Crossing the Boundary Into the Russian “Imagined Community?”

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Crossing the Boundary into the Russian “Imagined Community?”

“Language”, “Culture” and “Religion” in Russian Media Discourse on the Integration of Immigrants

Christine Myrdal Lukash

Dissertation for the Degree of PhD Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages University of Oslo

March, 2019

Supervised by Professor Pål Kolstø (University of Oslo) and Associate Professor Andreja Vezovnik (University of Ljubljana)

Notes on Transliteration

I have mainly relied on the Library of Congress Russian Romanization table, which can be accessed from https://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/russian.pdf I have chosen not to transcribe hard sign. I have transcribed soft sign, except for names that are commonly transcribed without it, such as “Eltsin.” I transcribe “ё” as “e”. With regard to names of places or indigenous peoples, I have transcribed these in the way they commonly appear in English language sources, for example “Biryulyovo,” instead of “Biriulёvo.”

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List of Abbreviations

CPRF Communist Party of the Russian Federation

DPNI Movement against Illegal Immigration

FADN Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs

FMS Federal Migration Service

KP Komsomol’skaia Pravda

LDPR Russia’s Liberal Democratic Party

MK Moskovskii Komsomolets

NEORUSS Nation-Building and Nationalism in Today’s Russia

RG Rossiiskaia Gazeta

ROC Russian Orthodox Church

Rosstat Russian Federal State Statistics Service

RSFSR Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

SPCH President’s Council on the Development of Civic Society and Human Rights

2019

Crossing the Boundary into the Russian “Imagined Community?” Language, Culture and Religion in Russian Media Discourse on the Integration of Immigrants.

Christine Myrdal Lukash http://www.duo.uio.no/

Print: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo

Abstract

The thesis studies how Russian national identity is negotiated in a hitherto little-explored segment of Russian public discourse: how the Russian “imagined community” is represented in print media discourse on the integration of immigrants. Second, I ask to what extent the images produced in the media correspond with the images of the Russian community conveyed in presidential discourse in the period 2000 up to 2015.

I adopt a discourse-based perspective on Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth’s idea of how group identities are maintained and reproduced as a result of perceptions of a boundary between them. I approach the research questions by investigating how the three diacritical markers “language”, “culture” and “religion” function as boundaries of the Russian “imagined community.” The study shows how the three diacritical markers contribute to produce a variety of images of the Russian community. Yet, the most dominant image is characterized by internal uniformity and a culture that can be expanded to include immigrants.

Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Professor Pål Kolstø at the University of Oslo, for his patience and thought-provoking comments throughout the long process of writing this thesis, not to mention my BA and MA theses. I also express my gratitude to my co-supervisor, Associate Professor Andreja Vezovnik at the University of Ljubljana, for advising me on discourse theory and discourse analysis. I am also sincerely grateful to Professor Vera Tolz, at the University of Manchester, who served as a discussant for my mid-term review. I also wish to thank my committee members Eleanor Knott and Peter Rutland for their constructive comments on the first version of my thesis.

My special thanks go to Professor Ljiljana Šarić for contributing to an inspiring academic and great social environment among the members of the “ILOS Area Studies Group.”

I would like to thank Tina Skouen for taking up the position as PhD coordinator at ILOS. Your advice on how to survive at UiO has been invaluable.

A great thanks to research coordinators Jon Anstein Olsen and Silje Mosgren for being so willing to my questions regarding practical issues.

To Marthe for being such a wonderful kontorkamerat.

To Egle for all the cups of tea and chocolates .

I am also indebted to my two copy editors: Susan Høivik for invaluable corrections, useful advice and encouragements, as well as updates from Sollihøgda and Italy, and Nicole Gallicchio for pointing to all my inconsistencies and advising me on how to weed them out.

This author is fully responsible for any inaccuracies or mistakes.

Now, to all of those who really and truly mean something. Mum, Dad, Håkon, Line, and Marius for great walks during weekends. All my good neighbors in Stjerneblokkveien who made me never forget that there is a world beynd academia. To Rehan for running the world’s best supermarket. To Beta, Milla, Akka, Katrine and those of you taking care of the “big children” who have smiled at me every morning. All employees at Furuset Elementary School and Activity School Camp who are there for us every day. To the majority in-group among Oslo’s inhabitants—that is, those who live in Groruddalen. To the owner of the café at VII

Furuset Bibliotek og Aktivitetshus, who makes the best coffee in the world. To those with whom I have shared study rooms at Furuset: keep up the good work! To the Night Ravens who are there when you end your work day at 11pm. To Kjersti for showing up for morning coffee at 7:30 in the morning on a Saturday.

To my new colleagues at VID and my neighbors and hopefully future friends in Stavanger. I am speechless with gratitude for your warm welcome and generosity in what has truly been a hectic period of my life.

Last, but not least: to Mitja and BBB for always being there. I look forward to spending more time with you. Home is wherever you are.

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Table of Contents

1 Chapter I Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Research Question ...... 1 1.2 Theory Framework ...... 2 1.3 Empirical Material ...... 3 1.4 Underlying Rationale and Main Contribution of the Study ...... 5 1.5 Literature Review ...... 7 1.6 Empirical Backdrop ...... 10 1.6.1 Migration ...... 10 1.6.2 “Compatriots” ...... 14 1.6.3 Integration of Immigrants ...... 15 1.6.4 The Role of the Other in Russian Identity Formation ...... 18 1.6.5 Summing Up ...... 21 1.7 Research Context ...... 22 1.7.1 Civic and Ethnic in the Russian Context ...... 22 1.7.2 Russkii and Rossiiskii ...... 23 1.7.3 Images of the Russian Community ...... 25 1.7.4 Ideal-Type Models of Integration ...... 28 1.7.5 Integration in the Russian Language ...... 30 1.8 The Diacritical Markers ...... 31 1.8.1 Language ...... 32 1.8.2 Culture ...... 34 1.8.3 Religion ...... 36 1.9 Thesis Outline ...... 37 1.9.1 Chapter II Theory Framework ...... 37 1.9.2 Chapter III Research Methodology ...... 38 1.9.3 Chapter IV Presidential Discourse ...... 38 1.10 Media Discourse Chapters ...... 38 1.10.1 Chapter V “Language” ...... 38 1.10.2 Chapter VI “Culture” ...... 39 1.10.3 Chapter VII “Religion” ...... 40 1.10.4 Chapter VIII Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research ...... 40

2 Chapter II Theory Framework ...... 41 2.1 Introduction ...... 41 2.2 Representations ...... 41 2.2.1 The Nation as Represented in Discourse ...... 41 2.3 Identity and Boundaries ...... 43 2.4 Discourse ...... 48 2.4.1 Structuralism ...... 50 2.4.2 Post-structuralism ...... 51 2.5 The Media ...... 51 2.6 Summing Up ...... 52 3 Chapter III Methodology ...... 53 3.1 Introduction: Collection of Empirical Material and a Discourse-Based Approach ... 53 3.2 Types of Empirical Material ...... 53 3.2.1 Newspaper Articles ...... 57 3.2.2 Overview of the Newspapers ...... 58 3.2.3 Collecting Newspaper Articles Step by Step ...... 62 3.3 A Discourse-Based Approach ...... 66 3.3.1 Order of Discourse and (Floating) Signifiers ...... 67 3.3.2 “Critical Discourse Moments” and Nodal Points ...... 68 3.4 Methodological Challenges ...... 69 3.4.1 Newspapers ...... 70 3.4.2 The Three Diacritical Markers ...... 71 3.4.3 Russian Terminology and the Researcher’s Lexical Choices ...... 72 3.5 Summing Up ...... 75 4 Chapter IV Presidential Discourse: the Official Image of the Russian Community ...... 77 4.1 Introduction ...... 77 4.2 Point of Departure: Vladimir Putin’s “Millennium Manifesto” ...... 78 4.2.1 The Russian Idea ...... 79 4.3 Patriotism ...... 81 The Diacritical Markers ...... 85 4.4 “Language” ...... 85 4.4.1 Nodal Point 1: The Russian “Imagined Community” as Stretching beyond the Russian Federation ...... 85

4.4.2 Nodal Point 2: The Russian “Imagined Community” as the Russian Federation 89 4.4.3 Summing Up ...... 92 4.5 “Culture” ...... 93 4.5.1 Nodal Point 1: “Culture” in the Singular ...... 93 4.5.2 “Cultures” in the Plural ...... 100 4.6 “Religion” ...... 106 4.6.1 Nodal Point 1: Religious Diversity ...... 106 4.6.2 Nodal Point 2: Religious Unity ...... 109 4.6.3 Summing Up ...... 113 4.7 Conclusions to Chapter IV ...... 113 5 Chapter V “Language” ...... 117 5.1 Introduction ...... 117 5.2 Nodal Point 1: The Soviet Past ...... 118 5.2.1 The Bygone Soviet Past ...... 123 5.2.2 A Solution of Former Colonial Empires: Prior Integration ...... 126 5.3 Summary and Discussion ...... 128 5.4 Nodal Point 2: Children of Migrants in the School System ...... 129 5.4.1 New Generations: Russia’s Future In-Group Members? ...... 129 5.4.2 Ambiguous Boundaries ...... 133 5.4.3 Immutable Boundaries ...... 138 5.5 Touching Upon the Unsayable: Who Does Not Want to Become Integrated? ...... 143 5.6 Summary and Discussion ...... 144 5.7 Comparison with Presidential Discourse ...... 145 6 Chapter VI “Culture” ...... 149 6.1 Introduction ...... 149 6.2 Nodal point 1: “Culture” in the Singular ...... 149 6.2.1 First Mode of Change: Change in Membership, Russian Culture as Constant 150 6.2.2 Second Mode of Change: Russian Culture as Open to Changes ...... 153 6.2.3 Third Mode of Change: Individuals as Open to Changes ...... 155 6.2.4 Migrants’ Otherness ...... 158 6.3 Summing up and Discussion ...... 161 6.4 Nodal Point 2: “Cultures” in the Plural ...... 162

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6.4.1 Multiculturalism ...... 162 6.4.2 Russia’s Own Multiculturalism ...... 166 6.4.3 “Melting Pot” Assimilation ...... 172 6.5 Summing up and Discussion ...... 176 6.6 Comparison with Official Discourse ...... 178 7 Chapter VII “Religion” ...... 181 7.1 Introduction ...... 181 7.2 Orthodoxy: A Russian is Russian Orthodox and/or a Russian Orthodox is Russian? 182 7.3 Overarching Nodal Point: What Common Ground for Integration—for Whom? ... 183 7.4 Summing Up ...... 195 7.5 Islam ...... 196 7.6 Summing Up ...... 204 7.7 Comparison with Presidential Discourse ...... 204 7.8 Discussion and Conclusions to Chapter VII ...... 205 8 Chapter VIII Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research ...... 209 8.1 Summaries of Main Findings in the Empirical Chapters ...... 210 8.2 Chapter IV: Presidential Discourse ...... 210 8.3 Chapters V, VI and VII: “Language,” “Culture,” and “Religion” in the Media Discourse ...... 213 8.3.1 “Language” ...... 213 8.3.2 “Culture” ...... 213 8.3.3 “Religion” ...... 214 8.4 The Dominant Image of the Russian Community in the Media Discourse ...... 215 8.5 Impacts on Other Fields and Suggestions for Further Research ...... 217 8.5.1 Suggestions for Further Research ...... 218 Literature ...... 221 8.6 Primary Sources ...... 231 8.6.1 Newspaper Articles ...... 231 8.6.2 Presidential Addresses and Articles ...... 236 Appendix ...... 241

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List of Tables

Table 1 Print Run and Numbers of Unique Visitors on Websites..…………………..60 Table 2: Distribution of Articles Between Newspapers………………………………63

Table 3: Number of Articles Per Year in the Period 2000–2015……………………..64

Table 4: Distribution of Critical Discourse Moments in Time and Between Newspapers…………………………………………………………………………...65

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1 Chapter I Introduction

1.1 Research Question

This thesis is ultimately concerned with a question that has featured in Russian public discourse for centuries: how do Russians understand what the Russian “imagined community” is? The dissolution of the Soviet Union reinvigorated the quest to solve this riddle of the Russian national idea. In his 2007 Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin referred to the search for a Russian national idea as an “old tradition, a favorite pastime.” Today, well over 25 years into post-Soviet times, this search persists, but the underlying conditions have changed dramatically since the dawn of the post-Soviet era in the early 1990s. In his 2007 address, Putin also referred to national identity as a work in progress (Putin April 26, 2007; see also Blakkisrud 2016: 266). That constitutes the point of departure for this research project. My intention is to study how this work in progress unfolds in a little- explored segment of Russian public discourse. I explore how the Russian “imagined community” is represented in Russian media discourse on the integration of immigrants.

I ask the following two main research questions:

1) How has the Russian national community been represented in Russian print media discourse on the integration of immigrants from 2000 and up to 2015?

2) To what extent does this “image” of the Russian community correspond with that conveyed in presidential discourse during the same period?

I approach these research questions by investigating how certain distinctive features—or diacritical markers—function either as boundaries between the members of the Russian in- group and members of out-groups or as a common ground for the integration of immigrants (see Barth 1969, 1994, 2000; see also Brubaker 2013). In turn, insights concerning the boundary between the Russian in-group community and its out-groups can make it possible to identify core characteristics of the Russian in-group as an “imagined community” (see Anderson 1991).

The question “how do Russians see Russia?” encompasses the questions “who belongs to Russia?”, or “who are the members of the Russian community?” Approaching this question from the perspective of the integration of immigrants leads to a question of relevance also beyond Russia: “who can become members of the in-group community?”, or “who can cross its boundaries and become integrated?” Close examination of these questions should yield important findings pertaining to self-perceptions about Russian national identity today— precisely where this study seeks to contribute to the literature on Russian nationalism and Russian national identity.

Project Affiliation

This thesis is part of the project “Nation-Building and Nationalism in Today’s Russia” (NEORUSS), in which the overall aim is to investigate the “national question” in Russian discourse, and to determine to what extent Russian national identity is shifting away from an imperial (and implicitly multiethnic) understanding of the nation and towards an ethnic and exclusive one. The NEORUSS project addresses the following four key issues, all related to the development of Russian nationalism:

1) changes in political signals, as well as the state’s actual policies 2) the nationality issue among the opposition and political fringe groups 3) the role of the media 4) changes in the public mood

This thesis is situated within the scope of key issue number 3, the role of the media, which is narrowed down to Russian mainstream media. However, it is not a study of Russian media per se. What I offer is an in-depth study of how Russian national identity is represented in a specific discourse in Russian newspapers. Examining this discourse, I see print media as part of the Russian public sphere in which this discourse unfolds.

1.2 Theory Framework

On the theoretical level, this study approaches the issue of Russian identity by adopting a discourse-based perspective on insights about group identity that originate in anthropological

2 studies. A key concept here is Barth’s (1969, 1994, 2000) idea regarding how group identities can be maintained and reproduced. To Barth (1969), identity construction takes place by accentuating how a group differs from other groups, by constructing a boundary between the in-group and those who are considered to be out-group members (see also Kolstø 2009: 16). On the one side of the boundary, we find the Russian “in-group community.” To quote Anderson’s (1991: 6–7) seminal formulation, we may see this community as an “imagined community.” It is a representation. What brings together Barth’s idea of a boundary and the representation of the Russian community is discourse (Kolstø 2009: 17; Neumann 1999).

According to Barth (1994: 16), “An imagined community is promoted by making a few […] diacritica1 highly salient and symbolic, that is, by an active construction of a boundary.” In this thesis, I identify three diacritical markers that appear in both official and media discourse: “language,” “culture” and “religion.” My main reason for choosing precisely these diacritical markers is their presence in both types of discourse. In the statements to the media, they are present in what I will term “critical discourse moments” (Chilton 1997: 12; Gamson 1992: 26). These are statements when the diacritical markers particularly visibly construct the boundaries of the Russian in-group community. Brubaker (2013: 3) identifies language and religion as “arguably the two most socially and politically consequential domains of cultural difference in the modern world.” However, the inclusion of “culture” among my diacritical markers cannot be justified in the same way. As Brubaker writes, culture encompasses both language and religion. The reason I include it as a separate diacritical marker is that it clearly functions as such in the empirical material. In this I follow Barth (1994: 12), who argued for a bottom-up approach to diacritical markers. It is not what the researcher sees as distinctive features of a given community that are relevant, but those that are invoked by members of the community themselves. In the current empirical material, “language,” “culture” and “religion” are the three diacritica that have been identified as most saliently being constructed as boundaries of the Russian community.

1.3 Empirical Material

On the empirical level, the study brings together two types of discourse on the Russian nation and Russian national identity. My material consists of textual sources. First, I draw on a

1 This Greek term that Barth used means “distinctive features.” I use “diacritica” interchangeably with “diacritical markers” throughout the thesis. 3 collection of presidential addresses and articles from 2000–2015. Most of these are the Russian presidents’ annual addresses to the Federal Assembly, followed by opening and concluding speeches to Russia’s Council for Interethnic Relations and the International Valdai Discussion Club. These texts also include Putin’s article “Russia: The National Question,” published in Nezavisimaia Gazeta (henceforth NG). Together, these sources constitute what I refer to as the “official” or “presidential discourse.”2 They all, in one way or the other, touch on the question of what Russia is, or what characterizes the Russian community.

The second type of sources are statements expressed in some of Russia’s most widely read newspapers in their coverage of the integration of immigrants. By “statements,” I here mean accounts by interviewees, journalists and columnists, and others who have expressed themselves to the media or authored texts published in the newspapers selected for this study. These statements constitute the “media discourse.” Here, it is important to note that media discourse differs from media coverage in going beyond journalistic coverage of the topic. I do not focus on editorial lines or journalistic framing of the news. What I examine is how the contributions to the discourse represent the Russian “imagined community” in the context of the integration of immigrants. I focus on how the Russian community is constructed in this discourse. From this focus on discourse, it follows that I see the publications included in this study as representing a segment of the Russian public sphere in which this discourse unfolds.

In this thesis, I adopt a multiperspectival approach to discourse (Jørgensen and Phillips 2012: 4). Hall (2007: 201, see also Jørgensen and Phillips 2012: 1) defines a discourse as “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about—i.e. a way of representing—a particular kind of knowledge about a topic.” In terms of methodology, I integrate selected elements of Jørgensen and Phillips’ (2012) conversion of discourse-theoretical concepts (i.e. Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Foucault 1972) into practical tools for analysis with the analysis of the statements as discourse. Addressing the three diacritical markers, I rely on an originally post-structuralist concept: nodal points, that is, themes that organize the discourse. By studying “critical discourse moments,” I focus on statements that can also be seen as challenging the limits of what is “sayable” in the current discourse (see Macgilchrist 2011: 11). As such, I am not concerned with mapping general tendencies of the discourse. In line with Macgilchrist (2011), I examine the specificities of each statement and how the

2 “Presidential” and “official” are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 4 representations of the Russian community produced by the statements relate to each other, and to those produced by the presidential discourse.

1.4 Underlying Rationale and Main Contribution of the Study

Why study representations of Russian national identity in discourses about the integration of immigrants? The main argument for presenting what might seem like just another study of the vague and often inconsistently used term “identity” is that—despite the abundance of existing studies—identity still matters (see Jenkins 2008). Its importance extends far beyond academic research. What we believe about who we are, and who we are not, is crucially important in everyday social interaction, although we may rarely be aware of this.

In the case of Russia, Hutchings and Tolz (2015: 1) pertinently note that their study of nation, ethnicity, and race on Russian television is ultimately concerned with the “conditions and prospects for statehood in Russia.” By the same token, a study that focuses on the topic of integration of immigrants is also concerned with Russia’s future: it concerns the various processes all aimed at incorporating new members into the Russian community. Thus, a study that approaches representations of the Russian community through the lens of perceptions about integration should ultimately be able to draw conclusions as to how Russians envisage their own society when this society is faced with prospective new members.

As Robarts (2008: 99) notes, the territory that once made up the Soviet Union has in post- Soviet times come to constitute one of the world’s principal migration regimes. As of 2013, Russia was the world’s second-largest migration recipient state (“International Migration” 2013). This makes studies dealing with migration and integration in Russia increasingly salient. Also relevant is the relatively recent shift in migration across the post-Soviet space from internal migration to international migration.

As time pushes the Soviet Union further back into the past, the cultural and linguistic influence of Russia across its territory decreases. Migrants formerly considered as fellow countrymen or recently having been such, are today increasingly perceived as ethnoculturally distant foreigners. At the same time, Russia in itself includes a considerable number of ethnic minorities, with those who identify as ethnic Russians making up approximately 80% (Kolstø 2016b: 35) of the total population. Thus, Russia constitutes an interesting case for a study of 5 how perceptions of its own ethnic composition play out in approaches to the integration of immigrants. While migration to Russia rarely features in the headlines of (Western) European media, migration to and the integration of immigrants in Europe attracts attention in Russian media. In turn, that connects this thesis with the historical debate on Russian identity, where Russia is compared and contrasted with the West (see Neumann 1996; Nistad 2004; Tolz 2001).

Located in-between the issue of post-Soviet international migration and Russia’s own ethnocultural diversity is the perception of Russia as having an “inner abroad”—the non- Russian republics of the North Caucasus (Kolstø 2016a: 4). As Russian citizens, people hailing from these republics should, theoretically at least, fall outside the discourse on the integration of immigrants. However, occasional mentions in the empirical material substantiate my argument that approaching Russian national identity as is done in this thesis provides a unique opportunity to uncover perceptions of Russia’s own diversity, or ideas as to who can be represented as Others, irrespective of formal citizenship.

Why has the topic of integration of immigrants in Russia remained underexplored? Part of the reason must be that there exists no comprehensive and consistent state program for integration in Russia. What I see as existing is an identifiable discourse on integration. Studying this discourse should make it possible to say something about how the idea of integrating migrants into Russian society resonates in Russia today—and it is relevant to the perennial search for a national idea in Russia. It is precisely this concern with a Russian national idea that has inspired the comparison of the two discourses in the thesis. Since the publication of Vladimir Putin’s (1999) “Millennium Manifesto,” statements that can be categorized as addressing Russia’s “national question” have recurred in presidential addresses and articles, under Putin as well as Medvedev. While I was collecting the empirical material, I identified the chosen diacritical markers as present in both types of discourses, and that inspired the element of comparison. However, I do not study these from the perspective of the possible effect of one type of discourse on another. No, I see the presidential discourse as a point of reference that exemplifies official representations of the Russian community. Against this backdrop, I study how images of the Russian community arise in the media discourse on this hitherto little- explored topic.

Thus, my study aims to contribute to the body of research on Russian national identity through the lens of discourses on the integration of immigrants. Within this frame, it sheds 6 light on the topics of migration and the integration of immigrants in Russia, while locating Russia as a case of interest within the larger academic field of migration studies. Close examination of contributions to the discourse on the integration of immigrants in Russia can provide insights relevant to other migrant-recipient countries as well.

1.5 Literature Review

As noted, this thesis is intended as a contribution to the literature on Russian nationalism and Russian national identity—specifically to the integration of immigrants as reflected in the Russian public sphere. Focusing on the integration of immigrants, it also relates to the issue of migration more broadly.

The scholarly literature on Russian nationalism and national identity that concerns migration can be divided into three groups. The one group consists of studies focused on overt forms of racism and/or xenophobia (Leonova 2010; Shnirelman 2010). A second group deals with attitudes towards migrants, as expressed in statistical surveys and otherwise (Alexseev 2010, 2015; Alexseev and Hale 2016; Kosmarskaya 2016). The present work can be categorized within the third group: studies that analyze the media. This body of literature is small but growing. As Hutchings and Tolz (2015) point out, many contributions here have been studies of Russian print media or the Internet available in the Russian language, or shorter journal articles focused on specific incidents or single issues. Within this third general group, we find studies dealing with racism and xenophobia in the Russian media. There are articles and more comprehensive volumes, in both English and Russian (Iarskaia 2012; Shnirel’man 2007; Svirina 2007).

Some studies of media representations of migrants employ content analysis, like Vera Mal’kova’s (2007) volume on representations in local newspapers of Moscow as a multiethnic city. Mal’kova found that the largest Moscow newspapers generally promote a Moscow regional identity and an atmosphere of peace and interethnic cohesion (Mal'kova 2007: 238). Employing a similar methodology, Schenk (2012) has studied representations of migrants and migration in local Stavropol’ newspapers, focusing on the coverage of events that started with a large street fight that resulted in the death of a Chechen student in 2007. Among her conclusions is that by allowing oligarch-owned papers to print ethnically charged

7 content, the Kremlin is showing tacit approval of these messages (Schenk 2012: 796).

A study of Russian media representations of migrants that does not directly link the findings to the national question in Russia is Titov’s (2004) article on how several major national newspapers construct migrants as “ethnic” migrants. This happens by implying that specific groups of people possess certain psychological and behavioral characteristics. According to Titov, this results in descriptions of migrants as either positive or negative. With the latter, newspapers characterize migrants by emphasizing features that evoke exclusively negative emotions from the reader, like fear or disgust. By contrast, when portraying migrants in positive terms, the journalist relates empathically to the individual migrant’s struggle to earn a living under difficult conditions (Titov 2004).

Some studies have assessed the link between migration and the national question or Russian national identity. Rybina (2014) employs critical discourse analysis to study representations of migrants in two Russian newspapers, Rossiiskaia Gazeta (RG) and Novaia Gazeta. She categorizes her empirical material in terms of four overarching themes: migration policy, the authorities, migration, and the national question (Rybina 2014: 41–42). Concerning the national question, Rybina finds that the issues of migrants and illegal migration are closely associated with both the national question and with tensions among the various ethnic groups residing in Russia—in particular, relations between ethnic Russians and North Caucasians (Rybina 2014: 52, 58). Davis and Sosnovskaya (2009) examine representations of otherness as a counterpoint to Russian national identity in the coverage of immigration in Russia’s four largest-circulation newspapers between January 1 and June 30, 2005, focusing on what attitudes these papers display towards immigrants.

Recent contributions on migrants and national identity construction in Russian media include those by Hutchings and Tolz (2012, 2015, 2016) and Tolz and Harding (2015). These thoroughly analyze the role of the state-aligned television in representing and forming perceptions of national identity in Russia. Focusing on the period from 2010 onwards, they cover recent events such as the 2010 riots in Moscow’s Manezhnaia Square, the riots in the Biryulyovo district of Moscow in 2013, as well as the beginning of Putin’s third presidency in 2012. On the whole, these publications show that the discourse on ethnicity and nationhood conveyed by the state-aligned channels is neither coherent nor univocal, and may even be contradictory. Broadcasters tend to either overstate or to downplay the significance of 8 ethnicity issues (Hutchings and Tolz 2015). Further, state television reflects the Kremlin’s promotion of ethno-cultural diversity in Russia, while also communicating ethnonationalist- friendly viewpoints (Hutchings and Tolz 2012: 896 and 2016: 328; Tolz and Harding 2015: 476). Analyzing TV coverage of the 2010 Manezhnaia riots, Hutchings and Tolz (2012: 897– 898) suggest that media coverage reflects deep uncertainties about how to define the Russian post-Soviet national community.

A study that occupies a special position as a forerunner to this thesis is an article by Berg- Nordlie, Aasland and Tkach (2010): “Compatriots or Competitors? A Glance at Rossiyskaya Gazeta’s Immigration Debate 2004–2009.” The three authors find that RG connected migration primarily with problems in maintaining law and order, and with the issue of the Russian economy. As regards “law and order” the most frequently and thoroughly discussed topic was illegal migration, debated as a problem that needed to be solved. With regard to the economy, the RG articles tended to display a positive attitude to migrants, except for 2009, when the financial crisis hit Russia. Their study also found that the coverage on migration peaked in 2007, when new amendments to the legislative framework on migration entered into force.

Largely absent from the coverage was the issue of interethnic tensions. Berg-Nordlie, Aasland and Tkach (2010: 22) attribute this to RG’s position as an official newspaper. That might explain the tendency to avoid fueling interethnic tensions, and to aim at reflecting the Russian leadership’s official desire for stability.

At the other end of the continuum, Tolz (2017) has shown how race, religion, and nationhood played a prominent role in state-aligned television coverage of migration during part of Vladimir Putin’s third term in office. State-controlled broadcasters began to employ ethno- racial definitions of the nation. Their coverage systematically racialized Islam in particular— in one instance even invoking the theories of Soviet ethnologist, Lev Gumilev, known for his unorthodox theories of eurasianism and ethnogenesis (Tolz 2017: 6). In their coverage of Western Europe, broadcasters emphasized how large numbers of Moslem migrants were threatening Europe’s traditional Christian values (Tolz 2017: 7–8).

The differences in findings can be explained by reference to both the two different types of media sources and the differences in the periods covered. Still, given the radically different findings in Berg-Nordlie, Aasland and Tkach’s and Tolz’ studies we may ask: what is

9 articulated in the public space between these two extreme points? What is deemed permissible to express, in the public sphere, about the integration of immigrants in Russia today?

Whereas Tolz has studied media coverage, Berg-Nordlie, Aasland and Tkach focus on media discourse. That is also the point of departure for my study. As the intention is to contribute to the field of Russian nationalism and national identity, I have narrowed down the focus to an in-depth study of how the three diacritical markers function as boundaries of the Russian “imagined community” in the current discourse on the integration of immigrants.

1.6 Empirical Backdrop

1.6.1 Migration

As Robarts (2008: 99) notes, the territory that used to make up the Soviet Union now constitutes one of the world’s principal migration regimes. According to the UN report “International Migration 2013: Migrants by Origin and Destination,” Russia hosted the second largest number of migrants worldwide in 2013, surpassed only by the USA (“International Migration” 2013). The vast majority of immigrants to Russia arrive from those member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that enjoy visa-free regimes with Russia.

According to material available from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), the top migrant-sending countries in 2016 were Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Moldova, and Kyrgyzstan (Surinov 2017: 84–85). Rosstat registered that in 2016, 575,158 individuals registered as immigrants in Russia3 (Surinov 2017: 84–85). Of these, 511,773 arrived from CIS countries, of which 141,855 were from the three Central Asian republics of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Arrivals from the Slavic-speaking countries Ukraine and Belarus amounted to 192,864—the vast majority from Ukraine. The remaining 177,054 arrived from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Turkmenistan. With regard to other countries, China topped the statistics with 8027 registered migrants during the same period (Surinov 2017: 84–85). As Tetruashvily (2012: 62) explains, it is important to note that such figures show only the total number of foreigners who are

3 “Immigration” is here defined as registering as a migrant for a certain period of time. See Surinov 2017: 78 for an explanation to the figures. 10 registered. The actual number of migrants staying in Russia is impossible to ascertain, due to illegal crossings of the Russian border, and also because initially legal migrants who have overstayed their visas or work permits may simply go under the statistics radar. Estimates of the number of illegal migrants in Russia vary from a few million to ten million or more (Kolstø 2016b: 41).

Soviet and Early Post-Soviet Migration Trends

Migration has occurred for centuries within the territory that today makes up the Russian Federation (Kappeler 2001). Over the ages, migration currents have assumed differing directions, depending on various push and pull factors. During the post-WWII industrialization, internal Soviet migration currents went towards the Central Asian republics, with workers from other parts of the USSR arriving to work in newly established factories (Rybakovskii 2009: 304). Internal USSR migration also encompassed educational migration, army service, and forced labor migration.

Large-scale migration to the areas of what is Russia today got underway in the 1970s, when ethnic Russians began to leave non-Russian Union republics and settle in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) (Malakhov 2014: 1063). During the late 1980s, the same type of migration again occurred, but now due to violent ethnic conflicts. This flow of migrants, or displaced (first internally, then internationally) persons, continued into the 1990s, peaking in 1994, when 1,200,000 people crossed into the Russian Federation (Malakhov 2014: 1063). Most of these were ethnic Russians or ethnic groups that were targeted in their states of origin (Tetruashvily 2012: 54). Between 1992 and 2001, some 1.6 million out of a total of 2 million immigrants were granted refugee status in Russia (Zaionchkovskaia, Mkrtchian, and Tiuriukanova 2009: 54). A parallel development that occurred in the second half of the 1990s was that of labor immigration. In the mid-1990s, the vast majority of migrant laborers to Russia arrived primarily from the neighboring Slavic-speaking countries of Ukraine and Belarus.

Overall, in the period from 1991 to 2010, net immigration to Russia was 5,129,500, with approximately 80% arriving before the year 2000 (Vechkanov 2015: 37). During the same period, registered net out-migration amounted to 675,700 people (Vechkanov 2015: 38). Here, we should note that although registered net in-migration was considerably higher than

11 net out-migration, Russia experienced negative population growth during the same period, due to natural decline (Vechkanov 2015: 37).

Early Developments of a Legislative Framework in the Sphere of Migration

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia found itself without a legislative framework for regulating the steady streams of forced migrants from former Soviet states.

During the 1990s, the Russian legislative framework regarding migration consisted of laws regulating freedom of movement within the Russian Federation, laws on forced migrants, and the Law on Citizenship. It was not until 2002, when Federal Law No 115- FZ “On the Legal Position of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation” was passed, that Russia got its first law regulating “voluntary” migration. This law constitutes the basis of the current legislation on migration (Tetruashvily 2012: 55). The 2002 law was a response to what were seen as undesirable effects of the influx of refugees during the 1990s: informal sector activity, forced labor, human and drug trafficking, and corruption (Tetruashvily 2012: 54–55). The 2002 law imposed a strict regime for registration and the issuance of temporary resident permits and work permits.

Labor Migration and Liberalization

Over the next several years, Russia experienced a period characterized by economic growth as well as a contracting population. This meant a need for more imported labor, and here the 2002 law proved to be an obstacle. In 2007, a set of new amendments to the existing legal framework entered into force. The most profound change of relevance to labor migrants was that the responsibility for applying for and receiving a work permit was now shifted from the employer to the individual migrant (Tetruashvily 2012: 64). For the migrants, the amendments ensured greater freedom and security, as they no longer had to depend on their employers for a work permit: they could now switch jobs according to their own preferences. The amendments did not cause the actual number of migrants to Russia to increase, but more migrants now took the steps necessary to legalize their stay in Russia. Moreover, the composition of the migration currents had changed since the mid-1990s. Whereas the

12 majority had been coming from Ukraine and Belarus, by 2007 the main migrant-sending country was Uzbekistan, and the number of Tajik migrants was on the rise (Myhre 2012: 13).4

Tightening of the Migration Regime

As a result of the global financial crisis, in 2009, the Federal Migration Service issued a decree that largely reversed the more liberal 2007 regime. The most significant change involved stricter requirements for migrants to document that they had a labor contract if they wanted to prolong their stay in Russia (Tetruashvily 2012: 66). As many employers simply did not offer labor contracts to migrants, the result was that, initially, legal labor migrants became illegal migrants.

In 2010, Russian migration legislation began to differentiate between “foreign specialists” and other labor migrants. The former were defined according to salary levels, and were persons from countries without a visa-free agreement with Russia. As to the second category, CIS migrant laborers were now allowed to work legally for private individuals independent of the quota system, by obtaining a license called patent in Russian. In practice, the license system was similar to a system of advance payment of tax. Having applied for and obtained a patent, migrants could work for private individuals as long as they continued to pay the required patent fee. In 2014 alone, 2.4 million patents were issued. In 2015, the patent system was expanded to cover employment for entrepreneurs and companies (Chudinovskikh and Denisenko May 18, 2017). The number of patents indicates who were migrating to Russia at that time. Prior to the forced-migrant influx from Ukraine, more than 60% of those coming to Russia arrived from Central Asia: from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan (Streltsova 2014: 25).

Since January 1 2015, the duration of a migrant’s legal stay in Russia has been limited to a maximum of three months in the course of a six-month period. Labor migrants who overstay the three-month period will be fined and banned from entering Russia for the next three years (“Russia: Re-Entry Restrictions for Illegal Migrants” February 27, 2015; “On Amending…” 2014). Moreover, CIS residents—except for citizens of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan—are required to enter Russia on their external passports. And, in some regions,

4 After the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine in 2013, Ukrainian migration to Russia rose significantly, outnumbering the Central Asians (see, for example, Myhre 2017). 13 patent fees have risen to such high levels that they equal two months of a full year’s salary (Chudinovskikh and Denisenko May 18, 2017).

1.6.2 “Compatriots”

An important distinction as regards categories of migrants is between “compatriots” (sootechestvenniki) and “migrants.” “Compatriot” is a fuzzy category. When the Soviet Union broke apart, many ethnic Russians found themselves residing outside the Russian Federation. Russia’s first attempt to solve at least part of this problem was to introduce legal dual citizenship with other former Soviet republics (Shevel 2011: 192, Zevelev 2008). However, some of the former Soviet states with the largest proportion of ethnic Russian residents— Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—did not accept dual citizenship. As a result, Russia shifted its focus towards what had been designed as a supplement to the strategy of dual citizenship: the program called “Basic Directions of the Russian Federation’s State Policy Towards Compatriots Living Abroad” (Zevelev 2008).

In 1999, Russia adopted the Federal Law “On the State Policy of the Russian Federation Towards Compatriots Abroad.” This law defined “compatriots” as a) citizens of the Russian Federation living abroad; b) former citizens of the Soviet Union; or c) individuals who had emigrated from the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation, including their descendants. For those who were citizens of the Russian Federation, the law explicitly stated that self- identification as a compatriot was voluntary (“On the State Policy…” 1999, Art. 3).

In 2010, the law on compatriots was amended. From now on, non-Russian citizens belonging to peoples who had historically lived within the territory of the Russian Federation could also be included in the “compatriot” category on the basis of individual self-identification (“On Amending…” 2010: art. 1). Moreover, according to the 1999 version of the law, descendants of members of titular nations in foreign states were not recognized as compatriots. In the 2010 amended version, this provision was deleted. As a result, individuals who could be recognized as “compatriots” under the 2010 law comprised a larger and more diverse group than under the 1999 version. Recognition as a compatriot means entitlement to apply for resettlement in the Russian Federation through the Compatriots Program. In 2014, the Federal Migration Service announced that more than 200,000 individuals had been resettled in Russia through the Program (Myhre 2017: 696). After the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine in 2013, Russian-

14 speaking Ukrainian refugees constituted the majority of compatriots arriving in Russia (Myhre 2017: 691).

1.6.3 Integration of Immigrants

So far, there exists no federal-level programs or established policy measures for the integration of immigrants in Russia (Streltsova 2014: 28). President Putin raised the issue at a meeting of the Council for Interethnic Relations in October of 2016. He pointed out that Russia lacked sufficient legal norms, as well as organizational and economic instruments, to ensure the proper integration of immigrants. He also underscored the need for a federal agency (federal’nyi organ) with responsibility for this policy field (“Meeting of the Council…” October 31, 2016).

According to various news outlets, reports and other Internet sources, Russian efforts to integrate migrants have been fragmented, and depend on the capacity and willingness of local authorities or non-state actors. What could loosely be subsumed under the term “integration measures” exist mainly as legal requirements that migrants must fulfill to obtain residence or work permits, or as various courses in Russian language, history, and civics. However, these are not coordinated on the federal level and are not necessarily accessible to all migrants.

In 2012, the State Duma passed amendments to the laws “On the Legal Position of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation” and “On Education in the Russian Federation.” These required certain groups of foreigners to either produce sufficient documentation of their fluency in the Russian language or pass a language proficiency test in order to obtain a work permit. At the time, more than 160 test centers had been granted the right to conduct such tests (Streltsova 2014: 28).

In 2014, President Putin signed into law the Russian language, civics and history test given to migrants today. The test was drafted by the Ministry of Education and Science, but actual implementation was delegated to the regions. Thus, there is no uniform standard across the country as to costs and processing time (Ruget 2018: 25). The test is compulsory for migrants applying a work permit or a permanent residence permit. Exemptions can be granted to foreign specialists or citizens of countries belonging to the Eurasian Economic Union: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, citizens from areas where Russian has the status of state language may be exempted from the Russian-language portion of the

15 test (Ruget 2018: 25). Centers to help migrants prepare for the exam have been set up all across Russia. This does not mean, however, that they provide comprehensive courses in Russian language and civics.

In May of 2017, Russia’s Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs (federal’noe agentstvo po delam natsional’nostei, FADN) prepared the bill “On the Social and Cultural Adaptation and Integration of Foreign Citizens in Russia.” The bill calls for the establishment of adaptation centers for migrants, and requires that migrants prove successful adaptation in order to have their stay in Russia legalized (“On the Social…” 2017: art. 8, 9). Although the Bill was finally prepared by FADN in 2017, the first draft dates back to 2014, indicating the inertia that may attend the development of policies and measures in Russia.5

Information about organized integration measures in Russia is scarce. So far, research points to St. Petersburg as the most successful example of organized integration measures (Rozanova 2014: 62). In St. Petersburg, the integration of immigrants has been incorporated under the two state programs for tolerance, adopted in 2006 and 2011. But, as Rozanova (2014: 70) notes, the integration component of the 2011 program is not comprehensive, and there is no guarantee that it will prove effective. Concerning Moscow, various news reports tell of the establishment of centers of adaptation and integration of immigrants. However, these centers do not seem to be part of a coordinated effort to ensure the integration of immigrants in the capital. Rather, the situation in Moscow seems to reflect the general situation in Russia: responsibility for the actual organization of integration measures is shifted to non-state actors.

The Russian state has actively promoted the non-state sector’s involvement in the organization of integration measures. Both the 2012 Presidential Decree on the Strategy of the State Nationalities Policy and the explanatory note to the law “On the Social and Cultural Adaptation” call for cooperation with volunteer organizations to assist the state in providing integration measures (see “On the Strategy…” 2012: Art 17.d; “Explanatory Note…” 2014). In 2014, the Russian government introduced an amendment to the law “On Non-Commercial Organizations,” enabling organizations that dealt with adaptation and integration of

5 Note that the year 2017 lies outside the timeframe of this thesis. Information on the preparation of the Bill is included here because I see it as important background information. 16 immigrants to register and apply for state funding for their activities (“On Non-Commercial Organizations…” 1995: Art 31.3, pp 15).

Among the non-state actors actively involved in integration efforts are religious organizations. Information obtainable on the web indicates that these are mainly the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and various Moslem organizations. As yet, only the ROC’s cooperation with Russian authorities has been formalized on the federal level. In April 2013, Patriarch Kirill and Konstantin Romodanovskii, who headed the now-defunct Federal Migration Service, signed a five-year agreement on cooperation, “Enlightenment: Language and Cultural Adaptation of Migrants” (“Podpisano soglashenie…” 2013). Previously, the FMS and the ROC had cooperated on the local level. The territorial bodies of the Federal Migration Service of Russia had already signed 62 cooperation agreements with various ROC eparchies (dioceses) (Shimanskaya 2016: 131).

With Moslem organizations and individuals, their involvement has been ad hoc and difficult to obtain information about. Similar to the ROC, the FMS has also cooperated with Moslem organizations on the local level. By 2013, this amounted to 35 agreements (Shimanskaya 2016: 131). According to the websites www.islam.ru and www.dumrf.ru, various local initiatives exist, but they depend on whether migrants attend their local mosques (“Politika DUM Rossii po sotsiokul’turnoi adaptatsii migrantov” 2011). In 2011, the Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia, Ravil Gainutdin, explained to head of FMS Konstantin Romodanovskii that Moslem migrants tend to visit the mosques when they need help (“Politika DUM Rossii po sotsiokul’turnoi adaptatsii migrantov” 2011).

While the Moslem efforts are less well-known than those of the ROC, the Russian leadership has obviously endorsed the Moslems’ involvement. In 2011, President Medvedev expressed his gratitude to Russian muftis for their involvement in the sphere of integration, which he considered important in securing interreligious cohesion in Russia (“Dmitry Medvedev Met with the Muftis…” 2011). In the ensuing years, Putin reiterated Medvedev’s viewpoint when meeting with representatives of Russia’s religious associations (“Introduction to the Meeting…” 2013; “Meeting of the Council…” 2014).

To sum up, it is difficult to achieve a full overview of existing integration efforts in Russia. This is mainly due to it still being a non-existent policy field that can be about to emerge. This brings me back to my point that this study addresses the discourse about integration. In the

Russian context, “integration” is first and foremost part of “the ‘reality’ that is entertained by the speaker” (Chilton 2004: 154).

1.6.4 The Role of the Other in Russian Identity Formation

Kolstø (2016a: 5) points to xenophobes as singling out Moslem immigrants as the main Other in today’s Russia. In a historical perspective, the idea of an Other in the formation of Russian national identity has been recognized as relevant by scholars.

The West

Perhaps the most thorough account of Russia and its Others is Tolz’ (2001) analysis of the West and the East as historical Others in Russian identity construction. Comparison with the West has been the most important element in modern Russian identity, beginning, with the reforms of Peter the Great, who aimed at westernizing Russia (Tolz 2001: 69). Throughout the centuries, intellectual discussions and cultural expressions in Russia have involved comparison with the West, emphasizing both similarities and difference. Among the central contributors to the discussion were two groups of the Russian 19th century intelligentsia, the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. These differed in their beliefs as to whether Russia should admire the West and aim to follow it, or rely on what were seen as its own indigenous traditions.

After the 1917 revolution, Soviet images of the West became increasingly negative. In the interwar period, the USA replaced Western Europe as the geographical location of Russia’s constituent Other. After World War II, a mythologized memory of the Soviet victory became crucially important for uniting the Soviet people (Tolz 2001: 115). Soviet hostility towards the West increased during the early post-war years, due not least to the Soviet perception that the Western allies had deliberately delayed the opening of a second front during the war (Tolz 2001: 115). Later, intellectual discussions about Russia’s position in the world again centered on Russia’s relationship with the West. The writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was among those who adopted the position of the Slavophiles and advocated a special path of development for Russia. By contrast, those who argued that Russia should aim at getting closer to the West saw the nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov as their main spokesperson. Towards the end of the Soviet era, Mikhail Gorbachev became the most prominent figure to be associated with

18 pro-Western attitudes. He held that Russia had always culturally belonged to Europe and “Western civilization” (Tolz 2001: 122).

Following the dissolution of the USSR, President Boris Eltsin and his government pursued a policy of integration with West European institutions and closer relations with the USA: in order to ensure future development, Russia would have to make sure to be included in “the civilized world” (Tolz 2001: 125). The efforts of the Eltsin leadership were not always popular. Criticism came from both the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and Russia’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), as well as individuals within Eltsin’s own administration. The general public also displayed anti-Western feelings, directed mainly at the USA, not Europe (Tolz 2001: 130).

The East

As Tolz (2001: 132) points out, “Russia’s agonizing ambivalence over its relationship with the West has raised inevitably the question of its relationship with the East, the ‘Orient.’” In the context of the current thesis, the Asian parts of the former Soviet Union are particularly relevant as they are home to a large proportion of those migrating to Russia. In many respects, Russia’s relationship with the East features an ambivalence. The difference from the West is that “the East” has been seen as either areas that were already part of the Russian state, areas that Russia was in the process of conquering, or areas which were considered possible to conquer in the future (Tolz 2001: 134). In the 18th century, the Tatars from Kazan constituted Russia’s “Asians.” Historical images of the Tatar Mongol invasion stretched back to the 13th century.

In the first half of the 19th century, one region in particular came into focus as Russia’s Eastern Other: the Caucasus. Between 1801 and 1830, Russia annexed the territories of Transcaucasia. From the 1820s until the mid-1860s, Russia was engaged in war with the “mountain dwellers” of the North Caucasus (Tolz 2001: 137). In the sphere of literature, the Russian people were introduced to the Caucasus by Pushkin’s poem “The Prisoner of the Caucasus” and the poems of Lermontov—in both cases, these featured a predominately imperialistic attitude towards the people of the Caucasus (Tolz 2001: 137).

Russia’s next area of expansion was Central Asia. After the takeover was concluded in 1885, Russian intellectuals began to view the region as Russia’s new “Orient.” Later, Far Eastern

19 areas were annexed and came to serve as Russia’s “Orient,” though to a more limited extent than the Caucasus and Central Asia (see Tolz 2001: 139). With regard to relations with the West, these eastward expansions were promoted as evidence of Russia’s ability to carry out its civilizing mission in the East more efficiently than the Europeans (Tolz 2001: 140). Importantly, alongside the attitude of the “Eastern” peoples as needing to become “civilized,” the discourse also encompassed the view that Russia’s relationship with the East differed from that of Europe. Here, the conquered “Asias” were seen as part of Russia: and the peoples were seen as capable of achieving the same cultural and intellectual standards as that of European civilization (Tolz 2001: 141).

The general Russian attitude towards Asia changed little during the Soviet period. One point, however, deserves further attention. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the question of demography entered the discourse on Russian identity. The high birth-rates in Central Asia and the North Caucasus brought into the debate the argument that ethnic Slavs might find themselves outnumbered. As a result, some Russians came to see the “Moslem” as Russia’s main constituent Other against whom to construct Russian national identity (Tolz 2001: 148). This brings us to the final type of “Others” in the Russian context: Russia’s own internal Others.

Today’s Internal Others

According to statistics from the Levada Center (see “Intolerance and Xenophobia” 2017), the groups towards which Russians consistently displayed negative attitudes in the period between 2004 and 2017 were Caucasians and Central Asians, followed by the Chinese. Of these, the Caucasians consistently top the statistics as the group that most respondents held should be subject to restrictions regarding residency within the territory of the Russian Federation. These figures tell us that Russians’6 skepticism towards groups other than their own is expressed primarily as skepticism towards members of the country’s own citizenry. During the same period, a stable percentage of 35–40% among those surveyed expressed positive attitudes towards realization of the slogan “Russia for Russians”—if carried out “within acceptable limits” (see “Intolerance and Xenophobia” 2017). In 2005, a large-scale survey showed that Russians were inclined to over-estimate the numbers of certain ethnic groups in their home area to 2.5 times greater than the actual figures (Alexseev 2010: 171–

6 Note that the presentation of the survey does not contain information about whether the term “Russians” means Russian citizens or ethnic Russians. 20

173). Anti-immigrant sentiments are also reflected in the popularity of the formerly leading nationalist organization Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), which was banned after the riots in Moscow’s Manezhnaia Square in 2010 (see Kolstø 2016b: 34).

Since the turn of the millennium, Russia has witnessed a series of clashes among ethnic groups.7 In 2000, the killing of an ethnic Russian in the town of Kletskaya in the Volgograd region resulted in mass demonstrations and attacks on local Chechens. In 2000 and 2001, Azerbaijani and Chechen vendors were attacked at Moscow markets, resulting in four deaths and numerous injuries.

In 2002, fighting between Russians and Chechens occurred in the Kurgan region and the Yaroslav region. In Moscow, young men attacked several Armenian families and demanded of the authorities that they “cleanse” the city of non-Russians after a perpetrator of Armenian descent had stabbed a Russian man with a knife in a Moscow bar. In the city of Nalchik, the local population and Chechen students were involved in two large-scale fights in 2003, beginning with the beating of a local resident on a bus.

In 2006, local residents attacked Caucasian individuals in the town of Kondopoga in Karelia, resulting in a massive violent conflict. The same year, members of the nationalist group “The Savior” (“Spas”) detonated a bomb in Moscow’s largest marketplace.

In December 2010, thousands of people gathered on Manezhnaia Square in central Moscow to protest the death of a Russian football supporter, Egor Sviridov, who was killed during a fight with North Caucasians in Moscow. In 2013, massive riots broke out in the Moscow region of Biryulyovo, after a young ethnic Russian was stabbed to death by a perpetrator assumed to be of migrant origin. The police later arrested a man of Azerbaijani origin for the murder.

While this account is not exhaustive, it shows that alongside the influx of migrants to Russia, members of the Russian in-group community have displayed a steady level of skepticism towards members of certain groups. Such attitudes have also found expression in numerous violent conflicts between ethnic Russians and members of other groups.

1.6.5 Summing Up

7 A list of ethnic conflicts/clashes can be found on the following web page: http://www.pravdareport.com/history/10-10-2007/98545-ethnic_conflicts-0/. 21

Russia is one of the world’s principal migration regimes. The majority of immigrants to Russia arrive from other former Soviet countries. Russia’s first law on migration was adopted in 2002. Since then, new legislation has been passed, aiming to control (and often restrict) migration to Russia. Since approximately 2007, migration currents to Russia have changed. An increasing share of migrant laborers arrived from the non-Slavic republics in Central Asia. Integration efforts are a relatively recent phenomenon in Russia and policy is still lacking. Since 2004, Russians consistently displayed negative attitudes towards members of certain groups, among them the Caucasians. Moreover, since the turn of the millennium, Russia has witnessed a series of clashes among ethnic groups.

1.7 Research Context

1.7.1 Civic and Ethnic in the Russian Context

The two terms “civic” and “ethnic” occupy a special position in the literature on Russian nationalism. The civic/ethnic distinction gained currency in scholarly literature on Russian nationalism and other post-Soviet nationalisms after the dissolution of the USSR (Smith 2003: 75). Briefly put, the distinction between a civic and an ethnic understanding of the nation consists of whether national loyalties are seen as related to the territory and institutions of the state, or as defined by primordial ties.

A civic nation is usually defined in terms of either its citizenry or its common territory (Brubaker 1996: 46; Kolstø 2000: 2), or as “bound together by voluntary, shared allegiance to political principles and procedures” (Smith 2003: 74). The term “civic” often encompasses systems of democracy or popular government and free and equal self-governing citizens as well (Smith 2003: 74).

By contrast, an ethnic nation is seen as held together by features such as common language, tradition, culture, religion, and folklore, and is not necessarily co-existent with the citizenry of the state (Brubaker 1996: 44; Kolstø 2000: 2). In Eastern Europe, the idea of an ethnic nation gained prevalence as part of the oppositional struggle against the rulers of the former empires (Kolstø 2000: 2).

Assuming a critical perspective, Yack (1996) contends that both concepts are questionable in themselves. In making the claim that a certain nation is founded on purely civic principles, we tend to overlook that these principles are also loaded with inherited cultural content (Yack 1996: 196). Likewise, a definition of an ethnic nation must necessarily rest on the claim that the national community can be traced back to a distinct ethnic community—but such a definition overlooks the possibility of change in identification with the national community (Yack 1996: 202). Further, Goode and Stroup (2015: 719–20) argue that the persistence of the civic/ethnic distinction in the literature precludes the study of ethnic majority nationalism, as it shifts the focus towards ethnic minorities. On the other hand, as Barrington (2006: 12) points out, the civic/ethnic dichotomy is useful to the extent that it provides us with analytical leverage. According to Smith (2003: 77), scholars tend to agree that the labels “civic” and “ethnic” are more a matter of degree than two distinct categories separated by massive walls.

1.7.2 Russkii and Rossiiskii

Moving from analytical categories to language in use, the distinction between a civic and ethnic nation is often coupled with the two terms that designate “Russian”: russkii and rossiiskii. Conventionally, russkii is associated with an ethnic understanding of the nation, while rossiiskii designates loyalty by citizenship and thus encompasses all citizens of Russia, irrespective of ethnic identification.

Today, rossiiskii is most commonly associated with former president Boris Eltsin’s usage of it, accompanied by the noun rossiiane, which he employed to refer to all citizens of the Russian Federation. Yet, the terms rossiiskii and rossiiane can be traced back to the 18th century, as can the distinction between russkii and rossiiskii. As they were employed by Russian historian Nikolai Karamzin, russkii referred to customs and culture, while rossiiskii referred to what we today call a civic community (Tishkov 2009: 45; 2013: 4). According to Tishkov (2009: 46), the type of civic allegiance to the state that later came to be associated with the term rossiiskii had already arisen under Peter I and Catherine II and described a sense of belonging to the concepts of “fatherland” and “homeland.” From this, Tishkov argues for the existence of a historical rossiiskoe state, which should be considered a nation-state, irrespective of is multiethnic composition (see Tishkov 2013: 5–7).

As Tishkov (2009) points out, Russians use the terms russkii and rossiiski interchangeably in everyday speech (see also Goode 2019). Further, both terms can be broadened up and

23 detached from the dichotomous distinction between civic and ethnic. Russkii can also designate cultural rather than ethnic adherence (see Laruelle 2016). On its side, rossiiskii can also mean not only non-ethnic, but even anti-ethnic (Rutland 2010). Moreover, rossiiskii can refer exclusively to non-Russian ethnicity (Miller 2009: 18). In the latter usage, it does not comprise all of Russia’s citizens, but only those who cannot be included in the community of russkiie.

Writing in 1995, Tishkov introduced the adjective Rossian to describe the civic adherence to the Russian nation. At the time, he argued that the Rossian population was homogeneous in the sense of having elements of common culture, common values and a common language (Tishkov 1995: 49). Neither did a Rossian identity need to exclude ethnic identity. Tishkov saw it as quite possible to self-identify both as a member of a non-Russian ethnic group and as a member of the Rossian nation. This brings me to another aspect of the two categories russkii and rossiiskii that will be brought to light in the empirical chapters of this thesis, namely the relationship between majority and minorities.

According to Blakkisrud (2016: 251), the kind of civic patriotism promoted by President Vladimir Putin envisions the Russian national community as held together by a broad set of common values and traditions (see also Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2004). However, post-Soviet civic-connoted patriotism has also been argued to be an expression of the nationalism of the ethnic russkii majority group (Prina 2016, see also Goode 2015: 720). According to Prina (2016), this leads to a conflation of civic and ethnic in the sense that rossiiskii tends to imply a tacit recognition of predominantly russkii Russianness. This prompts the question as to whether this conflation broadens up russkii or whether it narrows down rossiiskii and what implication this has for the majority and minority populations, respectively.

Another aspect of the distinction between civic and ethnic and russkii and rossiiskii is the contrast between diversity and unity, or “peoples” in the plural and “people” in the singular. Does Russia consist of its multiethnic people, the mnogonatsional’nyi narod, or is it envisioned as consisting of all of its peoples in the plural, the narody Rossiiskoi Federatsii? One of the questions that I will deal with in the empirical chapters is whether the in-group community is represented as one “people” in the singular or “peoples” in the plural. This also touches upon the issue of the distinction between the categories “migrants” and “minorities.” A question that will be touched upon in the empirical part of this thesis is whether migrants are understood as future minorities or whether it is implied that they will become future

24 majority in-group members. In turn, this also relates to the differences between the integration typologies that I will present in section 1.7.4.

This brings me back to my point of departure of the current discussion and the primary focus of the thesis: the study of language in use. As shown, russkii and rossiiskii carry connotations of a variety of understandings of the nation as a civic or an ethnic community. In line with the goals of discourse analysis, I investigate how russkii and rossiiskii are invested with meaning in the current discourse. Pertaining to the envisioned “meeting” between the Russian in-group and the migrants, the questions that arise are whether and to what extent russkii and rossiiski appear as relevant, and which kinds of social consequences arise from individuals’ employment of them.

1.7.3 Images of the Russian Community

In-built in the research question of this thesis is what we may term a “meeting” between discursively constructed images of the Russian community and integration typologies. Shevel (2011) presents a typology of five images of the Russian nation that she sees as having had prominence in post-Soviet nation building. According to Shevel, conceptual ambiguity and practical obstacles to their realization have plagued them all. Yet, they are important in the sense that they carry information about which aspects of their own community Russians consider the most important. My focus on images of the Russian community in relation to the integration of immigrants here prompts the question as to what kinds of approaches to integration are likely to be considered as suitable to each image. A question I will return to in the conclusion to this thesis is whether the analysis shows that the theme of integration points in the direction of increased relevance for one or more of the images.

The Civic Image of Russia

In line with the standard definition of the nation of an imagined community, Shevel presents the civic image of Russia with an emphasis on common territory and a community of citizens. As she holds, this territorial-based definition of the nation has the advantage that it in principle includes all of Russia’s minorities (Shevel 2011: 181). However, this way of thinking about the Russian nation has several problematic aspects. Pertaining to the emphasis on territory, the main obstacle is that such an understanding of the nation has no historical precedent in Russian history. Concerning the emphasis on the nation understood as a

25 community of citizens, this image faces the challenge of whether it should be thought of as a classic civic rossiiskaia nation that consists of all its citizens, irrespective of ethnic adherence, or whether it should acknowledge Russia’s ethnic diversity. In the case of the latter, the citizenry would be all of Russia’s minorities along with the Russian majority population: the mnogonatsional’nyi narod. According to Shevel (2011: 181–182), defining Russia in terms of citizenry has two main problematic aspects: first, Russian nationalists see the idea of a mnogonatsional’nyi narod as discriminating against ethnic Russians, while non-Russian minorities raise concerns that the classic civic nation is a disguise for assimilation and Russification.

Russia as the Homeland of Ethnic Russians

As Shevel (2011: 185) explains, the image of Russia as the homeland of, first and foremost, ethnic Russians is based on the view that the state should officially recognize ethnic Russians as the most important group in the country. The underlying claim is that ethnic Russians were disadvantaged in the Soviet period, and still are today. Moreover, the many Russians who ended up living outside Russia after 1991 should be entitled to unification with their co- ethnics (Shevel 2011: 186). Finally, ethnic Russians are “threatened” by demographic decline and migration, both by their own emigration from Russia and immigration of other groups to Russia. In contrast to the civic image of Russia, this image does not correspond to the territorial borders of the current Russian Federation.

Groups that can be seen as advocating this image of Russia include several established political parties, like the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and the now-defunct Rodina (“motherland”) party. They all share the conflation of “the people-as-demos with the people-as-ethnos” (Laruelle 2010: 28). Further, ethnic nationalism is evident in various political parties that lack parliamentary representation, as well as numerous groups that do not manage to establish themselves on a long-term basis (Laruelle 2010: 30–32). Current proponents of ethnic nationalism also include individuals like the national-liberalist Alexey Navalny, who merges nationalist with liberal and democratic values. Some currents of ethnic nationalism incorporate xenophobic sentiments and see non-Slavic migrants as a threat to Russian national culture and language (Kholmogorov 2012). However, moderately xenophobic sentiments can be found among many official political actors. They were evident during the 2013 Moscow mayoral election

26 campaign, and also in the rhetoric of the incumbent and Kremlin-aligned candidate Sergei Sobianin.

As with the image of Russia as a civic community, this image is also plagued with conceptual ambiguity. The first concerns the numerous ethnic minority groups in Russia. Moreover, despite the claims made by researchers about an increase in support for Russo-centered ethnic nationalism (see, for example, Kolstø 2016b), the idea of a formalized privileged status for ethnic Russians has generally not gained support among the populace in post-Soviet times (Shevel 2011: 186). The issue of who is really a genuine Russian is also ambiguity-ridden. Among the general public, linguistic and cultural definitions of Russianness tend to prevail over a purely ethnic definition. Particularly debated is whether the definition of “Russians” should encompass Ukrainians and Belarussians (Shevel 2011: 187–188).

Russia as an Eastern Slavic Nation

As Shevel (2011: 188) notes, the image of the Russian nation as an Eastern Slavic nation sidesteps the question of whether Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians belong to the same ethnic group. This idea stretches as far back in history as medieval Rus’. In addition to its historical precedence, the idea of all Eastern Slavic nations as one people has been supported among the Russian population in post-Soviet times (Shevel 2011: 188). The problems are similar to those entailed in the image of Russia as an ethnic Russian community. First, the image does not coincide with state borders. Second, it leaves no room for those citizens of the Russian Federation who belong to other ethnic groups.

A Russian-Speaking Nation

Shevel (2011: 188) points to the idea of a Russian-speaking nation as being less in conflict with ethnic federalism as the two preceding ideas of Russia as consisting of ethnic Russians or Eastern Slavs. Still, it embodies one problematic aspect that will also be touched upon in Chapter VI “Language”: can anyone who speaks Russian become a Russian, irrespective of ethnic origin? As Shevel (2011: 188) notes, most scholars conclude that the category “Russian-speakers” in this respect is most likely to be limited to Russian-speaking Slavs who are also likely to be politically loyal to Russia, rather than Russian-speakers as such.

Russia as Defined by the Territory of the Former USSR

The image of Russia as stretching across the entire territory of the former USSR has been advocated mainly by neo-Eurasianists and Soviet communists who differ in their views on those living there. Eurasianists see the territory as a common cultural and historical entity and the people as one anthropological entity, whereas Soviet communists have seen the inhabitants as having different ethnic identities (Shevel 2011: 189). As with the images of Russia as a community of Russian speakers, of Eastern Slavs, and as the homeland of ethnic Russians, this image is problematic mainly because of its irredentist character.

1.7.4 Ideal-Type Models of Integration

In approaching the different ideal-type models of integration, we may take as our starting point the definition proposed by the Asylum and Migration Glossary issued by the European Migration Network. Here, integration is defined as a “dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of member states” (Asylum and Migration Glossary 2010; see also Triandafyllidou, Madood, and Meer 2012: 3). As Castles et al. (2002: 114) note, “There is no single, generally accepted definition, theory or model of immigrant and refugee integration.” However, the most common approaches to integration can be grouped under three ideal-type models: the assimilationist approach, the multiculturalist approach, and the guest-worker approach.

The Multiculturalist Approach

As any other ideal type, “multiculturalism” encompasses a range of approaches, making it difficult to pin down one common definition. According to Triandafyllidou, Modood, and Meer (2012: 5), “multiculturalism” in the European context has come to mean the political accommodation by the state and/or a dominant group of all minority cultures defined primarily by reference to race, ethnicity or religion, and additionally but more controversially by reference to other group-defining characteristics such as nationality or “aboriginality.” In a multiculturalist society, immigrants may participate in all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their own culture, as long as they adhere to certain key values (Castles and Miller 2003: 247–48). The most common critique of multiculturalism is that it allows for “diversity” to become “difference” (Grillo 2007: 980).

As Kymlicka (2007: 61) notes, what all approaches to multiculturalism have in common is that they reject the ideal-type model of a unitary, homogeneous nation-state—mainly because this state is based on the idea of a dominant national group which used the state to privilege itself, defining the state as the expression of its own nationhood (Kymlicka 2007: 61). Anyone who does not belong to the dominant group had to become assimilated with it, or would be excluded from the in-group community. This brings me to the next ideal-type model: assimilation.

The Assimilationist Approach

Similar to multiculturalism, assimilation comes in various forms. Entzinger (2000: 102) refers to France as the prototype of the assimilationist model. In this model, immigrants are expected to assimilate with the host community through significant cultural adaptation (Entzinger 2000: 103). In contrast to the multiculturalist approach, cultural and religious differences are relegated mainly to the private sphere. Another version of assimilation is associated with the American “melting pot,” a process where diverse ethnic groups gradually come to share a common culture (Algan, Bisin, and Verdier 2012). In contrast to assimilation within an initially homogeneous nation-state, this type of assimilation is less connected to the ethnic culture of one particular dominant group. However, that aspect of classical assimilation theory was in practice challenged when non-European immigrant groups began arriving in the USA. Instead of blending in with the mainstream culture, members of these groups tended to preserve their ethnic and religious identities to a greater extent than presupposed by assimilationist theory (Algan, Bisin, and Verdier 2012: 5).

The Guest Worker Model

While both the multiculturalist approach and the assimilationist approach presuppose that migrants have come to stay on a permanent basis, the guest worker model sees migrants as a temporary phenomenon. In European history, migrant currents have been induced by economic development and need for workers. Consequently, the recipient states have displayed little concern with questions regarding their integration: immigrants have been seen as primarily citizens of another state, not entitled to the same protection as that which the recipient state offers to its own citizens. Germany is often cited as practicing a guest-worker approach to immigrants. The problem with this approach is that it does not acknowledge that

29 migrants may settle permanently in the recipient state. That was also the case in Germany until the late 1990s. The authorities maintained that Germany was not an immigration state, despite the growing number of immigrants who decided to stay (Entzinger 2000: 100).

1.7.5 Integration in the Russian Language

The Russian language contains two terms for integration that are both used in everyday speech: integratsiia and adaptatsiia. Literary translated, they mean “integration” and “adaptation,” respectively. Looking up standard definitions in Ozhegov’s Explanatory Dictionary, the noun integratsiia does not exist, but is covered by the verb integrirovat’. This is defined as “to unite into one whole” [“Объединить (-нять) в одно целое”] (http://www.ozhegov.com/words/11113.shtml). As examples, the dictionary lists only economic integration and linguistic integration, not the integration of immigrants.

The entry on adaptatsiia contains no definition directly relevant to integration. The most important aspect of the general definition is that it denotes a process of “adjustment” [“приспособление”] (http://www.ozhegov.com/words/194.shtml). This suggests that the term integratsiia generally denotes a process of the coming together of different elements, while adaptatsiia involves the adjustment of an individual.

Approaching the relationship between integratsiia and adaptatsiia from a Russian scholarly perspective, Ledeneva (2014) explains it as a matter of chronology and degree of integration. Integratsiia begins with social (sotsial’naia) adaptatsiia. First, sotsial’naia adaptatsiia is “a comprehensive integrational process [that leads] to harmonization of the relations between the migrants and the sociocultural space of the region” (Ledeneva 2014: 40). Migrants that have undergone successful adaptatsiia have retained some of their elements of national origin and have adopted the norms of social interaction of the recipient society. Successful adaptatsiia leads to social (sotsial’naia) integratsiia. Thus, integratsiia is the outcome of a process. But it can also be a process, itself. When understood as a process, it refers to the establishing of optimal ties between migrants and the recipient society (see Ledeneva 2014: 40–41).

The 2014 Explanatory Note to the Bill for the Federal Law “On the Social and Cultural Adaptation and Integration of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation,” displays a similar understanding of the relationship between adaptatsiia and integratsiia. Adaptatsiia is used 30 when referring to short-term migrants, while integratsiia is reserved for long-term migrants (see also Mukomel’ 2016). Together, Ledeneva’s account and that of the Explanatory Note suggest that the relationship between adaptatsiia and integratsiia is chronological and possibly also causal.

1.8 The Diacritical Markers

My choice of diacritical markers derives from their presence in the two types of empirical material selected for this study. This is not to say that they are without significance beyond the current study. As noted, Brubaker (2013: 3) points to language and religion as arguably the most important domains of cultural difference in the modern world. Moreover:

In popular understandings, both language and religion sort people into distinct, bounded and largely self-reproducing ‘communities’ […]. Second, language and religion are basic sources and forms of social, cultural and political identification. They are ways of identifying oneself and others, construing sameness and difference, and naming fundamental social groups. […] Language, religion or both are generally understood as central to or even constitutive of most ethnic and national identifications, and they frequently serve as the key diacritical markers, emblems or symbols of such identifications (Brubaker 2013: 3).

This thesis rests on the view of the nation as an “imagined community” that is constructed in discourse. Thus, I am concerned with how the diacritical markers function either as boundaries that either mark the difference of migrants as an out-group, or as constituting a common ground for their integration into the Russian imagined community—and what kind of image of the Russian community arises in this context. In line with Barth (1969: 51), I focus on the “boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses.” This means that I am not primarily concerned with the kind of content that contributors to the discourse ascribe to language, culture, or religion (exemplified by Orthodoxy or Islam). My focus is on how the Russian community is represented in discourse as a result of the diacritical markers assuming the function of boundaries. What the diacritical markers essentially do is that they contribute to the discursive construction of images of the Russian community. That said, language, culture and religion are also subject to legal provisions and/or policies that contribute to determining their status in contemporary Russia.

1.8.1 Language

Introducing language as a diacritical marker means assessing what Akturk (2017: 111) claims to be one of the key criteria of contemporary Russian national identity. As evident in Shevel’s typology, the Russian language also functions as a marker of identity beyond the territorial borders of the Russian Federation.

The basic legal documents that govern the formal status of languages in Russia, besides the Constitution, are Federal Law No 1807-1 “On the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation” and Federal Law No 53-FZ “On the State Language of the Russian Federation,” which was adopted in 2005.

Article 3.1 of Law No 1807-1 reads:

The state language of the Russian Federation across all its territory is Russian.

Государственным языком Российской Федерации на всей ее территории является русский язык.

According to Article 3.5:

The state recognizes the equal rights of all languages of the Russian Federation for their preservation and development. All the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation enjoy support of the State.

Государство признает равные права всех языков народов Российской Федерации на их сохранение и развитие. Все языки народов Российской Федерации пользуются поддержкой государства.

As the Article reads, the law explicitly states that all languages of the Russian Federation enjoy state support.

According the Article 26.2 of the Constitution, every individual enjoys the right to use

his or her native language, to a free choice of language of communication, upbringing, education and creative work. […]

право на пользование родным языком, на свободный выбор языка общения, воспитания, обучения и творчества.

Law No 53 on the state language iterates the content of the Constitution and Law No 1807-1, but as the title suggests, its Article 1 reads that:

In accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation the state language of the Russian Federation in all its territory is Russian.

В соответствии с Конституцией Российской Федерации государственным языком Российской Федерации на всей ее территории является русский язык.

While not legally binding, the preamble to the law is what most clearly underscores what must be understood as the central authorities’ aspiration for the position of the Russian language:

This Federal Law is aimed at ensuring the use of the state the language of the Russian Federation across the territory of the Russian Federation, providing citizens of the Russian Federation the right to use the state language of the Russian Federation, and the protection and development of language culture.

Настоящий Федеральный закон направлен на обеспечение использования государственного языка Российской Федерации на всей территории Российской Федерации, обеспечение права граждан Российской Федерации на пользование государственным языком Российской.

A central theme of Russian language policies during the period under study is the tension between the promotion of the Russian language and the rights and opportunities to learn and use minority languages. The general development points toward the occurrence of linguistic homogenization. Since 2001, Russia has adopted three “Federal Russian Language Programs” that have lasted for up to five years in a row. The first such program (2002–2005) stated as its objectives to spread the Russian language as the state language, develop it as the language of the Russian (russkii) people and enhance its position as a means of inter-ethnic communication among the peoples of Russia (“On the Federal Program…” 2001). Similar programs were launched for the periods 2006–2010 and 2011–2015. The last program allocated 2.5 billion roubles to the support of the Russian language, both at the federal level and throughout all of Russia’s regions (Prina 2016: 103). The Russian language has also received attention on the symbolic level. As I will return to in Chapter IV, in 2006, Putin declared the year 2007 to be the year of the Russian language. The same year, the Russian

World8 Foundation (Fond russkii mir) was established. As stated on its website (www.ruskiymir.ru), its stated goal is to promote Russian language and culture abroad. In line with this goal, Russia has established cultural centers at its embassies, supported student exchange programs and the implementation of joint curricula, as well as grants and fellowships for CIS students and professionals who want to study in Russia (Laruelle 2015: 11).

The promotion of the Russian language has been accompanied by increased levels of Russian language possession and a long-term decrease in levels of minority language fluency. Monitored through population censuses, this tendency is observed to have occurred since 1989 (Akturk 2017: 1108–1109). Thus, the state enhancement of the Russian language can be seen as building upon an already occurring tendency for linguistic homogenization in favor of the Russian language.

1.8.2 Culture

In contrast to language and religion, the term “culture” is much more open to definition. Adding the prefix “Russian” does not necessarily result in much clarification. The Russian Ozhegov’s Explanatory Dictionary explains the term as

the aggregate of produced societal and spiritual achievements of people [Совокупность производственных, общественных и духовных достижений людей].

Likewise, the English Oxford Learner’s Dictionary proposes the following definition:

the customs and beliefs, art, way of life and social organization of a particular country or group.

The main difference between these two definitions is that the English version ties “culture” to a specific country or a group, while the Russian one mentions only “people” in general. Looking at a scholarly definition from the same field as that of Barth, namely anthropology, Eriksen (1997: 56) defines culture as everything that makes communication possible right

8 Note that the expression “Russian world” (russkii mir) not only refers to the Foundation, but also functions as a concept that encompasses Russia’s policy for its Near Abroad and initiatives to make Russia’s voice sound in the world. See Laruelle (2015) for a thorough account of the genesis and different understandings of the Russian world concept. 34 here and now. Brochmann (1996: 14), who has a background in sociology and has studied the integration of immigrants in Norway, sees culture as a “fixed setting” of customs and traditions and patterns of communication that is established and “completed.” While Brochmann sees culture as a final product that is presumably less open to change, Eriksen’s definition makes culture appear as context dependent and thus open to change. Further, Eriksen’s definition contains an element that is relevant to this thesis, as it touches upon the question of what culture does. As noted, viewing culture as a diacritical marker means being less concerned with what culture is, but what it does. Thus, Eriksen’s definition reflects the main focus of this thesis: how culture works in discourse and what are the social consequences of that work.

In the legal sphere, the 1992 Russian Law No 3612-1 “On The Foundations of the Legislation on Culture” (amended in 2017) does not even employ the term “culture,” but rather “cultural values.” According to its Article 3, these are:

Moral and aesthetic ideals, norms and examples of habits, fashions of behavior, languages, dialects and subdialects, national traditions and customs; historical place names, folklore, artistic works and arts, pieces of culture and art, results and methods of scientific research of cultural activity, buildings that carry historical-cultural meaning, installations, objects and technologies; and territories […] that are unique in a historical-cultural context.

Культурные ценности - нравственные и эстетические идеалы, нормы и образцы поведения, языки, диалекты и говоры, национальные традиции и обычаи, исторические топонимы, фольклор, художественные промыслы и ремесла, произведения культуры и искусства, результаты и методы научных исследований культурной деятельности, имеющие историко-культурную значимость здания, сооружения, предметы и технологии, уникальные в историко-культурном отношении территории и объекты.

In terms of a pronounced cultural policy, this has not received such high priority in post- Soviet Russia. In fact, President Putin first talked about “cultural policy” in 2013 (Kurennoy and Khestanov 2018: 307). In 2014, Putin approved the state document “The Foundations of the State Cultural Policy of the Russian Federation” (“The Foundations…” 2014). When it comes to defining “culture,” this document relies on a definition similar to that of Ozhegov. “Culture” is defined as

the aggregate of formal and informal institutions, phenomena and factors that affect the preservation, production, translation and distribution of spiritual values (ethnical, aesthetic, intellectual and civic9 and so forth).

совокупность формальных и неформальных институтов, явлений и факторов, влияющих на сохранение, производство, трансляцию и распространение духовных ценностей (этических, эстетических, интеллектуальных, гражданских и т. д.) (“The Foundations…” 2014: 7).

In line with Kurennoy and Khestanov’s general observation, the document further sees culture as that which ensures the unity of Russia’s multiethnic (mnogonatsional’nyi) people, in that it promotes a feeling of patriotism and national pride. Cultural policy is related to the “strengthening of the unity of the Russian (rossiiskoe) society” [“укрепление единства российского общества посредством”] (“The Foundations…” 2014: 9). Concerning the content of Russian culture, the document does not provide much information. It only ties culture to the Russian language and the languages of the peoples of Russia. Language as such is in turn linked to Russian literature.

1.8.3 Religion

Article 14 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states that Russia is a secular state, in which no religion should be established as a state religion or mandatory religion. According to article 28,

Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of conscience, the freedom of religion, including the right to profess individually or together with others any religion or to profess no religion at all, to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious and other views and act according to them.

Каждому гарантируется свобода совести, свобода вероисповедания, включая право исповедовать индивидуально или совместно с другими любую религию или не исповедовать никакой, свободно выбирать, иметь и распространять религиозные и иные убеждения и действовать в соответствии с ними.

This is iterated in the 1997 Federal Law No 125-F3 “On the Freedom of Conscience and

9 It is not clear from the Russian original whether “гражданских” means predominantly “civic” as opposed to “ethnic,” or “civic” as “related to the state.” 36

Religious Associations.” However, according to its preamble, the law recognizes that certain religious faiths have a special position in Russia:

the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the establishment and development of Russia’s spirituality and culture; respecting Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions which constitute an inseparable part of the historical heritage of Russia’s peoples […].

признавая особую роль православия в истории России, в становлении и развитии ее духовности и культуры, уважая христианство, ислам, буддизм, иудаизм и другие религии, составляющие неотъемлемую часть исторического наследия народов России […].

Together, these two laws set up the basic legal principles that govern the relationship between state and religion in contemporary Russia. As the constitutional provisions read on paper, the Russian Federation is categorized as a secular state. However, as it shines through in the preamble to the 1997 law and the public discussion in Russia in general, certain religious faiths function as markers of Russian identity. As I will show in the empirical chapters of this thesis, this is particularly true for the two faiths that exemplify “religion” as a diacritical marker in the empirical material, Russian Orthodoxy and Islam. These are also the faiths with the largest numbers of adherents in Russia today (Merati 2017; Verkhovskii 2014).

1.9 Thesis Outline

1.9.1 Chapter II Theory Framework

This chapter presents the theory framework of the study, which consist of the following core components: a view of the nation, national identities and boundaries as constructed in discourse and depending on invocations of both similarity and difference. In line with Jørgensen and Phillips (2012), I adopt a multiperspectival approach to discourse, which also involves paying attention to what is considered permissible to express on a given topic in a given society.

1.9.2 Chapter III Research Methodology

Chapter III introduces the research methodology of the study. I account for the specific steps followed in undertaking the study. I pay particular attention to the process of collecting empirical material and the employment of discourse analysis as a methods. The chapter also discusses some methodological challenges and possible limitations of the study.

1.9.3 Chapter IV Presidential Discourse

This chapter analyzes the discursive constructions of the Russian community in presidential discourse between 2000 and 2015. First, I present one of the core values Vladimir Putin singled out in his “Millennium Manifesto”: patriotism. Next, I examine the three diacritical markers as found in the texts. Here, I focus on how the diacritical markers have been invoked by Presidents Putin and Medvedev as the “glue” that cements the Russian community. While emphasizing in-group similarity, references to language, culture and religion also imply out- group members. Further, I assess the images of Russia that arise as a result of the constructions of similarity and difference and discuss these in light of constructions of singularity and plurality.

1.10 Media Discourse Chapters

1.10.1 Chapter V “Language”

The first chapter on diacritical markers in the media discourse concerns the role of the Russian language in constructing the boundaries of the Russian community. The theme can be summarized by the following question from the source material: “can we, with the help of the language, turn newcomers into Russians?” [“можно ли с помощью языка сделать приезжих русскими?”] (Balabas and Lemutkina 2013). The chapter examines critical discourse moments that crystallize around two nodal points that I see as reflecting the main tensions inherent in this question. One factor involved here is time. Up until 2010, the shared Soviet past could still be represented as part of a common ground for integration, because the former citizenry is represented as Russian-speakers. From around 2010, the Soviet past starts to appear less and less relevant for the integration of present-day migrants. This is especially

38 true for members of the new generations, the children of immigrants. While their parents might have studied the Russian language in the school system before it disappeared from the curriculum in their home countries, their children must learn it after arriving in Russia.

A central finding in this chapter is that language as a diacritical marker may function as a pseudo-boundary that masks an essentialist understanding of ethnicity. In such cases, those who are excluded from the Russian in-group community are not necessarily international immigrants: they are just as likely to be members of certain other ethnic groups with the Russian citizenship than the Russian majority. This reveals the strength of perceptions of Russia’s “inner abroad.”

1.10.2 Chapter VI “Culture”

This chapter is organized around two nodal points: “culture” in the singular and “culture” in the plural. The chapter begins by addressing how multiculturalism functions to construct (Western) Europe as Russia’s Other (see Neumann 1996; Tolz 2001). When speakers use the term “multicultural” in a Russian context, this has different connotations. It functions as a description of interethnic tensions in Russia today. Within this context, Russia is implicitly represented as threatened by internal disunity. Salient themes here are the North Caucasus as an “inner abroad” and the Soviet past as Russia’s own Soviet multicultural past that finally broke apart, encumbering Russia with its current interethnic conflicts. The USSR is presented as an example of both multicultural project and classic “melting pot” assimilation.

Against this backdrop, we observe how “culture” as a diacritical marker of the Russian in- group community is made dependent on the emphasis on Russian culture as an indivisible entity. One of the prerequisites for migrants to become members of the Russian community is that this community is seen as having one, clearly identifiable culture. This part of the chapter also focuses on different modes of change. In contrast to the Russian language, which is not represented as subject to change, Russian culture is seen as able to change. This may happen through change of content, or change in in-group membership. Members of the migrant out- groups are represented as willing to undergo cultural change in order to become included the in-group community.

1.10.3 Chapter VII “Religion”

This chapter considers the role of religion as a diacritical marker of the Russian community, focusing on Russian Orthodox Christianity and Islam. Orthodoxy is the religion of the ethnic majority in-group, whereas Islam is the religion of a large proportion of the migrants arriving during the period under study. The available material is quantitatively small, but rich in information. The discourse on Orthodoxy crystallizes around one overarching nodal point that can be expressed as the following question: does membership in the religious community lead to membership in the national community or vice versa? Regarding Islam, the findings indicate that the critical discourse moments are highly varied, but with a slightly greater emphasis on Islam as an integral part of the image of Russia. Surprisingly, however, the theme of similarity between Russia’s traditional Moslem population and migrant Moslems is absent from the discourse. As a result, the image of the Russian community that emerges seems to be based on the status of Russian Orthodox Christianity as the majority religion (see Staalesen 2004; Verkhovskii 2014).

1.10.4 Chapter VIII Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

In this final chapter, I present and discuss the main findings of the study. Comparing and contrasting the findings from the empirical chapters, I evaluate the character of the discourse on integration and the relative importance of the three diacritical markers in the formation of Russian national identity. Here, the focus is on the ways in which my findings shed light on how migration can affect the formation of national identity in the recipient society. I further relate the study to adjacent fields, such as migration and studies of Russian national identity. I return to the question of what kind of integration regime appears most favorable to Russia, based on how the discourse constructs the world in meaning. With regard to venues for future research, I indicate how this thesis can function as a “door opener” to future studies of the hitherto little-explored field of the integration of immigrants in Russia. I also point to how the findings from this thesis can have relevance for studies of national identity beyond Russia.

2 Chapter II Theory Framework

2.1 Introduction

I opened this thesis by stating that it is ultimately concerned with the question, “how do Russians see the Russian ‘imagined community’?” My approach to this question is to see how the Russian “imagined community” is constructed in the media discourse on the integration of immigrants and to what extent this representation of Russia corresponds with the image of Russia that is conveyed through presidential speeches. The process of constructing the nation in discourse involves invocations of both similarity and difference; that is, by the active construction of a boundary.

2.2 Representations

In asking how the Russian community is “imagined” in discourse, I am concerned with representations. In the words of Hall (1997: 17), “representation” can be understood as “the production of the meaning of the concepts in our minds through language. It is the link between concepts and language which enables us to refer to either the ‘real’ world of objects, people or events, or indeed to imaginary worlds of fictional objects, people and events” (Hall 1997: 17). This thesis adopts a constructionist approach to representations. This means that it rests on the claim that things do not have an inherent meaning in themselves—we construct their meaning in discourse (see Hall 1997: 25).

2.2.1 The Nation as Represented in Discourse

Another word for representation is image. Borrowing a term from Anderson’s (1991) seminal work Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, I shall refer to the Russian “imagined community.” While not engaging directly with Anderson’s original work, I borrow his formulation to underline that I shall see the Russian national community as constructed in discourse. In line with de Cilia, Reisgl and Wodak (1999: 453), I see national “imagined communities” as mental constructs. Through the use of language, they are “represented in the minds and memories of the nationalized subjects as sovereign and limited political units” (de Cilia, Reisgl and Wodak 1999: 153).

A useful insight in this respect is Calhoun’s (1997: 3) view of nationalism as “a way of speaking that shapes our consciousness.” From this point of view, nationalism becomes a way of thinking about social solidarity (Özkirimli 2010: 187). Nationalism here assumes the function of tying people together in an “imagined community.” Yet, a nation is not just any type of “imagined community,” such as social or economic classes. When a national community is represented in discourse, it follows a certain pattern. It does so in the sense that it is possible to identify a list of distinguishing features out of which some are always present when the nation is construed in discourse. According to Calhoun (1997: 4-5), the list of distinguishing features spans from such issues as territory and popular sovereignty to culture, language and shared beliefs, as well as possibly sacred relations to the territory. On the one hand, the points on this list limit the representations of the nation that can arise. At the same time, it ensures that the community that is represented in discourse is a national community. As Calhoun (1997: 11-12) points out, nationalism is “a way of imagining communities.” Implied here is a focus on how. Rather than asking what a nation is, it is more relevant to ask how it is construed in discourse. This view of the nation and nationalism corresponds with the phrasing of my research question: how is the Russian community represented in the Russian discourse on the integration of immigrants?

Pertaining to the theme of integration, another presupposition about the nation has relevance in this thesis. The representation of one nation, in this case the Russian nation, depends on the perceived existence of other nations insofar as, in the process of constructing its in-group similarity, it also needs to distinguish itself from other nations (Triandafyllidou 1998: 594). As Triandafyllidou (1998: 594) holds, the nation has to be understood as part of a dual relationship. It is not an autonomous, self-contained unit. The discursive construction of a national “imagined community” also encompasses the perception of who are its members: the composition of the in-group. Imagining the in-group members of a national community entails the imagining of members of out-groups.

A particular concern of this thesis is whether and how out-group members are considered as being able to become members of the in-group community. This relates to criteria for membership in the national community (see Greenfield 1992: 11). One of the questions this thesis will explore is whether migrants are represented as prospective in-group members. Can they be considered as able to cross the boundary into the in-group?

Ernest Gellner and Entropy-Resistance

As the empirical material will reveal, not all theoretically prospective members of the in- group community are considered as able to cross its boundaries. Ernest Gellner (1993: 64) terms members of an eternal out-group “entropy-resistant”:

A classification is entropy-resistant if it is based on an attribute which has a marked tendency not to become, even with the passage of time since the initial establishment of an industrial society, evenly dispersed throughout the entire society. In such an entropy-resistant case, those individuals who are characterized by the trait in question will tend to be concentrated in one part or another of the total society.

Gellner exemplifies this idea of entropy resistance by reference to a hypothetical group of pigmentationally blue individuals who, over a longer period, tend to occupy the same place within a society. To Gellner, this is what makes “blueness” an entropy-resistant trait. Gellner’s concept of entropy resistance as a kind of “Otherness” informs this thesis, offering a conceptual understanding of those individuals that for some reason or another are construed as simply unable to be integrated into the Russian “imagined community.” In the empirical chapters, I shall refer to these as “eternal Others.” While Gellner’s term “blueness” carries connotations to color, my usage of the concept does not mean I relate it to race or phenotype specifically. The type of Otherness I am interested in is the one that arises in the discourse. As I will return to in Chapter III, the methodology chapter, it is often exceedingly difficult to determine the origin of those individuals referred to as “migrants” in Russia.

2.3 Identity and Boundaries

Studying nations from the perspective of discursive constructions of prospective membership in an “imagined community” means that I am concerned with national identities. I agree with de Cilia, Reisigl, and Wodak (1999: 153) that national identities can be conceived of as a particular kind of social identity that is “discursively […] produced, reproduced, transformed and destructed.”

Further, my view of identities rests on the following three basic claims. First, “identity” is a condition that is not necessarily stable. Second, “identity” involves two main criteria of comparison: similarity and difference (Jenkins 2008: 17; see also Wodak et. al. 2009). Third, constructions of group identities depend upon the discursive construction of a boundary.

I agree with Jenkins (2008: 17) that identities are always multi-dimensional, never a final or settled matter. They are always formed through social or institutional interaction. As a result, identity is not a condition, but must be regarded as a process of identification (see Jenkins 2008: 18). This process of identification takes place through discourse. This is not to say that identities must necessarily undergo constant change. Jenkins must be cited in support of the view that, although identities may appear as fixed and permanent, they are in principle always open to change. While some scholars prefer to employ the term “identification” to underline the view that identity is a process, I choose to employ the term “identity,” as this is the most commonly used term within Russian area studies.

My second claim is fundamentally important to the goal of my research. As noted, I see identity as involving two main criteria of comparison: similarity and difference (Jenkins 2008: 17; see also Wodak et al. 2009).10 Here, I agree with Jenkins (2008) that similarity and difference both presuppose each other. They are interdependent. From this follows what I see as Jenkins’ (2008: 22) most important contribution: if similarity and difference are to make any sense at all, they must imply each other. Being interdependent, inclusion entails exclusion in the sense that “[t]o say who I am is to say who or what I am not, but it is also to say with whom I have things in common” (Jenkins 2008: 21).

Making this claim, Jenkins accepts part of the argumentation advanced by the so-called “difference” school of thought. The difference theorists see “identity” and “difference” as two independent phenomena. They see difference as logically prior to identity. As a result, identity becomes a “product of the marking of difference” (Hall 1996: 4). As expressed by Benhabib (1996: 3): “Since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference.” Here, differentiation and identification are two different, independent processes. Identity is a result of what is considered a necessary process of differentiation. Jenkins (2008: 21) argues that this emphasis on difference overlooks the interdependence or constant interplay between similarity and difference. It also misses the multi-dimensional character of identity, both on the theoretical level and in everyday discursive practice.

10 Referring to Ricoeur (1992), Wodak et al. divides similarity into “Sameness” and “Selfhood,” while they employ the term “other” for expressing difference. 44

In line with Jenkins, I agree with the difference theorists that identity is not fixed, immutable or primordial, but negotiable and flexible. What I reject is the idea that difference is the sole element that always makes the process of identification function. If we pay attention only to someone’s distinctive difference from others, we communicate what they are not—and not what they are (Jenkins 2008: 21). In practice, this would mean that it would be possible to communicate who one is (or considers oneself to be) by denying all thinkable identities that one does not identify with. Even if it would be possible to do so, it would still leave us with the question of how one would give substance to what one would claim to be (Jenkins 2008: 22). The inclusion of similarity is also what permits us to identify with a community of an “us.” This is where boundaries become relevant.

Trying to define exactly who constitutes the members of a given community or group—be it national, ethnic, social or other—one necessarily engages in a process of boundary construction. References to boundaries, both as a theoretical concept and as an empirical reality, can be found within a variety of academic fields (see Hummel 2014). Within studies of nationalism, the term “boundaries” is often associated with Barth’s (1969) seminal introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (see also Eriksen 2010; Kolstø 2009; Neumann 1999).

Being concerned with ethnic groups, Barth holds that our understanding of ethnic groups depends on our perception of a boundary between them. As he (Barth 1994: 16) explains, the relationship between the imagined community and boundaries can be seen as follows: “An imagined community is promoted by making a few […] diacritica highly salient and symbolic, that is, by an active construction of a boundary.”

Barth’s (1969: 15) most central contribution to the view of ethnic identity is the view that we perceive ethnic groups as real because they are separated by a boundary, and not because of specific cultural traits of the members of the groups on either side of this boundary. According to Barth (1994: 2), a study of ethnic group identity “means focusing on the boundary and the processes of recruitment.” Barth’s focus on the processes of recruitment goes straight to the core of this thesis. The process of recruitment into a group entails the crossing of a boundary. This highlights an important quality of boundaries: they persist, despite being crossed by individuals who change their group affinity (Barth 1969: 4). This is expressed in his explanation of boundaries as rooted in “processes of exclusion and

45 incorporation whereby discrete social categories are maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual life histories” (Barth 1969: 10).

In a context of immigration and integration, the persistence of boundaries is relevant, as integration can be seen as a process that implies precisely the crossing of a boundary into the in-group recipient community. Moreover, Barth (1969: 15) also emphasizes the interaction between groups as a precondition for the construction of a boundary. This is also important in a context of integration, as members of the recipient society and the newcomers are residing on the same territory and must be assumed to have some kind of contact with each other.

Another important feature of a boundary is that it depends on the construction of both similarity and difference. As Barth (1969: 15) explains, identification with a group works so that external difference is constructed through interaction with other groups. Negotiation of identity then takes place at the boundary where external differences encounter internal similarity (Jenkins 2008: 44). Moreover, membership in a group depends on ascription and self-ascription, and groups and boundaries are relevant only “in so far as individuals embrace it, are constrained by it, act on it, and experience it” (Barth 1994: 12).

However, not every instance of making a distinction is necessarily an act of boundary- drawing (Barth 2000: 17). The fact that we as human beings are able to distinguish between different groups or things does not mean that we always draw boundaries between them (see also Jenkins 2008: 127). The boundary is our analytical concept, not an intrinsic quality of the groups themselves (see Barth 2000). Crucial to my use of boundaries as an analytical concept is the understanding that the decision of what similarities and differences people invoke is not subject to the researcher’s idea of what is specific to a group. As Barth (1994: 12) explains, “the differences of primary significance […] are those that people use to mark the distinction, the boundary, and not the analyst’s ideas of what is most aboriginal or characteristic in their culture.” Indeed, this is central to my choice of diacritical markers in the thesis: their presence in the two types of discourses. As I will elaborate in Chapter III, this entails a heuristic approach to the empirical material. I as a researcher have had to leave aside my own expectations about what would be important themes to study related to migration in Russia. Thus, I had to distance myself from previous research literature and allow for myself to be led by the source material. As a result of this bottom-up approach, I could discover what the contributors to the discourse invoked as salient when constructing a boundary. The result is that the study brings out knowledge about a different dynamic of identity construction that 46 can be seen as occurring in parallel with that covered by other studies of migrant-related issues in Russia.

Boundaries, Nationalism and Discourse

Using Barth’s theorizations of ethnic group identity as a point of departure for a study of contemporary Russian national community requires elaboration regarding Barth’s relevance as of today and for a discourse-based study. As argued by Hummel (2014: 57), Barth’s original insights “still hold strong potential for enhancing our understandings of contemporary social worlds.” Acknowledging the usefulness of Barth, we should not ignore that there is indeed a gap that needs to be bridged between Barth’s studies of pre-modern agrarian groups and the study of identity formation in modern nations. My argument is that this is fruitfully done by introducing discourse both as a theoretical concept and as a methodological tool for analysis.

As Hummel (2014: 50) explains, Barth saw ethnicity as constantly negotiated and renegotiated. Although Barth never employed the term “discourse” to describe this process, his point harmonizes with Jenkins’ (2008) view of identity as a process. What is missing from Barth’s side is precisely discourse. As Kolstø (2009: 17) pertinently points out in explaining the character of the boundary, it is not fruitful to treat the boundary as a given and unchangeable entity. This would lead us into an essentialist view of identities. In turn, this would reduce the usefulness of boundaries as an analytical concept. In the same way as identities are constructed, destructed and reconstructed in discourse, so is the boundary. Thus, I agree with Kolstø’s (2009: 17) assertion that “the boundary is, to use Benedict Anderson’s celebrated phrase, ‘imagined.’ It is contested and negotiated […] it is subject to discourse.” Here, we may note the similarity between Kolstø’s proposal and Jenkins’ view of identity as a process of identification. Viewing both the boundary and identity as subject to discourse is what bridges the gap between the study of pre-modern ethnic communities and the discursive construction of modern-day national identity. The process of identification thus occurs by constructing the members of the “imagined” out-group as different while simultaneously emphasizing similarity among the members of the “imagined” in-group community. Here, Jenkins agrees with Barth that “invocations of similarity are intimately entangled with the conjuring up of difference. One of the things that people have in common in any group is

47 precisely the recognition of other groups or categories from whom they differ” (Jenkins 2008: 23; see also Barth 1969).

Such a transposition and “broadening up” of Barth’s original propositions has also proven fruitful for other scholars. Among them are Eriksen11 (see, for instance 2010: 138-139), Neumann (1999) and Triandafyllidou (2001). Both Neumann (1999: 4) and Triandafyllidou 2001: 27) contend that Barth’s original propositions regarding he study of ethnic groups could be extended to national identities and the study of collective identity formation in general. Investigating national identities in light of immigration to Europe, Triandafyllidou (2001: 27) points to Barth as relevant precisely because of his focus on the processes that led to the formation and persistence of group identities. In this thesis, this process is discourse. As Neumann (1999: 161) states in his work on Russia as Europe’s Other, the Self–Other nexus “is operative on all levels of identity formation.”

Discursive construction of identity happens on all levels of society. Although they may be viewed as having different roles in a society, there is in principle no difference between the discursive construction of boundaries on an elite and non-elite level, as both occur in discourse. It is the discourse-based approach of the study, both on the level of theory and on the level of methodology, that enables my transposition of Barth’s concepts to the study of discourses about national identity formation.

2.4 Discourse

The study assumes a discourse-based approach to the research question. I see discourse analysis as both a theory and a method, which entails a multiperspectival view on discourse and discourse analysis (Jørgensen and Phillips 2012: 4). This applies to both the theoretical level and the level of methodology. In the current study, “multiperspectival” refers to

a) the fact that my conceptualization of “discourse” rests on a set of basic claims about what a discourse is and what a discourse does;

and

11 Thomas Hylland Eriksen has extensively applied Barth to the study of both national and ethnic communities. The reason I do not treat him in greater detail here is because his approach is not based on discourse. 48

b) the conversion of selected discourse-theoretical concepts into practical methodological tools for the discourse analytical method, as proposed by Jørgensen and Phillips (2012).

and

c) the intergration of these tools with the analysis of the empirical material as a discourse

As noted by Wodak and Meyer (2009: 6), the term “discourse” is used differently by different researchers and in different academic cultures. The common denominator is that discourse relates to language in use. In this thesis, I shall understand discourse in a threefold way. First, as noted in Chapter I, I see discourse as a specific way of talking about and representing the world in meaning (see Jørgensen and Phillips 2012: 1; Hall 2007: 201). As is evident, this alludes to a process of meaning construction. My second and complementary understanding of discourse derives from a much-cited definition of discourse by Foucault (1972: 11). Foucault defines discourse as “made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined.” Complementing this definition, Hall (2007: 201) defines discourse as “a group of statements which provide a language for talking about—i.e. a way of representing—a particular kind of knowledge about a topic.” Lastly, Wodak (2008: 6) distinguishes between discourse and text by claiming that a discourse “implies patterns and commonalities of knowledge.” While a discourse does not equal a text, it can be considered as realized through texts. From this, I shall infer that a discourse is “text in context” in the sense that it encompasses both the text and the context.

From Foucault and Hall’s definitions, we can infer that discourse is not merely a reflection of social reality: it also constitutes the social (Jørgensen and Phillips 2012: 13). As Hall (2007: 201) goes on to explain, this means that statements uttered in a particular discourse will construct a topic in a certain way, which in turn affects how it can be constructed on later occasions. Thus, a discourse can be seen as opening up possibilities for new representations while simultaneously imposing limits upon emerging representations, adhering to and also constructing its own limits of what is possible to say within a given context. In so doing, a discourse can be seen as representing the “truth” about a certain topic in a certain society. This claim is informed by Foucault’s conceptualization: “truth” in discourse is not what is true in the absolute sense, but what is regarded as true in a particular historical époque, even though it cannot be conclusively proven (Foucault 1972; see also Hall 2013: 34). Pertaining

49 to this thesis, the specific images of the Russian community that arise in the discourse on the integration of immigrants can be seen as representing the “truth” about the Russian “imagined community” in this particular context.

One way of understanding the “truth” in a certain discourse is to say that it encompasses everything that it has included as being “sayable” (Macgilchrist 2011: 11). In this thesis, I use the term sayable to refer to what Butler (1997: 132; see also Meijer and Prins 1998: 284) calls “speakable.” In line with Butler’s usage of speakable, I shall use the term sayable to refer to every utterance, topic or point of view that can be brought into a discourse. What is left outside the discourse and implicitly considered not to belong to it thus belongs to the “unsayable” of that discourse. I shall particularly understand the unsayable as that which appears to be suppressed from the discourse—thus, that which remains unarticulated, but can still be considered an underlying theme that the discourse indirectly touches upon.

Implied in Foucault’s contention that one can identify “a group of conditions of existence” for a discourse is an understanding that such conditions exist. These are linked to the process of producing the “truth.” It is this process that excludes the unsayable from the discourse. It is my argument that a post-structuralist view of discourse as precisely a process of meaning production is suitable for gaining an understanding of how Foucault’s “truth” may be produced. As the term indicates, post-structuralism indicates a move—away from structuralism, yet not a full rejection. Therefore, it is crucially important to see post- structuralism against the backdrop of its forerunner12: de Saussure’s (1960) structural linguistics.

2.4.1 Structuralism

Among the core elements of de Saussure’s structural linguistics is the argument that signs consisted of two elements: form and content, most often referred to by the terms signifier and signified (Jørgensen and Phillips 2012: 10). As an example, we may say that the signifier is the term “water” and the signified is the bluish transparent liquid that runs down from the tap or flows in a river or appears in unimaginably large amounts in seas and oceans. de Saussure’s point is that there is no connection between the term “water” and the substance

12 I do not mean to say that de Saussure’s structural linguistics is the sole forerunner to post-structuralism. It is, however, the forerunner that is the most relevant to the discourse-based framework applied in this thesis. 50 that it denotes. The term “water” does not acquire meaning from what it represents, but by being different from other terms, such as “earth,” “sky” and “ice” (even though ice is indeed frozen water). In this way, language becomes a structure of differences. Like the difference theorists’ view of identity, de Saussure proposed that water is water because of all the other things it is not. Important for later development of post-structuralism was also the contention that the relationship between signifier and signified was arbitrary. Thus, language should be studied based on the assumption that there is no fixed relationship between the outlook of the signifier (i.e. how a word is spelled) and the object or phenomenon that it represents.

2.4.2 Post-structuralism

This is what post-structuralism takes as its point of departure. What it modifies is the understanding of language as a fixed structure of differences. According to post-structuralist reasoning, meaning can never be entirely fixed. All other terms from which a term differs are open to change reliant on the context in which they are used (Jørgensen and Phillips 2012: 11; Laclau 1993: 433). The term in question may also be invested with new meanings. The term “water” may be understood as an element that is different from “earth,” “air” and “fire,” but also as “running water” that differs from “frozen water,” that is, ice. This is where the post- structuralist understanding of the term “discourse” comes in. As meaning can never be entirely fixed, discourse is necessarily a struggle. As expressed by Jørgensen and Phillips (2012: 25), “The creation of meaning as a social process is about the fixation of meaning, as if a Saussurian structure existed.” In the struggle for fixation of meaning, certain representations seem to gain more profound ground than others. They become the discursive “truth” on a certain topic.13

2.5 The Media

My choice of studying representations of the Russian national community in the Russian print media is based on my understanding of the media as part of the public sphere where images of the national community are constructed in discourse. I here agree with Tolz and Harding (2015: 455; see also Bauber 2012) that media discourse on migration can be viewed as

13 Post-structuralist theorists here use the term “hegemony.” Jørgensen and Phillips (2012) use both terms in their volume. As the term “hegemony” also carries connotations that are not relevant to the current thesis, I choose to stick to the term “truth” as it has been introduced above. 51 reflecting broader understandings of the national identity held by a society’s dominant group. Anthony Smith (1993: 11) stresses the importance of media content. In his view, the mass media contribute to the creation of nations by producing a shared culture composed of common values, traditions, ideas, and aspirations (see also Stańczyk 2013: 297). This relates to my focus on how the Russian national community is “imagined” in a specific discourse that can be located in the newspaper sphere. I see the print media as an integral part of the Russian public sphere where the construction of national identity takes place, also through constant negotiations over what is sayable in discourse.

2.6 Summing Up

This thesis studies how the Russian community is constructed in two types of discourses. One of its basic premises is the idea that nations and national identities are constructed, destructed and reconstructed in discourse. Identity thus equals a process of identification. This process depends on constructions of both similarity and difference, though both are not always made explicit. By constructing someone as members of an in-group, one simultaneously engages in a tacit construction of members of an out-group.

What separates the in-group members from those of the out-group is a boundary. The advantage of the boundary as an analytic concept is that it makes it possible to come to terms with change in the membership of different groups. Thus, it provides an excellent point of departure for studying discourses about the integration of immigrants into a given society. Because migrants can be seen as not yet having crossed the border into the host community, studying ideas about their prospective inclusion makes it possible to ascertain what kinds of boundaries are drawn and who are able to cross them. In line with Barth’s bottom-up approach, this also informs us about what diacritical markers are considered as important to the recipient society and how they function.

3 Chapter III Methodology

3.1 Introduction: Collection of Empirical Material and a Discourse-Based Approach

This thesis studies the Russian “imagined community” from the perspective of discursive constructions of national identity. The empirical material consists of two types of textual sources that belong to different genres: first, the sources that represent the “official” or “presidential discourse” are presidential addresses and articles by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev; the second type are newspaper articles that contain statements on integration during the time frame selected for the study (2000–2015). As I will flesh out below, I collected these two types of sources by combining different sampling techniques that also reflect how I as a researcher became more acquainted with the material during the process of collecting the current sample.

When it comes to the analysis of the material, the choice of methods was dictated by the research question. As I see the nation as constructed in discourse, I assume a discourse-based approach to the empirical material. This means that I am inspired by Jørgensen and Phillips’ (2012) development of selected elements of Laclau and Mouffes’ (2001) post-structuralist discourse theory into practical methodological tools for analysis and integrate these with the analysis of the empirical material as a discourse. This is part of the multiperspectival approach to discourse as I employ it this thesis (see Jørgensen and Phillips 2012: 4).

3.2 Types of Empirical Material

Presidential Addresses and Articles

In the collection of presidential addresses and articles, I relied exclusively on purposive sampling. Thus, I as a researcher relied on my own judgement in determining which sources would be relevant for the study (see Palinkas et.al. 2015). Chiefly, my sampling was guided by my interest in the role of the three diacritical markers in constructing the Russian “imagined community” in discourse. Initially, this interest sprung out of my discovery of their

53 presence in the newspaper articles, specifically in instances in which I saw the contributors to the discourse as constructing the boundaries of the Russian “imagined community.”

The major advantage of purposive sampling is that it allows the researcher to collect material according to its relevance to the research question. As pointed out by Robinson (2014: 32), the goal of purposive sampling is to ensure “that particular categories of cases within a sampling universe are represented in the final sample of a project.” The result is a corpus of material that is not suitable for generalization. Neither should it be interpreted as representing the one and only “correct” or, dominant discourse about Russian national identity. This is impossible, as purposive sampling inevitably involves a subjective component: the researcher’s own judgement about what sources are relevant to the study. Nor does it mean that I believe that the three diacritical markers are necessarily present in all utterances when Russian presidents touch upon the topic of Russian national identity. The overarching goal was to collect empirical material to compare and contrast with the media discourse regarding 1) how the three diacritical markers were invested with meaning as boundaries, and 2) how this contributed to “imagining” the Russian national community in discourse.

As indicated, my choice to rely on presidential speeches resulted from my discovery of how the diacritical markers functioned as boundaries in the newspaper articles. This discovery led me to search for them in other types of sources, to see if they would be present in contexts other than integration. As a result, I discovered their presence in some of President Putin’s annual addresses. This inspired me to scrutinize all annual addresses delivered by Putin and Medvedev during the current time frame, along with the other sources listed below.

The annual addresses function as an annual “state of the union” address, not triggered by any specific event. As such, they appear somewhat detached from the day-to-day political context. Further, they all belong to the same genre. This constitutes a good point of departure for comparing their content with the content of the media discourse. With regard to their function, I see them as what Charteris-Black (2014: xiii) terms epideictic speeches, which he explains as speeches aimed at constructing consensus. To use a metaphor further explained in Chapter IV, they can be seen as aiming to identify the “glue” that can bind the Russian community together.

Assuming this function, the annual addresses can be seen as engaging in a discursive struggle to construct the boundaries of the Russian community. When they explicitly emphasize the

54 similarity of the members of the in-group (i.e. who belongs in the Russian national community), they implicitly construct difference from those that do not belong. As follows from the view that similarity and difference are interdependent (see Jenkins 2008: 22), those who are not represented as members of the in-group are tacitly implied to be out-group members. From this point of view the speeches function as boundary-makers, as they form a discourse that constructs both similarity and difference.

Having discovered references to “language,” “culture” and “religion” in some of the annual addresses, I proceeded to collect and screen all annual addresses delivered in the period 2000– 2015 to check whether they were also present there. These were collected from the Kremlin’s official website www.kremlin.ru.14 After I discovered that they were present in a significant number of the addresses, I was inspired to check the presidential addresses given to the Council of Interethnic Relations to see if these would also contain references to the diacritical markers.

With regard to the introductory speeches at the meetings of the International Valdai Discussion Club, my choice to collect these these resulted from my reading of scholarly literature (i.e. Blakkisrud 2016), which had led me to believe they might contain statements relevant to the research question. The same applies to Vladimir Putin’s article “Russia: The National Question” and his “Crimean Speech” (Putin March 18, 2014; see Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2016). Keeping the opportunity for comparison between Presidents Putin and Medvedev open, I also chose to include Dmitry Medvedev’s article “Go Russia” in the initial corpus.

The initial body of empirical material consisted of the following sources:

Vladimir Putin

 The articles “Millennium Manifesto” [“Россия на рубеже тысячелетий”]) (December 30, 1999) and “Russia: The National Question” [“Россия: национальный вопрос”] (January 23, 2012), both printed in NG.

 Annual presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly, 2000–2015.

14 It emerged that the English translations on www.kremlin.ru sometimes deviated significantly from the Russian original. I have therefore modified them to make the content correspond better with the content of the Russian original. All translations should be considered as the author’s own translations. 55

 Introductory and concluding speeches at the meetings of the Council of Interethnic Relations, 2012–2015.

 Introductory speeches at the meetings of the International Valdai Discussion Club in 2013, 2014, and 2015.

 The President’s Address to the Federal Assembly following the Annexation of Crimea, March 18, 2014.

Dmitry Medvedev

 Annual presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly, 2008–2011.

 The article “Go Russia!” [“Россия, вперёд!”], published in NG in September 10, 2009.

Following a close reading of all sources, the corpus was narrowed down to the following texts that contained material relevant to the research questions. These are the texts that contain statements that are subject to explicit scrutiny in Chapter IV:

Vladimir Putin

 Annual presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly in the years 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015.

 Introductory and concluding speeches at the meetings of the Council of Interethnic Relations, 2012, 2013 and 2015.

 Introductory speech at the meeting of the International Valdai Discussion Club in 2013.

 The President’s Address to the Federal Assembly following the Annexation of Crimea, March 18, 2014.

Dmitry Medvedev

 Annual presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly in the years 2008 and 2009.

In sum, statements that contained reference to the diacritical markers appeared in two articles, eleven annual addresses, four speeches at the meetings of the Council of Interethnic Relations, one speech at the meeting of the International Valdai Discussion Club, and the President’s Address to the Federal Assembly following the Annexation of Crimea in 2014. Together, these are the texts that contain utterances that constitute the presidential/official discourse analyzed in Chapter IV.

3.2.1 Newspaper Articles

The second type of empirical are newspaper articles, which I consider as suitable for comparison with the presidential discourse because they can be considered as mainstream media. All the newspaper articles for the study were retrieved through the Integrum database. Integrum is an online database that covers a range of Russian-language textual news sources, both web-based and print editions. The Integrum search engine retrieves articles that have appeared in the print editions of the newspapers, but most of the articles I have collected are also available on the newspapers’ websites, which means that they reach out to a greater audience than the printed edition of the newspapers. In those cases where I found the article on the newspaper’s website, I have included it in the literature list. Occasionally, the publication dates differ: this often means that the web version of the article was published a few days after the article appeared in the print edition of the newspaper. In these instances, I have stated the date of publication of the print edition.

To examine the discourse from a broad perspective, I have relied on several different newspapers available through Integrum: official, broadsheet and tabloid, as well as one oppositional newspaper. In addition to being available through Integrum, all the selected newspapers rank among the top-10 most cited in Russia (Medialogiia November 2017). The following newspapers were included in the study: Rossiiskaia Gazeta (RG), Izvestiia, Kommersant, Komsomol’skaia Pravda (KP), Moskovskii Komsomolets (MK) and Novaia Gazeta. According to Toepfl’s (2011: 1305) typology, Russian media outlets can be grouped 57 in the following four categories: official mass media, mainstream mass media15, liberal- oppositional mass media, and social media. The newspapers can be grouped in these categories as follows: official—RG; mainstream—KP, MK, Izvestiia and Kommersant; and liberal-oppositional—Novaia Gazeta. The mainstream publications have in common that they are likely to be owned by wealthy individuals or large corporations. Their reporting can be seen as not too deviant from the opinion of the central authorities, as they ultimately depend on the power center to secure their profit (Toepfl 2011: 1305–1306). The liberal-oppositional category, represented in this study by Novaia Gazeta, has a much smaller audience. Their coverage is oppositional in the sense that the editorial line remains independent from government control.

3.2.2 Overview of the Newspapers16

Rossiiskaia Gazeta (RG) (www.rg.ru)

Established in November 1990, RG is the official newspaper of the Russian government, and therefore publishes official decrees, statements and documents of state bodies, and newly approved laws (see “On the Procedure…” 1994; “On the Procedure…” 1996). Like any other newspaper, it also contains news stories, commentaries, interviews and in-depth analyses. According to its website, RG has a daily print run of 160,000 copies, and is printed in 44 cities throughout the country. Given its official status, RG is highly likely to represent the viewpoints of the Russian government (Berg-Nordlie, Aasland, and Tkach 2010; see also Davis and Sosnovskaya 2009). RG’s webpages have some 6 to 6.5 million visitors each week, and 19.5 to 20 million visitors per month (Lashkul 2018).

Izvestiia (iz.ru)

Izvestiia was first issued in 1917. From 1991, it was an independent means of mass information; from 1996, it has been owned by representatives of various business structures and is currently owned—since 2011—by the National Media Group (see “National Media

15 Toepfl (2011) employs the term “mainstream” in the sense of neither being state-aligned nor oppositional. This should not be confused with my understanding of “mainstream” as “regular”, “non-extremist” media. 16 Where such data have been available on the websites of individual newspapers, I have included information about print run and numbers of visitors. I have also contacted all the newspapers and asked about these matters. When such information is missing, that means that it is not available online and the newspaper has not responded to my inquiries. 58

Group” 2017). It appears five times a week; according to its website, the national edition has a print run of 83,170 copies and the website has 540,000 unique visitors per day. Izvestiia covers Russian politics, but its previous editor-in-chief, Aram Gabrelianov, has indicated in an interview that it is not overly inclined to criticize the political leadership (Khvostunova 2013). The current editor-in-chief is Arsenii Oganesian.

Kommersant (www.kommersant.ru)

Kommersant first appeared in 1992, and is Russia’s leading business newspaper (Davis and Sosnovskaya 2009). It is issued six times a week. According to its website, the weekly print run is 120,000 copies. Kommersant is based in Moscow, as is also reflected in its readership, 67% of whom live in the capital (“About the Newspaper” 2018). Its editor-in-chief is Sergei Iakovlev.

Komsomol’skaia Pravda (KP) (www.kompravda.eu)

KP’s first issue appeared in May 1925; during Soviet times, it was the official mouthpiece of the Communist Union of Youth, “Komsomol.” After the dissolution of the USSR, KP continued to exist as a daily, semi-tabloid newspaper (Levintova 2010). According to its website, its total print run throughout Russia and the CIS reached more than 30 million copies in 2009. KP has a comprehensive website; in Moscow it also has its own radio station. The current editor-in-chief is Vladimir Sungorkin. According to its website, KP’s national (“all- Russian”) edition has a daily print run of 655 ,000 thousand copies and 3.6 million readers throughout Russia. Its website has more than 25 million unique visitors per month.

Moskovskii Komsomolets (MK) (www.mk.ru)

MK was founded in 1919. Today, it is a tabloid similar to KP and is privately owned. MK is available throughout the CIS as well as elsewhere around the globe. Its editor is Pavel Gusev, who is also a professor of journalism. According to its website, www.mk.ru has more than 7 million visitors per month and its print run is close to 750,000 copies on a daily basis.

Novaia Gazeta (www.novayagazeta.ru)

Novaia Gazeta is an independent bi-weekly newspaper widely known for its critical and investigative journalism. It was founded on April 1, 1993, with financial assistance from 59

Mikhail Gorbachev, who used some of the money from his 1990 Nobel Peace Prize to help establish the newspaper. Its first employees were several journalists who had left Komsomol’skaia Pravda because of its pro-Kremlin editorial line. Novaia Gazeta appears three times a week. According to its website, its print run is 189,050 copies.17 Novaia Gazeta is known for its thorough investigation of such events as the bombing of apartment blocks in Moscow in 1999, the hostage-taking in Moscow’s Dubrovka Theatre, the Beslan school siege in North Ossetia, and the case against Colonel Iurii Budanov, who was convicted for the kidnapping and murder of an 18-year-old Chechen woman. Because of its independent editorial line and investigative journalism, Novaia Gazeta has faced several lawsuits; its journalists have been assaulted, and six of them have been assassinated18—including Anna Politkovskaia, famed for her coverage of the wars in Chechnya. Since November 2017, its editor has been Sergey Kozheurov. Novaya Gazeta is owned by the members of its editorial board, with minority shares being held by Alexander Lebedev and Mikhail Gorbachev (Khvostunova 2013).

As Table 1 displays, the newspapers vary in both print run and number of unique visitors on their websites.

Table 1: Print Run and Numbers of Unique Visitors on Websites

Newspaper Print run Number of visitors on website RG 160,000 (daily) 6-6.5 million (per week) 19.5-20 million (per month) Izvestiia 83,170 (daily) 540 000 (per day) Kommersant 120,000 (weekly) 10 000 (per day) KP 655,000 (daily) >25 million (per month) MK 750,000 (daily) >7 million (per day) Novaia Gazeta 189,050 (daily) 5 (per month)

Based on their different profiles, we can also presuppose that there are differences among their readership. However, such information proved unobtainable in the academic literature. Repeated searches by the author have not resulted in reliable information about the readership of the respective newspapers.19 A possible explanation is the general decline in newspaper

17 Issue no 21, February 28, 2018 18 For a full overview of journalists killed in Russia since 1992, see Journalists 2018. 19 To some extent, information can be obtained from agencies that sell space for advertising, but as information varies between agencies, the author does not consider it as sufficiently reliable to be included in the thesis. 60 readership in Russia, as elsewhere in Europe. As suggested by Evans and Tilley (2017: 94), the decline in the number of people who read newspapers has led to less pronounced differences among their readership. When a large proportion of those individuals likely to read a certain type of newspaper are in fact likely to choose not to obtain a newspaper at all, measuring the socio-cultural status of readers becomes difficult and less reliable (Evans and Tilley 2017: 94).

While Evans and Tilley studied British newspapers, their argument can be transferred to a Russian context. In post-Soviet Russia, newspapers have long been outcompeted by television, even before the introduction of electronic media. What generally attracts the attention of scholars is the content of the publications, not their readership. This is also true for this study. My decision to collect newspaper articles arose from the discovery of articles that dealt with the integration of immigrants, independent of type of newspaper and readership. That said, it is reasonable to assume that readers of the two tabloids, MK and KP are more likely to hold less formal education than those reading Izvestiia or Novaia Gazeta. As Novaia Gazeta is an oppositional newspaper, it is also more likely to assume that it is read by individuals who agree with this position. With regard to Kommersant, its main focus is on news from the business sphere, which makes it apply to those who work in the business sector. As RG is the mouthpiece of the Russian authority, its readership most presumably comprises those who either support the current authority or those interested in reading “official” news. Concerning the presumed differences in readership, it is worth noticing that many of the statements analyzed come from the two tabloids, MK and KP. By implication, salient boundary constructions are likely to be read by an audience holding less formal education. While the question of audience reception remains beyond the scope of this thesis, it is reasonable to presume that this may result in a more polarized debate on migration and integration in Russia.

Although all the newspapers included are national ones, the selection is slightly skewed towards Moscow and its environs in terms of focus. With Izvestiia and RG, the edition retrievable through Integrum is the Moscow one. This means that some of the topics discussed in the newspaper articles are more salient in Moscow than in other parts of Russia. However, all articles collected for this study are presented with both the Moscow and national issue numbers in Integrum. This means that they have appeared in both the Moscow edition

61 and in other editions throughout Russia. Further, I have been able to retrieve the majority of articles quoted in the thesis from the web pages of the respective newspapers.

A plausible reason for the slight skew towards Moscow is the “natural” focus on Moscow as the capital. Moreover, Moscow is, along with St. Petersburg, among Russia’s largest migrant recipient cities. Moscow has also experienced a large influx of migrants that must be presumed to be “visible” in a relatively homogenous capital. In contrast to some European capitals, Moscow has not had a multiethnic outlook for very long. For example, media reports reveal that local authorities were unprepared to face the challenges posed by enrolling children of migrants in Moscow’s elementary schools can be expected to have attracted journalistic coverage, based on the recent rise in the number of schoolchildren who cannot follow the teacher’s instructions because they lack sufficient command of the Russian language.

3.2.3 Collecting Newspaper Articles Step by Step

As noted, I started the process of collecting newspaper articles by conducting an exhaustive search in Integrum. I employed the search criterion “adaptation and/or integration of migrants” [“адаптация и/или интеграция мигрантов”] in all possible grammatical forms and not necessarily appearing in the same sentence in the period between 2000 throughout 2015. As a search query, the Russian word “migrant” also produced hits on “emigrant” and “immigrant.” This initial search yielded 878 articles.

I then began to scale down this sample for the following reasons. First, I needed to reduce the number of articles to a manageable amount of material for a predominantly qualitative research project. Second, quite a large number of the initially collected articles mentioned “integration” and “migrants,” but did not contain statements about the integration of immigrants. Just as with the English word “integration,” the Russian integratsiia may also refer to other contexts, such as “European/Eurasian integration” or “economic integration,” without any connection with migration.

It was during my screening of the initial sample of 878 articles that I first made the discovery that determined the structure of the thesis. I became aware of the presence of the three diacritical markers in the articles. This was also when I decided to step down and study the discourse on the statement level, rather than the article level. As in turned out, few articles

62 dealt entirely with integration of immigrants. At this stage, the sampling process went from being exhaustive to purposive. As I became better acquainted with the material, my focus became narrower and more precise. From this point on, I collected only articles that contained reference to the three diacritical markers. In practice, my sampling took place through several screenings and a gradual narrowing down of the initial sample of 878 articles.

While collecting the articles, I prioritized articles that paid attention to integration in Russia. I included articles that covered integration elsewhere in the world only if they also dealt with integration in Russia. Having defined Russian newspapers as part of the Russian public sphere, I decided not to pay attention to the ethnic or national background of journalists or speakers. I see this as in accordance with my aim to investigate the Russian discourse on integration and national identity, not individual’s views on integration.

I finished the sampling when I had reached the point of saturation—that is, the point when adding new articles would not provide new information about the diacritical markers. This sampling strategy left me with an initial selection of 168 articles, which were distributed among the newspapers and throughout the chosen time frame for the study as shown in Tables 2 and 320:

Table 2: Distribution of Articles Between Newspapers

Distribution of Articles Between Newspapers

Novaia Gazeta 24

RG 13

Kommersant 12

Izvestiia 44

KP 37

MK 44

0 10 20 30 40 50

20 All articles are listed in the Appendix. 63

Table 3: Number of Articles Per Year in the Period 2000–2015

Number of Articles per Year 35

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

From these articles I extracted the articles that contained the statements that were singled out for close-up scrutiny in Chapters V, VI and VII. As I will explain below, I see these articles as containing statements in which the diacritical markers function most saliently as boundaries of the Russian “imagined community: “critical discourse moments.” The articles that are subject to close-up analysis in the thesis were distributed among the newspapers, as shown in Table 4:

Table 4: Distribution of Critical Discourse Moments in Time and Between Newspapers

MK KP Izvestiia Kommersant RG Novaia Total Gazeta

2003 1 1

2004 1 1

2005

2006 1 4 1 1 7

2007 2 2

2008 1 1

2009 1 1 1 3

2010 2 1 2 5

2011 2 4 1 1 1 9

2012 1 3 1 1 6

2013 5 2 2 9

2014 2 2

2015 1 2 3

Total: 13 16 9 1 3 7 49

As is the case with the statements collected for the presidential discourse, the current sample includes statements that could be fruitfully compared to each other, as well as to the Presidents’ statements.

3.3 A Discourse-Based Approach

As noted, this study assumes a multiperspectival approach to discourse. Studying the empirical material as two types of discourse, I am inspired by the discourse-analytical approach proposed by (Jørgensen and Phillips 2012). As they (Jørgensen and Phillips 2012: 1) note, discourse analysis is often referred to as both a theory and a method As a method, discourse analysis treats discourse itself as the object of analysis. This means that it is not the task of the researcher to assess to what extent the statements studied correspond with “reality.” The analyst explores the patterns that constitute the discourse by studying both the relationship between different statements and the social consequences of the various discursive representations of reality (Jørgensen and Phillips 2012: 21). As explained in Chapter II Theory Framework, in the current study I understand discourse as being first and foremost a way of representing the world in meaning (see also Jørgensen and Phillips 2012: 1). To quote Jørgensen and Phillips (2012: 145), the aim of discourse analysis is “to find out how the world (or aspects of it) is ascribed meaning discursively and what social consequences this has.”

Still, a discourse is also constituted by the social. It is always situated in a context. The context may include other texts and the non-discursive reality of the society the discourse was produced by and for. As Abdelal et al. (2009: 7) insightfully state, “deep social knowledge and a familiarity with interrelated texts are required for an analyst to recover meanings from discourse.” Further, they (Abdelal et al. 2009: 7) see discourse analysis as the “qualitative contextualization of texts and practices in order to describe social meanings.” Thus, in the empirical chapters, when I at times refer to how the discourse appears detached from the “realities on the ground,” this means that it constitutes the world in meaning in ways that do not necessarily reflect the non-discursive reality. What the discourse can be seen as doing on such occasions is constructing the world in meanings in new, sometimes unexpected, ways.

Importantly, this does not mean that it is necessarily possible to identify a causal relationship between a discourse and its exterior. Discussing the theoretical distinction between the discursive and non-discursive, Jørgensen and Phillips (2012: 90) fruitfully propose considering this distinction as an analytical distinction, not an empirical one. The main aim with the distinction between “discourse” and “non-discourse” is to delimit what kind of practice one considers to be discourse in a given study.

3.3.1 Order of Discourse and (Floating) Signifiers

In Chapter II, “Theory Framework”, I explained how I understand the term “discourse.” I made the claim that a discourse ties different statements together and is at the same time both constituted by and constitutive of the social. Discourse is also a struggle for the fixation of meaning. In the current study, I see three separate subdiscourses21 as engaging in a struggle for achieving fixation of meaning: the subdiscourses on “language,” “culture” and “religion.” Together, these constitute the order of discourse that aim to construct the “image” of the Russian community. The term “order of discourse” originates with Foucault, who employed it as the title for his Inaugural Lecture at the Collège du France in 1970. It is further interpreted by Jørgensen and Phillips (2012: 56) as the “social space in which different discourses partly cover the same terrain which they compete to fill with meaning each in their own particular way.” Expressed in post-structuralist terminology, what the three subdiscourses can be seen as doing, is to invest the Russian “imagined community” with meaning as regards how it is imagined.

This makes the Russian “imagined community” function as a floating signifier. Floating signifiers are the words and expressions22 that the discourse struggles to invest with meaning (Laclau 1990: 28, 1993: 287; Jørgensen and Phillips 2012: 28). It is usually a word or expression that is particularly open to being invested with meaning. While it is not a term, the concept “imagined community” also functions as a floating signifier because it is invested with different content as a result of constructions of in-group and out-group members.

In the empirical chapters, I shall also pay attention to how contributors to the discourse invest different words and concepts with meaning. Expressed with the post-structuralist terminology introduced in Chapter II, this means to assess the relationship between the signifier and the signified.

21 In order to distinguish the discourses on “language,” “culture,” and “religion,” from the overall discourse on the integration of immigrants, I here employ the term “subdiscourses” to denote them. In the empirical chapters, I will use only the term “discourse,” which is in accordance with how the term “discourse” is used by Jørgensen and Phillips (2012). 22 In post-structuralist vocabulary, the term “sign” is used instead of “words and expressions.” 67

3.3.2 “Critical Discourse Moments” and Nodal Points

As noted, the articles displayed in Table 4 are the ones that contain statements in which the three diacritical markers function most saliently as boundaries of the Russian “imagined community” in the media discourse. These I term “critical discourse moments.” Critical discourse moments can be defined as instances that “make the discourse on an issue especially visible” (Gamson 1992: 26).

Within the presidential discourse and the three subdiscourses of the media discourse, I see the critical discourse moments as crystallizing around different nodal points. Jørgensen and Phillips (2012: 28) define nodal points as “privileged signs around which a discourse is organized.” In this thesis, I shall apply an understanding of “signs” as concepts or themes around which the discourse unfolds (see Iuul 2008). A characteristic of nodal points is that they can only “obtain partial fixation” of the discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 113; Åkerstrøm Andersen 2003: 51). Thus, they are always in the midst of a discursive struggle (see Jensen and Skedsmo 2010). Further, it varies as to what extent they are made explicit or whether they appear as underlying attempts for fixation of the discourse. The thematic nodal points can be considered to function in the current thesis as activating underlying tensions that are salient to the topic of Russian national identity in the context of integration.

Examining the critical discourse moments, I have adhered to “a culture of close attention,” which Schiffauer (2008: 15; quoted and translated from the German by Macgilchrist 2011: 11) explains as aiming “to present a description and interpretation which is plausibly argued and resonates with readers.” In practice, this means that I have analyzed the critical discourse moments by searching for answers to the following sub-questions to the main research questions:

1) Does the current diacritical marker construct a boundary between an in-group and an out-group? 2) Who are the individual group members located on either side of the boundary? 3) Is the boundary represented as one that members of the out-group can cross? 4) What can the answers to the preceding questions tell us about the Russian community that is “imagined” in the current discourse?

3.4 Methodological Challenges

My choice to focus on integration led me into unknown territory within the field of Russian area studies. Studying a hitherto little-explored discourse with discursive constructions of Barth’s boundary as my point of departure has been challenging in many ways. The first challenge was the selection of empirical material. My interest in discourses on the integration of immigrants did not result from prior knowledge about migration and integration in a Russian context. Rather, it occurred as a result of a merger between my interest in the integration of immigrants per se and an initial plan to study migrants in the Russian media. As such, I had no pre-defined idea of what I might find. My response to this was to rely on a heuristic approach to the empirical material, thus aligning myself with Barth’s (1994: 12) emphasis on studying what is deemed salient by those who are being studied. I have taken the presence of the signifiers “language,” “culture” and “religion” in both types of discourse as a sign that they are made salient by the speakers. As a result, I have excluded other possibly existing boundaries, such as for example ethnicity and race. Instead, I focus on how other themes are indirectly present through the diacritical markers and interpret this throughout the study.

One may rightly ask how statements that have appeared in different publications over the course of such a long time-span can be subject to a qualitative study. The main reason it was possible to extract a sample that stretches over such a long time-span is the empirical material never exceeded a manageable amount. However, this is not to say that the study should be considered marginal. On the contrary, the strength of the study is that it approaches Russian national identity, a theme that has been subject to academic discussion for centuries, from a new and different angle. Further, the topic of the integration of immigrants is also related to migration, which is a field of study with the potential for expansion in a Russian context. In his work The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault was preoccupied with studying which statements were seen as meaningful and true in a given historical epoch (see Jørgensen and Phillips 2012: 11). Similarly, the research questions of this thesis can be interpreted as investigating “the truth” about what is sayable about the Russian “imagined community” in light of the integration of immigrants. In turn, this knowledge is obtained by investigating how the boundaries of this community are constructed in discourse.

Moreover, the disparity of the material investigated in Chapters V, VI and VII has posed some challenge. While many discourse-analytical studies appear firm in their conclusions about what was the dominant position on this or that topic, this study explores varieties. The critical discourse moments analyzed in the media discourse first sight appear like a messy collection of statements uttered at different points in time and related to different thematic nodal points. Yet, it is my firm belief that empirical material should not be left unanalyzed simply because it does not fit into this or that pre-defined classification scheme. Accepting this disparity and analyzing it as it appears is in accordance with the bottom-up approach employed throughout this study. One of the contributions of the study is that it shows the diversity of contexts in which the three diacritical markers function as boundaries.

It is my opinion that being guided by the empirical material is important when assuming a discourse-based approach, especially when it comes to responding to the frequently voiced criticism against discourse analysis that it is not objective (see Wilhelmsen 2013: 63–64). The main argument here is that a discourse analysist runs the danger of only “discovering” what he or she set out to find. Thus, the empirical material is reduced to a means to serve only one function: to confirm the researcher’s own hypotheses. “Discourse” thus becomes a means to justify a particular stance or interpretation (see Breeze 2011: 498). Approaching the empirical material from below, and following Barth’s (1994: 12) example to pay attention to themes that are made salient by the speakers, I believe I have avoided this pitfall.

As noted, my search queries were “integration and/or adaptation of migrants.” However, speakers at times also employ other signifiers when speaking about individuals who belong to the initial out-group. Sometimes, individuals are referred to as members of a particular ethnic or national group. On a fiew occasions, speakers employ the term “compatriots.” In line with my view of the discourse as crystallizing around nodal points, I have chosen not to systematically distinguish between migrants of different origins. Instead, I comment upon and discuss migrants’ individual background when I consider this as relevant.

3.4.1 Newspapers

As newspaper readership generally outcompeted by television and electronic media, it is reasonable to ask what merits a study of a discourse that unfolds in print media. There are several answers to this question. My first answer is that in line with my bottom-up approach to the empirical material, what first and foremost merits the study is the observed presence of

70 the diacritical markers in the empirical material. As noted in Chapter II, this is a study that is concerned with media discourse as reflecting broader understandings of national identity among the dominant group of a given society (see Tolz and Harding 2015: 455). This is in accordance with my focus on what constitutes the discursive “truth” about Russian national identity in the context of integration of immigrants. Thus, I am not concerned with readership, but media content. As the empirical chapters will show, the material extracted from the newspapers is rich in content. This alone merits analysis. Further, studying newspapers makes it possible to extract a sample of different publications that cover the whole “mainstream” political spectrum. As such, they can fruitfully be compared with the presidential discourse.

That said, my choice to rely on newspapers is also rooted in practical methodological considerations. Russian television has already been covered extensively by Tolz and colleagues23 and such a study would require a different research design. Examining radio and television broadcasts would make it difficult to collect enough empirical material within the time frame of the study, as I would have had to watch or listen to material in order to detect coverage of integration, rather than using a search engine.

Choosing to rely on newspapers also means that I excluded social media. While such a study would be fruitful, it would be more likely to complement the current study than to replace it. As recent studies of social media have revealed, this part of the public sphere displays a stronger tendency towards fragmentation into different “echo chambers” that can contribute towards polarization towards the extremes (Bright 2018), which would render comparison with presidential discourse less fruitful.

To sum up, the fact that there exists a discourse about the integration of immigrants in Russian newspapers, together with my finding that the three diacritical markers function as boundaries within that and the presidential discourse, are precisely the factors that makes the current study important. In terms of both sources and area of focus, the study shows how a bottom-up approach can provide the already established field of Russian nationalism studies with new and unexpected insight.

3.4.2 The Three Diacritical Markers

23 See literature review in Chapter 1. 71

It must be noted that on the conventional civic/ethnic continuum, the three diacritical markers are associated primarily with an understanding of the nation as an ethnic community (see Kolstø 2000: 2). One may rightly ask whether my choice of diacritical markers can be seen as limiting my study to one of ethnic nationalism. My response is that it is precisely here that my view of the nation as constructed in discourse assumes relevance. My discourse-based approach means that I study language in use. I focus on how the diacritical markers function as boundaries, which detaches me from established associations sufficiently enough to conduct an analysis that focuses on their role in the current discourse.

Further, and in line with Barth (1969: 51), I focus on their function as the “boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses.” This means that I am not primarily concerned with the kind of content speakers ascribe to “language,” “culture” or “religion.” My focus is on how the Russian community is constructed in discourse as a result of the diacritical markers assuming the function of boundaries. As explained, my choice of diacritical markers derives from their observed presence in the empirical material, not because they are associated with a particular definition of the nation. What they essentially do is to contribute to the discursive construction of images of the Russian national community. In order to underscore their function as boundaries, I write them in quotation marks in the empirical chapters: “language,” “culture” and “religion.”

3.4.3 Russian Terminology and the Researcher’s Lexical Choices

Studying Russian national identity in light of the topic of the integration of immigrants, the researcher encounters at least four major challenges that are inextricably linked:

1) How to understand the term “migrant”?

2) How to interpret words and expressions that denote Russian national identity?

3) How to employ English words and expressions that denote Russian national identity?

4) How to provide accurate translations of Russian terms into English?

Pertaining to all of these questions, Myhre (2018: 12) pointedly notes that the researcher must be aware of lexical choices, both in the empirical material and one’s own. Terms such as “the

Russian nation” and “migrant” often have different meanings in the Russian and English language and are also context-dependent.

As regards the term “migrant,” Berg-Nordlie, Aasland and Tkach (2010: 14) observe a lack of differentiation in the Russian usage of this term between internal migrants and foreign immigrants. The signifier “migrant” can refer to both an international migrant and an internal migrant. It is often not clear from the context to which category an individual belongs. This lack of lexical clarity is further complicated by the tendency to discuss both international and internal migration as one and the same topic. The statement “Moscow is inundated by hordes of migrants” may describe an influx of both internal migrants and foreign immigrants into the capital. Since Russia is a multiethnic state, members of minority groups that have a different physical appearance from the local population in the place where they arrive may be termed “migrant,” simply because they come across as different (Berg-Nordlie, Aasland and Tkach 2010: 14). It is precisely the likelihood of being subject to the same discursive construction of difference that unites the signified internal and external migrants in a Russian context. The mythical “migrant” is a discursive construction that is often based on perceived difference from the local population.

As addressed in Chapter I “Introduction”, the terms russkii and rossiiskii have different connotations. As I discussed there, it is important to note that while the most commonly understood distinction between russkii and rossiiskii is that between an ethnic and civic understanding of the nation, an individual’s usage of a term is not necessarily dictated by it. As I study language in use, I pay attention to and comment upon how terms appear in use in the empirical material. In line with the stated goals and related limitations of discourse analysis, I remain focused on how they are invested with meaning in each particular case.

With regard to translation, two Russian terms are particularly challenging to translate into English: natsional’nyi and etnos. As Prina (2016: 14, see also Shanin1988: 410) observes, the term natsional’nyi has no equivalent in English. It could mean both “national,” understood as adherence to the state, as well as “ethnic”, denoting belonging to a particular group. The noun natsional’nost’ could refer to assimilated individuals, who could be russkiie by natsional’nost’, but not by ethnic adherence. In Russian, the natsional’nyi can be employed in combination with the noun “minority.” Natsional’nyie men’shinstva means “ethnic” or “(ethno)national minorities”.

In this thesis, I translate natsional’nyi into “ethnic” when the term is used in a domestic Russian context. This is because I want to avoid confusion between mezhnatsional’nyi (“interethnic”) and mezhdunarodnyi (“international”), as both terms appear in the empirical material. On occasions when I want to pay attention to how the term is invested with meaning, I transcribe it into Latin script as natsional’nyi.

The term etnos derives from Soviet ethnology24 and carries primordial connotations to an ethnic group that has persisted over a long time span. The official English translation of Putin’s annual addresses available from www.kremlin.ru, the term is inconsistently translated as either “ethnicity” (Putin September 19, 2013), “peoples” (Putin August, 2012) and “ethnic group” (March 18, 2014). In order to be consistent, I translate this term as “ethnic” or add it as “[ethnic]” within square brackets. This choice is motivated by my wish to remain consistent and stick to commonplace English terminology. On occasions when I have wanted to pay attention to the usage of the term, I have commented on this in the empirical chapters.

The challenges produced by differences in terminology are also the main reason I chose to reproduce all direct quotes in the Russian original, together with my English translations. In doing so, I expose myself to criticism as regards the accuracy of my translations. However, this decision gives the readers the opportunity to trace and understand the analysis. In my opinion, this is also part of making the study retroductable (see Wodak and Meyer 2009).

The final consideration concerns my own choice of vocabulary. In the empirical material, speakers employ different signifiers to refer to the Russian in-group. Inspired by Anderson’s (1991) formulation “imagined community” (my italics), I have chosen to employ the term “Russian community” or Russian “imagined community” when referring to the in-group, or the Self—be it russkii or rossiiskii. This term reflects my view of the nation as constructed in discourse and fulfills the researcher’s need for a neutral term to denote the in-group community, irrespective of its characteristics.

24 The term was introduced in Russia Nikolai Shirokogorov in the 1920 and has also been employed by Lev Gumilev, who is known for his unorthodox theories of ethnogenesis. See Tishkov (1997) for a thorough account of the origin and usage of the term during Soviet times. 74

3.5 Summing Up

Focusing on the integration of immigrants, this thesis studies a hitherto underexplored topic in a Russian context. Choosing to focus on a topic that has received little attention in academic literature, I have relied on a bottom-up approach to the empirical material. I have conducted purposive sampling in order to collect empirical material that I believe can shed new and at times unexpected light on the long-standing academic discussion about Russian national identity. The analysis centers on how terms and concepts are invested with different meanings and how statements that can be grouped under different nodal points can provide information about how speakers understand the Russian “imagined community.”

4 Chapter IV Presidential Discourse: the Official Image of the Russian Community

4.1 Introduction

The point of departure of this chapter is the question posed at the beginning of this thesis. The question “what is the Russian ‘imagined community’?” can be rephrased as “what is it that holds the Russian ‘imagined community’ together?” As I pointed out in Chapter III, political speeches of the kind studied here can be considered as aiming to construct consensus among the in-group members. Metaphorically, we can say that they engage in a search for the right type of “glue” that can cement the “imagined community.” As explained in Chapter II “Theory Framework,” emphasis on in-group similarity necessarily entails constructions of out-group difference (see Jenkins 2008: 22). As the speeches studied here aim to construct consensus, the out-group constructions tend to happen covertly: by tacit implication. These should not be overlooked, as information about who are implied to be out-groups is imperative to understanding the underlying tensions in the formation of Russian national identity.

Beginning with Vladimir Putin’s “Millennium Manifesto” (December 30, 1999), I point out one of the key elements that Putin identified as the basis for the future development of Russia: a national rossiiskaia idea. Combined with an efficient economy and a strong state, the Russian rossiskaia idea was to ensure Russia’s resurgence (Blakkisrud 2016: 251). Focusing on one of the values in the “Manifesto,” I account for how a non-ethnic, state-centered patriotism has been the Kremlin’s main tool for nation-building since Putin’s accession to the presidency (Blakkisrud 2016: 251). In the succeeding analysis of the three diacritical markers—“language,” “culture,” and “religion”—the focus is on how these can link together a wide range of Russian “imagined communities.” As a main finding, I argue that the discourse by a considerable margin reflects Shevel’s (2011) claim about Russian nation- building being “purposefully ambiguous” in the sense that it appears as adjusting to the context of empirical reality in a way that makes it difficult to attack it for the implied out- group constructions.

4.2 Point of Departure: Vladimir Putin’s “Millennium Manifesto”

Why search for what it is that can tie an imagined community together? The answer may seem obvious: because it is missing. In his “Millennium Manifesto,” Putin discreetly recognized that what Russia needed at the time was precisely a suitable “glue” that could join its elements together as an “imagined community.” The reason lay in Russia’s recent past: with liberal reforms overshadowed by setbacks, conflict in Chechnya, the collapsing ruble and Eltsin’s own declining health, his second term in office has even been termed a “national disgrace” (Pain 2005).

In the “Millennium Manifesto,” Putin confessed that he saw the Russian community as split and internally disintegrated:

Fruitful and creative work which our country needs so badly today is impossible in a split and internally disintegrated society, a society where the man social sections and political forces have different basic values and fundamental ideological benchmarks.

Плодотворная созидательная работа, в которой так нуждается наше Отечество, невозможна в обществе, находящемся в состоянии раскола, внутренне разобщенном. В обществе, где основные социальные слои, политические силы придерживаются различных базовых ценностей и основополагающих идеологических ориентиров. (Putin December 30, 1999)

What characterized the Russian community was precisely the absence of a sense of community. In the second part of the “Manifesto,” Putin outlined a long-term strategy for ensuring “fast and stable economic and social development” [“быстрoe и устойчивoe экономическоe и социальноe развитиe страны”] (Putin, December 30, 1999). This strategy consisted of three core components: a strong state, an efficient economy, and a “Russian idea”—rossiiskaia ideia.

4.2.1 The Russian Idea

The expression “Russian idea” can be interpreted in two ways. It may refer to the general conceptualization of a Russian identity as elaborated in the 19th and 20th centuries (Merati 2017: 25). However, it is also the title of an essay by the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdiaev (1992), The Russian [russkaia] Idea, originally published in 1946 during his exile in Paris. As Merati (2017: 26) explains, Berdiaev’s Russian idea may be understood as the “true glue” that held together the vast and diverse Tsarist Empire. When it comes to the Russian idea as the rossiiskaia ideia, Eltsin had in the recent past attempted to invest this signifier with meaning. Among his efforts was a national essay competition on the concept in 1998, the year before the “Millennium Manifesto” was published (Rutland 2010, see also Helleman 2004).

In the “Manifesto”, Putin invested the Rossiiskaia ideia with meaning by referring to it as combining two constituent elements: what he presented as Russian traditional primordial (iskonnye) values, and a set of “universal” values. These universal values were

freedom of expression, freedom to travel abroad and other fundamental political rights and human liberties.

свобода слова, выезда за границу, другие основные политические права и свободы личности. (Putin December 30, 1999)

These he coupled with “another bolster for the unity of Russian society,” namely the “primordial traditional values of the Russians” [“исконныe, традиционныe ценности россиян”]:

Patriotism, belief in the greatness of Russia, statism, and social solidarity.

Пaтриотизм, Державность, Государственничество, Cоциальная солидарность. (Putin December 30,1999)

These values were nothing new. As Kolstø (2004b: 2) points out, the universal values or, as Putin termed them, “freedoms,” corresponded with what was then commonly associated with Western-style capitalism and democracy, as well as with the main political program of Putin’s predecessor, Eltsin. The “primordial traditional values” reiterated general ideas about

Russianness expressed in earlier works on Russian intellectual and cultural history (see Kolstø 2004b: 4). These were framed as the values of all rossiiane. Throughout the “Manifesto,” Putin consistently employed the term rossiiane when referring to the Russian population, thus aligning himself with his predecessor Eltsin’s habit of denoting the Russian population. What Putin can be seen as accomplishing in the “Millennium Manifesto” was to attribute the combination of the two types of values to the Russian population. In this way, he identified a broadly defined glue that could cement the Russian “imagined” community together.

How did Putin’s rossiiskaia ideia resonate among the population in general? There is no clear answer, but a survey conducted by Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2004) in June 2000 may give an indication. The survey revealed that it was precisely the combination of “universal values and traditional Russian values” that the respondents felt should be the main elements of a Russian state ideology25 (Kolstø 2004a: 331). While we cannot draw any conclusions about the causal relationship between Putin’s list of values and those preferred by the survey respondents, their correspondence shows at least that the same values were seen as important by both parties.

Pertaining to the “imagined” in-group behind the term rossiiane, we may here ask the banal question, “who were Putin’s rossiiane”? The obvious answer is that Putin was referring to all the citizens of the Russian Federation. Employing the same signifier as Eltsin introduced, Putin could be seen as “doing” no more than being consistent with his predecessor. However, with regard to both Putin and Eltsin, we ought not to forget that the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation opens with the reference, “We, the multiethnic people of the Russian Federation …” [“Мы, многонациональный народ Российской Федерации ”] (“Constitution…” 1993). Further, it established Russia’s federative structure with recognition of the republics’ right to introduce their own official languages and guarantees for all the peoples of the Russian Federation to employ and study their mother tongues (“Constitution…” 1993, Art. 68, Rutland 2010: 120).

Juxtaposing the rossiiane with the “multinational people of the Russian Federation” with reference to de Saussure’s (1960) vocabulary, we encounter the situation where its signifieds are the same, namely all the inhabitants of Russia. What differ are their signifiers: the terms

25 According to Article 13.2 of the Russian Constitution, no ideology may be established as the state (or obligatory) ideology in Russia. The June 2000 survey also asked whether Russia needed a state ideology, to which 72% of the respondents answered affirmatively; moreover, Russia’s 1996 “Concept of the State Nationalities Policy of the Russian Federation” referred to the values of both the various peoples of Russia and those of the Russian state ( Kolstø 2004a: 330) 80 that denote them. As noted in the introductory chapter, the corresponding adjective to rossiiane—rossiiskii—is most commonly understood as loyalty with the state by either a territorial definition, citizenship or common values. Inherent in Putin’s formulation, “the primordial traditional values” (my italics) of the rossiiane are pointing towards a more distant past than the Eltsin era. If we accept that Putin’s usage of rossiiskii and rossiiane carry connotations to a civic national state, the connection between “the primordial traditional values” and the rossiiane implies the recognition that such has existed in the past. This brings us to Tishkov’s (2013: 5–7) argument about the existence of the historical rossiiskoe state. As noted in the introductory chapter, Tishkov (2009: 46) argued that the type of civic allegiance to the state that later came to be associated with the term rossiiskii described a sense of belonging to the concepts of “fatherland” and “homeland.” While Tishkov (2009: 53) has argued that the rossiiskoe state should be considered a nation-state, Putin’s usage of the term can be seen as putting emphasis on the state, rather than the nation. As noted by Rutland (2010: 123), Putin has generally employed rossiiskii only in matters concerning the Russian state and less so when speaking about the Russian people. Among the listed “primordial traditional values of the Russians” was also “statism” (gosudarstvennichestvo).

According to Rutland (2010: 2014) in 2010, Putin has primarily been a statist (gosudarstvennik), not a nationalist. His “nationalism” is neither civic nor ethnic. In the words of Rutland (2010: 124), “State power—and not national community—[was] his object of veneration.” As follows from this, the connection between rossiiane and primordial traditional values can on the one hand be seen as diverging from his later discursive practice, while it on the other can be seen as an attempt to establish a connection between state power and the Russian people. Thus, what Putin could be seen as “doing,” was to legitimize statism by representing it as coming “from below,” from the people.

However, looking at the first decade of the new millennium, what has observably been the main strategy for nation-building in the years 2000–2008 is tied to a different signifier: “patriotism” (see Blakkisrud 2016: 251).

4.3 Patriotism

In the “Millenium Manifesto,” Putin defined patriotism as follows:

[..] for most Russians, [patriotism] has retained its original, fully positive value. It is a sense of pride in their homeland and its history and accomplishments. It is a desire to make the country more beautiful, richer, stronger, happier. When these feelings are free of national arrogance and imperial ambitions, there is nothing reprehensible or bigoted [in it]. It is a source of courage, fortitude, and strength of the people.26

[..] для большинства россиян [патриотизм] сохранило свое первоначальное, полностью позитивное значение. Это чувство гордости своим Отечеством, его историей и свершениями. Это стремление сделать свою страну краше, богаче, крепче, счастливее. Когда эти чувства свободны от национальной кичливости и имперских амбиций, в них нет ничего предосудительного, косного. Это источник мужества, стойкости, силы народа. (Putin December 30, 1999)

In his 2012 annual address to the Federal Assembly 13 years later, Putin stated that:

Being a patriot means […] first and foremost to serve one’s society and country.”

[“Именно в гражданской ответственности, в патриотизме вижу консолидирующую базу нашей политики. Быть патриотом значит […] прежде всего служить обществу и стране. (Putin December 12, 2012)

In the other presidential addresses examined, patriotism figured in a range of contexts and was linked to such different issues as demography, cultural traditions, and the business community. Reiterating the core content of the “Millennium Manifesto,” Putin, in his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 2000, stated that the unity of Russia was strengthened by the “patriotism inherent in our people, by cultural traditions and common historic memory” [“присущий нашему народу патриотизм, культурные традиции, общая историческая память”] (Putin July 8, 2000). In a similar fashion, in his 2007 annual address, he declared: “Genuine art […] helps to forge patriotic spirit” [“Настоящее искусство […] формирует начала патриотизма] (Putin April 26, 2007).

In his 2006 annual address and the opening address to the Valdai International Discussion Club in 2013, Putin referred to the need for patriotic education in the schools:

A huge number of young men of conscription age today suffer from chronic diseases and have problems with drinking, smoking, and sometimes drugs as well. I think that

26 The English translation on www.kremlin.ru here reads “nation.” As the Russian original uses the term “narod” I have translated this into “people.” 82

in our schools we need not just to teach, but to educate, our young people. We must engage in their physical and patriotic development.

Сегодня огромное число молодых людей призывного возраста имеют хронические болезни, пристрастие к алкоголю, курению, а порой и к наркотикам. Считаю, что в школах надо не только учить, но и воспитывать. Надо заниматься физической и военно-патриотической подготовкой молодежи. (Putin May 10, 2006)

The role of education is all the more important because in order to educate an individual, a patriot, we must restore the role of the great Russian culture and literature. They must serve as the foundation for people’s personal identity, the source of their uniqueness and their basis for understanding the national idea.

Роль образования тем важнее, что для воспитания личности, патриота нам нужно восстанавливать роль великой русской культуры и литературы. Они должны быть фундаментом для самоопределения граждан, источником самобытности и основы для понимания национальной идеи. (Putin September 19, 2013)

Before that, in the same speech, Putin had linked patriotic consciousness to the preservation of national unity across ethnic and religious differences:

…it is clearly impossible to identify oneself only through one’s ethnicity or religion in such a large nation with a multi-ethnic population.27 In order to maintain the unity of the country,28 people must develop a civic identity on the basis of shared values, a patriotic consciousness, civic responsibility and solidarity, respect for the law, and a sense of responsibility for the fate of their homeland, without losing touch with their ethnic or religious roots.

...идентификация исключительно через этнос, религию в крупнейшем государстве с полиэтническим составом населения, безусловно, невозможна. Формирование именно гражданской идентичности на основе общих ценностей, патриотического сознания, гражданской ответственности и солидарности, уважения к закону, сопричастности к судьбе Родины без потери связи со своими этническими, религиозными корнями—необходимое условие сохранения единства страны. (Putin September 19, 2013)

27 I here translate polietnicheskii with “multi-ethnic,” Putin did not employ the adjective natsional’nyi about Russia’s population. 28 The Russian original reads “strana,” which means “country,” not “nation,” which was the word employed in the English translation on www.kremlin.ru. I have changed this into “country.” 83

Looking at the citations above, they can on the one hand be seen as investing “patriotism” as a floating signifier with meaning. However, the statements do not appear as engaging in the presupposed discursive struggle over different understandings of the signifier. To the contrary, they give the impression that Putin invests “patriotism” with a different content in order to make it emerge as an all-embracing boundary. Further, his usage of the primordially connoted term etnos, can also be seen as emphasizing the need to distance patriotism from ethnicity.

Beyond the presidential discourse, patriotism was far from only rhetoric. When Putin mentioned education in 2006 and again in 2013, he brought into the discourse an arena of policy implementation not intuitively associated with elite discourse on national identity: the classroom. Along with the armed forces, Russian elementary school classrooms have functioned as the arena where patriotic education takes place. Since 2000, the Russian government has launched three government programs on patriotic education, the last of which will continue until 2020.

While its precise content has been subject to local variations, the common denominators of patriotic education have been the memorialization of great events in Russian history, the establishment of youth organizations and a general emphasis on the patriotic feelings of well- known scientists from Russian and Soviet history (Sanina 2017: 119).

In 2013, when Putin held his opening address to the Valdai Club, the third government program on patriotic education was in operation. Among its top priorities was interethnic peace (Sanina 2014: 44), which was precisely what Putin brought up in his address. This overlap between discourse and policy content must be interpreted as more than a mere concurrence. It shows how Putin’s discourse on national identity here ought to be seen as a product of carefully selected elements, including discrete references to policy measures or empirical reality.

The Diacritical Markers

4.4 “Language”

4.4.1 Nodal Point 1: The Russian “Imagined Community” as Stretching beyond the Russian Federation

The first reference to the Russian language in the examined Putin texts appeared in 2003, together with Putin’s first in-depth reference to migration.29 As the quote below suggests, Putin seemed to acknowledge the shortcomings of the 2002 restrictive law on migration:

We do not need bans and obstacles; we need an effective immigration policy. One that is advantageous for the country and practical for people, particularly for residents of the Commonwealth of Independent States. For people who are close to us and with whom we have a good understanding, and with whom we share the same language. These are people of our common Russian culture.

Нам нужны, конечно, не запреты и препоны, нам нужна эффективная иммиграционная политика. Выгодная для страны и удобная для людей. Особенно для жителей Содружества Независимых Государств. Для тех, кто близок нам и с кем мы хорошо понимаем друг друга. С кем говорим на одном языке. Это люди нашей с вами общей российской культуры. (Putin May 16, 2003)

Here, the Russian language was presented as linking together a community of Russian- speakers across the CIS space. This Russian “imagined community” was represented as open to all CIS migrants, who were referred to as being “close to” Russians, partly because they shared language with them. However, the closeness was not restricted to common language. As Putin expressed it, CIS residents were people of “our common Russian (rossiiskaia) culture.” Consequently, despite functioning as the main means of communication, the Russian language did not function as a sufficient criterion for unity. The image of the Russian community as open to CIS residents also depended on the perception of cultural similarity. As is evident, the signifier rossiiskaia was invested with meaning as able to include all citizens of the CIS. As a result, it was detached from the Russian state. This may be an attempt of tacit

29 Putin’s first and very brief reference to migration came in his 2002 annual address when he referred to the plan to conduct the first state census in the Russian Federation, which would aim, inter alia, at clarifying the number of immigrants in Russia. 85 recognition that the culture at hand was in reality the Soviet culture of the past and that the signifier rossiiskaia replaced “Soviet,” which can be regarded as confined to the unsayable.

Further, the statement was made at a time when people of working age throughout the post- Soviet area were still likely to possess Russian language skills. This excludes an overlap between “imagined” Russian-speakers and the culturally similar Eastern Slavs. As a community of Russian speakers, the “imagined” in-group was represented as sharing a cultural similarity that is not associated with ethnic culture similarity. The implied out-groups are those residing outside the CIS territory. As a result, “language” functioned to bind together a community of Russian-speakers that in reality excluded Russian-speakers residing outside the CIS, irrespective of national or ethnic origin.

The other image of Russia as stretching beyond the territorial borders of the Russian Federation was tied to the former Soviet past. In the context of the 60th anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Russian language in Putin’s annual address in 2005 figured, together with “the great culture,” as linking Russia to the former Soviet countries:

And Russia, bound to the former Soviet republics—now independent states—through a common historical destiny, and through the Russian language and the great culture that we share, cannot remain aloof from the shared desire for freedom.

И Россия, связанная с бывшими республиками СССР, а ныне независимыми государствами, единством исторической судьбы, русским языком и великой культурой, не может оставаться в стороне от общего стремления к свободе. (Putin April 25, 2005)

Again, “language” figured together with “culture.” Combined with the “common historical destiny,” it defined the in-group community as consisting of the former Soviet republics. Similar to 2003, the implied in-group members were all the inhabitants of the former USSR. Again, the image of Russia as an Eastern Slavic community was excluded. Identical to what was the case in 2003, the implied out-groups were only those outside the former Soviet territory. Thus, here also, “language” functioned as an ambiguous boundary that eventually excluded Russian-speakers from the Russian-speaking “imagined community.” By contrast to his usage of the signifier rossiiskii in 2003, Putin now explicitly mentioned the USSR. However, the common culture in the present was “great.” “Soviet culture” remained outside the discourse.

In 2007, Putin was speaking in the context of the Russian Language Year:

This year, the Russian Language Year, is a good time for us to remember once again that Russian is the language of a historical fraternity of peoples, a true language of international30 communication. The Russian language not only preserves an entire set of truly global achievements, but is also the living space for the many millions of people in the russkii mir, a community that goes far beyond Russia itself. As the common heritage of many peoples, the Russian language will never become the language of hatred or enmity, xenophobia or nationalism.

В этом году, объявленном Годом русского языка, есть повод еще раз вспомнить, что русский – это язык исторического братства народов, язык действительно международного общения. Он является не просто хранителем целого пласта поистине мировых достижений, но и живым пространством многомиллионного русского мира, который, конечно, значительно шире, чем сама Россия. Поэтому, как общее достояние многих народов, русский язык никогда не станет языком ненависти или вражды, ксенофобии или национализма. (Putin April 26, 2007)

In contrast to his 2003 and 2005 addresses, Putin here did not restrict the influence of the Russian language to the area of the USSR. By stressing its role as uniting a “historical fraternity of peoples” and “a community that goes far beyond Russia itself,” Putin left open the question of its limits, in time and in space. The connection between the Russian language and what was represented as “truly global achievements” substantiated the noted blurring of state borders. In turn, this connects with Putin’s mention of the russkii mir, the “Russian World.”

Known in English as the “Russian World,” the concept russkii mir can in its current shape be traced back to the revival of the tradition of a philosophical approach to Russia’s identity that occurred in the mid-90s. The stated goal with the intellectual discussions was, as it is formulated in the research questions of this thesis, to create an image of Russia. The process of creating the image of Russia was presented as similar to the aim of the presidential speeches: namely, to create connections between Russians (Laruelle 2015: 5). The term “Russian World” was for the first time used in an article titled “Russia: The Country that Does Not Exist” by Petr Shchedrovitsky and Efim Ostrovsky. Inspired by marketing techniques, the article read as a manifesto that called for a “rebranding” of Russia, both

30 “International” is used here in its conventional meaning: across state borders. The Russian original reads mezhdunarodnyi. 87 domestically and internationally (see Laruelle 2015: 5). The brand was the russkii mir. As Laruelle (2015: 2) notes, the term “world” should be understood as a civilizational space.

Being far from ethnonationalists, the designers behind the concept invested it with the meaning of Russia as participating in the world and offering a particular Russian voice to the world (see Laruelle 2015: 6). The Russian World is a russkii mir and not a rossiiskii mir. Consequently, russkii is in this sense a broader term than rossiiskii, which was recognized by Putin’s former deputy chief of staff, Vladislav Surkov (Rutland 2010: 122; see also Chadaev 2006).

The term russkii mir can be considered a floating signifier in the sense that it allows for the articulation of different links with Russia. On other occasions, Putin has used this term in referring to those who fall within the definition of compatriots (Laruelle 2015: 17). Accordingly, the implied out-groups also differ, ranging from anyone who is not a Russian- speaker to those who cannot identify as a compatriot.

By shifting his focus from the former Soviet Union and the present post-Soviet states towards a wider and less tangible community of Russian-speakers, Putin doubtless elevated “language” to the position of a stronger diacritical marker. Worthy of notice in this respect is that, in 2007, the Russian language functioned on its own without being linked to “culture.” In light of the status of the Russian language, this could be a sign of the development observed by Akturk (2017: 111) and to which I will return in Chapter V that the Russian language has become one of the key criteria of Russian national identity.

With regard to immigration, it is interesting to observe that Putin explicitly denied that the Russian language could ever be associated with xenophobia or nationalism. The year 2007 was the time when migration currents to Russia passed the “tipping point” towards an increasingly “foreign” character, as migration currents started to be dominated by individuals of non-Slavic descent. Further, the construction sectors heavily depended on access to foreign labor, which was also reflected in the 2007 amendments to the migration legislation. Besides, the year before, Russia had also witnessed the ethnically motivated violence in the Karelian town of Kondopoga. Taking this into account, the discursive space was at the time presumably limited to articulations of the Russian language as a common denominator of similarity that could outnumber other boundaries.

4.4.2 Nodal Point 2: The Russian “Imagined Community” as the Russian Federation

In his 2009 annual address, Medvedev iterated Putin’s emphasis on the role of the Russian language as a crucial means of communication between different peoples. Yet, his statement contrasted those of Putin analyzed above, as he limited the geographical impact area to the Russian Federation:

we need to […] develop and improve programs for the Russian language, which serves as the basis for interethnic communication and unity in our country.

мы обязаны […] развивать и совершенствовать программы обучения русскому языку, который является основой межнационального общения и единства нашей страны. (Medvedev November 12, 2009)

Similarly, Putin in his opening address to the Council for Interethnic Relations in February 2013, presented the Russian language as the fundamental basis of the unity of the Russian Federation:

The Russian language, our national language, is unquestionably the fundamental basis of national unity in our country as the language of interethnic communication. It shapes a common civic, cultural and educational environment, and every citizen of the Russian Federation must know this language well.

Фундаментальной основой единства страны, безусловно, является русский язык, наш государственный язык, язык межнационального общения. Именно он формирует общее гражданское, культурное,образовательное пространство. И знать его, причём на высоком уровне, должен каждый гражданин Российской Федерации. (Putin February 19, 2013)

In contrast to Putin’s 2007 address, the geographical impact area of the Russian language had now shrunk to the borders of the Russian Federation. Both presidents stressed the significance of the Russian language as the basis of unity by referencing its role as a means for interethnic communication. This prompts the question of whether the presidents’ mention of “interethnic communication” implies an image of Russia as a multi-ethnic “community of peoples.” Looking at Putin’s reference to “a common civic, cultural and educational environment,” this seems to draw attention away from ethnicity. What the Russian language was implied to unite is one cultural environment, not a plurality of “cultures” in the plural. In any case, “language”

89 functioned as a boundary that emphasized similarity within Russia, while tacitly omitting Russian-speakers beyond Russia’s borders.

In his opening address to the Council for Interethnic Relations in August 2012, Putin underscored how an ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse Russia was cemented by the Russian language, the Russian people and Russian culture.

According to the results of the 2010 national census, there are 193 peoples and ethnic groups in Russia today speaking 171 languages. Of these languages, 89 are taught in the state school system. I think I can confidently say that no European country offers such a [high] level of protection of citizens’ ethno-cultural rights.

[…]

No other country in the world has such a wealth of peoples [ethnic groups] and languages. In Europe, for sure, no country can match us here, and I think even in the United States it is so. True, the USA is a land of immigrants, but still, I think that no other country has Russia’s diversity. At the same time, we are fully justified in speaking of the key cementing role played by the Russian language and by the Russian people and its great culture.

По данным переписи 2010 года в России проживает 193 народа и народности, говорящих на 171 языке. В государственной системе oбразования используется 89 национальных языков, то есть в школах преподаётся 89 национальных языков. Такого уровня защиты этнокультурных прав граждан, я могу смело это сказать, наверно, нет ни в одной европейской стране.

[…]

Такого богатства этносов и языков нет ни в одной стране. В Европе точно нет, мне кажется, и в Штатах поменьше, хоть это и страна эмигрантов, но я думаю, что такого многообразия нет нигде. При этом мы с полным основанием можем говорить о ключевой, скрепляющей роли русского языка, русского народа, его великой культуры. (Putin August 24, 2012)

This was the first reference to Russia’s linguistic diversity. Contrasting Russia with Europe and the USA, Putin made Russia’s diversity appear almost as an immanent character trait. “Languages” in the plural was part of the boundary that united the diverse in-group. However, the linguistic “unity in diversity” did not function independently of the Russian language and culture, which were represented as the attributes of the Russian people. Diversity was represented as positive, as long as the members of the diversity agreed to be united by the

90 majority. By implication, a minority language speaker was included in the in-group based on his or her acceptance of the Russian language as the language of interethnic communication. As a result, the out-group was confined to the marginal group of non-Russian speakers.

In a similar fashion, in Putin’s opening 2015 address to the Joint Meeting of the Council for Interethnic Relations and the Council for the Russian Language, harmonious interethnic relations and civic unity went hand-in-hand. Here, he declared:

The preservation and development of the Russian language and the languages of all the peoples of our country are most important for harmony in interethnic relations and civic unity and for strengthening Russia’s state sovereignty and integrity.

Вопросы сохранения и развития русского, всех языков народов нашей страны имеют важнейшее значение для гармонизации межнациональных отношений, обеспечения гражданского единства, укрепления государственного суверенитета и целостности России. (Putin May 19, 2015)

For the first time, Putin mentioned the Russian language and all the languages spoken by the inhabitants of Russia as equally important for the unity of the nation. In so doing, he signaled that Russia’s linguistic diversity could also be part of the glue that cemented the Russian “imagined community.” The implied out-groups of the language-based community were only those residing outside the Russian Federation. Thus, the in-group “imagined community” was represented in terms of common territory and citizenship.

Considering the development in both discourse and policies, this statement is particularly intriguing. On the level of discourse, it represented a break with the hitherto dominant position of the Russian language. Pertaining to policies and general development, it also contradicted the tendencies of linguistic homogenization in Russia. As explained in section 1.8.1, a central tension in Russia during the period under study has been that between the promotion of the Russian language and the rights and opportunities to learn and use minority languages. Along with the promotion of the Russian language on the symbolic level, minority language speakers have experienced practical obstacles to the realization of their rights to use and learn their languages (see Prina 2016). Pertaining to actual language command, the general picture comprises increased levels of Russian language possession that have been accompanied by a long-term decrease in levels of fluency in minority languages (Akturk 2017: 1108–1109).

Against this backdrop, Putin’s 2012 and 2015 statements can be seen as an attempt to balance the interests of minority language speakers with those of the Russian-speaking majority. However, what should not be overlooked is the 2012 joint emphasis on both “language” and “culture.” This foreshadows a tendency to which I will return in Chapter V. The strengthening of “language” as a boundary when it functions together with “culture.”

4.4.3 Summing Up

The way the discourse on “language” crystallized around two broadly defined “imagined communities” reveals a difference in emphasis on linguistic and at times cultural uniformity and diversity. When it extended beyond Russia’s borders, the in-group members were represented as united by one language and one culture with virtually no emphasis on their diversity. By contrast, when the language-based community remained identical to the territory of the Russian Federation, the in-group could also be represented as characterized by its diversity. The fact that the total population of the post-Soviet space is even more diverse than that of the Russian Federation consistently remained outside the discourse. Thus, the “imagined community” that stretched beyond Russia’s territorial borders was less in touch with demographic reality than the one that coincided with the state entity.

This is also true for language command. While Putin, prior to Medvedev’s accession to the presidency, continued to emphasize the Russian language as a uniting factor across the entire post-Soviet space and beyond, he left unmentioned the already occurring decline in Russian language command throughout the area. In this regard, the discourse can be seen as touching upon its own unsayable. As a result of dwindling levels of fluency in Russian in the CIS, the implied universe of candidates for in-group membership is in reality gradually narrowed down to encompass those resourceful enough to learn Russian by their own efforts. In reality, these are increasingly likely to be other Eastern Slavs, which in turn overlap with those who are most likely to be represented as belonging to the “compatriot” category. These are generally not represented as “migrants”, but as “compatriots,” that is, “desired” citizens (see Myhre 2017).

Paradoxically, when tying together the citizens of the post-Soviet space, “language” functioned as a boundary that excluded Russian-speakers outside this area from the in-group. Looking at the discourse through the lens of Shevel’s (2011) claim about Russian nation-

92 building as purposefully ambiguous, this can be seen as resulting from the identification of particular groups as target groups for the occurring constructions of unity.

4.5 “Culture”

4.5.1 Nodal Point 1: “Culture” in the Singular

The discourse on “culture” crystallizes around two nodal points: “culture” in the singular and “cultures” in the plural. As with “language,” the first reference to Russian culture coincided with the first extensive reference to migration. In his 2003 annual address, Putin portrayed prospective CIS migrants as “people of our common Russian culture” [“люди нашей с вами общей российской культуры”] (Putin May 16, 2003). As indicated in the above analysis of “language,” the signifier rossiiskaia culture served to detach the “imagined” cultural community from notions of ethnicity. What Putin constructed was an in-group open to include CIS residents as such, irrespective of ethnic or national origin. Besides the detachment from ethnicity, rossiiskaia was also untangled from connotations to the Russian state. Encompassing all CIS migrants, rossiiskaia came to signify a common cultural adherence that stretched across state borders, rather than loyalty to one particular state. As noted, the question that was left unanswered, was whether rossiiskaia was in reality a substitute for “Soviet.”

Employing the same signifier, Putin made the following statement on migrants in 2006:

People coming to our country must treat Russian [rossiiskaia] culture, our national traditions with respect.

Переезжающие в Россию люди должны с уважением относиться к российской культуре, к нашим национальным традициям. (Putin May 10, 2006)

The “culture” in question was the same as in 2003: the rossiiskaia culture, this time accompanied by “our natsional’nye traditions,” in the plural. In contrast to his 2003 statement, the rossiiskaia cultural space was confined to include only the territory of the Russian Federation. What remained open to interpretation was the relationship between the rossiiskaia culture and the natsional’nye traditions. If rossiiskaia is taken to mean exclusively

93 state-centered, the rossiiskaia culture must be implied to exist detached from natsional’nye traditions. If rossiiskaia is taken to mean “non-ethnic,” it becomes open to interpretation whether it should be understood as completely detached from ethnicity per se or not associated with the ethnic Russian majority. In case of the latter, rossiiskii could denote the sum of all the natsional’nye traditions. In turn, this prompts the question of how we should understand the relationship between the ethnic Russian majority and the other bearers of the pluralized “traditions.” What remains open to question is whether rossiiskaia’s “unsayable signified” is the Russian majority population. Consequently, the statement is imbued with ambiguity, as the “imagined community” ends up as oscillating between a community of either all of Russia’s citizens, all of Russia’s peoples or the ethnic Russian majority together with the minorities.

From the perspective of integration, the way Putin formulated his statement sheds light on an interesting aspect of the “meeting” between members of the imagined in-group and the out- group. Putin’s call for migrants to treat the in-group’s culture and traditions with represented the culture and traditions as something possessed by the members of the in-group that would not automatically be open to the inclusion of migrants. Thus, “Russian culture and traditions,” regardless of their location along the civic–ethnic continuum, were depicted as phenomena that the migrants could approach, but not become included in. Their integration was a matter of adjustment, rather than inclusion. As a result, the rossiiskaia kul’tura functioned as a boundary that separated the migrants from the imagined in-group. With regards to the prospective migrants—or, in the words of Putin, “people coming to our country”—their out- group difference was based on an implicit reference to them as culturally different from the in-group. Even though the construction of in-group similarity remained open to several interpretations, the construction of the out-group members as different relied on the implicit understanding of them as culturally different.

Also speaking about migrants, Medvedev made the following statements on culture in his 2008 address:

In Russia, a flow of immigrants continues to arrive, particularly from the Commonwealth [CIS]. We know that many of them hope to obtain Russian citizenship. In general, this is a positive process. But citizenship must constitute proof of their successful integration into our society and their embracement of our culture and traditions.

В Россию продолжает прибывать поток мигрантов, особенно из стран Содружества. Известно, что многие из них стремятся получить российское гражданство. В целом это позитивный процесс. Однако получение гражданства должно стать доказательством их успешной интеграции в жизнь нашего общества и восприятия его культуры и традиций. (Medvedev November 5, 2008)

Here, Medvedev connected integration with the acquisition of Russian citizenship. Citizenship was linked to cultural integration, described as the migrants’ “embracement” (vospriiatie) of the in-group’s culture and traditions. Medvedev thus went further than Putin in envisaging the migrants as prospective members of the in-group’s cultural community. In contrast to Putin, he opened up the in-group community’s culture to include new members, while Putin represented the process of integration as ending in respect for Russian culture. Consequently, Medvedev’s “culture” came to function as a boundary that could be crossed and then function as common ground for integration. In describing integration as the migrants’ “embracement of our culture and traditions,” Medvedev hinted at an understanding of integration as closer to assimilation. Citizenship was represented as the ultimate formal recognition of successful integration. In the end, cultural assimilation was invested with meaning as a means to achieve formal integration.

What remained unanswered in Medvedev’s statement was what type of culture he referred to. As the Russian original reads, the culture and traditions were represented as the possession of the “society” (obshchestvo). In this way, linkages between “culture” and different representations of the in-group community simply remained outside the discourse.

The way both Putin and Medvedev’s statements were formulated, they revealed nothing about what kinds of migrants the presidents had in mind. Pertaining to their 2006 and 2008 statements, they occurred around the turning point when migration currents became increasingly dominated by non-Slavic migrants (Myhre 2012: 13). This may explain the shift in focus from Putin’s emphasis on CIS residents as members of the common rossiiskaia culture in 2003. Though not mentioned explicitly, the migrants had now become increasingly “foreign.” Still, they were represented as able to become integrated in the Russian in-group, depending on their respective adjustment or embracement to the in-group’s culture. Thus, the implied out-groups were those who would not meet this requirement of cultural integration.

Outside the context of immigration, “culture” in the singular showed its ability to tie together “imagined communities” that both traversed and conformed to the state borders of the Russian Federation. In connection with the 60th anniversary of Russia’s victory in the Great Patriotic War, Putin referred back to the Soviet era when he stated:

And Russia, linked with the former Soviet republics—now independent countries— through a common history, and through the Russian language and the great culture that we share, cannot stay away from the common desire for freedom.

Here, “the great culture” was represented as what all members of the former Soviet community still had in common. As noted in the section on “language” above, the “imagined” cultural community clearly stretched beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, founded on a past that was depicted as remaining sufficiently influential and relevant to function as a common ground for unity today. The adjective “great” (velikii) endowed it with positive content while also disentangling it from associations with any specific group or the “Soviet culture.” The statement showed that the idea of a common culture could still function in the context of the Soviet past and become part of the Russian “gallery” of greatness. The implied cultural in-group community comprised all former Soviet citizens, who were also united by a “common desire for freedom.” On the outside of the boundary were only those who were implied as remaining outside the territory of the former USSR.

In the same address, Putin turned his attention towards Europe:

Above all else Russia was, is and will, of course, be a major European power. Achieved through much suffering by European culture, the ideals of freedom, human rights, justice and democracy have for many centuries been our society’s determining values.

Прежде всего, Россия была, есть и, конечно, будет крупнейшей европейской нацией. Выстраданные и завоеванные европейской культурой идеалы свободы, прав человека, справедливости и демократии в течение многих веков являлись для нашего общества определяющим ценностным ориентиром. (Putin April 25, 2005)

In the current corpus, Putin’s invocation of similarity with Europe is unique. As is evident, European culture was represented as having undergone suffering to achieve what was represented as Russia’s determining values. On the surface, the statement may seem as an attempt to align Russia with Europe. Together with the above construction of similarity with the post-Soviet republics, Putin’s 2005 speech may immediately come across as oscillating and ambiguous regarding Russia’s position in the world. However, such an interpretation would imply falling into the trap of interpreting contemporary Russia as necessarily either of the West or non-European. I will return to this discussion in greater detail following the analysis of “cultures” in the plural.

Before that, however, I will assess one specific representation of the Russian “imagined community” that has been pointed to as characterizing Putin’s third presidency: the one that emphasizes the role of the ethnic Russians (see Blakkisrud 2016). To the general public, this theme was most prominently expressed in his programmatic article “Russia: The National Question,” when Putin underlined the role of the Russian people as “the state-forming people” (gosudarstvoobrazuiushchii narod):

The Russian people are the state-forming people—on the basis of Russia’s existence. The great mission of Russians is to unite and tighten our civilization together. Language, culture and “universal kind-heartedness,” according to Fyodor Dostoevsky, are what bring together Russian Armenians, Russian Azerbaijanis, Russian Germans, Russian Tatars.

Русский народ является государствообразующим— по факту существования России. Великая миссия русских—объединять, скреплять цивилизацию. Языком, культурой, “всемирной отзывчивостью,” по определению Федора Достоевского, скреплять русских армян, русских азербайджанцев, русских немцев, русских татар. (Putin January 23, 2012)

Later the same year, in his opening address to the meeting of the Council for Interethnic Relations and his annual address to the Federal Assembly, Putin reiterated his emphasis on the Russian people.

[…] we are fully justified in speaking of the key cementing role played by the Russian language and by the Russian people and its great culture.

[…] мы с полным основанием можем говорить о ключевой, скрепляющей роли русского языка, русского народа, его великой культуры. (Putin August 24, 2012)

This is supported by his formulation in his 2012 annual address to the Federal Assembly:

For centuries, Russia developed as a multiethnic state (from the very beginning), a civilization-state bonded by the Russian people, Russian language and Russian culture, native for all of us, uniting us and preventing us from dissolving in this diverse world.

Россия веками развивалась как многонациональное государство – изначально так было, – государство-цивилизация, скреплённое русским народом, русским языком и русской культурой, которые для всех нас родные, которые нас объединяют и не дают раствориться в этом многообразном мире. (Putin December 12, 2012)

In his opening speech to the 2013 Valdai Club meeting quoted above, Putin portrayed Russia as

a state-civilization, tightened by the Russian people, the Russian language, Russian culture, the Russian Orthodox Church and the country’s other traditional religions. It is precisely the state-civilization model that has shaped our state polity. It has always sought to flexibly accommodate the ethnic and religious specificity of particular territories, ensuring diversity in unity.

государство-цивилизация, скреплённая русским народом, русским языком, русской культурой, Русской православной церковью и другими традиционными религиями России. Именно из модели государства-цивилизации вытекают особенности нашего государственного устройства. Оно всегда стремилось гибко учитывать национальную, религиозную специфику тех или иных территорий, обеспечивая многообразие в единстве. (Putin September 19, 2013)

As is evident, on all three occasions Putin ascribed to the russkie Russians the role of cementing the core of the Russian civilization. Together with the Russian language, Russian culture was part of the “glue” that brought and kept “Russian Armenians,” “Russian Azerbaijanis,” “Russian Germans,” and “Russian Tatars” together in “Russia: The National Question.” This has been pointed to by scholars (Blakkisrud 2016: 255; Kolstø 2016a: 5) as signaling an ethnic turn in Russian nationalism.

Seen through the prism of the conventional understanding of civic and ethnic, the employment of russkii as a qualifier for other adjectives that denote ethnic or national adherence may at first sight appear like a contradiction in terms. Yet, it can also be considered through the prism of russkii as denoting cultural adherence. As Laruelle (2016: 275) contends about Russian culture, it is russkaia and not rossiiskaia —“even if Gogol is of Ukrainian origin and Vasilii Grossman from a Jewish family.” This is supported by the formulation in Putin’s 2012 annual address, that the Russian culture, together with the Russian language, is “native” (rodnye) for all of Russia’s inhabitants. Though here also tied to the Russian people, the Russian russkaia culture was—similar to the culture of the russkii mir—again represented as open to including Russians of other ethnic origins.

In light of the assertion about an ethnic turn in discourse during Putin’s third term, we may ask precisely what it is that makes “culture” come across as part of an ethnic Russian core. First, and as pointed out in Chapter III, “culture” as a diacritical marker is inherently connected with an ethnic understanding of the nation. Thus, it could be expected to engage more swiftly in constructions of similarity based on ethnic adherence than on civic allegiance. However, this is not confirmed by the findings above in this chapter, in which “culture” readily functions to unite “imagined communities” that appear as clearly detached from the ethnic adherence of its members. Seemingly, “culture” becomes “ethnic culture” when it is associated with a certain group of people. In the case of the alleged ethnic turn in Putin’s discourse, the possible ethnification of culture happens by way of connecting it with the Russian russkii people.

At the same time, this connection reveals a different, yet related, theme that will be expressed more saliently in Chapter VI on the media discourse: the relationship between minority and majority. If both tied to the Russian people and represented as open to including other groups, Russian russkaia culture is strengthened as a diacritical marker. First, it makes the in-group’s culture come across as one and undivided. Second, by including minorities in russkaia, one circumvents the distinction between russkii as ethnic Russian and rossiiskii as non-Russian (see Miller 2009: 18 and introductory chapter, this thesis). This rhymes well with the findings from the ROMIR 2013 NEORUSS survey that the majority among those surveyed were willing to accept minorities as part of a national russkii Self (Blakkisrud 2016: 266).

Looking at the context of the claimed ethnic turn, Putin’s statements appear as balancing the interests of different groups more than as an act of promoting ethnic Russianness. The 99 backdrop of the 2012 presidential election comprised the riots on Moscow’s Manezhnaia Square in December 2010. Besides the Kondopoga riots in August 2006, the Manezhnaia riots were the second major incident of ethnically motivated riots since the turn of the millennium. Kremlin’s reaction to the riots assumed shape both as an attempt to curb nationalism and as an attempt to challenge the nationalists’ monopoly of representing the interests of the ethnic russkie Russians (Blakkisrud 2016: 254). First, it abolished the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI). Second, Russia witnessed a series of court cases against alleged nationalists. In the discourse, the response materialized as Putin’s emphasis on the russkiie as the state-forming people while not omitting Russia’s multiethnic character from the discourse entirely.

Still, the formulation “state-forming people” caused reactions, in particular in non-Russian republics (see Blakkisrud 2016: 262). Following his reelection in March 2012, Putin initiated the process of bringing the federal nationalities policy up to date. In the final draft for the “State Strategy on Nationalities Policy for the Period until 2025,” the ethnic Russians were represented as the “system-forming core” [“системообразующее ядро”], which had played a key role in the unification of the Russian nation represented as the “rossiiskaia nation (natsiia)” [“российская нация”] (“Strategy …” 2012). Besides the change in formulations towards a less prominent position of the ethnic Russians, it is worth noticing that the draft for the Strategy did not contain reference to any of the diacritical markers. This is perhaps the clearest signal of a move away from connotations to a specific image of the in-group.

Summing up, we may thus say that Putin’s purported ethnic turn largely remained an act of discourse. His emphasis on the russkiie Russians constituted reality in a way that detached it too much from other actors’ perceptions of what ought to be the reality. As a result, it had limited social consequences, as became evident in the State Strategy on Nationalities Policy. What was decisive was the noted reaction among non-Russian groups that was related to the perception of implied out-groups. This, in turn, signals that too heavy an emphasis on the Russian russkii people is bound to cause reactions, as it is easily perceived as leading to the exclusion of Russia’s minorities from the in-group “imagined community.”

4.5.2 “Cultures” in the Plural

In his 2007 annual address, Putin depicted Russia’s multitude of cultures as the very foundation of Russia’s contribution to the formation of European and world culture: 100

Having a unique cultural and spiritual identity has never stopped anyone from building a country open to the world. Russia has made a tremendous contribution to the formation of European and world culture. Our country has historically developed as a union of many peoples and cultures.

[K]ультурная и духовная самобытность еще никому не мешали строить открытую миру страну. Россия сама внесла огромный вклад в становление общеевропейской и мировой культуры. Наша страна исторически формировалась как союз многих народов и культур. (Putin April 26, 2007)

He went on to emphasize that “it is also vitally important today to help develop the [natsional’nyie] cultures of our country’s different peoples, also through support for folklore groups” [“сегодня крайне важно развивать национальные культуры народов России, включая поддержку фольклорного творчества”] (Putin April 26, 2007).

In both these quotes, Putin portrayed the Russian community as uniquely characterized by its cultural diversity. Here, it was precisely Russia’s diversity that established the link with the outside world, Europe in particular. In fact, Putin’s current portrayal of Russia as a “union of many peoples and cultures” was very close to the motto of the European Union: “united in diversity.” The motto “signifies how Europeans have come together, in the form of the EU, to work for peace and prosperity, while at the same time being enriched by the continent’s many different cultures, traditions and languages” (“European Union” 2018).

In terms of its emphasis on diversity, the statement shows an important point of divergence between “culture” and “language” as diacritical markers. On the occasions when “language” was linked to Russia’s diversity, this pertained to an exclusively domestic context. While cultural diversity here established a connection between Russia and Europe, linguistic diversity remained an internal matter.

The same was the case in Putin’s 2014 “Crimean Speech.” This time, Putin showed how Russia’s cultural diversity could be invoked as the main point of similarity between Russia and Crimea:

Crimea is a unique blend of the cultures and traditions of different peoples. This makes it similar to Russia as a whole, where not a single ethnic group has been lost over the centuries. Russians and Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and people of other ethnic groups have lived side by side in Crimea, retaining their own identity, traditions, languages and faith. 101

Крым – это и уникальный сплав культур и традиций разных народов. И этим он так похож на большую Россию, где в течение веков не исчез, не растворился ни один этнос. Русские и украинцы, крымские татары и представители других народов жили и трудились рядом на крымской земле, сохраняя свою самобытность, традиции, язык и веру. (Putin March 18, 2014)

Here, Putin’s portrayal of Crimea as a miniature mirror image of Russia’s own diversity represented Russia as a multi-ethnic “community of peoples.” It was precisely their respective diversities that was presented as providing a common ground for unity among the inhabitants of Crimea and the Russian population. Also worth noticing is Putin’s usage of the noun etnos for “ethnic group.” This underlines the ethnic groups as stable entities. Thus, the “imagined” community of peoples is legitimized as its components are represented as stable and less open to change. While coming together in one diversity, they are indirectly represented as separated by ethnic boundaries. As I will return to in Chapter V, this shows how ethnicity can simmer under the surface, while another diacritical marker is invoked explicitly in the discourse.

Of course, in order to justify annexation, there was at the time a need to construct similarity with Crimea. Looking at the population composition in Crimea, the majority in the census of 2001 identified as ethnically Russian (Knott 2018: 284–285). Yet, Putin did not engage in a construction of similarity on the basis of ethnic Russianness. His reliance on diversity in this case mirrors findings from research on Crimean identity prior to the eruption of the Ukraine crisis. Knott (2018: 286–287) points to the findings of Malyarenko and Galbreath (2013: 197) when arguing that residents of Crimea had preferred a Crimean multiethnic identification, rather than an ethnic Russian or ethnic Ukrainian identity. This made Crimean identity a process of constructing difference towards the rest of Ukraine, rather than constructing similarity with Russia.

Of particular interest is these two statements’ overwhelming emphasis on in-group similarity. From this, we may infer that when pluralized and implied to tie together an “imagined community” that stretches beyond Russia’s borders, “cultures” assumes the shape of an attempted all-inclusive diacritical marker. As a result, it becomes less clear who the implied out-group members would be.

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“Multiculturalism”

By contrast, when “culture” is accompanied by the prefix “multi” and is turned into an “ism,” we observe the most salient constructions of difference throughout the whole discourse. “Culture” as “multiculturalism” unequivocally functioned to construct Europe as Russia’s main Other.

In his article “Russia: The National Question” and his opening address to the Valdai Club in September 2013, Putin lashed out against Western-style multiculturalism. Inherent in his criticism are three other claims of particular relevance to the representation of the Russian community: 1) multiculturalism as rejecting the idea of integration through assimilation; 2) the homogeneous nation-state as the ultimate cause of the failure of multiculturalism; and 3) multiculturalism as based on Europe having to pay for its colonial past.

In “Russia: The National Question,” Putin claimed that multiculturalism

elevates the “right of minorities to be different” to the absolute and, at the same time, fails to balance this right with civil, behavioral, and cultural obligations with regard to the indigenous population and society as a whole.

возводит в абсолют “право меньшинства на отличие” и при этом недостаточно уравновешивает это право – гражданскими, поведенческими и культурными обязанностями по отношению к коренному населению и обществу в целом. (Putin January 23, 2012)

Further:

Behind the “failure of the multicultural project” stands the crisis of the very model of a “nation-state”—a state historically built exclusively on the basis of ethnic identity. And that is a serious challenge facing Europe and many other regions of the world.

За “провалом мультикультурного проекта” стоит кризис самой модели “национального государства” – государства, исторически строившегося исключительно на основе этнической идентичности. И это – серьезный вызов, с которым придется столкнуться и Европе, и многим другим регионам мира. (Putin January 23, 2012)

In the first quote, Putin was attacking multiculturalism as a policy. Implicit in his criticism of multiculturalism’s disproportionate recognition of the rights of minorities to differ was the

103 view that this cannot constitute sufficient common ground for integration. A model based solely on the recognition of difference would never lead to integration. In referring to how multiculturalism has rejected the idea of integration through assimilation, Putin can be seen as having offered his tacit approval of assimilation. In the second quote, he attacked what multiculturalism has been recognized as being a reaction against: the homogeneous nation- state. As Kymlicka (2007: 7) notes, multiculturalism was indeed a response to the model of a homogeneous nation-state. Within the frames of such representation of the national community, those who did not belong to it either had to undergo assimilation or be excluded from the in-group.

The third element of Putin’s rejection of multiculturalism involved explaining what had led the countries of Europe to rely on it: “it is based on paying for the colonial past” [“в основе лежит своего рода плата за колониальное прошлое”] (Putin September 19, 2013). Implicit in this statement is the view of Russia’s tsarist past as differing from that of Europe by not having been colonial. This became clearer in the continuation, when Putin contended that multiculturalism was not capable of “integrating foreign languages or foreign cultural elements into [European] societies” [“обеспечить интеграцию в общество иноязычных и инокультурных элементов”] (Putin September 19, 2013). The emphasis on multiculturalist Europe as unable to integrate foreign cultural elements is worth noticing. It can be considered as a tacit act of boundary-drawing aimed at distancing Russia from Europe, based on what must in reality be considered a point of similarity between them: the challenge of integrating culturally different immigrants who do not speak the language of the host community. This proves Kolstø’s (2009: 16–17) assertion about the boundary as not depending on objective difference, but on perceptions about difference.

In the context of his emphasis on European values in his 2005 annual address Putin’s negative portrayal of multiculturalist Europe prompts the question of what kind of position he allocated to Russia in the world. As the continuation of “Russia: The National Question” was devoted to representing Russia as a “historical state” (istoricheskoe gosudarstvo), his rejection of multiculturalism functioned as a discursive strategy that paved way for a construction of Russia as different, both from the European nation-state and from European multiculturalist policies. At first sight, this may be seen as contradicting the statement in both his 2005 annual address and other instances of embracement of Europe closer to the turn of the millennium (see Laruelle 2016: 276–277).

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However, as Laruelle (2016: 276) points out, Putin can also be seen as deliberately reproducing the authorities’ line on not taking a stance on national identity. Following from Laruelle’s reasoning, assessing Russia’s relationship with Europe as if it were a question of either embracing or rejecting “the West” overlooks the third option for “imagining” Russia: as European, but anti-Western (Laruelle 2016: 282). In turn, this approach explains why Putin’s apparently contradictory embracement and rejection of Europe can be seen as falling within the frames of what can be identified as Kremlin’s conservatist position. On the level of discourse, this position encompasses Russia’s critique of what is represented as Western Europe’s moral decay due to its recognition of same sex marriages and orientation towards secularism, combined with a multiculturalist approach to integration. Against this backdrop, Russia is represented as embracing traditional multi-child families and heterosexual marriages, along with the religious and cultural traditions of the majority populations in both Russia and Western Europe (see Tolz and Harding 2015: 462). In essence, Russia is represented as an anti-Western, but European civilization.

In light of the focus of this thesis on integration, it is important to point out how the emphasis on the religious and cultural traditions of the majority populations connects with Putin’s rejection of multiculturalism. By implication, in order to achieve successful integration, one must necessarily acknowledge the majority’s “right” to be the majority. This, in turn connects with my above observation of how Russian russkaia culture appears as uniting Russia’s diversity by dint of being the culture of the majority that can be open to self-identification by the minorities.

This leads me to the relationship between russkii and rossiiskii and the character of Barth’s boundary. As the boundary rests on the invocation of similarity and difference based on what the members of the groups in question consider important diacritical markers of their community, it works from below. By contrast, the type of elite discourse studied here can be seen as intended to work from above. In order for it to carry the necessary salience, it must resonate with its listeners. Pertaining to an ideal type civic rossiiskii identity, this poses the following challenge pointed to by Pain (2009, see also Rutland 2010: 122): if a civic national identity is imposed only from above, it becomes a contradiction in terms, as one of its core components is democratic participation. Thus, if imposed from above, it is destined to lack resonance among the population. By contrast, a russkii identity resonates with the majority of the population.

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Looking at both “culture” in the singular and “cultures” in the plural, we may ask what image of the Russian community is most strongly conveyed? As argued above, the culture that most readily unites all Russians is russkaia culture. However, the culture that united the former Soviet inhabitants at the beginning was indeed rossiiskaia culture. This was also the culture that Putin in 2006 argued that the migrants had to treat with respect. From this we may infer that rossiiskaia can be untangled from connotations to the state and, at least at the current point in time, has shown its ability to broaden up and include prospective migrants. As a result, in the meeting with the migrant Other, rossiiskaia culture emerged as a more plausible common ground for integration, while the russkaia culture of the majority was portrayed as able to include all of Russia’s inhabitants.

The invocations of rossiiskii in-group similarity challenge the view held by the originators of the russkii mir that russkii can be more inclusive than rossiiskii. In so doing, they either downplay the strength of the russkii mir concept or suggest that migrants are seen as not included in it. By implication, the russkii mir must be viewed as detached from the topic of migration.

4.6 “Religion”

While “language” and “culture” were mentioned throughout the entire period studied here, there were no references to specific religious faiths before the publication of “Russia: The National Question” (Putin January 23, 2012). A possible “forerunner” to religion may be what the presidents referred to on some occasions as Russia’s “spiritual values.” These were never associated with any particular religious faith and will therefore not be examined here. As is also the case with the media discourse, it is difficult to define precise nodal points for “religion.” The two most important themes identified are “religious diversity” and “religious unity.”

4.6.1 Nodal Point 1: Religious Diversity

In “Russia: The National Question,” Putin’s first reference to specific religious faiths came in connection with his call for the establishment of a special council for interethnic relations31 that would ensure “interethnic harmony, and interethnic interaction” [“межнациональнoe

31 The Council for Interethnic Relations, established later the same year. 106

благополучиe, взаимодействиe этносов”], in which he expected the traditional religious faiths to become involved:

At the foundations of Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism—with all their differences and peculiarities—are basic, shared moral, ethical, and spiritual values: compassion, reciprocity, truth, justice, respect for elders, family and work values. These value systems cannot be replaced by anything: and we need to reinforce them.

В основе православия, ислама, буддизма, иудаизма – при всех различиях и особенностях – лежат базовые, общие моральные, нравственные, духовные ценности: милосердие, взаимопомощь, правда, справедливость, уважение к старшим, идеалы семьи и труда. Эти ценностные ориентиры невозможно чем- либо заменить, и их нам надо укреплять. (Putin January 23, 2012)

This reference to specific religious faiths is interesting in several respects. First, it introduced religion as the “glue” that could cement the Russian community. Putin also established a connection between specific religious faiths and a set of values: it was not the religious faiths per se that constituted the common ground for unity, but the shared values they were seen as representing.

Moreover, the list of religious faiths differed slightly from that of the preamble to the 1997 law “On the Freedom of Conscience.” According to the preamble, the law recognizes the special role of Russian Orthodox Christianity in the formation and the development of Russia’s spirituality and culture. Then, it “respects” Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism, as well as the other religions that form an integral part of the historical heritage of Russia. Putin thus reduced the list of religions from the 1997 law to include only Orthodoxy, Judaism, Buddhism and Islam. This slight rephrasing of the 1997 law both broadened up and narrowed down the Russian religious universe. On the one hand, it elevated Islam, Judaism and Buddhism to an equal position with Orthodoxy, while on the other it implicitly excluded other Christians.

The remaining references to religion concerned Orthodoxy (Christianity) and Islam. This happened on three occasions, all in the context of celebrating historical events. The first was the 225-year anniversary of the decree issued by Catherine the Great in 1788, establishing Russia’s Moslem Spiritual Assembly. Putin referred to this in his introductory address to the

107 meeting of the recently established Council for Interethnic Relations in October 2013. He began by emphasizing the important role of the 1788 decree:

This event played an important, very important role in strengthening Russian statehood, contributed to creating a common spiritual and cultural space, and to establishing the values and traditions that unite us. It is our duty to preserve this unique heritage, support interethnic harmony, and respond adequately and competently to new, contemporary challenges and problems.

Это событие сыграло заметную, очень важную роль в укреплении российской государственности, внесло свой вклад в создание общего духовного и культурного пространства, в формирование объединяющих нас ценностей и традиций. И наш долг – хранить это уникальное наследие, поддерживать межнациональное согласие, достойно и грамотно отвечать на новые современные вызовы и проблемы. (Putin October 22, 2013)

Similar to his statement in “Russia: The National Question,” Putin here established a connection between “religion” and “values.” Important to note is his emphasis on one common spiritual and cultural space. Islam was engaged in a construction of similarity by dint of contributing to the “common spiritual and cultural space.”

In the concluding remarks, however, Putin emphasized Russia as a multiethnic and multifaith country:

I met today with Moslem spiritual leaders and said what I have repeated on many occasions, namely, that our Moslems are Russians, our citizens, and this is their only home. We can say the same of every people living in the Russian Federation. Russia is the biggest part, but nonetheless only a part of the former homeland that we all shared, the Soviet Union. That we developed as a multiethnic and multifaith country does create some problems, but it also gives us unquestionably huge advantages. We therefore must make use of all the positive experience and good things that were built up over these decades, make use of our advantages as a multiethnic and multifaith country, which should give us a solid foundation for development.

Сегодня я встречался с лидерами мусульманского духовенства и об этом уже говорил неоднократно: наши мусульмане, российские, – это наши граждане, у них другой Родины нет. И так можно сказать обо всех народах, проживающих на территории Российской Федерации, потому что [Россия]—это самая большая, но всё-таки часть нашей бывшей единой большой Родины—Советского Союза,

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и здесь есть и проблемы из-за того, что мы складывались как многонациональное и многоконфессиональное государство, но есть, безусловно, и свои огромные плюсы. Поэтому мы должны опираться на всё хорошее, всё позитивное, что было наработано в последние десятилетия, и опираться как раз на эти плюсы и преимущества многонациональной, многоконфессиональной страны, которая должна создавать устойчивую базу развития. (Putin 22 October, 2013)

Here, Putin stressed the status of Moslems as Russian citizens and their rightful belonging to the Russian community. Interestingly, he also established a connection between Russia’s current multiethnic and multireligious character and the Soviet past as “the former homeland that we all shared.” Thus, the Russian community as he portrayed it—though emphasizing Russia’s citizens as its primary group—still appeared open to the inclusion of those with whom Russia shared a common Soviet past. Historical Russia came to constitute a common ground for unity that rested on diversity. This connection between the Soviet past and the representations of Russia as characterized by ethnic and religious diversity contrasted with the representations constructed under “language” and “culture.” When these were invoked as boundaries in relation to the Soviet Union, the in-group “imagined community” was depicted as characterized by one common language or one common culture—not by its diversity (see Putin May 16, 2003; April 25, 2005).

4.6.2 Nodal Point 2: Religious Unity

In his speech following the Russian annexation of Crimea, Russian Orthodoxy figured prominently in the construction of unity among the Eastern Slavs.

Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Chersonesus where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

В Крыму буквально всё пронизано нашей общей историей и гордостью. Здесь древний Херсонес, где принял крещение святой князь Владимир. Его духовный подвиг—обращение к православию—предопределил общую культурную, ценностную, цивилизационную основу, которая объединяет народы России, Украины и Белоруссии. (Putin March 18, 2014)

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In an almost identical fashion to how he linked Islam to values and traditions when speaking to the meeting of the Council for Interethnic Relations in 2013, Putin established a connection between Orthodoxy and what he termed “the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values.” This time, too, the religious community was envisioned as stretching beyond Russia. The difference was the explicit mention of the other Eastern Slavs, the Ukrainians and Belarussians. The “imagined community” that was linked together by Russian Orthodoxy differed from the one tied together by Islam in consisting of explicitly mentioned ethnic groups.

While explicit mention of ethnicity as such remained outside Putin’s 2014 reference to the Orthodox Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians, it found its way into his annual address to the Federal Assembly in December that year:

In addition to ethnic similarity, a common language, common elements of their material culture, a common territory, even though its borders were not marked then, and a nascent common economy and government, Christianity was a powerful spiritual unifying force that helped involve various tribes and tribal unions of the vast Eastern Slavic world in the creation of a Russian nation and Russian state. It was thanks to this spiritual unity that our forefathers for the first time and forevermore saw themselves as a united nation. All of this allows us to say that Crimea, the ancient Korsun or Chersonesus, and Sevastopol have invaluable civilizational and even sacral importance for Russia, like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and Judaism.

Наряду с этнической близостью, языком и общими элементами материальной культуры, общей, хотя и не очерченной тогда устойчивыми границами территорией, нарождающейся совместной хозяйственной деятельностью и властью князя христианство явилось мощной духовной объединяющей силой, которая позволила включить в формирование единой русской нации и образование общей государственности самые разные по крови племена и племенные союзы всего обширного восточнославянского мира. И именно на этой духовной почве наши предки впервые и навсегда осознали себя единым народом. И это даёт нам все основания сказать, что для России Крым, древняя Корсунь, Херсонес, Севастополь имеют огромное цивилизационное и сакральное значение. Так же, как Храмовая гора в Иерусалиме для тех, кто исповедует ислам или иудаизм. (Putin December 4, 2014)

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Here, Putin envisioned Christianity, not Orthodoxy as such, as having unified what he described as a community that already existed by virtue of ethnic, linguistic and cultural similarity. He emphasized Christianity as having played an important part in the unification into a national community. Thus, membership in an ethnic community appeared as something that preceded membership in the religious community that in turn led to membership in the national community.

Regarding other religious groups, Putin’s closing sentence functioned as a construction of both similarity and difference. Comparing places of sacral and “civilizational” importance in Crimea with the position of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem to Moslems and Jews, he constructed an ambiguous boundary. On the one hand, the comparison highlighted sacral places as something Russians had in common with Moslems and Jews. On the other, he drew a boundary towards Moslems and Jews, as their sacred places are located outside Russia. Further, he emphasized Crimea as sacral to Russians, not to Christians in general. Crimea’s sacral importance was not connected with religion per se. Its sacral importance was national, not religious.

At the same time, Putin employed the signifier “Christianity,” not “Orthodoxy.” In so doing, he widened up the in-group members to include those of other Christian denominations. He thus broke with the implied hierarchy in the preamble to the 1997 law. Most likely, this was caused by the historical fact that Chersonesus was for centuries an ancient Greek Orthodox Episcopal see, before it became the presumed location of the baptism of St. Vladimir.

The linkage between ethnicity and religion is an interesting case in point, as it detaches the statement from the general identity discourse on Crimea following the annexation. As noted by Teper (2015), references to religion and ethnicity did not occur in the mediated public discourse on identity after the annexation. This is in itself interesting, as it prompts the question of “religion’s” function as a diacritical marker. Is it religion per se that cannot be invoked as a diacritical marker, or is it the noted connection between Orthodoxy and certain ethnic groups that runs the danger of coming across as sentiments of ethnic nationalism? According to Teper (2015: 391), the issue at stake during the Crimean crisis was the general tendency of the public discourse to differentiate between Russians and Ukrainians. As both are Slavs and Orthodox, this similarity had to be downplayed, in order to not inhibit constructions of difference. What Putin can thus be seen as doing in his 2014 annual address

111 was to bring this point of similarity into the discourse. The “tool” he employed was the same as on other occasions when “religion” functioned as a diacritical marker: history.

This prompts the question of the ROC’s role in contemporary Russia. Functioning only as a diacritical marker in relation to historical events, it may seem as the Church’s otherwise heavily symbolic role cannot fully find its way into the president’s annual addresses. This may indicate that in spite of the ROC’s prominent role as a marker of Russian identity in the Russian public sphere together with Putin’s openness about his own Orthodox faith, religious faith has been considered as too divisive to be included in the annual addresses. Possible reasons for the absence of religion may be the general association of Islam with terrorism as a result of the international “war on terror,” the War in Chechnya and the presence of international terrorist groupings in Russia (see Merati 2017). With regards to Orthodoxy, the ROC has consolidated its position as a marker of Russian national identity, not religius (see Verkhovskii 2014). Among its most significant achievements are the introduction of military chaplains and the introduction of instruction in Orthodox culture in Russian elementary schools. Yet, as a religion, it appears to remain the matter of religious believers, not a diacritical marker that can operate alone in the type of official discourse studied here.

In light of the 2018 breach between the ROC and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the basis for constructions of Orthodox similarity between Russia and Ukraine appears as expired. Seemingly, Putin’s constructions of Ukraine’s similarity with Russia did not resonate strong enough in Ukraine. In fact, his formulation can be seen as depriving Ukraine of agency in the sense that it neglected the conflict situation with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that had lasted for several years. This may explain Putin’s reliance on a historical reference to Orthodoxy, while omitting the present.

This construction of similarity ressembles that which occurred in 2007 in Putin’s letter to Yushchenko. Following the conflict over the Ukrainian Literature Library in Moscow’s massive throw away of certain types of newspapers, Putin declared that Moscow would ort out the case with the library itself, before he constructed constructed similarity between Russia and Ukraine precisely on the basis of the contested issue: literature.

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4.6.3 Summing Up

Among the three diacritical markers, “religion” is the one that was least frequently invoked in the presidential discourse. Still, it strongly manifested itself as able to bind together different images of the Russian community. The main difference between “religion” and the two other diacritical markers is that the relationship between plurality and singularity and the different images of the Russian community can function according to the opposite logic of that of “language” and “culture.” While only “language” and “culture” in the singular could tie together “imagined communities” that stretched beyond Russia’s borders, religious diversity readily tied Crimea to Russia. Inside Russia, the similarity rested on the condition that the religions were seen as part of what constitutes Russia’s fundamental values, not as religious faiths per se. Irrespective of whether its ultimate signifiers were values or specific faiths, the pluralized “religions’” role as a boundary largely iterates the “managed pluralism” expressed in the 1997 Law on the Freedom of Conscience (see also Balzer 2003).

In terms of the relationship between Orthodoxy and Islam in Russia, the statements contain little information about this, apart from the representation of Orthodoxy as also uniting Belarussians and Ukrainians (Putin March 18, 2014). This mention of specific groups is worthy of further attention. First, it is the sole occasion on which one of the presidents explicitly mentioned ethnic or national groups outside Russia. Consequently, it is also the only occasion on which the “imagined community” was explicitly articulated as a community of Eastern Slavs. Second, the statement also established a link between religion and ethnic or national adherence. As a result, “religion’s” meaning as a religious faith was downplayed. This mirrors the general tendency to associate “Russian Orthodox” with Russianness, rather than the Orthodox faith per se. The religious community exists only by dint of overlapping with other “imagined communities.”

4.7 Conclusions to Chapter IV

The presidential discourse allows for three main inferences that also foreshadow the content of the remaining empirical chapters. First, rather than relating to the conventional understanding of the civic–ethnic dichotomy, the discourse reveals a concern between uniformity and diversity. This gains expression through constructions involving pluralization and singularization respectively. Interestingly, towards the end of the examined period, Putin

113 elevates the diversity among the in-group population to the position of a suitable “glue” to tie together “imagined communities” that both remain within and stretch beyond the borders of the Russian Federation.

The second inference is that “language” and “culture” partly operate together as diacritical markers. What characterizes the relationship between them is that “language” apparently depends on “culture,” but not vice versa. When it comes to “culture,” it functions as a boundary because it is invested with meaning pertaining to its form, and not its content. “Russian culture” is either russkaia, rossiiskaia, great or “our,” but never understood with reference to what kinds of cultural expression it encompasses. In the main, “culture” remains a signifier without a signified. As such, it mirrors the underlying of Russia’s cultural policy when it first was stated in The Foundations of the State Cultural Policy of the Russian Federation: to promote a feeling of patriotism and national pride (see section 1.8.2).

The third inference is that the current examination reveals how no one image of Russia prevails. To a considerable extent, the material reveals evidence of Shevel’s contention about Russian nation-building as purposefully ambiguous. Chiefly, the conveyed images of the Russian community appear as resulting from the combination of different elements from the whole repertoire of images in ways that link them to the “realities on the ground.” At times, this dependence on context helps to conceal the ambiguity.

As the sources examined here are part of a discourse aimed at constructing similarity, the findings on out-groups must be considered in light of how they result from tacit implication. Yet, this does not render them less forceful. Mainly, the implied out-groups are the same as those implied to be so due to either policies or formulations in the legal framework in the fields of religion, language and culture. Further, the implied out-groups can also be related to changes in the migration currents into Russia. Consequently, the presidential discourse can be seen as fulfilling its aim of constructing consensus, which it did by constituting the world in meaning in a way that reflected empirical reality. However, as shown by the examination of Putin’s ethnic turn in discourse, the sayable of the discourse does not always correspond with what is perceived as permissible to include in policy documents.

With regard to concrete out-groups, these are implied to be either those among linguistic minorities who do not display fluency in the Russian language to the extent that they can keep up with the tendencies of linguistic homogenization. Second, there are those who are not

114 willing to or who are tacitly implied to be too different to be allowed to self-identify with the Russian russkii cultural space (see Putin January 23, 2012). Finally, there are those who do not identify with the “traditional religions” and accordingly do not conform to the fundamental values jointly constituted by these.

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5 Chapter V “Language”

5.1 Introduction

The theme of this chapter can be summed up with the following question from two journalists: “Can we, with the help of the language, turn newcomers into Russians?” [“можно ли с помощью языка сделать приезжих русскими?”] (Balabas and Lemutkina 2013). Further, it can also be seen as investigating the following claim made by Tishkov in 2012: “The Russian language is one of the most powerful institutions of integration policy” [“Русский язык является одним из самых мощных институтов политики интеграции”] (Tishkov 2012). The part of the discourse that is analyzed in this chapter is organized around two thematic nodal points that illustrate the tensions this question evokes: 1) the Soviet past, and 2) the enrollment of children of migrants in Russian schools. As this suggests, one of the main tensions revealed by the discourse is that of time. When looking backwards into the Soviet era, speakers rely on the Soviet past to construct what is at first sight represented as a formerly existing community of Russian language speakers. However, further scrutiny reveals that “language” alone is not always a sufficient criterion to achieve unity. As was the case in presidential discourse, “language” functions as a necessary yet insufficient criterion for unity. Constructions of in-group similarity draw a boundary towards outsiders that are hinted at as Others in more profound terms than not being acquainted with the Russian language. With regard to territory, the Russian language works to deconstruct the territorial borders of Russia understood as the present-day Russian Federation. This implies that groups outside Russia are represented as prospective members of the Russian community, while groups inside the Russian Federation are hinted at as being excluded. They are represented as if their citizenship and historical presence in Russia is not enough to secure their in-group membership. In turn, this suggests an “imagined community” in which similarity based on fluency in Russian is “earmarked” for those who have already crossed the cultural boundary.

This brings me to the second nodal point. In the crystallization around the topic of enrollment of children of migrants in schools, the idea of a community of Russian-speakers intersects with an ethnicity-oriented understanding of culture (or cultural behavior). This makes “language” function as a “pseudo-boundary” that precludes the overt discussion of ethnicity. In so doing, the discourse clearly indicates that language acquisition is an indispensable

117 component of the process of integration, but language command alone does not guarantee in- group membership. As regards implied out-group members, the term “migrant” remains subject to the general lack of clarity that permeates the Russian discourse on migration (see Berg-Nordlie, Aasland and Tkach 2010: 14). However, hinting at well-known stereotypes uncovers how the Russian language is employed in constructions of ethnocultural internal Others. As a result, “language” undergoes covert transformation into a marker of ethnic adherence.

5.2 Nodal Point 1: The Soviet Past

Close to the time when statements relevant to my research question start to appear, the demographer Zhanna Zaionchkovskaia and Professor Valerii Tishkov both pointed out that the difference was not so much between international migrants and internal migrants: their prospects for language acquisition were more a matter of urbanization and education.

[…] Migrants to Russia mainly arrive from cities of the former USSR, for whom there exists no language barrier. Illegal migrants from rural districts do not speak the language very well and are not accustomed to living in big cities, and are therefore more inclined to form diaspora communities.

[…] в основном в Россию мигрируют выходцы из городов бывшего СССР, для которых не существует языкового барьера. Нелегальные же мигранты из сельских районов язык знают не очень хорошо, в больших городах жить не привыкли, а потому больше склонны к созданию диаспорных сообществ. (Zainchkovskaia, quoted in n.n. 2006)

Also: “Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks and Tajiks who work here as migrants speak Russian no worse than some of our rural villagers from Yakutia, Tuva or Dagestan” [“азербайджанцы, узбеки или таджики, которые у нас работают и находятся здесь как мигранты, знают русский язык, не хуже, чем наши некоторые сельские жители в Якутии, в Туве или в Дагестане”] (Tishkov 2006).

With regard to migrants from abroad, both statements represent “language” as a common ground for integration. In Zainchkovskaia’s statement, this is made salient by a linkage between command of the Russian language and the urban/rural dimension, in addition to a distinction between legal and illegal migrants. A migrant’s poor command of the Russian

118 language is linked to both the person’s background as coming from a rural district, which in turn is linked to his or her status as illegal once within the Russian Federation. As a consequence, they are more inclined to form diaspora communities.

In Tishkov’s statement, the comparison of external migrants with groups of “rural villagers” serves to represent command of the Russian language as a common ground for integration. This happens in the way that the “threshold” of language command is lowered to the level of those of Russia’s own citizens, who are hinted at as not fluent in it.

Seen together, Zaionchkovskaia and Tishkov’s statements indicate one problematic aspect of the image of the Russian community as being one of Russian-speakers, which is pointed out by Shevel (2011: 188). While the Russian community as a language-based community may effortlessly surpass state borders, “language” at the same time functions as a criterion for exclusion for members of the population within the state borders. The social consequence is that “language” is invested with meaning as more than a neutral means of communication. By dint of being either linked to or detached from different groups, it constructs similarity and difference in a way that includes citizens of the former USSR at the same time as it excludes members of some of Russia’s non-Slavic indigenous communities. External migrants are represented as welcome to enter the linguistic community, independent of origin. Neither statement appears to narrow down the category of prospective Russian-speakers among external migrants to others than sufficiently urbanized individuals.

Besides the urban/rural opposition, the discourse makes salient the difference between Russia and other large migrant-recipient countries. Comparing Russia with Europe and the USA, Sergei Markedonov, then director of the Department for Problems of Ethnic Relations at the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow, stated in 2007:

We all lived in the Soviet Union. Everyone went to visit the capital. Our migration differs from that of the USA and Europe. People who arrive there often have no experience of living together with the native population. For those who come to us, Russia is their second homeland. And they have a much better command of the language than Albanians who arrive in Italy or Arabs who arrive in France.

Все мы жили в Советском Союзе, все ездили погостить в столицу. Наша миграция отлична от того, что происходит в США и Европе. Туда приезжают люди, которые зачастую не имеют опыта совместного проживания с коренной национальностью. Тогда как к нам приезжают люди, для которых Россия—

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второй дом. И владеют они языком намного лучше, чем албанцы, которые приезжают в Италию, или арабы, прибывающие во Францию (quoted in Grekova 2007).

Here, Markedonov puts forward the Soviet past as the main reason why the Russian language can function as a common ground for integration. As the comparison with Europe and the USA implies, prospective migrants to Russia are seen as already being acquainted with the society of their destination. Unlike migrants arriving in Italy and France, most of them also possess sufficient language skills. Markedonov here makes “language” appear as a boundary that the migrants have crossed before they arrive in Russia. It thus becomes an intrinsic common ground for integration. The in-group and the out-group communities are tied together before the migrants arrived in Russia. However, this argument/reason rests on the assumption that “migrants” here are understood as persons from the former Soviet space.

Against this backdrop it becomes reasonable to ask whether it is really “language” that is invested with meaning as the common ground for integration. As I understand it, Markedonov represents command of the Russian language as a necessary but not sufficient condition for integration. His mention of Russia as the migrants’ “second homeland” adds a new dimension to the discourse. It alludes to the Soviet past as what really constitutes the common ground for integration. In a sense, “language” is here subordinated to the existence of a common homeland in the past.

Also worthy of interest is his usage of the term “native population” when referring to present- day United States and Europe. At least in the case of the USA, he represents the current majority population as the indigenous population, thus overlooking the fact that the indigenous population in the USA are in reality a minority. In this way, his statement reproduces the lack of clarity produced by the usage of the term “migrant” in the Russian debate on immigration (see Berg-Nordlie, Aasland and Tkach 2010). Further, he contributes to detaching the discourse from the “facts on the ground,” thus contributing to a strengthening of the tendency observed by other scholars (i.e. Alexseev 2010; Kolstø 2016a) that the Russian discourse on migration rests on individuals’ perceptions rather than objective facts.

The representation of the Soviet past as having endowed the successor states with more commonalities than just the Russian language also appeared when the head of the now-

120 defunct Federal Migration Service, Konstantin Romodanovskii, was interviewed by Novaia Gazeta in 2010:

we and Tajikistan understand each other better than European countries understand their former colonies. After all, we have a common history and a language of communication that is not yet forgotten.

мы легче понимаем друг друга с тем же Таджикистаном, чем европейские страны —свои бывшие колонии. У нас все-таки общая история, пока еще не забытый язык общения. (Sokolov 2010)

As in the previous example, the Soviet past is represented as something that the migrants and the Russian recipient population have in common on a more profound level than simply by having lived in the same country. Whereas Markedonov did not specify any country of origin, Romodanovskii referred explicitly to Tajikistan. This reference to a non-Slavic country strengthens the perception of the Soviet past as constituting a stronger common ground for integration than the Russian language alone. It disconnects his statement from associations to the Russian in-group community as open predominantly to those seen as ethnically culturally similar, thereby excluding the possibility of a representation of Russia as a community of Slavs (see Shevel 2011). In this way, his statement displays similarity with Tishkov’s (2006) reference to the Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks and Tajiks. This strengthens the impression that “language” depends on “culture.”

In the same breath as he constructs in-group similarity beyond the state borders of the Russian Federation, Romodanovskii also constructs Russia as different from Europe. The emphasis on the common Soviet history is contrasted with Europe’s former colonies, which are implicitly represented as lacking such. This reinforces the impression that it is not really “language” that enables the construction of similarity, it is a deeper feeling of commonality rooted in the common past. Eventually, the common past is turned into an implied common culture.

Despite Romodanovskii’s emphasis on the past Soviet experience as a common ground for integration, we can also read from his statement that the current existence of a common history and language is a temporary condition. “Language” as a diacritical marker of in-group similarity is weakened by the implicit understanding that it will disappear in the future (“yet not forgotten”). As Romodanovskii makes no mention of any wish to counteract the decreasing levels of Russian-language fluency among non-Slavic post-Soviet migrants to

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Russia, we can here see him as approaching the limits of the sayable of the discourse. The unsayable here is that future migrants entering Russia as a result of the gradually emerging pool of Russian-speakers are most likely to be fellow Slavs.

By contrast, the following example reveals how the Russian language might serve as the main “glue” that could unite the post-Soviet space. In an article on the Azerbaijani diaspora in Russia, two journalists (Tsyganov and Karavaev 2009) touched on the importance of distributing teaching materials in the Russian language to Azerbaijan, as this would make it easier for prospective migrants to adapt to Russian society.

[…] we must remember that the Russian language remains the most important means of communication across the post-Soviet space. It is through Russian […] that it is possible to bind together the cultural sphere of the CIS, the cooperation of not only Russian-speaking cultures and, moreover, the formation of cultural pluralism, erasing language barriers, and improving interethnic dialogue.

[…] надо вспомнить, что русский язык остается главным коммуникатором на постсоветском пространстве, именно через русский […] возможно сращивание культурного поля СНГ, взаимодействие не только русскоязычных культур, следовательно, и формирование культурного плюрализма, стирание языковых барьеров, улучшение межнационального диалога. (Tsyganov and Karavaev 2009)

Here, the entire post-Soviet space, with the CIS, is presented as a cultural community united by the Russian language. “Language” is invested with meaning as a common ground for uniting an otherwise diverse community. The representation of Russian community is akin to that of a multiethnic “community of peoples”—though here it is represented as extending beyond Russia’s borders.

Tsyganov and Karavaev go on to assert that the spread of Russian-language materials “directly affects the quality of the adaptation for new members of the diaspora to the Russian environment” [“непосредственно повлияет на качество адаптации новых представителей диаспор в российскую среду”]. Interestingly, they employ the term “adaptation” and the adjective rossiiskii in describing Russian society. Bearing in mind their portrayal of the CIS as a sphere of cultural pluralism, we may note how the Russian community is presented by usage of rossiiskii. This immediately makes rossiiskii appear ambiguous. On the one hand, it appears as open to include a plurality of cultures. On the other, it can be understood as detached from ethnicity. As its connotations remain unarticulated, we can only notice that the

122 pluralism that characterized the CIS is now left out of the discourse. “Language” thus demonstrates its flexibility, as it appears as a suitable common ground for integration in the context of both diversity and unity.

5.2.1 The Bygone Soviet Past

Three years after emphasizing the past Soviet experience as a common ground for integration, Konstantin Romodanovskii made a reference to Soviet education that represented “language” very differently: as a boundary that created migrants as clearly an out-group:

With the help of our information systems that register information about all foreign nationals who live in Russia, as well as those who cross the borders into our country, we have found that those who come are fairly young people, between 18 and 29 years of age. We may employ the term “deaf-mute” about them. They did not study in Soviet schools where the study of the Russian language was conceptually grounded and serious. They cannot read, hear, or understand.

С помощью нашей информационной системы, куда стекаются данные обо всех иностранных гражданах, проживающих в России, а также пересекающих границу нашей страны, мы выяснили, что к нам приезжают достаточно молодые люди - от 18 до 29 лет. К ним можно применить такой термин, как "глухонемые.” Они в советских школах, где изучение русского языка было концептуальным и серьезным, уже не учились. Они не могут прочитать, услышать, понять. (quoted in Subbotina 2013)

Here, “language” clearly functions as a boundary that excludes the migrants from the in-group community of Russian-speakers. Romodanovskii’s comparison of the migrants to deaf-mutes equates lack of fluency in the Russian language with the life-long condition of a severe handicap. His reference to deaf-mutes represents the non-Russophone migrants as helpless to an extent that it cannot be overcome through regular contact with Russian-speakers. The result is that “language” is invested with the meaning of a boundary that is difficult to cross, if not impossible.

While making language function as a boundary that represents contemporary migrants as an non-integratable out-group, Romodanovskii also invokes familiarity with the Russian language as a competence that can constitute a common ground for integration. However, this common ground belongs to the Soviet past. His description of Soviet-era schooling in the Russian language as “conceptually grounded and serious” reinforces the impression of the contemporary migrants as an out-group that can no longer be included as members of the 123

Russian community. Together, his two statements make clear how time affects the position of “language” as a boundary while the Soviet past continues to function as the nodal point.

While Romodanovskii’s statement suggests that “language” alone can function as a boundary that emphasizes difference, the following example contains the implicit view that a lack of language skills is not sufficient to construct migrants as an out-group. On the same day as the interview with Romodanovskii was printed, the head of the Department of Culture in the Moscow city government, Evgenii Kapkov, declared:

If we should speak about integration, the city [Moscow] can “absorb” a limited number of newcomers. The rest are just physically impossible to integrate. After the fall of the Soviet Union, poorly educated people who do not speak Russian started to arrive. They have no idea how we live here.

Eсли говорить об интеграции, город может "переварить" ограниченное число приезжих, остальные физически не могут быть интегрированы. После развала Советского Союза к нам стали приезжать плохо образованные люди, не знающие русского языка. Они не имеют представления о том, как мы здесь живем. (quoted in Kozlenkovaia 2013)

Kapkov emphasizes how the post-Soviet migrants lack a sufficient command of the Russian language. Implicit in his formulation is the understanding that this is connected with post- Soviet realities. Moreover, the migrants’ deficient language skills are connected with a wider idea of out-group Otherness: their poor knowledge of present-day Russian society. What serves to denote some migrants as non-integratable is the combination of poor knowledge about Russia and lack of fluency in the Russian language. Underlying this Otherness of today’s migrants is an implicit reference to the bygone Soviet past as being a sunken Atlantis: a different reality that is now gone.

Similar implicit references to Soviet society as bygone days now irretrievably lost were also evident when two MK journalists wrote of how Russian parents tried to avoid sending their children to classes full of migrants. When they cited a grandmother who protested that she did not want to send her grandson, who was already literate and learning English, to first grade in a school where other children did not even speak Russian, the journalists noted:

Children of different ethnic origins (natsional’nosti) always studied in the [same] schools in the capital. And there were never any serious problems. However, those

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children were raised in one and the same environment, in one culture, in the same backyards. It has never happened before that so many people who have a poor command of Russian and do not know or integrate with the local culture or way of life have arrived in such a short time.

В столичных школах всегда учились дети разных национальностей. И серьезных проблем никогда не случалось. Но эти дети все воспитывались в одной среде, в одной культуре, в одном дворе. Такого, чтобы за короткий срок в столицу приехало очень много людей, плохо говорящих по-русски, не знающих или не принимающих здешнюю культуру, уклад жизни, никогда прежде не было. (Demina and Milkus 2011)

Also here, language command is presented as not the only skill these migrants lack: they are also unfamiliar with the recipient community’s local culture and way of life. “Language” as such does not constitute a boundary on its own: it functions as part of a boundary that also encompasses culture and traditions, implicitly attributing a more comprehensive Otherness to contemporary migrants. This is contrasted with previous times, where everyone was part of the same environment, one and the same culture. Again, the common ground for integration has ceased to exist, the days of the Soviet past now over.

Back to the Tsarist Era and “Compatriot”

Pushing the limits of the sayable, an exchange of opinion about Circassian refugees from Syria exemplifies how the same group may be represented in diametrically opposed ways. The background was a suggestion from the President’s Council on the Development of Civic Society and Human Rights (Sovet pri prezidente po razvitiiu grazhdanskogo obshchestva i pravam cheloveka, SPCH) that Russia should accept Circassian refugees from the war in Syria. As a member of the SPCH, Maksim Shevchenko stated to Izvestiia:

They are a Caucasian people, but many were forced to leave towards the end of the 19th century because of the war in the Caucasus. They are our compatriots, an indigenous people of the Kransodar Krai, of Adygea. If Russia would officially recognize their right to become repatriated, that would erase the dark pages of the war in the Caucasus. Это народ Кавказа, но многие были вынуждены уехать в конце XIX века из-за Кавказской войны. Это наши соотечественники, коренной народ Краснодарского края, Адыгеи. Если бы Россия официально признала их право на переселение, она бы закрыла страшные страницы Кавказской войны. (quoted in Ivshukina 2015)

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By contrast, Vladimir Evseev, director of the Caucasus Department of the Institute for CIS countries, held that:

Currently, nothing binds them to Russia. They were torn away a long time ago. The language barrier will impede their adaptation. Сейчас их с Россией уже ничего не связывает, они давно оторваны, адаптации будет мешать языковой барьер. (quoted in Ivshukina 2015)

In the first statement, Shevchenko employs the two terms “compatriots” and “indigenous” to denote similarity with the Russian in-group community. This sharply contrasts with Evseev’s account of their proposed relationship with Russia as a matter of a distant and bygone past. What he foregrounds as the main obstacle to their adaptation is the language barrier: the suggested similarity is impeded by the Circassians’ lack of command of the Russian language. “Language” functions as a boundary that excludes the Circassians from the Russian community.

This confirms Shevel’s (2011: 183) point about the difficulties in defining who can really be considered as indigenous to Russia. On the one hand, Shevchenko extends the “compatriot” category far beyond the territorial borders of both Russia and the former USSR. He also makes the category of “indigenous” able to transgress limitations in time, when he constructs the Circassians’ historical presence on what is today Russian territory as a common ground for integration. As a result, the representation of the Russian in-group community is ambiguous when it comes to the out-group’s level of attachment. It is associated either with its tsarist past, or as a community of Russian-speakers with some kind of complementary attachment to present-day Russia. With regard to “language,” it here assumes the function of a pseudo-boundary for the Circassians’ long-term detachment from the Russian state.

5.2.2 A Solution of Former Colonial Empires: Prior Integration

Against this backdrop, it is interesting to observe that one proposed solution to the migrants’ lack of fluency in the Russian language is located in the post-Soviet area outside Russia.

As MK columnist, Guiseppe D’Amato, put it in an article in 2012:

Why do we have such bad relations with migrants in Russia, the majority of whom are our former brethren from the USSR? If they speak poor Russian, then not they but

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your authorities are guilty […] for the 20 past years they have failed to defend the Russian language in their “sphere of influence”—the near abroad.

Почему в России такое нехорошее отношение к мигрантам, большинство которых является бывшими собратьями по СССР? Если они плохо говорят по- русски, то виноваты в этом не они, а ваша власть, которая в течение минувших 20 лет не защитила русский язык в своей “сфере влияния”—ближнем зарубежье. (D'Amato 2012)

Again, the Russian language is represented as being a part of what had functioned as a common ground for integration in a now-bygone Soviet past. The reference to non-Russian speaking migrants as former Soviet “brethren” underscores the idea that contemporary negative attitudes towards migrants are a product of the present, arguably an outcome of what D’Amato sees as a failure on the part of the Russian authorities to institute a proper language policy across the post-Soviet space. As a result, “language” now functions as a boundary against out-groups more saliently than would have been the case if a Soviet language policy had been preserved.

The usage of quotation marks around “sphere of influence” creates an ironic distance from the concept. It untangles the CIS from Russia. In terms of linguistic dominance, the waning of Russian skills among migrants proves him right. The implied consequence is that migrants whose native languages are not similar to Russian will gradually fall outside the group of “former brethren,” as they will not necessarily be able to acquire the necessary language skills themselves.

When D’Amato’s statement is considered in light of the later introduction of compulsory language tests for migrants (see section 1.6), he also appears to be foreshadowing future developments of the Russian migration regime. Altogether, “language” is here presented as a state-initiated boundary that, in time, will narrow down the supply of prospective migrants to those who are able to cross the language barrier prior to arriving in Russia. Thus, the emerging image of the Russian in-group community will evolve from a community of Russian-speaking people, understood as all the residents of the former USSR, into a community of those who can easily master the language. Unless more attention is devoted to the Russian language in school curricula in the CIS in the future, an increasing proportion of those who are likely to acquire fluency in the Russian language will be speakers of Other Slavic languages; that is, those who are also likely to be culturally similar to Russians. Thus, “language” and “culture” will coincide as boundaries in the future. 127

The investment of “language” with the meaning of functioning as a common ground for integration only if the boundary is crossed before migrants enter the territory of the Russian Federation also resonates in an article from 2013 in which MK interviewed researchers in various fields about migrants. Journalist Natal’ia Vedeneeva noted:

Possibly, it would make sense to pass a law prohibiting migrants who do not speak Russian, and do not know the history and the traditions of the country from crossing the border. That is, to solve the problem not after it has arisen, but to prevent it from emerging.

Возможно, имело бы смысл издать закон, запрещающий пересекать границу мигрантам, не знающим язык, историю страны и ее обычаи. То есть решать проблему не по факту, здесь, а предупреждать ее появление (Vedeneeva 2013).

Together with “history and traditions,” “language” is here clearly presented as a boundary that is better crossed before the migrants cross the Russian border. Again, “language” does not function as an independent boundary: prospective migrants must also be sufficiently acquainted with Russian history and traditions. Only jointly with these can “language” engage in a construction of similarity and constitute a common ground for integration.

5.3 Summary and Discussion

On the surface, the critical discourse moments mark both closeness to and distance from the Soviet past. The decisive factor is time. The general tendency is that, following the shift in composition of migration currents around 2007, the Soviet Union became increasingly represented as part of an irrevocable past. In this way, the discourse touches upon its own unsayable that, as the USSR recedes further into the past, the influence of the Russian language outside Russia’s borders decreases.

Further, representing “language” as a boundary that does not coincide with territorial borders, the discourse both widens up and narrows down the Russian “imagined community.” This happens in a way that suggests that either cultural similarity or a sense of historical commonality functions as a prerequisite for a consideration of similarity based on language command. As it appears, this historical and cultural similarity appears as a preliminary boundary that “regulates” the number of candidates for language-based in-group membership.

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This reversed logical order suggests that established ideas in migration research about the process of integration as first learning the language become disrupted when discourses about integration are scrutinized from the perspective of national identity (see for example Niejenhuis, Ottenb and Flachea: 2018).

Individuals referred to vary between the mythical “migrant,” foreign citizens identified by nationality, and specified groups among Russia’s own citizenry. As regards implied in-group and out-group members, there is a tendency towards denoting out-group members with the signifier “migrant,” while prospective in-group members can be referred to by their national origin. This confirms the findings of Berg-Nordlie, Aasland and Tkach (2010) that the signifier “migrant” manly signifies difference.

5.4 Nodal Point 2: Children of Migrants in the School System

5.4.1 New Generations: Russia’s Future In-Group Members?

While Russia as a migrant-recipient state may present adult migrants with demands for language proficiency tests upon their arrival, the children of migrants add a new dimension to the discourse on integration measures. The critical discourse moments that crystallize around this theme reflect an empirical reality that is mostly present in Moscow and its environs. As the issue of the integration of immigrants has been and remains delegated to the regions, it is not easy to obtain an overview of how and to what extent children of migrants learn Russian in the school system throughout Russia. Part of the reason for this is that integration of children in some regions takes place through separate schools for indigenous ethnic minorities, because these teach Russian as a second language (Strel’tsova 2013: 54).

Yet, it is known that Moscow and St. Petersburg are the two cities that have the highest number of children of immigrants enrolled in public schools (Strel’tsova 2013: 34). These are also the regions that have made the most progress in educating children who do not speak Russian as their first language through the public school system. For both cities, reliable information about exact numbers are difficult to obtain. However, in the case of Moscow, some statistics are obtainable. As noted by Zaionchkovskaia and colleagues (2014), estimates 129 vary. In 2012, the local educational authorities estimated some 30,000 non-Russian children in schools, while figures obtained from the FMS suggested 70,000. The total amount of students enrolled in Moscow schools in 2007 was approximately 761,000 (Sheregi and Aref’eev 2010; Zaionchkovskaia et al. 2014). This means that, provided this number has remained relatively stable, migrant children defined as foreign citizens would comprise around 10% of the students, according to the FMS estimate.

Compared to other European metropolises, these figures are modest. As Kolstø (2016a: 4) notes, most Russian cities are remarkably ethnically homogenous. Citing the 2010 census, he further notes that the share of ethnic Russians among Moscow’s population was as high as 91.6%. Even if we take into account that this census did not include short-term and unregistered migrants, the figure still corresponds well with the cited figures on education institutions.

From this we may infer that the emergence of children of migrants in the school system as a nodal point in the current discourse serves to confirm Kolstø’s (2016a: 5; see also Alexseev 2010: 171–3) assertion that “ethnic composition as such does not influence the nationality debate directly: what matters is how it is perceived by the population.” Independent of actual figures, migrant children’s presence in schools produces critical discourse moments in which “language” functions expressively as a boundary. Further, it does so in a way that brings the observations from the part of the discourse that crystallized around the former Soviet Union as a nodal point into a future-oriented present time. As children of migrants are part of Russia’s growing generation, the current part of the discourse can serve as a preliminary indicator of whether there exists a long-term perspective on integration in Russia.

***

As with the previous nodal point, the collected material reveals that the year 2006 can be seen as a “tipping point,” when migrants’ lack of language fluency started to attract media attention. The following statement shows this. In 2006, former deputy of the Moscow City Duma and currently the Moscow Childrens’ Ombudsman, Evgenii Bunimovich, asserted that:

Very often, children from former [Soviet] states are not adapted to our educational system; they do not understand the Russian language. […] Those children have arrived in Moscow and it is simply necessary for them to adapt socially, independent of whether their parents will stay here or leave within a few years. The most important

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thing is for them to adapt to the Russian language, to our culture and traditions, so that they become educated. We have just recently begun to face the same [problem] as many world capitals do, that thousands and tens of thousands of children have a poor command of the state language, in this case the Russian language.

Очень часто дети из стран бывшего Союза не адаптированы к нашей образовательной системе, не знают русского языка. […] Эти дети приехали в Москву и просто необходимо их социально адаптировать, независимо от того, останутся тут их родители или уедут через два года. Главное - адаптировать их к русскому языку, к нашей культуре и традициям, чтобы они стали образованными. Мы совсем недавно столкнулись с тем, с чем сталкиваются многие мировые столицы - тысячи и десятки тысяч детей плохо говорят на государственном языке, в данном случае – русском. (quoted in Shamburova 2006)

Here, “language” competes with a broader idea of socially connoted adaptatsiia as constituting the main boundary that migrant children must cross in order to become integrated. In the first and the last sentences above, Bunimovich clearly points to lack of fluency in Russian as the main obstacle to integration. At the same time, he summarizes his view of integration as including adaptation to the Russian language, culture, and traditions. Language acquisition comes across as only one of the components of a wider concept of integration.

With regard to terminology, Bunimovich employs the term adaptatsiia to denote the process of integration. The children of migrants are represented as expected to adapt to the Russian language, culture and traditions. As a result, it remains unclear to what extent he envisages them as future members of the Russian community. If we rely on the dictionary understanding of the term adaptatsiia, the migrant children are represented as allowed to approach the boundary of the Russian in-group community, but it remains open as to whether they can actually cross it and become full-fledged members of the in-group. This is substantiated by Bunimovich’s statement that the ultimate goal of the adaptation process is merely that the children will “become educated.” Still, he includes both Russian culture and traditions on the list of what the children must be acquainted with. This adds some degree of ambiguity to his statement. “Language” is invested with meaning as a boundary that operates together with “culture” and “traditions,” and it is unclear whether this boundary can be crossed. What also remains outside the discourse is the chronological order of the boundaries. Language command and knowledge about Russian culture and traditions are lumped together as a common set of requirements in a way that reveals no information about their chronological order or causal relationships among them.

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While Bunimovich confined his understanding of “integration” to “adaptation,” MK journalist Matvei Ganapol’skii in 2011 exhibited an understanding of integration as closer to assimilation, thereby showing optimism regarding migrant children:

Getting to like the migrant is not that easy, because he has poor knowledge of the Russian language, is afraid to socialize, and lives in [his own] collective. Of course, one tries to meet the migrant halfway—special schools for the study of Russian language are established for his children. But that is for his children. They are the ones who in a decade will become “native Russians” with excellent Russian language skills, as can be expected from children. Полюбить мигранта не очень получается, потому что он плохо знает русский язык, боится общаться и живет общинно. Конечно, мигранту идут навстречу - для его детей открывают спецшколы, где учат русскому языку. Но это для его детей - именно они через десяток лет будут “коренными россиянами” с прекрасным русским языком, как и полагается детям. (Ganapol'skii 2011)

This difference in views on adult migrants and their children underlines my point about time and discursive tensions. Concerning the children of migrants, “language” is represented as a boundary that can be crossed through linguistic assimilation. Having crossed the boundary, the children will be included in the native Russian rossiiane community. Though native rossiiane appears in quotation marks, the use of the term creates an association of openness. The Russian recipient community is represented as being open to the inclusion of migrant children, provided they acquire the right language skills. In this way, “language” is involved in a construction of similarity and constitutes a common ground for integration. The use of the adjective “native” (korennoi) underlines that the children may become members of the Russian rossiiskii community in the full sense of the word.

While Ganapol’skii defines the children of immigrants as prospective rossiiane, he still describes adult migrants as living in their own collectives. Though he does not make this explicit, such optimism regarding the children may serve to conceal the underlying view that the parent generation is destined to remain in the out-group, because of their poor command of Russian. The implied community of Russian-speakers is narrowed down to those who arrive early enough not to have spent their formative years in a different linguistic community.

Moreover, a common understanding of “native” implies that an individual has roots in a particular community or place of origin. What remains unanswered is whether this can be applied to a community solely on the basis of language skills. Together with the juxtaposition

132 of adult migrants as keeping to their own collective, the usage of the term “native” can be understood to imply the formation of closer ties with the recipient community than merely the acquisition of language skills. Thus, the emerging “imagined community” of Russian- speakers converges on an in-group community that embraces other modes of identification with Russia in addition to speaking the language.

Important to note is that the in-group “imagined community” is rossiiskii, not russkii. This leaves open the question of whether the rossiiskii community encompasses a distinct russkii community that is unapproachable to migrants.

5.4.2 Ambiguous Boundaries

Emphasis on the importance of making an effort to prevent the children of migrants from remaining out-group members also manifests itself in the perspective of preventing ethnic ghettoes. Arguing against separate schools for migrants, in 2014 the director of the Higher School of Economics, Iaroslav Kuz’minov, said to MK:

Having schools where the majority of the students do not speak Russian or speak Russian badly is a highway to an ethnic ghetto! […] Children of different ethnic [natsinal’nyi] origin must be included in a Russian-speaking environment and study in regular schools. I hope that Moscow will avoid the fate of Paris and other large European cities which committed similar mistakes a few decades ago.

Иметь школы, где большинство учащихся не говорят или плохо говорят по- русски - путь к национальному гетто! […] Дети других национальностей должны быть включены в русскоязычное сообщество и учиться в обычных школах. Я надеюсь, что Москва избежит судьбы Парижа и других крупных европейских городов, которые несколько десятилетий назад совершили подобные ошибки. (quoted in Balabas 2014)

Kuz’minov’s statement exemplifies how “language” can also be connected to ethnic origin. Essentially, his account shows how otherwise undefined migrants are discursively constructed as an ethnic Other. Throughout the interview, Kuz’minov spoke of schools for migrants per se and not for those of any specific ethnic group. Given the composition of migration currents to Russia, the individuals he subsumes under the term “ethnic ghetto”32 are highly unlikely to be

32 For example, Huse (2014: 29) explains a “ghetto” as having the following four distinctive features: it is populated by one ethnic minority; living there is not a result of voluntary choice; there is little out-migration from it; and its residents’ basic needs are covered by institutions other than the state. 133 members of only one ethnic group. Thus, Kuz’minov’s ghetto is not in accordance with the accepted definition of a ghetto. What they have in common is their lack of Russian language skills, not their ethnic origin. Kuz’minov’s understanding that a ghetto is made up of migrants seen as being too different to become included in the recipient nation is substantiated by his reference to the “ghettoes” in Paris and other European cities. In this way, he implies that the migrants’ Otherness is less an issue of language command as such.

That said, similar to Ganapol’skii, Kuz’minov expresses optimism on behalf of the children of immigrants. The main difference here is that Kuz’minov speaks of their integration in terms of what must be avoided: the formation of ethnic ghettoes. In doing so, he brings into the discourse an ambiguity as regards the emerging image of the Russian in-group community: On the one hand, he sees “language” as representing similarity: the Russian language can function as a common ground for integration for the children of immigrants. Still, inherent in his initial warning against ethnic ghettoes is the tacit acknowledgement that the children’s acquisition of the Russian language will lead to a more profound level of integration into the Russian community. We may discern an underlying allusion to the desired outcome: the children should become assimilated into the Russian community. That makes it reasonable to conclude that, in his view, the Russian language alone does not function as a sufficient common ground for integration.

What kind of Russian community does Kuz’minov envisage? Here, asymmetry enters the discourse. Migrant children’s lack of fluency in the Russian language is presented as connected with their ethnic origin, whereas the Russian recipient society is mentioned only as a Russian-speaking environment. On the surface, the Russian in-group community is thus represented as a community of Russian-speakers, in contrast to the out-group, which is ethnicity-connoted. It is precisely this asymmetry that makes his statement come across as ambiguous.

Further, Kuz’minov’s reference to Paris and other European cities as examples of failed integration underlines the representation of integration as entailing more than mere fluency in the Russian language. The Russian “imagined” community is implicitly characterized by other distinctive features than the Russian language alone. In any case, his statement does not construct “language” as an immutable boundary. The ambiguity is confined to the implications of crossing the boundary. Acquisition of Russian language skills is only a means to achieve integration. The ultimate common ground for integration is seen as a more 134 profound expression of similarity and—though this is not made explicit—it implies the assimilation of members of coming generations.

Another example of how the ambiguities inherent in the discourse are foregrounded is related to how different conclusions can be drawn from comparing apparently similar cases. This lack of consistency was expressed when Professor Evgenii Kirov of the Moscow State Pedagogical University, in an interview with KP in 2007, compared the presence of migrant children in Moscow schools with migrant pupils in schools in European countries and the USA. The inconsistency indicates a tailoring of the understanding of integration to the different cases. Admitting non-native speakers into regular classes in the host society is presented as indicating successful integration in other countries—but is described as a problem in Russia. The presence of migrant children constitutes an impediment to the learning outcome of the “natives”:

[Moscow] teachers just clutch their heads: they try to explain something and those children33 do not understand anything. All because they do not understand the Russian language.

[…]

What if a class has students of ten to fifteen different nationalities, which is not a rare occurrence in schools in the capital? What about the young Muscovites who understand everything very well, but must wait while the teacher ends his explanation to those laggards?

Столичные учителя просто хватаются за голову: надо объяснять тему, а ребенок- инофон ничего не понимает. И все потому, что не знает русского языка.

[…]

А если в классе ученики десяти-пятнадцати национальностей, что уже не редкость в столичных школах? И как быть с маленькими москвичами, которые все прекрасно понимают, но вынуждены ждать, пока учитель закончит объяснение для отстающих? (Sergeev 2007)

Kirov’s usage of the term “laggards”—“отстающиe”—to describe those students who are not fluent in the Russian language makes them come across as being guilty themselves of not

33 From the context it is clear that this refers to those who do not speak the language of the society they live in, i.e. the Russian language. 135 speaking Russian. They are implicitly represented as not having worked hard enough to keep up with the class.

In this description of the situation in a Moscow classroom, Kirov comes close to representing “language” as an immutable boundary. It is clear that the teachers do not know what to do; that they “clutch their heads” indicates that they see the migrant children as a problem. While Kirov does not elaborate further on the Russian case, he proceeds to explain how he sees Europe and the USA as examples to follow. First, he describes the Netherlands:

The children of the migrants study in classes together with local children. They are submerged into the linguistic environment and easily soak up the language and European culture. As a result, they become integrated into society. Children of migrants do not feel like strangers and usually get along well in life.

Дети мигрантов учатся в общих классах с местными ребятами, они погружены в языковую среду и легко впитывают язык и европейскую культуру. В результате происходит интеграция инофонов в общество. Дети мигрантов не чувствуют себя чужими и, как правило, хорошо устраиваются в жизни. ( quoted in Sergeev 2007)

He then refers to the USA:

By the way, the same approach is active in the USA. It is exactly this [approach] that constitutes the foundation of the American “[melting] pot” in which all nationalities and ethnicities blend together. America is a country of migrants and the children of migrants are already one hundred percent Americans. I believe that Russia must follow this path. Then we will avoid social unrest, and will get happy rossiiane and not offended national minorities.

Та же схема, кстати, действует в США. Именно она легла в основу знаменитого американского “котла," в котором "переплавляются" все нации и народности. Америка - страна мигрантов, но дети мигрантов - уже стопроцентные американцы. Я думаю, что Россия должна идти именно по этому пути. Тогда мы избежим социальной напряженности и получим благополучных россиян, а не обиженные нацменьшинства. (quoted in Sergeev 2007)

Here, we see how Kirov presents the enrollment of migrant children in Russia and in the other countries in very different ways. While they appear as constituting an insoluble problem in Russia, they are represented as successfully blending with the locals in both the Netherlands and the USA. According to his account, integration in the Netherlands happens as the migrants soak up the local language and European culture. The result is that they cease to feel different. Though he never makes it explicit, Kirov exhibits an understanding of integration as

136 a process of assimilation during which the children of immigrants gradually become more similar to the majority in-group of the recipient community (see Entzinger 2000: 103).

With the USA, the allusions to assimilation are even clearer, especially due to the use of the “melting pot” metaphor as a positive example of integration. The subsequent characterization of once-migrant children as “already one hundred percent Americans” ultimately confirms the allusions to integration as assimilation. Bearing in mind the beginning of his account, it seems surprising that Kirov should conclude by prescribing the American “melting pot” model for Russian society, claiming that it will make Russia avoid interethnic tensions in the future. Together with the positive characterization of the USA as a country of immigrants, Kirov’s usage of the term rossiiane makes him come across as envisaging Russia in terms of an ethnicity-free civic “melting pot” where membership in the Russian community is based on other criteria than belonging to any particular group or country of origin.

Altogether, Kirov’s account is clearly ambiguous, as he recommends both ethnic majority assimilation and “melting pot” assimilation. First, the ideal-type “melting pot” assimilation is by default problematic in societies that are dominated by one majority group, which pertains to all three societies he mentions. When it comes to Russia, the resultant image of the Russian in-group community is one that is likely to emphasize homogeneity. Immigrants who become assimilated are likely to be absorbed into the Russian majority group, both linguistically and culturally (see Akturk 2017). As such, his statement exemplifies the challenges of the image of Russia as a multiethnic “community of peoples” (see Shevel 2011).

But how should we interpret Kirov’s ambiguity? Plausibly, his positively connoted portrayals of other countries conceal criticism of the Russian authorities for not doing enough to ensure proper integration of immigrants. This is strengthened by that fact that further down in the interview, Kirov laments how Russian teachers lack sufficient training in teaching Russian as a second language. Moreover, the emphasis on the Netherlands and the USA as successful examples of integration can be seen as a strategy for including into the sayable of the discourse the point that assimilation of the migrant children in Russia should be seen as entailing more than language fluency. With both the Netherlands and the USA, Kirov describes migrant children as becoming members of the respective host societies by blending into them. In the Netherlands, this happens by assimilation with the implied historical majority population; in the USA, as a process of melting together with a population composed of the descendants of previous migrants. Kirov’s reliance on the Netherlands as a successful 137 example of integration is unlikely to be a coincidence, as the Netherlands is among the European countries that consider it to be the immigrants’ duty to become integrated with the host population through compulsory language acquisition and a civic integration exam. A final point that is worthy of notice is Kirov’s positive appraisal of integration in the USA and Western Europe. This sharply contrasts the dominant position in the presidential discourse that represents integration in Europe as a failed multiculturalist project. In line with my contention in Chapter IV, we may infer that it is not Europe as such that constitutes Russia’s Other, but the “West” and its multiculturalism (see also Laruelle 2016).

5.4.3 Immutable Boundaries

Echoing Kirov’s assessment that Moscow teachers simply do not know what to do with non- Russian-speaking pupils, in 2013, Evgenii Iamburg, director of the Moscow Center of Education no 109, commented on the situation in Russia in general:

[w]e do not prepare teachers for work under contemporary conditions—for teaching in classes where the handicapped and children of migrants who neither speak nor understand Russian study together with normal [obychnye] children

Не готовим мы учителя и к работе в современных условиях — к преподаванию в классе, где вместе с обычными ребятами учатся инвалиды и дети мигрантов, не говорящие и не понимающие по-русски (Lemutkina 2013) [italics added].

Similar to the beginning of Kirov’s account above, Iamburg here constructs an image of migrant children as significantly different from the native Russian children, whom he describes as “normal children.” Iamburg, however, goes further in constructing an impassable boundary between these “normal” children and those who are hinted at as being abnormal. His grouping the children of migrants together with the (generally) life-long condition of suffering from a handicap substantiates the immutable character of the boundary. The children of migrants are represented as facing a challenge that they will probably never be able to overcome. They are destined to remain members of the out-group. Essentially, this reference to language skills demonstrates how “language” can be used to construct categories of essential out-groups.

The “Inner Abroad”

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While Kirov’s representation of “language” as a boundary that cannot be crossed is free from ethnicity-connoted content, the statements examined below exemplify how “language” can function as a pseudo-boundary that masks issues such as culture, ethnicity, and phenotype.

In an article on teachers’ experiences of having migrant children in regular classes, MK journalist Andrei Riabtsev in 2006 used the heading: “Who prevents the children of migrants from becoming genuine Muscovites?” [“Кто мешает детям мигрантов стать настоящими москвичами? ”] (Riabtsev 2006). The way it is formulated here makes it sound as if it would be possible to identify a culprit among the recipient population. While this remains unanswered throughout the article, the main theme is that the migrant children lack fluency in the Russian language to such an extent that it seriously impedes their learning. The explanation given is that these children lack practice in the Russian language outside the classroom, as they continue to speak their native tongue in all settings outside the school. As the heading indicates, another issue is also at stake. Concealed by the emphasis on language is the underlying theme of cultural differences. As evident from Riabtsev’s evaluation of the situation in Russian classrooms further down in the article, the themes of language and culture blend together and construct an image of migrant children as being too different to fit into a regular class:

[…] pedagogues are so afraid to say it aloud: the problem with the migrant children has become very serious. They have a poor command of the language of instruction in our schools and many lag one to two years behind in the general subjects. To try to raise them in the same way as the other children is sometimes simply scary! Try to guess how a young ignoramus from the mountains will react to getting [a bad grade].

[…] педагоги так боятся в открытую сказать: проблема с детьми мигрантов стала очень серьезной. Они плохо знают язык, на котором преподают в наших школах, многие на год-два отстают по общеобразовательным предметам. Пытаться применять к ним воспитательные меры, привычные для других ребят, иногда просто страшно! Попробуй угадай, как отреагирует горский недоросль на двойку? (Riabtsev 2006)

But who is the “migrant” in this case? Identified only by the signifier a “young mountain ignoramus,” that person might not even have crossed a Russian border. While the initial presentation of the problem as being one of poor language command with insufficient levels of knowledge and thus carries with it a representation of an uneducated migrant from another country, the mentioning of the “young mountain ignoramus” shifts the focus towards Russia’s

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“inner abroad.” The description fits in with the centuries-old stereotyped image of North Caucasians as “mountain dwellers” and their subsequent status as one of Russia’s major internal Others (Tolz 2001: 137).

Moreover, the label “недоросль” indicates these mountain dwellers not only as pupils who do not care or are simply stupid, but also as having an element of unpredictability, perhaps even becoming a dangerous one if they get bad grades. As Riabtsev formulates this part of his evaluation as a question that is not answered in the continuation of the article, it becomes a rhetorical question: the reader is assumed to know what kind of reaction to expect from a member of certain ethnic groups.

Though Riabtsev initially presents poor command of the Russian language as the primary obstacle, it is not “language” that functions as the real boundary in this case: language becomes a pseudo-boundary, masking implicit assumptions about certain students’ expected behavior because of their ethnocultural background, racialized by being presented as basic character traits. By adding this dimension to the issue of non-Russian-speaking children in elementary school classes, Riabtsev’s statement further opens the discursive space for also attributing Otherness to internal migrants. Thus, he brings into the sayable of the discourse the idea that people from Russia’s inner abroad can be simply too different to become a true part of the Russian community.

Concerning language skills, the North Caucasus region is indeed marked by high levels of proficiency in the titular language (i.e. not Russian), especially among Chechens (Akturk 2017: 1110). Along with the dwindling presence of monolingual Russian-speakers after the wars in Chechnya, the image of the region as constituting a particular linguistic community does carry some weight. However, it is also a fact that high levels of fluency in the titular language of the region are accompanied by high levels of proficiency in the Russian language (Akturk 2017: 1110). Being detached from the factual circumstances of language command in the region, the discourse shows how deeply rooted stereotypes are capable of seizing control over a diacritical marker.

Another example shows that other groups than the North Caucasians can also be used to represent “language” as a boundary against an out-group. The tendency to foreground ethnocultural differences resonated when KP journalist Aleksei Duel’ asked in 2011 how school classes ought to be composed in areas of Moscow densely populated by migrants:

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For many of the capital’s directors, it is a serious problem. How to compose classes? Put equal numbers of Muscovites and newcomers in each class? But then the class will have to move very slowly through the curriculum, at the pace of those who have not yet learned how to study, those for whom the teacher’s language is a foreign language. Or should one put these children in the back rows and work only with “normal” children? Then these rogues (izgoi) from “Kamchatka-like regions”34 will start tearing their homework apart.

Серьезная проблема для многих столичных директоров: как формировать классы? Собирать ребят, плохо говорящих по-русски, вместе и работать с ними по особой программе? Но, во-первых, какой учитель такую разношерстную компанию просто-напросто выдержит? Во-вторых, в школе есть программа и ее надо пройти. А как? Распределять в классах поровну москвичей и приезжих? Но тогда класс вынужден будет по программе двигаться очень медленно, ориентируясь на тех, кто еще не научен учиться, для кого язык учителя чужой. Посадить таких ребят за последние парты и работать только с “нормальными” детьми? Тогда очень скоро изгои с “камчатки” начнут срывать уроки (Duel’ 2011).

Here also, a lack of language skills is presented as the main challenge, together with the lack of experience with acquiring knowledge as such. The students who do not speak Russian pose a problem for those who are referred to as “normal” children. Similar to Iamburg’s (see above, this chapter) juxtaposition of “regular” children with children of migrants and handicapped children, Duel’ here constructs an image of migrant children as “abnormal.” Throughout the statement, we sense the underlying attitude that those who do not belong to the category of “normal” children face challenges they simply cannot overcome. As with the two previous examples, “language” alone does not function as a boundary for differentiating the out-group. As becomes clear in the last sentence, the boundary that separates “normal” from “abnormal” is again related to ethnic background. Those that will object to having to sit in the back row are the “rogues from Kamchatka-like regions.”

Similar to how Riabtsev’s reference to the mountain-folk played upon a widely known stereotype, we can again identify a reference to a certain ethnic group from an area geographically close to Kamchatka: Chukchis.35 As the main characters of a type of ethnic

34 The translation of “изгои с ‘камчатки’” into “rogues from Kamchatka-like regions” is motivated by the spelling of “kamchatka” with an uncapitalized k in quotation marks. The author has interpreted this as not a reference to Kamchatka per se, but as a reference to regions that are similar to Kamchatka. 35 The list of indigenous peoples of Kamchatka encompasses Koryaks, Itelmens, Evens and Evenky (Tungus), Chukchis, and Aleuts.

141 stupidity jokes popular in Russia in the 1990s and 2000s, the Chukchis were stereotyped as primitive and uncivilized (Pereltsvaig 9 October 2014; Davies 1990).

In fact, there is no statistical evidence that groups from Kamchatka or Chukotka have been migrating to Moscow on such a large scale as to pose significant challenges to schoolteachers. The language of instruction in schools in both regions—as throughout the Russian Federation—is Russian. Moreover, the indigenous peoples of Kamchatka Krai have been in contact with Russians ever since the Russian colonization of Siberia in the 16th and 17th centuries. Thus, the description of children from Kamchatka-like regions as “rogues” appears more as an act of foregrounding the migrants’ cultural Otherness and their perceived inability to fit into the classroom situation in the national capital. “Language” here seems less relevant as the main boundary, while the salience of culture understood as ethno-culture is amplified. The “rogues from ‘Kamchatka-like regions’” remain “outsiders” irrespective of their command of the Russian language. As to the emerging image of the Russian community, it clearly does not encompass the total population of the Russian Federation: membership is restricted to those who are sufficiently similar to blend in with Moscow’s russkii-dominated population.

Mowgli

KP also wrote about School No. 157 in Moscow, a “Russian language school” that predominantly Azerbaijani children attended in order to learn Russian before entering the regular elementary schools. The question that is posed as a heading to one of the paragraphs works in the same way as the descriptions of the students in the two previous examples, but with clearer connotations of racialization: “How to turn Mowgli into a schoolboy?” [“Как из Маугли сделать школьника?”] (Duel’ 2011). The comparison with Mowgli from The Jungle Book presents Azerbaijani schoolchildren as different to the degree that they cannot be expected to easily integrate into regular school-classes. After all, how could Mowgli, who was raised by animals in the jungle, be integrated into today’s Moscow? While the stereotypes in the two previous examples originated from inside Russia, the comparison with Mowgli appears as a fanciful idea with no clear relationship with Russian or Azerbaijani history. What it shows is to what extent the discourse can be detached from reality in constructions of Others.

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The article then proceeds to describe the aims of instruction at this school as being to teach the Russian language and Russian culture (Duel’ 2011). However, the subheading overshadows this stated goal, as it has already constructed a close to immutable boundary between the Azerbaijani children and Russian recipient society. Similar to what would be likely to be Mowgli’s fate in present-day Moscow, the Azerbaijani schoolchildren are hinted at as marked by an eternal Otherness, regardless of whether they manage to acquire fluency in the Russian language and become familiarized with Russian culture.

5.5 Touching Upon the Unsayable: Who Does Not Want to Become Integrated?

While not related to any of the nodal points above, a critical discourse moment that pinpoints the logic behind the examples of cultural racism is a statement which epitomizes the in- group’s avoidance of the migrant out-group. Reporting from the international conference “Europe in the 21st Century” held in Prague in July 2009, Novaia Gazeta quoted Professor of Economics at Moscow State University Valerii Elizarov as saying:

We relate to migrants as to second-class people, in a consumerist fashion. They are necessary and profitable, but we do not want to see them among our neighbors. Is it bad that they do not speak Russian? But why should they learn Russian if we do not intend to talk to them?

Мы относимся к мигрантам как к людям второго сорта, потребительски. Они нам нужны и выгодны, но мы не желаем видеть их соседями. Плохо, что они не знают русский? Но зачем им изучать наш язык, если мы и не собираемся с ними разговаривать? (quoted in Grafova 2009)

This indicates an issue that is also present in the discourse on “culture.” While a recurrent argument for the integration of immigrants in general is that the goal is to prevent the formation of ethnic enclaves, this will be of little help if the host population does not want to have contact with the newcomers. The result is a self-fulfilling prophecy of migrants as “eternal Others.” The Russian language cannot function as a common ground for integration, as the different kinds of Russian-speakers remain members of different communities. In this way, the statement contradicts Tishkov’s (2012) assertion that “the Russian language is one of the most powerful institutions of integration policy” [“Русский язык является одним из самых мощных институтов политики интеграции”]. Implicit in Elizarov’s statement is a

143 view that is otherwise absent from the empirical material presented in this chapter: that integration is a mutual process that also involves the efforts of the host community.

5.6 Summary and Discussion

The part of the discourse on the enrollment of the children of migrants in Russian schools shows that “language” in most cases does not function as a boundary alone. When the students are represented as prospective members of the Russian community, this inclusion presupposes a deeper level of integration, even assimilation, into the in-group community. “Language” readily represents the in-group community in other ways than that of a community composed solely of Russian-speakers. These range from ethnicity-free classic “melting pot” assimilation to an implied in-group of ethnic Russians only. The discourse does not celebrate linguistic diversity, neither with regard to international nor internal migrants. Linguistic diversity simply remains outside the discourse. This suggests that “language” demonstrates its capacity to exclude from the discourse a representation of Russia as a multiethnic and multilingual “community of peoples.” Ambiguity enters the discourse mainly because “language” as a diacritical marker can portray the Russian in-group community in several sometimes conflicting ways, while also functioning as a pseudo-boundary. At the same time, the discourse also reveals how other distinctive features may be essentialized to such extent as to morph into racialization.

Here, the current part of the discourse can be seen as picking up the thread from the first part of the discourse that crystallized around the USSR as a nodal point. Concerning the relationship between “language” and “culture,” the continuous presence of an underlying tension contributes to the emergence of a new logic of boundary constructions. This concerns the implied chronological order of linguistic and cultural integration. A natural reason for this is the emphasis on schoolchildren. As not having experienced the Soviet past, they cannot be expected to have crossed the preliminary boundary of a common cultural and historical background before they encounter “language.” As members of the younger generation, their integration must start from “scratch.” Thus, the implied chronological order of their integration corresponds with that of scholarly literature and the general tendency identified in

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Chapter V. First, migrants have to learn the language, then they can proceed towards further integration.

However, this does not mean that “culture” is pushed off the scene. On the contrary, it enters the discourse in the shape of an idea of a more profound level of integration that evolves into integration as assimilation. The presence of the idea of the children as able to become assimilated and achieve the status of “native” is accompanied by the immutable boundary constructions based on ethnocultural out-groupness. This suggests that the ultimate road to full-fledged in-group membership is to opt for assimilation, as this will prevent “migrants” from becoming “minorities” that can later become inner Others. The hinting at assimilation as a favorable path may also result from the schoolchildren being the offspring of recently arriving non-Slavic migrants. This may explain why the discourse seems to rest on the tacit assumption that the children need to assimilate in order to become accepted as in-group members. Assimilation is the only way they can overcome their initial Otherness.

On one point, the current part of the discourse differs from that on the Soviet past and the discourse on integration in general: it contains references to specific ethnic and/or national groups as out-groups. When the mythical “migrant” is replaced with such references, the otherwise distinct discourse on integration converges with the more general discourse on migration, where migrants have proven more likely to be represented as Others (see literature review, Chapter I). Further, it proves the deep-rootedness of Russians’ perceptions about “inner Others.” The observation that these perceptions are strong enough to enter into the current discourse and assume control over “language” as a diacritical marker tells us that such ideas are likely to continue to remain present in the general discourse on Russian national identity in the future as well. In turn, this precludes the emergence of the image of Russia as a community of all of its citizens: some will always be considered as too different to be included in it.

5.7 Comparison with Presidential Discourse

On another point, the two types of discourse clearly overlap: the Russian language is portrayed as capable of uniting people outside the current territorial borders of Russia. The

145 most noticeable border-transcending “imagined community” is the one that comprises all Russian-speakers across the post-Soviet space—that is, those residing in the territory of the former USSR.

As early as 2003, Putin brought migration from the CIS area into focus by stating that the residents of the CIS were “people who are close to us and with whom we have a good understanding, and with whom we share the same language” [“кто близок нам и с кем мы хорошо понимаем друг друга. С кем говорим на одном языке”] (Putin May 16, 2003).

In both 2005 and 2007, he reiterated the emphasis on language as a factor uniting the residents of the former Soviet space. In 2005, he described Russia as “tied to the former Soviet Republics […] through the Russian language and the great culture that we share” [“связанная с бывшими республиками СССР […] русским языком и великой культурой”] (Putin April 25, 2005). In 2007, he emphasized the Russian language as “the language of a historical fraternity of peoples” [“язык исторического братства народов”] (Putin April 26, 2007).

The last two quotes highlight the main points of similarity and those of difference between the two types of discourse. As evident in the formulation in the 2005 address, “language” readily functions together with “culture.” The difference concerns the relationship between these two markers. With regard to the Soviet Union, command of the Russian language is unquestionably imagined as a necessary condition for unity, at the same time as it is also closely linked to ideas of a common past and shared culture. In both discourses, “language” as a boundary is implied as preceded by “culture.” In chronological order, migrants will first have to cross the boundary into the Soviet past, before they can be considered as candidates for crossing the boundary into the current community of Russian-speakers.

While the media discourse displays how the idea of Soviet unity fades with time, the presidential discourse becomes more concerned with the Russian language as able to cement Russia’s diverse population. By contrast, celebrations of diversity remains entirely absent in the media discourse. The in-group Self appears as one undivided whole irrespective of what signifier is used to denote it. However, this singular Self goes hand-in-hand with out-group constructions that excludes from it members of Russia’s own citizenry.

In so doing, the media discourse displays concern with two themes that remain unarticulated in the presidential discourse: assimilation and perceptions of “inner Others.” Consequently,

146 we may say that the media discourse opens the discursive space to include perceptions about a stronger kind of in-group uniformity than that of the presidential discourse. In the presidential discourse, the strongest expression of uniformity was tied to the role of the Russian language as either the basis for interethnic communication or as part of the Russian russkii core that united the diverse population (Medvedev November 12, 2009; Putin January 23, 2012, February 19, 2013).

While differing in the emphasis on the Russian majority, both ways of representing the Russian language constructs an image of the Russian “imagined community” as embracing all of its citizens. Yet, their unity rests on the implied acceptance of the special position of the Russian language and its native speakers: the russkii majority population. This acceptance of dominance and possible identification with the Russian language and Russianness in general can also be said to contain a tacit call for further homogenization. As such, the media discourse can be seen as uncovering a theme that had to be confined to the unsayable of the presidential discourse because of its divisive character.

Finally, the observation that the strongest out-group constructions are those that exclude Russia’s own citizens from the “imagined community” hints at concerns about instability in Russia as not really connected with immigration. As I will return to in the next chapter, the most observable challenge for Russia is related to managing its own diverse population, not integrating migrants.

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6 Chapter VI “Culture”

6.1 Introduction

Chapter IV and V revealed two important findings that influence the understanding of “culture” in the overall discourse on integration. First, neither of the discourses invests the signifier “culture” with any particular content. With regard to integration, the general lack of a signified most likely results from the lack of an object of discussion, as the Russian language, history and civics test was introduced only in 2015 (see section 1.6). Moreover, both chapters revealed that “culture” is closely related to “language.” This relation is present both on the occasions when “language” functions as a boundary towards out-groups, and when the Russian language ties the cultural community together.

This chapter is devoted to the analysis of “culture” as a boundary. As follows, the object of investigation is its function, which in turn informs us about its character. This leaves out questions relating to its content. This is also in line with the dominant view of cultural integration in scholarly literature (see Algan, Bisin and Verdier 2010). Cultural integration is mainly tied to contact between the migrants and the recipient community, rather than the groups’ relations to their respective cultures. Approaching “culture” as a boundary provides insights about the “imagined character” of the in-group’s culture and how this plays out in relation to the notions of civic and ethnic, majority and minority. The chapter is structured around two thematic nodal points that reflect two findings about the “imagined character” of the Russian cultural boundary and that of the migrant “imagined community”: 1) “culture” in the singular; and 2) “cultures” in the plural, both in the shape of specific signifiers and by implication.

6.2 Nodal point 1: “Culture” in the Singular

The critical discourse moments that crystallize around this nodal point represent “culture” as constituting a common ground for integration produce important findings about the character of the in-group’s culture and the relationship between this culture and its individual bearers. Regarding the character of the in-group’s culture, the discourse relates this to three ideas about change. First, Russian culture is represented as basically fixed and unchangeable, yet capable of absorbing new individuals. Second, Russian culture itself is represented as open to 149 change by absorbing new elements. Third, there is also the idea that members of the migrant community can undergo change so as to become members of the Russian in-group cultural community.

The “change” mainly does here is to provide a new angle to prospects about integration in the Russian community.

6.2.1 First Mode of Change: Change in Membership, Russian Culture as Constant

As early as 2003, in a letter to the editor, an unnamed KP reader reacted to the newspaper’s previous publication of three articles on migration and the national question. This reader advocated that Russian culture should be open to new members irrespective of ethnic or even racial origin:

Why is it not a threat to national security when a Russian girl marries a Tatar or a Buriat but it is when she marries a migrant? What are we afraid of, that they will destroy our Slavic blood? Is the love for one’s motherland transmitted genetically? Blood is chemistry. Russians are Russians because of their adherence to Russian CULTURE. I believe that it is precisely the fear of losing one’s culture and traditions that lies at the core of many contemporary […] nationalist and chauvinist tendencies on the everyday level. For some reason, we are not afraid of a non-Russian Tatar, but we fear an Azerbaijani. The first one […] is included, on his terms, in Russian culture and statehood, the second one is not. The task of everyone interested in the continuation of Russian [rossiiskoi] tradition should be simple: the integration of the CHILDREN of migrants into Russian culture, through education […].Yes, then other Russians will grow up—with different skin color and phenotype—but they will discuss the secrets of the Russian soul in the same way and learn how to score goals for the Russian national soccer team.

Почему, когда русская девушка выходит замуж за татарина или бурята, - это не угроза национальной безопасности, а когда за мигранта -угроза? Чего мы боимся, что они нам кровь нашу славянскую попортят? Так разве любовь к Родине генетически передается? Кровь - это химия.. Русские называются русскими по принадлежности к русской КУЛЬТУРЕ. Мне кажется, именно страх потерять культуру, традицию лежит в основе многих сегодняшних […] националистических и шовинистских тенденций бытового уровня. Поэтому-то мы не боимся нерусского татарина, а азербайджанца боимся. Первый включен […] пусть и на своих условиях, в русскую культуру и государственность, а второй - нет. […] Значит, задача всех заинтересованных в продолжении российской традиции проста: интеграция ДЕТЕЙ мигрантов в российскую

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культуру через образование. Да, тогда вырастут другие русские - с другим цветом кожи и типом лица, но они будут так же рассуждать о загадочной русской душе и начнут наконец забивать голы за сборную России по футболу. (Sapozhnikova 2003)

First, the anonymous reader questions what he or she hints at as being an artificial distinction between non-Russian indigenous groups and external migrants. This is in itself interesting, as it counters the general tendency to lump these together as “migrants.” Further, the person clearly represents the mentioned ethnic groups as in-group members. The question that arises in the wake of the explicit mentioning of Tatars and Buriats is whether these function to exemplify all of Russia’s minorities or if some minorities could still be considered as “migrants.” Neither the quote nor the rest of the article provides any answer to this question, and we can only wonder whether such a distinction should be interpreted as confined to the unsayable or whether it is simply not part of the anonymous reader’s perceptions about the state of affairs.

If we consider the conveyed “imagined community” as consisting of all of Russia’s minorities, the statement can be seen as questioning whether this image comes across as open to newcomers. The criticism highlights the somewhat paradoxical issue that such a diverse community as Russia might not be positively inclined towards out-groups. Aiming to fit all of Russia’s minorities within its frames, Russia as an ethnically diverse “community of peoples” is here represented as inclined to exclude migrants, rather than welcoming them as new members who would make an already diverse in-group even more diverse.

Displaying a strong view of “culture” as a fundamental diacritical marker, the anonymous reader clearly disconnects it from other distinctive features of its individual bearers. Racial origin and cultural identity simply belong within different systems of classification: it is a person’s individual sense of belonging to a particular culture that defines whether he or she can be considered as a member of a community. Here, the letter-writer is arguing against the view of culture as ethnic culture. As a result, “culture” functions as a common ground for similarity based on individual choice.

But can this kind of culture be labelled as civic? To this, the statement provides no clear answer. Despite the disconnection of culture from biology and even race, Russian culture

151 appears to be a stable entity with its own content, independent of those who bear it. Judging from the final part of the letter, it is the migrants, or more precisely their children, who are required to adopt the Russian culture and then become russkiie Russians and continue to carry on the existing cultural heritage.

There is no elaboration as to the exact content of this cultural heritage. The adjectives russkii and rossiiskii are used interchangeably. The most reasonable interpretation is that the anonymous reader’s idea of Russian culture combines both civic and ethnic elements: a community in which a limited number of shared aspects of Russianness function as a common ground for integration. The cultural boundary can be crossed by anyone who wishes to, but this requires that newcomers adhere to an established stable core that is represented as Russian, albeit free from ethnic connotations.

Similarly, Anatolii Vishnevskii, Director of the Institute of Demography at the Higher School of Economics, expressed the view that a Russian russkaia culture would persist irrespective of whether migration caused future changes in the ethnic/racial composition of the population:

After all, Russians constitute the majority population, almost 80%. That cannot easily change. But in a longitudinal perspective it cannot be excluded. But should we be worried about such changes? The preservation of racial identity? Or linguistic, or cultural? These are different arithmetics. The population can change in terms of racial composition, but the language and culture remain Russian, only enriched with elements of other cultures.

Все-таки сейчас русские составляют большинство населения, где-то под 80%. Так просто это не изменишь. Но в отдаленной перспективе исключить этого нельзя. Только что нас должно заботить в этих возможных переменах? Сохранение расовой идентичности? Или языковой, культурной? Это разная арифметика. По расовому составу население может измениться, а язык и культура - остаться русскими, пусть и обогащенными прививками других культур (quoted in Il'ichev and Kolesnikov 2010).

Vishnevskii also sees “race” and “culture” as belonging to different schemes of classification. Arguing for a separation between them, he distances himself from the various Soviet traditions that implied the biologization of culture through the biologization of ethnicity (Shnirelman 2010: 129–30; Prina 2016: 26; Tishkov 1997). His “imagined” Russian culture is

152 also marked by a sense of continuity, as it—together with the Russian language—is represented as remaining “Russian, only enriched with elements of other cultures.”

Vishnevskii’s position differs from that of the anonymous KP letter-writer quoted above, as he indicates that the flow of people across the cultural boundary will cause only minor changes in Russian in-group culture. Thus, “culture” as in-group similarity, while retaining its Russian outlook, is additionally represented as open to enrichment by elements of other cultures. The way Vishnevskii brings into the discourse the otherwise undisputed ethnic majority status of the Russian population should not be overlooked. Combined with how he keeps the door open to minor changes in Russian culture, it suggests different Russian “imagined communities” that can be associated with both an ideal-type civic rossiiskii Russianness and the prevalence of the Russian russkii majority. The most important issue remains the idea of culture as one, regardless of whom it encompasses.

6.2.2 Second Mode of Change: Russian Culture as Open to Changes

While the examples above displayed a view of Russian culture as a basically stable entity open to change in its membership, the following examples reveal how a perception of Russian culture as unstable and changeable can also function as common ground for integration.

An Izvestiia article in 2010 described how the Azerbaijani leadership related to the integration of their citizens in Russia. According to the journalist, they held that the integration of Azerbaijani culture would contribute to the enrichment of Russian cultural space.

But when it comes to Russian Azerbaijanis, Baku […] aims to create favorable conditions for a high level of quality in their integration into Russian society […] [A] goal is to achieve greater inclusion of Azerbaijani mass culture and show business in the Russian cultural space.

Но в отношении российских азербайджанцев Баку […] стремится создать условия для их более качественной интеграции в российское общество […] Поставлена задача добиться еще бóльшей вовлеченности субъектов азербайджанской массовой культуры и шоу-бизнеса в российское культурное пространство. (Tsyganov 2010)

The emphasis on the spread of knowledge about Azerbaijani culture in Russia and the stated goal of achieving greater inclusion of Azerbaijani mass culture in Russian show business

153 indicates a view of integration as a two-way process of mutual accommodation (see Asylum and Migration Glossary 2010; see also Triandafyllidou, Madood and Meer 2012: 3). Members of the Azerbaijani community are represented as able to achieve integration into the Russian in-group community owing to their capability to contribute to the Russian rossiiskaia culture. Thus, the Russian recipient culture is represented as able to accept new elements of foreign culture, in this case Azerbaijani. As for the usage of the civic-connoted adjective rossiiskii as a qualifier for “culture,” the reason may be that the journalist is reporting from the viewpoint of the Azerbaijani leadership, which chooses rossiiskii, as it is connoted with the Russian state.

Another example that involves an element of mass culture pertains to Russian eating habits. In 2015, Evgenii Varshaver, a representative of the Center for Research on Migration and Ethnicity at the Russian Academy of Economy and Public Administration (Tsentr issledovaniia migratsii i etnichnosti Rossiiskoi akademii narodnogo khoziaistva i gossluzhby), discussed research on changes in the ethnic composition of the Moscow population. Rejecting the assumption that migrants who have settled in Moscow will form ethnic enclaves, he explained his understanding of integration as follows:

And can they change us? Integration is a two-way process. Russian culture in the 19th century did not include the habit of eating shashlyk.36 But a few decades of interaction with the Caucasus—and you see, we all go on picnics to eat shashlyk!

А нас они могут изменить? - Интеграция - это двухсторонний процесс. Русские в XIX веке не имели культуры есть шашлык. Но несколько десятков лет общения с Кавказом - и вот пожалуйста, мы все ездим на шашлыки! (quoted in Boiko 2015)

Here, integration is presented as a two-way process. Rather than people crossing boundaries, it is an element of a culture that is seen as travelling between communities. Implicit in the reference to shashlyk is the view that, although migration will cause changes to what is perceived as the content of the Russian culture, this is not necessarily negative. By representing Russian culture as open to new elements, Varshaver is portraying also the Russian community as also being open to individual bearers of these cultures. The implied

36 Widely known in the West as shish-kebab: grilled meat, often cooked on a barbecue spit over an open fire; very popular in Russia, for picnics and served at restaurants, cafes, and marketplaces. 154 result is that migrants will not remain “outsiders,” because they can contribute with changes to the culture of the recipient community.

The reference to shashlyk makes this critical discourse moment one of the rare instances when “culture” is implied to have a content. As shown in the previous critical discourse moment (Tsyganov 2010), when “culture” is invested with meaning, it happens in a way that readily detaches the discourse from perceptions about Russian culture as encompassing world-famous poets, writers and composers. Neither does it touch upon the indirect investment of the signifier “culture” with meaning of related to Russian Orthodoxy as shown in Chapter V. This may suggest a view that the commonly known “great Russian culture” is implied to be a part of the in-group’s culture that newcomers cannot access. Though it is difficult to reach a firm conclusion, the explicit references to food habits may be tacitly hinting at an unsayable of another cultural boundary: one that is immutable in the sense that the implied culture remains the possession of the tacitly “imagined” real in-group members.

6.2.3 Third Mode of Change: Individuals as Open to Changes

In addition to changes in the composition of the in-group membership and changes in the content of the recipient community’s culture, migrant individuals are also represented as open to change. Here, “culture” comes to function as a common ground, thanks to the willingness of the individual migrant to assimilate into the Russian majority culture.

This was evident in a 2004 evaluation by Valerii Stepanov, a senior scientific staff member of the Russian Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He assessed the changes—or rather, the lack of such—in the ethnic composition of Moscow:

Those who come to Moscow today are urban dwellers. [Moscow] is increasingly becoming a city of specialists. Besides, what really affects people strongly, especially children, is the change in ethnic self-identification. Some of them even aim to assimilate quickly and—without losing their “domestic” ethnic self- identity—join the common Russian (rossiiskaia), Russian (russkaia), Muscovite culture. In this respect, the face of the capital has been changing little.

Теперь в Москву едут горожане - она все больше становится городом специалистов. Кроме того, очень сильно влияет на людей, и особенно на детей, смена этнического самоопределения. Какая-то часть даже стремится побыстрее ассимилироваться и, не теряя "домашнего" этнического самосознания, приобщается к общероссийской, русской, московской

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культуре. В этом смысле лицо столицы меняется мало (quoted in Timofeeva 2004).

Stepanov depicts ethnic self-identification in clearly constructivist terms, especially as regards children. Moreover, his noting that some individuals are willing to assimilate with the recipient community makes “culture” engage in a construction of in-group similarity based on precisely this willingness. The Russian recipient culture remains stable and unchangeable, as in the examples above where it proved ready to absorb new individuals who were willing to cross the boundary.

The emerging representation of the Russian recipient culture is a concentric one. At the core, there is the local Moscow culture, which is surrounded by the Russian russkaia culture. Finally, there is the overarching rossiiskaia culture. As a result, the adjective russkii is here disconnected from an ethnic group. Further, there is no boundary between russkii and rossiiskii, thus preventing the view of the two as mutually exclusive. Russkii is included in obshcherosiiskii.

Also this statement displays a clear understanding of Russian culture as detached from phenotypical features. Essentially, anyone who wishes to assimilate can do so. On the other hand, the emphasis on Moscow as a city of specialists and of migrants who arrive in Moscow as largely urban dwellers draws up a boundary that includes as prospective in-group members those who are ready to assimilate based on their adherence to this group. This instance of drawing a boundary between urban and rural is not unique. In the first section in Chapter VI on language, I noted how Valerii Tishkov (2006) and Zhanna Zaionchkovskaia (quoted in n.n. 2006) also singled out rural and uneducated individuals as least likely to become integrated in the larger cities, irrespective of country of origin.

What, then, characterizes the image of the Russian in-group community? The three concentric circles of different cultures help to construct an image of the Russian community based on an understanding of culture that involves a blurring of boundaries between the civic and the ethnic. Included in this image is the understanding that migrants encounter a specific local culture. Acquiring membership in the in-group depends mainly on the migrants’ willingness to change their own ethnic self-identification. However, as individuals may also retain a part

156 of their previous self-identification, the initial boundary between in-group and out-group is blurred.

The theme of individual migrants as willing to undergo change was also evident in an article published in KP in 2006. The newspaper ran an interview with sociologists Igor’ Kuznetsov and Vladimir Mukomel’, who had conducted a survey among Azerbaijani migrants in Moscow. As the following interpretation of their findings reveals, many of those surveyed saw Moscow as a Russian russkii city and were prepared to live according to Russian customs and traditions:

People who are raised within the frames of traditional culture (Azerbaijani, Georgian, Tajik) have an easier task of “blending in” with Moscow life if it is based on the laws of a traditional culture, even if it is a different one. If migrants are faced with some kind of a multiethnic jelly, “a city of many cultures” where people live according to their own ideas, they start to construct a familiar environment for themselves. Here is yet another reason for the formation of enclaves. If we do not want this to emerge, we must present Moscow as a Russian city, and not as a “world capital” that has lost its ethnic colors. The Russian Moscow is not at all a “city for Russians only.” That is the strength of our culture, that it always gets along with the traditions of other peoples and is ready to adopt something new from them. It is like water, in which crystals of different cultures swim. Sometimes they dissolve and become Russians.

Людям, которые воспитаны в рамках традиционной народной культуры (азербайджанской, грузинской, таджикской"), легче 'влиться' в московскую жизнь, если она построена по законам пусть другой, но традиционной культуры. Если же мигранты видят перед собой некий многонациональный кисель, “город многих культур”, в котором каждый живет как знает, они начинают отстраивать привычную для себя среду. Вот еще одна причина возникновения анклавов. Не хотим их плодить - значит, надо преподносить Москву как русский город, а не как “столицу мира”, лишенную национального колорита. Но русская Москва - это вовсе не 'город только для русских'. В том и сила нашей культуры, что она всегда прекрасно уживалась с традициями других народов и готова была перенять у них что-то новое. Она, как вода, в которой плавают кристаллики иных культур, иногда они растворяются и становятся русскими. (quoted in Zhukovskaia 2006a)

Here, both migrants and the recipient Russian culture are represented as able to change. Moreover, the quotation provides an explanation of why multiculturalist-like approaches do

157 not promote integration. What the two sociologists here imply is that integration presupposes a clearly identifiable boundary for the migrants to cross. There must be one, basically unified culture to align with. Otherwise, ethnic ghettoization will occur, and all parties will be outsiders vis-à-vis each other.

The representation of migrants and the recipient society as ready to change during the process of integration is clear in the water and crystals metaphor. Both Russian society (as the water) and migrants (as the swimming crystals) will experience change when the crystals dissolve in the water. The implied view of integration is a two-way process where the focus is on the newcomers’ assimilation with the recipient society’s majority group. The implied image of the Russian community is associated with its hosting the majority culture into which the migrants can become absorbed.

Taking into consideration the time of Stepanov and Mukomel’’s statements (2004 and 2006), they date back to the period before Central Asian labor migration increased significantly. Therefore, both must be seen as referring to migrants who at the time were more likely to be both culturally similar to Russia and to speak the Russian language.

6.2.4 Migrants’ Otherness

When presented as one and undivided, “culture” can also function to underline migrants’ Otherness. In an article that was published in 2013 on the topic of ethnic enclaves, KP journalist Georgii Bovt suggested that integration is possible only when there is no alternative:

Migrants are representatives of an alien cultural identity that grows increasingly distant from our former Soviet cultural identity […]. Integration is possible only when the immigrants have no other way out than to resemble their neighboring natives. But how patient and warm-hearted should these natives be to the strangers? Are they ready to endure their presence in order to prevent the formation of enclaves?

Мигранты - это представители чужой, все более отдаляющейся от нашей прежней, еще советской, культурной идентичности. […] Интеграция возможна, лишь когда у иммигранта нет иного выхода, кроме как походить на своих соседей-аборигенов. Но сколь терпеливы и участливы должны быть сами аборигены к чужакам? Готовы ли они терпеть их возле себя ради того, чтобы те не начали сбиваться в эти самые анклавы? (Bovt 2013)

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Similar to the critical discourse moments on “language” that were organized around the Soviet past as a nodal point, Bovt here constructs a boundary in time. He represents the common Soviet culture as vanished with the past, no longer capable of functioning as a common ground for integration. Present-day migrants are bearers of an “alien” cultural identity.

Following the construction of the boundary in time, Bovt represents integration as possible only when the migrants understand that it is no longer possible not to integrate: integration is represented as a last resort. Then, Bovt asks a question that is similar to that posed by Elizarov (see Grafova 2009) in the chapter on “language”: whether the recipient society actually wants the migrants to integrate. Here Bovt displays an understanding of integration as a two-way process that inevitably entails interaction between members of the recipient community and the newcomers. In order to avoid the formation of ethnic enclaves in Russia, the local population must accept the presence of the migrants in their midst. Bovt’s questioning of whether the members of the Russian in-group would readily accept this degree of contact with the migrants brings to the fore Triandafyllidou’s (1998: 601) assertion that immigrants might become what she terms an “internal significant other.” She argues that, when some of the differences the migrants display (language, cultural, ethnic) are perceived as threatening the cultural “purity” of the recipient national community, this community will seek to redefine its own in-group identity in order to differentiate itself from the internal Other seen as threatening it (Triandafyllidou 1998: 601). Bovt’s question echoes Triandafyllidou’s assertion that the crossing of the boundary by members of the out-group might result in the construction of a new boundary that makes the out-group become an Other in a different way.

Concerning the perspective that integration is a two-way process, this theme is present in a statement by senior staff member at the Center for the Study of Population Problems at Moscow State University, Vladimir Arkhangel’skii. In August 2006, three members of the Russian racialist organization “The Savior” (Spas) were arrested on suspicion of having carried out a terrorist attack at Moscow’s Cherkizov Marketplace that caused the death of 10 people. Commenting on the attack, Arkhangel’skii was quoted as saying to KP that:

We cannot stop migration—with our fertility and death rates it is inevitable. Ethnic conflicts are also inevitable. We must teach tolerance (terpimost’) towards peoples of other ethnic origins. But migrants must also come one step forward. With regard to

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newcomers (priezzhie) we must pursue a policy that aims at their adaptation to our culture. They must not live among themselves. And I would advise young people not to blow up marketplaces, but to have children, in order to create an environment ethnically similar to themselves.

Миграцию нам не остановить - при нашей рождаемости и смертности она неизбежна. Неизбежны конфликты на национальной почве. Нужно воспитывать терпимость к людям других национальностей. Но мигранты тоже должны делать шаги навстречу. В отношении приезжих нужно проводить политику, направленную на их адаптацию к нашей культуре. Нельзя, чтобы они жили сами по себе. А молодым людям я бы посоветовал не рынки взрывать, а рожать детей, чтобы сформировать для себя этнически близкое окружение. (quoted in Skoibeda 2006)

On the one hand, Arkhangel’skii underlines that migrants must not live among themselves. Yet he confines his view of “integration” to the migrants’ adaptation to Russian culture. Their prospective integration depends on their ability to adjust. They are invited to become more alike to the in-group members, but it does not appear as if they will become part of it. Thus, their “adaptation” is limited to undergoing first-step integration, which allows them to approach the boundary that surrounds the Russian in-group, but not cross it.

His concluding advice to young people to “create an environment ethnically similar to themselves” adds further ambiguity to the statement. Underlying the encouragement of ethnic Russians to have more children, we may discern his indirect support of the viewpoint that “culture” ought to function as a boundary that prevents migrants from becoming members of the Russian community. Moreover, Arkhangel’skii includes into the discourse a theme that is generally absent: demography. While it has been observed as recurrent in the debate on migration (see Berg-Nordlie, Aasland, and Tkach 2010), Russia’s demographic challenges do not become tied to integration. What Arkhangel’skii can be seen as doing is to open the discursive space for the viewpoint that higher birth rates can ensure the dominance of ethnic Russians across the Russian Federation. In so doing, he indirectly biologizes culture, linking it to the future offspring of the bearers of a certain culture. As a result, “culture” is bound to function as a boundary that emphasizes difference. If culture is a matter of biology, culturally different migrants are deemed to remain an eternal out-group.

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6.3 Summing up and Discussion

The way “culture” in the singular here functions as a common ground for integration of immigrants highlights how perceptions about change are indispensable to the idea of the boundary. The current examination of critical discourse moments reveals that when individuals are “imagined” to cross the boundary, other changes also occur. Both the culture of the Russian recipient society and the migrants themselves or their culture are open to change. In this way, the discourse shows how Barth’s (1969) original thoughts are still highly relevant as of today, in particular in the context of integration.

When it comes to perceptions about integration, the discourse on “culture” in the singular points towards a view of integration as a two-way process of mutual accommodation by immigrants and members of the host society (see Asylum and Migration Glossary 2010; and Triandafyllidou, Madood, and Meer 2012: 3) to a greater extent than was the case with “language.” Yet, it is important to note that the portrayal of individual migrants’ willingness to change also points in the direction of assimilation as a suitable form of integration.

The representation of the in-group’s culture as one and undivided precludes the representation of the image of Russia as a culturally diverse community, unless the diversity can be represented as one, unifying whole. This prompts the question as to what roles are played by the signifiers russkii and rossiiskii. Here, the discourse shows that their content depends on how they are invested with meaning in each specific case, rather than connotations to either civic or ethnic, or specific cultural content.

In turn, the finding that “culture” in the singular readily functions as a common ground for integration triggers the question about the relationship between majority and minority cultures in Russia. As Prina (2016: 1015-110) notes, the general tendency in Russia is cultural homogenization. As she (Prina 2016: 1015-110) notes, cultural homogenization does not occur in the shape of a stated policy, but as a result of practical obstacles to the implementation of minorities’ rights. Still, considering this development, one may ask whether cultural homogenization actually can result in more favorable conditions for the integration of immigrants. This brings me to “cultures” in the plural.

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6.4 Nodal Point 2: “Cultures” in the Plural

Grammatically, “culture” in the plural ought to be “cultures.” In the current discourse, “culture” is also indirectly pluralized. Either by implication of the existing cultures or by adding the prefix “multi.” When this happens, it is also turned into an “-ism,” which can appear in the shape of a policy instrument, a theoretical approach to the integration of immigrants, and an ideology. As an approach to integration—both in theory and in practice— multiculturalism is left with little support in the Russian context. As we remember from Chapter IV, Vladimir Putin (January 23, 2012) sharply denounced Western-style multiculturalism in “Russia: The National Question.” The main impact areas of his critique were the integration of immigrants and the West-European nation-state. The focus on the West is also what characterizes the current part of the discourse. In the shape of “multiculturalism,” “culture” functions as a boundary towards Western Europe. At the same time, “cultures” in the plural also assume relevance as a way of describing Russia’s own challenges. While not an “-izm,” Russia’s own multicultural character is represented as an obstacle to successful national integration.

6.4.1 Multiculturalism

On two occasions in 2010 and 2011, Konstantin Romodanovskii, former head of the Federal Migration Service, sharply dismissed multiculturalism as a means for achieving integration:

Can you remember that Chancellor Merkel declared the failure of the program of multiculturalism? The approach in Europe was multiculturalist: the state supports the principle of distinct communities with their respective members that live according to the laws of the countries together with other communities that all have their distinctive features, religion and traditions. This was bound to lead to the formation of internal enclaves—and so it did. An enclave is never a good thing, it is a separate territory that is less controlled and less visited by members of other communities and not very popular among the surroundings. The way I see it, this was wrong from the outset. In my opinion, there is a different approach: assimilation and integration.

Помните заявление канцлера Меркель о неудаче программы мультикультурализма? Подход в Европе был именно мультикультурный: государство поддерживает принцип раздельного существования общин, члены которых проживают на основе действующих в стране законов рядом с другими общинами, у которых свои особенности, религия, традиции. Это должно было привести к созданию внутренних анклавов и - привело. Анклав - это всегда не очень здорово, это отдельная территория, которая хуже контролируется, хуже 162

посещается представителями других общин, хуже воспринимается окружающими. Вот это, мне кажется, изначально было ошибочно. На мой взгляд, есть иной подход—ассимиляция и интеграция. (quoted in Sokolov 2010) and

If we stimulate differences, it will lead us nowhere. The politics of integration—that is something else. We must stimulate the erosion of differences. In a society, people must live according to one set of rules.

Если стимулировать различия, это путь в никуда. Политика интеграции - это другая вещь, мы должны стимулировать cтирание различий... В обществе люди должны жить по единым правилам. (quoted in Cherkasova 2011)

As is evident from the first quote, Romodanovskii’s critique of multiculturalism is that members of distinct communities cannot be united merely by living according to the same laws. Obedience to the same laws does not provide sufficient common ground for integration. The result is the formation of ethnic enclaves, which serve to prevent inter-group contact. What multiculturalism “achieves” is not integration, but the preservation of the distinctiveness of each community. By juxtaposing multiculturalism with “assimilation and integration,” Romodanovskii further underlines how he dismisses it as a viable policy for integration. In the end, he seems to see multiculturalism as the implicit acceptance of eternal cultural Otherness.

Comparison of his reference to “laws” in the first quote with his mention of “rules” in the second quote points in the direction of an understanding of common rules for coexistence as detached from the legal framework of the recipient state. “Rules” appear more akin to cultural norms of behavior than to formal laws and regulations. In this way, the reliance of multiculturalism on adherence to a common legal framework and equality before the law is taken as insufficient common ground for integration (see also Barry 2001: 32).

Romodanovskii’s juxtaposition of multiculturalism with “assimilation and integration” and the “erosion of differences” prevents the view that migration could enrich Russia’s cultural diversity. His formulation implies that Russian culture should be understood as one and undivided. This brings us to his lumping together of “assimilation and integration,” which alludes to them as synonymous. While “assimilation” and “integration” may be two sides of the same coin in an American context, they are commonly understood as carrying different

163 connotations in Europe (see Entzinger 2000). With his current juxtaposition, Romodanovskii detaches the discourse from the reality in more than one way. First, he does not distinguish between how the two concepts carry different connotations in different societies. Second, he argues that “assimilation” is the preferred option for integration in Russia. This prompts the question of what kind of culture the migrants are expected to assimilate with. In a Russian context, it is difficult to circumvent the idea of “assimilation” meaning ethnic majority assimilation, unless something else is explicitly mentioned. Leaving policies aside, assimilation with the Russian majority has occurred for centuries (see Kappeler 2001). As a result, the emerging image of the Russian community rests on the view that the ethnic Russian majority group is what constitutes the main common ground for integration: the similarity invoked is similarity with the russkie Russians.

Romodanovskii’s statement demonstrates how assimilation can be included in the sayable of the Russian discourse and how individuals can take references to ideal types and use them outside their context to advance their own argument. What Romodanovskii essentially does is exploit the commonly accepted critique of European multiculturalism to propose an alternative solution that is not connected with the European context. His “achievement” is that he reproduces the lack of clarity known from the debate on “migrants” (see Berg-Nordlie, Aasland and Tkach 2010) In turn, this obscuring of terminology is likely to prevent a fact- based debate on integration.

Finally, we may also note how his statement echoes the findings from Chapter VI on “language”, where migrant children’s acquisition of the Russian language could be seen as the first step towards their assimilation with the in-group community represented as one and undivided.

The view that the multiculturalist approach has not proven sustainable in a European context is echoed in an assessment made by Professor Emil Pain of the Higher School of Economics, writing in Novaia Gazeta:

The main shortcoming of the policy of multiculturalism is that it causes segregation of groups and thus gives rise to artificial boundaries between communities and forms a kind of a voluntary ghetto […]. In many countries of the world, mono-ethnic, mono- religious, or mono-racial quarters and educational institutions have arisen […]. [M]ulticulturalism on the national level becomes crude mono-culturalism and segregation on the local level.

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Главным недостатком политики мультикультурализма является то, что она провоцирует сегрегацию групп, порождая искусственные границы между общинами и формируя своего рода гетто на добровольной основе […]. Во многих странах мира возникли замкнутые моноэтнические, монорелигиозные или монорасовые кварталы и учебные заведения […] [M]ультикультурализм на уровне страны оборачивается жестким монокультурализмом и сегрегацией на локальном уровне. (Pain 2011)

Similar to Romodanovskii, Pain here sees multiculturalism as leading to division rather than unity. His assertion that multiculturalism gives rise to artificial boundaries implies a view of the groups’ perceived Otherness as clearly not innate, but subject to construction. This indicates an understanding of culture as not primordial, but as being constructed as primordial by the multiculturalist policy approach. On this point, Pain concurs with Romodanovskii: both see integration as possible, but impeded by multiculturalist policies.

Against this backdrop, it is interesting to observe that in the continuation of his article, Pain deems “Russia’s move, away from the multicultural disruption towards multicultural integration” [“движение России от мультикультурного раскола к мультикультурной интеграции”] as strategically inevitable (Pain 2011). Here, Pain touches upon an important distinction between multiculturalism as a policy approach and multicultural as a condition. The formulation “multicultural disruption” creates connotations to Russian society as lacking the necessary “glue” to cement it, similar to what Putin (December 30, 1999) acknowledged in his “Millennium Manifesto.” The emerging image of the Russian community is that of a culturally diverse unit that is not properly tied together. While not seen as the result of a multiculturalist policy approach, Russia’s lack of unity is still linked to the adjective “multicultural.”

In a concrete example of the approach to the integration of immigrants chosen by St. Petersburg, MK journalist Dmitrii Steshin explained in 2012 why multiculturalism was never a preferred approach to integration in Russia:

A decision was made not to follow the European path of multiculturalism. Our culture, they say, is one […]. In St. Petersburg one succeeded in not committing the systemic error from which many European countries suffer. In solving the problem of xenophobia, St. Petersburg did not propagate ideas of multiculturalism in its European

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version, something which does not ease integration into the recipient, historically existing society, but leads to the consolidation of migrant groups.

По европейскому пути мультикультурализма решили не идти. Культура, мол, у нас одна […] - В Санкт-Петербурге удалось избежать системной ошибки, от которой сейчас страдают многие европейские страны. Решая проблему ксенофобии, в Санкт-Петербурге не пропагандировались идеи мультикультурализма в его европейском варианте, который фактически облегчает не интеграцию в принимающее, исторически сложившееся общество, а консолидацию иммигрантских групп. (Steshin 2012)

Again, multiculturalism contributes to producing an image of Europe as Russia’s Other. As a policy approach, it is depicted as likely to result in the consolidation of ethnic groups. Moreover, Steshin juxtaposes European multiculturalism with Russian culture. Underlying his portrayal of Russian culture as one is the tacit assumption that multiculturalism implies fragmentation and disunity of culture. Essentially, the “multi” causes disruption of the “culture,” leaving society without common cultural ground for integration. In order to function as a common ground for integration, “culture” must appear as one undivided entity.

6.4.2 Russia’s Own Multiculturalism

The examples above focus on multiculturalism as a policy, but Pain’s (2011) statement brought the adjective “multicultural” into the discourse in the form of a description of Russia’s domestic situation. While multiculturalism has generally been firmly rejected as a policy approach, the following examples show that it can enter the discourse in descriptions of interethnic tensions in Russia.

RG commentator Pierre Sidibe, in his report from a preparatory meeting of the World Political Forum in 2011, employed the term “many-cultural” to underline the similarity between Russia and Europe. In light of the participants’ descriptions of migrants as causing pressure on West-European welfare systems, Sidibe offered the following assessment of the situation in Russia:

By the way, Russia has similar problems. Trying to make sense of its post-imperial status in the world, our country, like the EU, is a many-cultural society that experiences demographic decline, has an unstable Caucasus and a large influx of migrants from Central Asia.

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Впрочем у России похожие проблемы. Пытаясь осмыслить свой постимперский статус в мире, наша страна, как и ЕС, многокультурное общество, переживает демографический спад, имеет нестабильный Кавказ и огромный приток мигрантов из Центральной Азии. (Sidibe, 24 June 2011)

Here, Sidibe constructs similarity between Russia and the EU by representing them as facing similar problems. The similarity is rooted in what Sidibe terms their “many-cultural” character. By avoiding the term “multicultural,” he represents Russia and the EU as similar, without taking a stand on their policies regarding integration. The result is that Russia’s population diversity is not presented as something unique, but as a feature shared with Europe, independent of how it came into being. Consequently, Europe is not represented as Russia’s Other: quite the contrary, it becomes a mirror image of Russia’s own problems. By constructing Russia as similar to Europe, Sidibe manages to open the discursive space to include the subsequent reference to Russia’s internal instability in the Caucasus as an example of a type of challenge that is not confined to Russia.

While Sidibe circumvents the term “multiculturalism,” Moscow-based Czech journalist Jiří Just authored an article in 2013 for MK on the riots in a Stockholm suburb that year, critically assessing the reactions of Russian politicians and experts:

But against the backdrop of burning police stations, not only the youth of the Swedish ghetto are celebrating, but also Russian politicians and experts. The Europeans are choking on their multiculturalism, they say.

Но на фоне сожженных полицейских участков победу празднуют не только подростки из шведских гетто, но и российские политики и эксперты. Мол, европейцы захлебнулись своей толерантностью и мультикультурализмом. (Just 2013b).

He then continues:

Just a minute, you Russian experts on European multiculturalism! How are things in your country? Does Russia have any project for the coexistence of different cultures that can function and that would be able to withstand the multiculturalism of the “overconsumed” West? Yes, there was such a project. It was called the USSR.

Минуточку, господа российские эксперты по европейскому мультикультурализму! А как обстоят дела у вас? Имеет ли Россия какой-нибудь проект сосуществования разных культур, который работает и который можно

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противопоставить мультикультурализму 'зажравшегося’ Запада? Да, был такой проект. Он назывался СССР. (Just 2013b)

He also employed the term “multiculturalism” when assessing the dissolution of the USSR:

We know how the history of the world’s largest multicultural project ended. In 1991 the Soviet Union broke apart under the pressure of the parade of sovereignties and interethnic conflicts. The united Soviet society, whose aim it was to replace the national and cultural diversity of its members, did not materialize. Russia inherited from the USSR not only nuclear weapons and [Sergei] Mikhailkov’s anthem, but also a multicultural conflict.

Чем закончилась история самого крупного мультикультурного проекта — известно. В 1991 году Советский Союз развалился под давлением парада суверенитетов и межэтнических конфликтов. Единое советское общество, которое должно было заменить собой национальные и культурные разновидности его членов, так и не образовалось. Россия получила в наследство от СССР не только ядерное оружие и михалковский гимн, но и мультикультурный конфликт. (Just 2013b)

What Just can be seen as doing here is attacking how Russian politicians and “experts” employ the term “multiculturalism” to construct Europe as Russia’s Other. He brings this up by employing the term “multicultural” to describe the USSR, thus portraying Russia as similar to Europe by dint of facing similar problems. While they approach the issue from different angles, Just arrives at the same conclusion as Sidibe: Russia and Europe are experiencing similar problems.

Just seems to perceive the general denouncement of European multiculturalism as part of a construction of difference that functions as a pseudo-boundary that serves to conceal Russia’s own problems. Though he sees Russia’s current problems as a result of its Soviet past, the outcome is the same as in Western Europe: “a multicultural conflict.” His attack on what he sees as an artificial boundary between Russia and Europe highlights an important aspect of the boundary as a concept. Similar to what was the case in the presidential discourse, construction of a boundary between groups does not depend on the degree of objective difference between them. While Russia and the rest of Europe differ in many ways, they share the experience of interethnic tensions. In this way, Just’s statement exemplifies how objectively similar groups can still be perceived as radically different by the group members themselves (Kolstø 2009: 16). 168

Referring to the dissolution of the USSR as “the world’s largest multicultural project” and pointing to how it “broke apart under the pressure of the parade of sovereignties and interethnic conflicts,” Just can also be seen as warning against a future scenario of interethnic tensions and secessionist claims. This is what is simmering beneath the surface when he proceeds to represent Russia as different from Europe by describing Russia’s troubles with its own multicultural character as being far worse than those faced by Europe.

In one voice [Russian experts] discuss the imminent end of Europe. […] In the course of 2012 and in the North Caucasus alone, 1225 people were injured and killed. What is that, if not a multicultural disaster?

The crisis of the coexistence of different cultures in Russia is so deep that even the expression “internal abroad” has emerged.

[Российские эксперты] хором рассуждают о скором конце Европы. […] Только за прошедший 2012 год и только на Северном Кавказе погибли и были ранены 1225 человек. Что это, если не мультикультурная катастрофа?

Кризис сосуществования разных культур в России настолько глубок, что появилось понятие “внутреннее зарубежье.” (Just 2013b)

Here, the allusion to similarity with Europe yields to a representation of Russia as facing far more serious problems. The reference to the situation within Russia as a “multicultural disaster” underscores the gravity of Russia’s domestic problems. When Just juxtaposes Russian experts’ predictions of the end of Europe with the number of deaths and injuries in Russia’s own North Caucasus, it becomes clearer that the widespread image of multiculturalist Europe as Russia’s main Other functions to conceal Russia’s own, far more serious problems. Essentially, the instability in the North Caucasus rules out the official image of Russia as a harmonious multiethnic “community of peoples.”

The tendency of Russian officials to invoke the negative outcomes of Western multicultural policies in order to distract attention from Russia’s own problems also appeared in another article written by Just. Here, too, he focused on the North Caucasus:

A year ago, presidential candidate and prime minister Vladimir Putin said with pride that in the West multiculturalism had failed, whereas there exist no serious interethnic problems in Russia. [...] I often hear that within Russia there exists “an inner abroad.” As if the North Caucasus and its inhabitants never belonged to the great multiethnic country and nation, “united by a common destiny on its soil.” 169

[…]

Instead of attempting to solve the problems of interethnic relations, “the people’s elect” exploits the theme of saving the russkie from the rossiiane.

Год назад кандидат в президенты и одновременно премьер-министр Владимир Путин с гордостью говорил, что на Западе мультикультурализм провалился, зато в России острых межнациональных проблем не существует. […] я все чаще слышу, что в рамках России существует некое “внутреннее зарубежье.” Северный Кавказ и его жители как будто никогда и не принадлежали к той великой многонациональной стране и нации, “соединенной общей судьбой на своей земле.” […] Вместо попыток решить проблемы межнациональных отношений “народные избранники” эксплуатируют тему спасения русских от россиян (Just 2013a).

What Just here brings into the discourse is an image of Russia as a multiethnic community that excludes the North Caucasians. In this way, the Russian community cannot be defined with reference to common territory, nor can it be defined as made up of all of the citizenry of Russia. Similar to the essentialist constructions of difference in the discourse on “language,” the North Caucasians are represented as an eternal out-group of the Russian community. Even more noteworthy is Just’s creative formulation about Russian politicians as “saving the russkiie from the rossiiane.” On one level, this formulation alludes to the politicians as promoting an image of the Russian community as consisting solely of the Russian russkii population. On another level, it picks up on a point analyzed in Chapter V: the in-goup members as those who do not want to become integrated (see Grafova 2009). As Grafova put it, why should migrants learn the Russian language if Russians do not want to talk to them anyway? Likewise, the process of saving the ethnic Russians from the other (understood as “Other”) “Russians” (here rossiiane) implies the construction of a boundary regarding an out- group. In this case, the out-group consists of persons who are citizens of Russia, with whom the russkie Russians prefer to avoid contact. The implied result is that national integration cannot happen.

Calling for the preservation of ethnocultural balance, economist Mikhail Deliagin in an interview with KP in 2009 assumed a negative view of cultural change as a result of migration, when he asserted that:

Another problem is the destruction of Russia’s ethnocultural balance. And this ethnocultural balance is being destroyed not only by people from Tajikistan and

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China, but by persons from the North Caucasus and other ethnic republics who arrive in regions traditionally populated by Russians. And then there is the exclusion of Russians, a silent ethnic cleansing about which the authorities keep quiet. It is about time we acknowledged it: the North Caucasus is different from what it was in Soviet and imperial times. It is de-russified, its culture has changed.

Другая проблема—разрушение миграцией этнокультурного баланса России. Причем этнокультурный баланс рушится не только жителями Таджикистана и Китая, но и приезжающими в традиционно населенные русскими регионы выходцами из Северного Кавказа, других национальных республик. И там идет выдавливание русских, тихая этническая чистка, которую власти замалчивают. Пора признать: Северный Кавказ уже отличается от советского и даже царского времени. Произошла его дерусификация, изменилась культура. (quoted in Chernikh 2009)

As the quote makes explicit, Deliagin narrows down “culture” to “ethnic culture.” “Russian culture” is represented as an attribute of ethnic Russians only. Similar to the main ingredients in Russian xenophobic nationalism (see Kholmogorov 2012; Rogoża 2014), he expresses the view that ethnoculturally different individuals will cause damage to Russian culture. The result is an ethnicity-connoted boundary. As a result, Chinese and Tajik migrants as well as the North Caucasians are represented as close to immutable Others.

Further, his statement exemplifies how cultural change can be represented as threatening the in-group’s culture. The change in the North Caucasians’ culture consists in its de- russification. Thus, the North Caucasians are represented as having crossed the boundary in the opposite direction: as a result of the de-russification of the region, they have become an out-group.

Underlying Deliagin’s statement is thus an understanding of Russian cultural dominance as that which could theoretically “save” Russia. In this way, the boundary that he draws is also one of time, with the Soviet and tsarist past as examples to be followed as regards spreading Russian cultural dominance across its territories.

Further down in the interview, Deliagin asserted that:

The diaspora is an objective hindrance to integration. However good its leaders are, they understand that they are needed only as long as the migrants cannot become integrated by themselves.

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А ведь диаспора - объективное препятствие интеграции. Какими бы хорошими ни были их руководители, они понимают, что нужны, только пока мигранты не могут интегрироваться в обществе сами. (quoted in Chernikh 2009)

Here, ambiguity enters the discourse. Now, Deliagin implicitly supports integration. The migrants themselves are guilty of not becoming integrated. Their lack of integration is alluded to as an expression of power relations among the diaspora members and their leaders: the minorities will only need their ethnic leaders as long as they remain unintegrated, and therefore the leaders are interested in the ethnic minorities remaining unintegrated so that they do not lose their leadership status. In any case, the preservation of the ethnocultural balance is seemingly no longer of interest. What Deliagin does is that he represents the migrant community as preserving their own Otherness, while the Russian community is implicitly represented as open to including them.

6.4.3 “Melting Pot” Assimilation

The classic US “melting pot” assimilation model is mentioned only once in the empirical material: when RG interviewed Viacheslav Postavnin, president of the foundation “Migration in the 21st Century” and former director of the now defunct FMS, in 2010. He argued for the need to integrate immigrants and to prevent xenophobia.

While being the sole instance found, Postavnin’s reference to the classic assimilationist melting pot is a highly information-rich contribution to the overall discourse. In outlining his argument, Postavnin provides the following justification: “I speak about the USA, because I think that it constitutes our nearest future” [“Я говорю про Америку, потому что мне кажется, что это наше ближайшее будущее”]. When the journalist questions this statement by referring to the USA as a country of immigrants whereas Russia is populated by “the indigenous Russian people” [“исконный российский народ”], Postavnin explains that:

…still, the [USA’s] core was Western civilization. European culture now dominates. For the time being. But for how long will that “for the time being” remain? The non- white population of the USA already comprises 40 percent [of its population], and in 20 years it will comprise 60–70 percent. Here is the fatal question of identity: who are they really, the Americans? And it must be said, the election of a dark-skinned president partly answers that question.

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Однако ядром была западная цивилизация. Европейская культура и сейчас у них превалирует. Пока. Но сколько еще будет длиться это "пока"? Небелого населения в Америке сейчас уже 40 процентов, через 20 лет будет 60-70 процентов. Тут и встает этот роковой вопрос идентичности: кто они на самом деле, американцы? Впрочем, появление темнокожего президента отчасти уже дает ответ на этот вопрос. (Grafova 2010)

What strikes the reader is how Postavnin explicitly brings the USA into the discourse in terms of a future image of Russia. By doing so, he includes into the sayable of the discourse the tacit acknowledgement that a natural consequence of large-scale migration to Russia is that future generations of Russians will not only be culturally different, but also of different phenotypes than today.

Similar to the representations of the Soviet past as losing relevance as a common ground for integration in Chapter V, Postavnin here alludes to the current ethnic Russian dominance as a temporary phenomenon. In contrast to the images of European multicultural societies as characterized by the general lack of integration, Postavnin’s statement demonstrates how assimilation opens up the discourse to the issue of demography in other terms than that of combatting demographic decline. Similar to Russia’s multiculturalism, its melting pot is also seen as originating with the Soviet past. When asked whether the Soviet Union was an American melting pot, Postavnin answers:

Yes, the Soviet Union went in that direction. It was not without reason that so many mixed families emerged. The leaders declared that the republics must develop on the foundations of ethnic cultures and language, while in reality they aimed at unification. I wish to underline that the Soviet leadership recognized the explosive danger of the national problem and then tried to find a way to prevent conflict. Today, we try to solve it with force. […] The problems of migration, and even more the delicate question of integrating migrants, is impossible to solve [by decree]. Only society can integrate migrants, and for this, society itself must want to integrate them.

Да, Советский Союз шел в этом направлении. Недаром же у нас возникло так много смешанных семей. Вожди заявляли, что республики должны развиваться на основе национальной культуры и языка, а на самом деле стремились к унификации. Хочу подчеркнуть, что взрывоопасность национальных проблем осознавало уже советское руководство и тогда старались искать пути преодоления конфликтов. Проблемы миграции, а тем более такой тонкий

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вопрос, как интеграция мигрантов, невозможно решить [приказом]. Интегрировать мигрантов может только общество, и для этого само общество должно захотеть их интегрировать. (Grafova 2010)

In contrast to the above representations of the ethno-federalist Soviet Union as similar to a multiculturalist society, Postavnin here indicates that its leaders “in reality aimed at unification.” The image of the Russian community that emerges is one that has inherited not a multicultural conflict, but an assimilationist conflict. What remains unclear is whether this conflict was caused by the attempt to create a common supra-ethnic Soviet identity or whether “assimilation” in this case alludes to ethnic majority assimilation with the Russians in parallel with the promotion of ethnic cultures.

Postavnin then contrasts the Soviet Union with present-day Russia by recognizing that the Soviet leadership at least attempted to solve the emerging conflicts. When he concludes by pointing out that society must want to integrate migrants, Postavnin implicitly represents Russia as not really interested in doing so. Since, at the time of that interview, Russia could hardly show any substantive efforts to integrate migrants, Postavnin’s implicit accusation of a lack of effort is highly relevant as regards the factual realities.

In spite of the difference between Russia and the USSR that Postavnin constructs, his description of the Soviet Union as aiming at unification can be seen as a proxy-image for contemporary Russia. The emerging image of the Russian community has moved from Soviet-style assimilation towards greater exclusion of former members of the prospective “melting pot” community. The in-group community becomes increasingly homogeneous, while the out-groups increase in number.

As if responding to Postavnin’s call for the recipient society to integrate migrants, incumbent candidate Sergeii Sobianin, during the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections, was quoted as saying to KP in a much-cited interview that:

According to world practice, one has tried to establish these ghettoes, monocultural areas […] I am categorically against that. I believe that Moscow is a Russian city and must remain so. Not Chinese, not Tajik, not Uzbek. We are always happy to welcome guests, Russia is a multiethnic country, with ethnic groups and traditions intermingled. To single them out and set them up against other cultures is very dangerous, simply explosion-prone, especially for our city.

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В мировой практике пытались создавать такие гетто, районы с монокультурой. […] Я категорически против этого. Считаю, что Москва - российский город и таким должна оставаться. Не китайским, не таджикским, не узбекским. Мы всегда рады гостям, Россия - многонациональная страна, все национальности и традиции перемешаны. Выделять их отдельно, противопоставлять другим культурам очень опасно, просто взрывоопасно, особенно для нашего города.

[…]

I am against these people [migrants] just staying on. If anyone should stay, then it is first and foremost the Russian-speakers, those with a culture appropriate to our traditions. Compatriots—that is what we literally call them. People who speak Russian poorly and who have a completely different culture are better off living in their own countries. Therefore, we do not welcome their adaptation in Moscow.

Я против того, чтобы эти люди (мигранты. - Ред.) просто так оставались. Если кого-то оставлять, то в первую очередь русскоязычных, с адекватной нашим традициям культурой. Соотечественников - так мы их условно называем. Людям, которые плохо говорят по-русски, у которых совершенно другая культура, лучше жить в своей стране. Поэтому мы не приветствуем их адаптацию в Москве. (Volkova 2013)

In the first part of this quote, Sobianin is warning against the formation of ethnic quarters and enclaves. His portrayal of Russia as a multiethnic country and Moscow as a rossiiskii city implies an image of Russia as a multiethnic “community of peoples” where cultural difference is accepted. Interestingly, he employs rossiiskii to describe the desired outlook of Moscow, while on the national level, all ethnic groups and traditions are “intermingled.” This renders possible different interpretations: first, he can be seen as investing rossiiskii with the meaning of the community composed by the sum of all the various ethnic groups. Second, rossiiskii can also be interpreted as civic-connoted and supraethnic, in line with his argument against the formation of ethnic enclaves. Finally, and following from his reference to “compatriots,” it can also encompass only those who are sufficiently culturally similar to integrate swiftly. Worthy of notice here is that Sobianin displays an understanding of the compatriot category as narrower than that of the 2010 amended law on compatriots (see “On Amending…” 2010; Shevel 2011: 192). While the law emphasizes the compatriots’ self- identification with Russia, Sobianin transfers the authority to define who is a compatriot to himself as a member of the Russian in-group community.

Irrespective of the interpretation of the term “compatriot,” the diverse in-group community obviously has its restrictions as regards membership. Referring to citizens of other countries

175 as “guests” does indeed suggest a boundary against individuals not seen as belonging to the group of those accepted as indigenous to Russia. Consequently, even if the in-group remains diverse, this community is not necessarily represented as welcoming new members. The Russian diversity is limited to its own, indigenous diversity.

6.5 Summing up and Discussion

The critical discourse moments that crystallize around “cultures” in the plural produce a discourse that differs significantly from the one on “culture” in the singular. While “culture” in the singular showed its ability to function as a common ground for integration, “cultures” in the plural is more likely to be part of constructions of difference. Further, this part of the discourse is also the one in which speakers most frequently make reference to integration typologies and policy approaches.

The combination of “multi” and “culture” is present both in the shape of “multiculturalism” and the adjective “multicultural.” While the former is reserved for the Western European context, “multicultural” can enter into a representation of Russia as Europe’s mirror image in the sense that both parties face similar challenges. The topic of integration thus brings into the discourse the acknowledgement of similarity with Europe. Interestingly, two of the main conveyors of this viewpoint are foreign journalists that write for Russian newspapers. While their contributions to the current discourse ought to be considered as part of the exchange of opinion in the Russian public sphere, it is worth noticing how they base their arguments on their own interpretations of how Russians perceive Western Europe. This prompts the question of why only journalists who are known to originate outside Russia express such overwhelmingly critical viewpoints about Russia. Though it is easy to jump to the conclusion that Russian journalists are either afraid of or not allowed to point to Russia’s problems, it is also likely to be a result of Sidibe and Just being able to view Russia from a different angle. As the Russian criticism of West-European multiculturalism can be seen as positioning itself in the centuries-long tradition of representing Russia as different from the West, constructing similarity based on both parties’ problems is less likely to be part of Russian journalists’ repertoire. The question this provokes is whether such constructions are confined to the unsayable. The discourse itself provides no clear answer to this. We can only speculate whether Sidibe and Just are breaking taboos or simply reshaping the discursive “truth” about Russia and Europe. In any case, the recurrent representation of the West as an Other

176 demonstrates that the perception of a boundary between two communities does not depend on objective difference between them (see Kolstø 2009: 17).

Further, the way in which the discourse conforms to the tradition of representing the West as an Other follows the established pattern of using Europe as a yardstick when defining Russia’s position in the world (Laruelle 2016: 278). It is not the migrants’ difference that most strongly influences the representation of the Russian Self, but Western Europe’s “imagined” difference as a migrant-recipient continent. By dint of sharing problems with Europe, Russia can also be seen as tacitly being constructed as similar to Europe.

With regard to integration typologies, the discourse on “culture” is by far the most informative concerning how these connect with the topic of national identities. Chiefly, the chapter has shown that speakers readily include references to established typologies to promote their own argument. However, when they do so, they disconnect the typologies from their context and exploit them to their own benefit. The result is a discourse that at times is less based on facts than speakers’ individual perceptions about processes of integration.

What happens is that the typologies become floating signifiers, as speakers can make reference to them without relating to the meanings they carry in other societies or in scholarly literature. This is in itself interesting, because it brings about the question of whether the typologies that are considered as established in Western societies will acquire different meanings in a Russian context if they become more employed as policy measures. For example, “assimilation” has room for both the classic “melting pot” assimilation in the US, and assimilation with the majority in-group in a European context.

In a future-oriented perspective, the current part of the discourse confirms the view of integration that shone through when “culture” functioned in the singular. Here, it was implied that successful integration depended on the perception of the in-group’s clearly identifiable one and undivided culture. What is not made explicit, but can be seen as simmering beneath the surface in Romodanovskii’s (quoted in Cherkasova 2011) second statement, is that multiculturalist policies may serve to weaken the majority population of the recipient state. The negative portrayal of multiculturalist policies can thus be seen as opening up the discursive space to include into its sayable the idea that ethnic majority assimilation is a preferred option for integration in a Russian context. This is also the case for the critical discourse moments that invoke Russia’s own cultural diversity. To use the metaphor from

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Chapter IV, Russia’s cultural diversity cannot function as a “glue” for neither national integration nor the integration of immigrants.

6.6 Comparison with Official Discourse

On one point, the presidential discourse and the media discourse clearly agree: both reject multiculturalism as a viable option for the integration of immigrants. What precludes multiculturalism from functioning as a common ground for integration is precisely the much- disputed prefix “multi.” In both the presidential discourse and the media discourse, the “multi” in multiculturalism is alluded to as what prevents society from having one common culture into which migrants can become integrated. Both types of discourse thus echo the critique of multiculturalism found in scholarly literature, where “diversity” becomes “difference” (Grillo 2007: 980).

However, their common dismissal follows two different trajectories of argumentation. In the official discourse, Putin attributed the current challenges in Europe to what multiculturalism was a reaction against: the homogeneous nation-state (see Kymlicka 2007). The nation-state was “a state historically built exclusively on the basis of ethnic identity” [“государствo, исторически строившегося исключительно на основе этнической идентичности”] (Putin January 23, 2012). It was thus the previous dominance of one ethnic group that had caused today’s “crisis” of multiculturalism.

Against this backdrop, the media discourse can be seen as having broadened up the discursive space to address what fell outside the presidential discourse: the fact that Russia and Europe, despite historical differences, are currently facing similar challenges. Yet, in the Russian context, these challenges are not associated with migration, but Russia’s own minorities.

By focusing on variances in historical development, Putin drew attention away from these themes and paved the way for a representation of Russia as unique. His imagining of Russia as different from Europe on the one hand iterated Europe’s function as Russia’s “yardstick,” while it can also be seen as implicitly having constituted Russia as the “other Europe”; that is, the Europe that does not follow the Western path of development (Laruelle 2016: 293).

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Another point of similarity between the discourses is how they—though in different ways— relied on references to the abroad. In the presidential discourse, this occurred as the image of the CIS as a common cultural space, as well as the view of Russian culture as having contributed to both European and world culture. In the media discourse, both Europe and the USA figured as examples of both successful and failed integration projects. This shows that the media discourse did not consistently rely on an image of the West as an Other. Contrarily, the topic of integration appeared to make the discourse cut across such established traditions of representation and, as noted, “reinvent” integration typologies to make them fit with different arguments.

While the presidential discourse could not entirely omit Russia’s cultural diversity from constructions of unity, the theme of integration made the media discourse move in another direction. In order to achieve successful integration, the migrants were better faced with an identifiable one and undivided in-group culture that was open to change. At the other end of the continuum, “culture” in the singular could also be subject to biologization, a theme that, as expected, did not find its way into presidential discourse.

The tendency to view “culture” in the singular as one and undivided can be seen as echoing the presidential discourse’s promotion of the unifying role of the russkii population. However, the media discourse did not rely on any kind of russkii core to tie it together. Employing both russkii and rossiiskii, the constructions of similarity in the media discourse relied on the investment of these with content according to the context, rather than relating to their conventional meanings on the civic-ethnic continuum. This was also true for the presidential discourse, where the russkii category was clearly opened up to include other individuals than only those of ethnic russkii descent.

This brings us to the topic of out-groups. In correspondence with the findings from “language,” the media discourse on “culture” reproduced the idea of Russia’s “inner abroad.” While the “inner abroad” was expectedly absent from the presidential discourse, implied out- group constructions nevertheless occurred. Most importantly, these were related to an underlying theme of self-identification with Russian culture. The implied outsiders were those who either would not self-identify, or were tacitly “imagined” as too different to be able to do so.

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Finally, the discourses diverge on one significant point: how they relate to change. As the theme of cultural change was entirely absent in the presidential discourse, its presence in the media discourse can be seen as resulting from the linkage with integration. This is interesting, as it demonstrates how the “meeting” in discourse between the in-group Self and the migrant Other can produce ideas about change on behalf of both parties. Accordingly, while the idea of the one and only “great Russian culture” may recur in the presidential discourse, linkages with other themes may bring about a view of Russian culture as flexible and open to change.

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7 Chapter VII “Religion”

7.1 Introduction

While “language” and “culture” can be seen as able to fill the signifier “integration” with meaning, “religion” follows a different logic. “Religion’s” function can be summarized as follows: it works as a boundary, but it does not invest the signifier “integration” with meaning in the same way as “language” and “culture.” In the scholarly literature, the linkage between migration and religion is usually studied from the perspective of integration of religious Others, such as integrating Moslems into predominantly Christian and/or secularized European states (see, for example Triandafyllidou 2003; 2010). The way this process is understood, it does not entail religious conversion.

As shown in previous research (Triandafyllidou 2003; 2010) and to be highlighted in the current chapter, “religion” works expressively as a boundary. It is invested with meaning in a way that underlines the particularity of the Russian discourse at the same time as it also locates Russia within the broader European context, in which Islam plays a significant role in constructions of “the Moslem migrant” as an Other.

This chapter focuses on the two religious faiths with the largest numbers of adherents in Russia: Russian Orthodox Christianity and Islam. The most pronounced difference between the discourse on “religion” and that of the two other diacritical markers is the general absence of overlapping among the nodal points. Regarding Orthodoxy, the discourse can be seen as organized around one overarching nodal point: the question of whether adherence to a national community precedes adherence to a religious community or vice versa. This theme was present in the presidential discourse in Putin’s 2014 address to the Federal Assembly. Here, adherence to the ethnic group preceded adherence to a religious group, which in turn was prior to membership in the national community.

When it comes to Islam, the critical discourse moments do not crystallize around specific nodal points. This prompts the question of whether the topic of Islam should be interpreted as less established in the current discourse or whether it is confined to the unsayable.

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7.2 Orthodoxy: A Russian is Russian Orthodox and/or a Russian Orthodox is Russian?

Admiraal (2010: 206) pointedly observes that the general post-Soviet discourse on Orthodoxy in Russia has involved a tendency to lump together two concepts of Russianness: 1) a Russian is a Russian Orthodox; 2) a Russian Orthodox is Russian. In order to illustrate her point, Admiraal refers to an article in Religion, State and Society, in which Sudo (2005: 78) contends that “Because ‘Russian is Orthodox, and Orthodox is Russian’, Catholics, Baptists, Buddhists and other inovertsy…may be attacked [by Russian nationalists] as well.” According to Sudo’s (2005: 78) explanation, “Russian is Orthodox” means that Russians are Orthodox Christians. Other faiths are “foreign.” Adherents of other faiths do not belong in Russia. Membership in the national community entails prior membership in the religious community. According to Admiraal (2010: 206), Sudo understands Russianness as tied to ethnicity. In her explanation of Sudo’s point: “Orthodoxy is necessary to Russian,” a Russian must be Orthodox in order to be truly Russian in the ethnic sense.” Elaborating the two propositions, Admiraal leaves the question of ethnicity aside and focuses on adherence to the national community and/or the realigous community.

Admiraal argues that Sudo’s second proposition, “a Russian Orthodox is Russian,” makes “Orthodoxy” sufficient to being “Russian.” All adherents of the Russian Orthodox faith are automatically regarded as members of the Russian national community, irrespective of ethnic origin (Admiraal 2010: 207).37 Thus, membership in the religious community entails membership in the national community, but the national community is not necessarily an ethnic community (Admiraal 2010: 207).

While Admiraal does not tie the two propositions to immigration and integration, her evaluation of the relationship between the national community and the religious community constitutes a highly relevant point of departure for analyzing the current discourse. Exploring how these two propositions play out in the context of integration of immigrants provides insights about the interplay of boundary constructions between the religious and the national community. Are migrants who have been integrated into the Orthodox community

37 Admiraal here equates “Russian Orthodox” with membership in the ROC, while her subsequent argumentation does not refer to specific Church membership. 182 automatically seen as prospective members of the Russian community, independent of ethnic origin?

Due to “religion” being mentioned much more rarely in relation to integration than “language” and “culture,” the empirical material is numerically much scarcer. The discourse on Orthodoxy crystallizes around only one thematic nodal point, while it is not possible to identify any specific nodal points for Islam. What the discourse on Orthodoxy can be seen as essentially doing, is strengthening the first proposition, while weakening the second. As a result, it ties religiosity to ethnicity in a way that privileges ethnoculturally similar immigrants, or those represented as “compatriots.”

7.3 Overarching Nodal Point: What Common Ground for Integration—for Whom?

On two occasions, before the launching of the “Enlightenment” program (late 2010, early 2011; see section 1.6.3), Patriarch Kirill made the following statements on already existing integration courses organized by the ROC. The first statement (Kirill, quoted in Klin 2010) was made during the annual diocesan meeting of the ROC; the second statement (Kirill, cited in Klin 2011), during the ROC’s annual Christmas Readings (rozhdestvenskiie chtenii) one month later:

Far from always do recently arrived persons possess the culture, knowledge or habits that are necessary for successful adaptation.

Далеко не всегда новоприбывшие обладают культурой, знаниями и навыками, необходимыми для успешной адаптации.

[…]

teaching [the migrants] the Russian language, helping them to adapt to our cultural traditions and way of life can become one of the most important social tasks of the Church.

Обучение [мигрантов] русскому языку, содействие в адаптации к нашей культурной традиции и образу жизни могут стать одной из важных социальных забот Церкви (quoted in Klin 2010).

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What this statement documents is that the Church at the time had identified organizing integration measures as a potential focus for its social work. Migrants are represented as essentially lacking the capacity to adapt to life in Russian society. Implicit in the Patriarch’s statement is the view that, without the necessary help, migrants will simply not manage, irrespective of their will to do so. They need the assistance the ROC can offer.

With regard to “religion,” it is only present in the reference to the Church. The reference to “our cultural tradition and way of life” [“нашей культурной традиции и образу жизни” – italics added] (Kirill II quoted in Klin 2010) underscores this. It does not explicitly touch upon Orthodox religion as a part of the Russian cultural traditions and way of life. Overall, the Patriarch’s 2010 statement seems to underline the ROC’s readiness to fulfill what had been its expected role among the Russian public in post-Soviet times: to support charitable work and to preserve cultural traditions (Verkhovskii 2014: 51). What remains ambiguous is whether the “cultural traditions and way of life” automatically includes Orthodoxy, and the possible implications for the meaning of the term “Orthodoxy” as such. Not mentioned at all, “Orthodoxy” remains outside the discourse. The result is that the boundary that does the work of separating the migrants from the Russian in-group is closer to “culture,” while it remains unsaid whether “culture” in this case encompasses Orthodoxy. As to the migrants, their out- groupness is also seen solely in terms of cultural and linguistic differences: the question of adherence to a particular religious faith remains unaddressed. Thus, apart from the Patriarch’s reference to the Church, he does not explicitly invest “religion” with the meaning of a boundary. Yet, his reference to the integration of immigrants as part of the Church’s social work establishes an indirect linkage to Orthodoxy as religion. This indirect presence may be seen as mirroring the main tension inherent in the post-Soviet discourse on Russian Orthodoxy: that it is constantly exposed to a discursive struggle between its two components, “Russian” and “Orthodox” (see Knox 2005; Lukash 2008).

Partly in contrast to this is Kirill’s statement in which he commented on the goals of integration in 2011:

knowledge about the language and culture, and the dominant religious tradition can be expected to promote social acceptance.

Знание языка, культуры и доминирующей религиозной традиции, несомненно, должно послужить достижению общественного согласия (quoted in Klin 2011).

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Here, the Patriarch makes it explicit that Russia has a dominant religious tradition. Moreover, he distinguishes “religion” from “culture” and thus makes it clear that Orthodoxy cannot necessary be absorbed into a wider concept of Russian culture. While he invests “religion” with the meaning of a boundary, the Patriarch’s call for the migrants to learn about the dominant religious tradition does not specifically portray them as a religious out-group. The stated aim of achieving social consent seems to be more an attempt to establish a three-pillar common ground for integration: the Russian language, the in-group’s culture and the in-group majority’s religious tradition. Though not represented as synonymous with or encompassed by it, “religion” in this case may be seen as converging on “culture” as a boundary. It is part of an overarching “package” of in-groupness that does not single out religious faith per se.

The patriarch’s emphasis on the dominant religious tradition (not faith as such) is what serves to imbue the statement with ambiguity concerning the question of Orthodoxy as religious faith. As “religious tradition” is not synonymous with religious faith, we may ask whether Kirill is widening the religious community to make its boundaries approach those of the national community. Thus, integration will entail having to be familiarized with the religious traditions of the host community and thus becoming a member of it. But the membership in the in-group community understood as the national community will not necessarily entail incorporation into the religious community, provided this is defined by religious belief.

In light of Admiraal’s two propositions, we may first exclude the option that the Russian community is understood as an ethnic community, as ethnicity here remains outside the discourse. Seemingly, “religion” as a boundary works in such a way that it opens up for accessing the in-group national community based on knowledge about the traditions of the religious community, while not having to relate to the question of faith at all.

Complementary to Admiraal’s two propositions, Kirill’s reference to religious tradition could be seen as portraying the in-group community as characterized by the ROC’s formally and informally acknowledged position, “the Church of the majority” (see Verkhovskii 2014). Important to note in this respect is that “Church” does not necessarily equate religious belief. As noted by Verkhovskii (2014: 53), mainstream Russian Orthodox confessional identity does not entail the obligation to follow the political, moral or religious teachings of the Church leadership. Thus, an individual’s identity as Orthodox does not necessarily mean that the person belongs to the narrower community of “the churchified” (votserkovlennyie): the faithful parishioners and “grassroots activists” of the ROC (Verkhovskii 2014: 52). This 185 division between churchified and other Orthodox is further reflected in Staalesen’s (2004: 301) assertion that the post-Soviet religious revival for many indicated a change of ideology, rather than the adoption of a specific faith.

In conclusion, we may say that the Patriarch’s statement indicates that in order to function as a common ground for integration, the concept of “Russian Orthodoxy” must be distinguished from its religious content, without becoming completely subsumed under “culture.” “Tradition” must be seen as referring to Orthodoxy as located somewhere between “culture” and “religion,” thus reproducing the dominant representation of Orthodoxy in the Russian public sphere. However, retaining this ambiguity is what makes it possible to promote Orthodoxy as a common ground for integration.

In a similar fashion, the following example demonstrates how “religion” can also function as a diacritical marker in a representation of Orthodoxy as the foundation of Russian culture. When asked about the ROC’s reasons for offering courses in the Russian language in 2012, Archpriest Aleksei Kirillov of the ROC’s local Yaroslavl branch of its Synodal Department for the Church’s Relations with Society (Sinodal’nyi otdel po vzaimootnosheniiam Tserkvi s obshchestvom) was quoted by KP:

I hope that they will become good and decent citizens who will respect the culture they live in […]. At best, they will become our parishioners, but I do not think that applies to a high percentage. Besides, it is not our goal to proselytize… And have you noticed that after the lectures on the Russian language they all stay to listen to the lectures on Orthodoxy, upon which Russian culture is founded?

Надеюсь, что они станут добрыми и хорошими гражданами, которые будут уважать культуру, в которой они живут […] В лучшем случае они станут нашими прихожанами, но не думаю, что это будет большой процент. Тем более у нас нет цели обращать их в веру... Вы заметили, что ни один из наших 'студентов' не уходит после урока русского языка, остаются послушать лекции о православии, на котором основана русская культура? (quoted in Ovchinnikov 2012).

Kirillov distinguishes between the Russian recipient community and the Church. The stated goal is for the migrants to become good citizens of the Russian recipient community in the sense of respecting its culture. The emerging representation of integration into the Russian community is characterized by good citizenry and respect for—but not necessarily inclusion into—the culture of the in-group.

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However, Kirillov goes on to open up the possibility for migrants to become more closely integrated with Russian culture, based on their attendance of lectures on Orthodoxy. This imbues his statement with ambiguity. While Kirillov first seemed to imply a separation between the Church as a religious community and the Russian in-group as a cultural community, he now apparently indicates that learning about Orthodox religion will result in knowledge about Russian culture. Thus, he concurs with Admiraal’s second proposition that “a Russian Orthodox is Russian.” The implied conclusion is that migrants may approach the Russian cultural community through learning about Orthodoxy. In the end, the distinction between “religion” and “culture” is blurred.

Culturally Similar Migrants

1) Access to Religion Follows from Access to Culture

An article that appeared in Novaia Gazeta in 2012 covered how the ROC and the local branch of the FMS in Saratov had worked together in organizing voluntary courses for migrants wishing to obtain Russian citizenship. As explained by journalist Nadezhda Andreeva,

The Saratov branch of the ROC and the local Federal Migration Service have prepared a series of lectures for [newcomers] who wish to obtain Russian citizenship. It is based on the example of the school subject “The Foundations of Orthodox Culture.”

[…]

The plan is to organize nine lectures about the Bible, Christian art, the role of Christianity in the history of Russia, and the churches in Saratov.

Саратовская митрополия РПЦ и управление Федеральной миграционной службы подготовили курс лекций для приезжих, желающих получить российское гражданство. В качестве образца использован школьный предмет “Основы православной культуры”. […]

Запланированы девять лекций о Библии, христианском искусстве, роли христианства в истории России, храмах Саратова (Andreeva 2012).

The intended target group is described as migrants who “more or less understand the Russian language and consider Russian culture close to their own” [“более или менее знают русский язык и считают русскую культуру близкой”] (Andreeva 2012).

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In other words, those

who have arrived in Russia on a permanent basis and want to obtain citizenship. First and foremost it pertains to Russian-speaking compatriots who arrive from CIS countries in accordance with the State Repatriation Program.

кто приехал в Россию на постоянное место жительства и претендует на гражданство. Прежде всего речь идет о русскоязычных соотечественниках, переезжающих из стран СНГ по государственной программе переселения. (Andreeva 2012)

In contrast to Kirill’s statement above (quoted in Klin 2011), the presentation of the course components indicates greater emphasis on the religious component, while “culture” still functions as overarching. This shines through in the emphasis on the role of Christianity in Russian history and culture. The emphasis on the intended target group as culturally similar individuals with a certain level of command of the Russian language represents the in-group community as similar to the ethnic Russian community envisioned in Admiraal’s first proposition (“Russian” is “Russian Orthodox”). The “prerequisite” for entering a course in Orthodox culture is here represented as being culturally similar to the members of the in- group Russian community. Thus, a “Russia-alike” migrant can become a “Russian Orthodox.” Inclusion into the Russian Orthodox community is hinted at as depending on the prospective in-group members’ knowledge about other aspects of Russian culture. In this way, Orthodoxy is represented as constituting a part of an in-group similarity that rests on a pre-existing cultural and linguistic similarity. The possibilities for crossing the boundary into the religious core community depend on already having crossed the border of broader cultural similarity: the in-group national community is defined by linguistic and cultural similarity. Again, the religious Orthodox community is implicitly imagined as being narrower than the Russian (Orthodox) community. Though the migrants are referred to as priezzhie, the implied signified are those who would otherwise fall into the compatriot category.

2) Access to In-Group Membership Follows from Adherence to a Religious Faith

While Andreeva saw cultural similarity with the Russian in-group functioning as a door- opener to Orthodoxy, a statement by LDPR State Duma representative Mikhail Degtariev reveals that the opposite construction is also possible: Orthodox religion can in itself function as a criterion for entry into the Russian community. This was accentuated in 2015 when

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Degtariev held that the religious faith of prospective migrants should be taken into account when considering who should be eligible for Russian citizenship:

We must automatically issue citizenship to all Russians (“russkie”) from the former USSR and the descendants of Russian emigrants. That is the position of our party. It is absurd when investors and individuals who originate from the distant abroad receive their passports faster than a Russian (“russkii”) family from Uzbekistan or Ukraine. […]

The question of the faith of the migrants is also important: why do we not take it into account? […]. In Russia, there is an Orthodox majority. We are more comfortable if people who are mentally close to us will arrive. The Church is separated from the State, but the State must take into account the interests of the majority. Verbal stunts about a multi-faith community do not work when we are talking about large numbers of people, their interests and accustomed environment. With migrants, the working formula must be: do you profess Orthodoxy; do you speak Russian or have managed to learn the language? Come and work. Like your work? Then stay here.

Гражданство нужно автоматически давать всем русским людям из республик экс-СССР потомкам русской эмиграции, это позиция нашей партии. Абсурдно, когда инвесторы и выходцы из дальнего зарубежья получают паспорт быстрее русской семьи из Узбекистана или с Украины.[…]. Вопрос вероисповедания мигрантов также важен: почему мы его не учитываем? […] Православных в России большинство. Нам комфортнее, если вокруг будут появляться ментально близкие люди. Церковь отделена от государства, но государство обязано учитывать интересы большинства. Словесные трюки о многоконфессиональности не работают, когда речь идет о массе людей, их интересах и среде обитания. С мигрантами должна работать формула: исповедуешь православие, знаешь или уже выучил русский язык? Приезжай работать. Понравилось работать? Оставайся жить (quoted in Malai and Runkevich 2015).

First, as explained in the interview, though not made explicit in this statement, Degtariev understands “integration” as acquiring formal citizenship. As shown in Chapter IV, citizenship acquisition is not among the dominant understandings of integration of immigrants in a Russian context. In the presidential discourse, it is only Medvedev’s 2010 annual address that links citizenship to integration.

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What Degtariev does is he clearly connects the issue of formal in-group membership to ethnicity, and as such privileges ethnic Russians living outside the Russian Federation. Then, he indicates that inclusion into the Russian in-group community should also depend on religious faith. In his assessment of religious faith, he acknowledges the separation of the Church from the State. He presents Orthodoxy as the religion of the in-group majority, whose interests should be taken into account. In light of Admiraal’s two propositions, Degtariev comes across as ambiguous. His initial reference to ethnic russkii Russianness points in the direction of a view of the Russian in-group community as that of Admiraal’s first proposition: it is eventually a Russian russkii ethnic community. However, together with his initial reference to ethnic Russianness, Degtariev’s assertion that Orthodoxy is the religion of the majority imbues his statement with ambiguity as to the distinction between the Orthodox majority and the majority as such.

On the one hand, Degtariev explicitly refers to the faith of the migrants as well as the Russian majority’s adherence to the Orthodox faith. Here, he blurs the boundaries between the signifiers “migrant” and “compatriot.” While he employs the term “migrant,” the signified are those who would be likely to be considered as compatriots in other contexts. Doing so, he envisages the Orthodox community as being wider than the Russian community. As a result, he represents the Russian in-group community in accordance with Admiraal’s second proposition (Russian Orthodox is Russian). Yet, in the continuation of his argument, he advocates the combination of command of the Russian language and Orthodox belief as constituting the requirements for taking up work in Russia. The Orthodox faith is now associated with another diacritical marker: the Russian language. As a result, the image of the prospective in-group members oscillates between that of Orthodox believers and Russian- speakers who adhere to the Orthodox faith. This group of Russian-speaking adherents of Orthodoxy would most likely be confined to Russian emigrants or other Eastern Slavs. Both groups comprise Orthodox Christians, and Eastern Slavs can fairly easily acquire familiarity with the Russian language. In sum, we may say that Degtariev’s portrayal of the Russian in- group community in line with Admiraal’s second proposition ends by blurring the boundaries between religion and ethnic adherence. The result is that he iterates the same lack of elaboration of the relationship between Russianness and Orthodoxy as that of Sudo.

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Ethnoculturally Different Migrants:

1) Converting to the Religion, not Becoming Members of the Russian Community

While Degtariev advocated that religious adherence should function as a criterion for access to Russianness, the following statement shows that this position has not been shared by everyone who has contributed to the discourse. A “Russian Orthodox” cannot necessarily become a “Russian.” In a transcription of a public lecture, printed in Novaia Gazeta in 2008, Aleksandr Auzan, Dean of the Faculty of Economy at Moscow State University, explicitly challenged the connection between membership in the Russian Orthodox community and membership in the Russian national community. Having established that integration of immigrants is a major challenge of our times, Auzan continued:

How to integrate? Just demand that [the migrants] abide by the laws and speak the language? No. It is understandable that integration is tied to the socialization of the migrants, that is not only their acceptance of the laws and their acquisition of the language, but of the values! Let us talk about the Chinese in the Russian Far East. A big problem! What must they acquire to become socially integrated? We can, for instance, baptize them as Orthodox Christians. Will that solve the problem? First, they will willingly be baptized, because Confucianism does not oppose it. It is not a religion, rather a philosophy of life that formulates the values of the Chinese etnos. Second, they will attend Mass much more regularly than our fellow countrymen38. But does that mean that they have become members of the etnos? I do not know, I am not sure.

Как интегрировать? Просто потребовать законопослушности и знания языка? Нет. Понятно, что интеграция связана с социализацией мигрантов, то есть принятием этими мигрантами не только законов и языка, но ценностей. Поговорим о китайцах на российском Дальнем Востоке. Большая проблема! Что они должны принять для того, чтобы быть социально интегрированными? Можно их, например, крестить в православие. Это решит проблему? Во-первых, они охотно покрестятся, потому что конфуцианство совершенно не противоречит этому, это не религия, это скорее философия жизни, формулирующая ценности китайского этноса. Во-вторых, они в церковь к причастию будут ходить гораздо регулярнее, чем наши соотечественники. Но

38 Sootechestvennik is here translated as “fellow countrymen,” as it most likely refers to Russians. 191

означает ли это, что они вошли в состав этноса? Не знаю, не уверен (Auzan 2008).

In contrast to Degtariev, Auzan eventually comes to deny that membership in the national community can be based on religious adherence. The religious conversion of the Chinese is envisaged as problem-free and their religious practice as more than good enough. Yet, Auzan doubts whether their inclusion into the Russian Orthodox community can make them members of the Russian community. In other words, “a Russian Orthodox” is not necessarily “a Russian,” at least not if the Russian Orthodox is Chinese.

Similar to Degtariev, Auzan understands the Russian Orthodox community as extending beyond the Russian community. The difference arises from the imagined out-group being Chinese. Though represented as able to integrate quite well with the Orthodox community, the Chinese will nevertheless remain an eternal out-group, because the boundary separating them from the Russian in-group community corresponds with an essentialist understanding of ethnicity. This is substantiated by Auzan’s usage of the term etnos. Auzan’s understanding of etnos makes the implied image of the Russian community narrower than the ordinary textbook definition of an “ethnic nation.” He displays an understanding of ethnic as “primordial” in the sense of an immutable characteristic. The most plausibly emerging representation of the Russian community is a community of ethnic Russians. Auzan rejects Admiraal’s second proposition by implying that it is not just any Russian Orthodox who can become Russian—thereby excluding Russian Orthodoxy as a common ground for integration.

Though differing on whether membership in the religious community should precede that of membership in the Russian in-group community or vice versa, Degtariev and Auzan’s views both imply an ethnification of the in-group community. In Degtariev’s statement, this is indirectly expressed in his blurring of the boundaries between the images of the in-group as ethnic Russians on the one hand and a community based on religion and language on the other. Auzan’s statement draws a boundary that excludes members of another ethnic group, even if they should adopt the majority religion of the in-group.

When it comes to the Chinese, Auzan’s statement is further interesting for the following two reasons. First, he speaks about a group that is rarely mentioned in an integration-related context. The number of Chinese residing in Russia is estimated to somewhere between 400,000 and 500,000 (Gabuev and Sharogradskii 2017). The fact that they are not subject to

192 more coverage in the current empirical material may be a sign that they are considered a regional issue that does not reach Moscow-based news outlets. Another possible reason is that they could be considered as so different that they are simply not among the target groups for integration.

2) Becoming Members of the Religious Community…?

Another example that similarly epitomizes the distinction between membership in the religious community and membership in the national community is found in an article that appeared in MK in 2014, on an Uzbek-language edition of the Bible. This time, the backdrop to the discursive tension that arose involved the ROC’s plans for distributing an Uzbek Bible translation as part of the Church’s response to the need for adaptation and integration of immigrants. After explaining how the ROC considered that the Uzbek migrants should read the Bible in order to gain a better understanding of Russian values, ideas and traditions, the article quoted Priest-Monk39 Dmitry, Head of the Missionary Committee under the Diocesan Council of Moscow, as stating:

It is very important to ensure that this edition is […] of high quality. It will be our response to society’s need for cultural adaptation and integration of migrant laborers. It is […] a standard that we can offer for the migrants to study.

Очень важно, что это издание будет […] качественное. Это будет наш ответ на потребность общества в культурной адаптации и интеграции трудовых мигрантов. Это […] стандарт, который мы можем предложить приезжающим для изучения. (quoted in Minkin 2014)

Interestingly, “religion” through the implied signifier “Bible” is represented as a common ground for cultural integration. By reading the Bible, the migrants are depicted as becoming able to integrate into the Russian cultural community, while it remains unknown whether they will become members of the Russian Orthodox community. As a result, the proposition “Russian Orthodox is Russian” is activated, but only superficially in the sense that “religion” works as a boundary of the Russian community and not the Russian Orthodox community, unless “culture” is understood as encompassing “religion.”

39 A Priest-Monk, also called a hieromonk, is a Russian Orthodox monk who is also an ordained priest. 193

While Priest-Monk Dmitry frames the publication of the Bible translation as intended to promote cultural adaptation and integration of migrants, the subsequent comment of journalist Aleksandr Minkin who interviewed the priest-monk challenges this approach. He begins by asking the question: “And why introduce the Bible in the Uzbek migrant community?” [“А зачем внедрять Библию в узбекско-мигрантскую среду?”] (Minkin 2014).

Then he challenges the Bible translation as a proper means for achieving cultural integration, questioning whether reading a book in one’s native language that hardly anyone in the recipient society had read would really lead to integration:

How many Russians [rossiiane] have read the Bible, what percentage? More specifically: how many [ethnic] Russians have read it? (As regards Dagestanis and Chechens we do not even ask.)

According to serious clerics, the number might be approximately five percent of those Orthodox who attend services, light candles, paint eggs, and fast (half-heartedly). Five percent of the Orthodox. Among the rest, the majority seem to think that the Bible and the Gospel are synonyms…

[…]

Russian construction workers do not read the Bible after working hours. Will Uzbeks?

Сколько россиян прочли Библию, какой процент? Спросим точнее: сколько русских россиян прочли её? (Про дагестанцев, чеченцев и т.д. даже не спрашиваем.)

По мнению серьёзных священников, речь может идти о примерно пяти процентах из тех православных, кто ходит в церковь, ставит свечки, красит яйца, постится (с грехом пополам). Пять процентов православных. Большинству остальных кажется, будто Библия и Евангелие это синонимы...

[…]

Русские бетонщики не читают Библию после работы. А узбеки будут? (Minkin 2014)

Underlying Minkin’s account is the image of Bible-reading Uzbek migrants as becoming integrated with only a narrow segment of the Russian community: those who have actually read the Bible. Their “cultural integration,” as represented by the Church representative, is in

194 practice unlikely to mean integration into the in-group community defined as the Russian national community. The implied conclusion is that if an Uzbek in this way would be integrated into a community, it would not be into the Russian (Orthodox) community, but simply an Orthodox community. From this it follows that Orthodoxy defined purely in term of religious faith cannot not function as a common ground for integration. The Russian in- group community is imagined as wider than the limited circle of “the churchified” (votserkovlennye), the latter being those who have read the Bible. In the end, a prospective migrant who converts to Orthodoxy would not necessarily become a member of the Russian in-group—because the Russians themselves are not necessarily Orthodox. Eventually, Minkin rejects both of Admiraal’s propositions based on the argument that Russians are not necessarily Russian Orthodox.

7.4 Summing Up

Approaching Russian Orthodoxy as a diacritical marker of the Russian community reveals, first and foremost, that “Orthodoxy” carries more than one connotation as regards what characterizes a Russian Orthodox community. On the one hand, the ROC representatives referred to here have tended to blur the boundary between Orthodoxy as religion and Orthodoxy as culture when arguing for Church involvement in organizing integration courses. In this way, they open up the discursive space for the image of Orthodoxy as a common ground for integration into the Russian community. On this point, they keep to the Church’s official position that its work with immigrants is not aimed at proselytizing the newcomers (Mitrofanova 2016: 110). However, they do not completely exclude the possibility that migrants might adopt the Orthodox faith. Interestingly, the blurring of the distinction between religion and Russian culture seems to be at odds with the Church’s official self- understanding as being primarily a Russian Orthodox Church, not a Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, the ROC’s willingness to include non-Slavic migrants in the religious community is in line with its official view that culturally different migrants do not represent a threat to the Russian people (Mitrofanova 2016: 110).

On the other hand, membership in the Orthodox community is represented as not necessarily entailing membership in the Russian national community. As conveyed in the statements of both Auzan (2008) and Minkin (2014), a Russian Orthodox is not necessarily a Russian. In the opinion of Auzan, devout commitment to Russian Orthodoxy is not a sufficient criterion

195 for entry into the Russian community. That reflects the tendency of religious boundaries in Russia to be constructed primarily along ethnic lines (Tishkov 1997: 105). To Minkin, a Russian Orthodox is not necessarily a Russian for the simple reason that the majority of in- group Russians are, according to him, not Orthodox believers. However, the discourse also has room for the opposite point of view. As shown in the opinion of Degtariev (quoted in Malai and Runkevich 2015), Orthodoxy can also function as a necessary precondition for membership in the Russian in-group community. What remains ambiguous is whether this is a sufficient condition.

7.5 Islam

While Orthodoxy is the religion of the majority in-group, Islam is the religion of a large share of the migrant community. It is also the religion of approximately 16% of the population of the Russian Federation (Merati 2017: 1). In the materials collected for this thesis, Islam was rarely invoked as a diacritical marker of the Russian community. Given the position of Islam as a minority faith in Russia, this may not be so surprising. However, considering the fact that the majority of immigrants to Russia who would need linguistic integration measures arrive from predominantly Moslem countries, this is an interesting finding. I return to a discussion of this question after the analysis of the empirical material. With regard to representations of Moslem migrants, I shall only note as a general observation that the few critical discourse moments that I have been able to retrieve do not univocally conform to the image of the “threatening Moslem migrant” revealed by other studies (for example Hutchings and Tolz 2015: 258). Rather, Islam is invested with different meanings than religiosity.

Similarity: Russian Islam as the Only Possible Common Ground for Integration

A prime example of the possibility of Islam functioning as an integral part of an individual’s Russian and European identity was supplied by Ravil’ Gainutdin, Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia. In an interview with leaders of Russia’s traditional religions, he explained to KP in 2011 how he would respond if European Moslems asked him about Russia:

European Moslems ask: “how do you live in Russia, are you adapted?” I answer with pride: I am a Russian (“rossiianin”), European, and I am not in need of adaptation in my own country.

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Европейские мусульмане спрашивают: “как вы живете в России, адаптированы?” Я с гордостью отвечаю: я россиянин, европеец и не нуждаюсь в адаптации в своей стране. (quoted in Kaftan 2011)

He then went on to say:

in Arab countries one waits for Russia’s support, and it is no coincidence that the Russian coat of arms—the two heads of the eagle—look towards the West and towards the East.

в арабских странах ждут помощи России, не случайно герб России—две головы орла: смотрят и на запад, и на восток. (quoted in Kaftan 2011)

Gainutdin’s statement exemplifies a view held by many Moslems in Russia: they see themselves as rightfully belonging within the discourse on patriotism that they conceptualize as a quest for a new “Russian idea” (see Merati 2017: 25). Gainutdin proclaims himself a Russian in his own country, and justifies his position by referring to the Russian coat of arms. By bringing in the dual-headed eagle, he backs up the claim advanced by Russian Moslems that Russia can be seen as promoting peace by functioning as a civilizational bridge between East and West (Merati 2017: 26).

At the same time as Gainutdin’s image of Moslems as an integral part of the Russian community echoes arguments put forward by Moslems in other post-Soviet countries, it implicitly touches on the difference between himself and immigrants to Russia. He is a Russian and a European.40 His identity thus encompasses both his Russianness and his Europeanness. While this could hold true for a Russian Moslem, a recent immigrant Moslem to Russia is most likely to be of (Central) Asian origin. What remains unclear is whether Gainutdin’s Islamic identity could function as a common ground for integration of such immigrants.

Against the backdrop of Gainutdin’s account, we may ask whether and how migrant Moslems in Russia may achieve the same degree of integration as the native Gainutdin. One of the very few articles to touch upon this question was published in KP in 2012, in connection with

40 More precisely, Gainutdin is from a Volga Tatar family. 197 coverage of local protests against the construction of an Islamic cultural center in Mitino, Moscow:

Shavkhat Aviasov, chair of Russia’s United Islamic Congress (Obedinennyi islamskii kongress Rossii), argued in favor of the construction of the cultural center:

One of the fundamental tasks an Islamic humanistic cultural center could fulfill would be to work with the adaptation of migrants, that is, the acquaintance of the Moslem share of the arriving youth to the traditions of our country and Moscow, [and] the organization of Russian language training.

I believe that this highly important work would be of great use to the inhabitants of Moscow, irrespective of their [ethno]national origin or religious worldviews.

Одной из основных задач, которую мог бы выполнять исламский гуманитарно- культурный центр, является работа по адаптации мигрантов, то есть приобщение мусульманской части приезжей молодежи к традициям нашей страны и Москвы, организация обучения их русскому языку,

Думаю, что эта важнейшая работа приносила бы большую пользу самим жителям Москвы, независимо от их национальности и религиозного воззрения (quoted in Mironov 2012).

Aviasov’s argumentation clearly resembles that on integration courses organized by the ROC. The ultimate goal is to include Moslem migrants into the traditions of the country and the city, as well as teaching them the language. Worth noticing is the mentioning of Islam only in relation to the migrants. The Russian in-group community is represented as marked by ethnic and religious diversity. Russian Moslems are not mentioned at all. As a result, “religion” in the shape of Islam works most expressively as a boundary that constructs the Otherness of the migrants. Among the in-group community, it is only present through the Islamic humanistic cultural center. What downplays its presence is also the signifier “Islamic humanistic,” which draws the attention away from Islam as religion. To the extent that “religion” functions as a common ground for integration, it does so by dint of being invested with meaning as a concept that extends broader than religious faith.

In the same article, an expert who is interviewed brought up an important aspect of the overall discourse on Islam in Russia. Igor’ Kuznetsov, a researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, opened his evaluation by saying: “By all means, to re-educate

198 guestworkers into moderate Russian-style Moslems would be great” [“Разумеется, перековать гастарбайтеров в умеренных мусульман российского толка было бы здорово”] (quoted in Mironov 2012).

Regardless of whether his reaction (“it would be great”) might be ironically meant, what Kuznetsov’s statement does is to indicate the Russian authorities’ approval of a Russian moderate version of Islam as being favorable (see Merati 2017: 14). Implicit here is the view that the migrants’ variety of the Moslem faith might be unfavorable to Russia.41 Thus, migrants are here constructed as an out-group through reference to their type of faith, but not without possibilities for becoming integrated: they could become converted into a moderate version of Islam, represented as “Russian Islam.” The emerging image of the Russian “imagined community” sees Islam as an integral part of Russia. Russianness can encompass Islam, as long as that Islam equals “Russian” Islam. “Religion” works as a boundary that engages in a construction of “Russian Islam” as common ground for integration. Further implied by Kuznetsov’s formulation is the view that all Moslems outside Russia are radical Moslems. As he does not mention this explicitly, it is as if this belongs to the conventional wisdom, which does not even have to be articulated. In turn, this underlines the difference between Russia and migrant-recipient countries where Islam has not been present or is considered as a traditional religion, for instance West-European countries. In both cases, Moslems can be constructed as Others, but in the Russian case, the in-group community offers a possibility for inclusion by asking the migrants to adjust to a variety of Islam that is considered as acceptable according to in-group standards.

Difference: the Construction of Out-Groups

Similar to Orthodoxy, Islam can also be represented as culture. In 2011, KP quoted Igor’ Beloborodov, director of the Institute for Demographic Research, as saying:

If we speak about migrants from Central Asia, they are predominantly bearers of Moslem culture and mentality. And they will not give it up. As soon as a person from a traditional society starts to adopt a different culture, he appears like a traitor to his fellow countrymen. Therefore, it is easier for them to live in closed communities, a kind of ghetto, assisting each other and occupying entire lucrative niches in the economy. Nowhere in the world, not Turks in Germany, Albanians in Greece, or

41 Most Moslems from Central Asia are followers of the Hanafi school of legal reasoning within Sunnism, similar to, for instance, Muslims of the Volga region (Merati 2017: 47). 199

Moroccans and Algerians in France, have Muslim migrants ever changed their identity.

Если речь о мигрантах из Средней Азии, то в основном это носители мусульманской культуры и ментальности. И они не будут от нее отказываться. Ведь как только человек из традиционного общества начнет перенимать иную культуру, в глазах своих соотечественников он будет выглядеть как предатель. Поэтому им легче жить замкнутой общиной, неким гетто, помогать друг другу и захватывать целые лакомые ниши экономики. Нигде в мире—ни в Германии турки, ни в Греции албанцы, ни во Франции марокканцы и представители Алжира—никогда не меняли свою идентичность. (quoted in Mironov 2011)

Here it is “Moslem culture and mentality” that is seen as the obstacle to integration, not the faith as such. This is underlined by Beloborodov’s listing of nationalities that allegedly have never properly integrated in the host societies in other countries. With regard to migrants in Russia, the reference to their “Moslem mentality” hints at Islam as more than a matter of religious faith: it appears as a feature that makes migrants remain a permanent out-group. In the end, the migrants’ purportedly self-imposed restrictions on their interaction with the host community are rooted in Beloborodov’s perception of Islam as a cultural construct, not a religious faith. As a result, it is not “religion” that works as a boundary of difference. “Religion” as Islam assumes the shape of a signifier that is invested with the meaning of culture.

By contrast, the following statement confirms that Islam as “religion” is accorded a slightly different function. In a lengthy interview about Moslem migrant teenagers in Moscow that appeared in KP as early as 2006, several experts discussed integration into Russian society. In contrast to widespread representations of Otherness as negative, what comes to the fore in these interviews is that Islam as a faith is capable of “saving” the migrants from the negative aspects of Russian youth culture. As psychologist Iulia Molchanova is quoted as saying about Azerbaijanis:

Islam protects Azerbaijanis from tobacco and alcohol. The religious ban on smoking and alcohol does a good job: smokers and drinkers […] among Azerbaijani teen-agers are [few], only three percent.

Азербайджанцев от табака и алкоголя защищает ислам. Религиозные запреты на курение и спиртное делают свое благое дело: курильщиков и выпивох […] среди

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азербайджанских подростков меньше, всего лишь по 3% .(quoted in Zhukovskaia 2006)

Here, Islam is seen as protecting migrant youth against certain negative aspects of integration into Russian society. Their Otherness is endowed with positive content. On the other hand, Islam, as a component in the migrants’ overall cultural expression, is apparently seen as posing the greatest danger to their successful integration into Russian society. Psychologist Molchanova goes on to describe Islam as part of the migrant children’s close connections with their own culture and their co-ethnics as follows:

They practice a special kind of “closedness” in order not to get lost among “the crowd,” not to blend in with the general masses. On the one hand, this is good. A traditional way of life lowers the risk of getting involved with drug abuse. On the other hand, such “preservationism” precludes the adaptation of the children of migrants. Sooner or later, they will have to move beyond their diaspora communities. Will they be ready to resist the temptations of the “big world”? If not, they might run a greater risk of getting involved in drug abuse than their peers among the host population.

их соблюдают с особой тщательностью, чтобы не затеряться в “толпе”, не слиться с общей массой. С одной стороны, это хорошо. Традиционный уклад жизни снижает риск вовлечения в употребление наркотиков. С другой стороны, такая “консервация” мешает адаптации детей мигрантов. Рано или поздно им придется выйти за пределы своих диаспор. Будут ли они готовы к сопротивлению соблазнам “большого мира”? Если нет, риск вовлечения в наркоманию для них может быть даже выше, чем для сверстников коренной национальности. (quoted in Zhukovskaia 2006)

Contrary to the general assumption of discursive construction of difference that focuses on negative aspects of the Other (see, for example de Cilia, Reisigl, and Wodak 1999; Tolz and Harding 2015), this view of Islam as “protecting” migrant youth against undesirable aspects of integration here initially functions to construct a positive kind of difference.

But that positive image is only fleeting. As soon as Islam goes from being a religious faith to becoming associated with migrants’ “traditional way of life,” it is represented as an obstacle to integration. When the boundaries between “religion” and “culture” are blurred, Islam becomes part of a construction of the Other. This representation rests on the perceived preservation of Islam as culture. Thus, Islam functions as a boundary that prevents members

201 of its own community from becoming integrated into the Russian recipient community. With regard to the “imagined” Russian in-group, both examples implicitly hint at an image of the Russian in-group community as not encompassing the migrants’ “alien” Islam—neither as religion nor as culture. In both cases, Moslems remain an out-group.

Becoming More Similar Reinforces Otherness

What happens when Moslem migrants acquire the habits of the locals? As shown by an exchange between MK journalist Natal’ia Vedeneeva and Leokadia Drobizheva, sociologist and chair of the Center for Research on Interethnic Relations at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, quoted below,42 the host population does not always see this as positive. Discussing the October 2013 riots in Biryulyovo, the journalist and the sociologist assessed the migrants as follows:

Vedeneeva: it seems to me that the newcomers’ huddling together in their enclaves poses the greatest problem on the road to [their] adaptation.

Drobizheva: But this can be solved. The authorities must regulate that. For example, why were there only migrants working in that vegetable warehouse in Biryulyovo? Why no locals? It is true, this is very important, that the locals themselves serve as examples of civilized behavior. Recently, however, I have often encountered migrants with bottles [with alcoholic beverages].

Vedeneeva: It is strange that some Eastern peoples, Caucasians, so quickly forget their religious commandments here. Since the dawn of time, they have observed the precepts more faithfully than Russian youth of today.

Веденеева: Мне кажется, что замыкание приезжих в своих анклавах—главная проблема на пути к адаптации.

Дробижева: Но она решаема. Это должны регулировать власти. К примеру, почему на той же овощебазе в Бирюлеве работали одни приезжие? Почему туда не допускали местных жителей? Тут, правда, еще очень важно, чтобы эти местные жители сами подавали пример цивилизованного поведения. А то в последнее время стали все чаще встречаться и мигранты с бутылками.

42 Tsentr issledovanii mezhnatsional’nykh otnoshenii Instituta sotsiologii RAN 202

Веденеева: Странно, что некоторые восточные люди, кавказцы так быстро забывают здесь свои религиозные заповеди. Ведь они испокон веков следовали заветам более строго, чем современная российская молодежь. (Vedeneeva 2013)

Here, the implied Moslem migrants are depicted as having acquired the habits of the host population. However, that does not produce an image of them as more integrated: quite the contrary, the migrants’ alcohol consumption imbues them with a second type of Otherness. The image of migrants as huddling together in enclaves is replaced by the image of people who have abandoned their religious convictions and thus also their original appropriate behavior. Their embracing of the bad habits of the locals constructs them as Others in a double sense of the word, reinforcing the initial negative connotations. This prompts the question of whether and how “religion” functions as a boundary. As we remember, the boundary is characterized by the possibility to cross it (see Barth 1969). In this case, the migrants’ crossing of the boundary happens through taking up habits that are commonly regarded as incompatible with their religious belief. This actually enables the conclusion that what they cross is not “religion” as a boundary, but “non-religion.”

Another act of boundary-drawing that is worthy of further attention is Vedeneeva’s closing statement. Continuing Drobizheva’s line of thought, she represents “Caucasians” as included in the broad and undefined group of “Eastern peoples.” In so doing, she revokes the historical representation of the East as one of Russia’s constituent Others (see Tolz 2001). She also blurs the boundaries between internal migrants and immigrants as the term “Caucasians” could refer to both types of migrants. As the topic of conversation centers on the religious ban on alcohol consumption, it is likely that she is talking about Moslems in the Caucasus (understood as both North and South). These are contrasted with the “contemporary Russian rossiiskaia youth.” The implied North Caucasian Moslems are thus represented as out-group members, separated from the in-group by reference to their religious practice. As a boundary, “religion” leads to a transcending of territorial borders. This does not happen by including foreign citizens in the in-group community, but by excluding some of Russia’s own citizens.

Her contrasting with the “contemporary Russian rossiiskaia youth” further implies that those who can be counted as rossiiane in this case are not Moslems. By implication, she represents the Russian “imagined community” as not encompassing Moslems.

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7.6 Summing Up

The critical discourse moments on Islam do not crystallize around any specific nodal points. What characterizes the discourse is that Islam itself assumes the shape of a signifier that can have more than one signified, as it is represented both as culture and as religion. Mainly, Islam works to underline the migrants’ Otherness. Yet, the out-group constructions do not concur with the image of a “threatening Moslem migrant” known from Russian television coverage (Hutchings and Tolz 2015: 258). When the migrants are constructed as Others, it is not so much Islam as a religious faith that serves to distinguish them from the Russian population. The difference is linked to Islam as being part of their alien/foreign cultural expression. In the one example when Islam is represented as a common ground for integration or part of the Russian “imagined community,” what is meant is moderate “Russian” Islam. Finally, their integration is not necessarily positive. As shown, it can lead to a strengthening of their Otherness, or a double Otherness, based on their initial difference from the recipient population and their adopted difference from the initial “out-group.”

7.7 Comparison with Presidential Discourse

The main observable difference between the presidential discourse and the media discourse is that the nodal points do not overlap to the same extent as those of “language” and “culture.” A plausible reason for this may be the low number of statements to analyze in both discourses. The presidential addresses and articles succeeded in constructing a sense of unity that transcended borders in both time and geographic space. By contrast, the media discourse on Islam is more likely to portray migrants as Others. Yet, these Others are not religious Others, but cultural Others. In contrast to what was the case with “language” and “culture,” “religion” is less likely to be invested with meaning as a common ground for integration. This is due to the separation of the religious community from the national community. Here, the religious community is imagined as “wider” than the national community. Explained with reference to Admiraal’s (2010) two propositions, inclusion into the in-group religious community does not necessarily entail inclusion into the national community. By contrast, both Orthodoxy and Islam were linked to common values in the presidential discourse. As Putin expressed in Russia: The National Question (Putin January 23, 2012), Russia’s four traditional religions represent “shared moral, ethical, and spiritual values” [“общие моральные, нравственные, духовные ценности”].

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Another observable difference is that in the media discourse, Orthodoxy and Islam are not mentioned together. They appear together only in the examples when migrants from predominantly Moslem countries are reported as attending courses or reading Bible translations in their native language. Representations of a multi-religious Russia are completely absent. Implied by this is a view of the Russian “imagined community” as dominated by Orthodoxy.

In Putin’s (October 22, 2013) introductory address to the meeting of the Council for Interethnic Relations, Russia’s position as a multi-faith country was underscored, after he pointed out that Russian Moslems are Russia’s own citizens: “our Muslims are Russians, our citizens, and this is their only motherland” [“наши мусульмане, российские,—это наши граждане, у них другой Родины нет”]. By comparison, in his speech in Crimea on March 18, 2014, Putin foregrounded Christianity as “a powerful spiritual unifying force that helped involve various tribes and tribal federations of the vast Eastern Slavic world” [“мощной духовной объединяющей силой, которая позволила включить в формирование единой русской нации и образование общей государственности самые разные по крови племена и племенные союзы всего обширного восточнославянского мира”] (Putin, March 18, 2014). The main point of difference is that Christianity can function as a unifying force alone, while Islam can only function together with the other traditional faiths. In turn, this mirrors the positions of Islam and of Orthodoxy as minority and majority faiths respectively.

7.8 Discussion and Conclusions to Chapter VII

Looking into the future, the lack of easily identifiable nodal points implies the absence of foreseeable closure of meaning. When present in the discourse, Islam works expressively as a boundary, but the tendency of the discourse not to crystallize around nodal points implies that we cannot expect that Islam strive for dominance in general discourse on integration in Russia. This observation prompts a “why?”

Since Moslem organizations’ efforts to help integrate migrants have been endorsed by both Putin and Medvedev, there is reason to ask why it receives such limited attention in the central media. After all, Islam is the religion of a large share of the migrants in Russia. One reason may be that the integration efforts made by Moslem organizations do not come into the

205 media spotlight because those migrant Moslems who do become integrated through contact with Russian Moslems are seen as remaining within their own circles. As a result, they slip under the radar. As noted in Chapter I, my information about Moslem contributions to integration had to be obtained from Russian Islamic web sites.

Due to its numerical dominance among the ethnic majority population and established symbolic position, the ROC occupies a more prominent role in the dominant representation of the in-group Russian “imagined community” than Islam. Though the media discourse does not always make this explicit, the implied Russian in-group community is more likely to be Russian Orthodox than Moslem. In this way, the discourse reflects the majority and minority positions of Orthodoxy and Islam respectively (see Verkhovskii 2014).

At the same time and in contrast to European countries, Islam has been present on parts of Russian soil even longer than Russian Orthodoxy. The viewpoint that Moslems per se are in need of integration measures may not be as widespread in Russia as in West-European popular opinion. As shown in the preceding chapters on “language” and “culture,” implied Moslems are more likely to be subject to constructions of Otherness based on other diacritical markers than be represented as welcome to integrate with the Russian in-group. Important in this respect is also the tendency towards racialization or ethnicization of Islam. As shown in particular by Tolz (2017: 743), the “Moslem migrant” in Russia is a construction that mixes narratives of ethno-racial identity, religion, culture and phenotype. Islam as religion alone is not capable of constructing either sufficient Otherness or functioning as common ground for integration.

Some of the works reviewed in the literature review for this thesis indicate that Moslem migrants are more likely to be mentioned in other contexts than that of integration (see Tolz 2017 and Tolz and Harding 2015). For example, Islam has also been part of the media narrative that has represented the multiculturalist West as Russia’s main Other. The presence of Islam in Europe dominated Russian television coverage of the refugee crisis in 2015–2016 (Tolz 2017: 750). Chaos and conflict were represented as resulting from Western governments’ failed policies of multiculturalism. While the West was represented as characterized by Islamophobia and prejudice, Russia was portrayed as having a government that maintained security by eliminating its own internal “Islamic threats” before they could cause significant harm (see Tolz 2017: 753). Correspondingly, the general discourse on Islam in Russia has tended to connect Islam with national security, both in relation to the wars in 206

Chechnya and the presence of radical Islamist groups, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir (see Merati 2017).

By contrast, Orthodoxy has been linked to national identity. After all, the majority of Russians who consider themselves to be followers of Russian Orthodoxy display a stronger identification with it as an expression of Russian culture and tradition than with it as a religious faith (see Verkhovskii 2014 and Chapter IV).

Combined with its presence in other discourses, Islam’s absence in the current discourse suggests that Islam is only “activated” in other contexts than that of integration. Together with Islam’s presence in other discourses, the generally weak connection between Islam as religion and integration makes it reasonable to ask whether Islam is relegated to the unsayable. While this may be the case, Islam’s presence in the general discourse on migration suggests that this is not the case. It may be that Islam as a religious faith simply falls outside the discourse on integration because religious faith is not associated with integration. Moslem migrants’ Otherness is likely to be a cultural Otherness. Further, by articulating the viewpoint that Moslems per se should not become integrated, one runs the risk of being accused of religious intolerance or inciting interethnic sentiment.

Again, looking into the future, we may ask if and when “Moslem migrants” cease to be “migrants” and become “minorities” or whether they will be turned into eternal Others. Among the most salient representations of Others in the whole discourse on integration are those implied to be “inner Others.” This suggests that the strongest dividing lines are more likely to be drawn between members of the territorial in-group than between Russians and migrants. Thus, future perspectives for stability and interethnic cohesion can be seen as depending on the establishing of a linkage between Islam and integration in the sense of paying attention to migrants’ Moslem faith in the process of integration. Otherwise, migrants’ Otherness may be activated at a point in time when its conflict potential may have risen significantly.

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8 Chapter VIII Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

I opened this thesis by posing the question: “how do Russians understand what the Russian ‘imagined community’ is?”

Then, I asked the following two main research questions:

3) How has the Russian national community been represented in Russian print media discourse on the integration of immigrants from 2000 and up to 2015?

4) To what extent does this “image” of the Russian community correspond with that conveyed in presidential discourse during the same period?

Departing from the two main research questions, I have examined and compared how the Russian “imagined community” has been constructed in two types of discourse that unfold in different textual sources: presidential articles and addresses, and articles collected from print media. In this endeavor, I have focused on how discursive construction of national identity unfolds in light of a hitherto underexplored topic within the field of Russian area-studies: the integration of immigrants in Russia.

In so doing, I have worked at the intersection between studies of Russian nationalism and national identity, and migration studies. By focusing on integration, I have added integration to the list of topics that can be fruitfully studied in order to gain new insights into how national identities are negotiated in Russia as a migrant-recipient state. Viewing integration as the “meeting” between the in-group members of the recipient community (Self) and the migrants as initial out-group members (Other), it is my contention that we gain access to a highly informative “site” of identity construction. Analyzing this site, I have brought together theoretical insights from several fields of academic study.

One of my main theoretical points of departure has been the conceptualization of the nation as an “imagined community” in the sense that it is constructed in discourse. Further, I have approached the empirical material based on the assumption that the current discourse can be read as a source on discursively constructed images of the Russian community.

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An important aspect of how Russians see the Russian community is whom they view as its members—or, in the context of integration: who are seen as prospective members of the Russian community? Embedded in this question is an implicit concern with another important theoretical concept that has informed this study: boundaries. I have envisioned the process of becoming a member of a given community as an act of crossing the boundary into this community.

As highlighted in chapter II “Theory Framework”, the boundary is not a given and stable entity. It is subject to discourse. By examining the boundary from the perspective of discourse, I have been able to transpose it from anthropology into the current field of nationalism studies. While Barth himself did not use the term “discourse,” he clearly pointed towards a non-essentialist approach to the boundary. In line with Barth, I have chosen to study national identity “from below” in the sense that I have focused my attention on the diacritical markers that the speakers make salient, rather than approaching the empirical material with pre-defined categories. Thus, I have searched for how Russians view their own “imagined community” by way of analyzing how contributors to the two types of discourse have invoked the three diacritical markers, “language,” “culture,” and “religion” as boundaries of this community.

8.1 Summaries of Main Findings in the Empirical Chapters

8.2 Chapter IV: Presidential Discourse

In Chapter IV, I assessed all three diacritical markers in annual addresses made by presidents Putin and Medvedev in the period from 2000 throughout 2015. When “language” was invoked as a diacritical marker, the discourse crystallized around two nodal points that equated two different images of Russia, both defined by territory: the Russian community as stretching beyond the Russian Federation, and the Russian community as corresponding with the territorial borders of the Russian Federation. While the nodal points expressed differences in geography, the analysis further revealed what can be considered as a balancing of interests between linguistic uniformity and linguistic diversity. While these acts of balancing can be seen as excluding the articulation of one firm view about the position of “language” as a

210 boundary, the material revealed a clear tendency for “language” to depend on “culture” to function strongly as a diacritical marker. The implied chronology between “culture” and “language” pointed to an understanding of former Soviet citizens as able to integrate first and foremost because the Soviet Union was invested with meaning as a cultural community that could still assume relevance at the point in time when it was invoked.

While the invocations of “language” crystallized around territory, the invocations of “culture” were organized by the two nodal points “culture” in the singular and “cultures” in the plural. Besides its occurrence in both the plural and singular, “culture” proved to be a multifaceted diacritical marker. Primarily, this is due to the many adjectives used to describe it and their various investments with meaning. “Culture” could be represented as “Russian” with the help of the signifiers russkii and rossiiskii, as well as “our” and natsional’nyi. Further, the relationship between signifier and signified proved open to change according to context. One and the same signifier could have different signifieds. For example, the signifier rossiiskii could denote both members of the Russian community understood as those living within the borders of the Russian Federation, as well as it could refer to the inhabitants of the entire post- Soviet space.

Following the opposite logic, the signified understood as the inhabitants of the Russian Federation could be referred to by both russkii and rossiiskii. This relatively loose relationship between signifier and signified suggests that russkii and rossiiskii should be understood as open to be invested with meaning according to context, rather than being fixed to notions of the nation as either civic or ethnic.

As shown, the culture that most readily united all Russian citizens was russkaia culture, while the culture that united the former Soviet inhabitants at the beginning of the period was rossiiskaia culture. This indicates that the presidents operated with two common grounds for integration: one for national integration and one for the integration of immigrants. The culture that was represented as important to unite around for Russian citizens differed from the one that migrants were expected to integrate into. The implied consequence is that russkaia culture can be seen as unique to Russian citizens, thus tacitly being hinted at as unapproachable to migrants.

“Religion” functioned a boundary only towards the end of the period, and then in the context of celebration of historical events or Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The recent appearance of

211 the references to specific religious faiths could be seen as an indication that they have now become included into the sayable as the “glue” that can bind the Russian “imagined community” together. This can be considered to result either from attempts to adjust to the empirical realities invoked in the speeches or as an indication that Orthodoxy and Islam are to be considered as being in the process of becoming consolidated as diacritical markers in the formation of Russian national identity.

The statements on “religion” crystallized around the same nodal points as “culture,” namely singularity and plurality. The relationship between singularity and plurality and territory was precisely the opposite of that of “culture” and “language.” When pluralized, “cultures” and “languages” could only unite Russia as the Russian Federation, while “religions” in the plural functioned to unite Russia with Crimea. This instance is unique, as it was the sole occasion when the Russian community was clearly represented as a community of Eastern Slavs. Further, “religion” was the only diacritical marker that was explicitly linked to the signifier “ethnicity”.

As noted, it is hard to single out one main tendency in the presidents’ invocations of “language,” “culture” and “religion.” In spite of my view of the annual addresses as detached from day-to-day political context, their content cannot be seen as untangled from political and societal realities. Neither can it be seen as controlled by it. Both the invocations of the diacritical markers as boundaries and the Presidents’ acts of investing of russkii and rossiiskii with different meanings came across as subject to changeable practices. This precludes consistent definition of in-groups and out-groups. As argued, the presidents’ utterances can thus be seen as confirming Shevel’s claim about Russian nation-building as purposefully ambiguous.

In the main, the emerging image of the Russian community can be seen as flexible. It takes up in it and balances elements from all of the images in Shevel’s (2011) typology. The result is that the community that is imagined can stretch beyond Russia’s borders and include both the post-Soviet space as well as the entire russkii mir at the same time as it devotes attention to both the russkii majority population and the minorities. The only image that can be firmly excluded, is the one that envisions Russia as a community of exclusively ethnic Russians. In spite of their conspicuous role in “Russia: the National Question,” the russkiie Russians were represented as having to share their culture with those implied as willing to identify with it. In spite of the exclusion of the russkii image, both Presidents’ continuous emphasis on the 212

Russian language as a uniting factor, together with the tendency of “language” to depend on “culture” can be seen as a sign that this image, while confined to the unsayable, is allowed to simmer beneath the surface.

8.3 Chapters V, VI and VII: “Language,” “Culture,” and “Religion” in the Media Discourse

8.3.1 “Language”

The critical discourse moments on “language” crystallized around two thematic nodal points that revealed a tension between past and future: the former Soviet Union and the enrollment of children of immigrants into Russian elementary schools. Similar to what was the case in the presidential discourse, when tying together the “imagined community” of the former USSR, “language” depended on “culture.” Functioning as a boundary, “culture” was logically prior to “language.” As the Soviet Union was pushed further back into the past, the representation of Soviet cultural similarity faded and was replaced by tacit hints towards the unsayable that Russian language as more likely to unite those who were now perceived as ethnoculturally similar to the Russian majority population.

With regard to the second nodal point, this ceased to be an unsayable to the extent that “language” came to function as a pseudo-boundary that proved capable of masking ethnocultural difference. These critical discourse moments showed how perceptions about Russia’s own “inner Others” are strong enough to enter the discourse on integration, even though ethnicity is not invoked as a separate boundary. This draws attention to a question that is left unanswered in the discourse on integration, namely whether perceptions of migrants that are represented as able to integrate will change if they change categories from “migrants” to “minorities.”

8.3.2 “Culture”

The critical discourse moments that invoked “culture” as a boundary crystallized around the two same nodal points as “culture” did in the presidential discourse: “culture” in the singular and “cultures” in the plural. Regarding “culture” in the singular, the chapter showed how successful integration was represented to be a result of three modes of change: first, change in

213 the in-group membership could occur as a result of migrants crossing the cultural boundary. In this case, the in-group’s culture was generally represented to remain the same. Second, the culture, of the in-group was represented as open to change due to migrants enriching it with new elements. Third, the migrants could undergo cultural change prior to crossing the boundary into the in-group’s culture. Besides change, the implied prerequisite for successful integration was that the in-group’s culture was represented as one and undivided, rather than being associated with understandings of culture as either civic or ethnic.

This was substantiated by the analysis of “cultures” in the plural. Multiculturalism was largely dismissed of as a suitable approach to integration. At the same time, some contributors to the discourse challenged what they saw as the dominant understanding of multiculturalism as only being a failed Western policy approach by pointing to Russia’s own multicultural problems. Though not represented as an “ism,” Russia still had its own “multiculturality,” handed down from the Soviet past. While integration of international migrants was represented as possible, national integration was hinted at as fraught with problems. In light of the findings in the previous chapters, this suggests a twofold view of integration in Russia. Integration of immigrants is a separate discourse with its own proposals for solutions that still await realization in the shape of policy measures, while national integration is located within the field of nationalities policies. As such, it is an internal matter and more inclined to be fraught with the obstacles and ambiguities identified by Shevel (2011).

8.3.3 “Religion”

First, the critical discourse moments on Orthodoxy crystallized around the question of whether integration into the religious community automatically entailed integration into the national community or vice versa. The chapter showed a tendency towards a stricter separation between the religious community and the national community than that of the presidential discourse. Further, the analysis revealed that when “religion” functioned as a boundary, the in-group community could be represented as an ethnic community. This was also found in the presidential discourse. This co-occurrence of the linkage between ethnicity and religion may be an indication that “religion” does not function strongly as a diacritical marker. Connecting ethnicity to religion can become included in the sayable because the religious community is untangled from the national community. Adherence to a religious

214 belief can or should correspond to ethnic adherence as long as “religion” as Orthodoxy does not become “culture.”

With regard to Islam, the identified critical discourse moments did not crystallize around any particular nodal points. The material indicated that Islam could function as a common ground for integration, unless it was confined to “Russian” Islam. When Moslem migrants were imagined as eternal Others, this was not solely because of their Moslem faith, but due to their assumed adherence to “Moslem culture.” Finally, Islam could also be subject to a double kind of Otherness. If breaking with Islamic tradition and adopting the habits of the in-group, the Moslem migrants were represented as unable able to cross the in-group’s boundary precisely because they had crossed the boundary out of their initial community.

8.4 The Dominant Image of the Russian Community in the Media Discourse

Similar to the presidential discourse, it is not possible to conclude that the media discourse conveys only one image of the Russian community. The discourse is neither coherent nor univocal. Out-group and in-group constructions vary to such an extent that it is impossible to draw firm conclusion based on migrants’ individual background. What further complicates the picture is that the signified can be detached from the signifier. As a result, boundaries between categories become blurred. As shown, the signifier “migrant” can encompass both culturally similar implied “compatriots” as well as Russia’s own citizens. This precludes differentiation between different types of migrants. Yet, the dominant image of the Russian “imagined community” in the media discourse can be characterized as follows:

It consists of culturally similar or assimilated individuals who share the same (Russian) language and is oriented towards future cultural uniformity. Provided it is represented as culture, this image also encompasses Russian Orthodoxy.

Immigrants can cross the boundaries of “language” and “culture” and become integrated with the one and undivided in-group. In this context, “integration” carries connotations to assimilation. By assimilating into the in-group, the “migrants” avoid becoming future “minorities.”

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This brings the discourse on the integration of immigrants in touch with the question of the relationship between minorities and the majority within Russia. As shown in Chapters V and VI, among those represented as eternal Others are some of Russia’s own citizens. If immigrants’ assimilation with the majority in-group constitutes a preferred approach for their integration in Russia, their integration can actually strengthen the dominance of the in-group majority. Thus, the “meeting” between the Russian Self and the migrant Other can be seen as strengthening the russkii majority. The prerequisite for this is that the russkiie expand their culture to comprise the migrants.

As the embracement of uniformity and assimilation is accompanied by the rejection of multiculturalism and references to Russia’s challenges with its own “multiculturality,” the discourse can be seen as pointing in the direction of a greater support for linguistic and cultural uniformity within Russia. This means that Shevel’s (2011) civic image of Russia as consisting of all of its ethnically diverse inhabitants is weakened.

It is important to note that while the emerging image of Russia emphasizes uniformity, it generally does not correspond to Shevel’s (2011) image of Russia as a community of only ethnic Russians. In the same way as in the presidential discourse, the image of Russia as a community of ethnic Russians is precluded because both “language” and “culture” readily function as common ground for the integration of different types of migrants. Only “religion” connects with ethnocultural background. Though all three diacritical markers are commonly associated with an ethnic nation (see Kolstø 2000: 2 and Chapter III), “language” and “culture” readily become detached from notions of ethnicity and race when functioning as boundaries.

Another reason for the weak presence of ethnicity may be “culture’s” general lack of investment with meaning as regards cultural content. Besides the references to shashlyk (see Boiko 2015) and Russian show business (see Tsyganov 2010), “culture” in the main remains a signifier without a signified. As a result, the implied image of the in-group community does not remain firmly attached to a particular ethnic group. However, the combination of emphasis on culture as one and undivided and the ability of the Russian language to function as a pseudo-boundary for ethnicity makes it difficult to overlook the position of the Russian majority population, even though this theme is consistently not made explicit.

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8.5 Impacts on Other Fields and Suggestions for Further Research

Focusing on integration, this study has been preoccupied with a theme that has virtually no limitation to its relevance, neither in time, nor in space. Being a result of migration, integration has in practice occurred for as long as people have changed places of residence and consequently also their group belonging.

In terms of geographical impact area, this study is limited to Russia. However, the combination of theoretical and methodological approach is not Russia-specific. I have shown how theoretical concepts that are not commonly associated with the field of Russian studies can be successfully applied in a Russian context. One particular contribution is the transposition of Barth’s (1969) original idea of a boundary into a point of departure for the study of Russian national identity. My discourse-based approach to the boundary ought to have implications beyond the field of Russian studies. In particular, this applies to studies of national identity in other migrant-recipient countries. As noted in Chapter II, examples of studies that rely on Barth’s boundary exist, but not all of them assume a discourse-based approach.

Further, this study has shown that viewing Barth’s boundary as constructed in discourse can produce valuable insights about how the in-group members construct their own national identity in the “meeting” with the migrant Other. Of particular significance to studies of other migrant-recipient countries is how the current study sheds light on perceptions about migrants as prospective in-group members.

Assuming a discourse-based view of the nation and the boundary opens the possibility of studying whether images that emerge in the context of integration become detached from or stay within the frames of the already existing repertoire of “imagined communities” of a given society. This can provide valuable insights about how integration can either strengthen or weaken already existing images. It can also produce information about the viability of different approaches to integration of immigrants as well as national integration.

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8.5.1 Suggestions for Further Research

This study has focused on Russian national identity in the media discourse about the integration of immigrants. Another approach could be the study of media coverage. Thus far, it is difficult to identify a coherent debate about the integration of immigrants in the Russian public sphere. This is also what has motivated me to examine the current empirical material as a discourse.

The findings of this study are in themselves a major argument for further monitoring media’s coverage of integration. As the integration of immigrants is a relatively new phenomenon in the Russian context, the work presented in this thesis should be considered as a first attempt at studying how the public discourse on the integration of immigrants unfolds and relates to Russian national identity. If Russia should develop a comprehensive program for the integration of immigrants in the future, this would probably bring more media coverage, which in turn could be studied.

Another approach would be to access existing media sources in order to examine which other topics are linked with the integration of immigrants over time. Such a study could be conducted using discourse analysis. Continuous mappings of the order of discourse could yield further insights into possible changes as to where Russian media “locate” the integration of immigrants in the overall public discourse.

From the perspective of discourse, it could be fruitful to conduct studies drawing on other types of empirical material, such as social and web-based media, as well as information collected through qualitative interviews with private individuals. Persons involved in activities related to the integration of immigrants, as well as residents of areas with significant concentrations of migrants, can be expected to have perceptions about integration.

Further, survey-based studies that approach the question of integration over time or in connection with specific events would be a welcome contribution to the field. Including questions about the integration of immigrants in surveys would enable researchers to monitor whether attitudes towards the inclusion of new members of the national community are changing with time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For example, in the future, will today’s migrants from former Soviet republics cease to be perceived as “migrants” or “newcomers” (priezzhie), and be viewed as “minorities”? In the Russian context, this question is

218 particularly relevant as it prompts the question of whether it would be possible to recreate the waning link between current migrants and the Soviet past. A future view of current post- Soviet migrants as an integral part of the Russian community defined by state borders would in fact represent a kind of return to the Soviet past, when those who are today international migrants were fellow countrymen. A relevant question in this respect would be whether this miniature “Soviet reality” could outcompete the observed tendency towards preferences for linguistic uniformity and cultural unity.

Further research can also show whether the recently adopted legislation requiring that migrants be tested in the knowledge of Russian language and civic matters can lead to changes in perceptions of who are seen as prospective members of the Russian community. As the influence of the Russian language has generally declined throughout the post-Soviet geographical space, migrants who are not originally Slavic-speakers will have to put more effort into learning the Russian language than, say, Ukrainian-speakers or persons from Belarus. Bearing in mind the findings in Chapter V “Language,” we may ask whether the image of Russia as a community of Eastern Slavs has the potential to become increasingly dominant. Pertaining to cultural content, it could be fruitful to turn the tables, and study migrants’ perceptions of Russian culture, as this would reveal important information about how migrants view their own prospects for integration in Russia.

As Ruget’s (2017) scrutiny of Russia’s civics and history test indicates, it is also important to study specific integration measures from the perspective of what they can reveal about the self-perceptions of the host community. However, Ruget’s article is confined to one obligatory exam. What still appears to constitute an unexplored area of research is the actual practice of integration measures in Russia. What images of the Russian community do the migrants encounter in preparatory courses about Russia?

An interesting sub-field here could involve studying possible regional differences in curricular content. The “Russia” conveyed in these courses—is it a local, regional or national identity? In turn, this could provide answers to how non-Russian groups in different parts of Russia view themselves in the meeting with external migrants.

Finally, and related to the contribution of this thesis beyond the field of Russian studies, is the study of discursive constructions of boundaries. As this study has shown, Barth’s idea of a boundary can—with the help of a discourse-based approach—be successfully transposed into

219 the study of contemporary national identity formation. It is my belief that this approach would prove a fruitful point of departure for studies of national identity beyond Russia.

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8.6 Primary Sources43

8.6.1 Newspaper Articles

Andreeva, Nadezhda. 2012. “Da pomozhet Bog sotsial'noi adaptatsii!” [“May God help with social adaptation”], Novaia Gazeta, June 4. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2012/06/03/50021-da-pomozhet-bog-sotsialnoy- adaptatsii Accessed December 28, 2017.

Auzan, Aleksandr. 2008. “Natsional'nyie tsennosti i konstitutsionnyi stroi” [“National values and constitutional order”], Novaia Gazeta, January 21. ( not available online).

Balabas, Evgenii. 2014. “Urokov patriotizma v shkolakh ne budet, zaiavil glava departamenta obrazovaniia Moskvy” [“There will be no lectures on patriotism in schools, declares Head of the Moscow Department of Education”], Moskovskii Komsomolets, August 28 http://www.mk.ru/social/2014/08/27/urokov-patriotizma-v-shkolakh-ne-budet-zayavil- glava-departamenta-obrazovaniya-moskvy.html Accessed September 1, 2017.

Balabas, Evgenii, and Marina Lemutkina. 2013. “Shkola dlia migrantov” [“School for migrants”], Moskovskii Komsomolets, October 21. http://www.mk.ru/social/education/article/2013/10/20/933301-shkola-dlya- migrantov.html Accessed September 1, 2017.

Boiko, Aleksandr. 2015. “Migranty pereustraivaiut pod sebia stolitsu: Kak ia iskal v Moskve Kirgiztaun” [“Migrants reconstruct the capital: How I searched for Kyrgyztown in Moscow”], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, July 20. https://www.msk.kp.ru/daily/26407.7/3283172/ Accessed September 20, 2017.

43 Only sources cited appear here. For a full list of articles consulted, please see Appendix 231

Bovt, Georgii. 2013. “Neizbezhnye anklavy” [“The unavoidable enclaves”], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, October 8. http://www.kompravda.eu/daily/26142/3032321/ Accessed June 20, 2017.

Cherkasova, Ekaterina. 2011. “’Svoi’ Migranty Skoro Zakonchatsia. Zhelaiushchikh Rabotat’ v Rossii Nachnut Otseniva’' po Ball'noi Sisteme?” [“Soon there will be no one left among ‘our migrants’. Will Russia award points to aspiring migrant laborers?”] Moskovskii Komsomolets, July 26. http://www.mk.ru/politics/2011/07/25/608604-svoi-migrantyi-skoro- zakonchatsya.html Accessed November 20, 2017.

Chernikh, Evgenii. 2009. “Mikhail Deliagin: ‘Prestupnik Imeet Natsional'nost’!’” [“Mikhail Deliagin: ‘The criminal has an ethnicity’”], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, October 29. https://www.kompravda.eu/daily/24386.3/564463/ Accessed November 27, 2017.

D'amato, Guiseppe. 2012. “O chem molchat politiki v Rossii. Migranty nuzhny—inache nekomu budet rabotat' i nechem platit' pensii” [“What Russian politicians keep quiet about: We need migrants, otherwise nobody will work and pay for our pensions”], Moskovskii Komsomolets, January 31. http://www.mk.ru/politics/world/2012/01/30/665838-o-chem-molchat-politiki-v- rossii.html Accessed June 30, 2017.

Demina, Aleksandra, and Aleksandr Milkus. 2011. “Mezhnatsional'nuiu rozn' seiut vzroslye, a ne deti” [“Adults, not children, incite interethnic tensions”], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, May 23. https://www.kompravda.eu/daily/25689.5/893593/ Accessed September 1, 2017.

Duel', Aleksei. 2011. “Moskvichi stremiatsia v shkoly bez detei migrantov” [“Muscovites flock to schools with no migrant children”], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, May19. https://www.msk.kp.ru/daily/25688.4/892109/ Accessed September 5, 2017.

Ganapol'skii, Matvei. 2011. “Pustit' nel'zia vygnat’. Strana ne mozhet reshit’, gde postavit’ zapiatuiu v voprose trudovykh migrantov, no stavit zhirnuiu tochku na svoikh grazhdanakh’ [“Do/Don’t let them in: the country cannot decide what to do about migrants”], Moskovskii Komsomolets, September 22. http://www.mk.ru/politics/russia/2011/09/21/625814-pustit-nelzya-vyignat.html Accessed September 11, 2017.

Grafova, Lidia. 2009. “Odin obed vmesta trekh” [“One meal instead of three”], Novaia Gazeta, July 8. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2009/07/08/42202-odin-obed-vmesto-treh Accessed November 16, 2017.

Grafova, Lidia. 2010. “Chuzhie—Rakurs” [“Strangers—perspective”], Rossiiskaia Gazeta. Moscow Edition, October 13. ( not available online).

Grekova, Ol'ga. 2007. “My za mif? [“Do we support the myth?”], Moskovskii Komsomolets, September 10.

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http://www.mk.ru/blogs/MK/2007/09/10/russia/311186/ Accessed September 15, 2017.

Il'ichev, Georgii, and Andrei Kolesnikov. 2010. “Anatolii Vishnevskii, Direktor Instituta Demografii Visshei Shkoly Ekonomiki: ‘Nado Delat' Stavku Na Detei Migrantov’” [Anatolii Vishnevskii, Director of the Institute for Demography at the Higher School of Economics: ‘We must invest in migrant children’], Novaia Gazeta, October 22 https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2010/10/22/1011-anatoliy-vishnevskiy-nado- delat-stavku-na-detey-migrantov Accessed September 15, 2017.

Ivshukina, Anna. 2015. “SPCH predlagaet priniat’ siriiskikh bezhentsev” [“SPCH proposes accepting Syrian refugees”], Izvestiia Moscow Edition, September 10. (not available online).

Just, Jiří. 2013a. “Bortsy za chistotu beloi lenty. Ksenofobiei v Rossii bol'ny i intellektualy, i liberaly” [“Fighters for the purity of whiteness. Both intellectuals and liberals suffer from xenophobia in Russia ”], Moskovskii Komsomolets, January 24. http://www.mk.ru/politics/2013/01/23/802311-bortsyi-zachistotu-beloy-lentyi.html Accessed December 1, 2017.

Just, Jiří. 2013b. “Stokgol'mskii sindrom rossiiskogo obshchestva” [“The Stockholm Syndrome of Russian society”], Moskovskii Komsomolets, June 3. (not available online).

Kaftan, Larisa. 2011. “Putin privel religioznyh liderov vo front” [“Putin pushes religious leaders to the front”], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, July 20 https://www.kompravda.eu/daily/25721/2713933/ Accessed December 1, 2017.

Klin, Boris. 2011. “Pravoslavnaia Simfoniia Dlia Detskogo Sada” [“Orthodox symphonia for kindergarten”], Izvestiia (Moscow Edition), January 25. https://iz.ru/news/370452 Accessed November 25, 2017.

Klin, Boris 2010. “Patriarch zastupilsia za priezhikh” [“Patriarch pleads for the newcomers”], Izvestiia (Moscow Edition), December 23. https://iz.ru/news/369573 Accessed November 24, 2017.

Kozlenkovaia, Iuliia. 2013. “Stolitsa mozhet 'perevarit'' ogranichennoe chislo priezzhikh” [“The capital can absorb limited numbers of newcomers”] Izvestiia: Moscow edition, December 24. (not available online)

Lemutkina, Marina. 2013. “Standart uchitelia ne iznasiluet” [“Teachers’ standard does no harm”], Moskovskii Komsomolets, January 21.

233

http://www.mk.ru/social/2013/01/20/800417-standart-uchitelya-neiznasiluet.html Accessed September 4, 2017.

Malai, Elena, and Dmitry Runkevich. 2015. “Pravoslavnym inostrantsam khotiat uprostit’ poluchenie grazhdanstva” [“Simplifying the procedure for acquisition of citizenship for Orthodox Christians”], Izvestiia, September 8. https://iz.ru/news/591095 Accessed September 8, 2017.

Minkin, Aleksandr. 2014. “Molis’, Uzbek!” [“Pray, Uzbek!”], Moskovskii Komsomolets, June 19. http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/06/18/molis-uzbek.html Accessed September 1, 2017.

Mironov, Nikita. 2011. “Migranty peredelyvaiut Moskvu na svoi lad” [“Migrants are changing Moscow along their own lines”], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, August 11. https://www.kompravda.eu/daily/25734.4/2723630/ Accessed November 28, 2017.

Mironov, Nikita. 2012. 'Musul'mane v Mitine khoteli perevospitat' gastarbaiterov [Moslems in Mitino want to re-educate guestworkers]', Komsomol'siaia Pravda, September 22. https://www.msk.kp.ru/daily/25954/2895788/ Accessed September 1, 2017.

n.n. 2006. “Ne vse migranty sil'ny v matematike” [“Not all migrants have good skills in mathematics”], Kommersant, May 17 (not available online).

Ovchinnikov, Aleksei. 2012. “Kak iz araba sdelat' iaroslavtsa?” [How to turn an Arab into a Yaroslavl native?], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, June 26. https://www.kompravda.eu/daily/25905/2861691/ Accessed December 29, 2017.

Pain, Emil. 2011. “Nevol'niki obshchin” [“Captives of the enclaves”], Novaia Gazeta, March 18. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2011/03/17/6454-nevolniki-obschin Accessed November 17, 2017

Riabtsev, Andrei 2006. “Kto meshaet detiam migrantov stat' nastoiachshimi moskvichami?” [“Who prevents the children from becoming genuine Muscovites?”], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, October 4 https://www.kompravda.eu/daily/23785/58177/ Accessed October 4, 2017.

Sapozhnikova, Galina. 2003. “Budut li russkie chtit' koran i est' ris palochkami?” [“Will Russians read the Quran and eat rice with chopsticks?”], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, July 24. (not available online).

Sergeev, Igor. 2007. “Inofon-eto zvuchit klassno” [“Non-Russophone, that sounds great”], Moskovskii Komsomolets, October 16 http://www.mk.ru/editions/daily/article/2007/10/15/75458-inofon-eto-zvuchit- klassno.html Accessed October 1, 2017.

234

Shamburova, Anna. 2006. “Syn za otsa otvechaet” [“The son answers for his father”], Novaia Gazeta. October 9. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2006/10/09/27632-syn-za-ottsa-otvechaet Accessed August 31, 2017.

Sidibe, Pierre. 2011. “Prilivy bez otlivov” [“High tide without low tide”], Rossiiskaia Gazeta (Moscow edition) June 24. (not available online).

Skoibeda, Ul'iana. 2006. “V sude bombist Tikhomorov krestilsia i chital molitvy” [“Terrorist bomber crosses himself, reads prayer in court”], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, August 24. https://www.ufa.kp.ru/daily/23761/56587/ Accessed 21 February 2017.

Sokolov, Sergei. 2010. “Konstantin Romodanovskii: sotsial'nuiu naprazhennost' sozdaiut ne gastarbaitery, a chinovniki” [“Bureaucrats, not guestworkers, cause social unrest”], Novaia Gazeta. December 6. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2010/12/06/374-konstantin-romodanovskiy- sotsialnuyu-napryazhennost-sozdayut-ne-gastarbaytery-a-chinovniki Accessed November 16, 2017.

Steshin, Dmitrii. 2012. “Tolerantnost' po piterskii: Russkomu iazyku obuchim, a vygulivat' baranov po Nevskomu ne dadim!” [“Tolerance the St. Petersburg way: We'll teach you the Russian language, but we won’t let anyone walk their sheep on Nevskii!”], Komsomol’skaia Pravda, November 15. https://www.kompravda.eu/daily/25985.4/2916805/ Accessed December 20, 2017.

Subbotina, Svetlana. 2013. “My vernemsia k nadeleniiu FMS polnomochiiami doznaniia” [“We return toeEndowing the FMS with the power of inquiry”], Izvestiia (Moscow edition), December 24. https://iz.ru/news/563069 Accessed September 15, 2017.

Timofeeva, Ol'ga. 2004. “Valerii Stepanov: ‘U Moskvy po-prezhnemu Russkoe Litso’” [“Valerii Stepanov: ‘Moscow still has a Russian face’”], Izvestiia (Moscow edition), March 25. (not available online)

Tishkov, Valerii. 2006. “Stenogramma press-konferentsii v ‘MK’ predsedatel'ia Komissi Obshchestvennoi palaty po voprosam tolerantnsti i svobody sovesti Valerii Tishkov” [“Report from the Chairman’s Press Conference on questions about tolerance at the public chamber at MK”], Moskovskii Komsomolets, February 14. http://www.mk.ru/editions/daily/article/2006/02/14/186033-stenogramma- presskonferentsii-v-mk.html Accessed September 6, 2017

Tishkov, Valerii. 2012. “Put’ k sebe” [“The road to oneself”], Rossiiskaia Gazeta (Moscow edition), August 24. https://rg.ru/2012/08/24/tishkov.html Accessed September 12, 2017.

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Tsyganov, Oleg. 2010. “Patriotizm, Optimizm, i Edinenie” [“Patriotism, optimism and unity”', Izvestiia, September 30. https://iz.ru/news/366497 Accessed November 24, 2017.

Tsyganov, Oleg, and Aleksandr Karavaev. 2009. “Diaspora za solidarnost’ and pluralism kul'tur” [“Diaspora for solidarity and cultural pluralism”], Izvestiia, December 24. (not available online).

Vedeneeva, Natal'ia. 2013. “Rossiiskie uchenye dali retsept "MK": Kak podruzhit'sia s migrantami” [“Russian researchers instruct MK: How to become friends with the migrants”], Moskovskii Komsomolets, November 12. http://www.mk.ru/social/interview/2013/11/11/943604-rossiyskie-uchenyie-dali- retsept-quotmkquot-kak-podruzhitsya-s-migrantami.html Accessed November 1, 2017.

Volkova, Svetlana. 2013. “Sergeii Sobianin: ‘Moskva—rossiiskii gorod i takim dolzhna ostavat'sia. Ne kitaiskim, ne tadzhikskim, ne uzbekskim’” [“Sergeii Sobianin: ‘Moscow is a Russian city and must remain so: Not Chinese, not Tadzhik, not Uzbek’”], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, May 31. https://www.msk.kp.ru/daily/26084/2987307/ Accessed November 28, 2017.

Zhukovskaia, Iuliia. 2006a. “Budut li v Moskve Migrantskie Kvartaly?” [“Will there be migrant quarters in Moscow?”], Komsomol'skaia Pravda (Moscow edition), March 30. https://www.kompravda.eu/daily/23682/51432/ Accessed November 24, 2017.

Zhukovskaia, Iuliia. 2006b. “Deti migrantov men'she p'iut i koliutsia” [“Children of migrants drink less and have less drug abuse ”], Komsomol'skaia Pravda, March 27. https://www.kompravda.eu/daily/23679.5/51291/ Accessed February 4, 2018.

8.6.2 Presidential Addresses and Articles

Medvedev, Dmitrii. November 5, 2008. “Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskoi Federatsii”, [“Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”], http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/1968 Accessed October 24, 2017.

Medvedev, Dmitrii. November 12, 2009. “Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [“Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”]. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/5979 Accessed November 28, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. December 30, 1999. “Rossiia na rubezhe tysiacheletii” [“Millennium Manifesto”], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 30 December 1999. http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millenium.html Accessed October 24, 2017

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Putin, Vladimir. July 8, 2000. “Poslaniie Federal'nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskoii Federatsii” [“Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”]. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21480 Accessed October 24, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. May 16, 2003. “Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [“Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”], http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21998 Accessed October 26, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. May 26, 2004. “Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [“Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”], http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22494 Accessed October 24, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. April 25, 2005. “Poslaniie Federal'nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskomu Federatsiiu” [“Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”], http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931 Accessed October, 24 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. May 10, 2006. “Poslaniie Federal'nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [“Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”]. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23577/videos Accessed October 24, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. April 26, 2007. “Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [“Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”] http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24203 Accessed October 12, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. January 23, 2012. “Rossiia: natsional'nyi vopros” [“Russia: the National Question”], Nezavisimaia Gazeta. www.ng.ru/politics/2012-01-23/1_national.html Accessed February 17, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. August 24, 2012. “Zasedanie Soveta po mezhnatsional'nym otnosheniiam” [“Meeting of the Council for Interethnic Relations”], http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16292 Accessed October 30, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. December 12, 2012. “Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskoi Federatsii [“Annual Address to the Federal Assembly”]. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17118 Accessed October 24, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. February 19, 2013. “Zasedanie Soveta po Mezhnatsional'nym Otnosheniiam” [“Meeting of Council for Interethnic Relations”] http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17536 Accessed October 26, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. September 19, 2013. “Zasedanie Mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba ‘Valdai’” [“Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club”], http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243 Accessed September 19, 2017.

237

Putin, Vladimir.October 22, 2013. “Zasedanie Soveta po Mezhnatsional'nym Otnosheniiam” [“Meeting of Council for Interethnic Relations”] http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19475 Accessed October 30, 2017. Putin, Vladimir. December 12, 2013. “Poslanie Prezidenta Federal'nomu Sobraniiu” [“Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”], http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19825 Accessed October 29, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. March 18, 2014. “Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [“Address by President of the Russian Federation”]. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 Accessed October 26, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. December 4, 2014. “Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniiu” [“Annual Address to the Federal Assembly”], http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47173 Accessed October 26, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. May 19, 2015. “Sovmestnoe Zasedanie Soveta po Mezhnatsional'nym Otnosheniiam i Soveta po Russkomu iazyku” [“Meeting of Council for Interethnic Relations and the Council of the Russian Language”]. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49491 Accessed October 26, 2017.

Putin, Vladimir. December 3, 2015. “Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniiu Rossiiskoii Federatsii” [“Annual Address to the Federal Assembly”] http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50864 Accessed October 10, 2017.

Legal Documents

Bill of May 5, 2017, “On the Social and Cultural Adaptation and Integration of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation” [ “O Sotsial’noi i kul’turnoi adaptatsii i integratsii inostrannyh grazhdan v Rossiiskoi Federatsii”].

Constitution of the Russian Federation [Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii]. December 12, 1993.

Explanatory Note of April 7, 2014, to the Bill for the Federal Law “On the Social and Cultural Adaptation and Integration of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation” [“Poiasnitel’naia zapiska k proektu federal’nogo zakona “O sotsial’noi i kul’turnoi adaptatsii i integratsii inostrannyh grazhdan v Rossiiskoi Federatsii”].

Federal Law No 1807-1 of October 25, 1991 “On the Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation” [“O iazykakh narodov Rossiiskoi Federatsii”] Federal Law No 3612-1 of October 9, 1992

238

“The Foundations of the Legislation on Culture in the Russian Federation” [“Osnovy zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii o kul’ture”]

Federal Law No 5-F3 of June 14, 1994 “On the Procedure of Publication and Enactment of Federal Constitutional Laws, Federal Laws and Acts of the Houses of the Federal Assembly”[“O poriadke opublikovaniia i vstupleniia v silu federal'nykh konstitutsionnykh zakonov, federal'nykh zakonov, aktov palat Federal'nogo sobraniia”] Federal Law No N7-FЗ of September 8, 1995 “On Non-Commercial Organizations” [“O nekommercheskikh organizatsiiakh”]

Federal Law No 125-F3 of September 26, 1997 “On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” [“O svobode sovesti i o religioznykh obedineniiakh”] Federal Law No 99-F3 of May 24, 1999 “On the State Policy of the Russian Federation towards Compatriots Abroad” [“O gosudarstvennoi politike Rossiiskoi Federatsii v otnoshenii sootechestvennikov za rubezhom”]

Federal Law No 115-FZ of July 25, 2002 “On the Legal Position of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation” [“O pravovom polozhenii inostrannykh grazhdan v Rossiiskoi Federatsii"] .

Federal Law No 179-F3 of July 23, 2010 “On Amending Federal Law No 99-F3 “’On the State Policy of the Russian Federation towards Compatriots Abroad’”[“O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal’nyi zakon ‘O gosudarstvennoi politike Rossiiskoi Federatsii v otnoshenii sootechestvennikov za rubezhom’”]

Federal Law No 273-F3 of December 29, 2012 “On Education in the Russian Federation” [“Ob obrazovanii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii”]

Federal Law N 524-F3 of December 31, 2014 “On Amending Article 27 of the Federal Law ‘On Exit from and Entry into the Russian Federation’” [“O vnesenii izmenenii v statiu 27 Federal'nogo zakona ‘O poriadke vyezda iz Rossiiskoii Federatsii i vezda v Rossiiskuiu Federatsiu’”]

Presidential Decree No 763 of May 23, 1996. “On the Procedure of Publication and Enactment of the Acts of the President of the Russian Federation, of the Government of Russia, and Statutory Legal Acts of the Federal Executive Authorities” [O poriadke opublikaovaniia i vstupleniia v silu aktov Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Pravitelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii i normativnykh pravovykh aktov federal'nykh organov ispolnitel'noi vlasti”]

239

Presidential Decree No 909 of June 15, 1996 “Concept of the State Nationalities Policy of the Russian Federation” [“Kontseptsiia gosudarstvennoi natsional’noi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii”].

Presidential Decree No 1666 of December 19, 2012 “On the Strategy of the State Nationalities Policy of the Russian Federation until 2025” [“O strategii gosudarsvennoi natsional'noi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2025 goda”]

Presidential Decree No 808 of November 24, 2014 “The Foundations of the State Cultural Policy of the Russian Federation” [“Osnovy gosudarstvennoi kul’turnoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii”].

Dictionaries

Ozhegov’s Explanatory Dictionary [Slovar’OzhegovaTolkovyi Russkogo Iazyka]. http://www.ozhegov.org/ Accessed February 1, 2019

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Appendix

“Language”

Izvestiia Дата выпуска: 18.12.2003 Номер выпуска: 231-M (26548) Автор: Заглавие: Владимир ЗОРИН, министр Российской Федерации: Россия заинтересована в мигрантах

Источник: Известия (Москва) (Приложение) Дата выпуска: 27.02.2007 Номер выпуска: 034 (27318) Автор: Николай Дроженко Рубрика: МОСКВА Заглавие: Мосгордума готова претворять в жизнь нацпроекты

Источник: Известия (Москва) Дата выпуска: 05.06.2009 Номер выпуска: 098-M (27869) Автор: Наталья Гранина Заглавие: Директор школы N 824 Татьяна Гузенко: "Сначала армяне преобладали. Потом узбеки. Сейчас киргизы"

Источник: Известия (Москва) Дата выпуска: 09.06.2009 Номер выпуска: 100-M (27871) Автор: Заглавие: "Почему бюджетные деньги тратятся на приезжих?"

Источник: Известия (Москва) Дата выпуска: 24.12.2009 Номер выпуска: 239-M (28010) Автор: Олег ЦЫГАНОВ, Александр КАРАВАЕВ Заглавие: Диаспора за солидарность и плюрализм культур

Источник: ИЗВЕСТИЯ (РОССИЯ) (Москва) Дата выпуска: 02.06.2010 Номер выпуска: 098-M (28113) З аглавие: Москвичи станут нацией Автор: Наталья Гранина

Источник: ИЗВЕСТИЯ (РОССИЯ) (Москва) Дата выпуска: 24.12.2010 Номер выпуска: 242-M (28257) Заглавие: Чернорабочие места

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Источник: ИЗВЕСТИЯ (РОССИЯ) (Москва) Дата выпуска: 29.03.2011 Номер выпуска: 053-M (28314) Заглавие: Статус квот Автор: Светлана Сметанина

Источник: ИЗВЕСТИЯ (РОССИЯ) (Москва) Дата выпуска: 25.04.2011 Номер выпуска: 072-M (28333) Заглавие: Как помочь русскому горю Автор: Лидия Графова, Вячеслав Поставнин

Источник: Известия (московский выпуск) Рубрика: ВСЯ МОСКВА Автор: МАРГАРИТА ВЕРХОВСКАЯ, НАТАЛЬЯ КОРЧМАРЕК Дата выпуска: 30.09.2011 Номер выпуска: 181 Заглавие: Школы готовы тратиться на детей мигрантов

Источник: Известия (московский выпуск) Рубрика: С ПЕРВОЙ ПОЛОСЫ Автор: АННА ПОЛЮХОВИЧ Дата выпуска: 20.10.2011 Номер выпуска: 195 Заглавие: Безъязыкая миграция

Источник: Известия (московский выпуск) Рубрика: ВСЯ МОСКВА Автор: Юлия Синяева Дата выпуска: 18.05.2012 Номер выпуска: 89 Заглавие: Детей мигрантов будут учить по-русски

Источник: Известия (московский выпуск) Рубрика: РОССИЯ-НОВОСТИ Автор: Екатерина Шабанова, Дарья Шипилова Дата выпуска: 26.04.2013 Номер выпуска: 77 Заглавие: В Петербурге внедряют систему SMS-оповещения для мигрантов

Источник: Известия (московский выпуск) Автор: Рубрика: ВСЯ МОСКВА Юлья Козленкова Дата выпуска: 24.12.2013 Номер выпуска: 242 Заглавие: "Столица может "переварить" ограниченное число приезжих"

Источник: Известия (московский выпуск) Рубрика: ВСЯ МОСКВА

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Автор: Анна Семенова, Юлия Козленкова Дата выпуска: 31.01.2014 Номер выпуска: 17 Заглавие: Для мигрантов откроют центр адаптации и трудоустройства

Источник: Известия (московский выпуск) Рубрика: СТОЛИЦЫ Автор: Татьяна Бородина, Мария Шаталова Дата выпуска: 04.03.2014 Номер выпуска: 39 Заглавие: Гастарбайтерам покажут "Я шагаю по Москве" и "Стиляг"

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252

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