/r.1m:.1tion:1! St,,dit1 Re1·iew V9/ I:? Nn 2 /Otumbtr20/ II: 95-115 87 R<'<:cived Sep«mbcr 15. 2011 Rev·iseJ November 17, 2011 Accepml November 30. 20 I I Who is the Strongest in Washingto n , D.C.?: A Comparative Study on the Korean­ American Comfo rt W omen Movement and the Ja panese-Arnerican Redress Movement EUNJUNG LIM• Washingcon. D.C. is noc only che national capital of the U nircd Scares. but it is also an imernacional arena in which world political issues :ire substancially dealt with. Immig rants in the: lJ nice<l Scares represent influence in world polirics, exemng cheir leverage on policy makers in Washington, D.C. Tht: Korean-Amcrica111 Comfort W omen Movement in 2007 and rhe Japanese-Amc:rican Redress Movement from 1970 ro 1992 share common grounJ in ct:rms of their norms and strategies for success. This article conducrs comparative analy­ sis on thtc t wo g rassroots movements based on Resource Mobiliz:irion Theory, and suggests their realistic implications ro political dynamics in Washington, D.C. · Keywords: Washington, D.C. , Grassroots Politics, Immig rants Group, Resource Mobilization Theory . Comfort \X1omcn Movement. Redress Movement • Ph.D. 0.nd,dacc, & hool or Advo1nced lmemational Studies, Johns Hopkins Univc,rsity Visiting Fellow, lntcrfaculty lnitinive in lnformacion Studu~s. The University uf Tokyo E-mail: tlim6@ jhu.edu Downloaded from Brill.com10/08/2021 08:21:09AM via free access 88 1. INTRODUCTION n che conrexc of foreign policy ,1n<l internacional r<:lacions, Washing.con, I D.C. is in ;1 league- of ics own. lcs rornl population of roughly 600,000 and total area of 68.3 square miles may nor qualify ic as a global cicy un<lN Sasscn (2002)'s definition, bu1 not even New York City is comparable co the scale and m,1gnicuJe of impact Washingron plays inccrnacionally. 1c is for chis reason chat officials from Japan, for instance, incenrionally make regular round trips between Narica and Dulles for official meerings wich Capirol Hill and a<lminiscracion personnel, chac lases only one or two days ac any one time. South Korean Presideac Lee Myung-bak spent nearly a full week in Washington during his official visit, an indication chat world leaders recognize the dividends one reaps by being in chis town physically. The ongoing economic recession, che ep1cenrer of which was Wall Stre<:c, has nused qu(:sr1ons as co whc:ch<:r rhe Uniced Scates is slipping from its srnrus as che preeminenc policical and economic power in the world; nevercheless , ir will remain .it lc:ast one of the most influential players, with \Xlashingcnn remaining in its uniqu.- pruminl·nce. U.S foreign policy is not confinl-<l w high levd diplomatic: mi:erings in \Xlashing­ con, D.C. Alrhough che revolving door rc-lacionship inherenr co chis cown between lobbyisrs and elected politici.rns ofcc.-n involve domestic agenda. many lobbyists also r<'pr<,senc internanonal business and governmenr diencs as well. In chis reh1civdy less-public forum played br ocnup:ints of K Screec officc:s, influemial phtyers seek to shape and influence U.S. foreign policy relevanr co cheir areas o( inct.-rl'St. 1\n txtrem<' example of chis pr:1c cicc- is in 199). when chen-Taiwan President Lcc- Teng-hui hired Cassidy and Associaci:s co pressure.- rhe U.S. Stare Department inco reconsidering its initial rejecrion of a visa request by Lee co travel co Cornell University. his alma macer. Lee's success in playing rhc K stret'c game had immediate geopolitical 1mplicacions. China responded co Washingcon's U-curn over Lee's visa by !:lunching missile tescs and rnilicary exercises in che Taiwan Scraic, which ulcimacely lead co the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis (Sheng 2001, 24-28; Ross 2000). Nevertheless, U.S. foreign policy evolves not only within public official meetings and private lobbyists; inceraccions. Bottom-up, grassroots movements also bave che potencjaJ co influence how Washingcon gets involved in incernacional cop ies. This article discusses two successful examples of chis category: namely rhe Korean-American Comfort Women Movcmenr in 2007 and the Japanese-American Redress Movement from 1970 co 1992. In presenting the cwo grassroots move­ ments, the paper serves co examine dynamics of immigram groups' mobilization in Washington, D .C., and hopes co contribute cowards a more holistic under­ scanding of rhe underlying dynamic forces char influence and shape chis city. Downloaded from Brill.com10/08/2021 08:21:09AM via free access (1,;NJUNG LIM 89 I. The Carns to be Studied "Comfort women" 1s a euphemiscic term for Asian women forceJ co serve as sex slavt-s for the Japanese Imperial Army. While the mosc prommenc stories come from the Korean Peninsula and China, Japan has vicumizt-d women ebcwherc in Asia, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, following its start o( a foll -scale warm rhe region in 1937 clial cvrnlu,illy di,,1l,u1:J imo WorlJ War li's Pacific Theater in 1941 . The foll excem of che victimization of chese women 1s difficult co measure; in face, the issue di<l noc come into the public spotlight even in South Korea until August 1991, when Kim Hak-Sun went public with her story as a comforc woman (Scecz and Oh 200 I, 16). lnspire<l by Kim's courage, former comfort women and civil activists have held "Wednesday Procesrs" in front of the Japanese Embassy building in Seoul every week since J anuary 8, 1992. Their voit<:"S Jem:tnding chat Tokyo apologizt· and make appropriarc compcn­ s:uions have foll 1:trgely on deaf ears for years. However, mobilizacion of Korean­ Americans m chi.' Uniced Scates to pass a resolucion m che U.S. House of Repn:sencacivcs cm,cizing the Japanc-se government on chc issue awakened Tokyo to July 2007 , forc ing 1t co engage in unsuccessful aJ h()c measurc:s such rus b11 y111g a full -page Waslungcon Post .uJ chac conJemneJ chc Comfort Women Movement, as cxplamed tn che l:icer secnon. 1l owevcr, chis rs not chc: only example of g rassroots movements in0ucncing 1ncern:1rion:1l nffairs. Twcmy years ago. J apanese-Americans succeedcJ in having ch,· ll.S. government :tpologize for its dccainmenc of 120.000 Japanc-se-Americans ltvrng in che Unrced Scates mainland into ten concentration camps, which were euphcmiscirnll y calkd ''relocation centers ." Following th<:' shocking ;mack o n Ptarl Harbor by J apan in 194 I. Franklin Roosevck issued Exern~ive Order 9066 due co suspicions rhac Japanese-Americans had been collaborating with their ancestral homeland in the war and hence needed to be locked up in prison camps. While chis tragedy cemained a taboo among J apanese-Americans for dc-cadt-s. as in the comfort women situation in South Koce:t. a grassroocs rnovemem seeking co redress che issue began tn che 1970s. le culminaced in 1992 when the U.S. government apologiied for che mass lockups and paid $20,000 for each of the surviving victims as compensation (Niiya 2001, 120-125; McPhee 2006, 13-16; Daniels ct al. 1986, 3-6). There is a two-decade time lag between these two movements. However, che cwo movements share several common characteristics for analytical interests. Firsc, boch cases are rclaced co compensation issues for World War 11 victims. Second, the rwo movements define a specific government as responsible for che victims' plighr and soughc justice. In ocher words, both o( chese mobilizations were boccom -up actions. Third, both movements employed the U.S. legislative system co achieve their goals. Fourth, they are g rassroots movements in che sense char respective Foreign Miniseries did not mobilize chem. Lastly, both Downloaded from Brill.com10/08/2021 08:21:09AM via free access 90 Who 11 tin Strongm in \fla1h111g1011, O.C.i movements involve Asian-American communmes. A compa.rarive analysis of these rwo cases may lead ro a bercer understanding of how Asian-American g roups mobilize co make a political impact 111 Washington, D.C., and ulcimacely shape U .S. foreign policy. 2. Theoretical Frnmework ,md Outline lJj the Article Two major cheoretical frameworks provide comrascing explanacions when analyz­ ing key factors of social movements. On rhe one hand, classical Collecrive Behavior Tiheory (CBT) characterizes social movcmcnrs as emotional, impuls.ive, and un­ ocganized phenomena based on unpredictable mass enthusiasm (Morris 2000). Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT ), on rhe ocher hand, recognizes socia.1 move­ ments and movement participants as political, well-planned, and organized. Morris's ( 1992) explanacion on che American Civil Rig hcs Movemenc , for mscance, is analycically relevant co rhe scudy c-0nducrc:d in rhis :micle. Morris suggests rhac che RMT Model firs che analysis of che Civil Righrs Movement, and he concludes dlar colkctivc acrion is rational and it develops from pre('xisci n,!! social scrucrures and poli tical processes. RMT is useful especially when invesrigating che abili ri cs uf groups to organize, mobilize, and manage the necessa.ry resources for success of a movemenc. As Morris ( 1984) scares, RMT illuminates the UTiporcance and necessit)' of rhe resm,rces ro inici11ce and J<:v<:l op :1ny social movemc:nt. The resources incluJe form:d or in formal organizacions , leaders, money, r>eople. amJ rhc ,ummunicy's necwurk. RMT does noc focus on governance. psychic strain, and ocher psychological sr:ares of members who participaced in a movement for ,cs anal)'SIS. I nsread. chc theory mainly annlyzcs chc: ability of groups cu organize, mobil ize:, and manage valuable resources chat determine whether the)' will be able co engage in social pcocest.