The Logics of Party Money Distribution: Notes on the Brazilian Case

Bruno Marques Schaefer1

Abstract: In the last years, research about elite recruitment, party organization, and electoral financing has been developing in Brazil. However, these studies focus on proportional federal elections, leaving several gaps in studies about competition for other positions. In this paper, I seek to fill this gap by comparing the parties’ strategic behavior regarding the distribution of resources of two extremely important positions for the functioning of the Brazilian political system: governor and federal deputy. My research problem is: how do Brazilian parties allocate financial resources - private and public - in the governor and federal deputy elections? Much has been said that Brazilian parties would be organizationally fragile and without fixed ideologies. Without denying the findings of the literature that make such statements, it is important to emphasize that Brazilian parties have control and coordination mechanisms when it comes to the distribution of money, in electoral and non-electoral periods. National Party Committees (NPC) receive public funds from the Party Fund every month and, at the time of the elections, they are also the destination of corporate and other donor resources. With this power, the NPC’s can choose which candidates within the party will benefit the most. My hypothesis is that Brazilian parties distribute financial resources to the incumbent governor and state legislator candidates in states where the level of electoral competition is low, and the rewards are high (positions for distribution). In order to test this, I analyze data from the 12,288 candidates for governor and federal deputy in the 27 Brazilian states in two elections: 2014 and 2018. The dependent variable is the percentage of resources allocated by candidate in a given election considering the total distributed by the party. I consider as independent variables the following: the number of incumbents in the state, the level of competition in the immediately preceding election, the electoral rewards in the district and the electoral strength of the party in the district. Key Words: Political Finance; Electoral Legislation; Party Organization; Party Resources.

Introduction

Financial resources are one of the most significant variables for electoral victories in the democratic world (KRAUSE, 2010). The literature about electoral financing has been fruitful in discovering the impact of money on the number of votes (JACOBSON, 1981; SPECK & CERVI, 2016; NETTO & SPECK, 2017; ARRAES et al, 2017; AVIS, 2019); on the candidates who receive more money than others (McMENAMIN, 2010; JUNCKES et al, 2019); as well as possible rewards from funders over donors

1 Ph.D. candidate in the Program in Political Science of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. CAPES Scholarship. Email: [email protected]. (AGGARWAL et al, 2012; DE FIGUEIREDO & RICHTER, 2014; FONSECA, 2017; MANCUSO et al., 2019).

The money also serves as an indicator for characterizing the organizational typologies of political parties. Maurice Duverger [1951] (1992), in his classic “The Political Parties”, points out that one of the differences between the cadre and the mass parties is that the first depends primarily on the contributions of their candidates, while the mass parties come to depend on their members’ resources. A broader base of small contributions strengthens party leadership over party candidates. Katz & Mair (1993, 1995, and 2009) frame this phenomenon in a theoretical model that considers three faces of party organizations: party in the public-office (PPO), party in the central-office (PCO) and party on the ground (POG). In Duverger's typology, the mass party is an organization in which the PCO controls the PPO. In this sense, the links between types of donors and political parties could serve as one of the indicators of the type of party organization (KRAUSE et al, 2015). At a systemic level, a country's political finance legislation could even be one of the variables that determine the size of the party system (MENDILLOW, 1992; SCARROW, 2006). In any liberal democracy, money is a necessary asset to electoral victories. For this reason, it is important to study how parties spend the money they receive. In the Brazilian case, significant institutional changes regarding the forms of electoral financing have occurred in recent years (MANCUSO, 2020). Recent corruption scandals, uncovered by the “Car Wash” (Lava-Jato) operation, showed that large companies, especially in the construction sector, had been donating money to candidates from various parties with expectations of future gains (CARAZZA, 2018). One of the reactions to this scandal was the change in the legislation on electoral financing in the country. In 2015, the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal - STF) ruled that corporate donations would be prohibited on Brazilian elections (KRAUSE & KESTLER, 2017). The impact of the decision was strong because companies were the main donors of Brazilian electoral campaigns. One of the reactions of political actors was to increase the amount of public money available to parties and candidates since that decision. Brazilian parties are yearly funded by public money from the Party Fund (Fundo Partidário -FP), which in 2018 distributed around US$ 172 million. In 2017, the National Congress (Senate and the House of Deputies) approved an Electoral Fund (Fundo Especial de Financiamento de Campanhas – FEFC) available every two years to parties, which in 2018 made available to party organizations US$ 417 million. This money is distributed to parties according to proportional criteria (votes in previous elections) and is available to National Party Committees (Executivas Nacionais – NPC), that choose which candidates will benefit from it. Much research has been done on the origins of electoral and party funding sources and on the impacts of economic power on dynamics of electoral competition and government policies in Brazil (SPECK & CERVI, 2016; NETTO & SPECK, 2017; ARRAES et al, 2017; AVIS, 2019; FONSECA, 2017; MANCUSO et al., 2019; PAZ, 2018; MANCUSO, 2020). However, there is still a gap to be analyzed which concerns the reverse direction. That is to evaluate the dynamics of the distribution of financial resources within party organizations, both in its logics and its effects on the internal political competition of the organization. Hereof, my research problem in this paper is to identify how Brazilian parties allocate these resources. To answer this question, I make a two-dimensional exploratory comparison. First, I make a comparison between two elections/campaigns: 2014 and 2018. In 2014 business donations were allowed while in 2018 they were not. Second, I compare two positions: governor and federal deputy. In Brazil, there are two electoral systems for the election of political positions: proportional open list for the legislative positions of councilor, state deputy and federal deputy, and plurality for the positions of senator, mayor, governor and president. The last three are Executive positions to which there is a second round in case a candidate fails to reach 50% + 1 of the votes. In the last years, several pieces of research about elite recruitment (CODATO et al, 2013; 2014; MARENCO DOS SANTOS & SERNA, 2007), party organization (RIBEIRO, 2010; SCHAEFER, 2018) and electoral financing (BRAGA & BOURDOKAN, 2009) were developed in Brazil. However, these studies focus mainly on proportional elections for federal deputy, which leave several gaps on research about the competition for other positions. In this paper, I seek to fill this gap by comparing the strategic behavior of the parties regarding the distribution of resources to two positions extremely important for the functioning of the Brazilian political system: governor and federal deputy. This paper is organized as follows: in the first part, I review part of the literature that deals with the strategic behavior of political parties regarding the distribution of financial resources in different democracies. In the second part, I briefly describe the Brazilian case. In the third, I indicate the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables and the analysis model. In the fourth, I analyze the results and, finally, I make the final remarks.

How do parties allocate resources in democracies? Political parties are central actors in democracies (LAPALOMBARA & WEINER, 1966). Despite the disbelief of these organizations to public opinion, political parties continue to serve as filters for political representation, selecting the political elite that will govern and legislate (SCARROW & WEBB, 2017; WEBB, POGUNTKE & SCARROW, 2017). As I pointed out earlier, parties exercise control over part of the money circulating in elections. The degree of this control and the strategies for allocation and distribution of financial resources, however, depend on several variables, such as the electoral financing legislation ruling the country under analysis, as well as the government system, state format and the type of electoral system. In presidential regimes, for example, the parties, can concentrate their financial efforts on competing for the top office: the presidency (ACUNA et al, 2018); while in parliamentary regimes the more equitable distribution of resources can be instrumental to the party's electoral victory. The format of the State - whether unitary or federalist - is also one of the variables that must be taken into account in the political party resource allocation strategies. For Carthy (2004), for example, parties would function as franchise systems. The national leadership would enact certain guidelines, but would not have interference with the party at the local level in critical areas of uncertainty, such as candidate recruitment and campaign financing. According to the author, modern parties should be governed by the principle of mutual autonomy, that is, the party at the local level (aware of the specific political market) would make its decisions without interference from the party at the national level and vice versa. For Deschouwer (2006), the parties should be organizations acting at various levels and with different pressures. Features such as the degree of autonomy of the federation states, the correspondence or not of the electoral cycles, and the social heterogeneity could be determinant for the centralized coordination in the national direction to be impaired. Even in nationally centralized parties, such as the post-WWII German SPD, the pressure could be strong and wide for regional autonomy, but when calculating the risks of losing unity (with the abandonment of local factions) or of losing decision-making power, the ruling coalition would give up the latter. That is, the National Committee loses power of interference on subnational units but ensures that those local elites remain in the party. According to Gierzynski & Breaux (1994), in the American case, political parties end up serving as a counterpoint to private donors (PACS2 and individuals), especially in the House of Representatives elections. The latter tends to favor the inflow of resources to incumbent candidates, once they are more likely to win an electoral victory again (JACOBSON, 1981), therefore they offer greater chances to donors gain - or maintain - access to decision-makers. The parties, in that context, allocate resources to candidates in Open Seat elections. According to Stonecash & Keith (1996), this strategic behavior of parties would be explained by the different goals of parties and private donors: the parties, in addition to the clear goal of winning elections, are also concerned with forming future leadership and maintaining the party, while the same is not true for PACS and individual donors. The parties partly neglect incumbents, as they have greater chances of electoral victory. For Jacobson (1985, p.604): The party would prefer to deploy resources in a way that promises to maximize the number of seats it wins. It would redirect resources from campaigns of its stronger candidates to the campaigns of weaker candidates up to the point where the expected marginal gains in seats among the latter began to be matched by the expected marginal losses among the former. Individual candidates, on the other hand, would understandably resist giving up resources if doing so would increase their risks of defeat. It is a process of a dispute between incumbents and party leadership over the distribution of the party's financial resources. In theoretical terms, this relationship is interesting, because it exposes a dispute between two faces of the party: PCO and PPO. However, in practical terms, the American political parties do not control the major part of the money in the elections.

In the Japanese case, Carlson (2010) investigates how Japanese parties distribute state financial resources to local units. The Japanese parties are very dependent on the State since the adoption of public resources as one of the sources for their organization. The country's electoral system is mixed: it adds majority representation (300 seats for 300 districts) and proportional representation (180 candidates are chosen in 11 electoral zones). Carlson (2010) investigates whether parties invest more in majority candidates or proportionate ones, and then if incumbent candidates receive more resources than “newcomers” do. The author concludes that Japanese parties tend to allocate resources in the districts, which means they favor majority competition, yet they do not differentiate

2 “Political Action Committee (PAC) — A popular term for a political committee organized for the purpose of raising and spending money to elect and defeat candidates. Most PACs represent business, labor or ideological interests. PACs can give $5,000 to a candidate committee per election (primary, general or special)”. Source: https://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacfaq.php. between novice and incumbent resources. For Carlson (2010), this equitable distribution indicates that national party leaders aim to reduce intra-party conflicts. Despite having only one variable (distribution of public funding to local committees), the author's work provides a specific insight into the organizational patterns of parties in that country. In Japan, therefore, the local vs. national dynamics are mediated by an equitable distribution of resources.

According to Hagevi (2018), in his analysis of the Swedish case, the increase in public money for party maintenance and electoral competition had the effect of increasing the power of the PPO over the PCO. Between 1966 and 2011, public resources favored the former over the latter. According to the author this empirical evidence “confirms the cartel party theory’s assumption of a change in the internal balance of power within Swedish parties” (2018, p.169). Moreover, it confirms that political parties became more stratarchical organizations, with more autonomy for the party local branches in financial terms. In the Uruguayan case, Acuna et al (2018) show that the countries’ three major parties (FA, PC and PN) distribute financial resources centrally, benefiting party factions close to the national leadership.

The Brazilian Case

The Brazilian party system is one of the most fragmented in the world. In 2018, 30 parties obtained representation in the House of Deputies, and 16.4 is the number of effective parties (NEP). The districts of electoral competition are the states (27 districts3), on the vast majority of positions (governor, senator, federal and state deputy),. The logic of dispute and party behavior in this sense is regional - in most parties (LIMA JR, 1997). However, Brazilian funding legislation is centralized nationally through the National Party Committees (NPC)4. The NPC’s are the institutions that receive public resources directly from the National Budget every year through the FP for the maintenance of party organizations.In election years, they further receive the resources of the FEFC, also

3 Acre, Amazonas, Alagoas, Amapá, Bahia, Ceará, Distrito Federal, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Maranhão, Pará, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piauí, Paraná Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul, Roraima, Rondônia, Rio de Janeiro, Sergipe, Santa Catarina, São Paulo, Tocantins. 4 Law 9096 of 1995: Law of the Political Parties. distributed directly from the National Budget (MANCUSO, 2020). That is, if in one hand the logic of electoral competition is centrifugal, in the other, the logic of distribution of public resources is centripetal (SCHAEFER, 2018).

In Figure 1, I present the organization chart of the distribution of candidate resources. Political parties control public resources through their NPCs, but they are also the destination of contributions from other actors such as companies (when allowed) and individuals. Even the most significant Brazilian companies prefer to donate to parties rather than candidates as a way of guaranteeing access to the organization and not to individual parliamentarians (CARAZZA, 2018).

In the case of both types of donation (private and public) political parties act as mediators, coordinating the distribution of resources through discretionary criteria: which candidates receive money and how much (SCHAEFER & BARBOSA, 2017). NPCs can allocate resources directly to individual campaigns or even distribute resources so that State Directorates (SPC's) can decide allocation strategies.

Figure 1: Organization chart of party donations

Source: TSE5.

5 http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/estatisticas/repositorio-de-dados-eleitorais-1/repositorio-de-dados- eleitorais. In the two elections analyzed in this paper, party-mediated resources represented the largest source of campaign resources. In the 2014 elections for the position of federal deputy, the amount that “circulated” by SPC's, and especially NPC's, was 37.43%, while for governor the sum was 24.90%. In 2018, with the prohibition of corporate donations, the sum was higher: 75.46% and 69.31%, respectively. In other words, it can be argued that institutional change from one election to another increased the power of party organizations, especially the NPC's. In the 2014 elections, 32 parties competed, and in the 2018 elections, there were 35.

Figure 2: The sources of money to federal deputy and governor candidates (2014-2018)

80,00 75,46 69,31 70,00

60,00

50,00 41,98 40,00 37,43 29,98 30,00 26,07 24,90 20,06 20,00 13,11 10,70 12,73 8,78 9,42 7,51 10,00 4,78 3,12 2,27 2,39 0,00 0,00 0,00 Federal Deputy Governor Federal Deputy Governor 2014 2018

Other Candidates Individual Party Resources Self-Financing Companies

Source: TSE6.

In absolute values, the financial resources distributed by the parties for the elections of governor and federal deputy were the amounts of US$ 108 millions (Governor - 2014), US$ 107 millions (Federal Deputy - 2014), US$ 71 millions (Governor - 2018), and US$ 250 millions (Federal Deputy - 2018). I understand party money as those resources that circulate through the NPC's. These values represent a considerable amount of resources and can determine the electoral competitiveness of candidates.

6 http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/estatisticas/repositorio-de-dados-eleitorais-1/repositorio-de-dados- eleitorais Analysis Model

Dependent Variable:

I consider as dependent variable the percentage of party financial resources received by the total district candidates, given the total resources distributed by party y to all candidates and all districts - in the two positions and years analyzed (GIERZYNSKI & BREAUX, 1994, p.180). For example, if party y distributed to all federal deputy candidates in 2014 the amount of US$ 200 thousand, and all the candidates of state of Acre received US$ 20 thousand, the percentage of party resources received by the party candidates in that district is 10%. I do not use the absolute value of party distribution because the variability of resources available to organizations is huge, and the idea of the paper is to capture the behavior of the party organizations as a whole.

The argument defended in this paper is that Brazilian political parties have conservative behavior regarding the distribution of financial resources, i.e. they invest in candidates preferably in the position of incumbents, and in districts with less competitiveness and higher rewards. Given this, I formulate four hypotheses for the answer to the initial question:

Hypothesis 1: Distribution values are higher for incumbents. The incumbency position usually guarantees more considerable/substantial party money to the candidates, both as federal deputy and governor (HAGEVI, 2018; VAN BIEZEN, 2000). Hypothesis 2: The financial resources distributed by parties’ decrease as electoral competition increases. Electoral competitiveness was operationalized by grouping - through factor analysis - two variables: NEP and Electoral Volatility. The NEP, index developed by Laakso & Taagepera (1979), had the value calculated from the immediately previous election: for the case of 2014, the reference election is 2010, for the case of 2018, the reference election is 2014, in the two positions analyzed. The idea is that the higher the effective number of parties in dispute for office, the smaller the resources distributed by the party. Volatility is also calculated from the immediately preceding elections. The index captures the fluctuation of voter preferences between elections (PEDERSEN, 1979). The more significant the change in party votes between elections, the higher the index values and the lower, by hypothesis, the distribution of party resources. Grouping two variables into one factor explained 52.46% of the variance. Hypothesis 3: The higher the electoral rewards in the districts, the greater the party investment.

The electoral reward is operationalized from two variables: state government tax extraction and the share of state GDP over national GDP. The extraction refers to the ability of the actual state government to collect taxes from the state's GDP: from the total produced by the economy, how much of this is collected in the form of taxes. In this sense, the higher the capacity for extraction, the larger, by hypothesis, the public budget and the higher the rewards for parties. The coefficients of distribution of party resources are expected to be higher for governor elections than for federal deputy, given the possibility that the governor will administer the state budget. State GDP is calculated from the share of the electoral district's GDP over the national GDP. The grouping of the two variables into one factor explained 84.51% of the variance.

Hypothesis 4: the greater the organizational/electoral strength of the parties in district i, the higher the percentage of party resources passed on to candidates competing there (GIERZYNSKI & BREAUX, 1994). This variable is calculated from the party's total votes in the district in the immediately preceding elections and the number of party’s affiliates in the election year analyzed. From these indicators, I calculated a proxy for the party's electoral and organizational strength in that particular state. The grouping of the two variables into factor explained 84.47% of the variance.

In table 1, I indicate the operationalization of the concepts.

Table 1: Research Design

Unit of Analyses Electoral Districts (Brazilian States) for all parties. Analysis Techniques Factorial analysis7, descriptive statistics, multiple linear regression. Dependent Variable % of party resources received by all candidates in the state i against the total distributed by the party (continuous variable) Independent Variables (1) Incumbent (Dummy for Governor and Continuous for Federal Deputy);

(2) District Electoral Competitiveness (Continuous); A grouping from the variables NEP and Electoral Volatility.

7 The factorial analysis tables are available in the appendix. (3) District Electoral Reward (Continuous); A grouping from the variables Extractive Capacity and Share of the state's GDP over the national GDP.

(4) Party Electoral / Organizational Strength in the District (Continuous). A grouping by variables Party Vote in the latest Chamber of Deputies elections and percentage of party voters in the district.

Table 2 shows the descriptive values of the variables. As can be seen, there is a great variability in numbers. While some parties concentrated all the resources distributed on one candidate, others did not invest any dollar in some of the candidates.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum Deviation Party Resources (Governor) 1,234 0,000 6,655 0,000 100,000 Party Resources (Federal Deputy) 3,703 1,740 6,062 0,000 47,840 Incumbent (Governor) 0,003 0,000 0,170 0,000 1,000 Incumbent (Federal Deputy) 0,540 0,000 1,168 0,000 13,000 District Electoral Competitiveness 0,000 -0,311 1,000 -2,293 3,249 District Electoral Reward 0,000 -0,201 1,000 -1,992 3,450 Party Electoral Organizational Strength in the District 0,000 -0,294 1,000 -1,008 8,908 Sources: TSE; IBGE.

The data used in this paper was collected on the website of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). The TSE makes all candidates' accounts available months after the elections. From this database and candidate information, I worked with the information from R and SPSS software to create codes for statistical tests. Other information used for the construction of the variables were collected from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)8.

Results

As the dependent variable is continuous (percentages), I chased to perform multiple linear regression tests, in order to answer the question initially presented on this paper (FIGUEIREDO FILHO et al, 2011). The idea is to understand - in an aggregative way - how Brazilian parties allocate resources in the federal deputy and governor elections. Some of the parties that disputed the elections analyzed did not have incumbents, so these organizations were removed from the analysis. Given that the test seeks to infer the variation in the distribution of resources based on whether the party has an incumbent or not, the non-incumbent parties have distributed all resources to candidates without a mandate. In total, I worked with data from 9615 candidates in the 27 states, the total N was 1215910.

In table 3, I present the data of the models tested for each position, differentiating the years. In this sense, it is possible to see the variation in the distribution of money according to the independent variables listed above. In total, four multiple linear regression tests were run for each position and each year.

First, it should be noted that not all variables were statistically significant at the 5% level. The direction of the coefficients, however, matters to the extent that they confirm or not the hypotheses. In the case of model one, for example, only the first variable is significant in the 5% level: the value distributed by the parties is greater to the incumbents. The other variables are not significant. Competitiveness, electoral reward and party electoral/organizational strength, however, follow the expected direction: candidates in more competitive districts receive fewer party resources, the wealthiest states seem to attract higher party transfers and the parties tend to distribute more resources to districts with more electoral/organizational strength.

8 https://sidra.ibge.gov.br/home/ipca/brasil. 9 Parties: Avante/PTdoB, DC/PSDC, DEM, MDB/PMDB, PATRI/PEN, PCdoB, PDT, PHS, Podemos/PTN, PP, PPL, PPS, PR, PRB, PROS, PSB, PSC, PSD, PSDB, PSL, PSOL, PT, PTB, PV, REDE e Solidariedade. 10 19 parties with incumbents in 2014 * 27 states = 513; 26 parties with incumbents in 2018 * 27 states = 702. Total 1215. In the other models, the direction of the coefficients and statistical significance support some of the hypotheses. Incumbent federal deputies and governors receive more party financial resources than challengers in all cases analyzed. Brazilian parties are conservative in that sense: they bet their financial resources on candidates already with a mandate. The magnitude of the coefficients shows that in 2018, when parties had control of almost 70% of the amount circulated in the governor elections, incumbents received on average 30.53% more resources from the parties than their challengers. In this regard, the electoral/organizational strength of the parties also weighed in choosing party directions to distribute resources: as far as one unit of the variable grew, on average 1.91% of party resources went to the campaigns.

Table 3: Multiple Linear Regression

Governor 2014 Governor 2018 Federal Deputy Federal Deputy (Model 1) (Model 2) 2014 (Model 3) 2018 (Model 4) Number of Incumbents 11,619*** 20,543*** 1,588*** 1,402*** (2,520) (0,823) (0,232) (0,155) District Electoral -0,916 0,187 -0,297 -0,010 Competitiveness (0,887) (0,528) (0,339) (0,137) District Electoral Reward 0,920 0,659 1,520*** 1,355*** (1,196) (0,964) (0,471) (0,257) Party Electoral 0,002 1,914* 1,685*** 1,646*** Organizational Strength (1,501) (0,790) (0,337) (0,231) in the District R² Adjusted 0,131 0,283 0,249 0,354 N 189 243 513 702 Significance *** P <0.005; ** P <0.010; * P <0.050. The standard error results are in parentheses. Source: Own elaboration, based on TSE and IBGE.

In the federal deputy elections, the competitiveness and reward variables did also follow the expected direction. Wealthier states with larger budgets did mean advantages in distributing party resources to candidates, and greater competitiveness detracts party resources (but without statistical significance). The results of multiple linear regressions indicate that hypotheses 1, 3 and 4 could be confirmed. The Brazilian political parties tend to invest in incumbent candidates and in the electoral districts that they already had some degree of electoral and organizational strength. In majority competitions (elections for governor), parties tend to favor incumbents. The magnitude of the coefficients demonstrates this behavior. In the proportional open list competition (elections for federal deputy), the magnitude of the coefficients shows that the candidates most favored by the parties are in the districts where the party organizations are already strong. The growth of a party force unit in the district tends to affect 1.68% and 1.64%, 2014 and 2018 respectively, on the party money distributed in the district.

Figure 3: Relationship between Party Resources and Organizational/Electoral Strenght

Source: TSE.

In the figure 3, it can be seen the variation between the percentage of party resources distributed to the electoral districts and the organizational/electoral strength, considering the political parties. In some organizations, PT (R² = 0,865), PR (R² = 0,755) and PPS (R² = 0,599), for example, there is a strong correlation between these two variables. This variation deserves a more substantive analysis in later works.

Conclusion Remarks

In this paper, I try to answer the question: how Brazilian parties allocate their financial resources in two elections. To seek the answer, I formulate four hypotheses extracted from the literature: (1) The incumbency position usually guarantees more substantial party money to the candidates, both as federal deputy and governor. (2) The financial resources distributed by parties decrease as electoral competition increases. (3) The higher the electoral rewards in the districts, the greater the party investment. (4) The greater the organizational/electoral strength of the parties in district i, the higher the percentage of party resources passed on to candidates competing there. These four hypotheses support the argument that political parties in Brazil would be conservative when allocating their financial resources. From the analysis of the data of 1215 cases (parties in the Brazilian states) for the position of federal deputy and governor in two elections, I could see that hypotheses 1, 3 and 4 sustain themselves empirically. In other words, Brazilian parties are conservative, and they financially privilege their incumbent candidates as well as candidates in elections in states where the party is electorally and organizationally strong, and in wealth districts.

Hypothesis 2 should be analyzed in future work. The calculation of party leadership in the NPC does not seem to take into account, given the results found here, issues such as the district competitiveness when sharing party resources. Thus, I think that these hypotheses should be tested in longitudinal comparisons for the Brazilian case, as well as tested in possible comparisons with other party systems.

In theoretical terms, it seems that Brazilian parties follow the relationship described in other works about the predominance of PPO over PCO (KATZ & MAIR, 1993; VAN BIEZEN, 2000; HAGEVI, 2018). Political parties tend to be conservative, which can have consequences for democratic representation itself.

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Appendix:

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