HOWCLEVER HOWCLEVER WAS THE OLD FOX? FOX?

LAWRENCE FINSEN

University of Redlands

SUSAN FINSEN

California State University University San Bernardino Bernardino

Michael A. Fox has recently recanted the maintain that the old Fox is wiser than the new views he published in Th e Case for Animal" one, as there are those who prefer the Experi mentation. His admissions that the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus to the thesis of his book was arbitrary and the view Wittgenstein of the Philosophical expressed arrogant are as eloquent and moving Investigations. Additionally, there are certain lessons to be learned from careful examination of this book that go beyond the arbitrariness and arrogance of its thesis, and so are all the more likely to be passed over in the wake of Fox's renunciation.

Jim Harter, Animals: ~ cooyright-FreeT!IUstratl.ons. New rork~ DOver, 1979

as they are unusual. Why then, if the author has renounced the position of the book, would a discussion of it be of interest? The most obvious reason is that the book will stand on its own, regardless of the author's current PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY position, to do whatever or ill books can do. There will inevitably be those who BETWEEN THE SPECIE'S 112

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How can even those who disagree with Fox's responsibilities to animals, including a defense of research learn from this book? Fox consideration of common fallacies in thinking was clearly a spokesperson for the research about animals; he attempts to set the record community, and he listened well to their straight about animals from an evolutionary arguments. By reading this book, itit is possible perspective, and he offers a philosophical to familiarize oneself with the concerns, discussion of the moral status of animals for attitudes and defensive moves of the research which the previous two chapters presumably commucommunity, nity, and thus prepare for discussion prepared us. The second half of the book looks with researchers and their sympathizers. specifically at scientific uses of animals, More specifically, it is possible to understand considering examples of some disputed research in greater detail than these are the kind of distorted image of usually presented, a discussion of the nature of arguments and concepts the opposition scientific inquiry and the appropriate place of presents. It's also important to understand animals within that framework, and a how scientists view scientific inquiry and their consideration of the ethical restraint placed on reasons for conducting research. researchers by the familiar (and much criticized) injunction to avoid inflicting It is often difficult to see that commCJn sense unnecessary . Fox concludes the book does not make sense until someone comes along by making a number of recommendations which and tries to defend it. Perhaps the greatest try to accommodate some concerns relating to opportunity provided by this book is the laboratory abuse of animals. opportunity to see the received view about animals in the refreshing light provided by its CLEARING THE AIR attempted defense. An important place to begin is on the alleged of finding the Fox attempts to set the background of the middle ground, of avoiding extremes. Fox aims moral issues by discussing irrational attitudes to provide a reasonable defense of "traditional toward animals---an air-clearing effort, so to wisdom" on the moral status of animals: the speak. Numerous irrationalities of his "moderate" position that nonhuman animals, opposition are identified, from the expression while certainly not full members of the moral of approval of violence against researchers to community, do have interests that should be ignoring the pressing needs of human suffering considered. This philosophical stance leads, in in favor of that of animals. One could qUibqle the end, to a defense of current scientific uses with the details of his account of such of animals with few caveats. In spelling out irrationnalities, such as the unsupported claim the rationale behind traditional wisdom Fox that campaigns on behalf of children go inadvertently lays bare the shaky foundations starving while the coffers of animals are of moderation. For lack of an extant term, we bursting, but the underlying issue here is more dub this preference for the middle ground the significant than the factual misinformation "fallacy of veritas inin media." It is Fox's own provided. For to make an issue of this alleged analysis of science and his attempt to spell out disparity as an expression of irrational what a moderate can say about the wrongness attitudes over these issues simply begs the of cruelty that lead us to see why moderation question, assuming without argument that the isn't a viable position as applied to animal only rational approach is to place all concerns experimentation. regarding humans over those concerning animals. Here Fox assumes rather The Case for Animal Experimentation can immoderately that any concern about human usefully be divided intointo two sections: in the ills is more significant than that regarding first part of the book Fox looks at issues animals, no matter what the nature of the ill preparatory to thinking about the experimental is. And beyond this prejudice, the choice is use of animals: he focuses on our posed as a dilemma---a false dilemma we

113 BEIWEEN THE SPECIES hasten to add---that one must either spend the notion of species difference is a highly one's time, money, energy and anxiety over pragmatic notion, like the notion of variety. humans or over animals. Needless to say the Fox must think that by detailing the impressive list of those who have succeeded at keeping genetic and behavioral commonalities between their eyes on both is not limited to Henry Salt human beings and other species, and by and Mohatma Gandhi. admitting that Evolutionary Theory is undoubtedly true, he is entitled to claim that he THE "EVOLUTIONARY" PERsPECTIVE has an "evolutionary perspective." But even the title of the section in which he discusses The subtitle of Fox's book is "An Evolutionary these issues, "Similarities Between Animals and Ethical Perspective." This subtitle and Homo Sapiens," belies the fundamental naturally would lead one to believe that the insight of Evolutionary Theory regarding the perspective on the human species and its human species: namely, we are animals. relation to other animals offered by Evolutionary Theory is an important aspect of It is clear that Fox needs the notion of the book. Chapter Two, entitled, "An difference in kind to justify the difference in Evolutionary Perspective on Humans and kind of moral considerability offered for Animals," offers something quite different. Homo sapiens over all other species. He does For here we find Fox arguing against the not wish to rest this difference upon anyone Darwinian view of the continuity of Homo characteristic but to discuss a host of sapiens and other species, and for the view characteristics, including a highly developed that humans are unique. Specifically, Fox brain, a precision grip, sophisticated language distinguishes three views: usage, ability to critically reflect upon oneself, etc. Possession of anyone of these "(1) that humans are totally unique; (2) that characteristics by itself may only represent a humans possess characteristics that are difference of degree compared to one who unique, but only in superficial and insignificant lacks them, but when they are all combined the ways (unique in degree perhaps, but not in difference becomes one of kind. Ultimately, kind); and (3) that although not totally unique, this is because these characteristics combine humans are 'still different from all other to make humans free in a way that other animals in significant respects (they possess organisms are not: humans are agents capable characteristics that are different in kind, not of fully self-conscious, voluntary and just in degree). [32] deliberate action. [45] This ultimately becomes the focus of Fox's claim Fox quickly dissociates himself from the first that humans are truly unique, and that their position, which is now associated with uniqueness matters morally. "creationism" and "thoroughly outmoded and deservingly discredited." The second view he Let us leave aside for the moment the quite rightly associates with Charles Darwin, questions whether autonomy even if it were a who, as he points out, viewed the difference unique feature of our species, would be the between the mental capacities of humans and sort of difference needed by Fox to motivate other animals to be a difference of degree and the difference in moral status he advocates. not of kind. The third is his own view. It What are his grounds for claiming that humans would, in our view, have been more accurate are uniquely autonomous? While Fox mentions to subtitle the book, "A Rejoinder to the a variety of characteristics as important in Evolutionary Perspective." For, the making humans autonomous, he rests most essentialist notion of difference in kind is an weight on human linguistic ability. [42] He Aristotelian notion which is fundamentally at quotes Stephen Walker approvingly: odds with the evolutionary perspective. For "Of all the discontinuties between man and Darwin, and for modern evolutionists as well, animals that could be quoted, ...... the

BEIWEEN THE SPECIES 114

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2 evergreen candidate for the fundamental language. The fact that these systems are discontinuity. ... . is language. . ..It is still not deployed as communication systems does reasonable to say that animals do not think as not detract from the fact that they are used in we do, when we think in words, and that in so discrimination and concept learning and inin the far as we are only conscious when we think in confirming and disconfirming of various words, they lack conscious awareness." [42] hypostheses. For example, animals such as rats, dogs, cats and pigeons are capable of It is remarkable to find such a Cartesian view learning concepts which have no simple of consciousness being promoted in the 20th physical correlates, inclUdingincluding relations such as Century, but Fox doesn't press this absurd 'larger than.' Thus, they cannot, in responding idea, merely winking in its general direction. correctly,correctly. be relying on simple stimulus What he does imply is that linguistic ability is discrimination learning but must have the central in producing autonomy and is also the ability to abstract and represent the best criterion for its presence. He says, information to themselves. For this and other reasons which it would take us too far afield to "When I speak of an autonomous being I mean discuss here, many psychologists find the one that is critically self-aware and has the postulation of a "language of thought" for 3 capacity to manipulate concepts in complex animals highly plausible and useful.3 ways, use a sophisticated language, reflect, plan, deliberate, choose, and accept Bu given that animals have such responsibility for acting. In other words, an representational capacity, it is not possible to autonomous being can act freely, choose and rule out that some of them have a rudimentary decide rationally in the fullest sense, and self-concept, nor do psychologists find it odd engage in self-making or self-realizing to study choice behavior in animals. activities." [45] Furthermore, psychologists regularly study memory in various species, and goal directed Of course, if you include in the meaning of behavior. Some philosophers (such as R. G. autonomy sophisticated linguistic ability, your Frey4) balk at talking about beliefs and desires have an easy time showing that humans are in animals, but it is part of Fodor's point that uniquely autonomous. Other evidence of self­ talk about concept learning, memories, and awareness gets ruled out by fiat. Fox says, "saying that human beings are critically self­ goal directed behavior requires the postUlationpostulation aware does not just mean that, apelike, they of a representational system, and here we can recognize and respond to a mirror image of have the essential elements of belief and of themselves. . ." [45] intention more generally. Namely we have a representation of the world in a symbolic But since it is autonomy which is morally system together with an attitude toward that relevant according to Fox, and lingUisticlinguistic representation. Perhaps other animals do not ability, it is a fair question to ask whether think "as we do," in the words of a natural other animals might have some degree of language, but if they do have goals, memories, autonomy as the result of their cognitive beliefs and desires, all mediated by an internal sophistication, in 'spite of their lack of representational system, then it is not all sophistication in the communication area. clear that they are different from us in kind Developments in cognitive psychology make in respect of these characteristics. Thus, this question very controversial and difficult autonomy itself may be a matter of degree. It to answer. Jerry Fodor has argued that the seems most likely that other animals possess learning ability of many organisms the abilities "[to] choose and decide rationally, necessitates their having internal and engage in self-making or self-realizing representational systems which resemble, in activities" to various degrees, just as humans many ways, the structure of human natural manifest these highly rational characteristics 115 BRIWEEN THE SPECIES ....

only some of the time, and for some of us, to a relevant features. Moore's intuition is that the very limited degree. Thus, it is not clear that beautiful world is preferable to the filthy one, autonomy is a trait of the all or nothing that could we do it, we ought to produce it, and variety, and as a result it isn't very well that the universe would be a better place for suited to marking the difference in kind which it, despite the fact that no one, human or Fox needs to motivate his double standard for otherwise, would profit from its existence or humans and other species. suffer its absence. Thus, the features that are valuable in that beautiful world are valuable Even supposing autonomy were in some way independently of their use or enjoyment by established as a uniquely human characteristic, humans or other conscious beings. Fox its moral significance needs examining. For, responds to this argument exactly as Bishop as Midgely has pointed out, simply Berkeley responded centuries earlier to the establishing that a characteristic is unique analogous view about the independent existence does not show that its uniqueness is morally of ordinary physical objects: what the arguer significant. 5 Fox does not make this mistake, of this thought experiment fails to recognize is however, He argues that autonomy is morally that he is the observerlvaluer in this situation. The attempt to conceive of important because it is what allows humans to something existing unthought of is an enter into a moral community as agents and impossibility, for the one conceiving is himself valuers, and it is only such members of a thinking of that thing; analogously, the attempt moral community who can truly possess and rights. In order to lay the foundation of his to think of the value of something existing independently of a valuer is an impossiblity, denial of value to animals, Fox provides an for the one conceiving of the value is himself a account of the nature of value in general. valuer. VALUE AND VALUERS Fox's response to Moore seems appropriate.

Fox asserts that nature has no value in and of One might conclude from it that Moore's itself apart from that value assigned to it by method is doomed to failure if its point is to valuers---human beings. Let us call this the identify values that exist independently of our Dependent Value Thesis (DVT). It comes to judgment that they are valuable, for we must this: nothing has value in and of itself apart make the jUdgment that such and such is from being valued by a valuer. Thus, value is valuable in order to perform the experiment. always a relation between the valued object But it does not follow from this negative and a valuer. From this claim, Fox concludes argument, of course, that values are dependent that the position that animals are inherently in the sense preferred by Fox. To establish valuable is literally unintelligible. There are that would require more than a refutation of serious problems with his defense of the DVT, Moore's attempt to show their independence. however. In fact, the question of whether values are independent of the judgment or acts of valuers First, the argument Fox makes for this position is not so easily resolved as Fox suggests. For is primarily negative: he argues that certain it is not obviously unintelligible to hold that attempts to justify attributing independent values exist, and that only the recognition of value to nature fail. Specifically, he considers values depends on the existence of certain G. E. Moore's famous thought experiment in kinds of beings, just as one might argue that which we are asked to consider two possible abstract entities (e. g., numbers) exist but universes, one containing whatever the reader won't have much impact on the thought of those holds beautiful, the other lacking this, holding creatures incapable of conceiving them. all else equal including the absence of any human beings in either to enjoy or miss the Second, and most importantly, if we grant Fox

BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES 116

1 % M ,m £. 171m - W n11$1 nettMen thethe Dependent Value Thesis, thethe conclusion he valuers does not make human lifelife thethe only seeks will still not follow,follow, even supposing as valuable thing,thing, or even thethe one central value toto Fox does, thatthat only human beings are capable which all else must be relatedrelated toto be valuable. of being valuers. From thethe factfact thatthat value isis relative to valuers inin this sense, itit does not So, as we have seen, Fox does not establish follow that animals or nature cannot be that the very ideaidea of animals or nature having regarded by valuers as having a value value independentlyindependently of a human decision to independentlyindependently of some particular relation to make itit so isis unintelligible. valuers, such as theirtheir usefulness or theirtheir similarity to us, or the enjoyment we achieve MORAL COMMUNITY inin contemplating them. All thatthat isis required isis that valuers ascribe value to that kind of While the Dependent Value Thesis provided Fox object. The appropriateness of placing human with a metaethical argument against animal life as a value over and above all else (i. e., rights, the central argument against the claim anthropocentrism) simply doesn't follow. Fox that animals are members of the moral makes a fundamental logical error in inferring community is as follows: (1) A moral from the claim that values exist only insofar community is a "group whose members share as valuers jUdge them to be so to the claim certain characteristics and whose members that only valuers (and their kind) can be are or consider themselves to be bound to valuable and all other values hinge in some observe certain rules of conduct in relation to sense on our valuing ourselves. one another because of their mutual likeness." [49] (2) Clearly only those beings capable of Perhaps a consideration of this kind of functioning within a moral community can be aothropocentrism would benefit from a members of that community. (3) To function consideration of the points commonly made here means to possess these characteristics, regarding the view known as psychological to recognize them in others, to recognize one's egoism. A similar move is made at times by likeness to others, and as a result to consider proponents of pscyhological egoism, despite oneself bound by rules of conduct. (4) Only the fact that it was exposed for the error that autonomous beings are capable of these things. it is by Bishop Butler some 250 years ag06 : (5) But only human beings (among the known the egoist sometimes argues that from the fact species) are fully autonomous in this sense. that I pursue my desires because the (6) Moral rights exist only inin the moral achievement of them satisfies me, I can community. (7) Since no animal is a member conclude that what I always really seek is just of a moral community, (8) no animal is a this satisfaction. Thus, all desire, and bearer of moral rights. consequently all action is aimed at prompting my self-interest. But from the fact that I am The argument looks suspiciously likelike a the one desiring something, and thus the one definitional stop: the moral community is who will achieve the satisfaction or simply defined, without justification,justification, as frustration of that desire, nothing follows consisting of moral agents. Fox's argument about the nature of the object of that desire: does not touch those, such as Steve 7 itit need not be myself at all. In fact, as Butler Sapontzis, who maintain that animals enjoy (and many others) have pointed out, many of some degree of moral agency even ifif they are the objects that give satisfaction are objects not fullyfully autonomous inin Fox's sense. that can only be fairly described as concerning Additionally, very few of those who wish to something other than oneself, for example, the argue for membership inin the moral community well-being of another, and would provide no of nonhumans would also maintain that animals satisfaction ifif that were not the case. are moral agents, so this definition isis clearly Analogously, thethe factfact thatthat human beings are not one Fox has a rightright toto without argument.

117 BEIWEEN THE SPECIES None is presented. classes of individuals, a reasonable position to take would seem to be that here membership in One important test of such an argument our own species ought to count for something, excluding animals concerns what can be said in in the sense in which a charitable attitude response to the by now classic problem of toward those less developed or less fortunate marginal cases. Ina nutshell, the problem is than ourselves, for whom we feel some that invoking such characteristics as Fox has especially close kinship, is particularly to argue that there is a gulf between animals compelling to a morally mature person." [60] and humans sufficient to bear the weight of a At the risk of exposing ourselves as morally denial of rights for animals seems to imply immature persons, we simply do not see how that various kinds of "deficient" or "marginal" rights are obtained by charity. Rights, after humans are also excluded from being rights­ all, are reserved on Fox's view for those bearers---a conclusion with which most would individuals who need them to protect their not be comfortable. Fox is also uncomfortable self-development as a being of that kind. [53] with this implication, and so he works to show But, many of the "deficient" individuals being that it does not really follow from the considered are incapable of this kind of self­ exclusion of animals from the moral development. On Fox's view, rights cannot be community that small infants, the severely valuable for them. Why, then, is extending mentally retarded, senile, autistic, badly rights to them an act of charity, if it doesn't brain-damaged and comatose individuals are do the recipient that much good? If it does help also excluded. Unfortunately, it is easier to them after all, then this should give us some assert that it isn't so than it is to show pause in thinking through Fox's discussion of convincingly that our intuitions that it the nature and function of rights and, of shouldn't be are supported by the moral theory course, the exclusion of animals from this being proposed. Fox's response---that we are prized position. justified in partiality to our own species--­ utterly fails to address the challenge. In sum, Fox's position on marginal cases begs the question. He thus fails to show why the The arguments in favor of this species moral community should consist of all and only partialism appear to be as follows: (1) since Homo sapiens and our fully autonomous natural emotional responses and feelings of cousins, if any. kinship are allowed to count as factors in shaping our assessment of the moral status of WHITHER CRUELTY? other species, then such feelings may legitimately count in assessing the moral Being committed to denying that any nonhuman status of members of our own species. [60] can have rights, Fox must find another Unfortunately, Fox nowhere argues that these foundation for the moral limits on our use of "natural emotional responses" or "feelings of animals, for, as a moderate he certainly kinship" are morally relevant factors to count believes there must be some limits. In recent with regard to animals---certainly they have history, such limits have been articulated in not been allowed to count in the same way that terms of the avoidance of cruelty and he is now proposing to let them count for unnecessary suffering and the desirability of "deficient" humans. For he has just offered an humaneness. Fox falls squarely within this argument that denies rights to animals, despite traditional framework. He raises the issue such kinship or emotion. This will not, with the following argument: "If moral therefore, explain why we are justified in obligations are contingent on rights and their extending rights to humans who fall outside the possession by certain beings, then since criterion that excludes animals. (2) "In animals have no rights, humans cannot have deciding how we ought to look on all these correlative obligations toward them. It

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follows that we have no duty in the strict demeaning, he offers some insights worth moral sense to prevent animal suffering." [70] noting. Sometimes the demeaningness of If this argument is sound, the problem becomes cruelty is taken as the causal claim that rather pressing for the moderate: what is the leads to bad character, and source of the wrongness of cruelty to animals? . thus to a greater likelihood that one's conspecifics will be mistreated. This is Fox suggests five reasons for thinking cruelty certainly an idea with a history: one finds it wrong. None of these attributes any kind of articulated in Kant's Lectures on , and direct obligation to the victim of that cruelty, Kant himself refers to a source as early as the including, of course, a right not to be harmed. mid-18th century (the engravings of William While the list is extensive (it includes empathy, evolutionary continuity, ecological Hogarth).8 Despite its pedigree, rarely is awareness, the demeaningness of cruelty, and evidence provided to show that this bit of self interest), Fox does not provide a traditional wisdom is in fact true, and Fox does convincing case that these reasons are a good job exploring this failing. He suggests adequate individually or collectively. Most of instead that cruelty to animals and later these turn out not to be reasons for the cruelty to humans may both be effects of the wrongness of cruelty at all but, rather, same cause (such as an impoverished childhood historical and descriptive claims about why wewe environment), rather than the one being a happen to react with concern to the sufferingsuffering causal condition of the other. So when Fox of members of other species.species. states that cruelty is demeaning, he does not mean that it leads to mistreating humans. With respect to empathy, the closest Fox Rather, he means that it is itself beneath comes to explaining why cruelty is wrong human dignity: in acting cruelly one gives comes in his statement that, despite the expression to the worst side of oneself. extraordinary difficulty of knowing what it is like to be a member of another species, But we ask why cruelty is beneath human "suffering in animals is often easily recognized dignity, or better, why this side of oneself is by obvious signs such as cries, grimaces, "worst," Fox's answer is that one ignores avoidance and defensive behavior, and the like what is morally relevant to his act: "he lets and does not require unusual moral sensitivity himself be insensitive, unmindful of morally to respond to." [71] Perhaps it does not relevant similarities between himself and the require unusual sensitivity to be moved by the animal(s) concerned.. ." [77] This seems suffering of others, including those in another perilously close to admitting that cruelty is species, but the fact that some of us (though wrong because of the wrongness of harming perhaps not those who are cruel?) do the animal itself. What are these similarities empathize with animals does not explain why it morally relevant to, if not the jUdgment that would be morally wrong to overrule those the harm inflicted is morally relevant to the feelings, or to lack them altogether. Again, wrongness of the act. when discussing the evolutionary relatedness of Homo sapiens and other species, he states, In the end, Fox's position in The Case for ."the awareness of evolutionary continuity Animal Experimentation is that animals enjoy should engender in us an enhanced sensitivity an ambiguous moral status: they have toward other species---their resemblance to interests that ought to be considered, but their us, their needs, and their vulnerability." [72] interests are not on a moral par with the Again, Fox seems to have lost sight of the interests of humans, as they are not rights­ question of how such declarations can explain bearers. They are not full members of the the wrongness of cruelty. moral community, but what we do to them is not completely morally indifferent. When Fox turns to the idea of cruelty as Nevertheless, just why what we do to

119 BRIWEEN THE SPECIES • • animals is not indifferent is never completely benefits must be "considerably in excess· of clear on Fox's account. It is one thing to say the harm caused. [114] On Fox's own that cruelty is a vice, and quite another to arguments this criterion is entirely explain its viciousness without attributing unworkable. He argues in Chapter 5 it is often value to the victim and also without impossible to determine in advance of entertaining a causal claim about its effects on performing an experiment whether that our dealings with those beings that do have experiment will reap benefits, and many value. Unsuspecting readers are likely to important discoveries have been made entirely allow this unintelligible middle ground because serendipitously. [139] In fact, this inability to I' J it gives expression to the comfortable predict the value of research, and the platitude that cruelty to animals is wrong. consequent need for basic research in science, is one of the more important points Fox makes Fox's general arguments in the first half of the in the entire book. But it makes any advance book do not succeed, then, in providing the attempt to weigh the importance of research solid middle ground he seeks. For, on the one against amount of suffering induced impossible. hand, he fails to show convincingly why other Yet the proportionality criterion must be used animals are so different from humans that they in advance if it is to shed any light. deserve exclusion from the moral community Furthermore, virtually any research which is of rights holders. On the other hand, even if well-conceived and of interest to the scientific we were to accept Fox's arguments for community can pass his test, since it can excluding them, he provides no convincing always be argued that such research may reasons why we should worry about cruelty to eventually have some applications. Thus, animals. It is no wonder Fox describes the Fox's criterion is inconsistent with his own moral position he has carved out for animals as correct analysis of the nature of science. "ambiguous." Just how ambiguous this position is becomes clear when Fox turns his attention Even assuming we could measure benefits in specifically to the uses of animals in research. advance, and that we knew how to weigh benefits against amount of suffering induced by IN THE LABORATORY an experiment, the proportionality criterion Fox employs entirely ignores the obvious The first task Fox sets himself when he turns questions of whether there were alternatives to experimentation is that of putting animal to the research he is attempting to vindicate research in context. What this means is that and whether the research does reliably Fox will show us, by adding in the details, generalize to humans. It may be worth rationale and benefits of various experiments, considering just one example of research that they are really not as bad as their which Fox attempts to justify to see how detractors in the community crucial these questions are. In the case of would have us believe. Thus, he takes on some Harlow's maternal deprivation experiments, of the most notorious research, such as there was a variety of clinical data available Harlow's experiments on social isolation in on the effects of maternal deprivation in infant monkeys, and Seligman's learned humans before Harlow conducted his helplessness research. .What will count as a experiments. For example, Wayne Dennis vlnolcation, on Fox's terms? He cautions made many clinical observations in institutions against overly simple formulae for determining during the 1940s, and he even carried out an whether an experiment is justified but does experiment on social deprivation in human offer a principle of proportionality: the actual infants by rearing two infants in isolation! In or potential benefits must be directly fact, there is a wealth of evidence from the proportional to the amount of SUffering the 40s through the 60s, documenting the effects experiment entails. In the case of very of maternal deprivation, often under well stressful experiments, such as Harlow's, the controlled conditions in orphanages.

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Furthermore, this data was very likely the impossibility of predicting the applications superior to that obtained by the Harlows, since and benefits of various experiments and there are serious doubts about the research programs, and thus the generalizability of the results of such studies inappropriateness of demands that research on from one species to another. Ruppenthal and animals be restricted to only those which are Fahrenbrech found results for rhesus monkeys clearly of immediate and life-saving and pigtail macaques to be importantly importance. This type of restriction is indeed different. 11 impossible, and those who wish merely to reducered uce the number of experiments exploiting What is ironic and unfortunate about Fox's animals along these lines should take note. analysis of this and other examples of painful Furthermore, Fox is quite right in pointing out research is that while he claims that a more the need, in scientific research, for a certain detailed understanding of the surrounding amount of replication. [145] It is important to context will vindicate the experiments, he has distinguish a redundant experiment (done in a not dug deeply enough into the surrounding teaching context or because the researcher context to answer or even to raise the crucial does not realize that the experiment has questions of alternatives and generalizability. already been performed) from a legitimate Thus, Fox undermines his claim to being an attempt to replicate an experiment. If the objective and independent inquirer regarding outcome of an experiment is unexpected, such experiments. This is revealed quite appearing to imply the need to change some clearly in his glowing reports of research assumptions which are well established, procedures which he was allowed to observe replication may be especially important. and which he describes as "exemplary from Finally, Fox correctly points out that the both aseptic and humane viewpoints." [122] statistical nature of biological and From his personal observations of animal psychological "laws" and the amount of experiments, Fox concludes that mistreatment variability present in much of these areas of of animals is anomalous. He uncritically inquiry sometimes require a large number of accepts the assurances of researchers, and it experimental subjects be used. So certain never seems to occur to him that there might requests for reductions in numbers of animals be any bias in the cases he observed as a be any bias in the cases he observed as a or in replication of experiments could result in function of his very presence. Nor does it function of his very presence. Nor does it making the research truly pointless. occur to him to raise obvious questions Nevertheless, Fox does not provide any regarding the reassurances he is offered. For examples of critics of animal research actually example, Fox describes the burn research making these sorts of mistakes; he merely being conducted upon pigs at Toronto's Hospital accuses "critics of animal research of for Sick Children. He is reassured that the generally misunderstanding" these points. In third degree burns inflicted upon the animals The Case for Animal Experimentation Fox has a are painless, since nerve endings in the burn habit of generalizing about the mistakes and area are destroyed. [119] But what about foibles of the animal rights community without other sources of suffering such an experiment reference to specific examples. produces, such as severe infection and fever, pain associated with the removal of skin for An examination of Fox's own suggestions grafting, and stress due to immobilization? regarding reform reveals the fundamental Apparently it didn't occur to Fox to ask these difficulty with the cost/benefit approach to questions. reform. Is the testing of cosmetics a trivial enough benefit to be overruled by the serious In spite of all these difficulties, Fox's degree of suffering it induces? Even here Fox discussion of the nature of scientific inquiry is is equivocal and appears to view testing as quite good. As already noted, Fox points out justified, at least until alternatives can be

121 BEIWEENBElWEEN' THE SPECIES found. In response to the argument that positions may in fact be less practical and animals should not be sacrificed just to protect workable than more extreme reforms designed people from inessentials like cosmetics, Fox to make the rights of animal subjects the quotes the following passage with approval: bottom line in considering what can and cannot be done in research. Antivivisectionists sometimes assert that animals should not be "made to pay" for human In fairness, Fox does seek reforms which "sins"...But we live in a deterministic world, would improve the conditions of laboratory and the concept of "retribution" is not animals, such as prohibiting multiple survival appropriate. Human life is more important to surgery as a classroom instruction procedure. the culture than animal life is, regardless of He also promotes education and dialogue, and the conditions that cause humans to engage in the use of ethics review boards. 11 While some behavior that is dangerous to themselves. of the reforms he suggests are commendable ( [183] and some are already in place), Fox's recommendations are for the most part as It seems that in here endorsing the ambiguous as the moral perspective which "deterministic world" Fox has conveniently stands behind them. forgotten that autonomy---i. e., human freedom---was to be the distinguishing feature CONCLUSK:>N setting humans apart from other animals. But what is even more revealing here is Fox's The Case for Animal Experimentatjon is a book willingness to allow that human needs, even that will infuriate animal rights advocates and artificial, detrimental desires, can expand to please some who think the case for animals' rights weak and a diversion from more overrule the most fundamental interests of important matters. Among other things, pro­ animals. We must ask what would be an animal activists such as the ALF are villified example of human need so trivial, and animal on these pages for violent acts, while little suffering so great, that it simply could not be attention is paid to the good they have done--­ justified? In examining Fox's suggestions for e. g., in revealing for public scrutiny the reform, it is difficult to answer this question, reality of laboratory life in such places as the for phrases such as "reasonable expectation that such studies will contribute significantly" and "...experimental animals are not to be SUbjected to unnecessary pain or distress" [208] are highly elastic. What counts as reasonable? Necessary? And necessary for what?

Fox's insightful discussion of science reveals the extreme difficulties confronting attempts to reform animal research and reduce the numbers of animals used. This quagmire of difficulties makes principled approaches more

Carol B_langer Grafton. workable than attempts to balance interests on Old-Fashioned Animal ~. Nell York; Dover, L981 a case by case basis. This suggests either abolition of animal research or absolute limitations on what can be done, along the lines of the Nuremberg guidelines. This is one important lesson animal welfarists can learn from a careful reading of Fox: moderate

BEIWEEN THE SPOCIFS 122

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University of Pennsylvania head injuryinjury lab.lab. 4 R. G. Frey, InterestsInterests and Rights: The Case Beyond this,this, thethe author sets himself up as Against Animals (Oxford(Oxford Clarendon Press, providing a rationalrational assessment of thethe moral 1980), 89-91. status of animals and thethe implicationsimplications thisthis has for scientific research employing them, an 5 , Man and Beast: The Roots of assessment in opposition to the often irrational assessment in opposition to the often irrational Human Nature (Ithaca: Cornell University and emotional pro-animal literature.literature. The Press, 1978), 203·209'203-209' fallacious arguments and appeals inin thisthis book, of which there are many, will be all the more 6 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons preachedPreached at infuriatinginfuriating to those who clearly are not itsits intendedintended audience. And the oft-repeated the Rolls Chapel (London), Sermon XI; chorus that his opponents' view isis clouded by a reprintedreprinted inin Paul Taylor, ed., Problems of failure to think clearly, consistently, Mora!Moral Philosophy (Belmont, Ca.: Dickenson unemotionally, and objectively will seem all unemotionally, and objectively will seem all Publishing Co., 1967), 117-129. the more ironic to those familiar with Fox's subsequent renunciation of the major thesis of the book as itself arbitrary. If it achieves 7 S. F. Sapontzis, Morals. Reason and Animals nothing else, animal activists can learn from (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, this book how offputting irrational appeals are 1987). to those not already convinced of the author's position (and to those careful thinkers who are in agreement). 8 cf. , "His Heart Exposed to Prying Eyes, to Pity Has No Claim: Reflections But there is more to be learned from a on Hogarth and the Nature of Cruelty," consideration of Fox's book, for after all, the ,Specjes, v. 2, no. 1 (Winter, discussions resulting from its publication led 1986), 12-18. Fox himself to change his views. Fox's courageous turnaround should give us hope for 9 Wayne Dennis and M. G. Dennis, the possibility of nonviolent and rational "Development Under Controlled Environmental Conditions," in Dennis, ed., Readings in ChjldChild change in the direction of greater respect for psychology (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: animals through such dialogue. Prentice-Hall, 1951), 104-131.

Notes 10 Michael Rutter, Maternal Deprivation 1 Michael Allen Fox, The Case for Animal (Penguin, 1972). Experimentation: An Evolutionary and Ethical Perspectiveperspective (Berkeley: University of 11 Ruppenthal and Fahrenbrech, "The Effects California Press, 1986); Fox's retraction of Total Social Isolation Rearing on Behavior of appears in "Animal Experimentation: A Rhesus and Pigtail Macaques," in R. Walsh and Philosopher's Changing Views," in Between the W. Greenough, eds., Environments as Therapy Species, v. 3, no. 2 (Spring, 1987), 55ff. for Brain Dysfunction (N.Y.: Plenum Press, 1976). 2 Jerry A. Fodor, The Language of Thought Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Press, 12 Whether the use of ethics review boards 1975), 68. 68. represents real progress on behalf of animals is taken up inin Lawrence Finsen, "Institutional 3 John Anderson and Gordon Bower, Human 3 John Anderson and Gordon Bower, Human Animal Care & Use Committees: A New Set of AssociativeAssocjative Memory (New York: Wiley & & Clothes for the Emperor?" inin The Journal of Sons, 1973). 1973). Medicine and Philososphy, forthcoming.forthcoming.

123 BElWEEN THE SPECIES

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