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Siege Warfare in the Latin East 1097-1131

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Siege Warfare in the Latin East 1097-1131 By the Sword or by an Oath 235 Chapter 11 By the Sword or by an Oath: Siege Warfare in the Latin East 1097-1131 Ian Wilson The military history of Outremer is full of spectacular sieges. Randall Rogers, in his study Latin Siege Warfare, noted that the scale of these sieges went “far beyond the usual experience of Latin combatants”. Sieges in northern Europe between the late eleventh and early decades of the twelfth centuries were usu- ally small affairs. However, around the shores of the Mediterranean the twelfth century witnessed some of the great sieges that defined the epoch and matched – if not surpassed – Roman siegecraft. These confrontations might eclipse the ‘typical’ sieges, argued Rogers, but it was the former that defined the epoch.1 Numerous studies have followed Rogers’s lead, and these great sieges have become synonymous with crusader siege warfare.2 No agreed-upon list of these ‘exemplar sieges’, as I have labelled them, exists. However, if one uses Rogers’s study as a starting point, about a dozen episodes emerge for this early period. By date of capture these were Nicaea (1097), Antioch (1098), Ma’arrat al-Nu’man (1098), Jerusalem (1099), Arsuf (1101), Caesarea (1101), Acre (1104), Tripoli (1109), Beirut (1110), Sidon (1110), and Tyre (1124).3 These sieges have attracted military historians because they provide a rich insight into the technicalities and technology of medieval siegecraft. Equally for those who study history of the Latin East, they were the decisive encounters, the major turning points in Outremer’s formation. As a group they share several common characteristics that have come to define crusader siege warfare. The vast majority of these sieges involved the great cities of the Mediterranean coast. Overcoming these bastions of Roman engineering 1 Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, pp. 5-7. 2 Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, pp. 93-127; Purton, A History of the Early Medieval Siege, pp. 209- 34. Popular works on sieges have also been drawn to these spectacular sieges although their selection is usually narrower. See Norris, Medieval Siege Warfare, pp. 61-62, 67-69, & 72-74; Hindley, Medieval Siege and Siegecraft, pp. 49-50, 85-87, 117-18, & 139-40; McGlynn, By Sword and Fire, pp. 56-58, 107-08, & 154-57. 3 Rogers continued his analyses to the close of the twelfth century, adding five more sieges to the list: Damascus (1148), Ascalon (1153), Alexandria (1167), Damietta (1169), and Acre (1187-91). © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi 10.1163/9789004362048_013 236 Wilson required great skill and intense effort. These sieges were protracted and com- plex affairs, involving both land and sea forces as well as large pieces of siege machinery, notably the iconic siege tower. Finally, the majority ended in a Frankish victory after they had breached and stormed the outer defences. Cities captured in this way, by force, were held to be at the mercy of the victors, resulting in wholesale massacres and numerous atrocities against the van- quished population. The exemplar sieges produce a coherent narrative, but one must wonder at the narrow focus. The thesis suffers from two critical omissions. Firstly, there is no interest in or analysis of the minor sieges, and secondly, no attention is given to sieges instigated by the Muslim powers of the region. These omissions raise the question: Are historians drawing inaccurate conclusions by focusing too narrowly on decisive sieges and ignoring the bigger picture? Defining Sieges Before turning to the largely ignored mundane sieges, it is necessary here to clarify the definition I have used for a siege and my reason for its usage. A siege refers to any hostile attack against a walled stronghold. I found that a tighter definition of a formal blockade did not work. Medieval warfare was not com- partmentalised. Raiding, for example, was a military action in its own right, but devastating the economic hinterland was often the first step in undermin- ing a fortification. Bohemond’s campaign against Apamea in 1100 illustrates the problem. The sources tell us that Bohemond stayed in the area for several days, laying waste to the crops but not attacking the town. However, a contem- porary, Ibn al-Qalānisī, considered Bohemond’s behaviour as part of a siege.4 The opportunistic nature of warfare also adds an uncertainty over the at tackers’ intentions. In 1115, the Franks attacked Gistrum,5 not with the objec- tive of taking the fortress but to force the nearby Muslim army into open battle. However, the Franks’ initial attack succeeded, resulting in the devastation of the lower town. Yet the burning town failed to bring the Muslim army to battle. The Franks at this point held a council to decide whether to pursue the of­­ fensive or to return to protect their own lands. Fearing Bursuq, the Muslim commander, would outmanoeuvre them, they abandoned the siege and 4 Ibn al-Qalānisī, The Damascus Chronicle, trans. H.A.R. Gibb, p. 49. 5 Gistrum remains unidentified. Asbridge and Edgington in Walter the Chancellor’s The Antiochene Wars, p. 94, n. 104, suggested that the citadel could be Shaizar or one of two forti- fications, Tall ibn-Ma’shar or Jisr al-Shugar..
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