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Map Nibil, Zahra 17 Jan.Pdf Syrian Arab Republic: Hard-to-Access Areas - Aleppo (as of 15 January 2014) INTERNAL ONLY OCHA Qarzihel Abin - ') !"!" '; Efrin Ein Dara Kafr Ghoz Noman Elward Shdud Baselhaya !" Afrin (Kurdish PYD-Controlled Enclave): IF (Salah IF (Tawheed) al-Din Dweir !" Deir Brigade) Elhawa Jmal Nabul and Zahra: Teltana 100,000 People Hard to Reach IF (Tawheed) Alsayed Ali IF (Tawheed) Oqayba r! Bseileh !" Samuqet Tweis IF (Tawheed) Airports Checkpoints Zahrat IF (Tawheed) Basuta Aazaz Sheikh Sosyan Abla '; Elhayat '; 45,000Kafr Naseh People BesiegedHarbal !" Elwan Islamic Front (Tawheed Brigade, Ahrar Tal Refaat Eskar Gov-Opp Nationalist Ziyara IF (Tawheed) !" Kimar IF (Tawheed) !" ') '; '; Afrin Kafir !" Saed - al-Sham, Sujur al-Sham), ISIS IF, MA Kafrnaya Clashes Islamist Besieged by opposition forces, includinMaratetg Hissiyeh Qlsroj Tal !" Um Hosh IF (Tawheed) Madeeq Burj !"!" Kafin IF (Salah Local '; Abdallah IF (Salah !" ISIS-AoG FSA al-Din Hazwan ') al-Din Brigade) !" '; Islamic FrontBrigade) (Tawheed Brigade, Ahrar Al-Sham, Waqqah Clashes '; ISIS/JaN Ahras Masqan Hosniyeh Mayasa !" - Hsajek '; Nabul IF (Tawheed, Mujahadeen!" Army (Nour El-Din Zenki, Fajr al-Islam), Opp. Sniper '; Fajr al-Islam) IF (Tawheed) '; PYD Mayer Syrian Revolutionaries Front (Local FSA) Taanah Brad Fire Maarset IF (Tawheed) !" Zahraa';!" Elkhan Government Wahshiyeh Qaramel '; Nabul '; Ahrar Positions of Telqraq !" Nayrabiyeh Forces Burj !" Souria IF (Tawheed) Shaala Elqas Nabul Hardatnin !" Armed Actors '; SAA Health Facilities '; Zahraa !" Qemmet '; Tal Baee Daghelbash Government !" IF (Tawheed), MA Ahrar Jbine Um Elamad IF (Tawheed) !" H Field Hospital (Noor al-Deen Souria !" Elbab Forces IF (Tawheed), MA '; al-Zengi Brigade), SRF Fafin Retyan Sheikh Burj (Noor al-Deen al-Zengi Byanun ISIS Kif Tal H Hospital Haydar Big !" Rahhal Basufan Brigade),'; SRF '; !" Maratet !" FSA Zawraq !"!" Elmosalamiyeh '; Territorial Control !"!" Nationalist '; ';Kabashin Bashkwi Samaan IF (Tawheed), MA IF (Tawheed) Islamist (E.g. Contested '; (Noor al-Deen Hayyan !" Ahrar Tal Sheer Fafertein al-Zengi Brigade), SRF ISIS !" Souria '; IF (Tawheed) Simaan Islamic Front) Government Tamura '; !" !" IF (Tawheed) !" ISIS and IF !"!" Musallamiyeh Bashmra (Tawheed) ISIS/JaN Forces Deir Qaq !" !" Ahrar Ahrar ') SAA !"!" IF (Sukur al-Sham, Souria al-Sham and PYD Hard to Little !" Ahrar al-Sham), Kafrantin Tawheed Andan '; !" '; Kafr Access MA (Noor al-Deen H!" ') Haritan ') Hilan Non-Affiliated Muqbia Daret al-Zengi Brigade) ISIS !" Big IF (Tawheed) Azza IF (Tawheed) Sarja Local/Tribal Armed H and Ahrar ';Haritan !" !"!" ISIS !" Daret Souria IF (Tawheed) H !" Opposition IF (Sukur al-Sham, Kafr Mran Armed Groups Azza Bssin and Ahrar Sh Ahrar al-Sham), Souria !" eikh Qabtan Yaqed Naj IF (Tawheed) Groups MA (Noor al-Deen !"!" IF (Tawheed) Indu ar ') Eljabal Eladas strial Suran Pro-Gov al-Zengi Brigade) IF (Tawheed) H City !"!" ') '; Sheikh !" !" Besieged Area Maaret !" Zayat Militias !" Ahrar Kafr Barhalin Local Ahrar Elartiq Hamra !"!" Souria'; '; ISIS IF (Tawheed) ') Souria !" !" Shamer IF: Islamic Front !" !"PYD !" Shuhada H IF (Tawheed IF (Tawheed ISIS MA: Mujahadeen Army Badr and Ahrar and Ahrar '; ')'; Baath !" !" Shuhada al-Sham), MA al-Sham) Aabad Hur Sein SRF: Syria Revolutionaries Front !" Brigades Baath Badr Local '; '; !" Afrin '; Baath Brigades !" Bshantara ';H !" Baath H !"!"H !" Anjara Brigades !" !" ') !" !" H ';Baath HHBrigades Tell Sheikh Local H '; '; BrigadesH!"Baath H Yousef SAA Jeb H H H '; '; Ghabsheh !" ';H!" HBrigades H ';!" Position Majbineh H';HH !" H HCitadel SAA H Sifa Map Doc Name: SYR_1101_Overview_A4L_Aleppo_131215 HH Fah ISIS IF (Tawheed Tiyara Arhab Bsartun Bishqatine Position ') ISIS !" !"!"';Aleppo ';!" !" and Ahrar Creation Date: 16 Jan 2014 Tqad ';';H MA'; IF, MA'; !"!" Tiba ';H '; '; H IF (Tawheed) al-Sham) !" Projection Datum: GCS WGS 1984 !" Hoteh '; H Elesm !" !" H'; ';'; Aleppo'1; and Local FSA Units: Degree '; 'MA; !" !" !" H !" '; !"!"!"!" H !" Local Local MA !" '; H '; H Zaalana Um Elamad Baath !" Alsafira Shuhada Oweijel ';MA H r! Local 0 4 8 !" Shuhada IF and SRF (Tawheed, !"!"!" !" '; H IF (Ahrar Brigades Tal Alam !" km Atareb, Atareb, Farouk, Liwa al-Haqq, !" IF (Tawheed !" !" al-Sham Local Local Kafr Shuhada Atareb'; and JaN) '; !"!" and Ahrar ´ Naha ') Abzemo Tadil Local Tawheed), MA al-Sham) !" !"!" '; '; IF (Tawheed !" !" !" Kabara and Ahrar Balat Baydura Radwaniyeh Map Data Source(s): Kafr Shuhada !" !"!" !" H !" !" al-Sham) The data for this map has a limited number of sources, including Taal Atareb, Rayan Local Local !" !" parties to the conflict. The data has not been independently verified Kafr !" Big Orm by third party and is subject to error or omission, deliberate or Amma !" Tal otherwise by various sources. Due to fluidity of the conflict, control Shuhada Ein Tal Hasel Atareb, !" Sabel status is likely to change. !" Little SAA Thabiyeh Shgheib Local SAA Tal Orm !" Hreibel '; Establ !" !" Disclaimer: Saqlaya Ahrar SAA Tal Aran The boundaries, areas, and names shown and the designations al-Sham used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance. ISIS and IF Western Khantuman !" Hweijeineh Kafr Jum !" Abu Ahrar Sfeita Ahrar al-Sham !" SAA 'Terkan; Sheikh al-Sham Wdeihi Haddadin Ali Local Tal Abur Qarras !" !" Groups and !" Tribes Htani Esan Arada !"'; Local Hmeira As-Safira Groups and Tribes As-Safira Kafr Zarbah Aleppo Zarbah!" Al-Sfeire Military Qanater Zeitan Production Ein Facilities Assan Qamari Abtin !" Sadaaya Bashkwi Safira Barqum Berna Diman Kassibeh Sfira Deir Jalaghim Saliba Um Jern Bawabiyeh Elsafira Rasm !" Elsafa Ballas Local Ziraa 02 4 8 Kilometers Groups and Mamimeh Tribes.
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