The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy

IMMIGRATION EXECUTIVE ACTION, 1970S STYLE:

THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

Andrew MacGregor Johnson Huntleigh

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and International Relations

Winter 2016

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IMMIGRATION EXECUTIVE ACTION, 1970S STYLE:

THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

Andrew MacGregor Johnson Huntleigh

Approved: ______Paul R. Brewer, Ph.D. Interim Chair of the Department of Political Science

Approved: ______George H. Watson, Ph.D. Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences

Approved: ______Ann L. Ardis, Ph.D. Interim Vice Provost for Graduate and Professional Education

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed: ______Mark J. Miller, Ph.D. Professor in charge of dissertation

Signed: ______Kara Ellerby, Ph.D. Member of dissertation committee

Signed: ______William H. Meyer, Ph.D. Member of dissertation committee

Signed: ______Roger Horowitz, Ph.D. Member of dissertation committee

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have come together without:

My gracious hosts during my residencies at Brandeis University’s Lawrence H. Fuchs SCIRP Archive, the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Clemson University’s Strom Thurmond Institute, and the University of Delaware’s Hugh Morris Library.

My ‘virtual’ residencies at the Maryland State/Charles M. Mathias Jr. Archives, and the University of Maryland Special Collections.

The staffs of the following research archives, all of whom were helpful at worst and excited by my research at best, saving me considerable research and travel time by procuring information for me (or occasionally searching and coming up empty for me): The Alice Curtis Desmond & Hamilton Fish Library; The Bates College/Edmund Muskie Archive; The National Archives; The Lake Forest College/Robert McCrory Archives; The Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library; and The USCIS Historical Library.

Archive.org, functionally giving me countless thousands of dollars in research grants by digitizing so many documents I needed to examine.

University of Connecticut’s Dodd Center, University of Arizona Library’s Special Collections/Dennis DeConcini/Morris K. Udall archives, Baylor University’s Poage Legislative Library/Sam B. Hall Jr. archive, University of Minnesota’s Immigration History Research Center, University of Oklahoma’s Carl Albert Center,

Berkeley University’s Bancroft Library/Mark R. Rosenzweig Archives, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, and the George Bush Presidential Library, for providing useful resources and new research directions.

The USCIS Periodicals Archive for its invaluable INS Monthly Review/I&N Reporter archives, available at http://www.uscis.gov/history-and-genealogy/historical- library/our-collection/periodicals even for non-federal employees.

Thanks to the courses taught and academic advice dispensed by Mark Miller, Julio Carrión, Stuart Kaufman, Jason Mycoff, Daniel Green, Matthew Weinert, David Wilson, Claire Rasmussen, William Meyer, Jennifer Lobasz, Kara Ellerby, Ralph Weisheit, Frank Morn, John Reitzel, Jessie Krienert, L. Edward Wells, David Falcone, Cara Rabe-Hemp, Sesha Kethineni, Beverly Smith, Tom Ellsworth, Jamal Nassar, Shirley Beller, Lori Newcomb, George Gordon, and George Kiser; thanks to Lynn Corbett, Robbie Miller, Barbara Ford, Nancy Koller, and all the other faculty and staff at the University of Leicester, University of Illinois, and Illinois State University who helped me make it here.

Non-traditional acknowledgements are also in order, to Hilton Hotels for being my dissertation home for several months, for a myriad of equally strange reasons; to all the fine coffee shops of the Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, Pacific Northwest, and New England; and of course to Chief Justice Zephyr H. Puddingpaws, for all you do.

And thanks, B.C. You were there for me, too.

DEDICATION

To my parents, Bob & Dee Hunt (“Deanna” and “Robert” if you are fancy) who have spent a lifetime supporting me regardless of the direction I headed or the speed I moved, and whose tireless efforts to drag me into responsibility finally paid off—due in no small part to:

My wife, partner, and adventuring companion, Amanda Grizzle Huntleigh, for mostly accepting the thousands of hours I put into this project, and for making it crystal- clear that she found my questionable excuses as to why I have not finished yet so laughable; and of course

Mark Miller, for being an outstanding mentor and endless source of migration knowledge, not to mention an inspiration to get back into academia as soon as possible.

Anna Rosalie Ferguson, 1982 – 2012. Now, the whispering wind plays o’er the hill, and the evening sounds again grow still. A year or more has passed since then; she will not pass my way again.

Jodi Lynn (Brown) Alicea, 1979 – 2011. With each shining ray, with each season’s change, with the sun, and the sea, and the sky, she remains.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………………………………………………………x LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………………………………………………xi ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………xii

Chapter

1: INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………………………………1

Immigration and Ideology………………………………………………………………………5 Importance of Immigration Policy…………………………………………………7 Proposal Development………………………………………………………………………………12 Justification: Seeking Validity…………………………………………………14 Overview………………………………………………………………………………………………………………21 Methodology………………………………………………………………………………………………………24 Discourse Analysis: Revealing Context and Nuance……27 Supplemental Method…………………………………………………………………………………31

2: LITERATURE REVIEW: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY HISTORY………………………………………35

Immigration Policy in the Colonial Era………………………………40 Policy at the Colonial-Confederate Transition……………48 Policy from 1824 to the Civil War……………………………………………56 Postbellum Policy to Pre-Great War Policy………………………70 The U.S. Commission on Immigration, 1907-1911……………81 …And Policy From 1911 to 1979………………………………………………………88 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………103

3: METHODOLOGY……………………………………………………………………………………………………107

Methodological Selection…………………………………………………………………107

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………107 Methodological Inspirations……………………………………………116

Methodological Implementation……………………………………………………118

vii

Coding Design…………………………………………………………………………………118 Coding……………………………………………………………………………………………………123

Methodological Review…………………………………………………………………………137

Historical Memory, Archival Sources, Oral History……………………………………………………………………………………143

4: LITERATURE REVIEW: IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONS…………………150

The Purpose of Policy Contemplation: Commissions…150 The Path to the SCIRP…………………………………………………………………………153 Intercommission Analysis…………………………………………………………………156 Commissions……………………………………………………………………………………………………159

5: THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY…………………………………………………170

Construction of the SCIRP………………………………………………………………170 The Commission……………………………………………………………………………………………177

Proceedings………………………………………………………………………………………178 Members…………………………………………………………………………………………………182 Reflections………………………………………………………………………………………184

Coding…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………188

6: DISCUSSION………………………………………………………………………………………………………199

A National Culture?………………………………………………………………………………206 Lessons Learned…………………………………………………………………………………………213 Fallout………………………………………………………………………………………………………………217 Future Research…………………………………………………………………………………………219

Select Commission Follow-Up……………………………………………219 National Identification Documentation…………………220 Secure Identification Systems………………………………………222 Eugenics………………………………………………………………………………………………224 Comparative Commissions………………………………………………………232

viii

BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………………………………………………236

Appendix

A. POTENTIAL INTERVIEWEE BIOGRAPHIES………….………311 B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE……………………………………….……322 C. IRB APPROVAL LETTER…………………………………………………………325

LIST OF TABLES

Table 5.1: A Nod to Content Analysis………………………………………………189

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1: The Pragmatism Codex…………………………………………………………128

Figure 3.2: The Bow-Tie Tome……………………………………………………………………129

ABSTRACT

This dissertation seeks to grasp the history, the construction, the impact, and the fallout of the 1979- 1981 Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. It does so using a combination of discourse analysis and historical memory techniques, following substantial analysis of U.S. immigration policy and the construction of immigration commissions generally.

The most major finding is a series of parallels between the SCIRP and previous major Commissions and Immigration Acts, where none has been previously recognized. Like the 1907-1911 “Dillingham Commission,” both Commissions set out to seek a solution to what was widely seen as a downward trend for immigrant quality, and that both Commissions subsequently found themselves crafting policy that belied their internal agreements. And like the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, the SCIRP set out to craft a new set of policies that would enable the U.S. to gain control over the immigration from less-preferred sources, and to decrease immigration overall, only to ultimately craft policies that resulted in massive new inflows. Furthermore, the ramifications of the fallout from the SCIRP’s recommendations on the IRCA is visible in the 21st century context as part of a move away from policymaking as technocratic endeavor to policymaking as an ideological brawl.

xii

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

[W]e have entered into an alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty, with Italy, Greece, and Turkey against one of the most terrible threats mankind has ever faced …. But, through this bill we say to their people: You are less worthy to come to this country than Englishmen or Irishmen …. Today we are “protecting” ourselves, as we were in 1924, against being flooded by immigrants from Eastern Europe …. These are only a few examples of the absurdity, the cruelty of carrying over into this year of 1952 the isolationist limitations of our 1924 law. In no other realm of our national life are we so hampered and stultified by the dead hand of the past, as we are in this field of immigration. -Harry Truman, on vetoing the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19521

[I]t is absolutely critical that we tone down the rhetoric when it comes to the immigration debate, because there has been an undertone that has been ugly. Oftentimes it has been directed at the Hispanic community. We have seen hate crimes skyrocket in the wake of the immigration debate, as it's been conducted in Washington, and that is unacceptable. We are a nation of laws and we are a nation of

1 Quoted in LeMay and Barkin 1999, 227-228

immigrants, and we can reconcile those two things. -Barack Obama, during a Democratic debate in Austin, Texas, February 21, 2008.2

The story of the human race is the story of migration and its consequences. William McNeill’s masterful History of the Human Community, Volume 1 spends many of its pages discussing the ways that the movements of people fundamentally shaped not only formerly uninhabited regions, but also those areas inhabited by previous residents (McNeill 1987). How the old and the new immigrants reacted to these meetings, anywhere on the spectrum from assimilation to disinterested relocation to genocide, speaks to the very nature of migration’s importance. In the specific case of the United States of

America, such meetings between old and new immigrants played out all across that very spectrum of peace and war

(Taylor 2001, 4-5), and in the process changed the region, the hemisphere, and the world forever.

The United States of America and its predecessor governments experienced several such societally tumultuous eras driven largely by immigration—albeit

2 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/us/politics/21text- demdebate.html?pagewanted=all

perhaps none as dramatic as those resulting from the first permanent arrival of Europeans—from the turn of the

19th century to this present moment. Its policymakers have made countless attempts to understand and respond to these troubles in the subsequent decades. Debate on immigration policy in the USA a century ago focused on the alarming numbers of immigrants arriving from afar, particularly in light of the increasing percentages of the national population they represented, and political and business interests were dramatically at odds over how to proceed. Contrast this with the second half of the

20th century, where… well, the more things change, the more they stay the same.

The structural contours of the immigration debate have retained surprising similarities throughout the last century. How different were the justifications for supporting a literacy test or a nationality quota compared to the justifications for opposing the DREAM Act or the McCain-Feingold bill? Has there been a consistent narrative of discrimination against immigrants throughout the century, or have the challenges to xenophobia from migrant communities, anti-nativists, and even business

interests, changed the tenor of the conversation significantly? Are “protecting jobs” and “protecting

America” both euphemisms for the same nativism and racism of a century prior?

This dissertation seeks to establish a definitive big-picture account of the 1979 Select Commission on

Immigration and Refugee Policy [“SCIRP”], as this relatively recent event in immigration policymaking history has gone overlooked relative to its importance.

It seeks to rectify misunderstandings and mythologizing in the manner of Vitalis (2005; 2010a; 2010b), Berger

(2009), and Martin (2009), demonstrating the error of the conventional wisdom in order to clear the underbrush for all subsequent research. To this end, this work seeks to understand how a seemingly straightforward expansionist immigration policy came into being in the early phases of anti-immigrant mania in the U.S., what unseen or unnoticed forces drove the different ideological aspects of these policy debates, and to demonstrate the massive shift in immigration policymaking in the subsequent decades, from technocratic to ideological in near-record time.

Immigration and Ideology

The quotes that opened this discussion serve as sort of chronological bookends—each roughly a quarter-century removed in opposite directions from the crux of the

1970s-1980s immigration debate, yet pushing back against eerily similar viewpoints. It seems that the modern debate over immigration, if it can be called debate, is a clash of ideologies with only the barest acknowledgement of data. A framework highlighted in Christina Boswell’s

The Political Uses of Expert Knowledge… (2009) suggests that such a change indicates a fundamental shift of immigration policy from a largely technocratic to a largely political issue; that perhaps the empirical notions have slowly given way to emotions. This is the focus of much discussion in Chapter 6, when even cursory analysis of 1970s immigration debates highlights the amazing level of professionalism involved when compared to contemporary debates.

The subject of this dissertation stands out for a variety of reasons when considering the spectrum of immigration policy debate: it was the first successful

major effort to address immigration from a scientific standpoint since the United States Congress Joint

Immigration Commission [“Dillingham Commission”] 70 years earlier3, it was a truly bipartisan effort with significant input from actors across the public and private sector, its final report and subsequent discussion led to the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control

Act, and perhaps most interestingly it represents perhaps the last time major domestic immigration policy was successfully crafted through largely empirical arguments.

This Commission was a dense concoction of technocratic know-how, Congressional argumentation, media influences, interest group campaigning, and left an enduring legacy of successful policymaking, but with results that are seen as mixed—at best—by modern critics. It is thus somewhat remarkable that it has been so little-studied up until this point, and why it makes an excellent central analytical focus for highlighting ideas, trends,

3 The 1965-1968 Select Commission on Western Hemisphere Immigration’s inability to come to a conclusion on the fundamental question it was created to answer, whether to change the recently-implemented 120,000 annual ceiling on immigration, makes it an interesting near-miss in the history of 20th century Congressional immigration commissions.

patterns, personages, and outcomes in immigration policymaking for the U.S.A.

Importance of Immigration Policy

Immigration plays a prominent role in federal policymaking, and has done so for as long as there has been a United States of America, and indeed the colonies struggled with similar issues for more than a century beforehand (Archdeacon, 1984; Zolberg, 2006; Martin,

2011). Immigration’s enduring importance is multifaceted: it relates not only to practical economic issues of labor and capital, but also to theoretical issues, from national identity to cultural security (Doty

2009; Doezema 2010; Huntington 2004). It is the cause of, and the result of, a panoply of pertinent political issues.

Still, ideological frameworks lurk behind nearly any interpretation of immigration (Borjas 2007; Huntington

2004). Bipartisan immigration policymaking is thus hardly an exact science; even long-term solutions can seem short-term in hindsight (and of course vice-versa).

Similarly, efforts to steer policy in one direction can

in the long run do precisely the opposite, as recently highlighted by an article4 discussing the 1965 Immigration

& Naturalization Act’s far-reaching and unintended consequences, and as we will see in the SCIRP as well.

Some of the earliest policies enacted by the newly- minted United States of America were immigrant naturalization laws, and concern over immigration numbers and countries of origin entered the conversation in subsequent decades. Heated debate and protest over immigration issues remained prominent from the earliest days of the U.S.A. to the present, and for nearly the entire time in-between (Archdeacon, 1984; Zolberg, 2006;

Martin, 2011). Though local- and state-level authorities often sought to craft immigration policy, immigration soon became (and remained) primarily a concern for the

United States' Congress.

The 1907 United States Immigration Commission

(better-known as the “Dillingham Commission”) had represented the first real push for a scientific

4 Tom Gjelten, “In 1965, A Conservative Tried To Keep America White. His Plan Backfired.” NPR, accessed October 3, 2015, from http://www.npr.org/2015/10/03/445339838/the-unintended- consequences-of-the-1965-immigration-act

grounding behind immigration policy, given the ascendancy of social science in matters of population control, from border checks to eugenics (Zeidel 2004; Hatton and

Williamson 1998). This Commission released a 41-volume report on the situation of migration to the United

States, covering what it saw as the causes of, effects of, and of course solutions to these ongoing mass migrations. The Commission arrived at a crucial time in turn-of-the-century politics. The Dillingham Commission is perhaps forever remembered primarily for its backwardness and as a product of wholly illegitimate scientific racism, particularly due to its association with legendary nativists like Henry Cabot Lodge.

Despite its significant shortcomings, the Dillingham

Commission’s impact on immigration policy was monumental.

It was the first scientific effort of its kind, and its troubled—yet occasionally nuanced—findings saw the country through to the middle of the century. By most accounts, its dramatic and forceful merger of racist science, eugenicist beliefs, primordial statistical social science work, and nativist ideologies helped set the stage for decades of restrictivist policymaking. By

the mid-century progressive thinkers such as President

Truman were horrified by the fundamental conflict between its illiberal findings and the foundations of American liberty, and the continual revisions to immigration policy in this era suggested continuing need for major overhaul. Despite this, not until the SCIRP in 1979 did the U.S. assemble a Commission up to the task.5

The SCIRP arrived at another pivotal time politically. Led by the indefatigable Father Theodore

Hesburgh, whose compassionate interest in human rights helped shape the proceedings, its often progressive- minded analysis and policy recommendations ushered in

1986's Immigration Reform and Control Act [“IRCA”], on its face the last major pro-immigration policy revision.

In turn, this dramatically changed the demographic face of the country (Archdeacon 1984; Zolberg 2006; Marshall

2009; Martin 2011). Still, these simple explanations of the method and impact of these Commissions belie the complexity of each case.

5 The 1978 federal Belmont Report on ethical principles and protecting human subjects in research suggests that the late 1970s was a time for significant scientific re- evaluation of policy at the federal level, and certainly the SCIRP is an excellent example of this phenomenon.

The SCIRP thus represented that the Congress felt the need for major reexamination of immigration policy, prefaced by similar conundrums and prefacing in turn significant shifts in policy as its predecessor the

Dillingham Commission. The SCIRP in turn was roughly as successful as its early predecessor in establishing a new baseline for solid immigration policy, given that nearly all of its recommendations became law in a relatively short time afterward (Zolberg 2006; Martin 2011). Yet its fundamental conceit—that of a general amnesty for those who bypassed legal immigration channels—has perhaps never been less popular, or more specifically has never been more readily used as a pejorative.

~~~

Princeton psychologist Daniel Kahneman was awarded a Nobel Prize for his findings in Economics, which included the fact that people pay more attention to horror stories than to statistics. (Etzioni 2004, 119)

Proposal Development

I originally came to this topic when Dr. Miller suggested I look into the 1979 Commission, due to its strong recommendations for a secure identity verification

system, and my own previous experience writing on those topics. One quote in particular, by Senator Alan Simpson commenting on the final report, stuck with me:

“[E]mployer sanctions, increased enforcement and some kind of identification system. If we get one without the other two or if we get two without the other one, we have nothing. Yet we will pretend we will and then we will be right back where we were before” (U.S. Congress, 1981,

88). Obviously it is no simple matter for even a

Congressionally-appointed commission to see its recommendations through to become law, given that the end result was indeed to implement only two of these three recommendations (with some questionable enforcement).

Originally the dissertation sought to place the

Dillingham Commission and the SCIRP side-by-side, seeking to understand when the nativism and eugenicism (from craniometry and phrenology to anthropometry, subjects of previous extensive study by the author) of the Dillingham

Commission ceased influencing immigration policymaking in the USA, and how to understand their ideological replacements. These two Commissions seemed like obvious pairings, given their similarity in influence on

subsequent policy, and their significant differences otherwise. The seeming success each had in this regard separated them from the later Asencio and Jordan immigration Commissions6.

As to the scope of the project, analyzing the

Dillingham Commission alone is a demonstrably book-sized project (Zeidel 2004), and the idea of taking on four

Commissions at once seemed like the kind of poor idea only a graduate student would develop. Barbara Jordan’s death limited the impact (and the potential study) of her

Commission. Neither the Jordan nor the Asencio

Commission appear in the literature7 in anything resembling the frequency that the Dillingham Commission and the SCIRP. While popularity and impact are not sufficient reasons on their own to reject these

Commissions, when combined with the need to keep the analytic scope manageable, those two were the easiest to

6 The Asencio Commission did have an impact on the structuring of NAFTA, notable indeed for its glossing- over of immigration issues; the Jordan Commission may have had a somewhat greater impact, as the militarization of the border may have been accelerated in response to the Commission’s findings. But neither compares to the scale of policymaking related to the Dillingham Commission or the SCIRP, nor was there any feasible way to examine them in the scope of this dissertation in any case.

eliminate—and given the relatively good extant scholarship on the Dillingham Commission, the SCIRP seemed by far the best choice for a dissertation focus8.

Justification: Seeking Validity

There is significant value to understanding the degree of mythmaking within the SCIRP. The general importance of differentiating between myth and reality is a constant theme of Robert Vitalis' innovative work on illuminating the claimed racist and imperialist origins of the subdiscipline of international relations, once called interracial relations and imperial relations

(Vitalis 2005), and the falsehoods surrounding the origins of the non-aligned movement’s emergence (Vitalis

2010a; 2010b). Indeed, it is easy to read Vitalis’ work as suggesting that correcting long- or widely-held mistakes is sufficient justification for any academic endeavor; knowing the history is essential to comprehending the present.

7 Indeed, if not for Dr. Miller discussing the Asencio Commission with me, I may still have never learned of its existence. 8 But of course I reserve the right to decide to write about those two someday anyway.

Philip Martin meanwhile devotes much of his work to debunking common lies told to perpetuate the cycle of importing undocumented labor (Martin 2009; 2005). The

SCIRP’s legacy is indeed seemingly roughly as straightforward as the Dillingham Commission’s. In both cases, discussion of the Commission’s findings is inexorably tied to the major legislation that followed, and the multifaceted nature of its work is generally boiled down to a single generalizable concept—amnesty for the SCIRP, eugenics for the Dillingham Commission

(Archdeacon, 1984; Zolberg, 2006; Martin, 2011).

It is important to note that the importance placed here on accurate historiography is not merely an avenue for scolding lax researchers, but rather encouraging scholarly accuracy for the benefit of the field as a whole. To again use Robert Vitalis’ work as illustrative, mythologizing the 1955 Bandung Conference as a kind of global empowerment summit for self- consciously non-white nations actively contradicts the truth that the participants actively fought against the idea of racial/color lines (Vitalis 2010b, 21). In this way, inattentive scholars perpetuate myths that detract

from informed research, stymie responsible journalism, and in this case even undermine the self-identity of marginalized nations (Vitalis, 2010a, 2010b). These mistakes are often perpetuated in the name of fabricating a compelling narrative over an accurate narrative

(Vitalis 2010a, 1). Functionally, these techniques create entertainment at the expense of enlightenment, particularly in light of the compatibility between mythologizing and propagandizing (Skonieczny, 2001, 440-

441).

More is at stake than intellectual and academic honesty: there are also policy considerations at work when palpable misunderstanding abounds. Dan Berger's

(2009) engagement with critical race literature demonstrates the real-world impact of misunderstanding the historical origins of a social movement. To accomplish this, he begins with recent revisionist work demonstrating that black power/black nationalism emerged parallel to the civil rights movement, rather than as an offshoot (Berger 2009). Such a revelation contradicts the standard dichotomous view of black power as a violent and vicious “misunderstanding” of the peaceful and noble

civil rights movement (Berger, 2009, 1). Similar to

Vitalis' aforementioned point about the myth of Bandung as a pivotal moment for Southern solidarity (Vitalis,

2010b), or international relations as interracial relations (Vitalis 2005), the conventional understanding of a group's origins can have real impact on its behaviors and how others perceive it. In this case, the previous narrative lionized the federal government coming to the rescue of the virtuous movement in the South while fighting the villainous movement as it appeared elsewhere in the country (Berger, 2009, 1-3), whereas the truth was considerably more complicated.

Nor is desire for such clarification confined to views from the Ivory Tower, as former Secretary of Labor

Ray Marshall also lambastes the seemingly unbroken cycle of corporate-government collusion in mythmaking to stymie progress on immigration reform (Marshall 2009, 10-11), machinations he witnessed firsthand. Certainly as academics, it is easy to understand the value of striving to reduce bias, and acknowledge presuppositions and unusual interpretations. It is hard to imagine that

wholly inaccurate information is helpful in any quest for objectivity (however impossible such a quest is).

Finally, mythologizing is certainly not limited in scope to immigration or oftentimes ambiguously-framed issues of minority empowerment (Wilson 2011, 30). John

Mueller’s Overblown, a direct assault on the mythmaking collusion of national security interests and the scare tactics of the mass media, brings forth the suggestion that disinformation can have a genuine life-and-death impact. Local and state police have been frequently lambasted (ironically, also by the mass media) in the 21st century for a seeming increase in U.S. civilian casualties, driven in no small part through increased use of military equipment and tactics. Though purchased and implemented for counterterrorism purposes, such military trappings have rarely been used in response to terrorism, but rather used to escalate situations of ordinary police work to unsustainable climaxes; mythmaking drives this violence.

These issues of mythologizing are made all the more relevant by witnessing the fate of academic research into the Dillingham Commission. The more I researched the

Dillingham Commission in particular, the more discrepancies I noticed, but the overall picture still seemed correct. After reading Robert F. Zeidel's comprehensive historical analysis of the Dillingham

Commission, however, the standard political science view of the commission took on an entirely new dimension—it started to sound wrong. Not entirely wrong, but certainly as though it exaggerated the controversial aspects of the reports while largely ignoring the even- minded and progressive research it produced that Zeidel's

2004 book illuminates.

Put simply, mainstream political science views of the Dillingham Commission seem crafted largely from prior secondary sources; prior sources that may have had little interest in accuracy. It is even possible that every work ultimately sources the same initial flawed primary- source analysis.9 Certainly if even Robert Zeidel admits to not reading all of the Dillingham Commission report in the process of preparing his book-length treatment of the

9 I admit to feeling fairly certain that I could ascertain what early source all political science works ultimately find as their common ancestor (it may be the book headed by Commission member Jenks), but that is surely outside the scope of this research.

subject—even mentioning that likely no one outside the commission itself has ever read all of it (Zeidel 2004,

101-102)—then the odds that anyone else along the chain has read the report in its entirety are relatively poor.

And yet, even Zeidel's admittedly imperfect analysis of the Dillingham Commission is a better launching point than exists for the SCIRP, which aside from references in immigration policy articles (Motomura 1990), book chapters (Tichenor 2002; Zolberg 2006), or policy publications (Marshall 2009), is relatively unheralded.

The Dillingham Commission, both in myth and in actuality, was essentially the federal blueprint for immigration policy at the beginning of the 20th century.

The SCIRP is not seen as having the same power and importance, despite setting in motion significant immigration reform, and very nearly resulting in even more dramatic structural change. The enormous significance of these joint government-academic-civil society Congressional immigration research commissions has not led to a comprehensive understanding of the enduring legacy of the SCIRP. And from the perspective of historical memory, as discussed earlier, no effort has

been made to separate the assumptions from the facts of the SCIRP, in any of its creation or its evolution or its impact.

This is why the aim of this dissertation is in part to cut through the neglect in the political science literature on the SCIRP in order to create a proper modern assessment of its place in policymaking, to understand the motivations behind its creation, to see how it came to influence the later IRCA as it did, and to understand how it even came to exist in the final form it took.

Overview

With that said, it is important to begin engaging with the literature on these immigration subjects, in order to better grasp the scope of the project and the holes it can fill. Historical context is a necessity for any full understanding of these issues, so this is where we turn next. There are several unanswered research questions here: How much have the fundamental motivations behind immigration policy changed in the past hundred years? How much of the nativist, racist, eugenicist past

of immigration history remains by the time of the SCIRP?

How much had given way to enlightened “fact-based” policymaking? What evidence is used? How different are proposed immigration policies today compared to those 25,

50, 75, or 100 years ago? How different are the justifications made in 1909 and 1981 for suggesting similar policies?

The analytical focus herein is on roughly a half- decade either direction of the Select Commission’s 1979 formation. Yet it is impossible to properly illuminate the competing issues tackled through this Commission without a grounding in U.S. and earlier colonial immigration policy. Thus the discussion now turns in

Chapter 2 to the second century of European influence on

North America, when many modern views on immigration began to form.

Chapter 4 bridges the gap between the historical policy analysis of Chapter 2 and the deconstruction of the SCIRP in Chapter 5 by engaging with current scholarship on governmental commissions, from why they are created to how they are assembled and of course to what impact they have—or are meant to have. Chapter 3

discusses the methodological tactics put to use for the analysis of the SCIRP and everything about the SCIRP.

Chapter 5 delves into the very heart of the matter, picking apart the SCIRP in detail, from its creation to its alteration to its conclusions and its reverberations.

It requires no effort to argue that the impact of the

SCIRP is still being felt today, which is why it seems an obvious choice for a focal point. This chapter does not stretch beyond the IRCA in 1986. Chapter 6 is devoted to analyzing the policy aftermath from the SCIRP, including the IRCA as obviously the most singularly important piece of immigration policymaking in decades.

~~~

“One of [qualitative methods in political science]'s strongest contributions … [is] the idea that robust causal analysis can be carried out through within-case analysis rather than, or as well as, cross-case analysis.” -Oisín Tansey, “Process Tracing…”

“Discourses have no inherent meaning in themselves and, to understand their constructive efforts, researchers must locate them historically and socially.” -Cynthia Hardy, Bill Harley, and Nelson Phillips, “Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?”

Methodology

Chapter 3 will have a fuller explanation of the precise methods of the discourse analysis, but it is important to briefly address the methodological meat of this dissertation sandwich. Given that assessing a large variety of data sources is the best way to produce viable assertions, this dissertation casts a wide net, producing a discourse analysis of the SCIRP report itself—creating a baseline contrast to the Dillingham Commission and current immigration policy debates. Contemporary newspapers to the late 1970s/early 1980s can serve as a good proxy for gauging public opinion, as in other situations of historical analysis where survey research is impossible (Boswell 2009, 22; Skonieczny, 2001).

Documentary work of other governmental and advocacy organizations relevant to the immigration debate provides a window into elite attitudes and suggestions of the time, as do press releases, campaign and stump speeches, policy research documents, working papers, hearing testimony, intragovernmental memos, and dozens of other types of archival documents, all of which have been

meticulously searched out and processed to grasp the

Zeitgeist of the era.

Further contemporary perspectives, albeit ones filtered through time and wisdom, came from a small set of interviews with individuals directly involved with the

SCIRP; in this way, this work seeks to weave a kind of informal oral history of the SCIRP into more traditional discourse analytical qualitative research, adding first- hand narratives into the overall analysis of the

Commission.10 Interviewing former members of the support staff keeps the focus on directly-involved individuals rather than sampling from the much larger group of individuals who had any brief or tenuous or indirect connection to the Commission. This ensures focus on

10 As individuals involved in the SCIRP could seek to downplay or misrepresent evidence for political or personal purposes, Bennett suggests protecting yourself by gathering “diverse sources and kinds of evidence and … anticipating and accounting for potential biases in the sources of evidence” (Bennett 2008, 707). Another problem is that the audio recording of elite interviews sometimes produces guarded and bland responses (Howard 2004, 8); I mitigate this by transcribing interviews rather than recording them. “[H]igh transcription costs” (Howard 2004, 8) for recordings thus do not relate; whether meaning costs in time or money, my 130+ WPM typing speed is sufficient to allow me to take dictation rather than rely on the transcription of audio recordings.

those most likely to possess unique insights to the phenomena at hand (Tansey 2007, 765, 767-768). That said, the interview process will also follow Tansey's suggestion for “reputational snowball sampling” (Tansey

2007, 770-771), inquiring as to whether anyone unofficially involved in the SCIRP—or who had an innocuous-sounding role that belied the individual’s true importance—could not be recognized as justifying an interview ex ante.11

General biographical material on members of the

Commission, including voting records and publicly-staked positions if ever serving as elected officials, also come into play. Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan in particular are seen as likely influences on the

Commission. This list is also non-exhaustive, as valuable data of course could come from virtually any relevant source, particularly from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. But before discussing the what of the research any further, it is necessary to cover the how.

11 Though the formal member list seems, looking back, to be a reasonably accurate picture of relevant participants.

Discourse Analysis: Revealing Context and Nuance

With an eye toward the best technique for contextualizing the data sources in this analysis, the obvious choices seemed to be discourse or content analysis. This is particularly so given the difficulties in establishing ideational causality. Content analysis proponents are concerned that human-driven coding is always problematic (Klebanov, Diermeier, and Beigman

2008, 448), as with discourse analysis' reliance on categories chosen by the analyst (Herrera and Braumoeller

2004, 17).

Still, even imperfectly-designed analytical categories, at least when properly operationalized, allow the reader to draw independent conclusions about their appropriateness for the study, and somewhat mitigate the concern over researcher-based coding. Another concern is that content analysis works best for larger-N studies of cases with a variety of comparable sample texts (Lowe,

2008, 359); given that immigration commissions are relatively uncommon, discourse analysis thus seems a more appropriate technique. Discourse analysis' fundamental concern with “the way in which power relations structure,

constrain, and produce systems of meaning” (Herrera and

Braumoeller 2004, 19) seemed particularly applicable for analysis of shifts of overt to covert ideological underpinnings for policy.12

Some potential competing explanations, per Boswell, are that the SCIRP served as a means of legitimizing immigration policy decisions, served to more broadly lend credibility and authority to the federal government for immigration concerns, or that its purposes were truly policy-instrumental (Boswell 2009, 5-15). Dvora Yanow's

How Does a Policy Mean? helps focus on how to capture the vagaries of political symbol in such cases. Yanow's take can be compared to those discussed in either Edelman's

Constructing the Political Spectacle or Coates' Covert

Racism, depending on what one expects to find in the

“context of the values, beliefs, and feelings engendered by and embodied in organizational artifacts” (Yanow 1996,

12 As for the extension of this dissertation to cover (at least briefly) the full immigration policy history of the U.S.A., this reflects the idea that discourse analysis requires at least some grounding in the history of fundamental beliefs, as well as the change in said beliefs, rather than measuring them at a specific time (Crawford 2004).

x) of this immigration commission and its place in society and history.

The SCIRP is clearly a pivotal moment in the

U.S.A.'s immigration policy debate, but why? That is what I seek to uncover. Was it representative of an ongoing cycle of knowledge gathering, analysis, processing, and subsequent informed policymaking? Was its primary purpose instead to legitimize whatever immigration policy the government ultimately initiated

(per Boswell 2009)? Was it a renewal of the beliefs that drove the Dillingham Commission and much immigration policy in the first half of the century? Perhaps, ultimately, the same processes that motivated the

Dillingham Commission in its inquiry and its findings at the turn of the last century (Zeidel 2004; Hatton and

Williamson 1998). Certainly the nature of immigration policy can be viewed simplistically in one of these ways:

Nativism/racism/eugenicism

→ anti-immigrant sentiment

→ anti-immigrant policy;

Pragmatism/conservatism

→ ambivalent sentiment

→ ambivalent immigrant policy;

Progressivism/liberalism

→ pro-immigrant sentiment

→ pro-immigrant policy.

With this in mind, the benefits of a close reading of the

SCIRP report and the material informing the SCIRP report are self-evident, particularly if the evidence points overwhelmingly to one ideological standpoint but the end results do not agree. These primitive logical constructions also inform the discussion of the formal discourse analysis coding in Chapter 3.

Supplemental Method

This dissertation also seeks to further analyzing the questions posed in the introduction, as to how immigration policies, the motivations behind immigration policies, and the commission(s) that analyzed and sought to solve immigration problems have all changed over the past century. Many of the new institutionalisms excel in establishing path dependence (Bennett 2009; Page 2006;

Pierson 2000), a potentially effective way to analyze lingering impacts of immigration commissions. Still, it would be easier to use an explicit institutionalist process if this were a cross-case study, which in its final form it is not.

The primary advantage to the aggregation of myriad sources is the possibility of data triangulation (Tansey

2007, 766), as each new information source adds some potential value to the whole both through itself and by highlighting the valuable (or revealing the misleading) information from other sources. This is particularly useful when trying to pin down elusive ideas such as ideological influence on policymaking.

Separating ideational from material decisions, and tracing the related causal mechanisms, is certainly challenging, particularly in single cases (Schoenfeld

2009). But recent systematic efforts to address this issue (Jacobs 2011, 2, 6-44) seem promising. Crucially,

“some configuration of factors is causally adequate if we cannot plausibly conceive of that configuration not producing the outcome in question” (Jackson 2006, 43), and this goal seems achievable with this study.

Thus, establishing the dissertation proper are the competing explanations to understand the meaning of the

SCIRP. Do immigration policy dialogues and decisions reflect a continuing logic of national identity and ascriptive hierarchy of the sort first crystallized by the Dillingham Commission? Or perhaps do they demonstrate a series of self-conscious adjustments made in response to the changed political and social climate of the U.S.A. throughout the course of the 1900s?

As to the extensive but still often digital research done for this dissertation—Evan Lieberman suggested in his excellent 2004 article on field work that one should seek to only enter the field to tackle “specific

attitudes and histories of individuals … [and] special primary sources … [restricted to certain] libraries and archives” (Lieberman 2004, 4). Indeed, when possible, I conducted interviews and archival research remotely— whether through digital or analog methods—for there “is no special value in sitting at a computer terminal [in the field] if the same work could be done at home”

(Lieberman 2004, 4). It has not seemed the least bit limiting, and other than a few archives at Stanford

University that are only accessible in-person, I have been fortunate enough to either have the opportunity to do research directly at archives when necessary or have librarians or archivists work with me to obtain valuable research materials.

A final methodological note, the impact that historical memory has on the interpretation and reinterpretation of facts, particularly as they relate to immigrant policymaking, strongly informs and undergirds virtually every facet of the analysis, often by default.

Whether expressing itself as intentional or unintentional mythmaking (ala Vitalis 2005; 2010a; 2010b), blowback

(vis-à-vis Snyder 1991), or just fundamental

misunderstandings or misremembering(s), historical memory is virtually inseparable from discourse analysis. Thus a substantial literature on historical memory is interwoven throughout material more straightforwardly related to immigration policy, be it work on commissions, or federal processes, or historical analysis more broadly. But for now, we turn back to the firm grounding of the entire dissertation in the grand sweep of U.S. immigration policy.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW:

AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY HISTORY

“The question of who is a 'true American' has always been problematic. Americans have argued, struggled, and died for their vision of the 'American way of life,' to include or exclude various people from the American polity and American dream”13

“[C]urrent efforts to enflame passions about securing the border with guards, walls, and helicopters [share] deep similarities with the racial hysterias that accompanied the initiation of the Asiatic Barred Zone that prohibited all Asian immigration through the first half of the twentieth century, the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, and the mass deportation of Mexican

Americans during Operation Wetback in the 1950s.”14

“That's all history is—the best tales. The ones that last. Might as well be mine.”15

13 Margo Anderson, 1988, The American Census: A Social History, 4 14 Ian Haney López, 20111 “Colorblind White Dominance,” in Rodney Coates’ “Covert Racism” 15 Dialogue from “Varric,” Dragon Age II (PC Game)

Immigration is more than just a facet of life in the

United States of America; in many ways it is America.

Removing the immigrants would leave you with something barely resembling the USA as it exists. Father Theodore

Hesburgh spoke to this in his introduction to the final report of the Select Commission: “Our history is largely the story of immigration. Even the Indians were immigrants. The ancestors of all other Americans—when measured in terms of world history—came here only yesterday.”16

It is impossible to separate the modern conceptualization of the USA from its origins as a multifaceted destination for the multitudes: as refuge for the persecuted, opportunity for the entrepreneur, or even purgatory for the slave. Immigrants built nearly every aspect of this country—even as they slowly and systematically eradicated its extant indigenous nations to do so. Immigrants (re)named the USA's geological and

16 Page 8, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: Appendix I to the Staff Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. Robert D. Farber University Archives & Special Collections Department, Brandeis University. Lawrence Fuchs Papers, 1948-2008. Series 7: Select Commission on Immigration & Refugee Policy (SCIRP), 1968-1985. Box 61 of 71.

political features, built its oldest cities, wrote its songs and created its stories, and ultimately sought to set criteria for the worthiness of future migrants—or rather, how to close its borders to insufficiently similar immigrants, even as the concept of who was dissimilar changed again and again through the centuries.

Immigrant and immigration policy has thus served a centrally important role since the earliest efforts at centralized authority in the USA, and such policies have covered everything from access to goods and services, to naturalization and relocation, to claims from refugees and asylees, to the employment of temporary and seasonal and permanent workers, to fundamental judgments about ethics and morality as they apply to the right of free movement, and to everything else inbetween.

Given immigration's foundational importance to the

USA, it is little wonder that entire volumes can be (and have been) written on the tortuous path that policymakers have taken in crafting and revising immigration policy over the centuries. That the policycrafting process is convoluted holds true almost regardless of how such policymaking is generally framed. Daniel Tichenor’s 2002

book Dividing Lines expresses immigration policymaking as the dominance of different actors in an overlapping and contrasting series of institutional processes (Tichenor

2002, 29-31). Aristide Zolberg’s 2006 tome A Nation By

Design views such policymaking as shifting patterns of attractions and repulsions reflecting the era's political climate (Zolberg 2006, 1-5). Susan Martin’s 2011 work A

Nation of Immigrants hypothesizes immigration policymaking as localized reactions to specific regions' needs and beliefs (Martin 2011, 1-2). Even picturing immigration policy as generally a series of ad hoc stopgap measures driven by a reluctance to impact the status quo, in the way they are often reflected in the mass media,17 illustrates the complexity of the process— and in this case, the fundamental inability to resolve that complexity in a satisfactory manner leading to progressive policy.

Deciding exactly who belongs, and who does not, always was (and will always be) serious business. This

17 “Why Immigration Reform Fell Short,” Karen Tumulty, Washington Post, February 3, 2013; http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/why-immigration- reform-fell-short/2013/02/03/fbb643aa-6be7-11e2-8740- 9b58f43c191a_story.html

was true when the newly-arrived European powers first struggled to create and maintain settlement footholds in the New World, and when 21st century electoral and counterterrorism concerns lead inexorably to perpetually incoherent policies seeking to reconcile cultural, business, and security demands. Yet as James C. Scott said in his masterly work Seeing Like a State, “the state has always been the enemy of ‘people who move around’”

(Scott 1998, 1) as statecraft fundamentally requires establishing legibility of individuals within its borders, and migrating peoples challenge such efforts

(Scott 1998, 1-2). So then it is little wonder that even before the Constitution, the Articles of Confederation, the Declaration of Independence, or even before the Stamp

Act, sections of what became the U.S.A. were already busily carving out restrictions on the sorts of people who were free to reside within their parts of the colony.

These efforts—still progressing today in many ways—strove to make their citizenry identifiable, and therefore governable, and to pursue statecraft through the increasingly possible18 control of borders and people. A

18 Up to a point; theorists like Scott (1998), Torpey

major purpose of this dissertation is to uncover whatever continuities and discontinuities do exist between the past and present, in order to better understand the backdrop of modern immigration policymaking. Thus, there is no escaping the need to analyze every major twist and turn in immigration policymaking dating back to the very beginnings of the USA—and indeed farther still, to the very beginnings of European colonization of North

America—to ensure that 1979 is placed in its proper context, where even things that happened in 1679 might still have some indirect resonance.

Immigration Policy in the Colonial Era

Susan Martin's 2011 book A Nation of Immigrants charts not only the trajectories of the aforementioned pre-national immigration goals, but also demonstrates their enduring importance to the national policies yet to come. In A Nation of Immigrants, Martin posits three major identifiable migrations with discernible impact on

(2006), Garfinkel (2001), Etzioni (2000), and Smith (2000) would argue that a greatly increased technological infrastructure must exist for much further improvement in statecraft, and only Etzioni and to some extent Brin (1998) might argue this as a potentially good thing

the culture of Colonial America. She calls these the

Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania models, in honor of the areas where each viewpoint first developed

(Martin 2011, 3-5). A similar, but four-pronged, approach discussed by David Hackett Fischer in Albion’s

Seed identifies roughly these same three groups as

Martin—calling them the “Distressed Cavaliers and

Indentured Servants” (Fischer 1989, 207), “English

Puritans” (Fischer 1989, 13), and “Friends” (Fischer

1989, 419) respectively. Fischer strongly differs, however, in proposing that migrants from North Britain

(Fischer 1989, 605) also affected the burgeoning nation significantly, and that their beliefs still impact the

U.S. centuries later.

Both theories suggest that, despite these groups’ similarities, their religion, socioeconomic status, and

British regional loyalties created significantly different outcomes (Martin 2011; Fischer 1989, 6).

Martin’s posited regional/tripartite path dependency perspective for immigration, suggesting that each was so firmly embedded in local culture that the USA continues to bounce between the three to this very day. Fischer’s

work predates Martin’s, thus her culling suggesting she did not agree that the North British migratory patterns impacted the developing nation in the same way.

The Virginia/‘Cavaliers and Servants’ model is oldest of the three, referring to the primarily profit- driven motivations of the trading companies that set up there, along with their tendencies to view free immigrants (or indentured servants, or convicts, or slaves) as primarily new sources of labor (Martin 2011,

3). “More thoroughly commercial, the English meant to

Christianize the Indians by first absorbing them as economic subordinates” (Taylor 2001, 129). Full social membership was essentially only possible for the wealthiest segment of the populace, and remained increasingly unlikely as one descended in status, obviously reaching the point of impossibility with slaves

(Martin 2011, 3). This model coincided with the first major wave of immigration to the region (Martin 2011, 1-

2), and as such it suggested that purely economic concerns are most literally foundational to this

particular understanding of immigration policy’s trajectory throughout the centuries.19

Yet a mere economic analysis does not explain the entire story. The Virginia colony’s active recruitment of allies from the British elite produced a very particular sort of settler, given that these “Royalist immigrants were refugees from oppression, just as New

England’s Puritans themselves had been” (Fischer 1989,

212). The ruling class in Virginia quickly came to resemble the ruling class back home; of “152 Virginians who held top offices in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century…. only eighteen were the sons of yeomen, traders, mariners, artisans, or ‘plebs’” (Fischer

1989, 216). Nor was this an accident; “Virginia’s great migration was the product of policy and social planning.

Its royalist elite succeeded in shaping the social history of an American region partly by regulating the process of migration” (Fischer 1989, 232). Aristocrats

19 Though Fischer goes further and suggests that some substantial part of the Virginia settlements’ character can be traced directly to the person of its original governor, Sir William Berkeley (Fischer 1989, 207-208; 210-212).

and wealth have always gone hand-in-hand, and so it was for this segment of the new settlers.20

Some of the same economic concerns of the Virginia colony factored heavily into the trading companies that helped create the Massachusetts Bay Colony/‘English

Puritans’ in 1630, but here Puritan theology and values were far more important to the value of a new resident

(Martin 2011, 3). Thus it was for most immigrants far easier to integrate into the local area, by merely being a fellow true believer, rather than by needing to possess a sufficient level of wealth to fit into the upper echelons of the colony. This, after all, was a settlement that strove to convert the heathen natives and even emblazoned this sentiment directly onto its great seal (Fischer 1989, 18). Its ultimate goal was to create a model theocratic government (Fischer 1989, 18-20), and it remains telling that John Winthrop’s foundational

“shining city on a hill” (Fischer 1989, 18-20) iconography recurs in ostensibly democratic rhetoric in

21st-century politics. This general focus on religion

20 One comment from John Randolph of Roanoke may expertly summarize the conundrum of American democracy’s aristocratic roots: “I love liberty; I hate equality” (quoted in Fischer 1989, 412).

belied the fact that settlement was originally driven by wealthy Puritans, establishing their new home through the virtues of an economic charter (Taylor 2001, 165).

The last of Martin's three frameworks is the

Pennsylvania model. Though made up predominantly of the low-born unlike the previous groups (Fischer 1989, 434-

436), this model derives motivation from religion as does the Massachusetts model (Martin 2011, 3), but in a markedly different fashion. William Penn cherished ideas of tolerance and diversity, establishing in 1681 a haven for persecuted Quakers in Britain (or perhaps

Massachusetts), and for any others who wished to immigrate (Martin 2011, 3). Built initially west of the

Delaware River and later expanded into the former

Swedish-Finnish-Dutch settlements along the Delaware

(Taylor 2001, 264), the territory occupied a symbolic and actual middle-ground between the economic and religious extremes of its colonizing neighbors. Quakers renounced

“formal prayers, sermons, and ceremony of any sort...[meeting] together as spiritual equals and

[sitting] silently until the divine spirit inspired someone, anyone, to speak” (Taylor 2001, 264), and this

egalitarianism21 animated Pennsylvania to its position as the most diverse area in religion, language, and culture in all of the proto-USA.

It was the Pennsylvanian ideal that proved most influential overall in the crafting of the new nation a century later (Martin 2011, 3). Perhaps it was only fair that the Quakers should make such a stir in their new world. Their migrations were so great that their numbers in Britain thinned to nearly nothing in many areas

(Fischer 1989, 422); in some meaningful way, the movement of Quakers represented a shift of democratic thought from

Britain to its colonies. Their pluralistic egalitarianism combined with their early favoring of a

“weak polity and strong communal groups” (Fischer 1989,

429-430) seems quite similar to ongoing left-right ideological tensions, perhaps also befitting founder

William Penn’s status as a “bundle of paradoxes” (Fischer

1989, 456).

The fourth group categorized by Fischer, the British

Northerners, began to arrive in great numbers in mid-1717

21 Though interestingly some of their 17th-century beliefs, including refusal to take oaths of allegiance (Taylor 2001, 265), might be mistaken for the extreme beliefs of a Jehovah’s Witness in the modern context.

(Fischer 1989, 605).22 These people were from the borders, the areas of least civilization (Fischer 1989,

621). Their “fierce and stubborn pride would be a cultural fact of high importance in the American region which they came to dominate” (Fischer 1989, 615), and indeed such descriptors are hardly uncommonly applied to

Americans in general throughout recent history.

But rather than disappear, Martin posits that the other traditions remain minority views, and that economic, ideological, and integrationist viewpoints can all be seen recurring (Martin 2011, 4), whether as

Bracero programs, strategic leverage against the Soviet

Union, or the creation of the DREAM Act, respectively.

Echoes of these frameworks can be seen throughout the debate on the Select Commission and in its final report, as seen later. The sweep of immigration policy between

1681, where we just were, and 1979, where we are going, invites innumerable pages of analysis, but a

22 Not all of them settled in Appalachia; the MacGregors and MacDonalds of my mother’s family first settled in Nova Scotia after the Highland Clearances robbed them of their island, and within a few decades had relocated to Michigan’s Upper Peninsula where some still live. Not that there are no similarities between that part of Michigan and Appalachia…

comparatively brief history is largely sufficient to identify continuities between the earliest types of

“American” immigration thought and the consequences of such in the later centuries, examining the impact that such policies had on both immigrants and citizens alike.

Joining Martin, Taylor, and Fischer's works at the end of the Colonial Era are the equally magisterial works by Aristide Zolberg (A Nation By Design...) and Daniel

Tichenor (Dividing Lines...), allowing three more distinct yet complementary perspectives on the policy paths taken in the new USA. Zolberg's approach heavily favors the concept of pragmatic policymaking decisions not overly weighed down by historical context, while

Tichenor's approach is historical institutionalist. When considered alongside Martin’s and Fischer's path dependency analyses, much of the seemingly convoluted thinking behind immigration policy becomes a bit clearer.

Policy at the Colonial-Confederate Transition

Now that everyone who resided in what was now the

United States of America could be considered citizens, it was time to go about deciding how quickly and how

dramatically to pull the ladder up behind them. The

Articles of Confederation and the Constitution both said virtually nothing about immigration guidelines (U.S.

Congress 1980b, 5), necessitating a new round of brainstorming; the earliest true immigration policy formed by the new country was the Naturalization Act of

1790, officially mandating that new residents became eligible for citizenship after two years' residence

(Archdeacon 1984, 58). This very first act also clarified that such citizenship was the exclusive domain of “white persons” (LeMay and Barkan 1999, xxviii), and crucially this remained restricted to those considered white from the 1790s through the 1940s (Anderson and

Fienberg 1999, 176). Granted, this truth did not hold in all states; Wisconsin granted black suffrage in 1849

(Fowler 2008, 7-8),23 and a number of counties throughout the North, counties where Free Soil or Whig influence predominated, also voted for black suffrage (Olbrich

1912, 105-108, 111-113).

23 Though this ruling was quickly deemed by the State Board of Canvassers as null and void, albeit in 1866 retroactively affirmed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Gillespie case (Fowler 2008, 7).

Still, the strong national resistance to non-white suffrage firmly established the fundamental hypocrisy of immigration policy in the Land of the Free that recurs throughout the subsequent centuries; a sort of rehashing of the Colonial era’s illiberal policies. Non-citizens actually enjoyed a wider range of citizen-like benefits than the modern mind would imagine, at this point, up to and including voting rights (Motomura 2006; Filindra

2009). In these early years, it was obviously difficult to decide what to do about those (white) people who continued to arrive from overseas. But paramount amongst policy priorities was altering how long someone had to wait to become “American,” as the Naturalization Act of

1795 demonstrated an early second-guessing of policy, increasing the residency requirement to five years

(Archdeacon 1984, 59) seemingly to assure proper time to assimilate. Evidently two was seen to be too lenient, perhaps too enabling of citizenship to insufficiently dedicated foreigners; indeed, these early years of policymaking ultimately established a surprisingly resilient precedent for future aspiring immigrants.

Other than the brief period a few years later when the

Naturalization Act of 1798 raised the residency requirement to 14 years (Archdeacon 1984, 60), the traditional 5-year wait to potentially ascend to citizenship has proven popular enough with subsequent waves of politicians to remain fundamentally intact.

The continuities and discontinuities of immigrant naturalization policy are possible to see even when examining these antebellum immigration policymaking decisions. This is not to say that all the policies of this period demonstrated such contemplation, nor that many (if any) others were as enduringly acceptable.

Reactionary laws rounded out the last days of the century, as the Alien Enemies Act allowed arrest, imprisonment, and deportation of any non-citizen males aged 14 or greater who posed a threat; meanwhile, the

Aliens Act allowed the President to order any alien suspected of being dangerous to leave the country

(Archdeacon 1984, 60-61). These first moral panics over the immigrant threat on newly-minted-American soil led to the first definitive power of the USA's President to order dangerous outsiders unceremoniously thrown out.

That this new power to arrest, imprison, and deport enemy immigrants only applied to men (Archdeacon 1984,

60) would hardly be the last time that conceptualizations of who counts as a full (and therefore potentially dangerous) person arose in immigration policy. It also demonstrated that the USA wasted no time in establishing a policy to help banish inferior outsiders without much heed to liberal principles. This began an entirely too long tradition of profiling in the USA, whether based on race, ethnicity, sex, or mental capabilities.

Martin proposes that the implementation of these earliest anti-immigrant measures were a result of tensions between the inclusive Pennsylvania and the exclusive Massachusetts models (Martin, 2011, 61), a time when the newly-minted nation perhaps first felt the ardors of the immigration policy divisiveness it had never had to deal with monolithically during its colonial period. Zolberg's national-interest model sees these policies are more straightforward, as the naturalization laws were obviously necessary and it is impossible to decide who to include without deciding who to exclude.

Tichenor argues that general anti-immigrant sentiment was

already building even in this early period, and that this may have been the impetus for enacting checks on free and easy citizenship (Tichenor 2002, 53-54). Thus rather than fundamental disagreement, these three perspectives concur that the new government obviously had to make choices about its new citizenry, and none of the three were particularly surprised that an exclusionary aura surrounded these policies.

The Constitution had specifically prohibited the

Congress from restricting immigration before 1808, but that year came and went with little change in policy

(U.S. Congress 1980a, 17). During this generally slow period of immigration policymaking, and as immigration policy slowly moved from an issue of pure naturalization or expulsion to a more multifaceted world of limits and quotas, the question arose of whether ultimate authority in such matters lay with state or federal government, a vital first step in paving the way for the Select

Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy to one day play its pivotal role. There was only minimal guidance from the federal government on immigration matters in these earliest days, and states generally forged their

own policies based largely or entirely on their own needs

(Filindra 2009, 29).

These earliest restrictions came into being without particular regard to the national origins of the threatening immigrant—the first ethnic-based challenge to a conceptualization of the new USA as a monolithic culture began not long after these first immigrant- fighting laws. In the 1820s, the first of a significant wave of Irish immigrants began to arrive (Zeidel 2004,

10). Ethnic tensions in immigration perhaps for the first time began to ratchet up—and it would be difficult to establish a time when they ever fully ratcheted back down again.

The proverbial warning shot for this group came when individuals promoting their Irish heritage attempted unsuccessfully to lobby Congress for a special mono- ethnic immigration zone in the Northwest Territory

(Huntington 2004, 193). The failure of this effort meant the two-million-plus Irish immigrants arriving over the span of the next four decades intermingling with the general population (Zeidel 2004, 11). Not that it is obvious what the ramifications would have been for an

actual Irish enclave, and perhaps it would have made life even more difficult for any Irish who chose to live outside it, but certainly the problems the Irish faced in this first full American century are well-known. Anti- immigration sentiment reached a crescendo shortly before the Civil War (Zeidel 2004, 10-12), and the association of groups collectively remembered as the Know-Nothings was the mainstream realization of these sentiments

(Edelman 1988, 81-82). Its relatively significant (if brief) electoral success (Kaye 2010, 127-128) speaks to the widespread nativist fears of this period, even as the oldest living citizens would have still predated the nation itself. Indeed, as Zolberg sums it up, “massive immigration, the rapidly increasing participation of foreigners in politics, … contributed to the ‘politics of impatience’ which lay at the root of the spectacular rise of the ‘Know Nothing’ movement” (Zolberg 2003, 216). The

Know-Nothings targeted Irish Catholics as surely as did

Protestants, but their power waned almost as quickly as it waxed (Zeidel 2004, 11-12) when even more pressing national concerns arose—namely the Civil War. But now

we are getting ahead of ourselves, and must refocus on the run up to the Civil War.

Policy from 1824 to the Civil War

The 1824 Supreme Court case Gibbons versus Ogden established Congressional supremacy in both international commerce and, for the first time, immigration regulation

(Zolberg 2006, 112), touching off the slow movement toward full federal control of immigration that solidified by the end of the century. This initial decision was later upheld and strengthened through the

Supreme Court cases (on the issue of local collection of an immigrant head tax), Smith versus Turner and Norris versus City of Boston, collectively and colloquially called the “Passenger Cases” (Zeidel 2004, 11). The

Supreme Court ruled on these cases in 1849, declaring that any subnational laws interfering with immigration infringe upon federal authority in the sphere of regulating interstate and international commerce, which effectively established federal power over immigration

(Zolberg 2006, 148).

The Supreme Court went on to enhance its federal supremacy rulings throughout the next half-century, as in the 1889 case Chae Chan Ping versus the United States

(Motomura 1990, 550-551) where it firmly established the enduring concept of plenary power over immigration.

Plenary power, simply put, is a doctrine of absolute federal supremacy (and sole authorship) over matters pertaining to its borders—or at least this is what it means on paper. In any case, 1892's Ekiu versus the

United States (Motomura 1990, 552) upheld and strengthened plenary power, and Fong Yue Ting versus the

United States confirmed that the Supreme Court could not even review immigration law without the explicit permission of Congress (Motomura 1990, 552-553).

The Supreme Court issued a few rulings granting minor immigration control latitude to states, though mostly relating to what some call immigrant rather than immigration policies,24 in order to distinguish between policies for managing migrants’ entry and assimilation as opposed to managing migrants’ blocked entry and/or

24 The difference is also referred to as “alienage” versus “admissions” policy elsewhere in the literature (Filindra 2009, 12).

deportation (Tichenor 2002, 35; Lahav 2004, 35; Filindra

2009, 12; concept originated with Hammar 1985).

Alexandra Filindra compellingly illustrates some of these exceptions through the perennial federal tolerance of state-level restrictions on employment for non-citizens

(Filindra 2009, 26/141-144/148-149), even as it maintains control over the majority of policies relating to immigrants. Despite these exceptions, plenary power over immigration matters still stands overall as one of the most enduring fundamental principles of federal sovereignty.

Still, subnational immigration lawmaking continued in earnest (Archdeacon, 1984, 36), and it was twenty more years until 1874's Henderson versus Mayor of New York led to stating that even an admissions policy is a federal responsibility (Filindra, 2009, 7). States such as

California endorsed policies representing significant diversion from federal priorities, particularly in its vociferous opposition to the 1868 Burlingame Treaty and its encouragement of Chinese immigration (Filindra, 2009,

29). The earlier Supreme Court decisions had focused power toward the federal government, but the real

consolidation of federal authority did not appear until the plenary power decisions of the 1880s.25

When the plenary power doctrine first came into being, state and federal immigration policy preferences were significantly divergent. The federal government had a good working relationship with China; it had used

Chinese labor to build its transcontinental railroad system, Chinese immigration was relatively small in number, and represented a generally beneficial exchange between the two countries (Zolberg 2006, 191). But at

25 A lengthy sidebar is needed here: It is the focus of Mae N. Ngai’s Impossible Subjects… that the construction of the illegal alien, in tandem with general trends of restrictionist and exclusionist immigration policymaking, are constitutive elements of U.S. national identity and nationalism (Ngai 2004; similarly argued in Hondagneu- Sotelo 2008). This dovetails excellently with the increasingly popular pop culture caricature of the willfully ignorant “’Merican” citizen, perpetually outraged about all foreign influence, no matter how benign. In some sense the federal consolidation of immigration authority is inexorably linked to these conceptualizations of nationalism, and the fact that crimes often seen as moderate personal failings, from shoplifting to DUIs, can be seen in the aggregate as serious enough to warrant deportation (Ngai 2004, 1-2) speaks very directly to differing conceptualizations of freedom and the pursuit of happiness for citizens and immigrants. It also likely speaks to the enduring popularity and influence of individuals that Didier Bigo insightfully called “professionals of unease” (Bigo 2002, 63).

the state and local level, Chinese immigrants were viewed with enmity bordering on revulsion. States like

California pushed hard to craft increasingly innovative anti-Chinese laws (Tichenor 2002, 92-93), and it became obvious that the continued political support of these states hinged on whether the federal government took their side. It was becoming increasingly clear that immigration was an explosive political issue, and was not likely to disappear from the national stage without intervention.

Though Tichenor's framework might not address the idea of an immigration policy actor specifically stripping itself of the right to engage in the policy process, the Supreme Court is not specifically acknowledged as possessing pivotal importance in either his or Martin's understandings of immigration policy.

Zolberg's commentary on the Supreme Court's stances on this issue, however, reinforces the idea that its rulings essentially uphold a sovereign nation’s freedom to control the comings and goings of individuals into its jurisdiction (225). Thus, it seems Zolberg's is the only framework that can help suggest why the Supreme Court

behaved the way it did, for pragmatic policy concerns.

Congress had taken several steps in the past to modify the USA's approach toward immigrants, but the plenary power step marked the beginning of an extended period of dramatic change in immigration policy, culminating in the

1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, whose fundamental principles continue driving policy more than a quarter-century later—but obviously this is getting ahead of the narrative.

For the latter half of the 1800s, the concept of federal supremacy was often ignored by states and municipalities on a large scale. California's continual disregard for the federal stranglehold on immigration policy led to the state attempting to create its own policies time and again (Wyman 2010; Motomura 1990,

2006). But federal policies then began to follow the lead set by the state, again due to the enormous electoral power present in these states (Filindra 2009,

29-30). In California's case, this helped turn the federal government around on the issue of Chinese worker immigration via the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act (Filindra

2009, 29), which represented the first directed

racialization of immigration policy (Wyman, 2010, 217-

218). It also helped abolish Chinese immigration in general, by leading to the 1892 Geary Act and its further impact on even extant Chinese immigrants (Chin 2005, 16).

These aspects of Californian immigration concerns echoed the most pivotal questions near the turn of the century related to regulating migration issues arising from Asians (Zolberg 2006, 191; Zeidel 2004, 12;

Archdeacon 1984; 148), immoral females (Archdeacon 1984,

144; Zeidel 2004, 12; Abrams 2005, 641), or 'inferior'

European stock (Kaye 2010, 82). Many such issues created stark contrasts between federal and subfederal governments, particularly in exclusionary matters, though this period also included the first definitive racialization of USA immigration policy via the Chinese

Exclusion Act (Wyman 2010, 217-218). The beginning of this period saw greater interest in migrants at the local and state level than the federal level, but ultimately within a few decades the momentum had switched, leading to the bubbling up of bottom-up restrictionist sentiment that eventually permeated much of the federal government as well.

A necessary side note here regarding what would eventually become the greatest immigration conundrum in the USA: the first substantial appearance of Latin

American, and particularly Mexican, migrants. This issue seemed almost entirely unimportant at the time of the end of the Mexican-American War, and the subsequent Treaty of

Guadalupe Hidalgo. Yet these events brought the Mexican populace of its definitively-annexed area into the USA as new citizens by treaty right (LeMay and Barkan 1999: xxxi), and its somewhat (in hindsight) obvious ramifications are a subject for discussion later in the chapter.

Returning to other matters in the mid-1800s, the ongoing and increasing appeal of the USA to disillusioned

Europeans throughout saw foreign development of push controls on migration even as the USA often enhanced its pull controls. The United Kingdom had overhauled its efforts at emigration restriction as early as 1803 by raising the costs of ocean transportation (Archdeacon

1984, 28), and in 1819 the USA imposed its own limitations on the number of passengers allowed on incoming ships (Zolberg 2006, 110-111), requiring

submission of passenger manifests in a move that continued until 1870 (U.S. Congress 1980b, 6), further complicating the process. That stood as one of the first major pieces of immigration legislation passed by

Congress (U.S. Congress 1980b, 5), and it was not until

1847 that the USA passed another measure, a new Passenger

Act imposing further restrictions on the number of passengers allowed on a single vessel (Zolberg 2006,

146); meanwhile in 1849 the English forbade involuntary assignment of men and women to the same berth (Archdeacon

1984, 35). All the aforementioned American legislation was repealed and replaced with the Passenger Act of 1855, confirming the ongoing efforts of the USA to reexamine subnational pull factors (Zolberg 2006, 158).

Returning to the immigration analysis frameworks for a moment, an interesting and troubling fact emerges here with Martin's general thematic argument. Quite early in

American history, Pennsylvania was the first state to enact limits on the number of passengers who could be carried on an incoming vessel (Martin 2011, 64). It is difficult to imagine how this was a humanitarian gesture in keeping with Pennsylvania's traditions, and seemed

rather a genuine effort to stop the flow of immigrants, more akin to Massachusetts-model behavior.

For that matter, Zolberg and Tichenor do not necessarily fare much better in explaining this turn toward restrictionist behavior. Zolberg identifies a general unwillingness for politicians to alienate the immigrant vote already in place by this period (Zolberg

2006, 57), and does not identify sufficient cause for restrictionist alarm, and Tichenor suggests that this was the period of the first real immigration crisis in

American History (Tichenor 2002, 99), but does not explain why the general array of pro-immigrant forces was overruled in this case.26 This is a more overt set of anti-immigration policies than was the simple act of crafting general naturalization policy. Each of these theories in some way touches on the problems of the policy feedback loop (Massey 2011; Wolgin 2011, 1-2) constraining future immigration choices.

There were also mid-century immigration concerns building outside the realm of official policymaking. The

26 At least until 1855, when the 34th Congress decided it lacked the legal standing to bar immigrants from admission no matter their character and quality (Zeidel 2004, 11)

first inklings of a burgeoning nativist movement had appeared as early as the 1830s, when anti-Catholic publications began circulation, and such movements continued growing into the 1840s, when secret societies like the Order of the Star-Spangled Banner (even before its evolution into part of the Know-Nothing Movement) began publishing screeds discussing what it meant to be a

“Real American” (U.S. Congress 1980a, 19). The echoes of the nativist proclamations of true Americanness of course linger even today, though now such arguments are made from virtually all parts of the political spectrum and by both supporters and opponents of immigration. Prior to the Civil War, nativism seemed almost as a potential way to smooth over the USA’s deep divisions over slavery by refocusing on a new other. But ultimately, economic need and exhortations to value liberty proved more persuasive than anti-Catholic heritage or fears of foreign takeover

(U.S. Congress 1980a, 18-19) … at least, for the moment.

Samuel Morse's claim that incoming Irish Catholic immigrants were “human priest-controlled machines” (U.S.

Congress 1980a, 19) were perhaps inevitable due to the

Irish potato famine leading to the largest ethnic

immigration yet seen, with, again, a full 2 million Irish arriving by 1860 (U.S. Congress 1980a, 19). The culture clash taking place at this point was perhaps an unavoidable one; as the SCIRP staff report reminds us, the USA was founded by some of the most radical

Protestants—and as radical literally refers to roots, radicalism was an attempt to metaphorically grasp an issue by the roots (McCarthy & Trodd 2009, xi), and in this case to start anew in a place where religious and cultural Protestantism could flourish unhindered by the historical weight of religious conflicts that prevented advancement in Europe. To the settlers of the nascent

United States of America, the Pope was seen as just as much a tyrant as any European king; the idea that the

Pope's loyal flock could ever accede to the new nation's conceptualizations of democracy seemed completely impossible to much of this Protestant stock (U.S.

Congress 1980a, 18-19). Little wonder that such consistent Catholic-Protestant conflict occurred (and recurred).

Tichenor sees the progression towards restrictionism from the middle of the 1800s as a fairly logical shift in

priorities on the part of several significant groups

(Tichenor 2002, 85-86). The divisions in the political world between those supporting and those opposing relatively free immigration continued to grow, as increased European recruitment (Tichenor 2002, 66) sat side-by-side with a rising tide of intellectual opposition (that eventually coalesced into the development of eugenics and the formation of groups like the Immigration Restriction League [Tichenor 2002, 79-

85]), and it became clear that business groups and liberal cosmopolitans had shared interests just as nativist reactionaries and prominent intellectuals did

(Tichenor 2002, 80-86). With the Ivy League intellectual support for eugenics and immigration restriction, now the

West and the East were seemingly aligned in their xenophobic beliefs, and the South was not far behind.

The often-competing groups aligning over the immigrant threat help explain the convoluted and often abortive immigration policy efforts at this point, certainly better than does Zolberg's suggestion of the national interest, given that any concept of the national interest was unclear. Martin suggests that the

Pennsylvania model continued to dominate in dealings with

Western and Northern European immigrants (Martin 2011,

103), but that others were presumably seen through more pragmatic prisms (Martin 2011, 103-104). Still, she has a difficult time explaining how Irish Catholics might broadly fit into this general regional division (Martin

2011, 103), indicating that Tichenor's model provides the best explanatory power overall in this period.

During this time of rising xenophobic and nativist beliefs, Wisconsin became perhaps the first state to attempt to take immigration matters into its own hands after the plenary power decision, and began advertising the merits of emigrating through advertisements in

European newspapers and pamphlets (Archdeacon 1984, 36).

In 1862, the USA re-enacted the Homestead Law, granting land to resident aliens filing a “declaration of intention” (Zolberg: 169). This act was perhaps responsible for the doubling of European arrivals in 1863

(Zolberg: 169). In 1864, perhaps in what can be seen as an ancestor to the World War foreign worker recruitment drives of the next century, the ongoing Civil War necessitated an expansive search for a replacement

workforce, leading to the Act to Encourage Immigration paying transportation fees for incoming migrants in potential exchange for these new migrants helping recoup the costs of their migration by “pledg[ing] the wages of their labor [for up to a year]” (Kaye 2010, 82).

The fundamentals of the 1864 Act to Encourage

Immigration were perhaps the first indication of the future of American attitudes toward immigration, offering something akin to indentured servitude as it did (Zolberg

2006, 171-172). It is easy to hear echoes of this logic in future temporary and guest worker programs, and this program’s repeal four years later (Zolberg 2006, 180) has its own echoes in the ambivalent modern attitudes toward such programs. Indeed only in 1891 did Congress seek to begin curtailing this formal encouragement of migration by steamship lines, through a regimen of increased fines for doing so (Archdeacon 2006, 145).

Postbellum Policy to Pre-Great War Policy

But despite the dramatic changes this period brought to the USA, nativism definitively survived. After the

Civil War, nativist and racist hatred in the South

largely changed to focus on its own former slave populations, and a general ambivalence about immigration kept these former slave-owning areas of the country from stirring up much anti-immigrant sentiment of its own for decades (Zeidel 2004, 43-45). Rather, the West would lead the rabble-rousing in the latter part of the 1800s, and such hatred began to flare up in subsequent years against new targets: Asians, Jews, Italians, Poles, and

Slavs (U.S. Congress 1980a, 19).

Though most of these immigrant groups were only then beginning to arrive in significant numbers, for the

Chinese, this discrimination already had some precedent.

There had been some initial dramatic (yet ultimately short-lived) efforts at discriminating against Chinese miners in 1850s California. “[M]ore than five hundred

California mining districts … barred Mexicans, Asians, or other immigrants from staking claims” (Rawls 1999, 9) and the “California Legislature in 1850 enacted a foreign miners' license tax requiring miners who were not citizens of the United States to pay a fee of twenty dollars a month” (Rawls 1999, 9).

Though this license tax and its accompanying threats of violence led to 10,000 Mexican miners leaving

California (Rawls 1999, 9), the law was replaced in 1852 by one requiring three dollars a month rather than twenty

(Luibhéid 2002, 32; Yung 1995, 22), and targeted almost exclusively Chinese immigrants by restricting the fee to only those migrants who were ineligible for naturalization (Rawls 1999, 9), thus overlooking

Mexicans. On its face this seems like an effort to push back against restrictionism. Yet this law, almost exclusively through contributions from Chinese immigrants, had “brought in nearly a fourth of the state's entire revenue” (Rawls and Bean 1997, 135) before being declared unconstitutional in 1870. Thus it seems likely that the modified tax was merely intended to be a pragmatic balance between keeping the immigrant masses away and continuing to fleece those who opted to stay and work.

In 1868, the Act to Encourage Immigration was officially repealed (Zolberg 2006, 180). Similar practices continued throughout the nation for years afterward to compensate for ongoing labor shortages (Kaye

2010, 82-83), however; furthermore, in this atmosphere of momentary migrant encouragement, it is little wonder that the USA was willing to take a chance on a new potential source of economic migrants. The federal government specifically authorized the immigration of Chinese citizens to the USA through the 1868 Burlingame Treaty

(Chin 2005, 8), ushering in a solid albeit relatively brief era of comparatively minimal discrimination against

Chinese citizens, at least after the 1870 repeal of

Californian taxes on Chinese fishermen, laundrymen, and brothel owners (Yung 1995, 22). But seeds of immigrant fear were, in hindsight, predictably planted by this step encouraging new Chinese migrants.

An inherent bias favoring wealthy immigrants had long existed through the sheer logistical ability to afford passage, hence efforts to mitigate the cost of overseas travel as in the Act to Encourage Immigration.

But more overt efforts to shape the type of immigrants arriving in the United States began to appear as the

1800s came to a close. The Burlingame Treaty was an unusually gracious federal act in comparison, even given the problems that followed in its wake. Localities were

also still administering the processing of arriving migrants at this point (Zeidel 2004, 11), and accompanying these local-level efforts were similarly local threats to refuse immigrants entry (Filindra 2009,

7), hinting at the sort of anti-immigration policies that were still forthcoming.

Yet racialized policies were hardly the only discriminatory policymaking going on in this period.

Even from a non-immigration perspective, women obviously occupied a formally second-class role in society at this point, given their inability to vote if nothing else (and there were plenty more reasons). But this was also the period when formal restrictions placed on female immigrants began to demonstrate the particularly cruel and arbitrary ways that the government discriminated against women through a patriarchal lens. But in 1874 the United States Ninth Circuit Court ruled the

California act specifically prohibiting the importation of Asian women unconstitutional, saying that the federal government must deal with the issue (Luibhéid 2002, 34)— but the federal government did indeed address it posthaste. Felons (Archdeacon 1984, 144) and Chinese

prostitutes (Abrams 2005, 641) had the dubious honor of being the first types of people specifically federally forbidden from coming to the United States, through the

Page Act legislation passed in 1875, a particularly dubious decision given the widely-held assumption that virtually every Chinese woman seeking admission was a prostitute (Luibhéid 2002, 31-33). In addition to these restrictions, statutes in places like California demanded that any Asian woman already in the country have proof of voluntary migration and also of a vaguely-defined “good character” (Luibhéid 2002, 33-34) or they would be assumed to be prostitutes.

But California served as a new focal point for anti- immigrant sentiment, even dating back to before the Gold

Rush and its subsequent migrant influx (Filindra 2009,

87), and even ostensibly indirect policies were still clearly targeted at immigrants—though the wider public sphere largely did not share such beliefs until Asian immigrants began arriving and settling (and succeeding) in greater numbers (Filindra 2009, 87). When

California's civil code was amended in 1880, it was in the name of disallowing whites to marry a “Negro,

Mulatto, or Mongolian” (Yung 1995, 29). Indeed, for some debates the only pro-Chinese immigration arguments rested on assumptions simultaneously racist and sexist, as with the argument that Chinese prostitutes should be allowed to immigrate as otherwise Chinese men might patronize white prostitutes (Luibhéid 2002, 35).

There were few ways in which the powerful white majority did not seek to hinder the progress of immigrants at this point. The aforementioned restrictions were joined not long afterward by prohibitions on those bearing dangerous diseases, polygamists (Archdeacon 1984, 145), and all those likely to become a public charge (Price 2009, 54). The United

States put an initial set of limits on Chinese laborers in 1880, but later agreed to not prohibit their immigration altogether (Zolberg 2006, 191) ... at least until the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. This act brought explicitly and solely racialized concepts to American immigration policy for the first time (Wyman 2010, 217-

218), and the 1892 Geary Act outright prohibited virtually all Chinese individuals from even entering the country save a select few elite (Chin 2005, 16). The

United States had declared the flow of Chinese immigrants to be a direct threat to its national security, and purely domestic action was no longer sufficient.27

Racialized politics truly came to the forefront of immigration policy at the end of the 1800s, often in relation to Asian migrants. Foreign settlements throughout the West were “attacked by bloodthirsty mobs out to loot, lynch, burn, and drive the Chinese out”

(Yung 1995, 22). Along with these popular uprisings came a new-found dedication on the federal government's part for formal identification record-keeping by ship captains, ordered in 1891 to report names, nationalities, former residencies, and intended destinations for all passengers, making shipping lines liable for repatriation of any inadmissible individuals they ferried to American shores (Archdeacon 1984, 145).

Such actions may, in a sense, be the first attempt to use employer sanctions in the United States.

Certainly, it is a distant ancestor of what Aristide

27 Here we see an interesting parallel with the next century’s securitization of migration; demonizing migrants for migrating, while continuing to encourage migrant laboring on behalf of the state. Though the fact of Chinese labor was itself seen as a bigger threat than the fact of Mexican labor a century later.

Zolberg came to call “remote control” (Zolberg 2003, 194-

196), representing “the first instance of processes whose locus was in Europe, but also of an absence of barriers to entry into the United States” (Zolberg 2003, 207).

Dorothee Schneider’s focus on this shifting of the locus of control as a vital element of the so-called “Open Door

Era” (Schneider 2007, 195) highlights the interesting fact that the U.S. Government experimented with placing the burden of managing immigrants on private entities or even foreign governments before it ever decided to give itself supreme domestic power over the issue.

But back to the racial exclusion of Chinese immigrants. China’s enthusiasm for “Western democracy,

Western liberal ideas, and Western learning” (MacMillan

2001, 322) belied its decades of humiliating treatment vis-à-vis U.S. immigration policy, and the general U.S. interest in ensuring an “open door through which everyone could exploit the Chinese equally” (MacMillan 2001, 324; similar ideas to Curtin 2000, 17-18). Exclusion of

Chinese immigrants began to bleed into calls to prohibit

Japanese immigrants as well, and eventually the 1907

Gentlemen's Agreement informally prohibited all Japanese

laborers from entering the country (Wyman 2010, 226).

This, as they say, was a fine way to treat an ally.

Japan, as China before it, had drawn the ire of the

U.S. exploitation machine, yet remained optimistic for a diplomatic future. At the crucial Paris Peace Conference of 1919 the U.S. was the prime belligerent against

Japanese interests (MacMillan 2001, 328). The U.S. refusal to endorse either a Japanese request for racial equality for the League of Nations, or their territorial claims on the Shantung railway, led inexorably to feelings of humiliation amongst the Japanese government

(MacMillan 2001, 336-337, 342). Yet this offered only the barest glimpse of the true horrors of war to come in part due to these bullheaded decisions.

Even considering the catastrophic treatment of Asian migrants and its enormous related fallout, the ethnic group that would ultimately become the primary focus of immigration policy in the United States, Mexicans (and other Latin Americans generally lumped into the same category), only even officially had their American- resident migrants counted for the first time in 1908

(Archdeacon 1984, 129). Their slow but virtually

irreversible appearance in society is no surprise in hindsight. Mexico's proximity to hugely-expanding economic sectors—industries that could not easily rely on cheap Chinese labor due to restrictionist tendencies— suggested that Mexico represented the source of an excellent and perhaps even superior replacement for

China's disappearing expatriate labor force, and the slow integration of Mexicans into the USA after the Treaty of

Guadalupe Hidalgo undoubtedly only exacerbated migratory movements by opening the door to later claims of rightful residency.

Gazing back onto this period of immigration policy history, the SCIRP's first semiannual report to Congress self-reflectively demarcates the kind of paradigm shift seen in the nativist racialization and general restrictionist belief that gained such initial traction at the end of the 1800s:

The fact is that the North American Continent was open virtually to anyone who could come here, not just in the 17th and 18th centuries but also during the first 100 years after the founding of the United States of America. During those first 100 years, the country's policy was that anyone who could reach America could stay. Our second 100 years, however, have been characterized by a series of laws increasing, refining, and altering restrictions

on who is allowed into the country as an immigrant. (U.S. Congress 1980a, 16)

The U.S. Commission on Immigration, 1907-1911

By the end of the first decade of the 1900s, the

Japanese had been excluded via the Gentlemen's Agreement in much the same way as had the Chinese before them

(Wyman 2010, 226), and further laws sought to close remaining loopholes regarding indirect entrance through

U.S.A. territories (Archdeacon 1984, 164). Importantly, the 1908 Gentlemen's Agreement occurred the same year as the first time American inspectors attempted a full count of Mexican migrants (Archdeacon 1984, 129), marking a epochal turning point in American migration history. But most importantly, in the midst of this first decade of immigration policy upheaval came the United States

Immigration Commission.

Better known as the “Dillingham Commission,” this study of immigration was the most comprehensive ever ordered by Congress, and in sheer volume still may remain the most exhaustive single piece of migration research in history, totalling as it does over 30,000 pages of purportedly scientific research. Written in an era of

“scientific racism” and blatant eugenics, this nine- member Commission was created by Section 39 of the

Immigration Act of 1907 (Zeidel 2004, 3). From perusing political science immigration texts, one gets the impression of a fairly straightforward event, albeit a monumentally important one.

The Dillingham Commission warrants barely a mention in Archdeacon's magisterial 1984 account of immigration policy history, framed essentially as something Theodore

Roosevelt did to set his mind at ease concerning his own conflicted feelings on the subject of immigration

(Archdeacon 1984, 163). Alan Dowty meanwhile discussed this commission in 1987 as laying the foundation for discriminatory immigration restrictions through its dramatic alarm over “alien invasions” (Dowty 1987, 53) and all the negativity such a statement entails. Desmond

King's chapter-length survey of the commission in his

2000 book discusses a litany of racist scientific misdeeds (King 2000, 61-69), and Daniel Tichenor's brief section on the subject in the still more recent Dividing

Lines similarly highlights its eugenicist and nativist thought and the policies such thinking suggested

(Tichenor 2002, 128-132). Aristide Zolberg's account of the commission is the most recent and is also fairly straightforward, leading in only a few paragraphs from the commission's creation to its institutionalizing of racialist science and the policymaking legacy it would leave behind (232-233).

Yet all of these analyses share an intriguing feature—they seem to have been written without delving into the bulk of the Dillingham Commission reports. Or, potentially (and somewhat libelously), without looking at the Commission at all. Perhaps the most telling sign that they are second (or third[+])-hand reports is a particular repeated mistake regarding the reports— frequent references to its 42 volumes (Tichenor 2002,

129), despite the 42nd volume (a planned comprehensive index), never actually coming to fruition, existing only as a hypothetical sketch of the final set of reports

(Zeidel 2004, 7). Desmond King repeats this painfully noticeable 42-volume error in his work as well (King

2000, 58), as does Zolberg (2006, 232). Similarly, both

Zolberg and King inflate the negative messages of the commission (King 2000, 79-81), and King ignores the vast

bulk of the material on European emigration, much of which actually paints a very favorable portrait of “new immigrant stock” (Zeidel 2004) in their natural element, contrary to nearly everything written on the subject in later years.

Other errors are easy to spot even without the benefit of having read the reports. Zolberg's penchant for quoting negative anecdotes about some of the commission's members, including Henry Cabot Lodge's near- endorsement of lynching in particular (Zolberg 2006,

213), make the full truth of the matter all the more intriguing: that even arch-restrictionist Lodge had tempered his anti-immigrant views by the end of the study

(Zeidel 2004, 111-112). When it came time to collapse the commission's mountain of data into an easily navigable report, Lodge expressed reservations at many of the harsh restrictivist recommendations (Zeidel 2004,

112-113). To Zolberg's credit, he does come closest of all these scholars to providing a minimally biased account of the Dillingham Commission, acknowledging that its findings were fairly liberal for the time, and that

they did occasionally refer to new-stock immigrants in a positive light (Zolberg 2006, 230-233).

This general misunderstanding of the Dillingham

Commission is not a recent error resulting from some myopic tendency to pay less attention to a subject as it drifts further away in time. Oscar Handlin's foundational Race and Nationality in American Life propagated the 42-volume error in 1957, and this error was accompanied with perhaps the first major glossing- over of the Commission’s somewhat nuanced views on migrants in favor of a eugenicist focus on Southern and

Eastern Europeans as a poor fit for America (Handlin

1957, 94-95). Zeidel's authoritative look at the subject would seem to suggest that the Commission identified a surprising degree of industriousness and potential viability as immigrants for all the studied peoples of

Europe.

The Dillingham Commission was essentially a

Progressivist attempt to create a tabula rasa for immigration policy understanding; the sheer depth and breadth of the investigation is difficult to comprehend even with the full 41 volumes of the final report, and as

Zeidel said in his analysis of the commission and its ambition (from what few papers remain discussing it), the commission essentially tried to do too much: studying virtually every type of immigrant in every milieu from city to country, factory to farm, Atlantic to Pacific, even sometimes investing their own money in the project if finding themselves over budget (Zeidel 2004, 85). The whole process would have likely continued expanding even further if Congress' patience had not run out (Zeidel

2004, 84-85, 145-146).28

Ultimately, the Dillingham Commission's report found essentially no justification for implementing harsh restrictivist measures (Zeidel 2004, 115). The

Dillingham Commission's modern reputation hardly gives them credit for even coming this close to avoiding restrictionist policy recommendations. Its ability to engage in a thorough and largely unbiased investigation into immigration, while still coming away with the recommendations they did, suggests something disrupted the positive feedback loop along the way. Zeidel suggests the commission's members were self-aware of the

28 Sounds like an academic endeavor, for sure!

problems of holding forums or hearings on immigration as they would result in the rehashing of the same arguments with no attention to factual detail (Zeidel 2004, 69), a suggestion George Borjas gives voice to in the contemporary world through his assertion that interpreting immigration data ultimately requires some measure of ideological filter (Borjas 2007). Just before releasing the official report, John Burnett, the

Dillingham Commission's most adamant xenophobe (Zeidel

2004, 113), was for whatever reason evidently able to convince a critical mass of the others to strongly recommend implementing a literacy test of the sort the nativists had been demanding for years (Zeidel 2004, 113-

114). This despite that neither the person who originally suggested it, nor its other adherents, offered any proof that such a policy would lead to its intended goals (Zeidel 2004, 15-22). The impact of this decision obviously rippled through the 20th century, and examining the SCIRP for evidence of last-minute compromises will prove similarly interesting.

…And Policy From 1911 to 1979

In 1914, Mexican labor received its first major boost when the erstwhile mandatory literacy tests and $8 head taxes levied on all new immigrants to the United

States were waived for Mexicans, a change made at the continued urging of farmers who had already even in this early year come to rely on them as a source of prolific and cheap labor (Archdeacon 1984, 129). This first exemption was followed in 1917 by a renewed effort to ban advance agricultural employment contracts, and to implement head taxes and literacy requirements (Wyman

2010, 158-159)—to which agriculture and railroad interests received 70,000 exemptions for their Mexican workforce (Zolberg 2006, 241). These hundred-year-old policies demonstrate the truly lengthy history of

Mexicans receiving double standards setting up their eventual vilification (from Americans and from other immigrant groups).

Controversial decisions about immigration began almost at once after the Dillingham Commission, and led to such policies as the aforementioned literacy test

(Zeidel 2004, 116; Wyman 2010; Price 2009, 54), barring

virtually all Asians from entering the USA (Filindra

2009, 128; Chin 2005, 16), establishing Prohibition in significant part to attack urban immigrant Catholics

(Archdeacon 1984, 170), the Palmer Raids against foreign radicals (Archdeacon 1984, 169), and the devastating

National Origins Act (Wyman 2010, 161). These negative measures continued through the 1930s, when little- heralded mass deportations of Mexican migrants

(Hondagneu-Sotelo 2007) began in earnest, foreshadowing the next great immigration problem in the USA. This federal program was carried out by local and state authorities, and amongst the nearly one million deported, many were American citizens of Mexican descent

(Hondagneu-Sotelo 2007), even potentially 40% or more of the total (Filindra 2009, 31), though this and the World

War II internment of Japanese nationals were perhaps the last time immigrants and citizens were rounded up indiscriminately by order of the federal government.

The middle of the century actually saw a reasonable improvement for migrants over earlier years. Returning

World War II soldiers wishing to bring their Asian wives sparked possibly the first pro-immigration federal

policy, aside from the first bracero program (Archdeacon,

1984, 179), since the 1800s (Wolgin 2011, 13). The second such bracero program brought in additional huge numbers of Mexican workers in the 1950s and 1960s; nearly five million entries had occurred by the time the program ended (Archdeacon, 1984, 1981, 179; Tichenor 2002, 210).

The Immigration and Naturalization (McCarran-Walter)

Act of 1952 continued the work begun by the soldiers' wives exception and opened up immigration in general even while keeping quotas in effect (Archdeacon 1984, 181-

182). While it abolished all racial requirements to citizenship on its face (Ngai 2004, 38), its focus on

Western Hemisphere countries (Ngai 2004, 254) foreshadowed the 1965 revisions. The fact that an arch- nativist cosponsored the Act in Congress also did not bode particularly well for its long-term equanimity (Ngai

2004, 212). Perhaps this is why the European quota numbers’ renewed focus on pre-War totals (U.S. Congress

1980a, 116) seemed somewhat worryingly inspired by the

Dillingham Commission’s eugenicist findings on the value of old- versus new-stock immigrants (Zeidel 2004).

Thus 1965 marked the year that immigration was placed on an essentially race-neutral basis in the U.S.A. for the first time (Chin 2005, 23), based on new amendments to the generally serviceable 1952 INA

(Archdeacon 1984, 207). Eugenicist theories of immigration had become so discredited by the Second World

War that arguments of cultural identity, rather than racial purity, were generally needed thereafter whenever justifying immigration restrictions (Archdeacon 1984,

201). Unfortunately, such arguments have not exactly been in short supply since.

Nor were racially-based laws entirely eliminated at first. Yes, the 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act claimed to abandon race as a bar to immigration and naturalization (U.S. Congress 1980a, 116), and duly treated Europeans per their country of origin. Yet often the new law categorized Asian applicants by their ethnicity instead (Archdeacon 1984, 181-182). The United

States did not have a formally race-neutral immigration policy until 1965 (Chin 2005, 23), though certainly there are arguments to be made through the present day that a truly race-neutral immigration policy still does not

exist—given that the United States' border with Mexico receives the overwhelming brunt of security-framed border enforcement, despite the fact that no terrorists have ever been known to enter there, whereas terrorists have definitively entered through Canada on multiple occasions

(Heyman and Ackleson 2010, 39).29

Though easy to imagine that World War II worker replacement needs drove the massive spike in Mexican immigration that continued through the middle of the 20th century, it seems obvious in hindsight that it was instead the booming economy of the 1950s that drove this expansion. Never did more than roughly 60,000 Mexicans workers arrive during any individual year of the World

War II plan (extending through 1947 per statistics (U.S.

Congress 1980a, 18), and yet at its height in the 1950s, nearly ten times that number arrived (U.S. Congress

1980a, 17). These programs, collectively seen as “farm labor supply appropriations acts” (U.S. Congress 1980a,

29 Indeed, the militarization of the border seen in conjunction with the adoption of immigration oversight on the part of law enforcement seems to render true Didier Bigo’s insight that police and military, despite ostensibly existing as separate spheres of domestic and international security, are on a path to merge over issues of border control, order, threats to identity, and migration in general (Duffield 2006, 68-69).

18) during World War II, provided emergency labor at critical times, but perhaps crucially excluded any emergency labor funds from assisting in domestic labor recruitment.

[N]o funds made available for these purposes ‘shall be used directly or indirectly to fix, regulate, or impose minimum wages or housing standards, to regulate hours of work, or to impose or enforce collective-bargaining requirements or union membership, with respect to any agricultural labor, except with respect to workers imported into the United States from a foreign country and then only to the extent required to comply with agreements with the government of such foreign country… (U.S. Congress 1980a, 18).

But given how important Mexican immigration quickly became around this point, it is necessary to take a quick step back to focus on this issue specifically. The two bracero programs in the United States, stretching from

1941-1947 (Archdeacon 1984, 179) and 1951-1964, brought more than 4.3 million Mexicans into the United States

(Archdeacon 1984, 179, Tichenor 2002, 210). All this despite occurring at a time when the general trend towards immigration was still restrictionist in nature, other than allowing for significant integration of

displaced citizens of countries impacted by World War II

(Archdeacon 1984, 180-181).

The 1952 INA struck at roughly the half-way point of the two Bracero programs and their impact on society, and it can scarcely be underestimated what an impact it had on the shape of U.S. immigration for the next half- century. Its laissez-faire approach to Western

Hemisphere migration was in keeping with the ongoing efforts to favor back-door immigration solutions to labor or demographic shortages, leading to a de facto legalization standard from 1942 to 1964 (Castles and

Miller 2009, 242-243). That these frequent legalizations were also operated in parallel with deportation programs colloquially dubbed by a racist designation (Castles and

Miller 2009, 243) presciently demonstrated naturalization was hardly incompatible with racism.

For this broad period of racialized and generally exclusionary immigration policy, it seems obvious that

Tichenor and Martin's ideas carry the most weight. A myriad of groups, from downtrodden blacks (Zolberg 2006,

184) to racist nativists (Tichenor 2002, 151), supported these policies, and only the existence of the ironclad

support of the Immigration Bureau and Labor Department in conjunction with growers in need of cheap farm labor helped prevent restrictionists from wielding even greater power (Tichenor 2002, 150-151). Martin's view of this period of the “Triumph of Restrictionism” (Martin 2011,

132) was that ultimately the Pennsylvania model was seen as a naïve experiment in assumptions of the good of humanity, to be replaced by the pragmatic Virginia model of guest workers (Martin 2011, 150). Zolberg's narrative nicely illustrates how Chinese migrants went from a novel curiosity to perhaps the most vilified immigrant group in a few scant decades (Zolberg 2006, 179, 184), but cannot generally explain why it was in the national interest to prevent the lowest-paid workers from remaining or even entering the country.

Still, back to analyzing the broad restrictionist turn in the early-middle 20th century: Just as Martin sees the National Origins Quota signified the death of the Pennsylvania model, she sees the Great Depression as a temporary destruction of the Virginia model (Martin

2011, 152). She generally claims that the middle of the

20th century was essentially a mixture of the Virginia

and Massachusetts models (Martin 2011, 182), but does not particularly explain how the Massachusetts model is compatible with immigration of culturally dissimilar laborers. Zolberg fares better here, as he does in most times of relatively greater immigration; he discusses how the fundamental questioning of the eugenicist regimes of the 1920s (Zolberg 2006, 293) led directly to the elimination of quotas in 1965 (Zolberg 2006, 293) through a series of realizations that America needed cheap labor.

After 1948, agricultural employers then received significant enough benefits to make bracero labor definitively cheaper than the domestic alternatives

(Zolberg 2006, 309-310). Tichenor sees the rising notion of inequality as being an inherently un-American belief as potentially the greatest change to the vying policy- shaping forces. This is particularly so in the immediate postwar period, when despite a brief nativist resurgence, the fight against Communism created a group of immigrants

(Communist country refugees) for whom it was easy to feel great sympathy, and opening up the door to further domestic cooperation on expansionist immigration policy

(Tichenor 2002, 176-177).

When queried for reflection on the successes and failures of the Bracero programs, Congressman Richard C.

White summarized his thoughts in a statement presented to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy in 1980:

[I]n 1950 only 67,500 Mexican laborers came to the United States under the [Bracero] program. That same year the Border Patrol apprehended 468,339 deportable aliens, and 98 percent were from Mexico. From 1950 on, the Bracero Program started realizing more concentrated use, and it peaked at 1959 when 437,643 Mexican workers were utilized. That same year only 30,000 deportable Mexican aliens were located. This trend held through 1964, the year the program was terminated by Congress. That’s when our real illegal alien problem started. In 1965, the year following termination of the program, apprehension of deportable Mexican aliens jumped to over 55,000, and the number has drastically compounded each year with 1979 recording 1,069,400 such apprehensions. Of this number, 998,761, or 93 percent, were Mexican nationals.30

The functional end of the second Bracero program in

1964 created a disjunction in domestic and foreign

3030 Statement of Richard C. White, M.C., 16th District of Texas, presented to Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, July 21, 1980, Washington D.C. Folder “Immigration: Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy”: Legislative Assistant Box 53 (Subject Files), Thurmond Collection, Special Collections, Clemson University Libraries, Clemson, South Carolina.

policy: the large-scale legal farm worker migration that obviously had been (and would continue to be) needed31 came to a sudden and definitive end. It seems likely, given how minimally introspective immigration policies of this era seem to be in hindsight, that the idea of forthcoming exponentially-expanding immigration problems had quite possibly never occurred to policymakers at the time. The Civil Rights Act of 1965 provided a second dramatic strike against the social order of the USA as it had been for decades: a lack of steady exploitable foreign labor suddenly combined with increased difficulty in exploiting domestic minorities.32 Not that the exploitation of domestic minorities did not continue in earnest regardless (Haney López 2014).

This attempt at creating a fuller sense of citizenship for erstwhile oppressed minorities, in conjunction with the beginnings of the build-up of undocumented immigrants in substantial numbers in the

USA, resulted in a particularly insidious kind of

31 At least in lieu of mechanization or a living wage. 32 Not that it should be much of a surprise that someone who blamed “‘the damn Negro-Puerto Rican groups out there’” (McGinniss 1970, 16) for lawlessness may have racist leanings anyway.

nativist backlash: a fundamental restructuring of the conceptualization of values. Social Security, Medicare, and other Great Society programs that formed the bulwark of Lyndon Johnson’s resounding presidential victory in

1964 were, by less than a decade later, starting to be used (in conjunction with welfare) as touchstones for covert (and overt) racism and xenophobia; what began with

Barry Goldwater’s unsuccessful and almost comical efforts to convince beneficiaries of the Tennessee Valley

Authority that they were better off without government help (Haney-López 2014, 20-22) turned by one presidential election cycle later into a winning formula for Richard

Nixon, who convinced substantial numbers of whites that those engaging in civil disobedience were just another type of common criminal and that demonstrators were merely engaging in delinquency (Haney-López 2014, 23-24).

By the time Nixon said that “‘forced integration of the suburbs is not in the national interest’” (Haney-López

2014, 23-26) it was already a foregone conclusion that it was O.K. to be racist as long as you were not directly admitting it.

Fifty years later, tolerance for racially coded appeals has changed, but in some ways it is just as strong as ever. After all, this era overlaps with the beginnings of what is now increasingly called the “New

Jim Crow” (Alexander 2010), where local, state, and federal policies negatively impacted both racial minorities and immigrants. Coded appeals with distinctions between ‘workers’ and ‘freeloaders,’ with only the former deserving government benefits, are perhaps unsurprisingly found to refer overwhelmingly to working-class whites in the former worthy-of-benefits case, and particularly to immigrants and young people

(who are also much more racially and ethnically diverse) in the latter undeserving-of-benefits group (Williamson et alia 2011, 33-34). Given the significant number of retired Tea Party adherents espousing these views, it becomes even more obvious that this is a categorization based on cultural ideas, not on literal concepts of active toil. Indeed Tea Party adherents as a group, somewhat uniquely amongst Americans, identify government spending and immigration controls as the nation’s largest problems (Williamson et alia 2011, 34). Those who

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suggest foreigners are contributing to economic inequality in the USA are likely unaware that, for example, the states with the most (California) and the fewest (West Virginia) immigrants are roughly equal in terms of economic equality (Stepan and Linz 2011, 850-

851).

Yet by the time of the 1970s, views on immigration had actually reached perhaps their liberal zenith for the

20th century. Roxanne Doty (2009) recounts an interview with former Klansman David Duke that can help illustrate this in an unusual way. Duke mentioned that his efforts in the 1970s, as part of the KKK's anti-immigrant border security initiatives, were nearly unanimously criticized at the time as being racist and fundamentally anti-

American. He then notes how their actions also bore significant similarities to the relatively widely- supported actions of the Minutemen Project and other such border-watch groups of the young 21st century, and more broadly to the general anti-undocumented-immigrant sentiment arising in the U.S.A. from the fallout of the

IRCA amnesty (Doty 2009, 61).

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There is real reason to question the popularity of proposals for extending the border patrol to sufficient levels to literally watch the entirety of the USA-Mexico border, as enthusiastically talked up by Republican

Senators Lindsey Graham (“You’ll have a border patrol agent every thousand feet on the border 24 hours a day, seven days a week.”) and John Hoeven (“Do the math.

Twenty thousand people out there armed. They’re going to see them and turn them back.”).33 Though such statements are certainly well-intentioned from the perspective of securing the homeland, or at least well-crafted for political points, they also ignore an increasing shift to electronic and other forms of non-physical border controls.

While it is also certainly true that the border can never completely shed its physical nature to become entirely virtual (Koslowski 2005, 3), a laser-focus on believing that watching the imaginary line separating the two countries will stop undocumented immigration

33 “Bipartisan Compromise on Immigration Reform Would Increase Border Agents” on NBC Nightly News, New York, NY: NBC Universal, 06/20/2013. Accessed Sunday, Jan 12, 2014 from NBC Learn: http://highered.nbclearn.com.proxy.nss.udel.edu/portal/si te/HigherEd/browse?cuecard=65188

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completely ignores a myriad of other ways to enter without authorization, from sea passage, to tunnels, to overstaying after a legal entry, or corruption in the border guards’ ranks. That a system is fallible is not sufficient reason to abandon its implementation, certainly, but neither should major flaws in a plan be ignored in the name of just “doing something.”

Conclusion

Throughout the history of immigration policy in the

United States, identifying and registering migrants as they arrived in the country slowly became a high priority. The one group who received the most frequent official and unofficial exemptions to this system—Mexican laborers—has perhaps then unsurprisingly remained the focus of undocumented migrant concerns for decades, even if it is simultaneously quite surprising that Americans seem mystified as to how a group given continual exemptions to immigration policy might eventually come to be the biggest source of immigration policy difficulty.

Paradoxically, though new immigrants often express disparities in cultural ideas from their host country,

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these tend to be quickly assimilated (Capeheart and

Milovanovic 2007, 81), increasing the likelihood of an increasingly good cultural fit with the host country even as their presence is seen as less tolerable the longer they stay (particularly if they attempt to settle rather than working and leaving). This makes an unfortunate sense in light of the ways that oppression of outsiders is often defended as a kind of cultural practice, something that can only be altered by the beliefs of the internal dominant group. This perpetually renders the immigrants’ concerns as less deserving of serious attention (Capeheart and Milovanovic 2007, 83). The valuation of the idea of a citizen over the idea of a human is a recurring issue throughout the history of critiques of democracy.

The word “undocumented” well highlights immigration problems in the modern USA; many documentation efforts have arisen as a result, yet surprisingly little serious policy effort has been made overall to understand and critically analyze the value of universal documentation as part of a solution for irregular migration flows.

Instead, other types of control efforts tend to receive

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the bulk of attention. This is particularly interesting given the relative truism of identification and governance that “the greater the manipulation envisaged, the greater the legibility required to effect it” (Scott

1998, 183). If it is possible to solve the problem of the indocumentado, then surely the document is the first requisite step in the process. The fundamental needs of a capitalist society even pretending to support free trade demand a tradeoff/tension between the speed of border crossing and the thoroughness of inspection

(Heyman and Ackleson 2010, 41), ensuring the impossibility of more intrusive control methods.

Contemporaneous debates on American immigration generally involve a debate over a relatively small number of solutions. Analyzing potential future immigration options alongside the most recent developments in immigration policy, all with an eye toward each general theoretical framework's past accuracy, is the best way to forge an understanding of the potential future of United

States immigration restrictions.

Against the backdrop of the largely more tolerant

1970s comes the creation of the Select Commission, with

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social justice advocate Father Theodore Hesburgh at the helm, to usher in a new era of progressive-minded immigration policy. A deep analysis of that Commission is the topic of the fifth chapter, though it is vital to understand the research efforts surrounding the reasons immigration commissions are created in the first place, the things they feel they can accomplish, and the reasons we can confidently say these things. This will be the focus of chapter four. First, in order to properly situate the remainder of this dissertation’s analysis, it is vital to examine its methodological underpinnings, understanding their selection and their implementation, and thus we turn immediately to the dissertation methodology in chapter three.

~~~

“No marigolds in the Promised Land, there’s a hole in the ground where they used to grow. Any man left on the Rio Grande is the King of the World, as far as I know.” - Steely Dan, “King of the World”

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Chapter 3

METHODOLOGY

Methodological Selection

Introduction

In an ideal analytical world, each method selected for a project receives equal attention. Realistically, discourse analysis and historical memory predominate here and see the primary share of both, with oral history and archival interrogation taking a secondary role due to practical limitations more than by lacking validity.34

The use of historical memory to analyze something so particularly public and long-lasting is of relatively straightforward justification; the maxim that history matters is oft repeated throughout the literature…though

34 Indeed, had a dissertation on the SCIRP come out in 1995 rather than 2015, the oral history aspect may well have been paramount. But my efforts to interview both Theodore Hesburgh and Lawrence Fuchs became obvious impossibilities during the course of this research, and I decided to de-emphasize the oral history aspects.

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also sometimes discussed as a not-particularly-useful stand-alone insight (Pierson 2004, 20; Levi 1997, 28).

Certainly some respected techniques, such as historical institutionalism, demonstrate that history matters by taking such context as a starting point.

Theda Skocpol’s landmark 1979 study of revolutions, and

Peter Hall’s 1989 historical visualization of

Keynesianism’s adoption, both highlight the value of letting theory flow freely (but directly) from historical context. Thus treating this as self-evident is useful insofar as it allows for taking a next step toward showing why history matters in any particular case. And while obviously not all social science theory presumes the importance of historical context, the importance of such precedent is hardly a novel claim. Ellen Immergut wrote an oft-cited study in 1992 demonstrating why national health insurance evolution differed significantly in three European welfare states (Immergut

1992, 57-58). This work, and others like it, helped to illustrate the importance of understanding institutions'

“formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship

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between individuals in various units of the polity”

(Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992, 2).

It is nearly as important to explain why one method was not chosen as it is to explain why another was.

Historical institutionalism, particularly as discussed in

Pierson and Skocpol's overview of the method (2002) and in Pierson's later work focusing on the importance of timing (2004), appeared an excellent potential tradition to follow for analysis in this dissertation framework.

It was originally considered as the possible primary method for this analysis, as it seemed to fit nicely with the relevance historical memory has for this topic.

Historical Institutionalism’s focus on the vital role cognition plays in understanding historical processes

(Mantzavinos, North, and Shariq 2004) dovetails somewhat well with a focus on what memories remain relevant in policymaking. Furthermore, as Steinmo explains, this method exists somewhere between rational choice and sociological institutionalism, as historical institutionalism values both actors and structures, and furthermore promotes the idea that individuals, contexts,

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and rules are all vitally important to understand eventual outcomes (Steinmo 2008)35.

Indeed, Sven Steinmo’s compelling statement that

“for historical institutionalists, history is not a chain of independent events” (Steinmo 2008, 166) suggested that historical institutionalism was a particularly good fit for studying immigration policy. Commissions are potentially good candidates for study in historical institutionalism—the individuals to study are finite and set, the contexts are temporally and even spatially bounded, and the formal set of rules is part of government record. Immigration policy has a clear impact on both the individual within the state and the economy, and even impacts individuals outside the state as foreign policy. Historical institutionalists seek the historical record when digging toward an understanding of political outcomes—and there is an unsurprising wealth of record to any governmental commission.

Steinmo thus provides perhaps the best introduction to my early attraction to historical institutionalism in

35 Though Dr. Lobasz argues these traits are virtually indistinguishable from sociological institutionalism as it is generally presented.

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this work—its attention to real-world empirical questions with historical orientation, and its ability to highlight the “ways in which institutions structure and shape political behavior and outcomes” (Steinmo 2008, 150).

Steinmo's focus on the importance of understanding two vital factors—both who participates and the rules of the structure in which they participate (Steinmo's “rules of the game” [2008, 160])—fits excellently into analyzing

Congressional commissions. Not only are the participants formally established, but so too are the rules by which they must abide, rendering the agents and their structure legible to analysis.

Some of the same structural attractions for historical institutionalism also demonstrate the value of discursive analysis, and this was where the initial methodological turn for the dissertation began. With an overwhelming volume of formal reports, transcriptions of hearings, and other various documents to analyze, it is hard to imagine not taking advantage of this material for a discursive analysis. As Skonieczny proved in her elegantly simple analysis of NAFTA propaganda, you can create a compelling illustration of behind-the-scenes

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thinking and ideological motivators when those involved in publicizing an issue also have a stake in the outcome of the issue (Skonieczny 2001, 433). Her focus on “how- possible” questions as opposed to “why” questions

(Skonieczny 2001, 434) is similarly appropriate for this dissertation, as we seek to examine the formal progressions of these commissions: creation → data gathering → data analysis → report to Congress → policy from Congress.

Ultimately Vivien Schmidt’s (2008) article on discursive institutionalism helped move the analytical focus away from pure historical institutionalism, and obviously eventually led to fully embracing discourse analysis on its own merits.

Politics of collective memory are often manipulated for political and media purposes surrounding the immigration debate, as evidenced most directly in the literature review by the consistent misunderstanding of the Dillingham Commission's findings. There is evidence to support nearly any position one wants to take on immigration. Which moments, trends, or themes are

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highlighted—and which ideological package filters the empirical facts on offer—leads to dramatic differences in discussion of immigration policy (per Borjas 2007).

The entirety of this dissertation is essentially framed by, and certainly motivated by, the excellent work performed in the various circles of memory analysis, whether called historical memory, memory politics, or collective memory. This is not a method in itself, but this work could be situated comfortably within the theoretical literature of historical memory nonetheless.

The defining framing quote for such memory-based studies, and perhaps therefore for this dissertation as well, is from Jeffrey Olick: “We cannot reassess the past without reassessing past assessments, nor can we reassess past assessments without reassessing the past” (Olick 2003,

285). Nor do memories of the past merely impact how we view and interpret the past—rather, memories also impact the processing of the present (Spillman 2003, 162), and indeed often “the past is invoked to shape the present”

(Berger 2009, 1), helping political work in this subject stay relevant to the future as well.

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This dissertation revolves in large part around these subtextual realms in conducting the second phase of the dissertation, with careful analysis of the SCIRP report. Critical political discourse analysis is relevant for understanding official policies, and policy commissions alike, and analysis of the use (and ignorance) of historical memory plays a vital role in understanding why some policy failures recur and some policy successes do not; as Norman Fairclough once said, the connections between language, power, and ideology are often obfuscated, and can only be revealed through critical examination (Fairclough 1989). Similarly,

Murray Edelman demonstrates the ease in which the framing of a political problem can singlehandedly dictate its ostensible solutions (Edelman 1988, 12-13).

The USA uses its policy discourse in much the way political discourse is generally used, for “controlling the contours of the political world, legitimizing policy, and … sustaining power relations” (Fairclough 1989, 90).

Similarly, whether the United States of America is producing eugenics-inspired hierarchies amongst workers, fomenting disdain between citizens and immigrants and

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between ethnicities to further encourage racism and xenophobia (Tichenor 2002), or promoting a vision of mass identity document controls (as with the SCIRP), the end result of all these immigration policies is the continual reinforcing of dominant conceptualizations of national identity, even if views on Eastern and Southern Europeans as only liminally “white” have changed substantially over the past century (indeed mostly by the first quarter of the last century).

Historical memory and discourse analysis alike, combined with modern sociological conceptualizations of covert racism, will help illustrate the ease in which regressive ideas can be reinforced through silence in the face of political claims reflecting institutional racism

(Dolgon 2011, 400). It is in this way even a progressive-minded individual like Father Hesburgh could unwittingly promote the causes of his discredited and long-dead progenitors of the Dillingham Commission36.

Historical memory is also an obvious fit for this analytical tale given the tendency for theorists, politicians, and journalists alike to refer to past

36 Though this is not to say he actually did.

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moments or larger patterns as somehow solely indicative of present or future trends. Some argue the dominant framing narrative for Mexican migration was, in some sense, permanently defined during the Great Depression.

Nativist attacks of the time scapegoated them for joblessness and all manner of other social ills, claims with echoes in discourse throughout the 20th century

(Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2007). Certainly Mexicans were not the first group targeted in this fashion, but the dramatic longevity of this depiction is both undeniable and interesting.

Issues of historical framing such as these are foundational in understanding the impact of the SCIRP.

This is why the methodological structure of this analysis reflects such qualitative inquiries. Narrowing the analytical scope considerably, to a single commission, has allowed time to discuss this particular interesting case in depth.

Methodological Inspirations

In some way, a substantial amount of credit for inspiring this project goes to Joshua Busby’s argument

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that political scientists can use process tracing “to look in detail at how decisions were made all along the way and, to the extent we can know, how they were justified internally and externally [through] careful reading of press reports, government documents, advocacy publications, memoirs, and … conducting interviews with participants” (Busby 2010, 48). While process tracing does not factor into the final methodological framework, the original intent herein was to discover if the acceptable realm of immigration policies envisioned by the nominally racist, nativist, and eugenicist Dillingham

Commission, assembled in the USA's first major effort to scientifically tackle immigration, still played some definable role in contemporary immigration policy. The use of process tracing no longer made sense once shifting to focus solely on the SCIRP, and though the use of discourse analysis in conjunction with process tracing would have followed in the footsteps of other scholars appreciating their complementary nature (Balzacq 2010;

Lupovici 2009), ultimately it seemed incompatible with a renewed focus on historical memory and discourse analysis

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in lieu of sufficient elite interviews for an oral history.37

Methodological Implementation

Coding Design

As discussed in the first chapter, one of the primary methodologies used to analyze the Select

Commission is a discourse analysis of its final report

(and targeted discourse analysis of elements of the final

Congressional hearings on the final report and the staff report accompanying the final report)38. Norman

Fairclough’s landmark work on discourse analysis, 1989’s

Language and Power, opens with a virtual admonishment on granting language its proper significance in the

“production, maintenance, and change of social relations of power” (Fairclough 1989, 1). Language assists in the powerful dominating the less powerful, Fairclough continues, and “the exercise of power, in modern society,

37 Interviews that also would have doubled as process tracing analytical material. 38 There will also be a bit of content analysis, as a simple but informative quantitative counterpart to the discourse analysis, using the same data in aggregate rather than analyzing the meaning of each coded segment as with discourse analysis.

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is increasingly achieved through ideology, and more particularly through the ideological workings of language. We live in a linguistic epoch…” (Fairclough

1989, 2).

Yet this is hardly to say that language and ideology are inextricably linked. Individuals shape and reshape both language and ideology, sometimes pressing one into service to aid their views on the other. Certainly many political discussions active in the postmodern societies of today relate much more strongly to concerns over language driving ideology rather than vice-versa (Haney

López 2011, 105), but ideology driving language is still the more common scenario.

Following in the footsteps of Zeidel (2004)’s excellent analysis of the Dillingham Commission, this study seeks to bring the SCIRP into fuller focus, turning what is little more than a skeletal framework in policy literature into a living creation.39 To answer common dissertation queries along these lines:

39 Or “turning the rough sketch of the SCIRP into a beautiful watercolor;” maybe “adding the meat and vegetables to the extant analytical broth;” perhaps “adding harmonies and rhythm to this research melody”

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“If you want to analyze a discourse, which texts will you examine, how will you select them, and how will you interpret, explicate, code, or categorize what you find?”

This dissertation will critically engage with the reports, debates, statistics, and other texts that make up the 1979 Congressional Select Commission on immigration during pivotal moments in policy history, with an eye toward historical memory. The text I plan to examine in the sense of coding for discourse analysis is the final report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy—the texts I plan to examine for the purposes of analyzing contemporary discourse include essentially anything available from the public or private spheres that relates to immigration policymaking, from televised news reports, to newspaper articles, to pamphlets clipped to personal correspondence in a personal archive. So in a sense, I am selecting everything valuable that I find for inclusion, but I am only strictly coding the final report that is the primary subject of this research.

“If you want to do interviews or focus groups, whom will you interview, and where, and how will you recruit them?”

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For the interview segment of my research, I intended to try to interview everyone still living who was on the

SCIRP commission. There were obviously immediate concern with the feasibility of this scope, given how important many of the individuals remain in political or academic circles. In addition to the challenge of accessing some of these individuals from the perspective of asymmetrical influence and authority between ‘U.S. Senator’ and

‘doctoral candidate,’ there remained the further issue of the nearly-40 years that have passed since the SCIRP’s creation leaving the majority of the staff unreachable for various reasons.

This is hardly to deny the potential problems in treating this Commission as a straightforward formal legal construction. Preliminary hypotheses stated that throughout the discourse analysis and the elite interview process, it would come to light that there were informal acts, or even informal actors, driving the action behind the scenes. Certainly, some of the most pivotal interview questions related to this very possibility.

But the majority of the digestible (or at least the analyzable) message of these commissions comes from

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records kept and reports produced, not from an arcane network of informalities.

Discourse analysis enables the reader to highlight, in this case, potentially causal reasoning for immigration policy undertakings. Again the example of the Dillingham Commission is illustrative; that

Commission blazed a new social scientific trail of sorts by grounding its racist immigration thinking in a technocratic model, backed by then-cutting-edge statistical analysis (Zuberi 2011, 81). The roughly

30,000-page length is illustrative of two major elements of the Commission’s research: its thoroughness and its scattershot approach, as the researchers sought to test the limits of the new methods and cover all possible analytical angles on immigration policy correlations, which they predictably largely interpreted as causations.

One major difference between these two Commissions is the political and social climate in which they were produced. The question of just how different their motivations and recommendations were is a question for another analysis, but there is no doubt that the USA had come a long way in the intervening 70 years as to the way

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discourse discussed racial and ethnic issues. The members of the Dillingham Commission had no need nor seemingly any desire to hide their biases, beyond simply claiming that they were formed by the empirical facts at hand. The SCIRP commissioners, meanwhile, had to be much more careful to hide any overt biases, as the 1960s had seemingly been the final days of open and unabashed racism in the political process (Lopez 2014, 55-57) and the level of sophistication in social science techniques, particularly statistical analysis, had grown immensely through the course of the 20th century, particularly in the decades that happened to follow the Dillingham

Commission (Igo 2007).

Coding

Demonstrating continuities and discontinuities in immigration policymaking involves a multi-step process, beginning (as discussed in the introduction) with perhaps the meatiest part of this work, the systematic coding and subsequent discourse analysis of the final report of the

Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. No doubt the idea of coding for such draconian elements as

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“eugenicism” might not sit well with those familiar with the progressive work of the SCIRP, particularly in light of Father Theodore Hesburgh’s recent passing. The idea of the good Father Hesburgh as abiding eugenicism to impact the Commission’s debate is not an easy sell

(fortunately, this is not actually what the dissertation claims even by coding for it). No more does this dissertation make the claim that the Dillingham

Commission turned all future intellectuals, policymakers, and clergy into racist nativists merely because such language exists in its final report (particularly as this is a quite incomplete picture of the truth). Nor does it seek to somehow claim humanitarian interests were not served—indeed, the idea of granting a national amnesty to undocumented immigrants living and working productive lives in the U.S.A. would likely have been anathema in

1907 (even more than it is again today!).

The simplest possible method of coding for immigration policy might be simply “pro” and “anti” immigration. That this is overly simplistic for the purposes of this research was so self-evident that this method never received serious consideration. Only

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slightly more compelling was the idea of adding a balancing point to the coding in the form of a third code, representing “pragmatic” policy recommendations; though this did inform the eventual system, it still seemed woefully inadequate for addressing the nuanced views surrounding the immigration debate.

For a time, it seemed obvious that coding should follow the ideas most expected to occur in the text, and then updating the list through Bayesian inference as needed. This initially led to the idea of initially coding for liberal, racist, nativist, eugenicist, restrictivist, and pragmatist policy arguments, and going from there. The Bayesian inference then came to a total halt for over a year as the enormity of coding the entire document only to then start over, with a better sense of what to “really” code for, loomed large.

Fortunately, as the months ticked on, a wise researcher familiar with this project40 asked about the question of an external opinion on coding reliability, bringing to mind that this had not even come up in the initial dissertation proposal. The decision was made to

40 Was this researcher my father? It is surely a mystery.

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show 10% of the final coding to two outside reviewers, and thus was the coding stalemate with the final report broken. Work began again in earnest to perfect the coding system, both to minimize the Bayesian necessity and because someone else was actually going to be examining the results.

After a few dozen coding iterations, ranging from incoherent scribbles on Denny’s napkins to incoherent scribbles on printer paper, swinging wildly between overly specific and hopelessly unspecific, the breakthrough moment came by categorizing arguments fundamentally into social or economic reasonings for immigration. This led somewhat elegantly into a solution avoiding the trap of balancing “pro” against “con” in such a way to make obvious heroes and villains in such an emotionally charged issue41, as social and economic arguments alike support both ends of the immigration belief spectrum. The first working chart produced in this “needing to be able to show others tangible progress” phase looked like a box with a hole in the

41 Coding one line as eugenicist and another as humanitarian roughly identifies good and evil.

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middle42, as seen on the following page, and seemed at the time to properly encompass the full range of this project’s analytical needs. However, a 50-page test coding of the Congressional Hearings on the Final Report of the Select Commission brought to light a major shortcoming in this coding model. Arguments made in a fashion to suggest the conclusion was self-evident, rather than specifically stating (or even strongly implying) a specific reason for the particular argument, had no obvious home in the contours of this model. As immigration policymaking is certainly no stranger to such axiomatic declarations, this posed a problem. In trying to fit this into the model, it first seemed that perhaps a pleasingly geometric goal was out of reach; shapes with inelegant names like “the tripartite log with four balls on the edge of a cliff” or “the box inside the diamond inside the box” arose and quickly failed the methodological elegance test.43

Ultimately, this relatively minor conceptual modification (but relatively major visual modification)

42 Or, perhaps, like a “Companion Cube” from the popular PC game series Portal. 43 I could include my sketches of these two, but have decided to spare you, dear reader.

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produced the final depiction of the coding process, available on the following page, in what could surely be

Figure 3.1: The Pragmatism Codex

called the “Bow Tie” Model44. The arguments supporting expansion are represented on the left side, while the

44 Or the “TIE Fighter” model … or perhaps the “Bow TIE Fighter” Model

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arguments supporting restriction are represented on the right side, and pragmatism connects both sides together just as one might expect.

Figure 3.2: The Bow-Tie Tome

The colors used to represent each of the seven coding types may seem distracting, but each corresponds

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to the colored pencil used for that particular part of the (hard-)coding process. The colors flowed from stoplight logic; green’s encouragement and red’s discouragement linked to economic thinking led somewhat logically to orange joining red on the restriction side for social issues and blue joining green on the permissive side for the same. Brown seemed like the only logical choice for a conflux of all other possible beliefs leading to a perhaps undesirable but at least feasible compromise. The final two colors were merely two vibrancies of the same color (purple) to represent the similarity in evidence-free assertions, with light purple as permissive and dark purple as restrictive.

As to the fact of actually physically coding a printout of the Select Commission’s final report, it is true that there are certainly several interesting software packages available to process qualitative data in this fashion. Indeed, this nearly became an ATLAS.ti,

NVivo, Ethnograph, HyperResearch, or QDA Miner45 project.

45 I do have to congratulate the QDA Miner people for their remarkably soft sell at the MPSA Annual Conference 2014—their booth attendants did nothing more aggressive than politely inviting me to help myself to their

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But ultimately, the deep analysis of a single major document did not necessarily seem ideally fitted to any of the software packages tested46, and the completion of this dissertation certainly did not need any more projects crammed into its completion timeframe.

As discussed and visualized above, the coding of the final report of the Select Commission uses the following categories: pro-expansion (economic rationale), pro- expansion (axiomatic), pro-expansion (social rationale), pragmatic, pro-restriction (economic rationale), pro- restriction (axiomatic), pro-restriction (social rationale). It would not be particularly helpful to list all of the words or phrases coded into these categories, so much as to list the contours of the coding regimen.

Not that they all require significant elaboration.

To start with the top of the chart, pro-expansion and pro-restriction arguments using economic reasoning are the simplest to identify. The same words are used

software demonstration CD. If only all vendors were so restrained. 46 Additionally, delinking coding from computers allowed it to be done even in the event of power outages, which surprisingly presented itself as an issue worth considering by the time of Vermont’s 2014-2015 winter season.

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regardless of the point being argued—“profit/profitable,”

“value,” “financial growth/loss,” “bargain,” and the like—only the context in which the words are placed changes to make the point. Thus economic arguments are fairly straightforward to code.

Pragmatism is perhaps easiest to spot. Its focus is squarely on logical/rational/uncontroversial thinking, often of the sort that is conceptually likely to meet with political approval—words or terms such as

“equitable,” “acceptable/reasonable allowances,” or

“measured limits” lean toward the first conceptualization, and “practical,” “feasible,” or

“workable” for the second conceptualization. The placement of axiomatic beliefs on either side of pragmatism is no accident—such statements are of the sort that are presented in a self-evident fashion, but it is precisely this lack of explanation that differentiates them from pragmatic views. Any statement given without even a nod to evidence, such as one of either

“immigration is detrimental to society” or “immigrants are beneficial to society,” given without immediate context falls into this category.

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And finally addressing the social rationale—on the pro-expansion side it is fairly wide in scope, but remains fairly uncontroversial, as have all the others thus far. Arguing that immigration is necessary for humanitarian or liberal democratic reasons (often in those very words) is fairly straightforward. The concepts of alleviating suffering or uplifting society through multiculturalism fill this category, with words like “relief,” “asylum47,” “safety/safe harbor,”

“diversity,” “industriousness/intelligence,” “cultural enrichment,” and any general form of praise along these lines come into play here.

Saving the most controversial coding for last: the pro-restriction side of the social rationale. This can be identified through any of a variety of viewpoints— exhortations against criminal immigrant behavior, or through appeals to racism, nativism, xenophobia, or eugenicism. Criminality is obviously recognizable through any discussion of proclivities for crime amongst the immigrant population—this can be suggesting such behaviors are above and beyond those seen amongst

47 When referring to the concept, not the legal term

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citizens or merely that they have the motive/opportunity to commit crimes more frequently. Racism might be represented by terms like “savage,” “vermin,” “subhuman,” and the like.

Nativist views would be expressed through phrases like “old/new immigrants/immigration” or “unassimilable foreigners” or other phrases indicating a kind of aggressive take on American Exceptionalism. Nationalism, meanwhile, is the friendlier face of nativism48, recognized through any opposition to immigration for the sake of “American culture” rather than for the foreigners’ fundamental differences; another way of viewing this distinction is as a nature versus nurture view of immigration; nationalists worry the immigrants will not assimilate, nativists worry the immigrants cannot assimilate. Eugenicist thought would be readily spotted through discussion of sterilization or other overt processes, and also through the remnants of Social

Darwinist thought regarding worries of overpopulation through uncontrolled “breeding” and the like; finally it

48 I did feel it was important to differentiate between nativism (“N-”) and nationalism (“N+”) in coding for this very reason, though they are otherwise in the same coding category.

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would include conceptualizations of inferiority, such as physical laziness, intellectual inferiority, or inherent criminality (differentiated from racist views due to the flattened “enlightened scientific” factual perspective, rather than emotional disgust).

This coding will enable me to get a full grasp on the cognitive images of various types of immigrants throughout the Commission. Cognitive images “function as perceptual filters and organize the world based on certain categories. They enable a response to certain behaviors and act like stereotypes, complete with certain

'facts' that support the reason for such categorization”

(Skonieczny 2001, 437). This in turn is based off the earlier revelation that “affect in combination with cognition does predict policy choice in the case of the enemy image” (Herrmann et alia 1997, 403), which may be particularly enlightening to help understand how the

Dillingham Commission could be seen in such a negative light if it does not live up to its reputation. Just as with the expected failure of the North American Free

Trade Agreement (NAFTA) via the rampant negative views about Mexico and regional integration (Skonieczny 2001,

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437-438), the Dillingham Commission was expected to find verifiable proof of immigrant inferiority per the views of the masses and the commission members, but seemingly did not.

On the subject of the members—obviously each commission has a wide assortment of members accompanying different points on the ideological spectrum. As such, it is expected that the commission reports may contain a variety of viewpoints expressed, though there will likely be efforts to speak with a neutral overall tone. Anytime it is possible to ascertain from context which commission member is responsible for which coded section, this will also be noted, as it can add a further dimension of analysis to understand if certain ideas come exclusively from certain individuals (Skonieczny 2001, 443-444). In practice, this means identifying sections specifically authored by certain Commission members or noting official dissents in vote-tallying.

It is likely true that the conceptualizations of racism and nativism have changed significantly in the past hundred years—though eugenicism has primarily changed in acceptability, rather than tone. Regardless,

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for the purposes of generating usable and consistent meaningful data, I coded all of the documents from a contemporary perspective.

Methodological Review

In reviewing the methodology, it is worth noting that I originally considered weighting the final results

(per Klass 2008, 10-11) after collecting all the coding data. Language used in an introductory setting or conclusion could be seen as more relevant or potentially disruptive to the overall text than would be an off- handed comment annotating a chart in an appendix, and keeping track of this seemed potentially useful. The ostensible goal to such weighting would be to construct different expansionist/restrictionist49 ratings depending on where such ideas appeared, as it would be telling if more extreme language appeared in more pivotal sections of text.

That said, both in the process of coding and through the natural structure of the Select Commission’s final report, it became evident that such weighting would have

49 Or humanitarian/nativist, or any other such dichotomous breakdown

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minimal impact on the analysis, and that dividing coded segments by the section of the final report in which they appear (policy summary, data analysis, final recommendations, et cetera) would be a less-biased way of accomplishing similar textual illumination.

Demonstrating the changes in language use throughout different sections of the report clarifies and invites questions in a much more focused way than forced weighting, when the intent and production of the weighting would almost certainly be seen as having some level of bias. This way, readers are free to draw their own conclusions as well as examining the author’s.

It is true that some degree of proper weighting allows rudimentary statistical analysis despite working solely with nominal variables. Discourse analysis obviously reflects an interpretive approach to policy, but this does not necessarily mean losing all of the advantages of statistics. As Kovács and Davis demonstrate in their 2011 “Language and Reality in Iraq,” the systematic assignment of weights to particular discursive patterns in case studies can provide further illumination on the narrowing of choice via a kind of

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pattern of discursive overload crowding out alternative choices.

That said, the relative gain in illuminating the text seems minimal, particularly given that all the coding relates to a single document. The array of charts, graphs, and other such data visualization normally possible with quantitative weighting would be significantly less useful for a single case. Other preliminary ideas relating to the use of Boolean algebra or Fuzzy Set QCA became essentially impossible once the scope of the project changed to no longer feature a coding comparison to the (admittedly unmanageable)

30,000-page Dillingham Commission. Any light such techniques might have shed on continuities or discontinuities not readily apparent from qualitative analysis per the original coding comparison plan are likely rendered irrelevant by the greatly compressed size of the final coding project.

Given that the coding process is less often coding individual words, but rather usually coding distinct phrases, sentences, and even paragraphs, it is important to note the mechanical behavior of the coding. A single

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“type” of thought is thus identified as the full expression of the specifically-coded idea. A code could thus be as long as a paragraph or as short as a single word—in the cases of explanation of a complex but singular idea, or a jarringly out-of-place reference in the midst of unrelated ideas, respectively. Bullet points are treated as discrete elements, even if multiple points speak to the same subject, as ostensibly the entire function of bullet points is to list separate ideas. The only exception to this rule is the handling of section titles; following many section titles are secondary titles of a sort, in complete sentences, summarizing the material contained in that section; that the ideas presented therein are duplicated in the immediately following text makes them appear to be an abstract or executive summary rather than standalone material, and as such they are not coded.

Duplication is not merely an issue for titles and their subsequent sections, but for the text at large. As with any such substantial policy paper exploring a single

(albeit multifaceted) topic, there is some degree of overlap, and even outright duplication, in the themes and

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suggestions produced by the Commission in this report.

Specifically, material covering recommendations about asylees often references the USA’s treatment of refugees, either by spelling out the treatment or by merely referencing general behaviors. When the duplicate appeared within the same paragraph, it was only coded once. When it appeared outside the paragraph, it was coded as many times as it appeared, given similar logic to the non-coding of the Appendixes—if the material was important enough to repeat, particularly if the context changes, it deserves to be considered twice.

Obviously it is also important to recognize the crucial material not coded that otherwise seems to fit into one of these aforementioned categories. Simply put, this comes down to the purpose of the coding. The ideological, political, and axiomatic ideas that infuse the policy recommendations of the SCIRP’s final report are the order of the day; far less important are the occasional digression into timelines of past policies, text from previous laws, graphs and charts showing immigration trends, and other such material. If these timelines, law citations, graphs, charts, and other

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material is cited as the inspiration for a forward- looking piece of policy, then that material is of course coded per usual. Otherwise, however, they are safely categorized as descriptive, rather than prescriptive, and thus falling outside the scope of the coding.

Another interesting question is what to make of the sections discussing what the INS (and now the CIS) call non-immigrants. This term of course does not, as one might assume, refer to individuals like citizens and legal permanent residents. Rather, this catch-all term indicates a non-resident:50 those travelers, crew, diplomats, temporary workers, athletes, press, and all the other individuals who are part of what we would now call the global mobility regime. Given that these individuals are in a sense outside the scope of immigration policy, it is tempting to ignore coding related to non-immigrant policymaking. That said, given the relatively commonplace ability for non-immigrants in certain categories to become intending immigrants, it

50 To be entirely clear, of course, individuals like diplomats and H-1B workers and the like can certainly be residents in the normal everyday sense of the word, living for years at a time alongside immigrants and native-born alike, but they remain “non-immigrants” until such day they hop onto the road to citizenship.

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seems that the Commission’s feelings towards the manifold individuals making up this category is as relevant as its assertions about any other group.

The Appendixes present another challenge entirely, as though they largely exist just for the sort of charts and graphs and other such material excised for reasons of text flow from the main document, Appendix B specifically contains extrapolations and further discussion from

Commissioners on specific topics. Still, these statements’ presence in an Appendix implies their relatively reduced importance compared to the regular text, and as such they are not coded.

Historical Memory, Archival Sources, Oral History

As Confino (1997, 1386-1387) put it, historical memory helps pin down “culture,” and in perhaps one of the least problematic ways, by analyzing what a society tangibly chooses to focus (or avoid focusing) on, through

“books, films, museums, commemorations, and others”

(Ibidem 1997, 1386). Conceptualizations of U.S. culture vary to an enormous degree, with arguments over even such literally foundational concepts as life, liberty, and the

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pursuit of happiness. When thinking specifically of

‘cultural’ attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, it takes the barest exposure to life in the USA for the impossibly wide spectrum of beliefs to become apparent.

While scholarly viewpoints are perhaps more erudite than mainstream views, the anti-immigration (at least, without assimilation) arguments made by scholars like Huntington

(2004) and the pro-integration arguments made by scholars like Pastor (2001) are not far removed from the ideological extremes seen amongst the populace.

The argument has been made that, some degree of inherent xenophobia notwithstanding, anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. was fundamentally linked to the closing of the frontier, as the focus of national identity shifted from expanding ever westward to the promised land to an inward focus on maintaining the integrity of the nation (Stratton 2000). This line of thinking led naturally to the fin de siècle reasoning of the Dillingham Commission, and its focusing of concern on cultural degeneration. Indeed the general contours of the immigration policies set by this point in U.S. history are still sometimes examined today when seeking

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to craft or revise said policy, including concerns over importing crime, un-American ideologies, and disease.

Yet it is perhaps the fears of American culture being overwhelmed by foreign entities is the single message that continues to resonate most strongly all these years hence. Selective historical memory has allowed failed policies to recur while successful policies disappear. Perhaps policies seen as inherently unscientific at the beginning of the 20th century remained so throughout. Even the overt rejection of the racism animating particular viewpoints might not change attitudes on the policies racism helped usher in, or limit the ability of covert racists to exploit the inertia of such structurally-cemented policies.51

Yet it is also possible the horrors of World War II and the tumult of the Civil Rights Era helped permanently decouple such reasoning from immigration policy. This would suggest restrictionist immigration policies became more difficult to implement later in the century, due to

51 Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer K. Lobasz demonstrate a recent example of rhetorically edging opponents out of policy debates in “Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq,” Security Studies, Volume 16, Number 3, July-September 2007, Pages 409-451.

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their lingering association with the rampant eugenicism and nativism of the early 1900s. If this were the case, path dependence would suggest even effective immigration policies would remain outside the realm of consideration due to their deleterious impact on those suggesting or implementing them.

The impact of Zeidel's analysis of the Dillingham

Commission was enhanced by his careful preparation of biographical data on the commission members.

Understanding predispositions, mitigating circumstances, and other varieties of goal or potential bias is enormously important for contextualizing the work these individuals perform. Some work already exists; obviously

Zeidel's research sheds light on Dillingham Commission members, though likely he did not find all the extant data there is to find on their personalities and proclivities.

For the SCIRP, some members of the commission were famous enough to have biographical data readily available—or, in the case of Father Hesburgh, autobiographical and biographical data both. Still, it was nearly certain that extant sources would be only

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tangentially related at best, for even those few individuals who do have such sources written about them.52

This is why elite interviews were set to play an important supporting role in this dissertation, and why the Appendix features limited biographies of most of the members who were not already public figures at the time of their appointment.

As mentioned earlier, many of the individuals who were still available and would be ideal interview candidates remained out-of-reach due to their prominence in their professional realms, and due to the generally disinteresting prospect of letting a desperate doctoral student interview you about something several decades old. But even as many of the optimally desirable interview subjects proved impossible to contact, the upside was that the interviews were not strictly a necessity for understanding this subject, merely an aid in shedding light on obfuscated behind-the-scenes information.

52 And surely this would have benefited Zeidel's analysis of the Dillingham Commission, had he written it 70 years earlier.

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I had a “short e-mail questionnaire” developed in tandem with the Institutional Review Board to send to anyone who seems disinterested in meeting for an interview. And on the off chance that said individual might feel like directing me to a non-obvious interview target, the interview prodded for a potential snowball sampling of other SCIRP-relevant interviewees. It seemed fruitless to attempt to conduct any major interviews over e-mail, though Skype was a possibility.53

As relatively recent an event as the SCIRP is in the long march of its related immigration policy, it is a tragic fact that many of the most important actors were already gone at the onset of this dissertation—and a few more left us not long thereafter. Further complicating the original goal of the oral history project is the relative prominence or obscurity of many of those still here; it has proven no easier to get an audience with

Alan Simpson than to ascertain the current whereabouts of

53 My wise retired-political-science-professor father also cautioned me that he had seen many an aspiring dissertation-writer set out with lofty ambitions for elite interviews and find in the end only a series of heartbreaking cancellations and precious little to show for a mountain of time and money spent. Well, now I understand him a little better than before.

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Ann Bartunek or Kitty I. S. Green. It almost seemed possible that I might meet with Father Hesburgh himself, given his reputation for speaking with anyone who might drop by. In practice those stories perhaps better represented his younger days, as my efforts to arrange a time to speak with him never made it past his assistant, even though I drove through Indiana a few times in the course of this dissertation and attempted to reach out for an interview.

~~~

“We’re moving to a situation where lives exist as information” - Pet Shop Boys, “Integral”

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Chapter 4

LITERATURE REVIEW:

IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONS

The Purpose of Policy Contemplation: Commissions

George Borjas' oft-mentioned claim that all immigration policy must be understood in terms of the ideological filter interpreting it could be seen (along with historical memory reassessment) as a pivot point of this entire dissertation; identifying the ideological filters used over the years can help us understand why some policies are repeated and others are ignored.

Huntington's Who Are We? openly suggests delegitimized nativist underpinnings still lurking behind policy decisions in the modern world, just as racism has been used since the earliest days of the nation to “place limits on access to national identity” (Stratton 2000,

57). Still, other less-controversial academics refute the sorts of claims he makes—as seen in the

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dissertation's opening quotes. Furthermore, it is hardly an incontrovertible fact that the USA jealously guards its white European identity—Reagan's 1986 move to grant amnesty to undocumented immigrants, as merely one example, is difficult (yet, interestingly, not impossible) to frame in terms of racist nativism.

Yet it is also unquestionable that immigration commissions deal with idyllic visions of past immigration patterns, and that perhaps some substantial part of their function is to separate the truthful wheat from the dishonest chaff54. The idea of a society's recent past as a “Golden Age” has been around for thousands of years, but playing on fears of modern life in comparison to an always-mythologically perfect recent past is an image with timeless, sustainable, repeatable appeal, as Andrew

R. Murphy put it (2009, 125). Furthermore, these appeals are hardly limited to inspiring publics or pundits;

Robert Vitalis' exposé on the competing narratives of the

1955 Bandung conference excellently demonstrates the way historical memory can serve as mythmaking and ideological reinforcement even among academics, as the appealing

54 Not in the eugenic sense.

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narrative of international and intercultural understanding was accepted and embraced and repeated while the truth of a minimally impactful meeting with few if any global luminaries present was rejected and forgotten (Vitalis 2010 [1]). It is easy to see how even federal commissions can fall victim to historical myth.

History is often abused in the course of creating policy: “If it is mentioned at all, history becomes a set of myths to justify current resentments and aggressions rather than a basis for understanding and explanation”

(Edelman 1988, 88). Mythmaking is particularly strong with immigration policy vis-a-vis the fundamental concept of a national identity. Citrin, Wong, and Duff suggest a compelling tripartite understanding of national identity, mixing ideas of self-categorization, affect, and normative content to understand how one fits into one's nation; they also provide the driving quote “a strong sense of national identity consistently was related to opposition to liberal immigration policies and official support for maintaining minority cultures—there is, then, an ideological tension between multiculturalism and nationalism” (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001, 96). But the

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idea that commissions solely exist to ascertain something resembling the objective truth of the matter is problematic, as this chapter explains.

The Path to the SCIRP

Studying the path that brought the nation to this commission can reveal truths about the U.S.A.'s relationship with its immigrants (and its immigration policy) and help explain why the creation of a second major commission became inevitable. The SCIRP was not formed in a vacuum, and there is a long and detailed history of immigration policy that led up to this point.

Efforts to prevent the arrival and success of immigrants in the U.S.A. have taken countless forms; in just the last few decades of the 1800s, these policies covered everything from restricting certain groups from owning land (Wyman 2010, 232-233), to requiring knowledge of

English (MacDonald 1920, 634), to outlawing socially marginalized ethnic groups (Chin 2005, 16) and unpopular types of people (Wyman 2010, 266-267), and even through supporting mandatory education in order to limit the

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economic value of perceived immigrant fecundity

(Archdeacon 1984, 161).

Yet pressure from business interests often created pro-immigration exceptions to maintain cheap labor flows.

This established one of many conflicting policy patterns persisting to this day. Business interests solicited immigrants in Europe (Zolberg 2006, 171-172) both with and without federal approval (Kaye 2010, 82-83), passed laws to force Japanese workers to remain workers rather than becoming employers themselves (Wyman 2010), and generally created exceptions for workers to continue flowing into the country without concern for their status once they arrived.

Congress favored Mexican laborers in particular when assessing the dangers of immigration in this intercommission era, whether by waiving taxes for

Mexicans that it required of other immigrants (Archdeacon

1984, 129), exempting Mexicans from literacy requirements and advance contract limitations via the pro-business

“fourth” and “ninth proviso” (Zolberg 2006, 241), or creating the “Texas Proviso” (Martin 2009, 29) to exempt employers from undocumented-immigrant harboring

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penalties. Such efforts seemingly worked against the societal push for immigration restriction, but Christina

Boswell excellently summarizes this contradictory nature of immigration policy. “[I]mmigration policy frequently brings [core state functions] into conflict in awkward ways. Governments are keen to demonstrate to their electorates that they are restricting unwanted immigration; but [are] equally under pressure to ensure

... an adequate supply of workers to fill labour and skills shortages” (Boswell 2009, 15).

Crucially, these exceptions did little to change the overall difficulty for immigrants attempting to start new lives in the U.S.A. No matter how many Mexican laborers entered the country through the unauthorized back door or through “side door” exceptions (Borjas 2007), the legitimacy of the front door proved elusive even after a century of noteworthy Mexican immigration (Archdeacon

1984, 129). Thus the end result of either a restrictivist literacy test requirement or a expansionist legalization program is paradoxically the same: endorsing a favored group of immigrants while making life harder on those less fortunate.

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Intercommission Analysis

Christina Boswell's The Political Uses of Expert

Knowledge opens by broadly discussing the recent movement in government and international organizational circles toward the use of expert information (Boswell 2009, i-3).

Boswell particularly highlights the current trend for

“'evidence-based' policymaking” (Boswell 2009, 3). It is not clear whether she rejects the idea that the

Progressive Era had a very similar orientation toward empirically-based decisionmaking (Zeidel 2004, 3-5), or whether as a British scholar she merely does not find it relevant.

Regardless, such expert-driven behavior is popular today, and demonstrates the importance of studying the pivotal 1979 expert immigration commission. Just as the

1898 Fashoda crisis gained sudden relevance with the prominence of the democratic peace theory (Bennett 2008,

706), so does Boswell's study demonstrating immigration commissions as reflecting and impacting governmental policies lend further importance to a full analysis of the SCIRP (Boswell 2009). This is particularly so given the variety of potential outcomes Boswell finds that such

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commissions can have, in a range from purely symbolic to purely instrumental (though the latter would be exceedingly rare).

What sort of impact can we expect the SCIRP to have?

Boswell's primary contention is that while expert knowledge is only modestly valued for its instrumental value for policy, “countries whose governments derive legitimacy from meeting externally measurable performance targets, like … limiting irregular immigration, may have an interest in using knowledge to help meet these targets, implying that policymakers may be interested in the instrumental functions of knowledge” (Boswell 2009,

16-17). The U.S.A. at both the beginning and end of the

20th century was particularly fixated on immigration numbers; even amongst the liberal members of the

Dillingham Commission, there was the idea that high immigration numbers should be reduced under certain circumstances (Zeidel 2004, 47-48), and SCIRP's motivation for legalization was seemingly in the name of reducing the significant number of undocumented migrants in the country (Marshall 2009, 1).

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Hatton and Williamson discuss the four major failures of the Dillingham Commission: differentiating old and new immigrants solely through prejudicial opinions, failing to draw on State Labor Bureau and other statistical evidence in the name of creating its own studies, misreading or distorting the statistical evidence, and certain members making up their mind about immigrants before the commission's report (Hatton and

Williamson 1998, 125). But Zeidel's subsequent analysis suggests that some of these fundamental accusations represent misreadings of their own, particularly the assertions that old and new immigrants were clearly delineated as good and bad respectively (Zeidel 2004, 54-

56), and that the commission members' opinions did not reflect any consideration of the evidence (Zeidel 2004,

4, 113-114, others).

Yet Zeidel's conclusions in turn seemingly do not consider all the relevant facts, including commission member Jeremiah Jenks and William Lauck's 1911 follow-up book The Immigration Problem, written as a clarification and forceful reassertion of the commission's fundamental arguments and logics. It would be helpful to undertake a

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new political science reading of the Dillingham

Commission to clear up these discrepancies, but such an undertaking is obviously well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Not only that, but the limits of analyzing the commission are significant: nearly all internal records of the Commission were destroyed during World War

I (Zeidel 2004, 7), and no individuals with first-hand knowledge remain. Thus, differentiating the instrumental purposes from the symbolic, or untangling formal public documents from informal private discussions and processes

(Bennett 2008, 710), becomes nearly impossible. If the

Dillingham Commission can still be misunderstood after a hundred years of academic follow-up, the more recent and less-analyzed SCIRP represents a definitive gap in the literature that must be addressed, particularly given its potential symbolic and instrumental importance.

Commissions

Conventional wisdom states that the best way to take a problem seriously while ultimately doing nothing about it is to form a commission. Political circumstances have challenged this assumption in recent years, particularly

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in places like the United Kingdom, where Tony Blair’s New

Labour government argued that enhancing policy and implementation necessitated “evidence-based approaches”

(Boswell 2011, 3-4). But even where academe and thinktanks are allowed to ply their craft freely, the fundamental question remains as to why politicians and civil servants commission such research, and what use such commissions ultimately serve in policymaking

(Boswell 2011, i).

There is a tendency to imagine that politicians often gird their suggestions for assembling a commission by expressing the deeper need for a problem- solving/instrumentalist-style approach, acknowledging that “expert knowledge is crucial for improving the quality of their output” (Boswell 2011 4) and that some sort of ideal equilibrium between ideology and action might be obtained. This instrumentalism is seen and endorsed by scholars in such works as Goldstein and

Keohane (1993) and Walsh (2000); Boswell (2011) posits that this appears to be an entirely plausible way for policymakers to behave, particularly as this is a kind of elegantly diplomatic thing for the politician her/himself

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to claim as motivation and likely corresponds to their reasoning self-perceptions.

But of course politicians cannot truly get involved with technocratic policymaking without some measure of ulterior motive. This is not even necessarily an indictment of politicians as a class so much as acknowledging the potentially ephemeral nature of their electability. There is often a substantial gap between the prescriptions produced by research and the policies adopted afterward, particularly in criminal justice, education, welfare, migration, and foreign policy—even moreso in subjects likely to be exposed to populist debate such as crime or immigration; thus, there is often a significant gap between what works and what meets the approval of public opinion or the mass media (Boswell

2011, 5-6).

Conversely, there is a suggestion in the literature that in countries where governments do derive legitimacy from addressing problems through tangible impacts on measureable performance targets, whether reducing the number of asylum-seekers or limiting other forms of irregular migration, the policymakers there may have

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precisely such an instrumental reasoning to encourage the production of knowledge to meet these measureable targets

(Boswell 2011, 16-17). The example of the United States of America is always easy to illustrate with comical overstatement, and thus one might point to the complete absence of technocratic endorsement for an actual physical wall separating the USA and Mexico and yet this very solution becoming a serious policy issue for presidents from Carter55 to Bush.

But none of the previously prominent explanations, political pressures, lack of organizational capacity, or lack of relevant knowledge, account for the continued interest of policymakers in research (Boswell 2011, 6-7); if the electorate is constrained from pursuing approaches from electoral considerations, why commission and make use of the knowledge? If there are administrative or scientific impediments to drawing on research, why order and carry out the research? Boswell poses these

55 There is a delightful irony in a wall between the USA and Mexico having once borne the nom de plume “The Carter Curtain” and having faced Republican opposition. (“Fence Plans For Border Elicit Jeers,” The Bulletin, White House Central File Subject File—Immigration-Naturalization, Folder “IM 1/1/79-3/15/79,” Box IM-2, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library)

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questions so that she might demonstrate that research is highly valued by policymakers and indeed plays a crucial role in policymaking and argumentation, but not exclusively—or even predominantly—due to its contribution to policy. Rather, its usage is seen as heavily symbolic, both legitimizing to grant epistemic authority and granting substantiation to policy preferences to undermine rival agencies and interests; it is, overall, thus credibility that is enhanced, rather than merely enhancing the quality of the policymaking output (Boswell

2011, 7-8).

Two particular insights from the institutionalist school of thought on expert testimony are that

“administrative agencies are not driven exclusively by a logic of addressing societal problems” (Boswell 2011, 11) and that organizations are fundamentally concerned with securing legitimacy from relevant actors in their environment, be they political leaders, organized interests, customers, or any other of a variety of individuals (Boswell 2011, 11).

But most administrative agencies derive their legitimacy from their adherence to certain norms and ideologies--or formal structures--

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rather than through their performance, or the observable impact of their societal interventions .... As such, knowledge is likely to be valued as much, or even more, for its symbolic functions as it is for its instrumental role in improving performance…. Organizations can enhance their legitimacy through adopting the trappings of rational decision-making styles. And this, as we shall see, can involve being seen to draw on expert knowledge. (Boswell 2011, 11)

These institutionalist assumptions say nothing about using knowledge in a discernably rational way, to expand power. Rather, it uses knowledge per its own interests and through the context of its environment. The battle over the fate of Terri Schiavo is an example of internal wrangling over policy leading to a failure to respond to public opinion on an issue (Boswell 2011, 12). Conflicts over the rights to life are amongst the most powerful symbolic arguments in the public arena, and there is little doubt that the emergency measures taken by the

Florida legislature were aimed precisely at this symbolic support of the right-to-life movement, more than any genuine technocratic concern over the laws governing

Terri Schiavo’s feeding tube.

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Examining the general intent behind other commissions is obviously important to a thorough analysis of the factors that drive their creation. The Dillingham

Commission, as discussed in the opening chapter, was the first Commission specifically designed to create a solution to immigration policy problems. It also represented a sea change of sorts in policymaking, generally; the goal of making a “full inquiry, examination, and investigation…into the subject of immigration” (Zeidel 2004, 3) meant that for the first time, the Government made an explicit effort to have properly trained experts carry out an investigation and analysis of an issue. The progressives’ “almost religious faith” (Zeidel 2004, 3) in the ability for scientific objectivity—combined with governmental intervention—to engender social betterment meant that these statistical studies were thought to provide objective certainty, and to possess the ability to ascertain the true nature of a problem, enabling the proper solution to surface (Zeidel 2004, 3).

Immigration was then, as it would be on occasions throughout the 20th century, and obviously still is today,

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“one of the top public concerns of the time, alongside business consolidation and political corruption” (Zeidel

2004, 4), issues also certainly fundamentally related to the perils (and potentials) of immigration. This was indeed a time fixated on understanding and coming to terms with those unfamiliar humans from around the world as a major wave of what we now call globalization continued (Friedman 2006), and different societies came into ever-closer contact and more facets of states became intertwined. Certainly it is the case that trade diasporas, groups that Philip D. Curtin calls “cross- cultural brokers” (Curtin 2000, 3) had already existed for centuries, but so too is it the case that such interconnectedness grew ever more pronounced, leading sometimes to deepened social interconnectedness and of course sometimes to war and tragedy.

From 1900-1930 in particular, eugenics, racism, and imperialism had a profound influence on North American and European thought (Hansen and King 2001, 240). In

Francis Galton’s memoir, this coiner of the term eugenics cites the minutes of the University of London for the proper definition of his term: “the study of agencies

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under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally” (Galton 1908, 321). Even this effort at a scientifically detached definition for the term does little to belie the terrifying weight of its purpose.

But that is hardly an accident—Galton shortly thereafter closes out his memoir by ponderously reflecting on the ultimate goals of eugenics: “to check the birth-rate of the Unfit, instead of allowing them to come into being…[and] improvement of the race by furthering the productivity of the Fit” (capitalization original,

Galton, 1908, 323).

Of course, we are here speaking of a Commission meant to produce a credible scientific study of immigration policy that was headed by a white supremacist, and that ultimately upheld more than a few scientific racist ideas. Among these ideas, the suggestion that there was a fundamental difference in quality between old stock Northern/Western European and new stock Southern/Eastern Europeans—a virtually unbridgeable “vast contrast” (Tichenor 2002, 129).

Indeed it went on, to discuss that certain less-

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progressive56 countries were virtually overrun with unskilled workers in dirty, overcrowded dwellings, noting evidence to demonstrate that some races were better- suited to American citizenship than others (Tichenor

2002, 130-131), indeed creating a vague ranking that placed Anglo-Saxons above Swedish/Dutch/German, who were themselves (significantly) above Hebrews, who in turn were seen as superior to Italians, Magyars, Slovaks,

Poles, and Asians; that African-Americans were at the bottom is unsurprising and yet impressive due to the strata of racist hatred present by even half-way down this chart (Tichenor 2002, 130-132). The SCIRP is, needless to say, a massive step away from the analysis of

56 Here we have one of the most worrying and direct links between the eugenicist thinking of the turn of the 20th century and the ostensibly scientific thinking of the late 20th century—no less an eminent politician than Senator Alan Simpson spoke almost these same words to indicate desirable limits on refugee admittance into the USA, that allowing too many individuals in from the less- progressive countries failing to share American values was cause for alarm: “If immigration is continued at a high level and yet a substantial portion of the newcomers and their descendants do not assimilate, they may create in America some of the same social, political, and economic problems which existed in the country which they have chosen to depart” (U.S. Congress 1981a [the SCIRP Final Report], 431). Simpson goes on to say a great many more astounding things but those will be saved for the chapter discussing the SCIRP proper.

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the Dillingham Commission, and it is finally to that

Commission that we now turn.

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Chapter 5

THE SELECT COMMISSION ON

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

Construction of the SCIRP

After briefly analyzing the entire history of USA immigration policy to the 1970s, and seeing the role that immigration commissions have filled in countries struggling to come to grips with their immigration problems, we arrive at long last at our destination: the creation of the Select Commission on Immigration and

Refugee Policy. As mentioned in the introduction, the

SCIRP, despite being a much more recent and potentially important commission, lacks even a single authoritative historical study of the sort the Dillingham Commission finally received in 2004. It is difficult to pinpoint the reason for this oversight, given its obvious relevance as the precursor to the major 1986 immigration

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overhaul.57 But the Dillingham Commission, according to

Handlin's 1950s-era retrospective, had essentially already drawn the conclusions it set out to prove: that new stock immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe were fundamentally inferior to old stock immigrants from

Northern and Western Europe (Handlin 1957, 101-102), and merely gave voice to the idea that the policy should reflect this scientific revelation. With this in mind, it seems relevant to keep an eye on what the creators of the SCIRP already believed at the time of its founding.

Certainly, President Carter knew from early in his term that myriad problems existed with the existing ways the USA dealt with foreign arrivals to its borders, whether economic migrants, endangered refugees, or political asylees. Much of the discussion over handling migration matters looked to history for a guide—though

"[a]ll historical analogies are fallible in one sense or another because they emphasize some aspects of the past while suppressing others to achieve the right fit. And yet we are perhaps incapable of living, thinking, or teaching without them" (Noon 2004, 340) but “[w]hen

57 And of course said overhaul's influence on creating the subsequent Ascencio and Jordan Commissions.

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issued by political leaders, historical analogies more often than not serve prescriptive rather than descriptive or analytical functions, and so--rather than critiquing the analogies point by point and perhaps locating

'better' ones--we are more usefully served by asking what those analogies seek to accomplish for those who enlist them” (Noon 2004, 340).

Suffice to say Jimmy Carter putting together an immigration commission was a very different thing than

Theodore Roosevelt doing so, and Father Hesburgh made a more compelling case for a compassionate immigration steward than Senator Dillingham. Virtually unassailable of character, as evidenced by repeated deference to his wisdom by individuals across the immigration policy spectrum, a better chair seems virtually impossible to imagine. Hesburgh’s own recollections of this period are telling, as he explains in his memoirs that the U.S. was clearly divided on immigration policy at the time when

Carter first approached him about serving on the SCIRP

(Hesburgh and Reedy 1990, 275). The minimal rancor concerning immigration policy in the mid-1970s seems virtually pacific from a contemporary perspective, and

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indeed even by the time Hesburgh completed his memoirs in the late 1980s immigration hardly captured any of the partisan divisions that it does today.

One major obstacle to reform: long-serving friend to the agricultural sector Senator James Eastland, who

“chaired both the Senate Judiciary Committee and its

Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization. He effectively killed immigration reform bills in committee”

(LeMay 2003, 12). Indeed it seems primarily the desire of young Senator Edward Kennedy to make a name for himself in immigration, combined with the support of the newly elected President Carter and his Secretary of Labor

F. Ray Marshall, that enabled the entire Commission- creation process to begin at all (LeMay 2003, 12-13).

Indeed only Kennedy’s willingness to “use a parliamentary trick” (LeMay 2003, 13) to avoid Senator Eastland stopping the legislation enabled any serious consideration of the SCIRP.

The struggle to prevent even discussion of such policymaking is easy to understand when examined from a historical context; “the modern state, through its officials, attempts with varying success to create a

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terrain and a population with precisely those standardized characteristics that will be easiest to monitor, count, assess and manage. The utopian, immanent, and continually frustrated goal of the modern state is to reduce the chaotic, disorderly, constantly changing social reality beneath it to something more closely resembling the administrative grid of its observation” (Scott 1998, 81-82). This is the perpetual active goal of immigration policy: to segregate, organize, analyze, count, and distribute those seeking to enter a state’s borders. And Senator Eastland obviously did not think that the national interest would benefit from meddling with immigration policy.

Much like the scientific forestry that occupies much of Scott’s book, the top-down management of immigration can have successes but ultimately is not capable of succeeding in what many wish to be its primary goal: preventing anyone from entering the country illegally.

Furthermore, it may even abjectly fail at its primary goal, as when the fully-planned city of Brasilia failed to account for the 60,000 migratory people required to build its extravagant towers and plazas, and they quickly

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progressed from temporary accommodations to squatting on additional land and building makeshift houses despite government efforts to keep these areas clear, and ironically turning Brasilia from its classless administrative utopia to stark spatial segregation by social class (Scott 1998, 129-130). Social homogeneity is anathema to creating communities involved with each other and with society generally (Putnam 2000, 210), and some fundamental understanding of this precept animates the awareness that adding new blood to a society is good on some level. The issues fitting in to the U.S. context were not unique to immigrants in the 1970s, and the problem only grows more complex over time.

Americans are growing increasingly separated from one another along lines of class, in every aspect of life: where they’re born and grow up, where they go to school, what they eat, how they travel, whom they marry, what their children do, how long they live, how they die. What kind of “national community” built on “mutual obligation” is possible when Americans have so little shared experience?58

58 George Packer, 2015, “The Republican Class War,” in The New Yorker, (November 9). http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/11/09/the- republican-class-war (accessed November 2, 2015)

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The CATO Institute summarized a particular strain of anti-immigration view in the USA that would only grow in subsequent years;

The barbed wire along the Mexican border has replaced the Statue of Liberty as the symbol of this country’s policy toward immigrants. These immigration barriers are supported by a curious combination of left and right. Thus we see Cesar Chavez, president of the United Farm Workers of America, demanding that the U.S. Border Patrol crack down on illegal alien workers and criticizing the Immigration and Naturalization Service for allowing ‘this flood of desperately poor workers [to continue] unchecked’ (New York Times, July 23, 1974). And we also see members of the Ku Klux Klan donate their time to patrol the border in cars equipped with spotlights and CB radios, assisting the border patrol by spotting [border-crossers].59

It is difficult to ignore that the nation’s oldest white supremacy group seemingly founded the nearly-mainstream

“citizen border watch” movement that received a resurgence of interest in the aftermath of the World

Trade Center attacks of 2001.

One significant reason the American public writ large remains so perpetually frustrated with immigration policy is the gulf between what is written and what is

59 Newsweek, November 14, 1977, quoted in CATO Institute Policy Report, II(2), February 1980, http://www.cato.org/policy-report/february-1980. Page 1.

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implemented; in the same way that centrally-planned economies only functioned due to the innovative ways that particular civil servants found to circumvent official rules in order to accomplish the letter of the law rather than the spirit of the law (Scott 1998, 350-351), so too does it seem that immigration laws as written are simply impossible without significant low-level alterations to implementation—but when such implementations would have to be undertaken everywhere that immigrants might congregate, it seems an even more overwhelming task than rectifying massive shortages at a state-run factory. But again, this is precisely why it was deemed time to create a new Commission to understand how to proceed on this delicate issue.

The Commission

On March 22, 1979, the White House formally announced the appointment of the four public members of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy: appointed as chairman was Reubin Askew, the former governor of Florida, not precisely the most logical choice for a non-governmental member but this shortly

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proved moot; Rose Matsui Ochi, director of criminal justice planning for the City of Los Angeles and a former

USA internment camp detainee; Joaquin Francisco Otero, immigrant activist and international vice president of the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks; and Cruz

Reynoso, associate justice of the Third Appellate

District in Sacramento and sometimes law professor. The time seemed palpably right for a major study of immigration—the Mariel Boatlift, Haitian refugees, ongoing Cold War migration crises.

Proceedings

The 1907 congregation of the Dillingham Commission had gone to great lengths to analyze the immigrant problem at its source in the sending countries (Zeidel

2004, 51-68). From all evidence present in the public record, it is unlikely that the SCIRP sent its congregation to every nation of Latin America to study the way its people lived in the way its predecessor had visited many European nations. Perhaps this is a crucial difference in interpreting information from the final reports regarding immigrant problems in their home

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countries versus immigrant problems in their host country, and may even help explain how its final report and policy recommendations led to IRCA (Marshall 2009).

Still, the SCIRP certainly kept an open dialogue with foreign leaders,60 as the opinions of the President of

Mexico, and by proxy some substantial part of the Mexican population, certainly played into both public and private policy parley.

One of many interesting side stories emerging from research into the SCIRP was the interplay and opposition between President Carter and Senator Strom Thurmond.

Before the SCIRP delivered its final report, Thurmond became head of the Judiciary Committee, and reactivated the long-dormant immigration subcommittee, appointing

Alan Simpson to chair it, so that Simpson could, in his words, ‘learn a policy area and put [his] stamp on it’

(Alan Simpson quoted in Tichenor 2002, 253).61 Thurmond’s

60 And of course the populace as well; Hesburgh remembers that after the SCIRP hearings had concluded their 12-city tour over 18 months, they had compiled “thirteen thick volumes of testimony, findings, and recommendations…each as thick as the New York City phone directory” (Hesburgh and Reedy 1990, 276). 61 Romano Mazzoli assumed the role of head of this subcommittee in the House at Hesburgh’s urgings (Tichenor 2002, 253).

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passion for the issue was publicly obvious, and privately confirmed as well. Cynical theorists might suggest that politicians are merely looking for innovative puffery techniques, or at the very least engage in résumé-padding for its own sake, but Thurmond’s interest seemed genuine.

One particularly memorable and documentable intragovernmental comment on the soon-to-be-announced

Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy came from Strom Thurmond’s letter to President Carter, a letter that struck an elegant balance between

Congressional and Corleone: “Historically, the field of immigration has been left to the Congress with proper cooperation and co-ordination with the Executive Branch of our Government. I trust this relationship shall continue.”62 Later in the same letter, Thurmond added:

Being the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee I anticipated this Committee will be called upon to handle considerable legislation having to do with the immigration problem which faces our Nation. For that reason, I shall endeavor to fully acquaint myself with every facet of this

62 Folder “White House Correspondence, Carter Administration, Folder VII, March 5, 1979-May 29, 1979”: White House Correspondence, Box 4, Thurmond Collection, Special Collections, Clemson University Libraries, Clemson, South Carolina

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complicated problem. I feel the other members of the Senate Judiciary will do likewise.

Father Hesburgh recalled in his memoirs that “[i]n setting policy, the commission came to the conclusion that the best way of dissuading excess immigration was to make it difficult, if not impossible, for these people to get jobs here without legal entry papers” (Hesburgh and

Reedy 1990, 276). Alan Simpson’s statements in response to the final report seem to uphold the insight of this idea, given that he agreed the system was solid but cautioned that without the full three-legged stool of employer sanctions, increased immigration enforcement, and a secure identity verifier, any new reforms were bound to fail just as surely as had previous reforms

(United States Congress 1981b, 88). And indeed in hindsight it is easy to see how quickly employer sanctions were cast aside in deference to immigration- heavy business interests, not to mention the reliance on the perpetually and peculiarly quixotic efforts to introduce national secure identity documentation to the

U.S.A., seemingly impossible no matter how valid the reasoning to implement such a system nor how

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ideologically confused the opposition (Watner and McElroy

2004; Etzioni 2000, 131; Smith 2000, 299-303).

Members

Focusing on the beliefs of the individual members of the Commission is vital given the discourse analytical approach of this work, though it is difficult to understand any serious analysis of Congressional policymaking without some significant focus on the individuals involved: “[t]he policy process is a complex political process in which there are many actors: politicians, pressure groups, civil servants, publicly employed professionals, and even sometimes those who see themselves as the passive recipients of policy” (Hill

2012, 4).

The SCIRP embodied a strong push for mandatory identification documents, which could sync up with any previous top-down efforts at crafting national identity.

The intersection of liberalism and nativism produces a scenario where identity documents are seen as illegitimate in the U.S.A.—but only for citizens.

Suggesting such documents be only for immigrants smacks

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of potentially discriminatory targeted surveillance, yet the idea of issuing secure documentation to all workers, regardless of citizenship, is generally as much a policy non-starter as any other push to document all Americans— regardless of the justification.

A dramatic and profound turn away from turn-of-the- century thinking in the 1970s might suggest that future commissions followed such a new pattern as well. Amnesty still stands out as an aberrant solution in immigration policy history, but failure of employer sanctions to be taken seriously seems to fit with continual focusing on the immigrant as the problem.

As Steinmo suggests, those focused on the importance of ideas can note how institutional change only comes about when the majority agrees on two important things— that there is a problem that needs solving, and that this solution might actually solve the problem (Steinmo 2008,

170). It is through this mechanism we can understand how the progressive policy of amnesty could come to be seriously considered even when most immigration policy was thoroughly embedded in the same nativist thought as it had been for decades—because it was overwhelmingly

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obvious that previous efforts had not succeeded in freeing the USA from its undocumented population, and an amnesty had the potential to rectify the situation. It is little wonder such a policy has essentially never been tried again given its obvious failure to fix the problem.

Still, this policy may have opened up a space for future commissions to move in more progressive directions.

Reflections

Justifying policy through previous experience “often produces a version of the past that resists critique by transforming the particularities of historical experience into timeless, eternal 'myths' that legitimate the present as the inevitable outcome of the past" (Noon

2004, 341). Highlighting the events that play into your preferred notion of the past is unsurprising, but can have significant consequences: witness the World War II memorial receiving $100 million in funding while proposed monuments to Rosie the Riveter and the Japanese internment camps were refused any funding (Noon 2004,

344). The SCIRP’s framing was political, of course; sometimes overtly, and sometimes covertly. Discourse

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analysis is well-suited to tackling subtext and helping assemble the big picture of a particular text.

Perhaps the most significant advantage in using discourse analysis on a government publication is the relatively straightforward context surrounding the text itself. The SCIRP’s final report is a document with an easy-to-follow publicly accessible provenance, written for reasons explicitly laid out both in the proclamation authorizing the SCIRP’s creation and within the report itself, and seeking to solve specific problems discussed at length in the introduction. Many subjective and endlessly debatable issues for traditional discourse analysis can be minimized in cases such as this, somewhat sidestepping thusly the “Frame Problem” (Gee 2010, 31), wherein the context of a particular text can expand nearly limitlessly, covering virtually any aspect of the text itself, its production, its authors, or even the contemporary Zeitgeist. Furthermore, even seeking to understand a relatively straightforward situation may result in a virtually opposite understanding of the scenario, or at the very least a vitally flawed

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misrepresentation of its subtleties rendering an analysis imperfect (Gee 2010, 31-35).

But again, these are the reasons to appreciate the mild blessing of working with official Government documentation, not that this completely eliminates ambiguity. Part of the reasoning behind conducting elite interviews was to help further ascertain any unexpected ambiguities, particularly any cases of informal hierarchies or other scenarios leading to unexpected sources of authority (Gee 2010, 36). Even after conducting only a few interviews, it did seem that the formal hierarchy of the Commission tracked relatively well to the informal hierarchy. This is related to the

Bayesian logic of what Gee calls the “Frame Problem Tool”

(Gee 2010, 37), where the best way to ascertain the full context of the material you examine with discourse analysis is to see if the original context looks different as a result of your investigation. At the end of the analysis, the initial assumptions of relatively straightforward Commission hierarchy held true in the big picture, which was a small mercy in the grand scheme of the dissertation but still welcome.

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One interesting avenue of contextual investigation is the ideological leanings of the administration—and given that the Reagan administration was in many important ways discordant to the Carter administration, this should have some impact on the tenor of the final publication. Indeed, the report is particularly interesting in this regard, even if not always in the expected fashion. Given the notion that ideology63 can be seen as cognitively prior to factual beliefs on political issues (Kahan and Braman 2006, 148), and that “[n]o actual choice can ever be completely free, fully enlightened, or altogether impartial; hence no choice made among alternative ways of life can be fully rational

(Fischer 1985, 249), it seemed inevitable that the Reagan administration would simply toss out the entirety of the

SCIRP and start again.

But at the same time, when ideological beliefs clash, surprising results are possible. Outcomes normally seen as impossible can occur given the proper structural circumstances (Kingdon 1999, 46-47). Thus

63 The original wording refers here to culture, not ideology, but Kahan and Braman also wholeheartedly promote the idea that ‘culture’ is merely a layman’s proxy for ideology, thus this summation.

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just as small-government conservatives are capable of supporting social welfare programs that fit their worldview, so too was it quite possible to see a handoff of policy between Carter and Reagan against seemingly all odds.

The form of the final report created some measure of controversy within the Congress itself, in the sense that some members thought the final report lacked sufficient lawmaker input (U.S. Congress 1980b). Furthermore, the fact that the SCIRP’s recommendations were non-binding meant some degree of skepticism about the entire project.64 Yet overall, the publication was itself minimally controversial, which in hindsight is all the more astounding given its far-reaching and dramatic recommendations (and the sometimes contradictory nature of its analysis, discussed in the next section).

Coding

After following the guidelines set down in Chapter

3, coding the final report of the SCIRP was a relatively

64 Adhering nicely to Boswell 2009’s visualizations of commissions; also in keeping with Gee 2010’s insight as to the relevance of language in different contexts (42- 43)

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straightforward process, if also time-consuming. The overall winner in the seven categories, perhaps unsurprisingly, was pragmatism; indeed, if the report of any Commission were not predominated with discussion of how to practically implement a solution it would be fairly surprising. But there were certainly surprises in store, some of which tilt the proceedings in directions that this dissertation contemplated but did not necessarily expect to find directly in the evidence.

Breaking things down by the numbers:

SECTI Axiomat Economi Humanitar Pragmat Humanitar Economic Axiomati ON ic Pro- c Pro- ian Pro- ic ian Pro- Pro- c Pro- Expansi Expansi Expansion Restricti Restrict Restrict on on on ion ion Intro 3 8 36 14 15 2 12 I - 2 4 10 1 1 3 II 6 12 8 61 20 24 18 III 8 17 27 27 3 4 15 IV 1 - 1 9 - - - V 2 1 15 47 4 5 1 VI 7 4 - 18 1 6 4 VII 3 - 4 75 1 - 1 ALL 30 44 95 261 45 42 54 Table 5.1: A Nod to Content Analysis

Merely glancing at the chart, it would seem that whatever was discussed in Section II must be something for which the Commission recommended strong pro-restriction activity. And yet, this was the section discussing the perils of illegal immigration—the very thing that the

Commission is known, by those who do know it, for

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promoting the most expansionist thought. What explains this disconnect?

Barring a first-hand account from the weekend helicopter-transported retreats65 to elaborate on the deliberation, our best guesses to this disparity will come from a careful reading of archival material, analysis of other contemporary material, and interviews with those people involved who are still willing (or able) to be interviewed. Certainly the opening words of

Father Theodore Hesburgh, more heavily filled with humanitarian concerns for immigrants than any other section of the report (and indeed nearly even when compared with the report in toto), seem to offer a suggestion as to where the expansionist heart of the

Commission lay—and yet Hesburgh, though obviously full of compassion for his fellow human, made it clear in his own

Appendix rebuttal that he was uncomfortable with the degree of leniency and immigration encouragement suggested by some of his Commissionmates. The complexity of this Commission’s discussion and debate is no

65 It was good to be on the Commission, it seems.

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surprise, but fortunately that is precisely what makes it such an interesting case study.

When breaking down the individually coded sections further, we see an intriguing theme emerging. Whether arguing for restriction or expansion, using the logic of economics or humanitarianism or even using no specific logic at all, nationalism is evoked on a consistent basis. Nationalism is used more frequently to justify restrictionist sentiment, but there are plenty of compelling reasons on offer for expansionist views as well.

One crucial consideration when performing discourse analysis is identifying statements that treat controversial ideas as self-evident or otherwise unquestionably factual. I suspected that such statements would be relatively common in the SCIRP’s final report, which again led to the creation of the axiomatic coding category. Indeed, subjective and even controversial statements on policy frequently popped up in the text, presented for policy recommendations as a sort of fait accompli, giving the reader—and by logical extension, the

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public—no hint that a political decision had just occurred.

Given this, it is even more interesting how seemingly at odds the report seems with itself.

Paragraph after paragraph of logical and even emotional prose damning immigrants opens the final report, with some of the argument even sounding quite similar to those used today.66 Father Hesburgh’s introductory words open with a quotation from Hillel (United States Congress

1981a, 30), address moral quandaries for family reunification as fundamentally “wrong” (United States

Congress 1981a, 44), deploy terms like “the common good”

(United States Congress 1981a, 46), and conclude with claims that the SCIRP report is free from the “cant, hypocrisy, and racism which have sometimes characterized

U.S. immigration policy in years gone by” (United States

Congress 1981a, 46). Here Hesburgh speaks forcefully from his position of religious/moral authority, grounding the report in a tone sympathetic to immigrants. Yet the same segment also includes restrictionist touchstones,

66 Albeit usually sticking to economic and logistical difficulties; nativist and even eugenic language about immigrants is certainly more common in discourse for the 2016 Presidential race than in this 35-year-old document

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sometimes inserted almost haphazardly into the flow of discussion over protecting those immigrants suffering in a fundamentally unfair system.

Truly, Father Hesburgh’s conflicted feelings in the introduction were palpable. Perhaps this was hardly surprising; here was a man who had to balance his religious life with the secular trappings of the

Commission. Further, he had already been called to serve a President in matters of amnesty before, when serving on

Gerald Ford’s Presidential Clemency Board and in part— even more ironically—helping reintegrate those who had avoided the draft by emigrating to Canada (Hesburgh and

Reedy 1990, 265-267).67 Tellingly, Hesburgh once found himself in an argument with fellow Board member Marine

General Lew Walt over granting amnesty to those convicted for draft resistance. Walt suggested that granting amnesty to even one applicant in a hundred was too

67 And indeed Hesburgh was a veteran voice of progressive justice even before Ford’s appointment. President Eisenhower appointed Hesburgh to the United States Civil Rights Commission, and in his time he came to fully appreciate the sentencing double standards for blacks who committed the same crimes as whites (Hesburgh and Reedy 1990, 268-269). Hesburgh surely had all these previous experiences in mind when consulting with President Carter during his first Presidential campaign on the continuing problem of amnesty (Hesburgh and Reedy 1990, 270).

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lenient, and Hesburgh retorted that he would be unhappy for the exact opposite reasons, remarking “I’m in the forgiving business” (Hesburgh and Reedy 1990, 267).

But how successful was the Commission at avoiding the aforementioned cant, hypocrisy, and racism? The organization Zero Population Growth, at the time quite openly critical of Mexican birth rates68 and whose recent past president was eugenicist John Tanton (Keely 1980,

351, 354), was a frequent contributor to both the public hearings and even the Congressional hearings on the SCIRP

(U.S. Congress 1981b). Furthermore, no less a figure than Lawrence Fuchs said at the Boston regional hearing

“We need the help of Zero Population Growth, people who have been thinking about this issue and its interrelatedness to the quality of life issues in developing some conception of ideal population growth in the future.”69 It is one thing to allow the participation of groups with undemocratic ideologies in a public forum,

68 And also disdainful of Mexicans in general (Stern 2005) 69 Robert D. Farber University Archives & Special Collections Department, Brandeis University. Lawrence Fuchs Papers, 1948-2008. Series 7: Select Commission on Immigration & Refugee Policy (SCIRP), 1968-1985. Box 46 of 71: Sub-Series 1: SCIRP Regional Hearings. SCIRP – Regional Hearings – Transcript – Boston, Massachusetts, 11/19/1979 [1/2]

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as obviously that is a proper demonstration of the democratic process, but the wholesale endorsement of their value to immigration policy brings a disturbing pallor to the proceedings.

But to return to the text of the final report—to an observer in 2015, one sentence in the SCIRP’s introductory statements stands out as highlighting a relatively rapid shift in meaning: “The strong desire to regain control over U.S. immigration policy is one of several reasons for the Commission’s unanimous vote to legalize a substantial portion of the undocumented/illegal aliens now in our country” (United

States Congress 1981a, 41). One might be forgiven for recoiling in shock from the fact that anything other than border security was ever seen as “gaining control” over immigration. This particular fragment is particularly telling for this very reason; any solution, be it expansionist, restrictionist, or purely pragmatist, could be seen by the SCIRP as a potential solution to the problem of immigration policy, so long as it created a future in which the Government had an easier time managing immigrants and immigration. Perhaps this view

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was more broadly accepted at the time? Much has been made in the media about how the extreme right of the

1970s has drifted into the mainstream; the Ku Klux Klan’s late-1970s efforts at establishing a border watch militia have obvious parallels in the Minutemen and other near- mainstream anti-immigrant groups of the last decade (Doty

2009, 27), so it is easy to see how the extremist interpretation of managing immigration policy—that keeping out (or kicking out) immigrants was the only way to ‘manage’ the problem—could have gained so much momentum.

Still, one thing that has not changed in this regard is the propensity for dramatic exogenous occurrences to change the tenor of public opinion on immigration; after

the Cuban push-out of 1980….[M]any letters to the Select Commission call[ed] for restrictions on U.S. immigration. It is easy to understand the feelings which motivated these opinions, but in the light of hard-headed U.S. interests it would be a mistake to let the emotion generated by an unusual, almost bizarre episode guide national policy. (United States Congress 1981a, 34)

Similarly, it can likely be said, letting emotional responses to an unusual and bizarre episode being a bad idea has also not changed since 1981. Though it is also

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only fair to say that the reality of significant numbers of undocumented migrants can hardly be called unusual or bizarre in 2015.

In the end, the SCIRP could be seen as a significant success, even if the ultimate results were not precisely what the Commissioners intended (but then, when are results ever precisely what is intended?). From 1981 to

1986, Father Hesburgh “operated a very small watchdog shadow commission to act as a sort of lobbying group for the recommendations of [the] original commission”

(Hesburgh and Reedy 1990, 279), presumably in part due to understandable concerns over Reagan’s disinclination to support Carter-promulgated policy solutions, and in part simply to act as responsible stewards. “We kept the pressure on Congress…so that the Simpson-Mazzoli bill would not slip through the cracks and be lost. By and large, the 1986 immigration law did incorporate most, if not all, of our original recommendations” (Hesburgh and

Reedy 1990, 279). The occasional bursts of antagonism throughout the proceedings manifested both as anger and as a kind of helpless resentment in the appendices of individual statements following the SCIRP report itself.

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Thus that there were significant issues for decades after the IRCA is perhaps unsurprising, and for that purpose we now turn to reflection on this entire project.

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Chapter 6

DISCUSSION

The sanctions to be placed on employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens are clearly the most important provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act.70

I guess I would like my life to say to the young people especially: He believed, he hoped, he tried, he failed often enough, but with God’s grace, he often accomplished more than he rationally could have dreamed.71

The baseline success for this entire dissertation is a sort of “clearing of the underbrush” for the SCIRP in the political science context, carefully examining and clarifying its contents while also opening it up for the ease of future research, including analysis of both the aforementioned comparatively minor immigration commissions springing in the 1990s from IRCA's passage.

Looking back at the SCIRP and the subsequent major immigration policy overhaul of the IRCA, the first

70 U.S. Department of Justice 1988, 18 71 Hesburgh and Reedy 1990, 313

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reaction an educated contemporary observer is likely to have, particularly if previously unfamiliar with 1980s immigration policy, is one of shock. The U.S.A. granted amnesty to millions of undocumented workers? And it was bipartisan? Under a Republican administration? This, of course, is but one of many reasons the mid-1970s to mid-

1980s were such a pivotal time in immigration policymaking, and why the relatively minimal analysis of the period remained befuddling. Yet just as the actualities of the Dillingham Commission remained obfuscated until Zeidel’s 2004 analysis, so too was a discussion of the vital essence of the SCIRP virtually nonexistent until now.

The SCIRP is generally seen as a fairly pragmatic entity, with progressive leadership, that helped usher in the largest amnesty in memory. But this perception, while not wrong, belies the dramatic truth of the matter: that just like the 1965 INA before it, its intentions were very much to make relatively minimal changes to the status quo. The SCIRP recommendations, as summarized by

Father Hesburgh in the introduction, essentially sought to normalize and stabilize the contemporary migration

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conundrums faced by the nation (U.S. Department of

Congress 1981a, 41). This solution involved streamlining enforcement and deportation proceedings, encouraging

English-language learning for all migrants, and generally creating an “equitable, efficient, and enforceable” (U.S.

Congress 1981a, 41-42) system.

In the end, what the SCIRP recommendations led to, even when implemented nearly in full, was something quite a bit different. Rather than rectifying the issue of millions of productive members of society hiding in the shadows and sealing the border to prevent more such individuals appearing, by a decade later there were anywhere from perhaps two to ten-times as many undocumented migrants in the U.S. as there had been at the time of the SCIRP. Certainly there is no guarantee to what degree these individuals came because they now thought amnesty was likely to recur, versus employers needing to maintain their supply of easily exploited workers, or stayed due to a desire to settle or merely to the ever-increasing difficulty of entering the country again if choosing to return home. But what is certain is that what started as a series of enlightened but

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conservative recommendations became the most radical overhaul of immigration policy, and indeed the make-up of the U.S. populace, in generations, again in this sense following in the footsteps of the 1965 INA.

Analysis of this historic moment, when juxtaposed against contemporary times, illustrates two particular points. First, the dramatic 1990s shift towards securitizing72 migration. NAFTA played a significant role in the change of attitudes toward the Mexican border that led to such securitization. Even from the perspective of one of the most influential figures in the early drafting of NAFTA, there were many major problems. The European

Union example was largely discounted, and subsequently both free movement of labor and a united currency were non-starters (Pastor 2001, 2-9). Mandatory debt repayment inexorably led to increased migration, as workers sought better pay after their industries failed

72 In the immortal words of Ole Wæver’s 1995 article “Securitization and Desecuritization” where he discussed the continual net-widening of security in political and academic discourse (Wæver 1995, 46); related, Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations speaks more broadly to the risks of securitization in migration, even if that is not its direct intent, while both Dannreuther (2007) and Drifte (2006) would argue that the concept of securitization is misapplied to migration (though obviously I disagree).

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and banks closed (Pastor 2001, 4-6). NAFTA as a whole dramatically accelerated the ongoing fallout of IRCA’s failure to fully implement the SCIRP’s recommendations.

Strongly related to securitization is the second point, the 2000s shift towards a new U.S. xenophobia.

These issues are so closely linked that seeking to analyze them independently, particularly in today’s context, would likely require another dissertation. Jef

Huysmans described securitization as “a political act in which the unity and autonomy, or in other words the sovereignty of the community, is asserted” (Huysmans

2006, 50), and though they are not always intimately linked, it is simple to see securitization’s effortless compatibility with xenophobia in the U.S. context; indeed, this is the reality in which American Politics73 must exist today. All the data in the world demonstrating the relatively similar assimilation rates of new immigrants, regardless of whether they come from

Mexico or Morocco or Monaco, does not have much impact on the new xenophobic mindset that believes Muslims and

73 In both the political science sense and the pure politics sense

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Mexicans are somehow causing irreparable damage to the very concept of America.

These ideas have ancestors in the traditional eugenic concept of certain individuals polluting (Kahan and Braman 2006, 150) or corrupting74 their host countries with their home countries’ ways (Scruggs 1961, 150;

Zeidel 2004, 12, 54; LeMay and Barkan 1999, xxii) which obviously were always seen as inferior due both to the inherent inferiority of the immigrants (Wilson 2011, 19) or their home countries’ systems, or of course from the mere fact of not being American (Shils 1956, 15).

Certain immigrants’ portrayal as fundamentally bestial and inherently uncontrollable was also a commonplace trope in early 20th century social scientific thought

(Vitalis 2010b; Filindra 2009, 129; Hansen and King 2001,

74 The news media still remembers this too, it seems, with a major article coming up just as I was writing this section: Erika Lee, USA Today, July 7, 2015, “Chinese immigrants now largest group of new arrivals to U.S.,” in which it reminds us that we accused Chinese immigrants en masse of “corrupting white women” in the early days of their domestic presence. Meanwhile, in 1981, Reagan’s favored newsletter Human Events was similarly covering this form of eugenicist thought…from a slightly different perspective, discussing the “much higher incidence of many contagious diseases” possessed by all Third World migrants (Palmer Stacy, Human Events, December 12, 1981, 13-14).

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240; U.S. Congress 1980a, 19) and early 21st century campaign speeches (Upadhyay 2011, 113). You would think the world had come a long way since the days when migrants could be murdered in brawls with relatively no effort made to stop the killings (Lucassen 2005, 80), and certainly that is not emblematic of the modern U.S. Yet every news story about a migrant being beaten or killed in the name of America has chilling echoes of those lawless xenophobic days.

Christina Boswell and Ole Wæver could likely have a fruitful discussion about the way that immigration policymaking in the U.S. changed in the decades following the SCIRP and the IRCA, considering the distinct possibility that segments of migration policy are increasingly pushed outside the realm of acceptable political discussion. Interestingly, Boswell’s terminology would classify the switch from empirical- based policymaking to intangible normative/symbolic-based policymaking as becoming a “political organization”

(Boswell 2009, 65), whereas for Wæver a policy area switching from the technocracy to the ideologues would be represent precisely the loss of political control over

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the issue (Wæver 1995). But their theories converge on the idea that the immigration opposition initially seen in minor notes throughout the SCIRP, and growing in intensity over the subsequent decades, represents a move away from technocratic policymaking.

A National Culture?

“Culture is a prism that biases the way one experiences the world” (Ellis, 1996, 175). Pushback against immigrants, violent or pacific, comes from a variety of sources. Many of the reasons cited for virulent xenophobia or simple restrictionist policy go hand-in-hand with visualizations of fundamental truths about the U.S. In one framing, Stepan and Linz argue that the United States of America is hardly a model democracy, and no matter how the construction of its national identity is examined, illiberalism and liberalism always coexist—still using many of the same illegitimate justifications for exclusion now as in centuries past, whenever convenient (Stepan and Linz

2011, 841-856). As Fairclough would frame it, such justifications ceased to be arbitrary and became natural

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and legitimate so long ago that they are now uncritically accepted (Fairclough 1989, 91). The racial profiling, voter ID laws, and immigration status-checks of today are all evidence that only the white majority is truly the

“in-group,” and as evidence that seeking public legitimacy and popular economic remedies can often involve the implementation of illiberal policies (Boswell

2008).

Citrin, Wong, and Duff discuss Tajfel's Social

Identity theory to discuss positive feelings engendered towards those defined as part of the group; by continually reasserting its ideas of belonging (as discussed in Huntington 2004), the government intentionally excludes non-white/European/Protestant residents from this positive framing (Citrin, Wong, and

Duff, 2001). Certainly cultural conceptualizations of the 18th-century entry of immigrants often overlook the fact that enslaved Africans, not far-flung liberty- seekers, made up the majority of new arrivals (Taylor

2001, 323).75

75 Certainly theories of culture do not always ignore the impact of immigration; Reinhard Drifte argues that for cultural reasons, societies like Japan and Korea are more

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Ideas of a single, unitary American culture were likely a myth throughout the entire history of the U.S.A.

Even by 1704, William Penn complained of this lack of unity, as though “a unified body of unequal parts ruled by a natural elite [was] guided by a long precedent…., the middle colonies were new societies composed of a diverse peoples who could not agree to give deference to a shared elite” (Taylor 2001, 271-272). Yet theorizing an American culture has remained popular for scholars; names as diverse and famous as Alexis de Tocqueville,

Gunnar Myrdal, Richard Hofstadter, Louis Hartz, Gabriel

Almond, Sidney Verba, C. Wright Mills, Daniel Elazar,

Michael Sandel, Samuel Huntington, Judith Butler,76 and countless others penned monolithic tomes attempting to definitively capture the American cultural idea. Whether doing so through the lens of the visitor, the oppressed, the elite, the European, the nationalist, or the ordinary person following the path dependence of a free nation,

intolerant of immigrants than the U.S., and India much more tolerant (Drifte 2006). Indeed Japan is facing a well-publicized population catastrophe if it does not either discover a method to dramatically increase the national birth rate, or significantly soften its stance on immigration. 76 Sort of.

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each scholar contributed something enduring to the theorizing of a U.S. culture.

One little-discussed example reflecting the mythmaking of a hegemonic ‘American’ cultural identity is the unrelentingly racist surveys of the first half of the

1900s. The whites-only social surveying of the

Middletown study, carrying with it the specific political agenda that non-whites were unrepresentative of America

(Igo 2007, 54-56), came under closer scrutiny later in the century. This led to national surveys focusing on divisions rather than unity in national culture (Igo

2007, 291/285-287), helping propagate the myth that the

U.S.A.'s culture was fundamentally different in the past and had begun to fracture under the weight of minority groups demanding representation, rather than merely finally reflecting the demographic truth. “A growing recognition of national segregation did not prevent, and could even promote, a desire for a unitary Americanness”

(Igo 2007, 292).

The visualization of disharmony, in conjunction with the aforementioned closing of the frontier, fed the idea that there was no longer limitless space for expansion.

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Even if, realistically, there is plenty of space for all those residing in the U.S., the debates about proper division of the extant physical space continued, whether about breaking treaties and dislocating native peoples, or fighting against desegregationist busing efforts.

Certainly these problems foreshadowed more recent perceived simultaneous threats to physical safety and domestic society that immigrants, and immigration as a whole, increasingly embodies (Messina 2007, 48-49).

But there is also an increasing tide of awareness in the modern U.S.A. that the divisive nativism of the past is indefensible, and in any case unsustainable, given ongoing demographic shifts in virtually every part of the country. Did the latter-20th-century immigration commissions usher in this new era of recognition of the incontrovertible changes to the population? Or did they merely uphold the early-20th-century pretense of a white

European nation? There is definitely room here for future research of significant policy relevance.

In the 1970s, a controversial concept arose to deal with the problem of undocumented workers streaming across the northern Mexican border—the building of an enormous

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wall. This wall was, as mentioned earlier, hyperbolically dubbed the “Carter Curtain.”77 No doubt this is precisely what presidential candidate Ronald

Reagan derided in passing—“rather than making, or talking about putting up a fence, why don’t we work out some recognition of our mutual problems, make it possible for them to come here legally….”— in his 1980 debate with

George H. W. Bush.78 Of course, Ronald Reagan also said

“open the border both ways” in that same answer, so the entirety of the debate comes from a place entirely alien to immigration discourse (or presidential campaigns) in the 21st century. But that is precisely the point: the

SCIRP and the IRCA are a fascinating glimpse of a very different, and yet fairly recent, time in the USA’s history.

Perhaps for this reason, the SCIRP remained on

Hesburgh’s mind the rest of his life. During an

77 “Fence Plans For Border Elicit Jeers,” The Bulletin, White House Central File Subject File—Immigration- Naturalization, Folder “IM 1/1/79-3/15/79,” Box IM-2, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. 78 Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ixi9_cciy8w and, if unavailable, also summarized at http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2015/08/06/3688656/r epublican-presidential-primary-debate-immigration- rhetoric/ at least as of October 21, 2015.

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interview in his early-mid 90s, he gestured to the SCIRP report on his office bookshelf and reiterated his feelings from the early 1980s—that if the policymakers in

Washington had followed all of the blueprints the

Commission laid out for reform, rather than implementing them in part, then the current immigration crisis would simply have not occurred.79 But he knew on some level that bringing the opposing sides of the issue together would be challenging even then. In the end, the bill following most of the SCIRP’s recommendations80 seemed offensive to Hispanic leaders, liberals, and conservatives alike (Hesburgh and Reedy 1990, 276, 277-

278), which thus to the outside observer might sound like something approaching an eminently reasonable compromise.

Hesburgh’s final thought on the matter in 1990 was that

“Illegal immigration is a big, complex problem; it will

79 Gerald F. Seib. 2015. “Theodore Hesburgh: A Life at the Intersection of Change and Progress.” Wall Street Journal, February 27. http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/02/27/theodore- hesburgh-a-life-at-the-intersection-of-change-and- progress/ 80 Reagan’s own immigration advisory group technically made their own suggestions for crafting policy, but the recommendations looked to Hesburgh to be basically the same as those from the SCIRP (Hesburgh and Reedy 1990, 278).

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not be solved simply. But I do believe that the new immigration law is a giant step in the right direction”

(Hesburgh and Reedy 1990, 278).

Lessons Learned

One major take-away lesson from this analysis and research, following Boswell, is that the United States

Congress has seemingly shifted slowly from an action organization to a political organization (Boswell 2009,

65) over the three decades following IRCA: that is to say, the sweeping immigration reforms passed in the 1980s suggest that final policy output and performance was the important outcome driving policymaker behavior, as in an action organization. The utter lack of sweeping immigration reforms since the 1980s, and indeed the virtual total lack of immigration policymaking since the

1990s, suggest the behavior of a political organization, focused on “espousing certain norms and values designed to meet public expectations about appropriate behavior”

(Boswell 2009, 65). While there is certainly an argument to be made that Congress as a whole has shifted strongly toward behaving as a political organization regardless of

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the policy issue, it is also the case that immigration policy was an early bellwether of the ideological stonewalling ahead, as technocratic policymaking (and even discussion of the practical effects of policy) turned over the next few decades to virtual ideological blood-feuds over increasingly minor policy shifts.

The first serious attempt at legislating major immigration reform since 1965, in what would one day become the Immigration Reform and Control Act, came to a head in 1982. Anti-immigrant sentiment had been on the rise in the past decade. Though this coincided with a general xenophobic populist trend globally by the 1980s

(Formisano 2005, 241), the specific circumstances causing a kind of nativist backlash in the USA were fairly obvious: the ending of the Bracero program, despite the continuing need for massive migrant farm labor, set up an immigration showdown, with reverberations certainly continuing today.

Jesse Helms attempted to strip amnesty from the bill entirely, but found his measure defeated 82-17; Charles

Grassley meanwhile introduced an amendment to increase the length of the residency requirement, defeated by a

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similar margin, 84-1681. These overwhelming shows of support for immigration reform in the U.S. Senate stand in virtually comical contrast to policymaking efforts a few decades later, where the mere mention of amnesty lurking in the subtext of a proposal instantly raises opposition, and a filibuster becomes a real possibility.

Indeed, to draw further comparison between the 1980s and the 2010s, an amendment merely seeking to count refugees alongside the same numbers applied to other groups of immigrants was defeated 63-35, a measure of the sort that would have quite possibly passed with minimal opposition in today’s climate82.

Yet even then, some attitudes sound very much like

2014 talking—“Amnesty rewards law-breaking .... It makes a mockery of American law. It will perpetuate the very immorality and lack of ethics that it seeks to end.”83 No matter when it is done, avoiding historical nuance and

"characteriz[ing] the world in a simple, dualistic

81 New York Times, August 13, 1982; “Senate Opens Debate on Immigration,” by Robert Pear; Accessed on January 22, 2014, via ProQuest Newsstand. 82 Possible Syrian refugee crisis notwithstanding. 83 Paula Hawkins (R-FL), quoted in New York Times, August 13, 1982; “Senate Opens Debate on Immigration,” by Robert Pear; Accessed on January 22, 2014, via ProQuest Newsstand.

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fashion … evades a critical engagement with history"

(Noon 2004, 339). The ideological stage-setting were beginning.

Interestingly, the INS Reporter’s discussion of implementing IRCA bends over backwards to avoid referencing the Carter Administration or the SCIRP as relevant the final legislation. The discussion instead focuses on legislators from 1981 to 1986 working from ideas initially proposed in “the early 1970’s” (U.S.

Department of Justice 1988, 4). Given that we are analyzing discourse here, it is interesting to note how placing the bill’s origins squarely under the Nixon or possibly Ford Administrations, in conjunction with emphasizing the lawmaking efforts from the 97th through the 99th Congress, neatly edges out what were possibly the

4 most vital years of deliberation, and for seemingly little reason beyond what Boswell would call the projection of technocratic legitimacy (2009).84

84 Though President Nixon’s appointment of Doris Meissner to head an interagency coalition—one seeking to craft an official Government response to the perception of growing illegal migration—was an alternate origin for the SCIRP’s raison d’être (cited by Mark J. Miller 2015, Andrew M. J. Huntleigh dissertation defense, December 18).

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Fallout

Surviving the policymaking process relatively intact as IRCA, the SCIRP recommendations made quite a dramatic impact on U.S. immigration policy. The significant impact of this legislation, of course, led eventually to virtually endless gridlock in U.S. immigration policy.

No longer could large-scale forgiveness for extant undocumented migrants be seriously considered, as the amnesty well was so thoroughly poisoned that, as mentioned earlier, the barest hint of blanket legalization brought outrage from many sectors. Nor, given the failure to enact powerful employer sanctions and the failure to enact any sort of universal identity verifier, was it any surprise that Alan Simpson’s prediction came true. Indeed, without establishing all three of legalization, a universal identity verifier, and strict border enforcement, it seemed that none of the enacted policies performed as well as expected (U.S.

Congress 1980b, 88).

This is hardly to say that enacting all three would have solved the problem, as it certainly would not. But the problems that arose certainly would have looked

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different than the environment the U.S. found itself in throughout the subsequent decades, where it could be said

“dispositions, social relations, and politics [were organized] according to a rationality of security”

(Huysmans 2006, 25, albeit about a different context).

Indeed, the end result of border enforcement without domestic support was a world where migration became one of those policy areas that, unless fixed, will make

“‘…everything else…irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)’” (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, 1998, 24). In these circumstances, “the actor has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game” (Buzan, Wæver, and

Wilde, 1998, 24), and thus the world finds itself in a situation where the ‘Carter Curtain’ has been back again on the agenda of the opposing party for much of the 21st century.

~~~

There is no reason why [nativism] cannot be confined to the alleys and bars and back streets and to the hate-filled hearts of the miserable creatures who espouse it. (Shils 1956, 15)

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Future Research

Where to begin? Even brief contemplation of the way immigration policy has changed from the 1980s to the

2000s demands further research into the social phenomena driving these changes. Certainly this is a better- studied area than the SCIRP itself, but the research for this dissertation certainly never encountered any works that seemed to fully explain the shift from data-based immigration policymaking to ideology-based immigration policymaking. While there must be some amount of recursive thinking in this logic—data-based policymaking in 1986 may have indeed led inexorably in part to ideology-based policymaking in 2016—there is so much more to learn.

Select Commission Follow-Up

In the course of assembling this dissertation, I have assembled quite the mountain of information about the Commission.85 Certainly I have far more data than would be relevant to this big-picture contextual analysis of the SCIRP. But perhaps a follow-up article focusing

85 And I know Dr. Miller also has a box of material or two that I never even dove into.

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on the specific minutiae of the Commission would allow for further exploration of this issue without bogging down this dissertation with endless rumination on increasingly minor moments.

National Identification Documentation

In the broadest sense, this topic has haunted me for years and continued to do so all through this dissertation. My first of three abortive dissertation topics was on the genuinely puzzling opposition that the

United Kingdom and its major former colonies—the U.S.A.,

Ireland, Canada, and Australia—have for national identity cards, while the citizenry of nearly the entirety of the rest of the planet is supportive or, at worst, functionally blasé about the whole thing. Some suggestions from readers included the possibility that the very structure of civil law is somehow anathema to centralized identification authority, or that the shared language simply made such opposition easy to spread in this particular set of countries from an early age. But every potential solution seemed to have substantial potential holes in its explanatory power for this

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conundrum, and the entire issue seems well worth a sustained and substantial study, particularly given that the needs of society will only hinge evermore on immediate access to proper identification the more interconnected and networked societies become.

By this same token, one might argue that the opposition at some point will be irrelevant and such systems will exist de facto in even these five nations as well. Certainly this misses the point of what makes the question so interesting, wondering if there is some sort of English Language Exceptionalism leading to an inherent distrust of surveillance. And furthermore if so, what other repercussions might such beliefs have for policymaking in other areas (immigration certainly being one possibly related area)? To tackle this, certainly I would first need to get a grasp on the field of identity document/biometric research again, as it has been nearly a decade since I was truly immersed in it. It is certainly possible that more studies in the interim have shown acceptance of such technologies and systems is either higher in some of these former English colonies, or that it is lower in other parts of the world that

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seemed accepting. Here Wilbur Zelinsky’s ideas may hold a particularly interesting insight, as his Doctrine of

First Effective Settlement (Zelinsky 1973, 34) suggests that such beliefs could indeed be the enduring legacy of these early settlements. But needless to say, this is an idea just getting started.

Secure Identification Systems

Obviously strongly related to the concept of a national identity document, but substantially different as well, is the idea of properly securing any identity document or other authorization document. Skipping right over the insider knowledge I now have on this topic as it relates to immigration, information that I cannot discuss without explicit permission from the U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Services Ethics Office, there is a great deal of controversy surrounding this topic generally, as there has been for ages, and there likely will be for the foreseeable future. But domestic controversy in the U.S. is decidedly minimal compared to the general debate over national identity cards, likely precisely because the debate as to how to secure identity documents can be

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related so easily to immigration concerns. The idea of biological data embedded in a chip after the U.S.

Passport’s mid-2000s revision caused substantial consternation in the public arena—but there it is much harder to summon comparative outrage over the required biometric scans of new immigrants that were already in place.

Father Hesburgh was of course a strong advocate for such verification systems throughout the process of the

SCIRP. “My solution to this dilemma, which I could not persuade the commission to adopt, was to pass a law requiring all American citizens and legal residents to carry an upgraded social security card in the form of a plastic credit card in which was embedded a microchip carrying essential information” (Hesburgh and Reedy 1990,

277). A pragmatic choice for any noted liberal, particularly given the obvious opposition for any such view from the ACLU and other such organizations. But

Hesburgh argued repeatedly for systems that seemed to benefit the most people and make an unjust system more just, and shrugged off the privacy concerns, given both how little privacy modern life affords (even for people

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living in the 1980s!) and how Europeans seem to be able to adapt to such systems (Hesburgh and Reedy 1990, 277-

278) without falling to tyranny.

Eugenics

Here is another (even more) controversial aspect of immigration policy that must receive further attention.

Considering just how controversial the subject remains, such that whenever I have presented a conference paper with the word in the title or the paper description I have gotten significant feedback about how it is

“inappropriate” to discuss the topic since it is obviously an outdated concept, it is surprisingly simple to find evidence of eugenicist thought in modern immigration discourse.86 It is true that these presentations all took place before the 2016 Presidential campaign got underway, and the eugenicist immigration rhetoric came thundering out in force, so perhaps such

86 Finding racist eugenicists amongst the masses is simple: log on to Amazon.com, find a one-star review of a pro-immigration book (or a five-star review of an anti- immigration book) where the reviewer makes a worrying number of grammatical and spelling errors, then look up other reviews by the same person. Voilà: Frances Galton 2015!

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papers would receive a less-hostile welcome now. But I feel an imperative to continue down this particular path and reveal this ugly strand of immigration opposition for what it is, particularly for those people who may not even realize they are supporting it.

It is a virtually incontestable fact that non-family reunification immigration is driven by a system that seeks to reward the intelligent or wealthy—particularly both—easily traced back to the earliest bans on undesirable sorts. Attempts as early as 1840 to ban

Irish immigrants for reasons of fundamental inferiority, accompanied by charming statements as Samuel Morse’s rhetorical “’can one throw mud into clear water and not disturb its clearness?’” (U.S. Congress 1980a, 18-19), soon paled in comparison to efforts of the postbellum era to keep out Asians, Jews, Italians, Poles, and Slavs

(U.S. Congress 1980a, 19), and began focusing particularly on the Chinese, and after regional efforts throughout the 1860s and 1870s (Luibhéid 2002, 33-34;

U.S. Congress 1980a 19-20), 1875 saw the Page Act take the boldest early national stab at keeping out those deemed fundamentally inferior: felons and Chinese

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prostitutes (Abrams 2005, 641; Zeidel 2004, 12; Luibhéid

2002, 34). Perhaps not coincidentally soon thereafter

California took the lead in adding “Mongolian” to the short list of races (Black, Mulatto) that whites were not legally allowed to marry (Yung 1995, 29).

But the claim here, or at least it has been whenever

I bring this up in conferences, is that we have moved so far away from this system so as to make comparisons irrelevant. But filling in the last century of restrictions demonstrates the questionable nature of this assertion. Why ban epileptics (Archdeacon 1984, 145) if you are not afraid they will contaminate your society?

The Commissioner of Naturalization’s 1910 Annual Report to the Secretary of Labor contained the aside that "many of the aliens entered in recent years belong to races differing radically from the Teutonic and Celtic stocks and … the overstraining of our powers of assimilation is a real menace" (U.S. Government Printing Office 1910,

116); why worry about ethnic background? President

Wilson vetoed the first literacy bill to protect asylum- seekers (Price 2009, 54) and the second due to its religious persecution exemption jeopardizing diplomatic

226

relationships (Price 2009, 54), but Wilson’s second veto was overridden (Wyman 2010, 158-159) and only married women87 are exempt, essentially becoming heteronormatively free from ordinary standards of immigrant intellectual capabilities (Luibhéid 2002, 60). Why implement a literacy test if not seeking a more effective way to keep out those seen as possessing inferior intellect?

Why ban the vagrant (U.S. Congress 1980b, 23) if not worried this vagrancy is somehow a biological defect— surely otherwise such a person would be an ideally ambitious worker? Why craft the Johnson-Reed Immigration

Act of 1924 such that the United Kingdom is given the single largest share of visas and Italy a pittance

(Zeidel 2004, 131, 140-141)? Why begin repatriating

Mexicans in large numbers in the 1930s after explicitly bringing them in in large numbers only a few decades before (Massey 2011, Filindra 2009, 7, 13)?

87 And Mexicans, who Congress decides deserve a waiver of both the literacy test and the implemented-in-parallel $8 head tax (Archdeacon 1984, 129). The first two decades of the 20th century, particularly the literacy test waiver in conjunction with banning of Japanese labor (Massey 2011) essentially crystallized the Mexican labor migration that remains contentious a century later.

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The U.S. Government recognizes the problem that perception plays with immigration policy—the INS felt in

1935 that the average American had “fantastic exaggerations” (U. S. Congress 1980b, 45) in mind of the numbers of immigrants and the overall pervasiveness of immigration; indeed media coverage occasionally discusses that the same holds true today, and likely causes similar issues. Why after fighting the Second World War against the evils of racism and genocidal eugenics did the

Congress still only seek to allow entry to brides of returning soldiers if they normally ethnically qualified for citizenship (Wolgin 2011, 13)? Why did President

Truman have to publicly rebuke the idea that those with

Irish names were inherently better than those with Greek names (U.S. Congress 1980, 24)? Why did it take until

1952 for all Asians to qualify for citizenship (Wolgin

2011, 8)? Why did an immigrant’s ethnicity rather than her/his nationality control what visa (s)he obtained until 1965 (Wolgin 2011, 8)? Why was the 1965 law written to attempt to restore European immigration

(Luibhéid 2002, 22-23)?88 Why were gays and lesbians

88 Also see Tom Gjelten’s October 3, 2015 “In 1965, A

228

excluded from entry even up until the 1990s (Luibhéid

2002, 23; Tichenor 2002, 273)?

There is obviously no single answer to any of these questions, other than to point to the idea that eugenics is not a safely abandoned concept of the distant past, from the days when Franciscan priests made comments like

“‘[n]o matter how old they are, California Indians are always children’” (Taylor 2001, 466). Rather, these beliefs are perpetually and frighteningly relevant, even if often expressed covertly. Perhaps the most important comment in Oscar Handlin's summary of the Dillingham

Commission is the assertion of its enduring influence in finding fundamental differences in different native

“stock”: “that assumption still influence[s] our laws,

[so] it is imperative that we look closely at the commission which gave it authoritative expression”

(Handlin 1957, 94). His own understanding of the

Commission was lacking, but his assertion of its influence was seemingly quite accurate.

Conservative Tried To Keep America White. His Plan Backfired,” NPR, available at http://www.npr.org/2015/10/03/445339838/the-unintended- consequences-of-the-1965-immigration-act and also in his book I would have surely read if it came out six months ago

229

Though Handlin’s words are more than 50 years old, it does not take a Herculean effort to identify at least rudimentary eugenic thought and behaviors in the wellspring of ideologues in the 2016 Republican

Presidential race. These living representatives of

Bigo’s “professionals of unease” (Bigo 2002, 63) generally follow the usual securitization pattern of comparing migration to a tidal wave, a hole in the dike, or a barbarian invasion (Bigo 2002, 69), and equally unsurprisingly use the term immigrant as little more than shorthand for a common enemy (Huysmans 2006, 83; Bigo

2002, 71). The nearly century-old admonishment of eugenicist Paul Popenoe89 sounds simultaneously anachronistic and yet worryingly (politically) timely:

“[A]mong the 1000 leading American men of science, there is not one son of a day laborer…. 48,000 unskilled laborers to produce one man distinguished enough to get

89 Famous by the mid-1900s as the nation’s most famous marriage counselor, with a decades-long run as a regular marriage columnist in Ladies’ Home Journal. Perhaps even more infamous later for praising Mein Kampf in the 1930s and admiring Hitler’s stance on race ‘betterment.’ Jill Lepore, 2010, “Fixed: The Rise of Marriage Therapy, and Other Dreams of Human Betterment,” The New Yorker, March 29. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/03/29/fixed (Accessed November 3, 2015.)

230

in Who’s Who, while the same number of Congregational ministers produces 6,000…” (Popenoe 1926, 130).

Perhaps the day will come when casual claims of

Mexicans as disease-ridden rapists garner universal outrage, rather than outrage mixed with strong support for fighting ‘political correctness;’90 then, it may be the case that eugenicist beliefs are finally leaving immigration policy.91 I would say “for good,” but it will never be safe to assume that they would not return in a new form, particularly given that viewing Mexicans through an overtly or covertly eugenicist view dates back to at least the 1910s, when arriving workers deemed physically capable had their arms ‘approved’ branded on their arms with permanent ink (Stern 2005, 57-58, 78-80).

Indeed, for as long as there are substantial numbers of those in the U.S. who believe that it is their patriotic

90 Which as always is shorthand for “human kindness and decency” 91 Not that eugenics has disappeared in areas outside immigration by any means; phrases like “stupid people shouldn’t breed” remain popular, and surely a non-trivial number of visitors to Eugenics.net are there in support rather than merely rubbernecking. The phrase “human biodiversity” is the current preferred term for concepts of eugenic superiority. Also worth noting that the dialogue of the “makers and takers” and certain types of people being seen as a “drain on society” flirt fairly seriously with eugenic discourse.

231

responsibility to help keep the world safe from evil, as many have in other parts of the world at other times in history before them (Lieven 2005, 33), there will be dangers of such Manichean beliefs mixing with other sorts of supremacist ideologies to create all manner of insidious beliefs.

~~~

“We’re living in a country that’s the finest place of earth, but some folks don’t appreciate this land that gave them birth. I hear that up in Washington they’re having an awful fuss, ‘cause Communists and spies are making monkeys out of us.” - Carson Robison, “I’m No Communist”

Comparative Commissions

Finally, as was the initial proposal for this dissertation topic, research analyzing the comparative setups, procedures, discussions, outcomes, and backlashes of all the immigration commissions of the past century in the U.S., or perhaps comparing the SCIRP to similar commissions that took place in other countries seems a logical follow-up. Indeed I surely have amassed enough choice quotes in OneNote to populate a dozen

232

dissertations with unique excerpts, so perhaps I already have a head start on this potential future research.

Still, if turning to a comparative case study analysis, I might be best served to also return to a more basic content analysis rather than discourse analysis, and let computers do the work this time (with hopefully-available

OCR .PDFs of commission reports). It might also be valuable to bring subnational immigration movements into the equation, given the frequently contentious history between local/state authorities and the Federal

Government over such matters. This is particularly true in light of contentions such as Buzan and Wæver’s, that solutions to problems of securitization over migration may need to be at the regional, state, or even community level (Buzan and Wæver 2004, 12-13). Similarly, such moderate subnational rebellion may be driven by the contention that there is a continual decline in respect for authority yet strengthening of democratic values in postmodern societies (Inglehart 1999, 236), suggesting that federal control might rankle when juxtaposed with community-level desires for coherent and responsive policies.

233

There is also undoubtedly much interesting material to mine along the lines of what former Canadian Foreign

Minister Lloyd Axworthy once said, that there must be a

“redefining of North American security [and that it must be] one not solely authored by the U.S.” (Axworthy 2004,

103-106).92 The U.S. example of immigration policymaking is certainly globally important, and indeed has served as a model for other nations’ policy. But it is far from the only approach to policy—and thank goodness for that, given its occasional periods of general silence for decades—though certainly it can be said the U.S. may still have better relations overall with its recent immigrants than some other post-industrial nations, such as France (Laurence and Vaisse 2006; Amara 2006).

Whatever the next step in researching U.S. immigration policy, it is both reassuring and disheartening to contemplate that there will likely always be a need for such research as it will likely remain a hot-button political issue for the indefinite future. But surely this is the noble goal of the

92 Not that this should be left up to Canada, either, given its own culpability in the securitization of migration in the 21st century (Mountz 2010).

234

political scientist and policy analyst. As written in the closing words of Father Hesburgh’s autobiography

(Hesburgh and Reedy 1990, 313): “Remember for me those wonderful words of Scripture: ‘God has chosen the weak of this world to confound the strong.’ So we are weak. No matter.”

235

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Appendix A

POTENTIAL INTERVIEWEE BIOGRAPHIES

The SCIRP's staff included dozens of individuals, many of whom I attempted unsuccessfully to locate. This appendix contains a supremely brief discussion94 of each individual who factored in some way into this research and whose identity is not already publicly known.95

 Ann Bartunek, M.A., editor: lecturer at Indiana

University and editor of Business Horizons magazine; extensive communication with her former department at

Indiana University turned up no leads as to her current whereabouts or even her current name.

94 1981-era biographical information from the SCIRP’s supplemental documents, except where noted (or post- 1981). 95 In other words, no summaries of Father Hesburgh or any appointed politicians/cabinet members; notes on these individuals often come up elsewhere.

311

 Elaine Daniels, public affairs officer: Select

Committee on Population staff for U.S. House; assistant superintendent, Senate Radio-TV Gallery. Spoke to local

Connecticut newspaper in 1981 about the crucial vote that declared secure identification to be necessary for any scheme to work.96

 Guillermina Jasso, Ph.D., Director of Research:

Assistant professor of sociology at Columbia, special assistant to Commissioner of Immigration and

Naturalization Service. Currently co-director of research at New York University.

 John Jones, J.D., Public Affairs Officer: General counsel and program coordinator for National Commission on International Year of the Child, assistant professor of business at Pennsylvania State University. Important referent in lawsuit against Lawrence Fuchs for racial discrimination by Harry G. Matthews' firing.97

96 Quoted in The Hour, Norwalk, Connecticut, Thursday, January 8, 1981. Added that minority groups found it discriminatory and civil libertarians felt it an unwarranted extension of government control. 97http://www.leagle.com/decision/1980612504FSupp108_1594

312

 Sheila H. Murphy, Research Aide: Staff intern for

Senator Paul Tsongas. Found a Sheila Murphy and a Sheila

Cerjanec who could be her, but neither responded to my unsolicited interview requests.

 Richard W. Day, Chief Counsel/Staff Director: Also served as Alan Simpson’s Chief of Staff, according to

Zolberg’s A Nation By Design (2006) (and confirmed by Dr.

Miller).

 Robert J. Portman, Research Aide: On Representative

Willis D. Gradison (R-Ohio)'s staff, now of course a sitting Senator who was infamously targeted by Anonymous after his authoring of the so-called “indefinite detention” bill in 2011.

 Donna Alvarado, Counsel: Also on Corrections

Corporation of America board. Currently serves as a

Regent on the Ohio Board of Regents, on the Governor’s

Commission on Higher Education and the Economy, and Vice

Chair of the Governor’s Workforce Policy Board in Ohio.98

98 https://www.cca.com/board-of-directors

313

 Rose Matsui Ochi, Presidential Appointee: Director of Criminal Justice Planning for City of Los Angeles and former USA internment camp detainee. May now have private law practice in Los Angeles, but unable to contact.

 Joaquin Francisco Otero, Presidential Appointee: immigrant activist and International Vice President of the Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks.

 Cruz Reynoso, Presidential Appointee: Associate

Justice of the Third Appellate District in Sacramento, one of a very few number of Justices ever recalled99 and occasional law professor.

 Ronald Scheinman, Ph.D., Research Associate: assistant professor of government and law at Lafayette

College, program(me) officer for United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees. Published a 1,000-page book

“The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees and the Contemporary International System” and

99 Victim of effort to target “liberal” judges, though he survived a first attempt on his position: http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative /probono_public_service/ls_pb_pbp_reynoso_interview_jj_20 12_su.authcheckdam.pdf

314

was director of New York Metropolitan EZPass until his retirement.

 Nina K. Solarz, M.A., Director of Public Affairs:

Director of National Development Council, representative of the mayor of New York in Washington D.C. Related to controversy over firing of Harry G. Matthews. Now on board of directors for Foundation for the National

Institutes of Health.

 Sandra A. Stevens, M.A., Special Assistant to the

Director and Executive Secretary to the Select

Commission: Management consultant and curriculum specialist. I had hoped Lawrence Fuchs might know what happened to her as I could not find any trace of her, but obviously I did not get the chance to ask him.

 Lee Thomas Surh, J.D., Public Affairs Officer:

Attorney at Legal Aid Society of Alameda County,

California. Still practices law in California.

 Ralph B. Thomas, Ph.D., Deputy Director of the

Commission: Special Assistant to the Commissioner,

Immigration and Naturalization Service; coordinator of management systems for Controller's Office, city of

Houston. Seemingly deceased.

315

 Lois J. Wilzewske, Office Manager and Press Liaison

Officer: Secretary to executive director of Task Force on

Immigration Policy and Law; director of Minnesota Medical

Society's Deaprtment of Socio-Economic Research.

Seemingly retired to Arlington and does not wish to be disturbed.

 Charles O. Wood, Counsel: Possibly has private practice in Los Angeles, but not certain.

 Arnold H. Leibowitz, Special Counsel.

 Dianne L. Brickey, secretary: Department of

Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs; Department of

Defense, Defense Investigative Service.

 Kitty I. S. Green, Secretary to the Director:

National Endowment for the Humanities, U.S. Coast Guard.

Again hoped to find her through Dr. Fuchs, as it is literally impossible to find “I. S.” without searching for “is” in search engines, thus resulting in the search

“Kitty is Green.” No other Kitty Greens I can find are old enough to be this one, so she likely changed her name.

 Marilyn H. Holleman, Secretary: National Endowment for the Humanities; United Methodist Church. No data.

316

 Antrena B. Myers, Secretary: Department of Commerce;

Department of Energy. Retired, living private life.

 Sharon M. Sullivan, Secretary: Department of

Commerce; Bureau of the Census; Department of the Navy.

May now be Sharon Lizama, but not sure.

 Julio J. Arias, Senior Foreign Affairs Advisor:

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services; Consul

General in Madrid, Spain. Department of State loan.

Deceased.

 Leon F. Bouvier, Ph.D., Research Associate:

Associate professor at University of Rhode Island; vice president of Population Reference Bureau; on loan from

U.S. Bureau of the Census. Wrote book “How Many

Americans?” and led jazz bands for 20 years, but passed away in 2011.

 Eileen Boyd, J.D., Special Assistant to the

Director: Director of Division of Policy Coordination for

HEW; counsel for Montgomery Country Maryland Human

Relations Commission. On detail from HEW. Deceased.

 Ernest B. Dane, M.A., Research Associate: Management

Analysis Officer, Visa Office, Department of State;

317

Consular Officer, Madras, India. On detail from

Department of State. Passed away in 2011.

 Joan Loeff, M.A., Research Associate: Chief of financial analysis, Office of Advanced Systems, Social

Security Administration; Economist for Social Security

Administration. On detail from Social Security

Administration. Sued Social Security Administration in

1999 for harassment.

 Lisa Smith Roney, M.P.A., Research Associate: Senior program analyst and statistician, on detail from

Immigration and Naturalization Service.

 Charles Keely, Ph.D., Consultant: Professor of sociology at Fordham University, staff of the Population

Council of the Center for Policy Studies. Seemingly only mentioned in single document. Deceased, per Dr. Miller.

 Mark R. Rosenzweig, Ph.D., Director of Research:

Former associate professor of economics, Yale University.

On leave from University of Minnesota. Passed away in

2009. Papers available at the Bancroft Library at

Berkeley.

318

 Charles D. Smith, J.D., Research Associate: Staff attorney, Center for Criminal Justice, Boston University;

Peace Corps Volunteer, Ethiopia. He is impossible to track down given that there is another Charles D. Smith who is a professor emeritus of Middle Eastern Studies

(not the same one, this one has a J.D.) and pops up no matter what searches I do.

 Mary Jo Grotenrath, J.D., Research Associate:

Executive assistant for chief attorney of Board of

Immigration Appeals; trial attorney for Criminal Division of Department of Justice. On detail from Office of

General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Subsequently wrote novel about murder at Interpol, available from her webpage.

 Lawrence Fuchs, Ph.D., Dean of Faculty at Brandeis

University, and Director of the Peace Corps in the

Philippines. Passed away during the course of my research, but his archives were obviously invaluable to my work. Various pieces of personal correspondence from the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library allude to the fact that Fuchs was seen as widely knowledgeable and widely likeable, and surely this combination of factors helped

319

inspire his selection over other distinguished candidates interviewed for the role, including Michael Teitelbaum and Guillermina Jasso.

 Susan S. Forbes (now Susan Martin), Research

Director. Replaced Guillermina Jasso and Mark R.

Rosenzweig in July 1980. Now Director of the Institute for the Study of International Migration in the School of

Foreign Service at Georgetown University, providing interdisciplinary analysis of immigration and refugee policy legal issues.100 Interviewed!

 Arthur P. Endres, Jr., Counsel: Private practice in

D.C., seemingly.

 Harris N. Miller, Legislative Assistant: Lost to Jim

Webb in 2006 U.S. Senate Democratic primary campaign in

Virginia. Also president of Career Colleges Association until 2011.101

100 And many more of Dr. Martin’s accomplishments are listed: http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publication s/insights_on_law_and_society_home/insights_on_law_and_so ciety_archive/martin_bio.html 101 http://www.gwheartandvascular.org/about/board-of- directors/harris-n-miller/

320

 Peter Regis, Legislative Assistant: May have private practice in D.C. May have worked with Hamilton Fish IV on immigration issues later in 1980s.

 Joe Wolf, Associate Counsel: Seemingly no chance of narrowing down this particular Joe Wolf.

 Janelle Jones, Senior Editor and Research Associate:

Just as impossible to locate as Joe Wolf.

 Barbara S. Kraft, Editor (Replaced Ann Bartunek,

August 1980): Possibly deceased.

 Luis F. Solis, Research Assistant: Possibly deceased, though also a very common name.

 Philip M. Wharton, Research Assistant: No confirmed information.

 Sam Bernsen, Director of Legal Research: Co-Founder of Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen, & Loewy. Deceased.

321

Appendix B

INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

 How did you end up working for the SCIRP?

 What qualities were you told/do you assume you

possessed that they sought?

 Did you feel that as [TITLE] your job

description/your role on/for the Select

Commission/IATFIP matched up with your duties? Did

you have specific expectations as to what you would

be doing?

 Did the regional hearings and the other Select

Commission meetings impact your work? Did you

attend any of them? If so, what was the general

tone of the “open mic” contributions?

 Was the period between meetings or deadlines

relevant for momentum, or the loss thereof?

 Did any individual or group seem to be seeking to

slow down or speed up the overall process?

322

 Was there any noteworthy unexpected interference

from interest groups? Business interests?

Protesters? Others? (For example, Zero Population

Growth specifically targeted members of the SCIRP

for direct lobbying)

 Was media coverage relevant for the process or the

outcome of the Select Commission/IATFIP?

 Did anything unexpected change the general direction

of the Select Commission/IATFIP’s inquiries?

 How did the switch from the Carter to the Reagan

administration impact the Select Commission? It

would seem very significant, but things were also

fairly far along by that point.

 Were transitional issues considered? Was

immigration envisioned as an issue to resolve for

the purposes of domestic policy? Were foreign

policy considerations pushed forward?

 The Carter Administration was seeking to implement

many of the policies that the Select Commission

ultimately recommended; did you feel the Select

Commission’s recommendations were preordained in

this manner?

323

o If so, did you have a sense of where the

recommendations originated?

o If not, did you feel the Select Commission

actively made suggestions opposed to earlier

predictions?

 Do you feel that you ever experienced personal or

professional fallout as a result of your position?

 Was there anything about the Select

Commission/IATFIP, whether its process or its

decisions or virtually any other topic, that was

ignored by the media/politicians/academics/the

general public or any other group, that you wish

were more widely known? To wit, is there anything

you wish were part of the historical record that

never made it?

“Do you have any notes?” “I hate everything about it.” “You hear that? Only one note!” -Gonzo & Kermit, The Muppets

324

Appendix C

IRB APPROVAL LETTER

325