www.hyd.org.tr [email protected] Dr. Refik Saydam Cad. No: 39, Da: 10, Şişhane 34430 Beyoğlu - İstanbul Tel: 212 292 68 42 - 43 Faks: 212 292 68 44 Authors Hale Akay and Zeynep Sarlak Turkish Proofreader Ayse Esra Koç English Translation Hale Akay English Redaction Mehmet Cem Ülgen Cover Visual Bertan Kılıçcıoğlu Design Myra Publication And Cover Design Tülay Demircan Application Serhan Baykara, Harun Yılmaz Printing İmak Ofset This publication has been prepared with the support of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Office.

www.festr.org [email protected]

The views expressed in this publication are those of the participants of the round table held as a part of the“Peace and Reconcilliation in Turkey from Human Security Perspective” meeting and do not necessarily reflect those of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly or Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Turkey Office. © Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği CONTENTS 4 Human Security Focused Conflict Resolution

7 The Implications of the Human Security Approach for the “Solution Process” in Turkey 9 “Peace and Reconciliation in 3 Turkey from the Perspective of Human Security” - Meeting Report

10 Laws, the Judiciary, and the Police 15 Village Guard System 19 Other Mechanisms of Insecurity and Inter-Communal Relations PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN TURKEY FROM A HUMAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVE HUMAN SECURITY FOCUSED CONFLICT RESOLUTION The concept of “human security” brought forward first by the United Nations (UN) and then by the European Union (EU) beginning from the mid 1990s, has been proposed as a human focused security approach that functions as an alternative to the traditional state-centred security discourse which has yet to be successful in providing solutions for the new security threats that emerged from the post-Cold War era and which could not correspond to the security perceptions of different individuals and communities. The concept of human security stresses that security policies should not be dictated from the top, but instead should be shaped according to the information from below and with the participation of society. It redefines security on the basis of human rights, human development, and human dignity. Hence, 4 it encompasses social, political, economic, psycho-social and environmental dimensions of security that are disregarded by the traditional approach. Human security is also a concept that is widely referred to within studies on conflict resolution and peace building. The human security approach underlines the fact that peace processes themselves also carry the risk of creating new types of conflicts especially in the short and long term. Therefore, it draws attention to the need for expanding peace-building processes that go beyond negotiations between political elites and promotes social engagement, as well as to the need for providing answers to different types of insecurity that have emerged as a result of the conflict, which are often neglected during negotiations. Contrary to the widening scope of states’ security policies on the basis of security considerations, the approach of human security intends to allow people to directly express collective and individual rights that constitute a common ground and understanding. Table 1, provided by the UN report titled “Human Security in Theory and Practice”, provides a summary of the human security approach and human security principles for post-conflict situations. TABLE 1: HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS1

Human Security Principle Human Security Approach

Put populations impacted by conflicts, including the most vulnerable, at the centre of analysis and planning. Emphasize reconciliation, reintegration and rehabilitation at the level of the individual and community and not only through large-scale institutional reforms. Consider and evaluate the impact of conflict interventions and donor policies from both a human and state security PEOPLE-CENTRED perspective. Adopt participatory processes where possible so as to consider information from the points of view of those affected. Think about local capacities and resources in order to identify gaps in protection and empowerment strategies. 5 Shift from a military focus towards public safety and reform of the state security sector.

Analyse the inter-linkages and externalities between e.g., security, health, education, human rights, etc. No element of post-conflict transition can be tackled in isolation. Adopt inclusive and multi-actor approaches. MULTI-SECTORAL Minimize negative externalities that can cause a conflict to relapse.

Ensure coherence among humanitarian, 1. United Nations Office security and developmental approaches. for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Link people and institutions towards Human Security Unit, inclusive and representative governance “Human Security in Theory and Practice, processes. pp. 44-45, http://hdr. undp.org/en/media/ HS_Handbook_2009.pdf. Human Security Principle Human Security Approach

Take a multi-dimensional approach, engaging a broad landscape of issues, sectors and disciplines (see human security clusters for post-conflict situations). Recognize that lasting peace requires social, economic and security dimensions to be addressed in a manner that captures their inter-linkages. COMPREHENSIVE Engage multiple actors from various levels including the local, district, national, regional and international. Provide extra attention to excluded groups and focus on social inequalities and reconciliation. Employ a dual ‘protection and empowerment’ framework to peace building strategies. 6

Adopt context-specific strategies to each unique post-conflict situation. Pay attention to the root causes behind the conflict in a given context. Conduct an in-depth analysis of targeted issues and populations from both local and external perspectives. CONTEXT-SPECIFIC Work with the principles, norms and institutions that are linked with the history and culture of a war-torn society. Extend analysis to capture the regional dynamics of the conflict where appropriate. Situate insecurity within other contexts (district, national, regional, global). Human Security Principle Human Security Approach

Conflict prevention must be included as an element of peace building. Address root causes of conflict and the ensuing insecurities. Develop early warning systems.

PREVENTION-ORIENTATED Support building of local capacity and ownership to ensure sustainability. Conduct mapping at different time periods to identify trends and provide information for preventive solutions. Identify most vulnerable and most neglected areas or populations.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH FOR THE “SOLUTION PROCESS”2 IN TURKEY In the beginning of 2013, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that Turkey had entered a new process of 7 negotiations aiming to solve the problem commonly named as the “Kurdish Question,” which has been continuing in the form of armed and violent conflict for almost 30 years except infrequent, short-term cease-fires. This new process has been managed differently than the 2009 initiative known as the “Kurdish Opening,” which was based on secret negotiations between the Turkish state and PKK in Oslo, Norway and which failed soon after they became public. This time the negotiations are taking place directly between the government and Abdullah Öcalan, the life- imprisoned leader of the PKK, detained in Imralı Island in Turkey. The public has not been regularly informed on the content and progress of those negotiations in an official manner. However, as the delegations of the pro-Kurdish Peace and have been allowed to visit Öcalan in İmralı island from time to time, Öcalan’s messages and opinions on the peace process can be followed in the media. A ceasefire has been declared by 2. The peace process in Öcalan after the process was made public in early 2013 and since Turkey concerning the Kurdish-Turkish conflict then, Turkey has been enjoying a new environment in which both is officially named by sides do not receive news on loved ones killed during gunfights the Government as “the solution process.” anymore, allaying the public’s concerns about the recurrence of armed clashes. One of the turning points of that process was in March 2013, when the message of Abdullah Öcalan was read in Kurdish and Turkish during the Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakir, also broadcasted live by major television news channels in Turkey. The withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkey officially began that day and has been claimed to be continuing ever since. One of the important steps taken as a part of the solution process was the establishment of the Wise People Commissions under the coordination of the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security. These commissions, allocated to seven geographical areas in Turkey, made field visits and prepared reports on different opinions, reactions and expectations among the public regarding the process, which were later presented to the Prime Minister in June 2013. On the other hand, within the Democratization Package revealed at the end of September 2013, the government proposed options for reducing/abolishing the 10 per cent general election threshold, which has been regarded widely as an important problem for sustaining peace, allowed for teaching in

8 different languages and dialects in private schools, annulled the ban on the use of letters X, Q, W freeing the Kurdish language, promised to reinstate the historical Kurdish names of towns and villages in South-East Turkey and allowed for election campaigns employing different languages and dialects. The solution process launched almost a year ago has been continuing despite the insecurities, concerns and unease on both sides, especially among the Kurdish population who feel disappointment as most of the demands for peace have yet to be met. Although this meeting report does not aim to make a general political analysis of the peace process in Turkey, it can nevertheless provide a brief evaluation of its management from the perspective of human security. The solution process in Turkey has been carried out through high-level negotiations not fully transparent to the public, while both the negotiating parties, the public and the media, perceive the process solely as a matter of technical and political decisions taken during these negotiations. Though the establishment of the Wise People Commissions can be regarded as the only and most important step for ensuring public ownership of the process, it is unclear how seriously the government takes -or plans to take- into consideration the outcomes of those Commissions’ observations and recommendations in their reports. Moreover, there is no sign of an attempt to implement mechanisms that will allow public dialogue and discussion between different groups during the peace process. The steps taken for the “socialization” and the “institutionalization” of peace are far from being sufficient. There is no evidence that in the planning of the future of the process, the consequences of the 30 year long armed conflict on society and individuals have been taken into account nor have the problems that may surface during the post-conflict period, which have the potential of creating new social tensions been considered thoroughly. Though one of the crucial demands of the Kurdish society has been the investigation into and reconciliation with the past crimes that the State’s security forces took part in especially during the 1990s, no steps have been taken toward that direction, save for a very limited number of on-going trials. Therefore, it is impossible to claim that the solution process in practice is managed in line with the requirements of a human security based approach, such as the establishment of a bottom- 9 up peace environment for the post-conflict period according to the information provided below nor has it taken into account the demands of society, providing permanent solutions for the root causes of the conflict or examining and eliminating the negative effects of the conflict on different communities and groups. Instead of a human-focused approach, up to now, the peace process in Turkey has been carried out by adopting a state -and PKK- focused approach. “PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN TURKEY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUMAN SECURITY”- MEETING REPORT The Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (hCa) has initiated a new project in 2013 in partnership with NGOs from five countries in the Balkans, and which is based on national and regional level research studies to be carried out by establishing collaboration between civil society and the academia around the theme of human security and evidence-based advocacy activities. One of the main pillars of this project titled “Cross-Border Citizens’ Network for Human Security” is defined as “peace and reconciliation.” The hCa decided to focus on the peace process of the Kurdish Question and the effects of forced internal migration of the Kurdish population from the perspective of human security as one of the main subjects of its’ national level research activities, which will actually begin as of 2014. The research study will intend to reflect to the public the opinions of both individuals/ groups that have been directly or indirectly affected from the conflict and the experts working at the community level. As part of its efforts to structure the research activities on the above-mentioned subject and with the aim of providing an alternative perspective on the on-going peace process, the hCa, in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung-Turkey, organized a closed working meeting titled “Peace and Reconciliation in Turkey from a Human Security Perspective” in İstanbul on September 28th, 2013. Scholars, experts and representatives of civil society organizations that have been working on various dimensions of the Kurdish problem and its social implications were invited to that meeting, which was planned to explore different human 10 security focused issues related to the solution process. Later, the hCa research team summarized the opinions and problems expressed during that meeting, which has led to this report. One should note that the content of the meeting was naturally limited to the number of participants, their respective areas of expertise and perspectives. Therefore, the resulting meeting report cannot claim to include all human security problems related to the solution process in Turkey. Nevertheless, we believe that by providing a list of problems that are prioritized by taking into account community-level inputs for a human security focused approach to the peace process will contribute to and provide insights for public debates on the current situation of the Turkish- Kurdish conflict. Our report summarizing the main outcomes of the meeting held in 28 September 2013 is presented below under crosscutting headings: LAWS, THE JUDICIARY, AND THE POLICE The legal framework in Turkey is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which stipulate that laws concerning human rights should be clear, explicit, predictable and accessible, and should conform to the rule of law. Contrary to the foundational principles of international conventions, the laws in Turkey tend to restrict basic rights and freedoms and pose a threat against their practice. Moreover, some provisions hidden in these laws function like land mines as regards to the practice of basic rights and freedoms. Another common problem of the general legal framework in Turkey is the extensiveness and frequency of limitations based on concepts like the state’s “security” and “secrecy.” Provisions that restrict the freedom of expression and right to information should also be noted. Some of the laws and their related articles that constitute threats for the practice of rights and freedoms are listed below: • Article 118 of the Turkish Constitution on the National Security Council. • Law No. 3173 on Combatting Terrorism. Especially Article 1 modified in 2003 which defines terror as “any kind of act done by one or more individuals belonging to an organization

with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as 11 specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat,” and its amendment, Article 2 (2006) regulating the use of arms by security forces. • Law No. 2559 on the Duties and Authorities of the Police and particularly Article 16 which regulates the use of force by the police. • Law No. 2935 on State of Emergency, which provides extraordinary powers to Governors. • Law No. 5442 on Provincial Administrations, Article 11, which defines the authorities of the Governors and the conditions for calling for help from armed forces. • Regulation on the Organization and Duties of the Gendarmerie, which authorizes investigative powers. On the other hand, the practice of the Judiciary itself has become a factor of insecurity among society. Arbitrary detentions, broad interpretations of provisions in the Laws to the disadvantage of the accused are among problems noted in this context. The Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure Article 182, which allows the court to rule that a hearing can be conducted partially or entirely closed to public when necessary with respect to public morality or security, is one of the examples of the provisions employed in such a way. The definition of “membership to a terrorist organization” in the Law on Combatting Terrorism and the court decisions based on that article are also problematic. According to the Law “Any member of an organization, founded to attain the aims defined in Article 1, who commits a crime to further these aims, individually or with others, or any member of such an organization, even if he does not commit such a crime, shall be deemed to be a terrorist offender” and “Individuals who are not members of a terrorist organization, but commit a 12 crime in the name of the organization, are also deemed to be terrorist offenders and shall be subject to the same punishment as members of such organizations.” The outcome of the broad interpretation employed in such cases is displayed in the Ministry of Justice’s response to the parliamentary question submitted by the Peace and Democracy Party MP Pervin Buldan, which states that between the years 2009 and 2012, 38,135 individuals had been tried under the allegation of being a member of or leading a terrorist organization, out of which 19,925 were convicted. The same response also demonstrates that, during the same period, the number of individuals tried on charges of leading a terrorist organization decreased, while the number of those charged with membership showed a substantial increase. These high figures make it clearly evident that the courts’ definition and interpretation of being a member of a terrorist organization is rather extensive. Moreover, as those who are not a member of a terrorist organization can be charged with an organizational crime according to the Law, people feel that they are living in an insecure environment in which they can easily find themselves as suspects of some cases. In addition, the gap between accusations and convictions has been narrowing, while some experts note that the discretionary power provided by the Law regarding the length of sentences also encourages judges and prosecutors to give conviction decisions without much hesitation. Another problem put forward in relation to the Law on Combatting Terrorism is that in a large number of cases the indictments include controversial or twisted/fabricated evidence. Examples like including texts of wiretappings in indictments without any filtering -thus disclosing irrelevant personal information- as evidence, accusations based on depositions of anonymous witnesses, inmates with pending trials based on irrelevant and/or unconvincing evidence who are incarcerated are becoming widespread practices. Furthermore, one of the problems observed in recent court decisions regarding charges on being a member to a terrorist organization and taking part in terrorist propaganda is that publicly expressing different types of injustice and social demands have begun to be frequently treated as acts of terrorism. By

increasing the ambiguity in the definition of terrorist acts 13 within the Law, this tendency indirectly creates an insecure environment for people to assert rights-based demands. As regards to the Kurdish question, this tendency implies linking politically active with terrorism and thus deterring not only those individuals involved in politics but a larger population of Kurds from defending their rights politically and taking part in rights-based activism. Also, the common opinion that the expressions of discontent regarding the government are gradually being included in the definition of such crimes also aggravates insecurity by creating an atmosphere of oppression. The detentions and prosecutions related to the Law on Combatting Terrorism also create a particular problem of discrimination and distrust among Kurdish citizens. As the legal treatment against people who have participated in the same activities, assumed similar political responsibilities and have expressed similar demands can vary, the public cannot understand on what grounds the ones to be detained/prosecuted are chosen, which naturally erodes the mutual trust within society and raises doubts between people. Impunity is one of the important elements of the public’s lack of confidence to the judicial system. When an actor has an official position representing the State or related to the State in some other ways, he/she is protected by a shield of impunity even if he/she is accused of crimes that fall into the legal definition of crimes against humanity or taken part in serious violations, mistreatment and/or malpractice. The commonality of such cases itself can be deemed as an element of violence and insecurity, as it creates a widespread perception that when the accused is a state official, justice will never be served. Four characteristics stand out when the general legal framework that regulates the authorities and responsibilities of the Law Enforcement Agency (General Directorate of Security)3 -Law on the Duties and Authorities of the Police, Code of Criminal Procedure, Law on Combatting Terrorism and Police Force Law- is analysed. First of all, from the very beginning the Police Force has been designed as a mechanism to protect the State and consequently the clause “to ensure public security (order)” has been used to legitimize police practices and operations that 14 violate citizens’ rights. Secondly, there is an attempt to construct a conservative social structure on the concept of “public morality.” The third characteristic, which are revealed when daily practices are examined, is that, similar to the Judiciary, ambiguous and unclear provisions within the laws allow the Police to use its discretionary powers in a very broad way. Finally, when using its discretionary powers, the Police always prioritize the State and attaches central importance to concepts like public morality and public order. All the characteristics above imply that any attempt to reform the Police Forces should not be restricted to legislative changes, but should rather target a substantial cultural transformation in mentality. Otherwise, during the solution process of the Kurdish Question, instead of serving as the protector of public peace, the Police Forces can become a problem that can risk the continuation of the process. In this regard, it should be noted that recent attempts to produce a 3. For a recent analysis on bottom-up negative security conception, based on encouraging law enforcement in Turkey see, Biriz Berksoy, Military, the citizens to act as informants, appear as an ominous Police and. Intelligence development. in Turkey: Recent Transformations and Needs for Reform, TESEV, 2013. In the context of the Kurdish Question, the practices of security forces also generate a spiral of violence and internalization of that violence by those that act in defence of civil and political rights. People who participate in demonstrations or other types of activism in order to voice their political demands, go out to the streets taking for granted that as a result of their actions, they are likely to face violence, can be jailed or, in worst case scenarios, may even get killed. This situation, on the one hand strengthens the politicization and solidarity within the Kurdish movement, while on the other, puts Kurdish victims of internal displacement who have moved to the Western parts of the country at the risk of facing systematic violence. Moreover, this causes the normalization and unquestioned acceptance of violence in society.4 VILLAGE GUARD SYSTEM One of the elements that casts doubts about the continuity of the peace process and has the potential of creating new problems as well as threats, is the Village Guard system in Turkey, which has been employed by the State as a para-military force for the fight 15 against PKK since the mid-80s. According to Minister of Interior Muammer Güler’s statement on May 2013, there are 46,495 temporary and 19,343 voluntary village guards in Turkey.5 Although the abolition of the Village Guard system is commonly regarded as one of the important steps necessary for the solution process, the fact that the government has not declared any clear plan to do so raises concerns. According to the estimates, 100,000 people have entered into the Village Guard system so far, including those removed from their posts or who have retired. However, an important point that should be noted is that people do not enter the Village Guard 4. 07.05.2013, “Bakan system individually; families of Village Guards also indirectly Güler’den Korucular Açıklaması”, http:// become a part of the system. Therefore, the total number of www.aktifhaber.com/ people that have directly or indirectly participated is estimated to bakan-gulerden-korucular- aciklamasi-781908h.htm be as high as 600-700,000. Taking into account the demographic 5. 07.05.2013, “Bakan figures of the Kurdish populated region, this is a very high Güler’den Korucular number and should be kept in mind when plans and programs Açıklaması”, http:// www.aktifhaber.com/ for the abolition/transformation of the Village Guard system are bakan-gulerden-korucular- being developed. aciklamasi-781908h.htm When talking about individuals and families that are a part of the Village Guard system, one should note that they can’t be regarded as a homogenous group that supported the side of the State during the conflict. While an important part of them were forced to accept being a Village Guard as a result of State pressure, some of them have identified themselves with the State over time, or even have undergone a process of identity transformation -i.e. losing their Kurdish identity. Moreover, there are differences between Village Guards in terms of their duties in the security system. For example, it is known that there were Special Village Guard Teams taking part in the operations of Mixed Special Forces Teams and the number of this type Village Guards is estimated to be approximately 8,000. The abolition of these Special Village Guard teams is an important issue regarding the removal of the whole Village Guard system. One important problem related to this system is the conflict- related or non-political crimes committed by Village Guards in the past 30 years and the fact that most of these crimes have gone unpunished. Abducting women, blood feuds, land disputes are 16 among issues that some of the village guards are accused in the context of malpractice and since most of them enjoy impunity, this increases insecurity in society and destroys public confidence in the judicial system. With respect to conflict resolution, land disputes in Kurdish villages also make Village Guards a risk for the continuity of the solution process. After Kurdish villages were evacuated, the lands belonging to those who were forced to leave were sometimes directly handed over to Village Guards; in some cases these plots were even unlawfully registered on their names. In many cases, officials turned a blind eye to land seizures by Village Guards. Since the evacuated population began to return to their villages as a result of the decreasing risk of armed clashes, the lands occupied by the Village Guards have become an important problem creating local conflicts. One of the striking examples of this kind of land conflict is the massacre that took place in Mardin’s Bilge Village in 2009, in which 44 people were killed. Though initially the media portrayed the massacre as a result of an honour killing, during the trial, the real reason was revealed to be a land dispute between Village Guards and other locals. Moreover, turmoil struck the same village in 2012 during a land registry evaluation. When the background of the media reports on murders related to land dispute or blood feuds are investigated, the main reason usually appears to be land seizures by Village Guards that took place during the 30 years of conflict. It has also been noted that public institutions and political parties are usually unresponsive to warnings about the potential threat land disputes pose for public peace in the region. In this respect, problems pertinent to land registry -e.g. private lands registered to the Treasury, - occur mostly during land registration primarily due to the locals’ lack of technical knowledge and language problems. The accumulated income raised by Village Guards from seized lands, cultural resistance against women’s right of inheritance, land disputes arising from recent land registration processes and increases in land prices due to public infrastructure investments are also among other important factors. Since more and more evacuated families return to their villages or at least desire to come and work on their land daily or periodically, the tensions around land disputes have been escalating. In this context, the low level of soil fertility causing a high debt burden 17 on the villagers, the villagers’ lack of professional knowledge after almost 20 years of incapacitation of their farming skills and the use of traditional, archaic means of production, along with the fact that due to those problems, younger generations who can not work in agriculture tend to see illegal ways such as smuggling as a solution to unemployment, are all among issues that should be underlined. Moreover, a crucial point is that some of the disputed lands are in fact Armenian properties seized after the events of 1915. Consequently these lands have been subjected to illegal seizure during the 30 years of armed clashes between state security forces and the PKK. Moreover, telling villagers that the PKK will confiscate the lands their families seized after 1915 was used as a propaganda tool at the time in order to force the residents to accept posts as Village Guards. The fact that there are villagers who became Village Guards with the urge of protecting their once illegally obtained property is an important issue that is rarely voiced and should be evaluated from a historical perspective. There are two crucial elements to keep in mind when considering policies to be implemented for groups like Village Guards that pose a threat to peace processes. The first element is to refrain from alienating these groups from the process and telling them that the process will turn out to be to their disadvantage. Instead, mechanisms should be developed that serve to engage these groups in the peace process. However, in doing so, the public’s faith in justice should not be shaken by the cultivation of a widespread perception that those who took part in crimes are being protected. On the other hand, the Turkish Government seems to evaluate two options as a solution for the Village Guard system. The first option is to employ Village Guards in different private/public security guard jobs without disarming them. Since this option will not be regarded by the public as the abolition of the system but as its’ continuation in a different form, it will raise security concerns among the locals. The second option is disarming and retiring village guards and encouraging them to return to agriculture and livestock production. Yet, this option is under strong resistance on behalf of Village Guards who fear being the target of public reaction. However we should also 18 note that, after the launching of the solution process, some of the Village Guards laid down their arms on their own accord. Therefore, any policy developed for the abolition of the Village Guard system should be responsive to the concerns of those who were pressured into becoming Village Guards, particularly those who are not against to the idea of peace but are worried about being stigmatized due to their position as Village Guards. One should also note that an important reason underlying the uncertainty about the future of the Village Guard system is the State’s unwillingness to come to terms with crimes that public servants have committed during the 30 years of conflict, such as extra-judicial killings, disappearances, along with incidents of torture and mistreatment. This unwillingness is exploited as leverage by Village Guards that have taken part in those crimes or witnessed them, who threaten State institutions by implying that they will reveal the information they have about those malpractices. OTHER MECHANISMS OF INSECURITY AND INTER-COMMUNAL RELATIONS One of the negative outcomes of the 30 year-long Kurdish conflict is the perception of insecurity and the dilemma of security felt by society. Due to this inter-communal security dilemma, social problems which can be resolved by dialogue remain unresolved or even become threats to social peace. While one of the dynamics behind this dilemma is the ambiguity about the intentions of certain social actors, another one is the structural uncertainty arising due to legal loopholes and daily functioning of the system. In such an environment, it is impossible to establish confidence among parties; therefore all groups shape their expectations and behaviours according to the worst-case assumptions. The inevitable result of actions based on worst-case assumptions is the reactionary responses observed in society. We should also note that these reactionary behaviours are multi- layered: For example, what Cenk Saracoğlu6 named as “exclusive recognition” in his study on the Kurdish population in İzmir, is a reaction based on economic and cultural grounds, which indicate that social discrimination does not operate through the denial 19 of ethnic identities anymore. Instead, it has transformed into more detrimental discriminatory behaviour and practices that recognizes and includes identities. This reactionary attitude, which manifests itself in Western parts of Turkey as an unwillingness to live in the same neighbourhoods or to send their children to the same schools, is not only a result of individuals’ pursuit of security but also a factor that strengthens the perception of insecurity. The spaces where Kurds and the State encounter each other can be seen as sites of cultural production that cause the internalization of structural uncertainty. As the first place where the Kurds are confronted with the State, schools are the most important example of such cultural production sites. The attitudes of teachers toward students, the school curricula, the problem of teaching in a language other than their mother-tongue all contribute to the creation of violence towards and oppression of Kurdish pupils, thus their first impression of the State are shaped 6. Cenk Saraçoğlu, Kurds according to these unfortunate experiences during primary of Modern Turkey: education. The second important example can be claimed to be Migration, Neoliberalism and Exclusion, I.B.Tauris, London, 2010. the army, which, as a result of compulsory military service, serves as the first meeting place of Kurdish and Turkish young men. However, we should also note that studies on these mechanisms demonstrate a trend toward implicit discriminatory practices instead of open disputes and explicit practices. Since it is the meeting place of Shafii and Hanafi citizens, it is possible to claim that mosques may also prove to be an example of places of implicit discrimination in which Kurds feel themselves alienated, segregated and excluded. Another mechanism of insecurity is the practice of linking social assistance and other types of benefits to terrorist crimes. Due to the broad definition of terrorism, such mechanisms prevent families related to terrorist acts to be entitled to certain social benefits, thus endangering their democratic rights. The revoking of green cards of people that participated in public demonstrations in some provinces and threatening students with exclusion from aid distribution in schools if they take part in street protests, are some examples of this attitude. Some of these mechanisms violate the principle that individuals can only be held 20 responsible of their own actions. Quite to the contrary, they are used as tools to punish and control families. One related example is obliging Village Guards to submit their spouse’s criminal records during retirement procedures. The language used when addressing Kurds, especially by the representatives of the governing party, the vagueness about the citizenship rights to be established during the peace process, the arbitrariness concerning the recognition of those rights and the impression that “Kurds will have to make do with what the Turks are willing to offer” are all among the factors that contribute and strengthen the perception of insecurity among the Kurdish population. For example, in June, during the final meeting between the Prime Minister and the Wise People Commissions, it was announced that there were no plans for education in mother tongue, that the electoral threshold in general elections would not be lowered, and that the construction of new border posts in South East Turkey would continue as planned. However, as mentioned before, the Democratization Package announced in September included some improvements regarding those issues. This type of contradictory behaviour that deepens insecurities indicates to the public that the solution process progresses in momentary, whimsical steps instead of following a pre- determined plan -and therefore its fate is uncertain. This type of practices and uncertainties prove that, contrary to the principles of the human security approach, decision-makers in charge of the solution process lack a political understanding that prioritizes human dignity. In addition to the problems mentioned above, the obstacles in Turkey preventing the public to enjoy their collective economic and social rights weaken the sense of solidarity within society and cause identity-based rights struggles to take the central stage. Subcontracting, widely used by local governments and state institutions, is a crucial obstacle in the way of economic rights- based movements and is a system that causes identity-based segregation in the labour market. Other important issues that should be noted in this context are the provisions of the European Social Charter that prohibit discriminatory behaviour and allows for social dialogue in workplaces, all which have not been put into practice in Turkey.

During our meeting on September 28, 2013, the participants 21 pointed out two specific examples of vulnerable groups that deserve particular attention during the solution process. The first one concerns veteran soldiers who have served in the military in conflict zones and who have suffered a loss of limb as a result. The second group underlined by the participants are women who, along with children, are widely recognized as groups that are faced with the most severe negative effects of these conflicts. As is well known, many have lost their lives or were injured/ disabled as a result of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict. When we analyse the group that name themselves South East Veterans, we observe that the official practices make a distinction between those accepted as disabled on active duty and those who are linked to “terror” related operations. The soldiers who had performed their military service in South East Turkey are recognized as veterans officially only if they suffered a loss of limb and can prove it by medical reports that the degree of this loss fulfils the requirement for entitlement. Mental problems like post-traumatic stress disorder following armed clashes are not recognized among losses necessary to obtain official veteran entitlement. Observations on the AKP’s attitude toward the solution process indicate that decision makers mostly approach the problems of those who had served in South East Turkey and their families from an economic point of view. However, conflict resolution requires a broader approach that also takes into account the psycho-social results of the conflict among that group and the wider population. In this context, the insecurity among Kurdish victims of forced internal dislocation and ex- soldiers who were physically or mentally affected from the war living side by side in poor neighbourhoods of big cities should also be taken into consideration. The veterans also point out the disappointment they feel due to negative behaviour of other public servants toward them on many occasions. The unresponsiveness of political decision makers to the problems of this group and the lack of mechanisms that aim to constructively engage these groups into the peace process make them feel further isolated, along with triggering reactions against the solution process, as well as leading them to question concepts like military service and martyrdom. It is widely argued that the Kurdish conflict has caused the 22 politicization of and thus liberated them during the 30 year long struggle. One of the important, though often disregarded outcomes of the conflict on women is the protection that the PKK provided against domestic violence. Therefore the withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkey in fact have made local women nervous, as they fear that they will lose this protection they have so far enjoyed. Moreover, while the PKK forces continue their withdrawal, the presence of Turkish military forces in the region continues along with a new influx of a male population into the region in search of the job openings in the construction of new border posts. Since this implies an unbalanced increase in the male population, women have now become even more insecure and are forced to stay home. Taking into account the sexual offenses occurred during the conflict, which have been and continue to be rarely revealed or investigated, it is easy to understand how this situation creates a sense of insecurity among local women. Moreover, women are also confronted with the following dilemma: Being at the forefront of political protests or returning to their traditional domestic duties of controlling the rage and anxiety of their spouses and caring for their children. 23