Countering ISIS: One Year Later February 10, 2016 by Dr

Countering ISIS: One Year Later February 10, 2016 By Dr. Denise Natali Da’ish is not a shared priority for regional Executive Summary: On December 3, 2015, The actors; some are benefitting from the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) persistence of Da’ish to advance their sponsored a conference, “Countering ISIS: One political agendas and gain economically. Year Later”. The purpose of the conference was to critically re-assess the assumptions, policies, and  Sectarian divides; geopolitical tensions. strategic objectives of the U.S.-led effort to counter Countering Da’ish efforts are embedded in the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), or regional sectarian and geopolitical tensions Da’ish. The conference examined the continuities that directly affect non-state actors. They and changes in this effort over the past year, to have led to the creation of local proxies that include strategic challenges, regional dynamics, are becoming more politicized and the adaptations in Da’ish financing, messaging, and proliferation of various militias acting as recruitment, and successes and failures in Iraq and renegade vigilantes outside the control of Syria. Over 100 participants attended the event, central governments. including representatives from U.S. government agencies, regional analysts, practitioners, scholars,  Da’ish Enablers. While Da’ish financing and think tank experts who specialize on Iraq, Syria, has been weakened its messaging and counter-terrorism, and Middle Eastern affairs. recruitment continues to thrive. The visa waiver program is a threat to U.S. homeland Key Findings: security due to the volume of Europeans who travel to Syria to fight. Also, as Da’ish  Assumptions, means, and strategic end state. power declines in Iraq and Syria it may seek U.S. assumptions about Da’ish do not to emphasize power elsewhere, such as in necessarily support the means and/or the Sinai and Libya. Concern remains for strategic end state to defeat Da’ish. The use the next potential Da’ish iteration and of terms, degrading, defeating, and/or possible re-unification with al-Qaeda. destroying Da’ish interchangeably undermines clarity of objectives.  Centers of Gravity: Iraq and Syria. Da’ish is a symptom of pre-existing conflicts and  Regional partners: Regional and local instability in Iraq and Syria, which have partners have distinct threat perceptions and become more complex over time. A sound political objectives that are not necessarily countering Da’ish strategy ultimately aligned with U.S. strategic aims. Defeating requires a political solution that includes stabilizing weak states and their borders.

Reassessing assumptions, means, and end-states. The approach differed in Syria, which has been Since the creation of the U.S.-led Global Coalition mired in a civil war since 2011. In contrast to Iraq, to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant the U.S does not regard the regime of Bashar al- in December 2014, U.S. objectives have been to Assad as a local partner. It also initially rejected the defeat Da’ish, preserve a unified, federal, and stable train and equip program for a moderate opposition Iraqi state, and support a political transition in Syria force. Instead, the U.S. has focused on a negotiated that de-escalates the war. These objectives, which end to the Syrian civil war and Assad regime that are part of a broader aim to achieve regional would maintain state institutions. This approach, stability, are based on four key assumptions; 1) pursued through a series of conferences in Geneva Da’ish is a global organization with Iraq and Syria and Vienna, is based on the assumption that if as the center of gravity; defeats in Iraq and Syria Assad willingly steps aside the Syrian army and will make it inviable for it to maintain the nationalist rebels would join forces against Da’ish. organization globally; 2) the campaign needs to rely With Iran and Russia now part of the negotiations on and enable local partners; 3) defeating Da’ish alongside key regional actors, the U.S. hopes to ultimately requires a political solution in Iraq and deliver Assad to the political transition process as Syria; and 4) defeating Da’ish will be a multi- outlined by the 2012 Geneva Agreement. Over the faceted and multi-year campaign. past year, it has also increased Coalition support to local partners, namely the Kurdish People’s U.S. strategy has been designed around nine lines of Protection Units (YPG) and smaller groups of effort (LOEs) that target key Da’ish enablers and Christian and Sunni Arab fighters as part of the sources of state instability. They include; 1) Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) alliance. supporting effective governance in Iraq; 2) denying Da’ish safe-havens; 3) building partner capacity; 4) Should the U.S. Do More? The U.S has realized enhancing intelligence collection on Da’ish; 5) some progress in its countering Da’ish efforts thus disrupting Da’ish finances; 6) exposing the true far. It has assembled a 65-member Coalition, re- nature of Da’ish; 7) disrupting the flow of foreign taken about twenty-five to forty percent of Da’ish fighters; 8) protecting the homeland; and 9) territories, helped reduce Da’ish oil revenues, humanitarian support.1 targeted Da’ish leadership, and enhanced intelligence and information sharing with regional LOEs have been tailored to the distinct political and European partners on Da’ish operations. Some opportunities and constraints in Iraq and Syria. The participants claim that the U.S. has also successfully U.S. has pursued an Iraq-first approach given the enhanced Iraqi government capabilities, as well as availability of reliable partners on the ground; a local partners fighting Da’ish in Iraq and Syria. viable Iraqi government under Prime Minister About 90 percent of displaced families have Haidar al-Abadi and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and returned to Da’ish-free territories in parts of Iraq Kurdish peshmerga forces. The assumed was that and northeastern Syria. these local partners could effectively dislodge Da’ish strongholds with Coalition support while Still, some participants argued that the U.S. has addressing the underlying political roots of Da’ish missed important opportunities to defeat Da’ish. A in Iraq: Sunni Arab disfranchisement. key criticism is the lack of clarity in projecting U.S. objectives. Using the terms degrade, destroy, and

1 “FACT SHEET: The Administration’s Strategy to Counter the Islamic state eventually defeat Da’ish interchangeably is of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Updated FY2015 Overseas Contingency ambiguous since they are different and distinct end Operations Request”, November 7, 2014. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/07/fact-sheet- states. One expert stated that current efforts are not administration-s-strategy-counter-islamic-state-iraq-and-leva) aimed at destroying Da’ish but containing it. The

decision not to engage in a full war effort but rather, political balance with the Iraqi government and a multi-year campaign has resulted in a war of further embolden Iranian-backed Shi’a militias and attrition; holding Da’ish down, degrading it, and those seeking to undermine Prime Minister Abadi. then “assuming that something positive will occur.” An enlarged U.S. footprint would also act as a During the first eighteen months the U.S. employed substitute for supporting and enabling local partners limited tactics in the absence of advisors forward who need the capabilities to defend and secure their deployed, use of Army fire, artillery, and Apache own territories. Moreover, there is little U.S. helicopters that could have effectively targeted domestic support for increased military engagement Da’ish. Another criticism is that the military plan to and uncertainty in its sustainability over the long degrade Da’ish does not coincide with necessary term. Any effort to deepen engagement, political accommodations in Iraq and Syria. particularly after the Paris terrorist attacks in Despite successes in ridding Da’ish safe havens in November 2015, should be to rally other Coalition Iraq and the return of families to their homes, partners to do more, including Europe and Baghdad has been unable to fully take back elsewhere. population centers, even in Tikrit and Beiji. Syria has also proven to be resilient to countering Da’ish Regional Partners: Opportunities or Obstacles? efforts. One expert lamented, “We had a wish and a Coalition partners and regional states do not have a prayer for good faith negotiations. Instead, the way shared priority to defeat Da’ish. One participant in which chemical red-line crisis was handled remarked that “Da’ish is the number three or four encouraged some very bad actors to think they problem for several states. It is the number one could act with absolute impunity.” problem for no one.” Rather, regional political priorities are based on domestic security concerns, Some participants called for a shift in U.S. strategy, sectarianism, and geopolitical interests that take particularly greater military engagement. “Without precedence over or co-exist with Da’ish threats. the mindset of all-out war the only result will be to Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia are also continue mowing the grass to manage this conflict, benefitting from the weak and hyper-fragmented and not to accomplish anything.” One proposal is to Iraqi and Syrian states by supporting proxy groups put U.S. troops on the ground in numbers beyond to entrench their interests. One expert stated that Special Forces. Another is to create a “coalition of “Iraq has become a security client state for Iran and the willing” - an international force comprised of may be increasingly for Russia because of the largely vetted, well-trained and equipped people intelligence and military cooperation against ISIS.” from the region that involves an international Similarly, Turkey has penetrated northern Iraq in component. Experts also argued that “raiding does the attempt to create a Sunni Muslim sphere of not work, as it failed to draw out al-Qaeda in influence, control Mosul and its oil resources, and Falluja.” check the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK).

Others questioned the need to “do more” and the These interventions have created or reinforced implications on stability and sustainability. Time geopolitical tensions and alliances between states. and political will is a central factor. Greater military Russian president Vladimir Putin visited Iran for the engagement demands that the U.S. inject a level of first time in a decade, Moscow berated Turkey in urgency and mobilize others to join the fight for the the aftermath of the SU 24 shoot-down, and Russia long-term while not letting Da’ish gain momentum. and Israel are cooperating to de-conflict airspace. The U.S also cannot lose the strategic consent of Changing regional dynamics also have created new Baghdad to engage in activities in Iraq. Large-scale opportunities and obstacles to defeating Da’ish in U.S. forces in Iraq would risk damaging the delicate

Iraq and Syria, most importantly from Turkey and problem. This relationship and the prospects for an Russia. Ankara-PYD entente can change, although it depends upon trans-border Kurdish and internal Turkey’s Turnaround: How Far? Since July 2015 Turkey-PKK dynamics. The Turkish government is Turkey has increased its support for the anti-Da’ish likely to continue its bombing campaign against the campaign to include tightening its border with Syria PKK in the near future as a means of bringing the and permitting the use of its Incirlik air base to PKK to the negotiating table from a position of launch Coalition airstrikes.2 The positive effects of weakness. Turkey’s engagement are reflected in recent Da’ish propaganda, which now states that it does not trust Russian Red Lines and End Games. Russia’s Turkey and that foreign fighters should adjust their military intervention in Syria in September 2015 is route, avoid the Istanbul airport, and be aware of the first time since the Cold War that Moscow has Turkish intelligence. Da’ish has also increased its deployed a substantial force far outside areas of the recruitment efforts in Turkey to include producing Soviet Union. The ability of Russia to penetrate high quality videos and translating Salafi texts into Syria so robustly is not surprising. According to Turkish and Kurdish.3 one expert, “Russia does not have a strategy. It has strategic goals. It pursues them by primarily seeking Turkey’s current challenge is not only to seal and opportunities rather than developing clear plans.” monitor its geographically complex 500-mile Syrian border but also to break up illegal and smuggling The Da’ish threat also represents a major part of networks that have benefited from its lax border Russia’s domestic security concerns; regime policy. Turkey was criticized for not doing more to perpetuation. Russia is concerned by the rise of close its border to Da’ish fighters and other radical extremist Sunni Islam and the Sunni export of terror jihadists. One expert stated, “Its [Turkey] military to Russia; about eight percent of Russia’s is infantry-based and ground-centric. It could seal population, or between 15 and 18 million people, off the border if the government decided to, but it are Sunni Muslim. These demographics coexist has not decided to fully do so.” with an ongoing insurgency in Dagastan and the migration of many Chechens to Syria since the civil Ankara remains preoccupied with domestic PKK war commenced in 2011. Russian president security concerns, which drives its perceptions and Valdimir Putin emphasized this threat in a public policies in Syria. Turkey is especially sensitive to statement, “I have 2,000 Russian militants in ISIS the PKK affiliate, the Democratic Union Party and I have to deal with them.” Russia’s concern (PYD) in Syria and the nature of the U.S-PYD with radical Islam coexists with other pressures, alliance in fighting Da’ish. This concern has such as the collapse of oil prices, inflation of the increased as the PYD expands territorial control and ruble, sanctions against Russia after Crimea, and the gains semi-legitimacy abroad. Conversely, the economic fallout of closing off exports to Turkey. PYD’s view of Turkey depends entirely on Ankara’s resolution of the PKK and Kurdish

2 Tucker, Patrick and Marcus Weisgerber. “Turkey Opens Key Airbases for US Strikes On ISIS”, Defense One, July 23, 2015. http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/07/turkey-opens-key-air-base-us- strikes-isis/118443/

3 Demir, Hilmi and Selim Koru. “The Islamic State’s Plans for Turkey”, War on the Rocks, January 18, 2016. http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/the-islamic-states-plans-for-turkey/

Source: http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Airstrikes%2029%20JAN- %2007%20FEB%20%20%281%29.pdf.

Russia also has regional security interests. It seeks awe effect’ to emphasize Russia capabilities, to secure and protect Tartus, its only base in Syria, including precision-guided munitions and Caliber which serves as a bridge to Iran that gets equity missiles from the Caspian Sea. One expert argued through Hezbollah in Lebanon. Additionally, Putin that the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile system has red lines that he clearly indicated as early as deployment is “strategically very troubling because 2012, the most important of which was the fall of it can reach deep into Turkey, Israel, and the the Assad regime, especially if induced by outside Mediterranean Sea, which changes the security forces. According to one expert, “Russia may also equation in the region.” Another concern is want to poke the eye of the U.S. and the West and Russia’s reactions, which are likely to be show that Moscow has engaged where the U.S. has asymmetrical and aimed at hurting Turkey where not and will not.” Ankara will not expect it. One likely way is through the Kurds, and specifically by Equally important is the manner in which Russia strengthening the capabilities of the PKK and its has engaged in Syria. It employed a ‘shock and PYD affiliate.

What are Moscow’s end games in Syria? themselves, and negotiating a political solution Moscow’s engagement in Syria reflects a “series of whereby Russia becomes a protector of useful end games from best to worst”, none of which are Syria, including its gas fields and shores of the likely to induce Assad to step down or to sell out Mediterranean. These options are important Assad or his inner circle. Politically, Russia’s because they indicate that the U.S. will not optimal goal is to reform the Syrian state and bring necessarily face one end game in Syria, but several the status quo back to 2011; a re-centralized end games. government in Damascus with a strong role played by the Syrian army that can regain control of the Others cautioned against over-determining Russian entirety of territories. In this scenario, Russia could capabilities. Russia could fall into its own Syrian discuss the role of Assad, although it would prefer quagmire that affects its willingness to engage to keep him for reasons that have nothing to do with against the Assad regime. One participant stated Syria. Rather, Putin can use Assad to reinforce the that the “Russians have hit a hornets’ nest in Syria; notion that he never lets down his allies and does it is not going as cleanly as they hoped could ease not accept regime change. Russia’s attempts to Assad out.” Although months of heavy Russian “give a second life to Assad’s regime” may include bombing have helped to reverse rebel gains made forcing Damascus to have quick legislative last year and tipped the war in Assad’s favor, the elections in the following six months and to form a attempt to retake Aleppo has been a fiasco. Even if national unity government with some ‘pseudo- Assad gains the upper hand, Russia would not opponents’. Putin is also unlikely to sell out Assad support ousting the Ba’athist regime, which is a because he opposes what Moscow regards as U.S. Russian pillar of stability not just for the Alawites democratization and “regime change jihad” that but for the Christian Orthodox community. needs to be countered before it arrives on the Kremlin’s doorstep. Sectarian and geopolitical dynamics. The effort to counter Da’ish has become embedded in sectarian Russia may also have to accept a “Plan B”, which and geopolitical tensions. Regional states are could be to protect the contours of what is now aligned along a Sunni and Shi’a divide, although referred to as “useful Syria” - the borders that one that is also fragmented by different Islamic stretch from Latakia in the north, through Jabal beliefs, domestic security priorities, and economic Akkrad, and close to Homs and Aleppo. In this alliances. For instance, Turkey may seek to create a scenario, Russia can check the Syrian opposition Sunni Muslim sphere of influence and check Iran, and enable Assad to hold on until next year, after a but its regional policies differ from those of Saudi change in the U.S. administration or shift in global Arabia. Ankara does not have Riyadh’s financial conditions. In doing so Putin could be planning a muscle, has sympathies with the Muslim “diplomatic coup”; forcing the hand of Western Brotherhood, which it shares with Qatar, and powers to choose the lesser of two evils, Assad or prioritizes controlling the PKK. Turkey also Da’ish, which could result in a U.S.-Russian maintains important energy and commercial ties coalition against Da’ish. Putin’s military campaign with Iran that may increase with the lifting of is consistent with this approach of creating a sanctions, contrary to the cold war between Riyadh situation whereby the choice is between “the barrel and Tehran. bomber and Baghdadi”, which would be a humiliation for the U.S but “the ultimate brass ring” Nor does Iran act or speak with one voice. for Putin. Further, Russia may have a “Plan B According to one participant, reactions inside Iran premium”: taking territory in hold, freezing the to the nuclear agreement, Da’ish, and Iranian conflict, waiting for adversaries to exhaust President Rouhani’s domestic politics is a

“complete replay of the Khatemi era”. While been active for many years, including the brief progress is occurring on one side of the regime, presidency of Muslim Brotherhood leader there is a complete retreat from other aspects, which Mohamed Morsi in 2012, but do not want an partly explains the penetration of the Islamic Islamic state. Similarly, unlike Salafists in Saudi Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iraq and Arabia, Salafists in Lebanon oppose an Islamic state Syria. Given the absence of a single coherent but want Sunni Islam to be considered as a form of strategy in Iran, it is very possible that Tehran governance within the Lebanese state structure. negotiates with Sunni Muslim extremists, including These countries, which were staunchly secular and Da’ish, which has been demonstrated by Iran’s authoritarian for decades, are also negotiating the activity in Afghanistan. One expert argued that degree of Islamic tradition that will influence “Iran sees Iraq and Syria as a multi-playing field; governance. there are certain areas that can be captured indefinitely while other areas will be outside Iran’s Another response to the evolution of Sunni Islam is control”. One of Tehran’s key concerns is how to the forceful development of Shi’a militias. In Iraq create some sort of Shi’a safe zone that ensures some of these militias are supported by the IRGC their safe passage for years to come. while others are part of the Iraqi government’s popular mobilization units (PMUs) that formed after Local sectarian dynamics. Geopolitical and the fatwa issued by Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani sectarian power struggles have directly affected in Iraq in 2014, which called for armed engagement non-state actors. Local Salafists have become against Da’ish.4 Like Salafists, Shi’a militias are politically engaged because they believe that state largely but not solely driven by ideology and rivalry has forced them to enter the political arena, religion. Although Sistani’s fatwa clearly called for despite the fact that political activism is anti-thetical all Iraqis to combat Da’ish, only the Shi’a initially to traditional Salafist ideology. Local Salafist responded. The result has been the creation of behavior also has a profound religious and various militias acting essentially as renegade ideological dimension that is tied to how people vigilantes outside the control of the Iraqi identify as Muslims and “the other” in Arab government and the Shi’a religious establishment, societies. Most non-violent Salafists in Lebanon, or marja’iyya and controlled by the IRGC. Egypt, Iraq, and Syria traditionally believe in Although the Shi’a militias state that they will quietism and pursuing dawa, or the call to Islam on capture the lands and return them to displaced Sunni a popular level. Yet they regard Iran as the rising Arab populations, in many instances they have power in the Middle East that will not only invade taken over towns and ransacked Sunni Arab homes. and take over Arab lands, but extinguish the Sunni In other instances such as Ramadi, PMUs have not sect. Their new activism has translated into entered or taken Sunni Arab territories, which has developing political parties and more recently, resulted in more accommodating relations. About entering social media space. For instance, one 40,000 Sunni Arab fighters have also joined or are Salafist with twelve million Twitter followers prepared to join the PMUs within the ISF, although “tweets daily against the Shi’a and has greatly as distinct Sunni Arab forces. influenced public opinion.”

Activist Salafism also reflects contestations within the Sunni Muslim community that vary across states. According to one expert, “many Sunni Muslims, including Salafists, do not support Da’ish 4 This type of fatwa is unprecedented in Shi’a Islam beyond Ayatollah and are tweeting against it.” In Egypt, Salafists have Khomeini’s call for Iranians to take arms against Iraq in 1980 at the outset of the Iran-Iraq war.

Tweet from a suspended Da’ish Twitter account showing Da’ish doctors treating Muslims in Manbij in Aleppo Governorate, Syria. Source: http://www.memri.org/images/big_report/image/24973.jpg.

Da’ish Enablers. Da’ish capabilities have more than al-Qaeda. Its message is “al weakened in some areas and strengthened in others. Qaeda is doing nothing and we have These shifts are tied to three key enablers; social definitively eclipsed them.” media, foreign fighters, and finance. Da’ish propaganda has three non-distinct  Social Media. Da’ish social messaging and phases; strength, governance, and propaganda efforts are essential to expansion. It emphasizes each of these convincing groups to join or at least to not components as separate messages that are oppose it. Messaging aims to intimidate part of a broader strategy. The message of foes, attract foreign fighters, and aid Da’ish strength is depicted through Da’ish brutality expansion efforts in places like the Sinai and and demonstrated through open social media Libya, particularly as Da’ish tries to become sources that show beheadings and men a truly global organization. Da’ish is also burning alive or drowning in a swimming very technologically proficient. It pool. It is not just about brutality itself but understands social media, can produce a projecting the organization’s strength. For good video, generates excitement, and has instance, Da’ish has effectively used its solid networks to distribute its material - far social media dexterity through videos of

convoys and flags on government buildings in 2015 is majoritarian pro-Da’ish or pro- to convince the Western media that it Jabhat al-Nusra. Additionally, three sons of controlled the Libyan city of Deria, when in members of parliament (MP) in Jordan who fact it did not. Da’ish also courted Boko are normally under control and very loyal to Haram to show it had a strong Africa the kingdom died fighting for either Da’ish presence and that the costs of defecting or Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. would not be too large. Da’ish may be shifting its strategy in Additionally, Da’ish emphasizes that it has a another sense. As its power declines in Iraq functioning society. Alongside the and Syria it may seek to emphasize power beheadings is a focus on governing elsewhere, such as in the Sinai and Libya, territories. Its social media emphasizes a which affirms the strength phase. This kids’ day in Raqqa with big blow-up slides strategy has created challenges and and bouncy castles, a grand opening at a weaknesses for Da’ish. It has raised the luxury hotel, or Da’ish garbage men criteria for support; recruits have to believe cleaning the streets. Da’ish shows stores that genocide, beheadings, torture, and with wheat, bread and culturally appropriate sexual slavery are all good, which may be foods that cater to European fighters. The beyond what Da’ish followers or potential point is to show “that they have it all.” followers can bear. Also, a narrative based on strength is reversible; Da’ish has put Da’ish is now in an expansion phase. It has itself in a position where it can undermine made it very clear that it aims to re-establish their own legitimacy. the boundaries of the caliphate as it used to exist, and that it has to keep on expanding. Foreign Fighters. Da’ish has drawn on Da’ish has attempted to project its growth foreign fighters from over 120 countries. It through affiliate organizations and alliances continues to tap into and manipulate a sense within or outside their provinces. Its pace of of disaffection and ideology that is attacks abroad is now increasing, which mobilizing people to global jihad. A recent indicates that the November 2015 Paris study of Western foreign fighters that have attacks that killed 129 people were not gone to Syria indicates several common necessarily a shift in strategy. Rather, characteristics: female, young, and active Da’ish has been telegraphing its desire to online, particularly American fighters.6 attack the west for well over a year, even Western Da’ish supporters post assiduously after the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in on jihadi websites and deal directly with January 2015.5 Da’ish in Turkey and Syria. One out of three of these Western foreign fighters has Other worrying trends are in Jordan, a also had previous familial connection to politically and socially conservative country, jihad, whether through relatives currently where Da’ish has gained popularity in areas fighting in Syria or Iraq, or through that are not supposed to be Islamized. For marriage. example, the town of the Jordanian pilot who was burned and assassinated by Da’ish 6 The study is based on 474 individuals from 25 countries. Women are represented in unprecedented numbers, as compared to the Afghan and 5 Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who was the leader of the Paris attacks, was in Bosnian jihad, where women fighters were either non-existent or very close to Belgium at the time and managed to escape to Syria, evading French security zero. The average age is 25. services.

Source: http://static1.businessinsider.com/image/559d1e75ecad04715f42a3ba-1057-681/screenshot%202015-07-08%2008.56.01.png.

One problem with assessing foreign fighters with as much as 80 having gone to fight in is tracing their locations due to lack of Syria. accurate information. Of the Western fighters who have gone to Syria or Iraq, a What does this mean for U.S. homeland few are in government custody, half are security? The threat to the United States dead, and a significant number are still at from returning foreign fighters is very low, large. Many fighters have indicated that and likely manageable.7 Da’ish-inspired their path to Syria was through Turkey, bombings in the U.S. remain a serious although half have given no indication of concern, although the U.S. is protected by their route. two important factors, geography and the small volume of people returning. The Identifying foreign fighters is another threat of returning fighters is higher in challenge. One expert surmised that of the Europe. estimated 25,000 foreign fighters in Da’ish, Interpol has the names of about 5,000 people; the remaining have not been identified. This challenge is further 7 There are only two cases publicly known of foreign fighters returning from complicated by the distant geography of Syria to the United States. One case is the Floridian Moner Abu Salha, who Da’ish recruits, which extend as far as came back to Florida after training in Syria, tried to recruit a number of people in Florida, and then went back to Syria and conducted a suicide attack. This Trinidad and Tobago, a small island nation does not, however, suggest that Jabhat al-Nusra was interested in directing with a population of one million. Trinidad him to attack the United States. Rather, it indicates that it used him as cannon fodder on the frontlines in Syria. The second case involved a man called Abu and Tobago have 43 proven foreign fighters, Rahman Muhammad, who was also allegedly recruited by Jabhat al-Nusra and not by Da’ish.

The real problem for U.S. homeland security international sanctions during the 1990s. is the visa waiver program due to the Da’ish also continues to raise money from volume of Europeans who travel to Syria to donors and through social media well fight. Another potential threat is the next beyond Iraq and Syria. iteration of Da’ish, which could represent a merging with al-Qaeda again. At present, Still, the Da’ish model cannot succeed in the the differences between Da’ish and al-Qaeda long run because it is not reliant on outside are not about aims but to some degree about sources, but internal revenue flows. tactics, and mostly about personalities. One Although Da’ish initially received expert argued that “this split [between indiscriminate Gulf donations to “Sunni Da’ish and al-Qaeda] is unlikely to be groups against Assad” either by direct permanent.” The distinctions between contribution or predation of fellow groups. Da’ish and other iterations also have This external funding is now minimal, if it implications for wider Salafi jihadi exists at all. constellations; who is going to govern the Islamic world, the Sunni Islamic leadership Centers of Gravity: Syria and Iraq. Defeating framework, and what that future looks like.8 Da’ish and stabilizing Syria and Iraq demands Da’ish is part of a larger phenomenon that differentiating the symptoms from the includes an al-Qaeda part of the equation, manifestations of the problem. A key question is and a rebranding that makes them very whether Syria and Iraq are unstable because of dangerous. Da’ish or whether Da’ish can function because Syria and Iraq are unstable. One expert argued that Finance. Da’ish behaves as a criminal state Da’ish is a symptom of pre-existing conflicts and where there is a convergence of terrorism instability in Iraq and Syria. Unless these political and crime. As long as Da’ish controls problems are resolved, at least in part, then they will territories that are extremely resource rich continue to “toss up ISIS, and sons of ISIS, and within weak states, its revenues will derive grandsons of ISIS, and great-grandsons of ISIS until from criminality. Coalition forces have there’s political stability there.” dramatically attacked parts of the oil infrastructure in Iraq and Syria controlled by Consequently, military force and traditional Da’ish; however, the main source of revenue counter-terrorism strategy have important is extortion and taxation. Da’ish revenue limitations. Targeting Da’ish leaders and assets networks are deeply embedded in the local may assist in garnering intelligence and cause economies and society that thrive from the Da’ish temporary setbacks, but it does not address weak Iraqi and Syria states, which makes the political roots of Da’ish, which include direct Coalition targeting problematic, if not stabilizing weak states and their borders. Da’ish unlikely. Most of these networks are based drivers have also shifted and become more complex on the same smuggling routes used by over time. They now involve dynamics between the Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athists to evade Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shi’a militias, and Turkey as they affect expanded territories, demographic 8 Lynch, Thomas. III. “ISIS as Icarus? Assessing the Extent of the Islamic changes, and control of resources. State Threat Beyond Iraq and Syria”, Wilson Center, October 2015. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/isis-icarus-assessing-the-extent-the- islamic-state-threat-beyond-iraq-and-syria

Source: http://warincontext.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/img128.jpg.

Syria. Syria is the “low-hanging fruit” for Da’ish, function separately from one another, although they which controls about 50-60 percent of the country’s are considered part of ‘Rojava’. The southern front, land mass. Unlike Iraq, Da’ish is an imposed which includes the stretch of Da’ish-free territories presence in Syria that does not have roots. Most around the provinces of Daraa, Quneitra, and Syrians despise Da’ish but genuinely like Jabhat al- Suwayda, is becoming more autonomous over time, Nusra, which remains a significant problem. The and monitored by Jordanian and Israeli intelligence Da’ish threat is also superimposed over an groups. The deserted center and mainland of Syria increasingly hyper-fragmented state, which affects is being fought between Da’ish and non-Da’ish how and where Da’ish can survive, and how to rebel groups. Defeating Da’ish in eastern Syria, think about stabilizing Syria after its defeat. Rather therefore, does not require a political settlement in than an Assad Syria and a Da’ish Syria fighting western Syria. each other, the country has several parts fighting each other in a multi-front war with competing Defeating Da’ish in Syria remains stuck on the issue aims. of Assad. The political issue is not whether Assad should leave power, but when and how he should be For instance, Syrian Kurds are benefitting from deposed. Some participants prioritize defeating Coalition support and Russian engagement to not Da’ish first and turning Damascus into a counter- only expel Da’ish, but to expand their territories and terrorism partner, alongside Russia. Others insist carve out an enclave between three main regions that as long as Assad is in power, Damascus cannot they call ‘Rojava’; Hasakah (the Jazira region), be a partner in the fight Da’ish. These issues are a Kobane, and west Jabal Amel. These regions key part of the Vienna conferences that have

reaffirmed the Geneva communique as the basis for who do not prioritize defeating Da’ish but rather, political settlement in Syria and which agreed to expanding territories and remaining strategically work towards a U.N.-supervised election and significant. From the outset, Kurdish forces that nationwide ceasefire. should have unified and partnered to defeat Da’ish have been more concerned with the political Yet the Vienna process is strongly criticized for arrangements after Da’ish. back-peddling on Assad’s departure. Sectarian and political divisions among participants and For instance, since the anti-Da’ish campaign opposition groups continues to frustrate decision- commenced, Kurdish power struggles have making, much the way they did with previous exacerbated as different groups seek weapons, meetings in Geneva. For instance, Jordan is leading legitimacy, and external support. The main tensions one commission to devise a list of local participants - which existed decades before the Da’ish onslaught to attend the conference. This effort includes - are between Ma’sud Barzani’s Kurdistan determining which rebel groups are jihadists, non- Democratic Party (KDP), the main power holder jihadists, and radical jihadists, and is being and recipient of military support to the Kurdistan pressured by Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Regional Government (KRG) and the PKK, whose PYG militia are fighting Da’ish in Syria and Iraqi According to some experts, the Vienna process also Kurdistan. Within these two main divisions are lacks real “diplomatic steam” and does not other Kurdish peshmerga and groups seeking to correspond with changing political realities. Despite counter Barzani and PKK power. the failure to train and equip a moderate opposition and increased Russian military engagement, the Kurdish territorial gains have also instigated or U.S. continues to affirm the same 2012 formula that reinforced pre-existing disputes between aims to strengthen the moderate opposition in Syria communities. In northern Iraq’s disputed territories, and pressure the Assad regime to force a political which have become Da’ish battlegrounds, armed solution. One participant opined, “…there is no conflicts have occurred between Shi’a militias more moderate opposition, Da’ish [ISIS] is supported by Iran and the Kurdish peshmerga, who controlling half of the country, and we are no more have pushed the notional ‘green line’ south into talking about a political solution, at least from the Sunni Arab and Shi’a Turcoman territories. In same nature.” The fear is that the Syrian conflict clearing Da’ish territories, Kurdish peshmerga and will become a second Israeli-Palestinian conflict in some PMUs have also retaliated against Sunni the region, and that the U.S. will have a “Geneva 1, Arabs, deepening local grievances and preventing Geneva 2, and Vienna 1, Vienna 2…” without any the types of negotiated political settlements that are real resolution. needed to defeat Da’ish.

Iraq. Like Syria, the Da’ish threat has been The Shi’a majority is also deeply divided and superimposed over a hyper-fragmented and weak preventing Sunni and Shi’a Arab reconciliation. Iraqi state whereby groups are vying for their own Internal power struggles run deep between two territories, revenues, and resources. It is a symptom strong camps within Abad’s Dawa party and the of Sunni Arab grievances and distinct local State of Law Coalition (SOL).9 The first camp is led dynamics that demand a negotiated settlement between the Iraqi government and Sunni Arab 9 “State of Law Coalition”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 27, 2009. populations. The persistence of Da’ish in Iraq also http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-iq/dv/d- reflects U.S. mirror imaging and miscalculating the iq20091202_05_/d-iq20091202_05_en.pdf. State of Law was created by former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki for the 2009 Iraqi parliamentary capabilities and interests of its Kurdish partners, elections in the attempt to attract a broad spectrum of Iraqis. While failing to gain support from major Shi’a groups State of Law did attract some smaller

by Prime Minister Abadi, which includes Muqtada Most Sunni Arab Iraqi leaders want inclusive al-Sadar and Ammar al-Hakim, and the parties and governance and different forms of local and constituencies they bring with them. The second is regional autonomy with minimal interference from headed by former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, Baghdad. They also lack a shared political and includes Iranian-backed groups and militias to objective and do not want to be under the control of include the Badr Corps and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq fellow Sunni Arabs. Some seek an arrangement (AAH). Abadi may be supported by the west, but similar to the relationship between the Kurdistan he is considered weak and ineffective inside Iraq, Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad to which has permitted the second group of Iranian- include control over their own resources, revenues, backed militias and their party leaders to maintain and security. Others seek greater autonomy and a influence.10 Even support from Ayatollah Sistani confederation with Anbar, Ninewah and Salahiddin. has wavered with Abadi’s inability to enact his Still others want a newly configured Ninewah reform package. province but challenge the notion of a distinct Sunni Arab region, arguing instead for a province based Sunni fragmentation and incompatibility. Iraq Sunni on Sunni Arabs and minority groups. Sunni Arabs Arab and Sunni Turcoman communities are also in Anbar want greater local authorities but under a becoming more fragmented over time. Some are strong Iraqi government. As a result of these allied with the Iraqi government while others are divisions, it is unlikely that a single or strong Sunni opposed to Baghdad politically, although not Arab region, or a ‘Sunnistan’ will emerge in the necessarily in terms of armed opposition. Still future. Sunni Arab demands are also totally others are engaged in armed resistance. All Sunni incompatible with the aims of Iraqi Kurds, who groups are opposed to one another and are have expanded into traditionally Sunni territories. competing for political leadership after Da’ish. This competition reflects the fading of traditional Implications for U.S. policy. Since commencing its Sunni Arab political leadership, mainly due to the war against Da’ish in 2014, the U.S. has realized loss of credibility in post-Saddam Iraq and progress and some successes. To continue this displacement from their homes. More than half of momentum it needs to reassess its initial Sunni Arab Iraq is dispossessed and living as assumptions, ways and means, and strategic end- refugees or residing inside their territories that have states to ultimate defeat Da’ish. Policy options become wastelands. These power struggles also include: reflect the fact that about half of the Sunni Arab community does not support its own leadership in  Intensify pressures against Da’ish in Iraq the Iraqi Parliament and provincial governance, and Syria. The U.S. and Coalition should leaving the Sunni community to seek new leaders intensify pressures against Da’ish on that are more radicalized. multiple fronts. This effort can include adding a small component of special Sunni and Shi’a Arabs, including the Anbar Salvation National Front, Faily expeditionary forces – at the Iraqi Kurds, and Shi’a Turcoman. government’s request – enhancing the

10Sowell, Kirk H. “Abadi’s Failed Reforms”, Carnegie Endowment for training of Iraq’s elite counter-terrorism International Peace, November 17, 2015. forces, and increasing efforts to train and http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=62004; and Inside Iraqi Politics, Issue No. 116, October 5, 2015, p. 2. www.insideir aqipolitics.com. Maliki’s equip Sunni Arab brigades in coordination loyalists are referred to as the ‘Third Term Hashd.’ Abadi’s failed reforms had with Baghdad. In Syria, it should continue less to do with fighting corruption than power struggles within Shi’a camps, as well as his own mistakes. The November 2, 2015 vote in the Iraqi to balance Coalition support for Kurdish parliament was not necessarily against reforms, but the ‘unconstitutional fighters with more evident engagement with nature’ of Abadi’s proposals. The parliament voted to enact reforms only if they were supported by other political actors in the parliament. Sunni Arabs. The U.S. should work with

Russia and set a series of benchmarks that Da’ish drivers; local power struggles and should be met and which would allow for aims to expand and control territories and cooperation in Syria at this time. The U.S. resources. The U.S. cannot resolve these should also continue to affirm its support for problems but should seek to mitigate the the territorial integrity of Syria, and seek to consequences of external support on the assuage Turkish tensions over the U.S. and local balance of power and ultimately, Sunni PYD cooperation by encouraging a ceasefire Arab sense of disfranchisement. between Turkish forces and the PKK in Turkey.  Post-Da’ish stabilization. Even if the U.S. defeats Da’ish tomorrow, there will be a  Address Da’ish expansion. While Iraq and day-after problem in much of Iraq and Syria. Syria should remain the center of gravity for U.S. aims to stabilize Iraq and Syria should the fight against Da’ish, the U.S. should address the larger problem of weakened address increasing global threats. It should states and the emergence of strong, violent put more pressure on the individual branches non-state and sub-state actors. This effort of Da’ish across the region, particularly in will demand a stable set of political security the Sinai and Libya. Da’ish inspired, Paris- arrangements that can avoid the emergence like attacks also demand that the U.S. move of another Da’ish in the future. It should with greater urgency on multiple fronts - also assure that liberated areas are successful intelligence sharing, foreign fighter flow, and stable so that people can return. This and financing - with Coalition partners. effort should include providing massive refugee assistance, immediate resources and  Counter-Da’ish messaging. The U.S. should humanitarian aid, developing local power re-focus its counter-messaging efforts by sharing and security agreements, building undermining the ideological aspect of local institutions, and mitigating regional Da’ish. This effort requires an effective spillover. The U.S. should mobilize its counter-messaging digital online campaign international partners to provide this that targets new safe havens and Da’ish’ assistance so that it can mitigate potential sense of invincibility. An effective future instability, alleviate humanitarian campaign also needs to understand Da’ish crises, show success, and support the Iraqi weaknesses. The U.S. should more government economically and politically. effectively promote the message about people who have defected from Da’ish ### through credible third parties, and whose voices will resonate in the Muslim world, to Dr. Denise Natali is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research at National Defense University’s include the voices of defectors. Another Institute for National Strategic Studies. She may be contacted core component of an effective countering at (202) 685-2249 or [email protected]. The views Da’ish narrative should target the ethno- expressed are her own and do not reflect the official policy or sectarian and intra-sectarian divides that position of the National Defense University, the Department of Da’ish is exploiting. Defense, or the U.S. government.

 Address root causes of Da’ish and instability. While focusing on Da’ish as an organization, the U.S. should pay closer attention to the broader political picture of