Collaboration Between Civil Society and Governmental Organizations in 2 Dutch Refugee (Crisis) Reception Governance

1 Bumping into the neighbour; collaboration between civil society and governmental organizations in 2 Dutch refugee (crisis) reception governance. 3 Larruina, R., Boersma, F.K., Hoogenboom, L., Ponzoni, E., Rienks, S. 4 [email protected] 5 Key Words: Civil Society Organizations, Collaboration, Governance, Governmental Organizations, 6 Refugee reception, Refugee Crisis. 7 In the last decade the effects of the institutionalization of asylum seekers in the Netherlands were 8 addressed in diverse academic and policy papers. They contributed to its acknowledgment by official 9 authorities and boosted a shift in the public and policy discussions on the refugee reception and 10 integration by bringing together governmental and civil society organizations in the debate. However, this 11 dialogue was affected by the increased refugee flow between 2015-2016, the refugee crisis. Research and 12 government reports have shown that the collaboration between civil society and governmental actors 13 during the crisis was crucial for an effective crisis governance. In this paper I draw on to literature about 14 the governance of refugee reception and crisis governance and on a preliminary (exploratory) empirical 15 investigation of the experiences and views of different governmental, non-governmental and community 16 actors, with an active role in Amsterdam between 2015 and 2016. This project has an explorative nature 17 and is based on a qualitative and interpretative research. The experiences of the participants show 18 circumstantial and inter-organizational elements that enhanced or hampered their work during the crisis. I 19 argue that the interactions between governmental and civil society actors before, during and after the so- 20 called Refugee crisis in the Netherlands bring chances to reach durable collaboration in refugee reception 21 and integration. 22 23 1. Introduction 24 During 2015-2016 the dramatic increase in the arrival of asylum seekers in Europe and the Netherlands 25 affected the organizational landscape in the refugee reception. Organizations that until then had been 26 seemly detached, due to their different aims and missions, had to come together and work towards a 27 humane, yet efficient arrival and reception of refugees. The Dutch ‘refugee crisis’refers to a particular 28 high number of arrival of individuals requesting asylum. According to Eurostat in 2015 the Netherlands 29 received 44,970 asylum applications, most of them from individuals coming from Syria, Eritrea and Iraq. 30 This high inflow caused the need for emergency shelters and asylum request processing facilities within a 31 short period of time. This also caused public outcries against the establishment of this temporary asylum 32 seeker centers (AZC). 1 1 This situation made the contribution of bottom-up initiatives and NGO’s already working in refugee 2 welcoming and reception temporarily urgent since collaboration between civil society organizations 3 (CSO) and governmental organizations (GO) at that time was crucial to an effective crisis management 4 (Boersma et al, 2018). The governmental response led to a formal top-down 'command and control' crisis 5 management, with a reduced understanding of how to integrate the know-how and expertise of these civil 6 society actors in the crisis response ((Boersma, Kraiukhina, Larruina, Lehota & Nury,2018). The Dutch 7 case was no exception to the top-down crisis approach adopted by governmental actors in other European 8 countries, where it hampered the creation of a durable model for collective action (Hadfiled & Zwitter, 9 2015). 10 Research before and during the crisis shows that the interaction between governmental and non- 11 governmental organizational responses is key to a successful crisis management and governance 12 (Boersma et al, 2018, COA, 2017, Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003) Moreover, to our understanding, the 13 refugee crisis speeded a process that had been activated few years before. In the last decade the effects of 14 the institutionalization of asylum seekers in the Netherlands were addressed in diverse academic and 15 policy papers. They contributed to its acknowledgment by official authorities and boosted a shift in the 16 public and policy discussions on the refugee reception and integration towards a focus on early inclusion 17 and societal participation of asylum seekers and refugees, bringing together governmental and civil 18 society organizations in the debate. The increased refugee flow between 2015-2016, the ‘refugee crisis’, 19 affected this dialogue by increasing the pressure and introducing a multitude of novel actors into the field. 20 The increased influx of refugees has indeed released not only worries and polarized reactions in Dutch 21 society, but also a lot of encouraging dynamism by different individuals and initiatives. Next to the more 22 traditional and established actors in the field (governmental agencies, municipalities, traditional NGO’s) 23 many others have undertaken action: neighbourhood residents, social entrepreneurs, bottom-up societal 24 initiatives and businesses have been actively involved in creating meeting opportunities between refugees 25 and Dutch people, developing alternative ways to teach the Dutch language or to match refugees with 26 employers. Taking this into consideration, it is important to understand where CSO and GO stand after 27 the refugee crisis and if they have the right conditions to coordinate actions in future critical situations, 28 and in their everyday activities. But also, whether the emergence of many small bottom-up community 29 organisations with the ambition of contributing to welcoming and including refugees in Dutch society did 30 somehow change the ecology of the field of refugee reception and whether these changes might create the 31 conditions for more inclusive structures. Do the refugee crisis and the type of cooperation/relation 32 emerged there bring chances for more inclusive practices of the actors involved? 33 2.2 The Refugee Crisis, framing common goals? 2 1 The Dutch migration and refugee organizational territory is composed by two types of organizations: 2 governmental organizations and civil society organizations. Governmental organizations are the Central 3 Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA), Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) & 4 departments from the local governments. On the civil society side, these organizations play a very 5 important role in refugee reception and integration. They mostly have the capacity to assist immediately 6 after the refugees’ arrival and facilitate their integration (Garkisch, Heidingsfelder, & Beckmann,2017). 7 The individuals working for these organizations can adapt to the refugees’ possibilities and connect them 8 with other relevant individuals, initiatives or third-party organizations. In the case of the Netherlands, 9 civil society organizations are a bridge, a link between the refugees’ past experiences and their future in 10 the host society (Larruina & Ghorashi, 2016).They do this by advocating (for the newcomers), providing 11 services (extra services), bringing experts who volunteer, building capacities (providing training and 12 education when not allowed by the status of the refugee), representing (on behalf of the refugees) without 13 the constrains of the official organizations work frame, which is heavily institutionalized. In other words, 14 civil society organizations, can provide a level or flexibility and adaptability that official organizations 15 cannot. Within CSO we are referring to bottom-up community, spontaneous organizations which at some 16 point were supported or interacted with established NGO’s, like the Dutch Refugee Council (Boersma et 17 al). This was particularly visible during the crisis, not only because they were fulfilling their 18 responsibilities, but also because they were asked by the government to assist. From September 2015 19 onwards, due to the COA’s lack of capacity in its AZCs, the accommodation of asylum seekers took place 20 in other locations. According to the current law, applicants should know the decision about their residence 21 permit within six months. During the crisis this period had to be extended. The time of preparing and 22 starting the procedure had to be prolonged, and refugees were accommodated in temporary reception 23 centres. In the case of the city of Amsterdam, the local government was required to accept temporarily 24 asylum seekers. The municipality had to set up four emergency shelters and requested assistance from 25 The Salvation Army. As of April 2016, after having regained capacity, the COA took over the 26 management of all locations in Amsterdam. In May 2017, it announced that its capacity to accommodate 27 asylum seekers was going to be reduced, due to lower occupancy and expectations of the refugee inflow 28 (COA 2017). However, while official initiatives were scaling down, there was a perceived feeling that 29 stakeholders were cautious about any possible renewal in the refugee influx. This is clearly expressed by 30 COA Chairman Gerard Bakker, speaking about these reductions, said: 31 "We have grown substantially together, so it is also important that we also scale back together. 32 We learned a lot from each other, and therefore we are locally involved in this movement. City, 3 1 volunteers and locals of locations. We do not just close the door behind us because we need each 2 other again if the number of asylum seekers will grow again unexpectedly” (COA,

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