NO. 45 OCTOBER 2018 Introduction

The Changing Dynamics of the Question Arzu Yılmaz

The in the Middle East have become significant political and military actors in the context of the fight against IS. One of the most important consequences of this situation has been the transformation of the Kurdish Question. Frustrated with the largely fruitless efforts to achieve equal rights and equal political footing in the coun- tries where they reside, Kurdish parties have tended to change their perceptions and strategies. There is a remarkable shift under way: from the fight for “justice, freedom and equality inside a given nation state” to the “defence of ” as a political ter- ritory. Therefore, a fragmented approach towards the Kurdish Question as a domestic issue of national concern is not realistic anymore. Developments in the Kurdish land- scape require a review of the conventional stance and a comprehensive solution in order to balance competing interests and cope with the evolving challenges in the Middle East.

The cross-border nature of the Arab Spring The Rise and Fall of the that motivated the masses, above all else, “Kurdish Moment” weakened the positions of power centres vis-à-vis their peripheries, where disadvan- In this context, the emergence of the Islamic taged groups live who have been subordi- State (IS) and the role that the Kurdish nated for a long time by authoritarian fighters have played in the struggle against regimes. The Kurdish parties were the most the IS have provided an invaluable oppor- – if not the only – well-prepared groups tunity for Kurdish political actors. Kurdish in the peripheries of imploding nation- leaders were finally on the political scene states in the Middle East. Their political acting in the name of the Kurdish people, and military organisations responded to with political and military support coming the region-wide demand for change in the from the United States as well as some status quo, which was characterised by European states. Thus, it was a historic the widespread repression of free speech, “Kurdish moment” seemingly enabling the human rights abuses, economic misman- Kurds to get rid of denial, subordination, agement, and corruption. and coercion.

Nevertheless, despite the inflexible Baghdad via two separate political power stance of international actors and the risks domains, namely Arbil and Sulaimaniya. stemming from the objections of regional Ultimately, a year after the referendum, actors such as and , the Kurds in political trauma remains for the Iraqi Kurds staged a referendum for independence. and the Kurdish parties. In the eyes of most Tens of thousands of Kurds from four parts people in , the KRG experi- of Kurdistan rallied to construct an autono- ence is over, but no one knows what comes mous region in . Armed conflict broke next. The weak power-sharing arrangement out once again following a two-year-long between the two prominent Kurdish parties peace negotiation process in Turkey. In Iran, – namely the Kurdistan Democratic Party Kurdish actors decided to return to armed (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan struggle after two decades of non-violence. (PUK) – has completely deteriorated; the However, the initial tally of such efforts former is about to be marginalised in Bagh- demonstrated that, for the Kurdish people dad while the latter is losing political ground in the Middle East, the losses turned out to in the KRG. Repercussions from the recently be greater than the gains. held parliamentary elections in Iraq and the parliamentary elections in the KRG demonstrate that reconciliation is unlikely. The Consequences of the On the other hand, the international sup- Referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan port that the are searching for in order to recover is apparently limited, The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with the acknowledgement of the Kurds has been the most remarkable achievement being “good fighters”, but nothing more. of the Kurds in the Middle East. When The international actors’ preference for the the Iraqi army withdrew in the face of IS reconstruction of Iraq’s territorial integrity attacks in 2014, this achievement was is evident. boosted by gaining de facto jurisdiction over disputed areas defined by Article 140 of the Constitution of Iraq. Given this, the The : primary goal of the referendum for inde- The Shift of the “Rojava pendence from Iraq in 2017 was indeed to Revolution” to North Syria expand the de jure boundaries of the KRG through the Diyala, Nineveh, and The ongoing process for establishing an provinces in disputed areas. autonomous Kurdish region (Rojava) in The consequence, however, has been a Syria, like the KRG, is in turmoil. The Kurd- territorially narrowed as well as politically ish-ruled areas are suffering because of and militarily weakened KRG. The destruc- Turkish military intervention beyond its tion in disputed areas is almost irreparable. borders. One of the three cantons ruled by KRG forces lost 40 per cent of the territory the Kurds in Syria, Afrin, is already back in it previously held. With Bagdad’s military the hands of Turkey-backed Syrian opposi- control of Kirkuk, the export of 300,000 tion groups. The remaining two areas are barrels of oil per day from the KRG to Tur- under threat from both Turkish attacks as key came to an end. In disputed areas, the well as the expanding control of the Bashar Iraqi government removed Kurdish officials al-Assad regime throughout northern Syria. from local administrative posts and secu- It is debatable whether the hesitant pres- rity-related positions. Meanwhile, just in ence of the United States on the eastern the province of Kirkuk, 30,000 Kurds lost banks of the Euphrates River would help their homes. The KRG presidency, which Kurdish self-rule to survive. was recognised internationally as the legiti- In this sense, the “Rojava Revolution” is mate representative of the Kurds, was sus- far from meeting the expectations of the pended, and the KRG had to re-engage with Kurds following seven years of war and the

SWP Comment 45 October 2018

2 death of almost 10,000 Kurdish fighters. Escalation of Repression in Meanwhile the use of the denomination “Rojava” has already given way to the term “North Syria”, with an emphasis on the east Behind the walls of the Islamist revolution- of the Euphrates River. Finally, the US-led ary regime in Iran, Iranian Kurdistan had coalition’s distinction between the People’s been relatively quiet since the mid-1990s. Protection Units (YPG), as a legitimate local The Kurdish political parties could only force, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party operate in exile, mainly in Iraqi Kurdistan. (PKK), as a terrorist organisation, tends to For decades, they were far from being able validate the Turkish argument that portrays to mobilise the masses in Iranian Kurdistan. the two groups as one terrorist organisa- Meanwhile, Kurdish activists in Iran be- tion. As a result, the Democratic Union Party came more influential in the political (PYD) cannot participate in the Syrian peace sphere, as experienced during the Green process, either in Geneva or in Astana. Movement in 2009. In the wake of the Arab Spring, this influence increased through the rise of nation-wide demonstrations in Iran. Collapse of the Peace Process When 25-year-old Kurdish woman Farinaz in Turkey Khosrawani died in 2015 while trying to escape a sexual assault by an Iranian mili- The peace process that began in 2013 tary officer, unprecedented protests spread between Turkey and the PKK turned into across Iranian Kurdistan. a destructive war in just two years. Turkey It was during this time in 2015 that the launched an intensive military offensive, Iranian Kurdish parties decided to return to not only against the PKK bases in the moun- armed struggle. The response of the Iranian tains, but also against the PKK-affiliated regime was to increase levels of repression. Kurdish urban militias in the cities. In the Kurdish activists received severe sentences, last four years, the as a whole and the number of death sentences rose have experienced harsh and brutal meas- sharply. There are reports of 135 Kurds ures based on the state of emergency rule. being executed in Iran just between October During the course of this escalation, the 2016 and October 2017. Furthermore, Iran government has forcibly displaced about killed 14 members of Iranian Kurdish par- 500,000 people and destroyed the homes of ties in a rocket attack on their headquarters 255,000 people. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ in Iraqi Kurdistan. Democratic Party (HDP) saw its ousting from the political scene through the imprison- ment of thousands of its members, includ- A Deadlock ing its co-chairs and parliamentarians. In addition, the government removed 93 elected A peaceful solution to the Kurdish Question mayors in Kurdish provinces and took on the level of existing nation-states is evi- direct control of the municipalities by ap- dently not an achievable target in the near pointing state commissioners. Despite this future. The states in question are far from suppression, the HDP finally succeeded in turning into democracies. The Iranian re- crossing the threshold during parliamen- gime remains standing, despite all efforts tary elections held in June 2018. However, to topple it; the reconstruction of Iraq is not considering the overall political situation in progressing; the Assad regime seems poised the newly constituted presidential system of to survive; and even Turkey – a NATO Turkey, no one expects a normalisation pro- member and still an EU candidate coun- cess to take place soon in the Kurdish areas. try – has moved far ahead on its path towards autocracy. Moreover, the response of Western coun- tries to the Arab Spring, for instance in

SWP Comment 45 October 2018

3 Egypt and in Syria, has demonstrated that mentation appeared to represent the very – whatever the extent of massacres, dic- nature of Kurdish society itself. So it was tatorships, and violations of human rights easy to emphasise the political differences – safeguarding the political borders and among the Kurds and to legitimise the con- the territorial integrity of the states is con- ceptualisation of the Kurdish Question sidered the foremost priority. as being merely a domestic issue of the re- Once the IS threat was contained, the spective nation-state. In this sense, Kurds Kurds were called upon to retreat within turned into vulnerable minority groups in the existing national boundaries, as in the respective nation-states, rather than the cases of Iraq and Syria. However, inter- being a nation unto itself. Kurdistan figured national actors were silent when the Ira- as a geo-cultural term without any political nian-backed militia forces took control in reference to Kurdish aspirations. disputed areas of Iraq in October 2017 and This state of affairs, however, has changed Turkey invaded Afrin in January 2018. over the course of recent decades. It was In view of such circumstances, a dead- first the establishment of a Kurdish autono- lock in the Kurdish Question is more likely mous region in northern Iraq in 1992, than any fast solution. A closer look at the and then the emergence of Kurdish rule in changing dynamics of the Kurdish Ques- northern Syria by 2012 that triggered the tion, however, indicates that such a dead- cross-border mobilisation of the Kurds. lock might soon pose serious new challenges They have been reconnected and reorgan- in the Middle East. ised due to four main elements: immigra- tion, armed struggle, border trade/business, and the . Migration reconstructed the The Changing Dynamics strictly separated former identities of Kurds from different nation-states into one Kurd- Traditionally, international actors treated ish identity, with an emphasis on common the Kurdish Question as a domestic issue of ethnicity. the states in the region where the Kurdish Armed-struggle has weakened ideological people reside, namely Turkey, Iraq, Iran, differences in the name of the defence of and Syria. Such a perception was shaped Kurdistan. Enhanced cross-border trade and during the Cold War era, when Western business has allowed for the capitalisation powers supported the central authorities of transborder kinship and tribal bounda- of these states and helped them control the ries and helped new interest groups to political borders. Drawing a sharp distinc- emerge. More than one hundred TV chan- tion between domestic and foreign policies, nels as well as various radio stations and the Kurdish Question remained contained social networks have enabled the Kurds of within national boundaries and was re- different states to communicate with each garded only as a security issue of the indi- other, despite difficulties due to linguistic vidual nation-states. differences. As a result, the Kurds found themselves socially, economically, and culturally dis- connected from one another, while the The Emergence of Kurdistan As a Kurdish identity was reshaped and differ- Political Territory and the Unity entiated in its relation to the dominant of the Kurds nationalist projects of the constituent states. Furthermore, the Kurdish national Thus, it is fair to claim that the Kurdish movements that emerged as a reaction to Question is being reshaped in a fluid these nationalist projects developed in close regional context that transcends national dependency with the geopolitical fragmen- boundaries. Today, the Kurdish struggle for tation of Kurdistan. Given the linguistic and “justice, equality, freedom” has obviously religious differences, however, this frag- switched to the “defence of Kurdistan”. A

SWP Comment 45 October 2018

4 lack of peaceful solutions – besides the able to return to Sinjar by cooperating with restrictions imposed by central authorities the YPG and other PKK-affiliated groups, – encourages bottom-up changes that which launched a prompt rescue operation favour separation rather than integration. for the Yazidis in the face of IS assaults. In recent decades, we have observed the Afterwards, the KDP and the PKK coordinated emergence of Kurdistan as a political term, to liberate Sinjar in 2015. Since then, Sinjar with a greater emphasis on the Kurdish has become a symbol of co-existence be- homeland, in both discourse and practice. tween Peshmarga and the Guerilla connec- Unlike in the past, for instance, Turkish tion between south and west Kurdistan. Kurds consider themselves as Kurdi Bakuri However, the tide soon turned in Sinjar (Kurds from northern Kurdistan) and Iraqi as the Kurdish parties got into a power Kurds as Kurdi Basuri (Kurds from southern struggle on how to rule the city. The con- Kurdistan). The Kurdish people’s political sequence was the militarisation of everyday orientation today is concentrated on the life in Sinjar while the Yazidis distanced Kurdistan theatre more than ever. Accord- themselves from Kurdish parties in order to ingly, the most popular topic of today’s secure their own interests apart from intra- Kurdish agenda is the “unity of the Kurds”, Kurdish conflicts. In the end, both the KDP but not the political developments in the and the PKK forces withdrew, and the city countries where they reside. of Sinjar fell into the hands of Baghdad in However, the Kurdish political parties’ late 2017. responses to these newly emerging expec- It is true that different factors and actors tations have been far from adequate. They have played crucial roles in all of these could hardly unite during the fight against cases. The overall impact of those failures IS and, soon after, were once again trapped on Kurdish public opinion, however, is that in rivalries. In this sense, the loss of Kirkuk, the Kurdish parties have prioritised their in particular, after the referendum in Iraqi own interests rather than the interests of Kurdistan on 16 October 2017 constituted the Kurdish people, and Kurdistan as a a turning point. Regardless of their party whole. Nevertheless, in recent elections, affiliations, the vast majority of Kurdish there have been remarkably lower turnouts people accused the Kurdish political actors in the Kurdish regions. For instance, a Kurd- for that failure, rather than the regional ish voter who expressed his unwillingness and international actors. According to many, to vote in the Kurdistan parliamentary elec- the main reason for the failure was the lack tion said on 30 September: “I only ever of unity among the Kurdish parties. voted in the referendum because that was Such a perception gained strength when for Kurdistan. These elections are for the the Turkish army invaded Afrin a couple of parties, not for Kurdistan.” months after the loss of Kirkuk. The PYD’s On the other hand, both the voters who obstinate dominance over all other Kurdish voted in the parliamentary elections in Iraq parties in , in the end, and the KRG rewarded the KDP vis-à-vis weakened the legitimacy of Kurdish rule other Kurdish parties. Whereas the number and paved the way for Turkey’s interference of votes for the PUK, for instance, decreased via Syrian opposition groups, which had and the other parties did not achieve re- more or less cooperated with these Kurdish markable successes, the KDP increased its parties since the civil war erupted in Syria. vote share. Such a result simply indicates Another case was the withdrawal of all that, despite the negative results, the major- Kurdish forces from Sinjar, a Yazidi-popu- ity of Kurdish voters did not punish the lated district in northern Iraq on the Syrian KDP, who had, in fact, championed the border. Sinjar was under de facto control independence referendum. On the contrary, of the KRG before the IS emerged. When the voters showed less interest in the par- the IS attacked Sinjar in 2014, however, the ties that opposed the independence of the KRG withdrew its troops. The KRG was only KRG from Iraq.

SWP Comment 45 October 2018

5 Even so, it is hard to say that the KDP is whereas KRG Special Forces, Zerevani, basi- more powerful than it was one year ago. A cally consist of ex-PKK fighters who are lack of unity in Kurdish politics apparently originally from Turkey. This is also true for undermines the legitimacy of the power the armed groups affiliated with the PKK – that any party gains via elections or mili- this group already constitutes the most tary success. Nevertheless, after the parlia- diverse Kurdish armed group, as it has oper- mentary elections in the KRG, the KDP will ated in four parts of Kurdistan for decades. likely partner with the PUK, in particular, Accordingly, any Kurdish fighter from any in order to consolidate unity once again in Kurdish armed group in the current context the KRG – although the KDP could easily simply claims that he or she “fights for Kur- form the government with the support of distan” and gives no significant reference to the 11 seats designated to minority groups a geographical region or political party. In in the KRG Parliament. On the other hand, this sense, it is fair to say that the “defence the dominant pro-Kurdish party in Turkey of Kurdistan” as a common cause prevents has already declared that it would look to clashes among the Kurdish parties while build an alliance with the Kurdish parties providing a common ground for co-exist- for the local elections in March 2019. ence as well. According to a Peshmerga commander, if In sum, the Kurdish national cause the Kurdish parties did not clash with each evidently lacks the necessary unity or mili- other during recent developments, it was tary and political capacity to win any power mainly due to armed groups not being wil- struggle over Kurdistan territory. However, ling to do so. Indeed, Kurdish armed groups it is also a fact that there is no other national have not clashed since the early 2000s. Such and/or international offer that could sup- a modus vivendi was achieved following a press a bottom-up mobilisation of the Kurd- power-sharing agreement brokered by the ish national awakening. In this sense, it will Kurdish parties, namely the KDP, the PUK, not be easy to roll back the Kurds within and the PKK, who committed not to inter- national boundaries, especially when the fere in the others’ political and military states in question are either imploding or spheres of influence. However, this state of too fragile to exert dominance over Kurdish affairs has evidently become invalid since settled areas. the emergence of the IS in 2014. All Kurd- ish parties have expanded their spheres of influence by building new alliances with The Role of the West regional and international actors while their armed groups have had to face off Against the backdrop of these develop- against each other on many occasions. On ments, the question arises as to whether the these occasions, however, all groups have fragmented approach to the Kurdish Ques- avoided clashes – except one case in Sinjar tion as a domestic issue of nation-states can in March 2017 – and repeatedly assured still be the sole approach. Clearly, it is hard followers that the Kurdish-Kurdish fight to expect the West to play a decisive role in was over. the context of the Kurdish Question today Such a stance, in fact, relies on two new when Western countries do not identify a dynamics. Despite their strong affiliation “common threat” in the Middle East after with a specific Kurdish party, the Kurdish the defeat of the IS. Even if they came to a armed groups have become more diverse in shared risk-evaluation, the decline of trans- terms of their members’ origins. Unlike in atlantic relations under President Donald the past, for instance, the number of Kurds Trump thwarts any possibility of seeing eye outside of Iraqi Kurdistan in the KRG forces to eye on Iran, Turkey, or Russia. has notably increased. At present, there are Moreover, the new motto of US foreign thousands of Syrian Kurdish fighters, called policy, “America First”, followed by the Leshkeri Roj, under the command of the KDP, imperative of “no boots on the ground”,

SWP Comment 45 October 2018

6 indicates that the American military pres- anti-Iran policy. First, the Iraqi Kurds could ence is about to decline in the Middle East. reduce their dependence on Turkish eco- The United States tends to limit its role nomic and military support. Second, it to “backing” allies instead of engaging in would help Kurdish political actors to co- military interventions. However, Washing- operate with the Sunnis of Iraq in order ton lacks the support of its “strategic allies” to mitigate the Shia dominance in both in the region for this approach. Kurdistan and disputed areas. The tense relationship between the Furthermore, despite their vulnerabili- United States and Turkey, in particular, is ties, the Kurdish political parties still hold eroding their alliance and is prone to lead significant positions in the Middle East to a series of crises. Despite the claim that as the major local powers in the Kurdish- © Stiftung Wissenschaft US support for the Kurdish fighters in Syria populated areas. Without the consent of und Politik, 2018 was the main driver for the tense relations, the Kurdish political parties, it will be diffi- All rights reserved the case of Pastor Andrew Brunson has cult to progress with the reconstruction This Comment reflects recently shed light on the fact that the of – or re-stabilisation in – Iraq and Syria. the author’s views. problem is deeper and has developed to a The Kurdish political parties may not have degree where sentences such as “The White the capacity to unite, but they have the The online version of House has decided to give up on Turkey as capacity to upend domestic and regional this publication contains an ally” are formulated. The most visible balances. This is also true for the Kurdish functioning links to other signs of such escalation are the American parties in Turkey and Iran. In both cases, SWP texts and other relevant sources. sanctions that have exacerbated the eco- the control of central authorities over Kurd- nomic crisis in Turkey. Turkey’s insistence ish-populated areas relies on forces that SWP Comments are subject on buying an S-400 surface-to-air missile undermine their legitimacy and strengthen to internal peer review, fact- system from Russia additionally under- the Kurdish parties’ role as representatives checking and copy-editing. mines the possibility of a recovery follow- of the Kurdish will. For further information on our quality control pro- ing the release of Pastor Brunson. Overall, In this context, the “Kurdish Moment” cedures, please visit the SWP there are indicators that Turkey might close is likely to be resurrected if there is a con- website: https://www.swp- ranks with Russia and Iran. tinued power vacuum due to shifting alli- berlin.org/en/about-swp/ In such circumstances, one could argue ances in the Middle East. European coun- quality-management-for- that the newly emerging alliance between tries are apparently neither prepared nor swp-publications/ Saudi Arabia and Israel as regional partners willing to fill the vacuum. It is also doubt- SWP of the United States could replace the stra- ful whether Russia has the capacity to Stiftung Wissenschaft und tegic alliance with Turkey and function as invest more in the Middle East. Politik an efficient barrier against Iranian expan- In sum, it is obvious that the course of German Institute for sion in the Middle East. The initial signs, these developments urgently require an up- International and however, suggest that Kurdish political ac- date of the Western approach towards the Security Affairs tors are likely to be the beneficiaries of this Kurdish Question in order to cope with Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 newly emerging Saudi Arabia–Israel–US the evolving regional and geopolitical chal- 10719 Berlin alliance. Thus far, neither the Saudis nor the lenges in the Middle East. Correspondingly, Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Israelis have objected to Kurdish aspirations. both the internal and external dynamics of Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has already com- the Kurdish Question are also evolving. It www.swp-berlin.org mitted $100 million for the “stabilisation is unrealistic to try to turn back the clock in [email protected] projects” in the areas held by the Kurdish the Middle East. ISSN 1861-1761 dominated Syrian Democratic Council. In the absence of Turkey, in particular, on the side of the United States, there is no doubt that Kurdish political actors in Iraq would be the other beneficiaries of the US

Dr Arzu Yılmaz is the 2018 IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at SWP. The Mercator IPC Fellowship Programme at SWP is funded by Stiftung Mercator.

SWP Comment 45 October 2018

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