to note that the main difference here is the fact that Hsing only includes the tangible factors in war like weapons. Shih however, can include the intangible such as psychology and logistics. 98 William H. Mott and Jae Chang Kim, The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture Shih vs. Li. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 11. 99 Chen Tien, 32. 100 Besides the three reasons for just war, almost all ancient Chinese philosophies tended to believe that greed is what causes war and conflict. For instance, in the Tao de Jing, it says, “When the world has the Way, running horses are retired to till the fields. When the world lacks the Way, War-horses are bred in the countryside. No crime is greater than approving of greed, no calamity is greater than discontent, no fault is greater than possessiveness. As a result, to avoid war, it is necessary to gain control over human greed. Thomas Cleary, Translation of Mastering the Art of War by Zhuge Liang and Liu Ji. Boston: Shambhala, 1989, 3-4. Lei32

cutting off of the fellow Zhou, but I have not heard of putting a sovereign to death.”101 This quote justifies executing tyrants, which follows the second reasoning for engaging in warfare. Secondly, Sun-Tzu and Confucius both believed war should only be fought in a last resort scenario. Sun Tzu highlights that winning one hundred battles is not the acme of skill, rather “to subdue the enemy without fighting” is truly what separates success from failure.102 Furthermore, he says one should take an entire country “whole and intact” rather than destroying it.103 Confucianism in turn is vigilant about “fasting, war, and illness.”104 Confucianism stresses moral integrity and righteousness. Both Confucius and Sun Tzu believed that war should be avoided. Additionally, both Sun Tzu and Confucius emphasize the Way, or Tao, and Heaven, or Tian. Confucius believed that the Way was a formula of executing something that can be perfected as an art. Heaven referred to the supreme deity.105 Under Confucius, following the Way of Man is of the utmost importance while following the Way of Heaven is secondary: “It is Man who is capable of broadening the Way. It is not the Way that is capable of broadening Man.”106 The Way of Heaven is essential for moral order amongst society, but it is up to Man to realize this order. Sun Tzu likewise believed that the Way of Heaven were essential to understanding the world and society. He notes that amongst the five constant factors of war, Heaven and the Way are critical for determining the environment of war.107 However, it is important to note that Sun Tzu and Confucius also had different interpretations of Heaven. While Confucius saw Heaven as a moral order, Sun Tzu took it as a literal sense, the determination of time and seasons. As a result, Heaven and the Way are both important to Sun Tzu and Confucius, but Heaven is

101 Ibid. 102 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B., Griffith (London: Oxford University Press), 1971, Chapter IX: the Nine Situations. 103 Chen Tien, 32. 104 Confucius, The Analects, 7:13. 105 Confucius, The Analects, 2:5. 106 Ibid., 15:29. 107 Sun Tzu, Chapter I: Laying Plans Lei33

more literal under Sun Tzu’s definition. (See Figure 6 below for comparison diagram).

Figure 8: Sun-Tzu vs. Confucius

Similarities: War should be the last resort; Dao and Tian; Humanism emphasis, Fighting a Just War

Confucianism Sun Tzu • Benevolence • Deception • ren- Humaneness • War is fought to preserve resources • War is fought to preserve life and • Legalism influence- humaneness pessimistic view towards human nature • has had ups and downs in society • Embraced by the all of society

Sun-Tzu vs Confucius Differences Beyond the underlying avoidance of war and understanding of the Way and Heaven, Confucianism and Sun Tzu differ from one another quite differently. The first difference between Sun Tzu and Confucius is that Confucianism is more pacifist while Sun Tzu is more of a pragmatic realist towards war. Sun Tzu leaned more towards the competing school of thought against Confucian values—Legalism. Legalism has a pessimistic view towards human nature: all humans are inherently evil and need a strict set of rules to keep society in order108 Confucianism on the other hand, emphasizes ren, or humaneness, in society. Sun Tzu is far more willing to apply coercion against a foreign power when compared to Confucius.

108 Shu Guang Zhang, “China: Traditional and Revolutionary Heritage,” in Strategic Cultures in the Asia- Pacific Region, eds. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1999), 30. Lei34

Secondly, even though both thinkers believed that war should be avoided, they had different motives for avoiding war. Sun Tzu avoided war because he thought that it was necessary to preserve resources: “your aim is to take All-under- Heaven intact. Thus your troops are not worn out and your gains will be complete.” Preservation of resources is key to winning a war. Confucius on the other hand, avoided war because it was not benevolent. Confucius is quoted saying, “to send the common people to war untrained is to throw them away.”109 War was more sacrificial rather than effective from a Confucian perspective. Another obvious difference between Confucius and Sun Tzu is the concept of deception. Sun Tzu’s war strategy of “all warfare is based upon deception” advocated for deceit and exploiting vulnerabilities. Deception is one of the key factors that must be wielded to wage a successful war campaign. On the other hand, Confucius greatly disliked deceit. In The Analects he notes the classic saying, “Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire.”110 He believed that trickery and deceit were not useful to society. Instead, he believed benevolence and trust in one another is necessary to free society from ill will. The third difference between Confucius and Sun Tzu is not related to their philosophies, but their varying levels of acceptance by Chinese society. Because Mao Zedong toted Sun Tzu as a great source of wisdom and applied Sun Tzu’s advice to his own war campaign, the Communist Party can fully embrace “The Art of War.”111 Unfortunately, Confucianism has yet to enjoy the same degree of prestige. Mao believed that Confucius’ philosophy was the “glue” for the feudal system that had held China back during the Qing dynasty.112 Consequently, when a 31 foot statue of Confucius was placed in the Tiananmen Square across from Mao’s giant portrait in 2011 by the National History Museum, it was immediately taken down three months

109 Confucius, The Analects, 13:30. 110 Confucius, The Analects, 12:2. 111 "Sun Tzu and the Art of Soft Power." The Economist. December 17, 2011. Accessed November 8, 2014. 112 Ibid. Lei35

later.113 However, despite the superficial rejection of Confucianism, it still cannot be denied that Confucius and Sun Tzu continues to significantly impact Chinese society—contributing to the development of Chinese modern warfare, The Three Warfares.

The Three Warfares (sanzhongzanfa) The development of the Three Warfares is the ultimate modern expression of Chinese asymmetrical warfare. The Three Warfares is “war by other means.”114 Some also refer to it as “political warfare.”115 116Broken into three parts - psychological, media, and legal warfare - each strategy has the ability to bolster the ability of the other, especially during a crisis (See Figure 10 below). In particular, each type of warfare is focused on a different level of attack: media and legal warfare are focused on influencing the public’s opinion while psychological warfare directly targets the enemy’s troops.117 Legal and media warfare can best be described as China’s pivot towards increasing soft power and manipulating the image of China internationally and domestically to suit its goals. Psychological warfare is used to complement this pivot towards greater power by decreasing the power of foreign barriers. China realizes the potential that soft power has as a way to expand influence and create a new international order.

113 Ibid. 114 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 11. 115 Stokes, Mark, and Russell Hsiao. "The People's Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics." Project 2049 Institute, 2013. http://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf 116 Behind the Three Warfares strategy is the PLA’s General Political Department Liaison Department (GPD/LD), which “functions as an interlocking directorate that operates at the nexus of politics, military operations, and intelligence.” 117 "舆论战、心理战、法律战三大战法加速战争胜利." Sina. March 8, 2008. Accessed October 5, 2014. Lei36

Figure 9: China’s Three Warfares Type of Warfare: Characteristics: 1) Psychological Warfare • Disrupt an opponent’s decision making capacity • Diminish the will to fight • Create doubt • Deceive the enemy 2) Legal Warfare • Enacting domestic law to make claims in international law • Manipulating maps 3) Media Warfare • Amplifying the effects of psychological and legal warfare through media channels • Targeting both domestic and international audiences

Psychological Warfare (心理 战 xinli zhan) Psychological Warfare aims to destroy an enemy’s will to resist by manipulating the enemy’s emotion, behavior, and confidence in war. It seeks to influence and disrupt an opponent’s decision making capabilities through false narratives, misinformation, and harassment. Specifically, psychological warfare targets critical nodes, or the guanjie of an establishment to create chaos.118 China’s economic tactics to restrict U.S. imports and pressure U.S. businesses in China are an example of psychological warfare.119 Economic sanctions form an environment that is not conducive to U.S. commercial interests overseas. From an offensive standpoint, when implemented correctly, psychological warfare can divide alliances without the enemy realizing that China is the mastermind behind the tension. Specifically, it should “sap the enemy’s morale, disintegrate their will to fight, ignite the anti-war sentiment among citizens at home, heighten international and domestic conflict, weaken and sway the will to fight among its high level decision makers, and in turn lessen their superiority in military strength.”120 From a defensive standpoint,

118 Halper, 349. 119 Halper, 12. 120 Larry M. Wortzel, The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Information Warfare. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014, 35-36. Lei37

psychological warfare is essential to hiding and protecting Chinese military and political motives. In other words, it is a battle of the “minds” against the enemy.121 Psychological warfare, out of the Three Warfares, has the strongest ties to classical Chinese thought--Sun Tzu’s idea of deception. Subsequently, psychological warfare is particularly hard to identify. The adversary is deceived until the end goal is achieved and even then the deceit may not be immediately evident. When used with legal and media warfare, it becomes very potent. For example, in April 2012 when the Philippines Navy sent a warship to investigate eight Chinese fishing boats in Scarborough Shoal, China responded by dispatching hundreds of ships to the area all while claiming that the Philippines had engaged in “radical behavior” through media outlets.122 Economic psychological warfare was also employed by banning the import of Philippine bananas, which China at the time accounted for 30 percent of Philippine banana exports.123 Employing media warfare and psychological warfare together in this scenario forced the Philippine government to resort to less aggressive policies towards China in respect to Scarborough Shool.

Legal Warfare 法律战 (faluzhan)

Legal warfare aims to achieve legal basis for conducting war or causing hostilities between nations. It creates favorable laws for war within the strategist country while creating unfavorable laws for its opponents. Legal warfare manipulates laws by creating new precedence within the framework of existing international laws.124 In other words, it uses different forms of legal violations to attack the enemy and decrease an enemy’s support on the international stage through both domestic and international legislation.125 For instance, forming stronger legal diplomatic ties, participating more adamantly in the United Nations,

121 "舆论战、心理战、法律战三大战法加速战争胜利." Sina. March 8, 2008. Accessed October 5, 2014. 122 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 99. 123 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 100. 124Walton, 9. 125 Ibid. Lei38

manipulating maps, and analyzing very specific areas of international law all contribute to China’s establishment of sovereignty through legal warfare. Peng and Yao describe legal warfare as a way to publicize one’s own humanitarianism while revealing the war crimes committed by the opponent in violation of international law; it compels the opponent to “bog down in isolation and passivity.”126 Many tactics of legal warfare in China can be attributed to China’s study of U.S. legal warfare tactics. In fact, China perceives the U.S. as one of the “leading practitioners” of legal warfare. The U.S. practiced its own form of legal warfare during the Gulf War. Without the support of the United Nations or NATO during the Second Gulf War, the U.S. was able to manipulate international law to give it justification to attack Iraq.127 The U.S. portrayed Iraq as perpetrator and itself as a victim. However, China also noted that while the U.S. was able to give itself domestic legal justification to attack Iraq in Operation Urgent Fury in 1983, the U.S. was not successful in generating enough international support for the war.128 It had failed to utilize international legal warfare to shape the legal discourse surrounding the U.S. invasion of Grenada. Without the support of the United Nations, the U.S. was abandoned by many of its allies. As a result, by learning from U.S. mistakes, the main focus of China’s legal warfare is gaining international support rather than just simply gaining domestic legal support.129 China is currently claiming control over the Senkaku Islands because of the “nine-dashed line” (See Figure 11 below). The nine dashed, U shaped line covers approximately 1 million square miles of the South China Sea and severely distorts international law.130 China has presented the international community with fake

126 Peng and Yao, Science of Military Strategy, p. 79 127 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 341. 128 Ibid , 348. 129 Another factor that may play into China’s heavier targeting of international law rather than simply domestic law is because of institutional differences between the U.S. and China. Military action does not require as lengthy of a bureaucratic process in China when compared to the U.S. 130 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 29. Lei39

maps and armored itself with specific UNCLOS and other international conventions to claim property rights over the Senkaku Islands. Figure 10: China’s Nine-Dash U-Shaped Line in the South China Sea131

It exploits the legal system to further the goals of the state. 132 By justifying its actions as legally valid and creating doubts in the broader international community over the legitimacy of Japan’s rights over the Senkaku Islands, it also diminishes Japan’s support and thus, also makes it more vulnerable to psychological warfare.

131 OSD. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011 (Washington, DC: OSD, 2011), 16. 132 Dean Cheng, "Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Public Opinion Warfare and the Need for a Robust American Response." The Heritage Foundation. November 26, 2012. Accessed November 22, 2014. Lei40

The Chinese realize that the world is becoming a “smarter planet”; the planet represents a new battlefield for mining intelligence.133 Future battles are transparent and exposed for the world to see due to technological advancements and new data mining techniques. As a result, legal warfare not only creates the positive image of information “transparency” but is also useful for creating alliances and receiving international support.

Media Warfare, yulunzhan, 舆论战

“Before the troops and horses move, public opinion is already underway (bingma weidong, yulun xianxiang)” -The People’s Liberation Army

Media warfare is a more complex form of propaganda.134 Media warfare is made for gaining xinwenquan (media power), xinxiquan (confidence power), in order to have xinliquan (“heart” power) over the people. Power over the news gives China power over people’s confidence and ultimately, their “hearts.” Media warfare is the usage of varying forms of media to transmit information to a targeted audience; the information can be transmitted to a domestic audience to increase nationalism, de-legitimize a foreign government through scathing reports, and, tied into legal warfare, generate support overseas. According to Chinese newspaper People’s Daily, China believes that the Western news media’s soft power is much stronger than the Western world’s hard power.135 China is attempting to shift this

133 王业明，“智慧地球”：让未来战场更“透明” （The Smart Planet”: Allows Future Battles to be more “Transparent”), PLA Daily, December 16th 2010. 134 Out of all of the Three Warfares, media warfare has had the most influence from U.S. propaganda strategy. In an effort to develop media warfare strategy, the PLA studied the Second Gulf War and the U.S. tactics to undermine Saddam Hussein through the promotion of the “Axis of Evil.” See Dean Cheng, "Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Public Opinion Warfare and the Need for a Robust American Response." 135 David Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 159. Lei41

stronghold of propaganda that the Western world has, from Hollywood to New York Times articles,136 to China’s media. Three important techniques are used to describe media warfare. Firstly, media should not be used randomly, rather with an idea of preemption--active defense is practiced through media channels to define the scope of an issue first.137 Secondly, in a defensive situation, a counter media attack must be prompt as to counterbalance a negative view immediately. Domestically, a counter approach may take the form of the censorship of negative materials. Internationally, news reports claiming victimization and slander are used. Lastly, and perhaps the most obvious, the most effective media warfare tactic is one that tailors itself to its audience.138 Media warfare must be flexible in the constantly changing world of news reports and employ a variety of propaganda activities to expand its networks.139 For instance, if the media wanted to manipulate the views of a younger audience, social media channels would be more preferable than newspapers. Media warfare requires creativity and utilizes all available assets. The largest “war” goal for state-controlled Chinese media is to raise public support and guide public opinion. China must use the media to “block, collapse, and counter the enemy’s media offensive.140 Currently, China has an “Internet Army” that has approximately 2 million Internet “public opinion analysts.”141 Every day these “public opinion analysts” sort through Chinese news websites, commercial corporations, and large foreign media channels to compile reports on China’s

136 The New York Times released a document in 2012 analyzing the Chinese prime minister’s hidden wealth. This report resulted in large sanctions on NY Times reporters by the Chinese government and was seen as an attack by Western media to instill unrest within China. 137 Dean Cheng, "Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Public Opinion Warfare and the Need for a Robust American Response." The Heritage Foundation. November 26, 2012. Accessed November 22, 2014. 138 Larry M. Wortzel, The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Information Warfare. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014. 139 Dean Cheng, "Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Public Opinion Warfare and the Need for a Robust American Response." 140 "舆论战、心理战、法律战三大战法加速战争胜利." Sina. March 8, 2008. Accessed October 5, 2014. 141 "China 'employs 2 Million to Police Internet' - CNN.com." CNN. Accessed April 3, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/07/world/asia/china-internet-monitors/. Lei42

internet activity. This large scale control serves to shape the opinions of the Chinese people. An example of Chinese media warfare is when the Chinese media promotes ideas such as “Chinese Military Buildup No Threat to the World,”142 “Peaceful Development”143 or “Harmonious Ocean.”144 By balancing more alarming words such as “military buildup” and “development” with more positive terms such as “peaceful” and “harmonious,” China seeks to appease foreign countries of any ill intentions, even if these ill intentions may exist. The Chinese describe such a practice as liang mian san dao, literally meaning two faces and three swords, which refers to disguising ulterior motives with an amicable image.

The Three Warfares Case Study: Anti Secession Law On March 8th, 2005, the National People’s Congress, one of the largest parliamentary bodies in the world, passed the Anti-Secession Law. It threatened to employ “non peaceful means” if Taiwan decided to split completely from China. It served three roles: 1) to warn Taiwan separatists from fully declaring sovereignty from China 2) strengthened and justified China’s view towards territorial sovereignty and 3) set a foundational legal base for future conflicts with Taiwan.145 China can now justify all of their hostile actions against a “separatist” Taiwan through legal means. The creation and utilization of the Anti-Secession Law can be divided into five different usages of China’s Three Warfares according to David Huang, a member of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council:

1. Setting agenda and repeating messages—media warfare 2. Creating pressures on the government—psychological warfare 3. Undermining the government’s public authority—legal warfare

142 Defense Minister Liang Guanglie’s statement in November 12th 143 China’s National Defense Slogan 144 The theme of the PLA Navy’s multinational naval event in 2009 145 Timothy A. Walton, "China's Three Warfares." Delex. January 12, 2012. Accessed October 5, 2014. http://www.delex.com/data/files/Three Warfares.pdf, 10. Lei43

4. Generating the “chilling effect” by rewarding cooperating members— psychological warfare 5. Denying Taiwan’s sovereign status by isolating it—legal warfare146

By effectively utilizing the Three Warfares, China is able to achieve combined effects Additionally, because the Three Warfares are subtle, Taiwan cannot claim that China is attacking it. Taiwan can only condemn China for threatening Taiwan. China is using this slow but effective approach to realize their goal of reunification with Taiwan.

The Three Warfares Case Study: Taiwan Re-unification The Three Warfares strategy has been adeptly and quietly used for the purpose of re-unifying Taiwan with China. Michael Cole, a former analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence, claims that the prominent China Energy Committee (CEFC, 中华能源基⾦委员会), a Hong Kong registered nongovernmental organization that advertises itself as a think tank is actively engaged in political warfare against Taiwan.147 In particular, he stresses the involvement of Xu Jialu 许嘉 璐, President of Nishan Forum, who is associated with multiple “cultural promotion institutes,” including the notorious Confucius Institutes, is claimed to be the orchestrator behind China’s political warfare strategy.148 Through actions such as hosting cultural events that can further China’s propaganda agenda and gaining financial resources to shape the discourse about China in Taiwan, the ongoing political warfare is especially dangerous because it is very hard to be identified. The different layers and titles of bureaucratic functions that are protecting the CEFC is allowing it to maneuver in the political arena and actively undermine Taiwan’s

146 Ibid. 147 Cole, Michael. "Unstoppable: China's Secret Plan to Subvert Taiwan." The National Interest. Accessed April 3, 2015. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/unstoppable-chinas-secret-plan-subvert-taiwan- 12463?page=2. 148 Ibid. Lei44

government. Of course, this strategy was not implemented overnight. The CEFC slowly amassed its power over the years. This long term strategy can be tied with the Confucian idea of patience where “a lack of patience in small matters leads to the disruption of great plans.”149

The Dangers of the Three Warfares The world is becoming more interconnected economically, politically, and culturally than ever before; China recognizes that a new arena for warfare has been created.150 The Three Warfares skillfully utilizes soft power and deception in a three-dimensional format to attack its enemies. Because of the fluidity and passive aggressive nature of the Three Warfares, it presents a risk to U.S. interests abroad. The United States is one of the four key audiences targeted by the Three Warfares.151 While China’s exact motives are unclear (a result of the “formlessness” advocated by Sun Tzu), it is evident that China is using Three Warfare tactics to prevent the U.S. from entering the Western Pacific in three ways: 1) countering U.S. naval presence 2) countering US surveillance operations and 3) targeting US allies in the South China Sea.152 Along with media channels stating that the United States has declined in power, China will be able to expand its sovereignty while diminishing U.S. legitimacy.153 Additionally, coupled with the U.S.’ meager information about the Three Warfares, the strength of the scheming Three Warfare tactics are amplified.

149 The Analects, 15:27. 150 王业明，“智慧地球”：让未来战场更“透明” （The Smart Planet”: Allows Future Battles to be more “Transparent”), PLA Daily, December 16th 2010. 151 The other three include the South China Sea claims, domestic opinion, and the global public. 152 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 102. 153 While the US has never encountered the Three Warfares on such a large scale before, it is necessary to note that much of Chinese Three warfare strategies comes from studying US military operations. It can be particularly seen in Chinese news reports ("舆论战、心理战、法律战三大战法加速战争胜利." Sina. March 8, 2008. Accessed October 5, 2014. ) Therefore, the US knows how to enact the Three Warfares, but does not have the capacity to counterattack it. The lack of attention and research is perhaps most evident in the fact that new of the Three Warfares was first released in 2003, but no in depth analysis was given to it until 2012 by Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation. Lei45

The Three Warfares have the potential to significantly decrease U.S. influence in Asia and deters the United States’ “Asian Pivot.”154

Confucius and the Three Warfares Confucianism has subtly influenced the development of the Three Warfares and because of its functionality within Chinese culture, is able to support the effectiveness of the Three Warfares. Confucian influences on the Three Warfares may seem ironic on first look. After all, one of Confucius’ central philosophies emphasize ren, or humanity. War, with all its blood, sacrifice, and destruction, surely cannot be influenced by Confucianism; outwardly, they contradict one another. Yet, when applied to war by other means, such as China’s Three Warfares, the influence of Confucian thought becomes more transparent. Confucian ideas are based upon harmony and order within a society, with recognition from neighboring political bodies. China is seeking to establish a world order where China would become the manifestation of the Confucian state.155 Confucianism has a direct impact on China’s Sino-centric view of sovereignty, which influences how legal and media warfare are executed. The beginning of the Warring States period influenced the way Confucius defined a stable and successful state. Under Confucius, states cannot co-exist in sovereignty amongst one another.156 The Warring States period commenced a time where there were numerous kingdoms battling for rule over territory. Power was too divided. Confucius, realizing that power has to be centralized in order to build a stable government, developed the political ethic of “monism”.157 As the famous Ming Dynasty political figure Huang Tsung-hsi writes in The Records of the Ming Scholars,

154 The “Asian Pivot” is a phrase coined by Obama where the U.S. expands its influence militarily, economically, and socially in the Asian Pacific. 155 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 11. 156 Tsung-hsi Huang, The Records of the Ming Scholars, trans. Julie Ching (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 49. 157 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 14. Lei46

“Just as there can only be one father in the family in Confucianism, to whom all others owe profound filial piety, so can there only be one real sovereign in the world.” 158 Today, China’s adamant defense of absolute sovereignty against the West is arguably shaped by this idea of indivisible sovereignty.159 One recent example of China’s Sino-centric sovereignty is of maps printed in new Chinese passports depicting areas of “China” that are also claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, and India (See Figure 12 below). By placing this information on a document as important as a passport, China is underhandedly making other countries accept their influence every time a country stamps a new Chinese passport. It antagonizes all the nations in the South China Sea and also exposes China’s view of what it considers its territory. While the motives for China’s passport are unclear, the Chinese passport incident shows what China believes as their extension over territories. Furthermore, this “cartographic aggression” also represents the usage of legal warfare to cast doubt over ownership of areas.160

158 Ibid. 159 Mingjiang Li, Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics, (Lanham: Lexington Books), 2009, 254-255. 160 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 59-62. Lei47

Figure 11: South China Sea “Map”161

Legal and Media Warfare and Confucian Soft Power Legal and media warfare have the most immediate connections to Confucianism. The reasoning is because Confucianism strongly emphasizes soft power, something that legal and media warfare both promote. Xunzi, a Confucian scholar who was influential in the development of Chinese war strategy once said, “...if there is no soft power, there cannot be hard power. By making good use of the ‘Way,’ or resources and soft power available, a state that is only 100 li, or 50 km, is able to establish independent rule.162 Legal warfare and the Confucian idea of yizhan, or righteous warfare, share connections with one another. Legal warfare, by using international law, justifies how China as a victim is allowed to conduct yizhan against its enemy. Legal warfare is testimony to make sure that a country is conducting righteous warfare. Confucius’

161 “China seeks to Calm Anger Over Passports”. The Wall Street Journal. November 28, 2012. 162 William A. Callahan, China Orders the World: Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011.62. Lei48

Sino-centric view of sovereignty has also shaped how China views the rule of international law, and thus, how legal warfare should be conducted. Due to this rejection of the co-equality of sovereign nations in a legitimate international order, “there cannot be interstate relations that we conceive of them in the West.”163 The ideal ruler needs to have universal rule. Thus, China’s commitments to international law are skewed when compared to the Western outlook; China views international law as a weapon that can be wielded and manipulated while the West treats international law as a legitimate commitment to preserving the powers of equal governing authorities.164 Additionally, media warfare serves as a useful tool in realizing the Confucius goal of using culture to extend influence over the world, not just within the country’s borders. Subsequently, the Chinese have found that incorporating foreign journalists into America’s news channels are particularly effective in gaining international support.165 Since the 1990s, China has improved upon its foreign media warfare by using foreigners as a “bridge,” otherwise known as yiqiao weiqiao, to shape a positive public image.166 Overseas Chinese in particular are seen as important lobbyists to target foreign audiences. By stressing the importance of Chinese ancestry and a common Chinese identity, regardless of nationality, in the media, China is able to leverage this notion of a transnational culture. Overseas Chinese in turn are able to further Chinese interests in any geographical location.167 Examples of this transnational culture technique can be seen in conclaves of Chinese ethnic communities, university campuses, and Confucius Institutes.168

163 Christopher Ford, The Mind of Empire: China’s History and Modern Foreign Relations, 2010, 37. 164 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 48-49. 165 Ibid. 166 David Lampton. The Three Faces of Chinese Power, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 224. 167 California, Texas, and New York in particular have become popular destinations for Overseas Chinese with a strong transnational, Chinese identity. 168 Timothy A. Walton, "China's Three Warfares." Delex. January 12, 2012. Accessed October 5, 2014. http://www.delex.com/data/files/Three Warfares.pdf., 7. Lei49

In a recent media warfare tactic, China has been continuously labeling its rise as “peaceful.”169 China is emphasizing its Confucian value of aiming to creating a harmonious society in order to lessen the discomfort of its military modernization and rising military strength. However, in this implication of a harmonious rise that would complement Confucian philosophy, it also comes with the expectation of foreign military powers such as the U.S. to accommodate China’s rise in the Eastern hemisphere to establish Sino-centric sovereignty.170 In other words, the Confucian influence of creating Sino-centric sovereignty under the aim of “harmony” and “peace” is also allowing China to use a modern day passive aggressive excuse to continue militarization.

Confucius as a Media Warfare Weapon In addition to influencing the development of the Three Warfares, Confucius is also the leading figure in China’s soft power drive in the media and overseas. By promoting Confucius like “Father Christmas without the undignified jolliness”171 China is able to shape its portrayal overseas. Confucius, in his aura of benevolence and righteousness, represents China’s image and can be transmitted to the world through media warfare techniques. Recently, there has been a proliferation of Confucianism institutes around the world. Since 2004, over 300 of these language training institutes have been set up worldwide.172 The expansion of Confucius institutes initially were welcomed by multiple higher education institutions around the world such as the University of Chicago, U.C. Berkeley, the London School of Economics, etc.173 However, in the past

169 Larry M. Wortzel, The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Information Warfare. Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014, 45. 170 Ibid. 171 "Sun Tzu and the Art of Soft Power." The Economist. December 17, 2011. Accessed November 8, 2014. 172 Dean Cheng, "Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare." The Heritage Foundation. May 21, 2012. Accessed October 5, 2014. 173 On September 2015, the University of Chicago, one of the many academic institutions with a Confucius Institute, decided to shut their institute down after raised concerns about the growing Chinese influence over UChicago’s curriculum. Lei50

year, realizations of China’s national propaganda motives through the Confucius institutes has led to significant criticism and questioning. People are beginning to realize China’s ulterior motives of extending influence over higher education. Regardless, the Confucius Institutes have become the paradigm of China’s ambitious soft power efforts and stems from media warfare. Confucianism may be shunned upon in a political way, but as a historical artifact, it can easily become one of China’s valuable “exports.”174 Confucianism has become both an influential force over modern Chinese society and an influential tool to influence modern Chinese society. Its ideas of respect, and the preservation of societal relationships, and outwardly benevolent ideals is ideal for promoting nationalism on a domestic level and soft power on an international one.175 As previously mentioned,176 Confucianism believed a significant portion of Chinese expansion involves cultural influence. The best way to expand is through cultural rather than military means. In the Three Warfares scenario, Confucianism has become the way to govern through cultural means.

174 Pang Zhongying, “Kongzi sixiang de “chukou” he ruanshili de tisheng” (The “Beijing Consensus” and the increase of China’s softpower”. Dangdai shijie yu she-huizhuyi (Contemporary World and Socialism) 4 (2004), pp 10-14. 175 Subrata Saha, China's Grand Strategy from Confucius to Contemporary, 3-4. 176 See “Confucius and Soft Power” Lei51

Figure 12: China’s Three Warfares: Connections to Confucianism

Legal Warfare

Confucianism China's Three as a media Warfares: Sino-centric warfare Connecons to sovereignty weapon Confucianism

Media Warfare

Sun Tzu and the Three Warfares Sun Tzu’s strategic thought is glaringly prominent in modern Chinese warfare when compared to Confucius’ more hidden role. It is perhaps the only big name amongst Chinese thinkers that has seemed to survive the communist era without a scratch.177 Sun Tzu is cited twenty six times in Peng and Yao’s The Science of Military Strategy, a volume depicting the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s war tactics.178 They claim that Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” “marked the basic establishment of ancient China’s strategic theory.”179 In addition, Fumio Oto, former Vice Admiral of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense force writes:

177 "Sun Tzu and the Art of Soft Power." The Economist. December 17, 2011. Accessed November 8, 2014. 178 Peng and Yao, Science of Military Strategy 179 Ibid, 70. Lei52

“The PLA issued 100 examples each for psychological, media, and legal warfare. Psychological warfare examples cited Sun Tzu 30 times, media warfare examples cited him 6 times, and legal warfare examples cited him 3 times. The most cited phrase (from chapter 3) is “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill,” which appears 10 times. The next most repeated phrase (from chapter 1) is “All warfare is based on deception,” appearing half a dozen times.”

While later works, such as Art of War by Wu Zi and Sun Bin’s Art of War later helped to evolve Chinese war strategy, Sun-tzu’s military classic continued to be held in high regard. Indeed, all Chinese military personnel at the Nanjing PLA Army Command Academy are not only required to read The Art of War, but also expected to memorize it by heart.180 Mao Zedong may have shunned Confucianism, but he fully embraced Sun Tzu. Some of Mao Zedong’s most effective strategies, such as, “When an enemy advances, we will retreat,” “When an enemy stays, we will disturb them,” “When an enemy is tired, we will strike them,” and “When an enemy retreats, we will chase them” are very similar to Sun Tzu’s “When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you.”181 Mao Zedong adapted Sun Tzu’s war strategies to his own, resulting in a more effective battle and defeat over Chiang Kai Shek’s Republic of China.

180 Fumio Ota. "National Defense University Press." National Defense University Press. April 1, 2014. Accessed November 9, 2014. Former Vice Admiral Fumio Ota of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force went to the Nanjing PLA Army Command Academy. Upon referencing one of Sun Tzu’s tactics in conversation, he discovered all the Chinese military officials could recite The Art of War’s passages word for word. 181 Sun Tzu, Art of War, Chapter 1. Lei53

Sun Tzu’s Influence The amount of influence that Sun Tzu has had on the development of China’s Three Warfares is undeniable. The fundamental principles of the Three Warfares is based upon Sun Tzu’s strategies. Analyzing the Three Warfare’s emphasis on strategy and deception highlights this fact. One of Sun Tzu’s core concepts, “When he is united, divide him,” can be seen across all three warfares.182 Legal warfare aims to decrease the support the enemy has with its allies, divide the opinions of the public through media warfare, and instill insecurities within army units through psychological warfare. Secondly, in developing the Three Warfares, China has studied U.S. tactics extensively to understand and incorporate it into their own strategies. For example, Chinese military personnel have studied the best practices and failures of the U.S. in the Gulf War to develop legal and media warfare.183 The idea behind analyzing U.S. war tactics thoroughly can be seen in Sun Tzu’s idea to “know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”184 One has to fully explore the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. “Knowing the enemy” will allow someone to attack their weaknesses and learn from their strengths. “Knowing thyself” allows one to protect its weaknesses while utilizing all of its strengths. China, by viewing the U.S. as one of its main adversaries in establishing hegemony over the Pacific, has used this tactic to improve upon their own weaknesses and strengths to develop the Three Warfares. In addition, Sun Tzu strongly emphasizes how the best leader is the one who is able to win a war without arms: “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”185 The Three Warfares do not resort to any traditional means of “fighting.” Rather, it alters the strategic environment of a war zone to underline Chinese superiority. Sun Tzu acknowledges that war is beyond physical force. Brute

182 Ibid, Chapter 1: 25. 183 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 57. 184 Sun Tzu, Art of War, Chapter 3: 31. 185 Sun Tzu, Art of War, Chapter 3: 3. Lei54

force needs to be coupled with diplomacy, complete knowledge of the enemy, psychological pressure (psychological warfare), undermining the opponent’s support (media and legal warfare), and hiding one’s own psychological and societal weaknesses at the same time (media warfare counter-attack).186 Winning without fighting will not only preserve precious resources, but also heighten the scale of statecraft. Lastly, the idea of “all warfare is based on deception”187 is acknowledged as an underlying characteristic of China’s Three Warfares. In a 566 paged defense contractor report that was produced by the Pentagon’s think tank on future warfare, the Office of Net Assessment, Stefan Halper, the director of the study specifically warns: “Importantly, for US planners, [the Three Warfares] is highly deceptive.”188 The Three Warfare tactics are able to hide in plain sight. Legal, media, and psychological warfare are all very obvious when implemented, but the motive behind the tactics, whether enhancing propaganda or trying to manipulate international law, is extremely hard to define. They all achieve a level of “formlessness.” Although everyone can see the outward aspects of the Three Warfares, none understand the motives behind the Three Warfares.189 Because the Three Warfares also aligns itself with Sun Tzu’s concept of formlessness, it is extremely difficult to gauge the effects of The Three Warfares. The most essential and overarching concept of the Three Warfares is Sun Tzu’s deceptive and unconventional warfare strategy.

186 David Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 16. 187 Ibid, Chapter 1: 17. 188 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 11. 189 Sun Tzu, Chapter VI: 25. Lei55

Psychological Warfare and Deception Out of the Three Warfares, psychological warfare is the most deeply rooted in Sun Tzu’s philosophy (See Figure 14 below). Psychological warfare is established upon Sun Tzu’s “all warfare is based upon deception.”190 Winning a war is based upon gaining control of an enemy’s mind. The highest realization of warfare is to attack an enemy’s plans. The last priority of war is to attach the physical entities of the enemy.191 Victory relies upon mental impressions and correctly “grasping and evaluating the intentions, traits and thought patterns of the enemy decision makers as well as the metal condition of his troops.”192 Additionally, psychological warfare tactics such as faking inferiority and encouraging overconfidence, all while masking China’s own intentions, is able to deceive enemy alliances into believing that there is no need for joining forces.193 It effectively “disrupts alliances” and does not allow enemies to come together.194 Psychological warfare is compatible to and influenced by Sun Tzu’s ancient Chinese strategy.

190 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 88. 191 Derek M. C. Yuen, ‘Deciphering Sun Tzu’. Comparative Strategy. 27:2. 2008, 187 192 Ibid, 190. 193 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. University of Cambridge, 2013, 89.. 194 Sun Tzu, Art of War, Chapter 3:5. Lei56

Figure 13: China’s Three Warfares: Connections to Sun-Tzu

Psychological Warfare

China's Three Know the Warfares: enemy Connecons Deceit to Sun Tzu

War by other means

Moving Forward The threat of the Three Warfares is large and looming, but how should the U.S. counter such a big yet difficult to distinguish threat? The answer is for the U.S. to learn from the ideas of Sun Tzu as well as develop its own calculative strategy. The U.S. should counter with Sun Tzu’s strategy, “know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”195 The U.S. must understand how China prioritizes and views its position in the Asian hemisphere. Understanding China’s Confucius identity would be the first step to identifying China’s motives. China’s Sino-centric view and preference for soft power can all be linked to its Confucius history. And, as seen in the utilization of Confucianism as a

195 Ibid, Chapter 3: 31. Lei57

mask for ulterior motives, understanding how China relates to its Confucius history is necessary as well. The U.S. must attack the enemies’ strategy. The first of the five fundamental factors of Sun Tzu’s war strategy is moral influence. A successful state has to have an adequately benevolent ruler and the confidence of its people.196 Dissolving Chinese moral towards their leaders would lead to an unstable country and eventually, a decrease in its influence. In October of 2012 The New York Times disintegrated Chinese moral influence when it published a report of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabo family’s overseas assets.197 The news severely damaged the legitimacy of the Communist Party.198 While The New York Times published the article out of pursuing journalistic and transparency motives, the same method should be employed by the U.S. to pursue international interests. The U.S. should use the media to target China’s weaknesses. Understanding Chinese motives through its Confucian influences and how they utilize Sun Tzu’s strategies to operate are necessary to counter China’s Three Warfares.

Conclusion The brilliance of China’s Three Warfares lies in the fact that it is able to be conducted both during war and during peacetime. While China’s Three Warfares all reinforce one another, they can be split into two parts based upon ideological influences. Legal and media warfare, with its soft power tendencies and diplomatic manipulation can be tied to benevolent Confucian thought. Psychological warfare on the other hand, with its propensity to deceive and dissolve enemy morale has bonds to Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” strategies. The aversion of conflict and the deceptive

196 Ibid, Chapter 3: 3. 197 David Barboza, "Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader," The New York Times, October 25, 2012. Accessed November 25, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/business/global/family-of- wen-jiabao-holds-a-hidden-fortune-in-china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 198 Fumio Ota. "National Defense University Press." National Defense University Press. April 1, 2014. Accessed November 9, 2014. Lei58

nature of the Three Warfares all point to Confucius and Sun Tzu’s influences respectively. The Three Warfares are flexible, nuanced, and effective; it should not be overlooked by the U.S.. With China’s increasing power and aggressive actions in the Asia Pacific,199 the U.S. should explore different methods to counterattack the Three Warfares. If the U.S. truly wants to compete against China’s Three Warfare strategy, the U.S. needs to look beyond China’s actions, but its long term goals, strategies, and culture. The culture and strategies that China employs and embraces can become a double-edged sword to use against it. The only way to counter the Three Warfares is to thoroughly understand the main influences on its development—Confucius and Sun Tzu.

199 China has stirred up conflict in both the East China Sea against Japan and the South China Sea against multiple Southeast Asian over a series of small islands in recent years. Lei59

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