Naval War College Review Volume 69 Article 12 Number 1 Winter

2016 Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam,by Gregory Daddis William Thomas Allison

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Recommended Citation Allison, William Thomas (2016) "Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam,by Gregory Daddis," Naval War College Review: Vol. 69 : No. 1 , Article 12. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/12

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the conflict, as opposed to focusing war, in policy making, and in shap- on how America fought. Moyn then ing and reflecting societal norms, the traces a shift toward the end of the war, book offers many valuable insights. particularly Telford Taylor’s trenchant JOHN MERRIAM criticism of American warfighting practices, which Taylor came to view as unlawful. By contrast, Moyn argues that criticism of our modern conflicts is directed at the conduct of hostilities— Daddis, Gregory. Westmoreland’s War: Reassess- torture, rules of engagement, and war ing American Strategy in Vietnam. Oxford, U.K.: crimes. He ascribes this to the end of Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 320pp. $36.95 conscription and the relative inoculation William Westmoreland, the of much of the American public from American commander of Military As- the effects of our wars abroad, but also sistance Command Vietnam (MACV) to a larger shift in the broad discourse from 1964 through 1968, remains one of about the law of war in the modern era, the most contentious personalities of the in which the means and methods of , still the subject of intense warfare are much more tightly regulated. debate among veterans and historians The final essay builds to some extent on of the war. Prevalent still is the view Moyn’s work, though Larry May’s “War that “Westy” could not see the forest for Crimes Trials during and after War” is the trees, or vice versa, and disastrously less cogent and ultimately less valu- lacked strategic vision and operational able. May sets out to examine whether creativity owing to his parochial focus war crimes trials are best prosecuted on employing Cold War “big unit” while hostilities are still under way or doctrine and attrition to combat an after hostilities are concluded. Contro- insurgent war of unification. The most versially, May argues that war crimes extreme of such assessments of West­ trials during hostilities ought to address moreland comes from Lewis Sorley, who jus ad bellum matters: once a tribunal in multiple works, notably Westmore- finds that unlawful “aggressive war” is land: The General Who Lost Vietnam being waged, soldiers of that side are (Houghton Mifflin, 2011), all but charges on notice that they may be participants Westmoreland with gross negligence. in the war crime of aggression. This Gregory Daddis, formerly of the Military strikes the reviewer as highly implau- History Department at West Point and sible, and for that reason this essay now associate professor of history at is perhaps the weakest of the five. Chapman University, offers what he Ultimately, Law and War is a collec- believes is a more balanced view of this tion of essays that are largely concep- controversial general. In Westmore- tual and highly normative in their land’s War, Daddis argues that instead arguments. As such it is undoubtedly of lacking understanding of the con- a thought-provoking and challenging flict in Vietnam and warmly wrapping book, but also one that is not likely to himself in the comfort of familiar “big be of immediate use to military lawyers unit” doctrine, Westmoreland em- per se. On the other hand, for non- braced approaches lawyers who ponder the role of law in

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and pacification, strongly supported failure is in part one of miscommunicat- building up the Army of the Republic ing what it was he believed he was doing of Vietnam (ARVN), and recognized in , if not disconnecting the importance of establishing the that belief through intent or ignorance political legitimacy of the government from the military reality his forces of the Republic of Vietnam among the faced, especially from 1966 forward. South Vietnamese people. Far from Vietnam was not Westmoreland’s war. the bumbling, career-climbing marti- Yes, Westmoreland has been and prob- net characterized by Sorley, Daddis’s ably will continue to be the face of that Westmoreland at least asserted an intel- conflict. He is, after all, an easy if not lectual understanding of the challenges agreeable target on which to place a of revolutionary warfare. Daddis argues great deal of blame for the American that West­moreland recognized the need debacle. However, as Daddis correctly for pacification and other counterinsur- points out, the Johnson administration, gency measures, but failed to articulate not Westmoreland, placed limitations on his strategy publicly or to his command- what Westmoreland could do in Viet- ers in the field, ending up conducting nam. Political leaders in Washington, what was in essence an unwinnable war. like the military leader Westmore­land, Daddis offers a challenging corrective on eagerly accepted the primacy of Ameri- Westmoreland, but some will find that can firepower as a military solution to his ideas fall a bit short. What West­ both military and political problems in moreland said and wrote, which Daddis South Vietnam. Still, one must accept ably reveals through his extensive and that the officials of the Johnson admin- valuable archival research, does not con- istration grounded those limitations in nect to what happened on the battlefield. deep political earth. At the time, they Westmoreland could not militarily rec- believed they had good reasons for ap- tify the political problems of South Viet- proaching the conflict the way they did. nam, and, as both the military and polit- Ultimately, as Daddis suggests, it did not ical situations continued to deteriorate, matter what those in Washington, Sai- Westmoreland in turn relied more on gon, or MACV did. The war in Vietnam big-unit operations was a bad war that American leadership and the massive firepower the American believed had to be fought nonetheless, military had at its disposal. The military resulting in defeat and tragedy that still situation, arguably, dictated that West- haunts the fifty years later. moreland use his limited resources—yes, Westmoreland’s War is an important limited resources—to stem the tide book. Scholars of the conflict should on the military side at the expense of read it. Daddis offers thought-provoking manpower and resources for pacification arguments that counter the Sorley and other nonkinetic programs. Attri- school on the Westmoreland years of tion, whether Westmoreland intended American involvement in Vietnam. it or not (Daddis argues not), was the Whether one agrees with Daddis (or public face of his strategic and opera- Sorley for that matter), diligent scholars tional approach throughout his tenure must consider Daddis’s point of view as commander of MACV. If that was and his interpretation of the archival indeed the case, then Westmoreland’s evidence. Daddis has made a valuable

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contribution to the discussion, just and failing miserably. He learned the as he did with his similarly provoca- folly of trying to change the behavior tive No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. of an entire community. He writes, Army Effectiveness and Progress in the “Years later, in the Middle East, in the Vietnam War (Oxford, 2011). As for Balkans, in Asia, I would see time and Westmoreland, the debate continues. time again systemized efforts on the part of the United States to pick winners in WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON situations we understood little about. Like my efforts at the Tole Tea Estate’s credit union, they never worked.” Another key theme that emerges is the Hill, Christopher. Outpost: Life on the Frontlines importance of mentoring and how it of American Diplomacy. New York: Simon & enabled Hill to reach his full potential Schuster, 2014. 448pp. $30 in the State Department. His early as- An American diplomat for over three signments under Lawrence Eagleburger decades, Christopher Hill’s service (later Secretary of State under George H. took him all over the globe and into W. Bush) in Yugoslavia and Richard Hol- some of the most challenging cir- brooke (lead negotiator at the Dayton cumstances faced by a member of Peace Accords and later ambassador the Foreign Service. This account of to the UN) at the European Bureau his unique postings during that dy- exposed him to two of the best practitio- namic time frame is a vivid reminder ners of statecraft in the U.S. government. of how much the world has changed. After recounting the great success at In his memoir, Outpost: Life on the Dayton, Hill transitions his narrative Frontlines of American Diplomacy, Hill, to the latter part of his career, in which now a dean at the Josef Korbel School of his record as a Foreign Service officer International Studies at the University is a little more mixed. He describes of Denver, traces his rise in the Depart- the numerous actors, both domes- ment of State in a style that is engaging tic (politicians and members of the and lively. His writing is honest and military) and international, that he reflective as he recounts his interactions encountered during some of his most with some of the most distinguished demanding billets. These postings, and most notorious individuals to grace as the Assistant Secretary of State for the world stage. Over the course of his East Asian and Pacific Affairs, envoy fast-paced narrative, he doesn’t pull any to the North Korean nuclear talks for punches in his assessments of people or the Bush administration, and the U.S. policy decisions and, most importantly, ambassador to Iraq for the Obama he shares valuable and candid insights administration, seem to have left Hill (both successes and failures) and lessons unfulfilled and somewhat frustrated. learned over his distinguished career. He takes both administrations to task Prior to his start in the State Depart- for what he believes was an unhealthy ment, Hill spent two years in the Peace blend of partisan politics and lack of a Corps. He recalls trying to influence a long-term policy vision. Of particular local credit union election in Cameroon note is Hill’s withering critique of Vice

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