Reading Tariq Ramadan: Political Liberalism, Islam, and ‘‘Overlapping Consensus’’ Andrew F. March he interest of Western intellectuals in Islamic political and ethical tradi- tions (predominantly its traditions of warfare, but also of governance, Tsocial order, and gender relations) is now almost matched by our fasci- nation with ‘‘Islam in the West.’’ This interest quite naturally manifests itself in a focus on certain key public figures in European Islam, the single most prominent of which by far is Tariq Ramadan. The fascination with Ramadan is understandable. He is, on the one hand, a scion of political Islam—the grandson of Hasan al-Banna, the Egyptian founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (the wellspring of many of Islamism’s twentieth- century tendencies); and the son of Sa‘id Ramadan, one of the most prominent mid-century figures in the ‘‘Islamist International,’’ comprised of exiles from Muslim countries, local grassroots movements (from the Brotherhood to more radical ‘‘Salafi’’ groups), and the conservative oil monarchies. On the other hand, he is an outspoken advocate of the notion that European Muslims can be both European and Muslim in equal measure. He calls on Muslims to be active and engaged citizens of European countries, faithful to their constitutional systems, yet insists that this can be done without adopting a diluted, ‘‘liberal Islam’’ in matters of social and personal morality. On top of this, Ramadan is telegenic, articulate, multilingual, and charismatic. For a Western audience he is a unique Muslim media figure: neither a radical bogeyman a` la bin Laden or Khomeini (or one of their myriad imitators, such as Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri or even, significantly, Ramadan’s own brother, Hani), nor an outright secular liberal (ex-)Muslim a` la Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Irshad Manji, or Salman Rushdie. Given the current historical and political moment, Ramadan is an exciting and controversial figure; and it was perhaps inevitable that there should emerge a small journalistic and political industry dedicated to speculation on his ulti- 1 mate views or intentions. Underlying the scrutiny of Ramadan’s career and 399 views is not just a concern with whether this particular public intellectual is trustworthy, but a larger concern with whether and how Islam might be rendered ‘‘compatible’’ in the long-term with European conceptions of liberalism, mod- ernity, and social order. Ramadan is indeed an appropriate object of scrutiny for those interested in the placeofIslamintheWest.Hehaswrittenabout the possibility of an Islamic affir- mation of membership in European societies in perhaps the most self-conscious manner of any European Muslim thinker. While situating himself as much as pos- sible in a conservative Islamic legal and theological tradition (his book To Be a European Muslim is tellingly subtitled ‘‘A Study of Islamic Sources in the European Context’’), his treatment of the core matters of forging political community in the conditions of religious and moral diversity reveals a familiarity with the language and long-term concerns of political liberalism. It is less clear, however, of what pre- cise interest Ramadan’s writings ought to be and what should be expected from them. An early journalistic cliche´ pegged Ramadan as the ‘‘Muslim Martin Luther.’’ This awkward attempt to express a desire for an Islamic theology that would allow Muslims to endorse certain aspects of Western-style modernity nonetheless got it exactly wrong. Indeed, the last thing Western liberals ought to wish for is more ‘‘Muslim Martin Luthers’’ on top of the countless self-appointed, iconoclastic, back- to-the-text, literal-minded zealots who have appeared in the footsteps of Ramadan’s own grandfather. What was meant, of course, was that Ramadan might be a poten- tial ‘‘Muslim John Locke’’—that is, a thinker who would use religious and scriptural arguments to formulate a doctrine of religious tolerance and secular government. If this is why political liberals ought to be interested in reading Tariq Rama- dan, does he fit the bill? What exactly is the place of (possibly illiberal) religion in a liberal society, what constitutes a loyal affirmation of citizenship, and what positions cross the boundaries of reasonableness? Further, given that we prefer a single secular public language for deliberation, why should we concern ourselves at all with Islamic theological or juridical polemics? POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND RELIGION Much of the disagreement and controversy over Ramadan’s significance arguably stems not from a disagreement over what he is on record as having asserted or done but from unexamined or unarticulated assumptions about liberal princi- ples and what they demand of Muslims. 400 Andrew F. March Political philosophers often speak of two forms of liberalism: comprehensive liberalism versus political liberalism. Comprehensive liberalism is a way of life, a theory of value, and an epistemology. Comprehensive liberals value rational autonomy, critical scrutiny of tradition, skepticism, and experimentation. They make truth claims for these values and do not seek to disguise their incom- patibility with ways of life based on heteronomous deference to established authority. Comprehensive liberalism is often associated with the worldviews of Voltaire, Kant, J. S. Mill, and (more recently) Joseph Raz. Political liberalism, by contrast, is purely a doctrine of social and political cooper- ation. It seeks to elaborate the most reasonable public conception of justice and citi- zenship for free and equal persons, given the existence of disagreement on the ultimate meaning of life and the epistemological foundation for discovering it. Polit- ical liberals value the right to individual freedom from being coerced to live a certain way based on a certain conception of the good, as well as social solidarity based on mutual recognition and a fair distribution of resources. They also insist on the edu- cation of citizens so that they are aware of their freedoms and rights and of the need to recognize the equal rights of other citizens to these freedoms, but they do not pre- sume to educate citizens into a single worldview or epistemology. Political liberalism defends these terms of citizenship not as ‘‘true’’ but as the most reasonable given the fact of moral pluralism and—importantly—insists that these terms need not contra- dict the aims of most ways of life, particularly religious ones. This doctrine of social cooperation is most explicitly associated with the work of John Rawls (and many other contemporary liberal philosophers), but a tradition of similar thought might also be plausibly traced from John Locke to the decisions of the Warren Court. Many citizens of Western democracies are both comprehensive and political liberals. They value autonomy and critical thinking in their own lives and raise their children in this way, but do not assume that religious fellow citizens need to be taught the truth of these values in schools and other public institutions. Many citizens are comprehensive authoritarians but political liberals. They be- lieve in the truth of a revealed morality and raise their children to obey it, but do not seek to commandeer the state or other coercive authority to impose it on others (or even their own children). Of course, many citizens are not political liberals at all but (to continue to follow the philosophical jargon) ‘‘political per- fectionists’’: they think they know that their metaphysical (religious or secular) beliefs are true and that this alone justifies using public authority to transform society and the consciousness of its members. political liberalism, islam, and ‘‘overlapping consensus’’ 401 Which doctrine best characterizes contemporary European and North American societies? Broadly speaking, a form of political liberalism holds sway, although not usually by that name. Rather, we speak of societies that accommo- date diversity, religious freedom, pluralism, multiculturalism, fairness, and toler- ance. But the broad agreement with political liberalism is unmistakable: the state does not come down on one side or the other of metaphysical questions (Is there a God? Which revelation best conveys His instructions? What is the best way to live?); religious communities are tolerated so long as they respect human and civil rights and are left alone to perform their own exegesis and theology; the state is only permitted to interfere in the lives of individuals and minority com- munities insofar as this is necessary to defend the rights of vulnerable individuals or to protect legitimate public interests (such as security, public health, and so forth); and we expect that certain religious ways of life that do not affirm the pri- macy of individual freedom, scientific rationality, and absolute gender equality 2 will survive. Political liberals are thus faced with the task of identifying what exactly the minimum demands of ‘‘integration’’ are with special reference to Islamic doc- trine and the possible points of principled conflict. Integration into a liberal democratic society involves, I would like to submit, demands of justice and de- 3 mands of citizenship. Demands of justice relate to the broad range of liberal rights and freedoms that all citizens enjoy on an equal basis. There is no doubt that a committed Muslim can find within Islamic legal doctrine plenty of grounds for rejecting liberal conceptions of justice. Muslims are enjoined to ‘‘command the right and forbid the wrong’’; and a long tradition of juridical, political, and