Tanzania Comoros

COUNTRY REPORT

Tanzania Comoros

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1st quarter 2000

The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent St, London SW1Y 4LR United Kingdom The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For over 50 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The EIU delivers its information in four ways: through subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through specific research reports, whether for general release or for particular clients; through electronic publishing; and by organising conferences and roundtables. The firm is a member of The Economist Group.

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Contents

3 Summary

Tanzania

5 Political structure 6 Economic structure 6 Annual indicators 7 Quarterly indicators 8 Outlook for 2000-01 12 The political scene 14 Economic policy 17 The domestic economy 17 Economic trends 18 Agriculture 19 Mining and energy 20 Infrastructure 21 Financial and other services 22 Foreign trade and payments

Comoros

24 Political structure 25 Economic structure 25 Annual indicators 25 Quarterly indicators 26 Outlook for 2000-01 27 The political scene 31 Economic policy and the economy 33 Aid news

33 Trade data

List of tables

8 Tanzania: forecast summary 11 Tanzania: prices for main export crops 11 Tanzania: gold production 16 Corruption perception index: African countries, 1999 19 Tanzania: cotton production 19 Tanzania: tobacco production 22 Tanzania: tourist visitors

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22 Tanzania: trade balance 33 Tanzania: foreign trade 34 Tanzania: UK trade 35 Comoros: foreign trade 35 Comoros: French trade

List of figures

12 Tanzania: gross domestic product 12 Tanzania: Tanzanian shilling real exchange rates 17 Tanzania: weightings for consumer price index 18 Tanzania: exchange rate 27 Comoros: gross domestic product 27 Comoros: Comorian franc real exchange rates

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February 18th 2000 Summary

1st quarter 2000

Tanzania

Outlook for 2000-01 Proposed constitutional changes and the status of Zanzibar will feature prominently on the domestic political front in the lead-up to elections in October. The Zanzibari president, Salmin Amour, will manipulate his supporters to push for a constitutional change allowing him to stand for a third term. This is unlikely to be successful, although it will put him in a stronger position to name his own successor. The failure firmly to quash the issue will weaken the authority of the president, Benjamin Mkapa, within the ruling party. The elections are expected to be broadly fair, although the harassment of opposition will continue. The ruling CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) has commanding advantages as the incumbent party in the upcoming election campaign and will easily win re-election. The positive economic performance of 1999 will continue into 2000. Real GDP growth is expected to rise to 5.2%, driven by strong contributions from the fast-growing mining and tourism sectors, which will mask the ongoing underperformance of agriculture. Inflation is expected to be low, falling to roughly 7.1% in 2000. Low international commodity prices will depress agricultural export earnings in 2000. However, a sharp rise in gold exports and improvement in the services balance will narrow the deficit on the current account to $541m in 2000. Economic performance should pick up in 2001 on the assumption of favourable agro-climatic conditions and agricultural policy reforms. Combined with ongoing strong contributions from tourism and mining, real GDP growth could reach 5.7%. decisive

The political scene The government has announced an election date of October 29th 2000. The harassment of opposition parties on both Zanzibar and the mainland has continued. A new influx into north-west Tanzania of refugees fleeing the Burundian civil war has occurred. Nelson Mandela has been appointed mediator in the Burundian peace talks in Arusha, replacing the Tanzania’s late president, Julius Nyerere.

Economic policy The government has announced the liberalisation of the domestic fuel import market. The extremely high cost of electricity in Tanzania has been highlighted in two separate studies. According to the government, the liberalisation of the electricity sector will not take place for another three years. The World Bank has announced measures to support private-sector development. Measures are to be introduced to tighten tax collection. The government has announced an anti-corruption strategy.

The domestic economy Inflation has fallen in 1999 to 7.9% from 13.5% in 1998, prompted largely by falls in food prices. The shilling has experienced some fluctuation over the past year due to weak international commodity prices for Tanzania’s main agricultural exports. The contribution of the manufacturing sector to the

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economy has been substantially underestimated, according to new research. Food production recovered in 1999 from the drought conditions of the year before. The value of gold production doubled in 1999 to $74m. A third company has been listed on the stock exchange. Tourism growth has slackened after several years of rapid growth.

Foreign trade and Exports fell 8.8% in 1999, driven by the impact of low agricultural commodity payments prices. Regional economic integration has been aided by the signing of the East African Co-operation Treaty in November by the heads of state of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya.

Comoros

Outlook for 2000-01 The refusal of separatist leaders on the island of Anjouan to compromise and sign the Antananarivo peace agreement will ensure continued deadlock despite increased international efforts to find a solution. The Organisation of African Unity will proceed cautiously with its threat to intervene militarily. Pressure will be maintained on the military ruler, Colonel Azali Assoumane, to hand over power to a civilian government. The clearing of arrears to the World Bank has opened the way for the resumption of assistance from the World Bank. However, economic prospects for 2000-01 remain poor. The economy will continue to suffer from political instability, sanctions on the island of Anjouan and stiff competition from other tourism destinations in the Indian Ocean.

The political scene The diplomatic isolation of Comoros which followed the military coup of last year has been maintained by neighbouring states in the Indian Ocean Commission. Colonel Assoumane has responded to international pressure by appointing a prime minister and bringing more civilians into cabinet. Other opposition leaders, including the former prime minister, Abbas Djoussouf, have refused to join the government. Separatist leaders on Anjouan have ignored an ultimatum from the Organisation of African Unity, which has imposed sanctions. The separatist leader, Colonel Said Abeid, has held a referendum which rejected the Antananarivo peace agreement, although the legitimacy of the result has not been accepted by the international community.

Economic policy and the The government is continuing with efforts to increase revenue and rationalise economy expenditure. An audit of the civil service payroll has removed ghost workers, reducing costs by 14%. The World Bank is to resume assistance to Comoros following the payment of arrears by the government.

Editor: Douglas Mason All queries: Tel: (44.20) 7830 1007 Fax: (44.20) 7830 1023 Next report: Our next Country Report will be published in June

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Tanzania

Political structure

Official name United Republic of Tanzania

Form of state Republic, formed by the 1964 union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar

Legal system Based on English common law, the 1977 Union and 1985 Zanzibari constitutions, as amended

National legislature National Assembly, comprising 269 members (232 directly elected and 37 women appointed); elected members are chosen by Union-wide adult suffrage every five years; Zanzibar has its own House of Representatives of 59 members (nine women appointees), which legislates on internal matters

National elections October-November 1995 (legislative and presidential); next elections due in 2000 (legislative and presidential)

Head of state President, elected by universal adult suffrage every five years

National government The president, vice-president and Council of Ministers; last cabinet reshuffle September 1998

Main political parties The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM); Civic United Front (CUF); National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi); United Democratic Party (UDP); Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema)

President Benjamin Mkapa Vice-president Omar Ali Juma Prime minister Frederick Sumaye

Key ministers Agriculture & co-operatives Paul Kimiti Communications & transport Ernest Nyanda Community development, women’s affairs & children Mary Nagu Defence Edgar Majogo Education Juma Kapuya Energy & minerals Abdallah Kigoda Finance & planning Daniel Yona Foreign affairs Jakaya Kikwete Health Aaron Chiduo Home affairs Ali Ameir Mohammed Industry & trade Iddi Simba Justice & constitutional affairs Bakari Mwapachu Labour & youth development Sebastian Kinyondo Lands, housing & urban development Gideon Cheyo Natural resources & tourism Zakia Meghji Science, technology & higher education Jackson Makweta Water & livestock development Pius Ng’wandu Works Anna Abdallah

Central bank governor Daudi Ballali

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Economic structure

Annual indicators

1995 1996 1997 1998a 1999b GDP at market prices (TSh bn) 3,066 3,746 4,616 5,630 6,341 Real GDP growthc (%) 5.1 4.6 3.5 3.7 4.1 Consumer price inflationc (av; %) 29.8 19.7 16.1 12.8d 7.9 Population (m) 29.7 30.6 31.5 32.4 33.3 Exports fob ($ m) 683 764 715 590 541 Imports fob ($ m) 1,340 1,213 1,164 1,365 1,419 Current-account balance ($ m) –646 –511 –708 –1,076 –911 Reserves excl gold ($ m) 270.2 440.1 622.1 599.2d 620.0 Total external debt ($ m) 7,447 7,412 7,177 7,446b 7,693 External debt-service ratio, paid (%) 17.9 18.9 129 24.4b 25.3 Coffee productione ('000, bags) 43.5 52.0 42.4 38.0 42.7 Cotton (lint) productione ('000 tonnes) 44.5 84.2 84.5 69.9 35.6 Exchange rate (av; TSh:$) 575 590 617 665d 745

February 18th 2000 TSh802.2:$1

Origins of gross domestic product 1998a % of total Components of gross domestic product 1997a % of total Agriculture, forestry & fishing 49.1 Private consumption 83.0 Mining 2.0 Government consumption 8.5 Manufacturing 8.4 Gross fixed capital formation 17.5 Construction & utilities 6.9 Increase in stocks 0.2 Trade & hotels 15.9 Exports of goods & non-factor services 16.3 Transport & communications 5.3 Imports of goods & non-factor services –25.5 GDP at factor cost incl others 100.0 GDP at market prices 100.0

Principal exports 1998f $ m Principal imports 1998f $ m Coffee 117.4 Machinery & transport equipment 331.4 Cotton 116.5 Consumer goods 246.7 Manufactures 172.0 Building materials 77.0 Cashew nuts 73.4 Oil 60.0 Minerals 92.8 Industrial raw materials 50.5

Main destinations of exports 1998f % of total Main origins of imports 1998f % of total India 19.5 Japan 8.3 UK 10.1 South Africa 8.3 Germany 8.3 UK 7.8 Japan 7.7 Kenya 6.7 Netherlands 7.6 India 5.7 Belgium 4.4 US 5.2 a IMF, Tanzanian authorities. b EIU estimates. c Mainland only. d Actual. e Crop years ending June . f Bank of Tanzania.

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Quarterly indicators

1997 1998 1999 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr Government finance (Tsh bn) Revenue & grants 173.94 150.64 275.76 181.59 217.76 185.05 274.88 190.18 Expenditure 128.61 148.91 346.56 142.02 154.18 192.15 330.99 181.55 Adjustment –25.90 –13.05 –37.66 –6.80 –49.64 3.83 3.84 –39.88 Balance 19.43 –11.33 –108.47 32.77 13.94 –3.28 –52.27 –31.25 Prices Consumer prices (1995=100) 141.7 159.6 159.9 155.6 158.6 173.7 173.1 167.2 % change, year on year 15.4 14.4 12.7 12.3 11.9 8.8 8.3 7.5 Financial indicators Exchange rate TSh:$ (av) 617.03 649.89 663.54 668.78 676.47 687.23 707.62 786.80 TSh:$ (end-period) 624.57 665.01 665.49 675.82 681.00 694.00 737.00 797.90 Interest rates (%) Deposit (av) 6.98 7.49 7.67 7.74 8.12 7.98 7.76 7.34 Discount (end-period) 16.20 18.20 17.20 19.20 17.60 15.20 12.20 18.00 Lending (av) 27.00 26.00 24.67 26.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 Treasury bill (av) 10.70 11.61 10.38 13.19 12.13 8.26 6.42 10.52 M1 (end-period; TSh bn) 493.87 485.30 481.64 503.29 545.52 511.04 508.99 548.92 % change, year on year 9.9 15.7 1.9 5.8 10.5 5.3 5.7 9.1 M2 (end-period; TSh bn) 927 924 947 966 1,026 1,021 1,035 1,120 % change, year on year 12.9 14.5 7.7 6.9 10.8 10.5 9.2 15.9 Sectoral trends Productiona (annual totals; ‘000 tonnes) C o f f e e 4 2 . 4 ( 3 8 . 0 ) ( 4 5 . 0 b ) Cotton, lint 69.6 ( 54.3 ) ( 54.3b ) S i s a l 2 5 . 0 ( 2 5 . 0 ) ( 2 6 . 0 b ) Foreign trade (TSh m) Exports fob 126,180 119,366 84,038 90,350 155,547 81,309 54,425 74,299 Imports cif 218,737 197,073 269,694 260,595 239,718 272,513 280,614 344,814 Trade balance –92,557 –77,707 –185,656 –170,245 –84,171 –191,204 –226,189 –270,515 Foreign reserves Reserves excl gold (end-period; $ m) 622.1 601.0 502.5 556.0 599.2 631.5 604.6 666.6 a Crop year ending year shown. b Estimate.

Sources: FAO; Bank of Tanzania, Economic Bulletin; IMF, International Financial Statistics.

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Outlook for 2000-01

Tanzania: forecast summary ($ m unless otherwise indicated) 1998a 1999a 2000b 2001b GDP at market pricesc (% change year on year) 3.7 4.1 5.2 5.7 Agriculturec 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.5 Industryc 6.4 4.6 8.0 9.0 Servicesc 4.4 5.0 5.5 5.5 Consumer pricesc (av, %) 12.8 7.9 7.1 7.0 Merchandise exports fob 590 541 937 1,050 of which: coffee 145 150 150 165 manufactures 90 110 125 135 cotton 95 107 115 125 gold 39 74 203 312 Merchandise imports fob 1,365 1,419 1,568 1,700 Current-account balance –1,076 –911 –541 –595 Exchange rate (av; TSh:$) 665 745 830 900

a EIU estimates. b EIU forecasts. c Mainland only.

The constitution and the Despite the fact that a general election is less than nine months away, Zanzibari question come Tanzanian politics is currently focused on constitutional reform and the to the fore— Zanzibari question rather than electoral campaigning, as might be expected. Aside from the importance of these two issues, this also indicates that the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party is confident that it will easily win the forthcoming election. The debate surrounding the two issues has highlighted the absence from the domestic political scene of the late former president, Julius Nyerere, who had played the role of elder statesman with the authority to both calm political fighting and provide a figurehead for pro-unionists.

—and a report on the The heightened concern over the constitutional question stems directly from constitution will cause the findings of the Kisanga Commission, headed by Justice Robert Kisanga, controversy— which was set up by the government in 1998 to solicit public opinion on the future shape of the union between Tanzania and Zanzibar. According to the findings of the Commission, nearly 90% of those consulted either preferred to retain the status quo or indicated that they supported the current two- government arrangement. In spite of this, Mr Kisanga has chosen to include his own minority view in the report, recommending a three-tier federal system including a central government as well as separate administrations for both Zanzibar and the mainland. Mr Kisanga’s move has a precedent in Tanzania, as the head of a 1992 commission on political reforms also published his own minority viewpoint with the commission’s findings, arguing for the rejection of one-party rule and the introduction of multiparty democracy. Unlike in 1992, however, the minority view is not shared by Tanzania’s president, Benjamin Mkapa, and senior government members.

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—but the government is In fact, the Kisanga report has perturbed Mr Mkapa, who is publicly critical of likely to reject its the commission, accusing it of exceeding its mandate on the grounds that it conclusions was established to solicit public opinion on the constitution, rather than propose changes. As a result, the government is likely to use the findings of the Kisanga Commission to support the president’s view that the current structure of the union should not be changed, or at least that no changes will be proposed until after this year’s election and probably well into 2001.

The clamour for Mr Amour While the debate over the exact form of union to be adopted will continue in to stand for a third term parliament in the coming months, it is quickly becoming overshadowed by a increases— resurgence of the Zanzibar question, as the Zanzibari president, Salmin Amour, now appears to be angling for a third term in office. This has been backed by some Zanzibari members of CCM, who are actively campaigning to have the constitution changed in order to allow this. Mr Amour will not make the running over the issue himself, preferring instead to make it appear as if he is responding to a mounting groundswell of popular opinion in favour of such a change rather than actively driving it.

—and Mr Mkapa fails to The issue has already been debated at a meeting of the CCM’s executive take a firm line council in the middle of December, where the overwhelming opinion within the party seems to have been opposed to any change in the constitution to accommodate Mr Amour’s ambitions. However, Mr Mkapa did not immediately overrule the Zanzibari leader, and the issue is likely to be brought up again at an extraordinary session of the CCM planned for late February. Mr Mkapa’s ambiguous response has not gone down well with all members of his party. Many, mostly notable “Nyererists” such as Joseph Warioba and Joseph Butiku, have criticised the president for failing to quash the idea within the executive committee before it becomes an even larger problem. Not surprisingly, these figures hark back to the Nyerere days, arguing that he would have dealt with the issue firmly and that since his death Mr Amour has become increasingly unreasonable in his dealings with the mainland government.

Mr Amour may not have Nonetheless, it is unclear whether Mr Amour could actually win sufficient enough support to change support for a constitutional change within the Zanzibari House of the constitution Representatives—the island’s legislative assembly—where he is opposed not only by the members of his own party, but also by the opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF). There are rumours of possible gerrymandering and other tactics to buy off those who would oppose him, but Mr Amour is unlikely to risk such methods. While it is not inconceivable that he could still attempt to go it alone, the most likely outcome is that Mr Amour will back down from his plans. However, he will do so only after securing Mr Mkapa’s support for his own chosen candidate, after which Mr Amour would be able to position himself for his own election to the all-Union presidency.

The dispute will Perhaps a more important outcome of this dispute—coupled with a undermine Mr Mkapa’s deterioration of the political environment, including the ongoing treason trial authority in Zanzibar and the arrest of two leading opposition party members on the mainland (see The political scene)—has been to undermine the authority of Mr Mkapa. Such developments have fostered a growing sense of disillusionment

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among leading members of the party in the past 18 months, that Mr Mkapa has been weak and indecisive in standing up to Mr Amour and generally in carrying out his role as president. While the odds are still strongly against a direct challenge to Mr Mkapa from within the CCM, the growing sense of unease in the party will serve to weaken his position in the run-up to the general election. But such views should not be overstated. If history is a good guide, the CCM tends to back its incumbent president through his two terms in office, with a succession battle only developing if the incumbent chooses to resign or has completed his allotted constitutional term. However, as democracy within Tanzania and the CCM has developed, so has uncertainty about an orderly succession. If Mr Mkapa is to be challenged, the names that crop up most often as possible challengers are those of the minister of foreign affairs, Jakaya Kikwete, and of the former prime minister, John Malecela, as well as that of the CCM stalwart, Gertrude Mongella. Nonetheless, one factor favouring unity within the party is the knowledge that a leadership challenge at this stage would almost certainly be damaging, although not fatal, to the party’s election prospects.

The CCM will have huge Regardless of current questions over its leadership, the CCM has commanding advantages in the advantages in the upcoming election and will almost certainly emerge as the forthcoming election— winning party. While the party’s share of the total vote is likely to drop somewhat, under the current first-past-the-post system it will still retain a large majority of seats in parliament. In part, the party’s strength reflects the fact that for many Tanzanians, especially in the rural areas, it is still the natural governing party and perhaps the only one able to rule the country effectively. Its other strengths include a still monolithic party structure remaining from the long period of single-party rule, when it established party offices in nearly every major village in the country, and not inconsiderable financial resources.

—which will be broadly Despite the arrest and harassment of leading opposition figures, the first multi- free and fair party elections held in Tanzania in 1995 were largely free and fair. The country’s second such elections later this year are likely to follow a similar pattern. In 1995, however, the harassment of opposition politicians remained a feature of the political landscape, as it does now, despite the ongoing development of democracy within the country (see The political scene). To ensure a stronger performance than in 1995, opposition parties will have to concentrate on gathering support in urban areas. Moreover, there is a pressing need for them to promote co-ordination and ensure that the smaller opposition parties do not divide the opposition vote and weaken the chances of the National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi), the party most likely to put up a good showing against the CCM.

Strong growth will The economy is expected to continue to perform well in 2000-01, consistent continue— with the pattern of the past year, in which inflation was in single digits and expansion was driven by growth in mining and—to a lesser extent—tourism. Coupled with increases in gold production and high tourist arrivals in 2000, real GDP growth should be robust, reaching 5.2%. In 2001, after several years of poor weather conditions, it is assumed that more benign climatic conditions and policy reforms to open up fully the marketing of crops will raise real GDP growth further, to 5.7%.

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—but disguise weaknesses However, growth will not be broadly based or generate significant employment in the agricultural sector growth. The main problems for the economy stem from the ongoing weak performance in the all-important agricultural sector and highlight the economy’s narrow base, its limited infrastructure and its continued vulnerability to external shocks. Domestic food production has been lower than expected in some regions, and weak international prices for some of the country's key crops—coffee, cotton and tea—have led to an overall drop in farmers’ earnings, in exports and government revenue. In addition, climatic conditions and long- standing weaknesses in the agricultural sector (see Agriculture) will ensure that Tanzania remains a large food importer in 2000. The external environment for Tanzania’s primary agricultural commodity exports will generally remain unfavourable during the outlook period. The EIU is forecasting that the price of Arabica coffee will fall by 7% in 2000 and by 19.9% in 2001. The price of tea is expected to rise by 1.2% in 2000 before falling by 5.7% in 2001. However, a slight—2.1%—recovery is forecast in the price of cotton in 2000, and this trend will accelerate in 2001, with prices rising by 13.8%, providing some relief to where output has fallen sharply because of the downturn in prices.

Tanzania: prices for main export crops 1998 1999 2000a 2001a Arabica coffee (cents/lb) 135.2 102.7 95.5 76.5 Cotton (cents/lb) 65.3 53.4 54.5 62.0 Tea (pence/kg) 2.01 1.73 1.75 1.65

a EIU forecasts.

—and the mineral sector Although the mining sector has performed well in recent years—expanding by will remain dependent 17% in 1997 and 27% in 1998—this has been almost entirely dependent upon on gold gold, the main source of growth. This trend will continue in the outlook period. We forecast an increase in the price of gold, after three years of declines, to $303/oz in 2000 and $325/oz in 2001. Tanzania’s gold mines are nearly all low- cost producers, and at current prices they will be highly profitable.

Tanzania: gold production 1997 1998 1999 2000a 2001a Production (tonnes) 5.3 5.5 11.1a 27.9 40.0 Price ($/troy oz) 331.4 294.1 279.0a 302.5 325.0 Value ($m) 42.2 38.8 74.3 202.6 312.0

a EIU forecasts.

Tourism should continue Apart from gold mining, the other booming sector of the economy in the to boom outlook period will be tourism. Given the weakness of its prime competitor markets, Kenya and South Africa, partly because of perceptions of crime, Tanzania is well placed to benefit from substantial growth in tourist arrivals. Tanzania's drawback is its relatively weak infrastructure compared with the other two countries, but this can also be a marketing advantage in encouraging high-value, low-volume rather than mass tourism. According to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, tourism receipts are targeted to reach $627m in 2000 (see Financial and other services).

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The shilling will stabilise The outlook for the shilling in 2000 remains mixed. Weak international prices for Tanzania’s key commodity exports may mean that the shilling could be vulnerable to the kind of fluctuation it experienced in 1999, when it slipped sharply in July before stabilising in the final four months of the year. However, with the deficit on the current account improving, foreign-exchange reserves should remain robust, and this will mitigate any prolonged downward movements in the currency.

The current-account deficit The deficit on the current account is expected to narrow in 2000 thanks to will narrow rapid growth in gold exports, a lowering in the deficit on the services balance and ongoing high inflows of foreign aid. As a result the deficit on the current account will improve from an estimated $911 in 1999 to a forecast $541m 2000. Despite higher gold exports, the current account may weaken slightly in 2001 to $595m, as the deficit on the services balance increases because of higher costs related to the mining, financial and industrial sectors. Any further positive movement in the current account would require a substantial change in agricultural commodity prices.

The political scene

The government announces The government has formally announced that the general and presidential the election date elections will be on October 29th. Registration of all candidates will start on August 1st, and a final list of candidates for presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections will be announced by August 13th. In the light of this, it is perhaps unsurprising that there have been serious incidents of harassment of key opposition leaders reported both in Zanzibar and on the mainland.

There are new In recent years the political situation in Zanzibar has tended to be much more developments in the tense than on the mainland, following the decision of the authorities in Zanzibar treason trial January 1998 to prosecute 18 members of the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) on trumped-up treason charges. While the trial has dragged on for two years with little progress, it may be speeded up now that the government has

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announced that it will release funds to cover witness expenses. The case continues to be controversial. On January 18th, at a preliminary hearing, violent demonstrations were broken up by the police, resulting in 40 people being arrested.

Police harassment of the The police subsequently stepped up their operations against the CUF. On opposition increases— January 23rd riot police were deployed on the streets to counter a planned anti-government demonstration. While none materialised, the police did search the houses of a number of CUF activists. Several days later police removed all CUF posters and other signs of political affiliation from the Mbuyu Taifa area of the old town, on the grounds that they had been put up without a permit from the municipal council. While this justification was probably technically correct, the events can only be seen as political harassment of the opposition since every major town in Tanzania is covered with political advertising, much of it for the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party, put up without official sanction. Also in late January arrest warrants were issued for an additional eight members of the CUF, including its secretary-general, Seif Shariff Hamad, and vice-chairman, Shaaban Mloo. Shortly after the warrants were issued, however, the Zanzibar attorney-general, Ali Mohammed Omar, was relieved of his duties by the president, Salmin Amour, and replaced by Swaleh Abdallah Dahoma, although it is not clear whether or not the cause of his downfall was over-zealousness in harassing the opposition. The treason trial has been postponed until February 28th to allow the prosecution to review its case following the appointment of Mr Dahoma.

—and two opposition On the mainland the chairman of the opposition Tanzania Labour Party (TLP), leaders are arrested Augustine Mrema, and the party’s vice-chairman, Farah Mzee Farahan, were arrested by police in late November after addressing a public rally near Moshi. Both were detained for 35 days and eventually charged with “inciting chaos”, following disturbances at the December 6th 1998 by-election for the Kigoma- Urban constituency. It is expected that the charges against the politicians will be dropped when they go to court, but the case once again highlights the heavy-handed approach adopted by the police, which seems to hark back to the days when Tanzania was a one-party state and not a nascent democracy.

An identity card is to be The government has announced that it intends to start introducing national introduced identity cards before the forthcoming election. Although identity cards are found in many other African countries and are usually preferable to using passports for identification, there is a suspicion that the requirement for citizens to carry such cards will provide a convenient pretext for police harassment. Tensions are likely to arise from this measure, as the government has clearly stated that one reason why it is keen on introducing cards is to try to detect a perceived influx of illegal immigrants.

The refugee problem will The upsurge in fighting in Burundi towards the end of 1999, and the not go away Burundian government’s policy of regrouping the population into special camps, have caused a large increase in the number of refugees crossing into Tanzania. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), about 55,000 Burundian refugees crossed into Tanzania between September 1999

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and January 2000, forcing the UNHCR to open a new refugee camp at Karago in Kigoma region because existing camps were full. The latest arrivals bring the number of Burundian refugees in camps in north-west Tanzania to 320,000. In a sign of growing international concern, on January 17th the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, visited camps housing Burundian refugees in Tanzania and stated that she would push for international pressure to be applied against governments that harass their own populations and force them from their homes.

The refugee populations in Tanzania are also a political headache for the government, as Burundi has long alleged that the camps are used as a base by Hutu rebels who move freely across the border between the two countries. Tanzania has long denied that it allows this to happen, but in a debate at the UN Security Council on January 19th over the Burundian conflict a thinly veiled diplomatic rebuke was delivered to Tanzania for laxity in restricting crossborder attacks from its territory by the Hutu militias. Tanzanian and Burundian authorities have since met to discuss means of improving crossborder security.

Nelson Mandela replaces The Tanzanian government must hope that the appointment in December of Julius Nyerere in the the former South African president, Nelson Mandela, as mediator in the Burundi peace talks Burundian peace talks, following the death of Nyerere in October, will enhance prospects of finding a solution to the conflict. Tanzania is keen to retain influence in the peace talks, held under the aegis of the Nyerere Foundation. In this regard the government was pleased by Mr Mandela’s decision to retain top Tanzanian officials involved and to keep the talks based in Arusha. Mr Mandela brings with him immense personal prestige and skill from the South African experience of reaching a political settlement, although he will face a substantially different conflict involving a full-scale civil war, multiple military and political groups and the overlapping regional conflict in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo.

Economic policy

The domestic fuel market is On January 1st the government announced the full liberalisation of the liberalised domestic fuel market. But, as is often the case, it has hedged the process with a cumbersome bureaucratic requirement. Having delayed the reforms because of fears that liberalisation would lead to the importation of substandard fuel products and higher prices, importers are now required to obtain the approval of the Bank of Tanzania. For this, they need to provide a pre-loading confirmation of the specifications of the imported fuel products and the price. While it must be hoped that this requirement will be dropped as a competitive market develops, it does show that the government is still extremely cautious about many aspects of liberalisation, despite over a decade of structural adjustment.

The high cost of electricity A survey of industries conducted by the international accountancy firm, becomes an issue— PriceWaterhouseCoopers, has found that high utility prices, of electricity in particular, topped the list of complaints from over 60 Tanzanian industrialists and were considered an important factor in the cost of production and in

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undermining export competitiveness. This is unsurprising. Industries in Tanzania have long complained about the high cost and erratic supply of electricity, which has forced many of them to invest in their own costly back- up generating facilities. Further support for the view that electricity is too expensive in Tanzania was provided in a recent study by the South African energy consulting company, SAD-ELEC, of electricity prices in 11 Southern African countries. This found that the Tanzania Electric Supply Co (Tanesco) had some of easily the highest tariffs in the region.

—but tariff reduction is Although the government announced in July 1999 that it would like to see no closer Tanesco reduce tariffs by 20-50%, no concrete action has been taken to date. Reportedly, the proposed power tariff reductions have been approved by Tanesco and the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, but await the approval of the Ministry of Finance, which would need to increase its subsidy to the parastatal in order to offset the loss in revenue. Although there is undoubtedly logic to such a requirement, it fails to address the more obvious need to open the sector to competition in order to increase supplies and push down prices. Subsequently, however, the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Energy, Patrick Rutabanibwa, stated that the ministry is now pushing ahead with plans for privatisation of the electricity supply sector. In what is a typically slow route to liberalisation, he also stated that this would be only after a three-year period when, he hoped, Tanesco would be in good enough shape to allow the government to proceed with privatising the company.

The World Bank is to The World Bank has announced a new project to support the development of promote private-sector the private sector in Tanzania, through a recently approved $49.5m credit. The development project will support private-sector growth through:

• providing technical advice in preparing parastatals for sale or closing down unprofitable ones;

• providing support to design and implement regulatory frameworks for privatised utilities; and

• facilitating increased dialogue between the private sector and the government on the reform process.

While this type of aid package should help to speed up the privatisation and liberalisation programme in the long run, it does not change our view that such reforms will be put on the back burner in the run-up to this year’s election.

Higher tax collection is With a general election looming, the government is beginning to prepare key targeted— proposals for the June budget. The main problem facing the government from a political point of view is that, while the budget deficit is manageable, there is little room to increase expenditure without raising additional revenue. Raising taxes appears not to be an option in an election year; instead, the focus of the budget on the fiscal side is likely to be an effort to broaden the tax base and ensure greater compliance in a country that traditionally has a high level of tax avoidance. Recent campaigns along these lines by the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) include efforts to increase value-added tax (VAT) revenue and to reduce smuggling into the country, especially via Zanzibar. However, such

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campaigns can also backfire on the TRA, with many smaller traders complaining of harassment. Another factor working against extra expenditure is that revenue in recent months has been substantially below forecasts, and under the current cash budgeting system the government cannot spend money that it does not have. The government has delayed payment of salaries at times in the last three months, citing problems in raising sufficient revenue. According to recent data from the Bank of Tanzania (BoT, the central bank), the cumulative deficit, before grants, to December 1999 stood at TSh24.9bn ($31m), although after grants this fell to only Tsh1.8bn.

—and the government The government has been stung by the fact that it has been ranked as the third maps out an anti- most corrupt country in Africa, ahead of only Cameroon and Nigeria, in the corruption strategy annual corruption perceptions index of the Berlin-based organisation, Transparency International. Recently the government has stepped up its anti- corruption campaign, with the president, Benjamin Mkapa, asking donor countries to provide more support for the government’s corruption watchdog, the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB). In the middle of January the PCB unveiled its National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan, which is supposed to provide a framework for senior government officials, policymakers and other key actors to deal with the issue. This new plan is also part of the national strategy on corruption announced in November by the President’s Office. This has the ambitious goal of achieving “zero tolerance” of corruption by the suitably distant date of 2025. In a first sign of stepped-up efforts to take a firmer line against official corruption, a retired permanent secretary in the Ministry of Works and five others were recently charged with corruption in the high court in Dar es Salaam under the Economic Sabotage and Organised Crimes Act.

Corruption perception index: selected sub-Saharan countries, 1999

World ranking Country Score 24 Botswana 6.1 29 Namibia 5.3 34 South Africa 5.0 36 Mauritius 4.9 45 Malawi 4.1 45 Zimbabwe 4.1 56 Mozambique 3.5 56 Zambia 3.5 58 Senegal 3.4 63 Ghana 3.3 75 Côte d’Ivoire 2.6 87 Uganda 2.2 90 Kenya 2.0 93 Tanzania 1.9 98 Nigeria 1.6 99 Cameroon 1.5 Sub-Saharan average 3.4 Source: Transparency International.

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The domestic economy

Economic trends

The economy performs On the surface the Tanzanian economy performed reasonably well in 1999. Real well— GDP growth remained relatively robust, at 4.1%, and inflation fell well into single digits. However, growth was driven largely by expansion in the mining sector; it was not broadly based and did not generate significant employment.

—and the rate of inflation According to the Bank of Tanzania (BoT, the central bank), annual average falls steadily during 1999 inflation in 1999 was 7.9%, down from 12.8% in 1998. The fall was attributable to declines in the non-food and food components of the index, with the non-food component now at a year-on-year rate of only 3.7%, down from 6.1% at the start of the year. As with many developing countries, food is the largest component of the overall consumer price index, where it accounts for 71.2%. This means that of the 7.9% year-on-year increase, 86% was the result of the rise in food prices.

GDP is likely to be revised The manufacturing sector in Tanzania may be twice as large as shown by upwards official statistics, according to research from Eindhoven University in the Netherlands. This has raised questions about the reliability of GDP data published to date. Using the 1992 input-output tables to compare their data with those published in the national accounts, researchers have found that, while there is both under- and overestimation of GDP in nearly all sectors of the economy, the manufacturing sector was particularly underestimated and may actually account for 18% of GDP, rather than 8% as previously assumed. When the revisions are introduced into the official statistics, they should also lead to a substantial upward revision in the overall level of GDP.

The shilling stabilises after After a long period of stability, the Tanzanian shilling experienced some its mid-year fall fluctuation over the past year, according to recent data. From Tsh708.48:$ at the end of May 1999 the exchange rate fell rapidly, reaching Tsh790.48:$ at the end of July—a fall of 11.6%. However, following the sharp downward adjustment, the exchange rate stabilised and has traded in a thin band of Tsh796-797:$1 up

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until the end of January this year. This fall is not necessarily alarming, and it is not unusual for exchange rates to experience periods of fluctuation.

Agriculture

Food production recovers— According to recent data, cereal production in 1998-99 improved moderately from the previous year, when the country experienced a major drought-related food crisis, although production was still below the average for much of the 1990s. Nonetheless, non-cereal food production was up, a trend that is expected to be maintained into 1999-2000. With erratic rainfall set to continue in 2000, recent reports indicate that Tanzania may need to import some 600,000 tonnes of food this year, compared with 550,000 tonnes in 1999.

—but the sector is still Despite the fact that the need to import food has become an annual necessity, hindered by poor the government is still seen to be dragging its feet in announcing its long- government policy awaited agricultural policy. The problems confronting the sector have remained pretty much unchanged for much of the 1990s. Although price liberalisation initially moved ahead rapidly, full liberalisation of purchase and marketing procedures has been largely confined to export crops. The government has remained unwilling to open food crop marketing up fully to the private sector, and it has been left in the hands of state marketing boards. In addition to the ongoing poor performance of the various marketing boards, food crop production continues to be held back by poor infrastructure and the lack of rural credit facilities. If the government is to see a marked improvement in the sector, it will need to begin to address these constraints as well as lay out how the private investors can become more deeply involved in the sector, especially in the marketing of food crops.

There are new problems The low price of cotton on world markets has continued to have a negative with cotton marketing effect. Following the higher prices paid to farmers in the early 1990s and the liberalisation of cotton marketing in 1994, output increased from the low levels of the early 1990s to reach 84,500 tonnes in 1997. Falling world prices for cotton, however, have meant that the last two years have been a difficult time for cotton farmers and output has fallen sharply.

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Tanzania: cotton production 1990 1997 1998 1999 Production (‘000 tonnes) 49.0 84.5 69.9 35.6a Earnings (TSh m) 14.8 79.6 31.6 25.3a International price (cents/lb) 76.9 79.4 65.3 53.4

a EIU estimate.

Sources: Tanzania Bureau of Statistics; EIU.

As a result of these depressed conditions for the sector, much of this year’s crop is believed not to have been collected and is lying unsold in villages around the country. This situation is similar to that in the early 1990s when farmers refused to sell their crop at the low prices offered by the state-run cotton board, the Nyanza Co-operative Union (NCU). The current problems seem to stem from the fact that many of the new private buyers suffered badly last year from the fall in the world price and were unable to purchase as much this year or offered the farmers prices that were too low. The NCU has therefore had to step in to buy cotton to ensure that farmers can at least purchase new seeds for the following year. The liberalisation process went relatively smoothly at a time of buoyant world prices and rising output, but there are bound to be more problems at a time of low world prices, although the situation can be expected to stabilise eventually.

A tobacco research In order to address the downward trend in tobacco production in recent years, institute is to be a new body, the Tobacco Research Institute (TRI) has been established that is established due to start operations in time for the 2000/01 growing season. The decline has, in fact, been so dramatic, that the Tanzanian Cigarette Company has been forced to import tobacco from Malawi and Zimbabwe in order to maintain production levels. The TRI is to work with the state Tanzanian Tobacco Board in researching into the main problems confronting farmers and how output and quality can best be increased.

Tanzania: tobacco production 1997 1998 1999 Production (‘000 tonnes) 52.0 37.8 29.0a

a EIU estimate.

Mining and energy

Gold production doubles Gold has continued to lead the mining sector: production more than doubled in 1999 in 1999 to 11.1 tonnes from 5.5 tonnes the year before. In contrast, the output of other minerals has stagnated and even fallen. For example, diamond output fell from 123,100 carats in 1997 to 95,300 carats in 1998, while gypsum output fell from 46,300 tonnes to 18,000 tonnes in 1998. This is in spite of the fact that the government has been keen to encourage investment in the mining sector and is still working on a new mining act to facilitate this.

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The government needs to Gold production is planned to rise rapidly in the next two to three years, when review its policy toward Tanzania is expected to emerge as one of Africa’s largest gold exporters. But small-scale miners output could be higher if the government reduces the high level of mineral smuggling by small-scale artisanal miners. A study by the Tanzanian-based Economic and Social Research Foundation has found that 70-85% of the country’s gold output was smuggled into Kenya in 1997, largely because of the more favourable tax regime there. Similar figures apply to other valuable minerals and gemstone: estimates by the Tanzania Chamber of Mines have placed the annual value of smuggled minerals at $200m—more than double the value of officially recorded mineral exports. While the proportion of total gold output that is smuggled will fall as new output from large-scale mines comes on stream, the study has underlined that the government needs to reduce and simplify the tax burden for small-scale miners, or simply exempt them altogether and look for alternative ways of raising revenue from the trade.

The Songo-Songo project The long-delayed Songo-Songo gas-electricity power project is at last showing may finally start some signs of progress. Songas—a joint-venture between Ocelot Energy and Trans-Canada Pipelines—confirmed that it is in the process of drawing up tender documents for two major contracts: the installation of a gas collection plant and the laying of a 323-km pipeline from Songo-Songo island to the mainland, where it will feed a proposed 110-mw power station. The project has been delayed for two years by the ongoing dispute over the deal between Tanesco and a Malaysian-backed company, Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL), which has been sharply criticised by the World Bank and other donors as being too expensive and over-favourable to IPTL (3rd quarter 1998, page 19). Under the terms of the original deal, Tanesco would have been required to purchase electricity from IPTL at rates that would have effectively bankrupted the company. The dispute between ITPL and Tanesco is currently being mediated by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ISCID), although in the meantime talks with the Tanzanian government, Tanesco and the World Bank have allowed the project to resume. Backers for the Songo-Songo project include the World Bank, the European Investment Bank and the Commonwealth Development Corporation.

Further energy exploration As well as moving ahead with the Songo-Songo project, Tanzania is also is proposed attempting to attract international interest in a new round of oil and gas exploration licences. The government expects to announce the round, based on new seismic data, in the middle of 2000. Any new finds are to be developed under production-sharing agreements (PSAs) between international companies and the government, which is keen to demonstrate that the terms available to prospectors are extremely favourable by international standards.

Infrastructure

Reforms in the road sector The Ministry of Works has announced that it will embark on two major are announced— programmes to upgrade the country’s road network. The first, which is to run from 2000 to 2002, is the Emergency Roads Rehabilitation Programme (ERRP), aimed at restoring parts of the road network that were damaged by heavy rains

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in 1998. The government has announced measures to strengthen its institutional capacity to manage road maintenance, addressing what is a critical need after years of failure either to upgrade or maintain the country’s sprawling road network. As announced in the 1999-2000 budget, the government has also now set up a Road Fund Board to oversee the rehabilitation and maintenance of the road network. In addition, the government is to establish Tanroads, an independent agency, to implement road projects on its behalf. Progress in establishing Tanroads has been delayed, however, because the authorities have been unable to determine the exact relationship between it and the other two key actors, the Ministry of Works and the Road Fund Board.

—including a new Despite these delays, the Ministry of Works announced that it is to move ahead road project with a new, third stage of the Integrated Roads Project (IRP). This will run from 2000 to 2010 and aims to pave 2,500 km of trunk roads, with up to 90% of costs covered by donors. The programme should become the first major project to be implemented by Tanroads which, it is hoped, will lead to an improvement in implementation compared with earlier stages of the IRP. Although the first stage of the IRP, in 1990-96, was relatively successful, with 1,454 km of road being paved compared with a target of 1,526 km, the second stage, which has just been completed, was considerably less successful, with as little as 20% of its targets being achieved in some areas.

Financial and other services

The stock exchange is Trading in shares in Tanzanian Tea Packers Ltd (Tatepa) commenced on boosted by a new listing— December 6th on the Dar es Salaam stock exchange (DSE). The listing brings the total number of traded companies on the exchange to three—the other two being Tanzanian Breweries Ltd (TBL) and Tanzanian Oxygen Limited (TOL)—in addition to a bond from the East African Development bank. The primary importance of Tatepa’s listing is that it is the first private company to seek a share issue—the other two previous listings involved the sale of government stakes in privatised companies. The Tatepa listing also represents the type of company that would benefit from access to capital markets and that the DSE would like to attract in the future—small to medium-sized companies needing to raise capital quickly to finance their own expansion. In statements to the press the DSE Chief Executive, Hamisi Kibola, was upbeat about the prospects for the exchange, and announced that the DSE hopes to push ahead with the listing of the Tanzania Cigarette Company, British Petroleum (Tanzania) Ltd and even some of the gold mining companies setting up operations in the country. The DSE has also announced that it is to increase trading days from two to three per week. Although foreigners are not currently allowed to purchase shares on the exchange, Mr Kibola announced that this had been recommended to the government in order to give the market more liquidity and boost demand further, although foreign ownership is likely to be restricted to about 10% of market capitalisation.

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—but is dragged down by a The performance of the DSE was relatively good in 1999, although the index poor performer has been dragged down by the poor performance of TOL, which recorded a cumulative loss of Tsh443.3m ($552,000) in the first half of 1999 and continues to be plagued by poor cashflow and high debt following its rapid post-privatisation expansion. The company is developing a restructuring plan in conjunction with the Parastatal Reform Commission, although its main hope for a long-term resolution to its problems may lie in finding a strategic investor that can bring new money and management skills to the company.

The NSSF will move into A big buyer of shares in the DSE has been the government’s National Social property investment Security Fund (NSSF). However, as with many larger investors in Africa, the NSSF’s main problem is in finding enough suitable investments. Having already bought heavily into the stock exchange as well as government bonds and Treasury bills, the NSSF has now moved to diversity into real estate. Moreover, it has started to diversify its investment outside of Dar es Salaam.

There is a pause in The performance of the tourism industry was steady in 1999 and, according to tourism growth the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, total earnings were $578m, up slightly from $570m in 1998. This is a slowdown from the rapid growth of recent years, although earnings are targeted to increase further this year, to $627m. Tourism will also receive a boost during 2000 from the planned privatisation of some of the lodges and hotels currently operated by the parastatal company, Tanzanian Hotels Investment (Tahi), which would introduce much needed new investment and marketing skills.

Tanzania: tourist visitors 1990 1994 1997 1998 Number of visitors 153,000 261,595 326,192 482,000 Source: Bank of Tanzania, Economic Survey.

Foreign trade and payments

Exports fall in 1999 The Bank of Tanzania (BoT, the central bank) has recently published its provisional trade figures for 1999. These show that exports fell to $541m, down 8.8% from $588.5m in 1998 owing to weak prices for the country’s main agricultural commodity exports. Imports continued to grow, rising to $1,418.6m and resulting in a trade deficit of $877.5, compared to $777.5m the year before. Tanzania: trade balance ($ m) 1997 1998 1999 Exports 752.5 588.5 541.1 Imports 1,148.0 1,366.0 1,418.6 Trade deficit 395.4 777.5 877.5 Sources: Tanzanian Revenue Authority, Customs Department; Bank of Tanzania.

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While imports grew by 4.8% on an annual basis, the authorities will draw comfort from the fact that imports of consumer goods increased by only 2.8%, according to the provisional data. Intermediate goods increased by 14.9%, with the level of capital goods imported remaining roughly constant. This indicates that much of the import growth during the year was for part-processing in Tanzania or investment, rather than for consumption. Food imports also fell from the very high levels of 1998, but still remain high.

Import procedures are Speaking at a recent training seminar, the chief executive of Cotecna improved Inspections SA, the Swiss company contracted to manage Tanzania’s customs, was optimistic about the prospects for the company speeding up the passage of goods through Tanzania’s ports, the slow pace of which has long been a complaint of businessmen. Cotecna has been contracted by the Tanzanian Revenue Authority to speed up the process and to improve the overall level of revenue collection at the ports. Early indications point to some progress, although further sustained improvements will be necessary to confirm whether the partnership is working.

Regional integration moves The heads of state from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania met in Arusha on a step forward November 30th 1999 to sign into force the East African Co-operation Treaty, which is meant ultimately to establish an economic union for East Africa. However, not too much should be read into this development, as the document signed in Arusha sets out only a broad vision of how economic union is to progress over the next 20 years. In fact, the signing was only possible in the context of differences remaining unresolved over the exact timetable and scale of tariff barrier reductions that would occur within the new economic grouping. These are to be negotiated over the next four years.

There was already deadlock on these matters up to the signing ceremony because of the concerns of the Tanzanian and Ugandan business sectors that they would not be able to compete with Kenyan goods following any opening of their own markets. Although the economies of both Tanzania and Uganda have outperformed that of Kenya in recent years in promoting market reform and achieving macroeconomic stability and economic growth, the higher overall level of development in Kenya still provides it with a considerable advantage over the other economies. Moreover, as the Kenyan economy begins to recover in 2000 and 2001, its role as the major regional economic power will come to the fore again and will make it even harder to make rapid progress with on-going negotiations to establish the Commission for East African Co-operation.

Comoros

Political structure

Official name République fédérale islamique des Comores

Form of state Federal Islamic republic

Legal system Based on Code Napoléon, the 1996 constitution and sharia (Islamic law)

National legislature Council of State, composed of army (12) and civilian (eight) personnel

Head of state President

National government Colonel Azali Assoumane seized power in a military coup on April 30th 1999

Main political parties After the April 1999 coup 24 main parties and movements, both conservative and reformist, came together to form a single political movement whose sole objective is the restoration of civilian rule. Some of these parties have since joined President Assoumane’s government. Prominent parties in Comoros include the reformist Front pour le redressement national (FRN), the Islamist Front national pour la justice (FNJ), the Forces pour l’action républicaine (FAR) and a long-standing conservative alliance, the Rassemblement national pour le développement (RND). The RND itself includes the Union nationale pour la démocratie aux Comores (UNDC), the Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le renouveau (RDR), Udzima, Uwezo, Maecha Bora and Chuma

President Colonel Azali Assoumane

Prime Minister Bianrifi Tarmidi

Committee of state Civil service, employment & work Miissane Hamdia commissioners Culture, youth, sports & information Captain Ahmed Sidi Economy, commerce, industry & artisans Assoumani Aboudou Equipment & energy Djaffar Mmadi Finance, budget & planning Soundi Abdou Foreign affairs & co-operation Souef Mohamed El-Amine Interior & state institutions Mohamed Abdou Soimadou Justice & Islamic affairs Abdoulbar Youssouf National education & francophonie Moinaécha Yahaya Production & environment Charif Abdallah Public health, population, & women’s affairs Mlahaïli Mistoihi Public works & employment Abdallah Kouati Tourism, transport, posts & telecommunications Saïd Dhoifir Bounou

Central bank governor Mohamed Halifa

Economic structure

Annual indicators 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999a GDP at market prices (Cfr bn) 80.3 81.9 84.7 88.9 93.0 Real GDP growth (%) –3.9 –0.4 0.0 1.1 0.5 Consumer price inflation (av; %) 7.1 1.4 2.5 4.0 4.0 Populationb (‘000) 610 630 650 671a 692 Exports fob ($ m) 11.2 9.2 8.8 9.3 8.0 Imports fob ($ m) 44.5 35.7 46.2 49.5 51.0 Current-account balance ($ m) –19.0 –16.0 –13.4 –17.2 n/a Reserves excl gold ($ m) 44.5 50.5 40.5 39.1 37.7 Total external debt ($ m) 204 206 197 n/a n/a External debt-service ratio, paid (%) 1.6 2.3 3.9 n/a n/a Exchange rate (av; Cfr:$) 374.4 383.7 437.8 421.6 458.0

February 18th 2000 Cfr500.4:$1 Origins of gross domestic product 1997c % of total Components of gross domestic product 1997c % of total Agriculture, fishing & forestry 38.6 Private consumption 90.7 Manufacturing 5.3 Government consumption 15.1 Services 56.0 Gross domestic investment 18.7

GDP at market prices 100.0d Exports of goods & non-factor services 19.7 Imports of goods & non-factor services –44.6 GDP at market prices 100.0d

Principal exports 1997e $ m Principal imports 1996e $ m Vanilla 3.7 Rice 14.0 Ylang-ylang 2.4 Petroleum products 7.7

Main destinations of exports 1997f % of total Main origins of imports 1997f % of total France 42.9 France 58.9 US 42.9 South Africa 14.9 Germany 7.1 Kenya 6.0 Madagascar 3.6 a EIU estimates. b IMF, International Financial Statistics. c IMF and Comoros Directorate of Statistics. d Total does not sum in source. e Bank of France. f Based on trading partners’ returns; subject to a wide margin of error. Quarterly indicators

1997 1998 1999 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr Financial indicators Exchange rate Cfr:$ (av) 441.27 457.25 451.15 443.11 418.33 438.31 465.55 469.32 Cfr:$ (end-period) 449.10 463.84 458.80 421.23 421.65 457.99 476.34 461.29 M1 (end-period; Cfr m) 10,603 10,628 10,430 12,129 10,015 9,849 10,079 12,505 % change, year on year –18.6 –14.8 –12.1 6.3 –5.5 –7.3 –3.4 3.1 Foreign reserves Reserves excl gold (end-period; $ m) 40.48 37.08 36.91 43.18 39.14 36.22 35.62 40.11

Outlook for 2000-01

Anjouannais are unlikely Comoros will continue to be dogged throughout much of the 2000-01 outlook to back down— period by the twin crises of separatism on Anjouan island and the international isolation which has followed the seizure of power by the military on the main island of Grande Comore since April of last year (2nd quarter 1999, page 22). The continued refusal of the separatist leaders in Anjouan to sign the Antananarivo peace agreement brokered in April 1999 (2nd quarter 1999, page 25), despite an ultimatum from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that failure to do so will result in sanctions, has set the stage for renewed confrontation with the renegade island. Despite the subsequent imposition of sanctions on February 1st, and even the threat of armed intervention, the secessionist leaders have evidently decided to call the OAU’s bluff and remain firm in their demands for substantially more autonomy than granted in the current peace agreement.

—and the military option In the face of the intransigence of separatist leaders which has thwarted a is raised diplomatic solution, the OAU is considering military intervention and has discussed this with the military authorities in neighbouring countries. Naturally, however, the OAU secretariat in Addis Ababa remains extremely cautious about such an undertaking in the knowledge that it could result in a protracted military stalemate against a determined foe, not to mention the risk that full support from the international community may not be forthcoming. Nor is either Grande Comore or north-west Madagascar particularly well- equipped to act as a rear base for an invasion force.

The legitimacy of the The compromised status and legitimacy of the military ruler of Comoros, Moroni government is in Colonel Azali Assoumane, also mitigates against intervention at this time as question the OAU, neighbouring Indian Ocean states—not to mention the local opposition—are all pressing him to step down and return the country to civilian rule. Should he renege on his earlier promise to step down in April this year, Colonel Assoumane’s government could be the object of OAU sanctions. Despite the cool reaction to his attempts to respond to domestic and international criticism by appointing a new prime minister and bringing more civilians into government (see The political scene), Colonel Assoumane appears to be determined that he should be given “a minimum” of two years before holding free, democratic elections on the islands.

—although a consensus on Further confusing the political scene is the fact that the OAU has been unable the way forward is out to establish a consensus among Comorian politicians over who would head a of reach transitional government, should Colonel Assoumane be persuaded to step down. While agreement on the need to form an inclusive transitional government of national unity is largely accepted, a complicating issue is the historical precedent that transitional presidents and prime ministers in Comoros have rarely played a neutral role and have instead positioned themselves to ensure their own political longevity. The prime rivals for the premiership at present appear to be the ousted former civilian prime minister, Abbas Djoussouf, who was ousted by Colonel Assoumane last year, and the

leader of the Shawiri Party, the wealthy retired army officer, Mahmoud Mradabi. Although Mr Mradabi was elbowed out of the chairmanship of the national fuel parastatal in October last year in an attempt by Mr Assoumane to undermine him, he still has not inconsiderable political clout, a point amply demonstrated when he demanded—and received—the post of finance minister for his nephew in the newly reshuffled government (see The political scene).

Renewed World Bank The clearing of payment arrears to the World Bank by the government has led assistance is expected to renewed dialogue between the two parties and the likelihood of aid being resumed. The World Bank, like other donors, will press the government to move ahead with the restoration of civilian rule, although it may stop short of demanding that this be done before it resumes aid. One objective of the World Bank will be to review its existing portfolio of projects to determine whether the present balance is appropriate to Comoros’ needs.

The outlook is mixed The economic prospects for Comoros in 2000-01 remain mixed. The government’s attempts to increase revenue generation and improve the quality of economic management will continue to produce some positive results, while the expected resumption in World Bank assistance may also open the way for increased international aid. In the absence of a truly civilian government, however, more extensive funding from other bilateral sources is unlikely. Political instability and competition from other more competitive destinations in the Indian Ocean area mean that the tourism sector will continue to perform poorly. The aggregate level of exports will also stagnate owing to international sanctions imposed on the island of Anjouan.

The political scene

Neighbouring states put Recent months have seen an increase in regional pressure on Comoros’ diplomatic pressure on military ruler, Colonel Azali Assoumane. Late in 1999 fellow member states of Colonel Assoumane the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) banned Colonel Assoumane and members of his government from attending the organisation’s summit in the

French department of Réunion on March 3rd. The governments of Mauritius and Madagascar both warned that they would stay away from the meeting if Colonel Assoumane or other members of his government were allowed to attend. Although Colonel Assoumane sent a letter to the French president, Jacques Chirac, appealing against the ban, IOC leaders were adamant that their position would only soften if Colonel Assoumane nominated a prime minister and a government of consensus and set out a time-table for democratic elections and the restoration of democracy—demands similar to those of the opposition in Moroni.

—who appoints a civilian In response to these external pressures, Colonel Assoumane backed down and prime minister— on December 2nd named a new civilian prime minister, Bianrifi Tarmidi, previously one of the leaders of the secessionist movement on Mohéli, Comoros’ third—and smallest—island. At the time of his appointment Mr Tarmidi had been co-ordinator of the committee of state and commissioner of state for interior and institutions, as well as having been minister of interior in the transitional government of President Caabi El-Yachroutu (1995-96). Mr Tarmidi’s appointment had been insisted upon by a prominent local power broker and notable on the island of Mohéli, Mohamed Hassanali, who also successfully demanded the retention of three other commissioners from the island and who has now come to be one of Colonel Assoumane’s principal political partners. The measures indicate a new axis of support from Mohéli for Mr Assoumane’s government.

The appointment of the prime minister—an entirely new post—had actually required an amendment to the Constitutional Charter (CC), which had replaced Comoros’ previous constitution that was suspended shortly after the military take-over in April 1999. According to the revised CC, in case of a power vacuum the chairman of the Council of State—the consultative and control body of the government and the civil service—will take temporary charge while a new head of state is selected by the army.

—and a largely civilian After the appointment of Mr Tarmidi as prime minister, Colonel Assoumane cabinet— spent a further week in tortuous negotiations with 22 political parties and small groupings which had earlier decided to support him in order to put together a new government. The closely watched inter-island composition of the new 12–member government includes eight from Grande Comore and three from Mohéli, while only one is now from Anjouannais, compared with two in the outgoing administration. Seven of the new commissioners (ministers) were retained from the previous government, which now includes only one army officer, the Anjouannais Captain Ahmed Sidi, who retains the culture, youth, sport and information portfolio. Moinaécha Yahaya has stayed at the education and vocational training department, while the outgoing minister of finance, Assoumani Aboudou, has been moved to economics and trade and is replaced by Soundi Abdou, a close relative and adviser of Mahamoud Mradabi, a prominent retired military officer who is believed to have personal ambitions for the presidency (4th quarter 1999, page 22). However, the appointment of Mr Abdou appears designed to bind the Mradabi camp into support for the Assoumane government. Newcomers to the cabinet

include the former Marxist leader, Mohamed Abdou Soimadou, who has been appointed to the interior ministry, and Abdoulbar Youssouf, from the Islamist National Front for Justice, who now in charge of justice and Islamic affairs. Colonel Assoumane remains head of state and commander in chief of the army but has relinquished control of the defence portfolio—which has been assumed by a member of the president’s office—in an attempt to defuse foreign criticism of his position as a military ruler .

—but fails to convince the Despite attempts to dilute the military character of his government, Colonel more radical opposition— Assoumane was unable to persuade the more radical opposition, led by the former prime minister, Abbas Djoussouf, to join the new cabinet. Mr Djoussouf concluded—unsurprisingly, in view of the international community’s hostility to the government—that his own credentials as a democrat would be undermined by participation in the administration and has rejected suggestions that the new team was a government of consensus.

—who are far from united Although the opposition has continued to demand Colonel Assoumane’s departure and the restoration of democratic government, they are divided themselves over what government should follow, as there is little support for a return to office of the former president, Tadjiddine Ben Saïd Massonde, who was overthrown by Assoumane in April last year. Mr Assoumane has been quick to take advantage of these divisions and on January 13th announced a minor reshuffle, co-opting more opposition members into government. These include Mahamoud Soilih, a former ambassador to Belgium, who was named secretary-general in the president’s office as well as, Ali Affandi, the leader of the Partie socialiste comorienne (Pasoco), who was appointed head of the president’s private office.

Secessionist leaders on Efforts to seek a solution to the secessionist crisis on the island of Anjouan Anjouan defy OAU through the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) have continued, and in sanctions— December governments in the region met in South Africa. Government representatives and the OAU decided to follow through on earlier threats and issue an ultimatum to the Anjouannais secessionists to sign the Antananarivo Peace Agreement—negotiated in April 1999 and which provides substantial autonomy to all islands in a loose federation—by January 30th or face sanctions (2nd quarter 1999, page 25).

—and call a referendum Ultimately, however, the hard-line secessionist leader, Colonel Said Abeid, refused to back down and ignored the ultimatum while continuing to promote his demand for a loose confederation of states in which each island would be virtually sovereign. Indeed, to strengthen his position further, given the fact that some faction leaders favour compromise with the central government, Mr Abeid pushed ahead with holding a referendum on January 23rd, at which local inhabitants would be allowed to pronounce their views on the Antananarivo peace agreement. Although the referendum, as expected, produced a resounding “no” vote, its democratic credibility as a legitimate expression of public opinion has been compromised by Mr Abeid’s refusal to allow anyone to come to Anjouan to campaign in favour of the Antananarivo agreement. Unsurprisingly, the result has not been recognised by any external

party including, the OAU, France and the central government in Moroni. Similarly, calls by Mr Abeid for the OAU to give way to UN mediation have also been ignored.

International sanctions are After the January 30th deadline passed without agreement from Anjouan, imposed on Anjouan sanctions against the island were implemented by the OAU and Comoros’ regional neighbours. These are primarily targeted against the separatist leaders and their allies both on and off the island and include travel restrictions and the freezing of bank accounts as well as a ban on financial transactions to Anjouan. These and other sanctions are to be tightened in the absence of compromise from Anjouan. The OAU also said that its ministers would consider a military invasion of Anjouan within a month if the secessionists persisted in their refusal to sign the Antananarivo Agreement. Nonetheless, the sanctions have been criticised as being weak—no mechanism for monitoring compliance has been imposed—and it is not clear that they will be sufficient to force the secessionist into making concessions.

Colonel Assoumane rebuffs Nevertheless, the secessionist leaders have evidently felt some pressure, and attempts to restore Mr Abeid has made three attempts to re-launch direct negotiations with the bilateral dialogue central government on Grande Comore in the hope of circumventing the sanctions. These negotiations had originally been initiated last July by Colonel Assoumane, but talks collapsed in October last year, after the Anjouannais secessionists refused to make concessions. On this occasion, however, Mr Assoumane’s government has rebuffed attempts at restarting a dialogue and has reiterated that signature of the Antananarivo Agreement remains non- negotiable. Nonetheless, the OAU secretariat is reportedly displeased that it had been sidelined by these bilateral contacts, which have undermined its authority as mediator. As a result, Colonel Assoumane has since decided to restrict his bilateral contacts in favour of multilateral efforts through the OAU. Ambassadors accredited to the OAU by Comoros’ neighbours, as well as a group of non-regional states—Algeria, Burkina Faso and Togo—have been asked to formulate concrete proposals for a settlement of the Comoros crisis before an OAU council of ministers meeting in Addis Ababa in February. A committee of experts has also been set up to suggest ways to resolve the crisis.

Agreement is reached on Recent events confirming a change in the status of the near-by island of Mayotte’s status as a French Mayotte—which opted to remain a French territory at independence in 1974— territory have been closely followed by Comorians. On January 27th the French government signed an agreement under which the island will remain an overseas territory (territoire d’outre-mer) for ten years, after which its residents will vote on whether to become a département with full status as an integral part of France. During the intervening ten years measures will be introduced to improve the island’s economic and social conditions to levels comparable to other existing French departments, as well as reforms to the island’s legal and administrative systems.

Economic policy and the economy

A vigorous drive continues The government has continued with efforts over the first quarter of 2000 to to raise revenue— control expenditure and improve revenue collection (4th quarter 1999, page 27). It has also carried on with efforts to recover funds owed to the state. In the latest example of this the president, Azali Assoumane, ordered the management of the Office national d’importation et de commercialisation du riz (Onicor; the national rice import agency) to institute legal action to recover Cfr900bn ($18m) in debts due to it. This action is not politically risk-free as those with debts to the company reportedly include powerful local businessmen, senior civil servants and parliamentary deputies. Nonetheless, the court bailiff in the case has already embarked on tough action to recover the funds, seizing vehicles and other assets.

—and rationalise In addition, the government has instituted an audit of state finances which has expenditure resulted in the removal of “ghost” workers from the public-sector pay-roll whose salaries were being fraudulently collected by other employees, as well as the demotion of others who had forged qualifications to gain salary grades to which they were not entitled. As a result of these measures, under way since July, the government has been able to cut the monthly payroll bill by roughly 14%, from Cfr554m ($1.1m) to Cfr478m.

Progress is made on salary The payroll rationalisation has at least helped the government to improve the payments regularity of salary payments. In 1999 public-sector employees were paid ten of their 12 monthly salaries—actually a substantial improvement from recent years—which has provided a modest boost to staff morale. Unpaid school- teachers, who had stayed away from public-sector classrooms to teach in the growing number of private schools, are reported to have begun returning to work in the state schools. The government hopes to make all 12 monthly salary payments due during 2000.

The World Bank may The government has cleared arrears on payments to the World Bank and resume aid reportedly also to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Arrears of $2m—which had accumulated since June 1998—have been paid in three tranches. As a result, the World Bank has reportedly decided to resume disbursements to Comoros which had been suspended since Colonel Assoumane assumed power in a military coup in April last year. These include five main programmes covering education, health, agriculture, social welfare and small business, with a total value of $30m in undrawn funds. A joint mission of the World Bank and the IMF are to travel to Comoros in late February, when the existing project portfolio is to be reviewed.

Assistance will be on the One issue to be discussed with the government during this mission will be agenda for Anjouan— assistance for the separatist-controlled island of Anjouan. The World Bank is reportedly anxious to resume disbursements for existing projects there, particularly for the social sector, in view of the island’s deepening poverty. The central government in Moroni will be requested not to obstruct this in

view of the fact that sanction by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) against the island are meant to target only the separatist leadership and its financial backers, rather than the wider population.

—which is much the The secessionist island endures much the worse development conditions in the worst off Comoran archipelago, given its relatively large population, limited farmland and heavy erosion. Since the start of the current secessionist rebellion and resulting isolation social welfare has deteriorated, and anecdotal evidence points to substantially worsened rates of malnutrition and other social indicators. The island also has much weaker networks of social solidarity than Grande Comore and receives relatively lower expatriate remittances, which are a large source of income on the other two islands.

Aid news

The Islamic Development Bank has provided a loan of $1.8m to the government to finance the expansion of storage facilities on Grande Comore and the installation of modern fire-fighting equipment.

Trade data

Tanzania: foreign trade ($ m) Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Jun Jan-Jun 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1998 1999 Imports cif Food 127.1 45.3 52.2 97.5 227.1 99.2 72.8 Other consumer goods 231.7 333.7 308.3 275.5 311.1 147.6 194.1 Industrial raw materials 128.4 403.9 348.6 186.7 154.3 50.3 103.4 Building & construction 107.2 48.9 42.2 85.8 132.0 76.9 63.1 Oil & products 148.8 194.8 159.4 172.6 102.4 60.4 61.4 Machinery 304.9 292.8 255.5 225.3 389.7 213.5 146.1 Transport equipment 240.5 209.8 202.1 254.2 241.0 116.9 144.4 Total incl others 1,502.7 1,541.4 1,392.0 1,320.3 1,569.3 769.7 793.0 Domestic exports fob Cashew nuts 52.0 62.8 81.8 90.7 108.0 20.8 11.2 Coffee 115.3 141.2 147.6 118.8 108.7 51.0 38.7 Tea 39.5 23.0 25.9 31.9 30.2 19.6 12.7 Tobacco 20.6 26.7 48.3 54.0 55.2 33.7 24.9 Cotton 104.8 120.5 137.2 130.1 47.6 19.8 8.7 Sisal 5.2 6.2 5.3 9.1 6.8 3.1 3.9 Minerals 30.2 44.4 54.2 51.1 26.3 13.6 20.2 Petroleum products 5.5 10.8 13.3 7.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Manufactured goods 76.8 109.7 111.9 110.6 35.8 17.8 14.7 Total incl others 520.3 679.2 785.2 750.7 589.5 242.7 195.2

Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Domestic Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Imports cif 1995 1996 1997 1998 exports fob 1995 1996 1997 1998 Japan 108.0 77.0 74.0 131.0 India 58.0 73.0 66.5 114.8 South Africa 93.5 73.0 96.0 130.7 UK 39.9 41.0 37.4 59.7 UK 145.0 128.0 123.1 122.7 Germany 72.1 74.5 67.8 49.0 Kenya 137.0 161.0 95.7 105.8 Japan 65.0 65.9 60.0 45.6 Netherlands 33.0 33.0 28.2 93.4 Netherlands 41.0 44.0 40.1 45.2 India 71.0 106.8 77.5 89.8 Belgium 10.0 9.0 8.2 26.1 US 66.0 50.0 52.6 81.3 Kenya 12.0 14.0 12.8 26.0 Germany 53.0 45.0 49.6 77.6 Ireland 1.0 2.0 1.8 20.0 Total incl others 1,541.4 1,392.0 1,320.3 1,569.3 Total incl others 679.2 785.2 750.7 589.5 Source: Bank of Tanzania, Economic Bulletin.

Tanzania: UK trade (£ ‘000) Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Nov Jan-Nov 1995 1996 1997 1998 1998 1999 UK exports fob Food, drink & tobacco 2,377 2,644 3,710 3,049 2,588 2,750 Textile fibres & waste 6,870 7,538 7,311 4,786 4,357 5,001 Petroleum & products 77 98 535 196 191 61 Chemicals 8,792 8,997 7,403 6,132 5,429 6,118 Rubber manufactures 844 507 598 487 468 2,262 Paper & manufactures 1,170 546 1,173 481 408 665 Textile yarn, cloth & manufactures 522 652 564 216 190 358 Non-metallic mineral manufactures 986 1,671 661 585 540 377 Iron & steel 1,608 1,809 1,580 456 266 436 Non-ferrous metals 405 181 323 316 293 61 Metal manufactures 2,139 2,556 3,746 3,299 844 2,509 Machinery incl electric 28,562 28,057 24,598 24,056 21,219 19,557 Road vehicles 20,209 14,091 9,459 8,642 8,009 9,520 Other transport equipment 2,192 1,548 1,214 441 439 890 Clothing 969 669 632 586 510 472 Scientific instruments etc 2,566 3,289 3,508 3,674 3,217 3,321 Total incl others 87,412 81,851 77,008 63,732 56,751 58,292 UK imports cif Sugar & products 4,846 5,802 5,380 8,146 8,146 4,410 Coffee, tea & spices 3,475 4,293 5,269 4,785 4,611 2,790 Tobacco & manufactures 4,131 7,611 7,844 5,271 5,238 3,997 Textile fibres & waste 1,502 1,185 1,578 251 226 404 Textile yarn, cloth & manufactures 926 556 348 275 275 26 Non-metallic mineral manufactures 37 742 5,390 2,014 1,423 29 Non-ferrous metals 1,486 0 121 1,094 653 0 Machinery & transport equipment 4,519 1,011 451 1,721 1,607 841 Clothing 4,222 5,255 3,601 3,095 2,956 1,224 Total incl others 27,480 28,983 33,148 29,089 27,427 17,710 Source: UK HM Customs & Excise, Business Monitor, MM20.

Comoros: foreign trade ($ m) Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Exports fob 1992 1993 1994 1995 Imports cif 1992 1993 1994 1995 Cloves 0.41 1.08 1.27 0.36 Meat & preparations 4.43 5.08 3.14 4.47 Vanilla 15.59 19.42 6.72 6.22 Rice 8.16 6.65 6.29 14.05 Essential oils 4.35 3.34 2.26 2.30 Petroleum products 7.19 7.22 6.13 7.75 Total incl others 22.14 25.06 11.39 11.36 Cement 3.31 4.11 4.03 4.42 Iron & steel 2.40 2.52 2.05 2.38 Road vehicles 7.33 6.10 3.89 4.41 Total incl others 68.62 67.76 52.78 62.63

Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Exports foba 1994 1995 1996 1997 Imports cifa 1994 1995 1996 1997 France 8 6 6 5 France 66 92 99 99 US 6 2 6 2 South Africa 12 21 23 27 Germany 1 2 1 2 Kenya 7 8 10 11 Total incl others 18 11 14 11 Madagascar 2 5 6 6 Singapore 5 6 5 4 Total incl others 113 157 164 164 a Derived.

Sources: UN, International Trade Statistics, yearbook; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, yearbook.

Comoros: French trade ($ ‘000) Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 French exports fob Cereals & preparations 815 937 1,408 1,319 2,071 2,845 Chemicals 7,250 7,670 8,451 10,425 10,497a 11,350a Rubber & manufactures 502 449 671 792 822 518 Textile yarn, cloth & manufactures 726 399 578 538 1,221b 1,247b Iron & steel 1,098 1,262 1,489 3,933 6,240c 6,084c Metal manufactures 3,462 3,330 4,740 6,809 1,717d 2,488d Machinery incl electric 15,263 14,393 24,415 25,986 26,796 27,976 Transport equipment 8,896 8,593 14,781 16,348 16,007 14,860 Scientific instruments etc 1,905 1,766 2,954 2,793 2,716 3,443 Total incl others 57,991 59,924 86,632 100,653 97,910 103,087 French imports cif Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 6,417 2,790 1,197 2,085 1,451 2,159 Chemicals 5,042 5,664 5,216 4,831 4,206a 4,231a Total incl others 11,523 8,704 6,525 12,400 5,932 7,219 a Including crude fertilisers and manufactures of plastics. b Including fibres. c Including manufactures and scrap. d Tools etc and miscellaneous metal manufactures.

Source: UN, External Trade Statistics, series D.