Collaboration Between Civil Society and Governmental Organizations in 2 Dutch Refugee (Crisis) Reception Governance

1 Bumping into the neighbour; collaboration between civil society and governmental organizations in 2 Dutch refugee (crisis) reception governance.

3 Larruina, R., Boersma, F.K., Hoogenboom, L., Ponzoni, E., Rienks, S.

4 [email protected]

5 Key Words: Civil Society Organizations, Collaboration, Governance, Governmental Organizations, 6 Refugee reception, Refugee Crisis.

7 In the last decade the effects of the institutionalization of asylum seekers in the Netherlands were 8 addressed in diverse academic and policy papers. They contributed to its acknowledgment by official 9 authorities and boosted a shift in the public and policy discussions on the refugee reception and 10 integration by bringing together governmental and civil society organizations in the debate. However, this 11 dialogue was affected by the increased refugee flow between 2015-2016, the refugee crisis. Research and 12 government reports have shown that the collaboration between civil society and governmental actors 13 during the crisis was crucial for an effective crisis governance. In this paper I draw on to literature about 14 the governance of refugee reception and crisis governance and on a preliminary (exploratory) empirical 15 investigation of the experiences and views of different governmental, non-governmental and community 16 actors, with an active role in Amsterdam between 2015 and 2016. This project has an explorative nature 17 and is based on a qualitative and interpretative research. The experiences of the participants show 18 circumstantial and inter-organizational elements that enhanced or hampered their work during the crisis. I 19 argue that the interactions between governmental and civil society actors before, during and after the so- 20 called Refugee crisis in the Netherlands bring chances to reach durable collaboration in refugee reception 21 and integration. 22

23 1. Introduction 24 During 2015-2016 the dramatic increase in the arrival of asylum seekers in Europe and the Netherlands 25 affected the organizational landscape in the refugee reception. Organizations that until then had been 26 seemly detached, due to their different aims and missions, had to come together and work towards a 27 humane, yet efficient arrival and reception of refugees. The Dutch ‘refugee crisis’refers to a particular 28 high number of arrival of individuals requesting asylum. According to Eurostat in 2015 the Netherlands 29 received 44,970 asylum applications, most of them from individuals coming from Syria, Eritrea and Iraq. 30 This high inflow caused the need for emergency shelters and asylum request processing facilities within a 31 short period of time. This also caused public outcries against the establishment of this temporary asylum 32 seeker centers (AZC).

1 This situation made the contribution of bottom-up initiatives and NGO’s already working in refugee 2 welcoming and reception temporarily urgent since collaboration between civil society organizations 3 (CSO) and governmental organizations (GO) at that time was crucial to an effective crisis management 4 (Boersma et al, 2018). The governmental response led to a formal top-down 'command and control' crisis 5 management, with a reduced understanding of how to integrate the know-how and expertise of these civil 6 society actors in the crisis response ((Boersma, Kraiukhina, Larruina, Lehota & Nury,2018). The Dutch 7 case was no exception to the top-down crisis approach adopted by governmental actors in other European 8 countries, where it hampered the creation of a durable model for collective action (Hadfiled & Zwitter, 9 2015).

10 Research before and during the crisis shows that the interaction between governmental and non- 11 governmental organizational responses is key to a successful crisis management and governance 12 (Boersma et al, 2018, COA, 2017, Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003) Moreover, to our understanding, the 13 refugee crisis speeded a process that had been activated few years before. In the last decade the effects of 14 the institutionalization of asylum seekers in the Netherlands were addressed in diverse academic and 15 policy papers. They contributed to its acknowledgment by official authorities and boosted a shift in the 16 public and policy discussions on the refugee reception and integration towards a focus on early inclusion 17 and societal participation of asylum seekers and refugees, bringing together governmental and civil 18 society organizations in the debate. The increased refugee flow between 2015-2016, the ‘refugee crisis’, 19 affected this dialogue by increasing the pressure and introducing a multitude of novel actors into the field. 20 The increased influx of refugees has indeed released not only worries and polarized reactions in Dutch 21 society, but also a lot of encouraging dynamism by different individuals and initiatives. Next to the more 22 traditional and established actors in the field (governmental agencies, municipalities, traditional NGO’s) 23 many others have undertaken action: neighbourhood residents, social entrepreneurs, bottom-up societal 24 initiatives and businesses have been actively involved in creating meeting opportunities between refugees 25 and Dutch people, developing alternative ways to teach the Dutch language or to match refugees with 26 employers. Taking this into consideration, it is important to understand where CSO and GO stand after 27 the refugee crisis and if they have the right conditions to coordinate actions in future critical situations, 28 and in their everyday activities. But also, whether the emergence of many small bottom-up community 29 organisations with the ambition of contributing to welcoming and including refugees in Dutch society did 30 somehow change the ecology of the field of refugee reception and whether these changes might create the 31 conditions for more inclusive structures. Do the refugee crisis and the type of cooperation/relation 32 emerged there bring chances for more inclusive practices of the actors involved?

33 2.2 The Refugee Crisis, framing common goals?

1 The Dutch migration and refugee organizational territory is composed by two types of organizations: 2 governmental organizations and civil society organizations. Governmental organizations are the Central 3 Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA), Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) & 4 departments from the local governments. On the civil society side, these organizations play a very 5 important role in refugee reception and integration. They mostly have the capacity to assist immediately 6 after the refugees’ arrival and facilitate their integration (Garkisch, Heidingsfelder, & Beckmann,2017). 7 The individuals working for these organizations can adapt to the refugees’ possibilities and connect them 8 with other relevant individuals, initiatives or third-party organizations. In the case of the Netherlands, 9 civil society organizations are a bridge, a link between the refugees’ past experiences and their future in 10 the host society (Larruina & Ghorashi, 2016).They do this by advocating (for the newcomers), providing 11 services (extra services), bringing experts who volunteer, building capacities (providing training and 12 education when not allowed by the status of the refugee), representing (on behalf of the refugees) without 13 the constrains of the official organizations work frame, which is heavily institutionalized. In other words, 14 civil society organizations, can provide a level or flexibility and adaptability that official organizations 15 cannot. Within CSO we are referring to bottom-up community, spontaneous organizations which at some 16 point were supported or interacted with established NGO’s, like the Dutch Refugee Council (Boersma et 17 al). This was particularly visible during the crisis, not only because they were fulfilling their 18 responsibilities, but also because they were asked by the government to assist. From September 2015 19 onwards, due to the COA’s lack of capacity in its AZCs, the accommodation of asylum seekers took place 20 in other locations. According to the current law, applicants should know the decision about their residence 21 permit within six months. During the crisis this period had to be extended. The time of preparing and 22 starting the procedure had to be prolonged, and refugees were accommodated in temporary reception 23 centres. In the case of the city of Amsterdam, the local government was required to accept temporarily 24 asylum seekers. The municipality had to set up four emergency shelters and requested assistance from 25 The Salvation Army. As of April 2016, after having regained capacity, the COA took over the 26 management of all locations in Amsterdam. In May 2017, it announced that its capacity to accommodate 27 asylum seekers was going to be reduced, due to lower occupancy and expectations of the refugee inflow 28 (COA 2017). However, while official initiatives were scaling down, there was a perceived feeling that 29 stakeholders were cautious about any possible renewal in the refugee influx. This is clearly expressed by 30 COA Chairman Gerard Bakker, speaking about these reductions, said:

31 "We have grown substantially together, so it is also important that we also scale back together. 32 We learned a lot from each other, and therefore we are locally involved in this movement. City,

1 volunteers and locals of locations. We do not just close the door behind us because we need each 2 other again if the number of asylum seekers will grow again unexpectedly” (COA, 2017).

3 Additionally, the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ) work plan for 2017 (ACVZ, 2017) 4 was focused in what the Dutch minister of justice had called Migration Management 2030. The 5 authorities remained concerned with the 'Future Migration 2030' and looked for advice to consider in a 6 stable long-term migration system that would assist them to organize their capacities and capabilities 7 accordingly. The question is to understand what led to the COA’s statement and if individuals in state and 8 civil society organizations have perceived the same. Considering the importance of both types of 9 organizations in the Dutch reception of asylum seekers during crisis and non-crisis periods, what 10 possibilities of common efforts between them would be? The main objective of this paper is to explore 11 whether the spaces of encounter and collaboration created a path to materialize long term exchange of 12 ideas between different stakeholders.

13 2.0 Theoretical Framework 14 The reception of refugees in the Netherlands is a highly established (institutionalized) process, which 15 implies rigidity and resistance to change (Ansell, Boin & Kuipers). However, the refugee crisis provided a 16 “window of opportunity” to produce policy agenda changes (Kingdon 1984). To shed light on whether the 17 refugee crisis brought chances to achieve durable collaboration, it is useful to explore the concepts of 18 crisis and collaborative governance. The latter can help understand why specific actors would engage 19 with these types of interactions and what this means for the creation of future collaborative assets. 20 2.1 Crisis governance 21 A crisis appears as the disruption to the peace and order in society, it manifests in diverse forms, from 22 failures in the financial system to dramatic changes in the refugee influx (Boin 2015). According to Boin, 23 governments should not work only towards remediating the crisis, but also towards enhancing community 24 resilience for future crises. Boin describes crisis as follows: “a social system, a community, an 25 organization, a policy sector, a country…experiences an urgent threat to its basic structures or 26 fundamental values, which harbours many “unknowns” and appears to require a far-reaching response” 27 (Boin, pp5). This definition has three central elements: threat, urgency, and uncertainty. Considering these 28 elements, the notion of crisis management appears as a set of intertwined governance challenges. During 29 crisis periods, formal authorities often rely upon the instrumentation of the Chaos, Command & Control 30 governance model (Dynes, 1994, Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004). The idea is that crises cause ‘chaos’ and 31 that ‘command’ and ‘control’ are the means to reduce the situation to manageable proportions. Over 32 several years, the C model has been undermined by co-operation amongst different governments, and the 33 emergence of advising institutions. Since the end of the nineteen seventies the focus has been more and

1 more directed towards civil emergency operations by aid organizations in close contact with local and 2 functional governments. In the nineteen eighties the whole western world witnessed a dramatic shift from 3 civil defence to disaster management. The logic behind the Continuity, Co-ordination, Co-operation 4 crisis management model is that without controlling, people could develop more successfully strategies 5 than if they were commanded and controlled. Crises disrupt society (Dynes), but they do not create social 6 chaos or a reduction of individuals or social structures capacities (Helsloot & Ruitenberg). Continuity, 7 coordination and cooperation are, in this model, the central elements needed for a society to be 8 operational during a crisis. Continuity means that using present social structures is the most effective 9 approach to deal with problems arising. Coordination refers to the fact that continuity can be achieved 10 through the normal planning and repetition of activities, the establishment and development of social and 11 logistical networks. Organizing resources should be aimed at needs emerging from the field/the 12 individuals in need, instead of focused in the demands of official organizations. Actions based on the 13 Chaos, Command, Control model encounter issues incorporating organizations that do not follow the 14 same approach (Dynes, Helsloot & Ruitenberg). However, these organizations can substantially assist in 15 remediating the crisis. In this context, actions should aim at solving the issues generated during the crisis, 16 not at avoiding chaos. The main characteristic of this model is that it permits inventiveness and lateral 17 thinking during the response, something essential to adapt to the changing nature of social and 18 organizational dynamics during different stages of the crisis. Effective responses, with synchronized 19 forms of preparation and improvisation, could be guaranteed by creating response structures ready to be 20 triggered when needed. We could conclude that if a Continuity, Cooperation and Coordination crisis 21 model was adopted during high influx of refugee arrivals, new opportunities for collaboration and 22 resources optimizations would be possible. 23 24 2.2 Network performance and shift trust/ Inter organizational collaboration/collaborative 25 governance

26 According to Thompson (2001), collaboration is “…a process in which autonomous actors interact 27 through formal and informal negotiations, jointly creating rules and structures governing their 28 relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is process involving 29 shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions.” (Thompson 2001 quoted in Thompson and Perry, 30 2006, p.23). In the specific case of collaborative governance, Ansell & Gash (2007, pp543-544) define it 31 as a practice that brings multiple stakeholders together in spaces where public agencies engage in a 32 general agreement oriented action taking process (decision making); This definition highlights six 33 elements: (1)a process initiated by a public agency; (2) non-state actors; (3) direct engagement of

1 participants in the decision-making process; (4) formal and collective meetings; (5) the meeting aims at 2 deciding by agreement and (6)the focus of the collaborative process is public policy or public 3 management. Stoker (2004), quoted in Ansell & Gash (2006), refers to collective governance as the rules 4 around collective decision-making. In this case, collective refers to the fact that not only an individual 5 decides, but rather a group of individuals or organizations. For this type of governance public and private 6 actors work jointly, using their own processes, to establish a framework for the provision of public goods. 7 Gray (1989, p5) argues that collaboration is a process where “parties who see different aspects of a 8 problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own 9 limited vision of what is possible”. While these processes are described in the context of a contained 10 organizational setting, considering the recent crisis, it becomes relevant to understand organizations 11 during critical moments. The refugee crisis provided a favourable environment for the formation of 12 temporary, emergent collaborations between GO, CSO and emergent CSO. The unintended, developing, 13 and temporary collaboration process observed during the refugee crisis has two important elements: 14 endurance and formation (Cropper and Palmer 2008). Temporary collaboration connecting different 15 organizations with a shared goal mostly appear to cope with a complex environment. However, they lack 16 planning and always rely on spontaneous actions to coordinate activities (Beck and Plowman, 2014, pp 17 1235). How this collaboration forms has to do with emergent or engineered efforts. Emergent 18 collaboration appears in context where organizations experiment threats or are under pressure, 19 organizations participate at will responding to conditions that require contributions from multiple 20 stakeholders. (Beck and Plowman, 2014, pp 1235). These collaborative arrangements develop rapidly 21 following critical situations and tends to happen rather randomly. Interactions between actors develop 22 organically through the exchange of information and resources. For this to happen, coordination is based 23 mainly on self-organization. 24 25 Based on the above theoretical insights, we are going to reflect on the empirical material and on which 26 elements can we discern in the interaction between actors during the crisis and which are beneficial to 27 work towards a collaborative governance or collaborative spaces.

28 3.0 Research approach and methods 29 A case study based on the research carried out with individuals from governmental and civil society 30 organizations taking part in activities within the Refugee Academy1, Institute for Societal Resilience at 31 the VU University. This project aimed at identifying crisis response practices applied to the refugee crisis. 32 The main research question that led our project was; What are the experiences of individuals in GO and

1 https://fsw.vu.nl/en/research/refugee-academy

1 SCO working in Amsterdam during the period of increased refugee arrivals of 2015-2017? Can these 2 experiences be used to develop common activities to provide a more effective reception and reception of 3 asylum seekers? Have these interactions brought about a more fundamental shift refugee reception that 4 enables social inclusion of CSO? 5 6 This project had explorative longitudinal nature and was based on a qualitative and interpretative research 7 (Denscombe, 2014, Yanow & Schwartz-Shea 2015). It aimed to analyse different data sources in the 8 context of the Refugee Academy’s activities within its (Refugee) Crisis Governance research stream. This 9 comprises data gathered during meetings (qualitative) document analysis (website, social media, leaflets, 10 etc.), panel discussions as well as twelve semi-structured interviews (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The 11 follow up interviews were organized by obtaining a list of contacts from the Refugee Academy. We 12 selected 45 potential respondents, from civil society, they were established NGO’s, but also emergent 13 bottom up initiatives and state organizations. From this list, 15 did not react, 18 did not see enough 14 connections between their work and the potential interviews. A group of 12 individuals finally agreed to 15 be interviewed, however they were mainly emergent/bottom up social organizations. The interviews were 16 carried following a premeditated interview guide created considering the operationalization of the central 17 concepts to be investigated. The analysis helped to visualize and interpret patterns, both in terms of 18 content and actors, revealing which mechanisms enable or inhibit collaboration/collaborative governance 19 between NGO and governmental agencies. The aim was to identify recurring subjects and develop an 20 overview of the different perceptions, views and opinions within the two types of organizational 21 members. To systematize and analyse the data gathered, this research made use of the grounded theory 22 approach. The interviews were transcribed and supplementary notes with impressions and thoughts 23 related to the theory were considered. The empirical findings were based on selected quotes and episodes 24 from the most representative fragments from the reports or answers during the interviews. 25 4 Empirical findings 26 The main findings of this explorative research were external and inter-organizational factors. The first 27 were related to the inability to anticipate the crisis and the slow reaction to instrument cooperation and 28 change in the perceived needs of the refugees that organizations have. The second group of findings 29 shows good intentions and obstacles, fragmented connections, the existing approaches and human 30 resources giving shape to it and policy agenda change 31 4.1 External or circumstantial factors 32 4.1.1 Inability to anticipate and the slow development of cooperation 33 The high influx of refugees’ arrival did not appear as a surprise to the respondents, they elaborated about 34 different visible elements that indicated the increase in the arrivals and their subsequent implications.

1 2 ‘This was a crisis that was coming for years and years’; ‘We are giving them a hopeless future 3 despite that we saw it coming’. (R 12)

4 ‘There was actually a very long preamble to the actual explosion. It is of course ridiculous that a 5 rich country like the Netherlands didn’t anticipate to that.’ (R 3)

6 ‘What was striking, was that there was a lot of talking about the crisis, while I was thinking by 7 myself, if we have a crisis it is a crisis of organizations and how we fix things and in what way 8 we are prepared and not prepared to things that, from my view, we could have seen coming.’ (R 9 6)

10 During the opening meeting of the Refugee Academy members of municipalities, NGOs and researchers 11 explored the question about the refugee crisis during the period 2015-2017. 12 13 “It was discussed that this event should be thought of as an urban crisis. This crisis was also a 14 "blessing in disguise". Firstly, this opportunity brought into the organizational stage local and 15 private initiatives, dealing with different aspects regarding refugees. Secondly, municipalities are 16 more concerned about refugee reception than before, they are taking responsibilities and 17 initiatives. These elements are generating space for transition by changing the way of thinking 18 about different social actors’ participation and actions.” ISR 2017, rep.1

19 These quotes clearly express a critical stance and elaborate about that fact that the crisis was not a 20 surprise. However, many of the respondents agreed with the idea of a blessing in disguise, an apparent 21 misfortune that brings good results. These were clearly represented by the coming together of 22 independent individuals and local initiatives that otherwise would have remained separated. The crisis 23 was not a surprise and was an opportunity to come together.

24 Respondents representing CSOs that have been present in Dutch society for at least three decades 25 reflected on the impact of events portrayed in the media and the influx of calls or visit to their offices to 26 request information about volunteering opportunities. 27 28 “While society was taken by surprise with the high refugee influx, the war in Syria had been 29 going on for few years. Certain events portrayed in the media stared the public opinion and

2 R= respondent, Rep. = report

1 influenced the amount of volunteer willing to help and often starting initiatives, local community 2 organisations and projects. Established NGO/charity organisations perceived the high number of 3 volunteers and new initiatives as sometimes interfering with their work.” ISR,2017, rep 2

4 This flow of requests and intentions to apply for positions, sometimes non-existing, hindered the already 5 congested working agenda of established organizations. This created obstructions and overlapping; 6 requests to help from refugees, request of information or assistance from local individuals willing to help 7 and the strains proper of the crisis.

8 4.2.1 Change in perceived needs 9 The table brought the problem of learning as organizations during the high influx of arrivals. 10 “For all organizations it is important to understand how to provide specific help or give tools for 11 refugees to develop/integrate. To achieve the latter, it is relevant to investigate what abilities 12 people already have and build on them […] Intrinsically related to these points it is relevant to 13 understand how we can make refugee reception sustainable and how/what we learn from each 14 other. Rep.1. 15 The participants shared the impressions and requirements observed during their activities in the period 16 2015-2016, understanding refugees needs to provide what is needed rather than giving by assuming what 17 they lack was important for all participants. Assessing what is needed by refugees would also contribute 18 to the optimization of all the available resources and facilitate a viable refugee reception. Evaluating 19 requirements and opportunities between refugees and organizations assisting them would require the 20 involvement of new actors. This also appears as a challenge to learn and optimize resources. Bringing 21 together like-minded organizations and individuals appeared as the challenge to facilitate learning and 22 cooperation. 23 How do we engage an organization and involve new stakeholders? How do you facilitate the 24 beginning of such actions? […] Until now the Netherlands has presented itself as omniscient, but 25 refugees should be made co-owner of the crisis.” Rep.1. 26 The learning process is not only a process where the host society takes part, but also involves the refugees 27 as soon as they arrive. The concept of co-ownership is an interesting finding in this quote, it indicates a 28 shift between providing help, just giving, and providing help by asking what is needed. This idea was 29 mentioned during the second meeting: 30 “Another thing noticed is that we tend to organise initiatives for refugees and not with refugees. 31 We need a great deal more of reflection on this. During the past years there was a tendency to talk 32 about refugees but not to talk to them and that was something that all participants agreed.” Rep.2 33

1 4.2 Inter-organizational elements 2 4.2.2 Good intentions and obstacles 3 By the time that the second meeting of the refugee academy was organized, the research team had dealt 4 with several comments about using the concept crisis or not in the name of their activities. Considering 5 this the second meeting took place Crisis governance or governance crisis: A model for long term refugee 6 reception and integration? When asked what the organizations had learnt during the crisis, it was 7 recognized that governmental organizations had the opportunity to interact and learn from the work and 8 practices of civil society initiatives or other governmental bodies. 9 “Formal organizations learnt a great deal by going into the field and work with initiatives and 10 municipalities. This is a process that had started before the refugee crisis but was developed 11 further and faster during this period. On the other hand, it was highlighted that the good intentions 12 of local governments can lead to unintended (negative) results. For instance, the actions of 13 municipalities often foment the competition between initiatives.” Rep.2

14 ‘Yes, in some municipalities it is a bit easier because they are smaller. That makes it easy to get 15 to them, to reach them. Everything I say isn’t about my interaction, but what I see in the field. I 16 have a pretty good relation with the municipality. I know where to be, so that is not very relevant, 17 it is more about the middle field. The municipality of (name of city) is known to be a step ahead, 18 because they are anticipating in the right way and really involve the middle field. They are also 19 open to processes and new things.’ (R 5)

20 The participants acknowledged that the encounter of governmental and non-governmental organizations 21 had started before the refugee crisis and that this process was accelerated during this period. 22 Paradoxically, this coming together of different actors was hampered by unintentional negatives 23 consequences, the example provided was related to the competition between different initiatives that 24 municipalities create by stimulating new projects or providing funding for new ideas.

25 4.2.3 Fragmented connections 26 Apart from the interaction between governmental and NGOs, the interactions between organizations that 27 belong to the same sector were emphasized by the respondents. In this case the relation between more 28 established and emergent organizations. 29 “This was also observed as lacking any connection with the long experience and knowledge built 30 within the NGOs themselves […] Thus, it appears crucial to rethink and re-design the relation 31 between established NGO’s like Vluchtelingenwerk and more ‘fluid’ (emergent roots initiatives)

1 community initiatives, so that the positive potential of the latter is realized and interconnected 2 with the work of the first.” Rep. 2

3 Both state and social organizations lacked communication with the result of a deficient collaboration and 4 even conflict. Another respondent said there was a lack of support from relevant organizations and 5 bureaucratic rules stood in the way of a clear communication. Also, respondent 1 mentioned that the lack 6 of collaboration was mostly frustrating.

7 ‘By this point I think there should be a lot of cross collaboration between civil society and 8 (official n.d) organization, that needs to be stepped up a little bit. We definitely do anything we 9 can to reach out to organizations. That’s the ideal situation that there’d be more cooperation 10 between the groups.’ (R 6)

11 ‘Sometimes there was a clear guideline communicated from the national organizations to the 12 local ones. Then there is someone you know, and that you can call. But the bureaucracy was very 13 laboriously.’; ‘There is someone behind a desk who says ‘Rules are rules!’ (Respondent 3)

14 The respondents observed that if this horizontal cooperation and collaboration happened, then 15 experienced organizations could assist less experienced one during their establishment, this would also 16 facilitate the right circumstances to receive all the new volunteers willing to join these organizations.

17 Shortly, there was some kind of attempt of ‘yeah hold on, we have to do everything exactly by the 18 book and everything that flourishes and grows by itself is threatening to us and we are keeping 19 distance from that.’ (R 4)

20 This respondent elaborates about the idea that the innovation or innovative ideas brought to the field do 21 not have the space to contribute to the field where she is working.

22 4.2.4 Existing approaches and human resources giving shape to it 23 Another important element emphasised was related to the type of people working in the refugee reception. 24 The respondents in the table argued that it is a matter of finding the right type of individual to perform the 25 task they are ready or qualified to do. Rather than finding people to fill up positions, it is a matter of 26 finding the individuals whose personal characteristics guaranty the efficacy of their assistance to the 27 refugees. 28 “Regardless of the (type) of organisation, there are always people that you can connect with, who 29 can make a difference. Working together towards an inclusive system boils down to finding those

1 people and keep in touch with the network one establishes. We should invest in creating 2 structures in which people can find each other and build durable networks.” Rep 2

3 Intrinsically related to the previous fragment, the idea of tailoring actions rather than having a collective 4 and generic approach to assist.

5 “It was also mentioned that in the Dutch domain of care and social support, we are working 6 towards individual approaches, tailoring as much as possible towards individuals. However, when 7 it comes to refugees we design collective approaches (based on refugee identity and categories) 8 instead of individual methods”. Rep 2.

9 Network was mentioned multiple times in the establishment of a proper collaboration. Respondent 2 said 10 that ‘in the Netherlands you need to have a network’ and in addition respondent 4 said that the most 11 important thing is to use the networks. Network is established over years and more experienced 12 employees had a greater network.

13 ‘For the largest part in Amsterdam also, where we were. You must take care of the network of 14 those refugees (people), which they are building, that it can also last. That you do not throw this 15 away. This was developing over time, it is about the contacts, to build a network, and begin to 16 organize certain lessons for the refugees when they received the status of citizen (…).’ (R 4)

17 For most of the time the process was as following: an individual knows a person that he or she can call, 18 and because they are already familiar with each other, they are more open to help each other. In this case 19 collaboration will run more smoothly and more effects can be created. Many respondents used their 20 network to obtain contact with the right person to respond more quick, coordinated and adequate to the 21 events of the crisis.

22 ‘What you begin to see in Amsterdam is that all different kinds of people were in contact with 23 each other, so that refugees (people) who were in an asylum centre all week, had met some 24 people from Amsterdam, seen their houses etcetera, met up for a coffee weekly.’ (R 4)

25 ‘It is really a huge network of partners, it isn’t normal anymore! Citizen initiatives, volunteers, 26 there are so many, it is almost too broad.’ (R 5)

27 Most of the employees from social organizations talked about their networks, referring to other social 28 organizations, volunteers or citizen initiatives. Sometimes these networks included also employees from 29 state organizations. But if the social organizations wanted to establish collaboration with the state 30 organizations, it still seemed more difficult because of the bureaucratic core of the latter.

1 ‘Yes, we think that a network approach is really important. If you don’t know how to find each 2 other, a lot of time and energy will be lost. If you are all doing the same thing and you don’t 3 know it.. You need some sort of coordination and you have to find each other.’ (R 11)

4 With the alignment of actions through the use of networks a more appropriate response and collaboration 5 can be implemented.

6 ‘It helps enormously to be in the same spot for a while. I have a huge network [...] from which I 7 have benefitted a lot in the last years. Especially in this field it helps a lot to work at the same spot 8 for a while.’ (R 10)

9 4.2.5 Policy agenda change 10 Regarding the actions taken, the participants mostly agree that the traditional channels should be 11 modified, top down versus bottom up. 12 “The grassroots initiatives and government are on the same line, but middle management could 13 be a barrier. For the central government this crisis is an emergency question, but policy makers 14 have not yet been trained enough to take advantage of these elements. Rep. 1 15 16 If this synchronization is accurate, the main challenge would be creating the right environment for quick 17 policymaking or change. 18 “Stakeholders must be sought outside the established circle ("unexpected partners"), to come 19 outside the existing discourse. Is this an opportunity to think about "New governance"? For this, 20 it is important not only to understand the roles and relationships between provider-receiver, but 21 also how we can scale up local initiatives”. Rep. 1 22 23 The respondents acknowledged that the crisis and the challenges observed during it provide the 24 opportunity to think about new ways of leading refugee reception. They highlighted the relevance of 25 understanding the different roles that the relevant actors in this process have, mainly between the 26 organizations and individuals giving and receiving assistance, this could be applied to the relation 27 between heterogeneous and homogenous organizations, but also the relation between organizations and 28 refugees. The table acknowledged the necessity of spaces for collaboration and delimitation or role 29 definition, this could lead to a responsibilities and duties, but also a clear organizational map to 30 understand who the relevant stakeholders are depending on the circumstances. The transition between 31 different governmental organizations (national to local governments) appears as a challenge. 32

1 “When organizations come together, they can learn directly from each other. By creating spaces 2 of collaboration stakeholders ‘roles could be identified and assigned […] The transition from 3 COA to the realm of a municipality is big and challenging. This is a step in the integration 4 process, which does not receive enough attention in spite of its importance for status holders.” 5 Rep. 2.

6 The connections with organizations that appeared during the recent refugee crisis appear as central, the 7 participants suggested two main points in this process, focusing on positive people, can do attitude? Not 8 clear and local governments assuming a coordinating role.

9 “It is crucial to interact with organisations and initiatives that emerged during 2015-2016. […] the 10 municipality should facilitate a network of spontaneous interactions. There are a lot of 11 organisations which try to help refugees, but which do not have all the information and 12 connection they require […] Currently, if you ask a question to three different stakeholders, you 13 get three different answers.” Rep.2.

14 Coordinating logistical information between stakeholder and refugees appeared as the main concern 15 between the different actors. The narratives of the respondents show that they have observed and 16 experiences different challenges during the crisis, circumstantial and inter-organizational. The 17 respondents define their roles by focusing on what could have been done better and how. Their reflexivity 18 about their own performance elements during the crisis and lack of judgement of the other stakeholders 19 denote a clear understanding of their own roles and those of their counterparts.

20 4.2.6 Change in priorities?

21 What was defined as refugee crisis, was an opportunity to bring unexpected actors together. However, 22 while in June 2017 individuals from GO were more open to discuss what they experience during the crisis 23 were, by November, our second meeting, it was more difficult to attract them to talk specifically about it, 24 this was confirmed in January 2018 when none of the official organizations which had taken part of the 25 round tables was willing to be interviewed. Interesting enough, many of the same organizations were still 26 willing to contribute with our activities regarding other issues, but not those framed within the refugee 27 crisis. It seems that this was the effect of a shift trust during the crisis, but not a long-term commitment. 28 As indicated in the methodology fragment of this paper based on the contact in our database, we selected 29 45 potential respondents, from civil society, they were established NGO’s, but also emergent bottom up 30 initiatives and state organizations. From this list, 15 did not react, 18 did not see enough connections 31 between their work and the potential interviews. A group of 12 individuals finally agreed to be

1 interviewed, however they were mainly emergent/bottom up social organizations.From a crisis 2 management point of view understanding civil society organizations could facilitate authorities with the 3 correct elements to leave the command and control approach to crisis and focus instead on coordination 4 and collaboration frames. (refusal)

5 The main findings of this explorative research were external or circumstantial and inter-organizational 6 factors. The first were related to the inability to anticipate the crisis and the slow reaction to instrument 7 cooperation and change in the perceived needs of the refugees that organizations have. The second group 8 of findings have to do with good intentions and obstacles, fragmented connections, the existing 9 approaches and human resources giving shape to it and policy agenda change. A final finding is 10 concerned with the research process and how the interest or engagement from the different stakeholders 11 has decreased with a year (June 2017 to March 2018). 12 13 5 Discussion & Conclusion (the following is just a draft based on the above and it has an indicative 14 purpose, apart from the theory and data I would like to connect it with social inclusion of SCO) 15 16 In this paper we draw on an empirical longitudinal study of the experiences and views of different 17 governmental, non-governmental and community actors, with an active role in Amsterdam between 2015 18 and 2017 and on literature about the governance of refugee reception and crisis governance. This 19 provided the opportunity to understand how far the ‘crisis’ offered a chance for stakeholders to achieve 20 new forms of collaboration and how far it, on the contrary, delayed/hampered the process of creating 21 durable forms of collaboration. The latter become a vital part of the crisis management and governance, 22 particularly considering the uncertainty of the dynamics of the crisis and changes to the relevant policies 23 at national and European level. Currently governmental and social organizations are conscious that the 24 situation regarding the arrival of refugees in Europe and the Netherlands might change at any time (COA, 25 2017, ACVZ, 2017). From a crisis management point of view understanding civil society organizations 26 could facilitate authorities with the correct elements to leave the command and control approach to crisis 27 and focus instead on coordination and collaboration frames. This could facilitate the interaction of 28 heterogeneous stakeholders while making the most of their human, social and logistical resources. The 29 answer to this relies on the adaptation of the top down organized refugee system to the dynamic local 30 conditions will create more opportunities for the development of more resilience in the crisis context. This 31 could be done by creating a “ready-to-activate” model of cooperation between civil society and 32 governmental organizations (Scholtens, 2008). 33

1 Considering the importance of governmental and civil society organizations in the refugee reception in 2 the Netherlands, their collaboration should be facilitated during crisis and non-crisis periods. During a 3 crisis period a collaboration governance would facilitate the understanding and when possible the 4 incorporation of the role and dynamics of social organizations during current and future crises. During 5 non-crisis periods, collaborative governance appears as the possible solution to originate spaces of 6 collaboration on a long-term basis. Adapting the top down organized refugee system to the dynamic local 7 conditions will create opportunities for the development of social and organizational resilience, not only 8 in the crisis context, but also during non-crisis periods. This was observed during the period before the 9 Refugee Crisis. If governmental organizations leave the top down command and control approach and as 10 an alternative look for collaboration with civic society initiatives, the reception of refugees will be much 11 more effective and humane. However, considering the shift in the level of engagement by organizational 12 actors, between the first meeting organized about the topic in June 2017 and the access to the interviews 13 that we carried in March 2018, appears as concerning point. It seems that this was the effect of a shift 14 trust during the crisis, but not a long term or more sustainable commitment. 15 16 This exploratory research shows that there are opportunities for collaboration among different 17 stakeholders, aiming at policy changes or best practices advice. It is important to evaluate whether the 18 current social and political circumstances enable these organizations to work together during non-critical 19 periods and to be ready for any possible dramatic changes in the refugee influx. They will provide a less 20 institutionalized refugee reception that would not only honour the mandate enshrined in the laws that 21 frame official organizations3 but produce the right conditions for effective integration of refugees in 22 Dutch society. (Needs further elaboration and consideration)

24 Acknowledgements; Prof. Dr Arjen Boin. 25 26 Conflict of Interests; The authors declare no conflict of interests.

29 30

3 (U-Reception Directive and the Regulation(s) for the Provisions for Asylum Seekers )

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