Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Police Modernization in Zambia

Methods

This is exploratory qualitative research based on 15 days in Zambia in August 2017. I conducted 22 interviews with Zambia Police, US Embassy personnel, non-governmental (NGO) workers, local Zambian officials, and others, all of whom I selected through a snowballing methodology. Direct observation of various facets of Zambian institutions, street life, and day-to- day interactions of its people complemented the semi-structured interviews. Six of the days in country I passed in Lusaka, the capital, with the remainder spent on a 40-hour round trip bus trek up through the Copperbelt cities of Ndola and Kitwe, and Westward through the frontier towns of Solwezi and Mwinilunga, the latter being on the Angola and Congo border and the field site of anthropologist Victor Turner.1 Review of local print-based newspaper articles and archival material completed in-country research activities. Because this is a single-N case, my analytical goal is descriptive, not causal.

Modern Zambia

The creation of the modern nation state of Zambia owes itself to the actions of 19th century British missionaries and colonialists who formed governing coalitions with the Bemba peoples in what was called Northern Rhodesia. The development of a modern copper industry and attendant railway in the 1930s created urban concentrations from Lusaka to the Copperbelt seemingly necessary for a post-Westphalian nation state with a complex economy at its base.

Political scientist Robert Bates has suggested that rural-to-urban migrants in Zambia’s thriving

1 See Victor Turner, The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1967).

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Copperbelt were the shock troops of the nationalist period,2 and Kenneth Kaunda of the Bemba region would be the leader of the newly independent Zambia in 1964 and would preside over the one-party state represented by UNIP (1968-91).3 Long considered a relatively successful sub-

Saharan democracy, Zambian politics became tumultuous with the death in office of Michael

Sata (Patriotic Front, PF) in 2011. As of the date of the fieldwork of this paper, Hakainde

Hichilema (United Party for National Development, UPND) contested the results of the 2016 national elections that put Edgar Lungu (PF) in office, and HH was incarcerated on “treason” charges for a portion of the field visits. According to at least one knowledgeable observer, this political feud is ethnically based, with the PF being a de-ethnicized label for a Bemba coalition and the UPND the same for a Tonga and Losi coalition.

Police and Modernization: Two Conceptions

Citing Daniel Lerner, Samuel Huntington in his classic Political Order in Changing

Societies described modernization as “a multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity.”4 In many ways, Zambia has until recent times been a very traditional society. Consider that the 1969 census, the first after independence in 1964, reported that up to 9% of the population living in male-headed “African Households” in Zambia had between two and “5+” wives. No such similar figures were reported for female-headed

2 Robert Bates, Rural Responses to Industrialization (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1976), 65.

3 John M. Mwanaktwe, End of Kaunda Era (Lusaka: A Multimedia Publication, 1994).

4 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 2006 [1968]), 32.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel households.5

There are two ways to frame the relationship of police to modernization. First, police may supersede an organizational pattern based on political loyalties, or social forces, such as those of the Boss Tweed ring and Tammany Hall in New York, and become organized based on principles of individual merit. The newer organizational form is characterized by identification with and service to a broader political entity and may include specific organizational characteristics, such as college-educated leadership cadre, reliance on scientific principles in forensic investigations, and civil service and pension systems. August Vollmer, his student, O.W.

Wilson, and the Wickersham Commission Report of 1929 all represented the extension of these

5 “Table 5: African Households Classified by Sex of Head, Number of Wives Present

(Male Heads) and Size of Houhold: Total Zambia,” in Republic of Zambia, Census of Population and Housing, 1969 (Lusaka: Central Statistical Office, August 1970), 89. Up to 18% of households were female-headed, according to this chart, and no female-headed household was listed with multiple husbands. Strongly defined sex roles, virtually universally associated with patriarchy, are well documented. See Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of

Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1:119; A.R. Radcliffe-

Brown, The Andaman Islanders (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1933), 43;

Robert Redfield, “The Folk Society,” The American Journal of Sociology 52, no. 4 (1947): 297-

8; and Bruce Mannheim, The Language of the Inka since the European Invasion (Austin, TX:

University of Texas Press, 1991), 79.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel principles of the Progressive Movement in government to the police sector in the US.6 To judge the universality of the appeal of this ‘modern’ form of police organization, consider that Mexican intellectuals translated to Spanish O.W. Wilson’s book on modern police administration.7

International analysts have seen African police institutions following essentially the same historical evolution as those led by August Vollmer, albeit with mixed success. David J. Francis has seen so-called “community policing” as a foil to neo-patrimonial policing—i.e., politically or ethnically based police forces—and non-state policing, to include religious police.8 Milan Pagon complained that “community policing” was not working in South and Central Africa’s transition to democracy.9 David Bayley has described the process of modernization for the police of

India.10

National analysts, such as Nigeria’s Tekena N. Tamuno, have been more content to

6 Daniel Sabet, Police Reform in Mexico (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 6-8;

See also, August Vollmer, The Police and Modern Society (Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, 1971

[1936]); and O.W. Wilson and Roy C. McLaren, Police Administration, 3rd ed. (New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1972 [1950]).

7 O.W. Wilson, Administración de la Policia (Mexico City: Editorial Limusa-Wiley, SA,

1963).

8 David J. Francis, Policing in Africa (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 13, 19.

9 Milan Pagon, Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Deviance, Violence, and

Victimization (Ljubljana, Slovenia: College of Police Security Studies, 2002), 89ff.

10 David H. Bayley, The Police and Political Development in India (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1969).

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel portray their country’s police institutions as modern in terms of equipment, technology, buildings, and iconography, with little or no reference to the political or patrimonial police institutions they displaced, or more likely, co-existed with.11 Such a nationalist literature is basically ‘constructivist’ in the sense that it wishes to call into existence the very institutions it purports to report on.

Second, police institutions may, in late modernizing countries, be an institutional vanguard ushering the country into modern, complex society. Police, depending on context, are closely related to the military. Huntington wrote that in the early stages of modernization, “the military officers play a highly modernizing and progressive role” with regard to political development by challenging oligarchy, promoting social and economic reform, assailing

“backwardness,” introducing middle-class ideas of efficiency, honesty, and national loyalty, managing technology well, and forging international contact, among other things.12 Morris

Janowitz more narrowly celebrated the military as a mechanism for civic education, an assimilator of immigrants and as a school for nationalism.13

Police too may play this modernizing role. This seems to be the case when a Zambian

Police executive in Lusaka recited the national slogan, “One Nation, One Zambia,” asserted that

English is the national language in a country with 44 languages, and claimed that the national

11 Tekena N. Tamuno, The Police in Modern Nigeria 1861-1965 ([Ibadan, Nigeria]:

Ibadan University Press, 1970).

12 Huntington, Political Order, 203-4.

13 Morris Janowitz, The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), xiii-ix, 9, 14, 43, 48, and 54.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel police force was unlikely to assign personnel based on tribal loyalties. “[It is] likely if you are from the North, you are not sent to the North,” he said.14 Fieldwork suggested his comments were accurate. A mid- to low-level Zambia National Police officer in Ndola described rotation in his own career. A 25-year veteran, the National Police had assigned him to Ndola for five years, and before that, he was in Kitwe, Lusaka, and Kabwe.15

Police may be retrograde with reference to political modernization too. According to

Huntington, a modernizing military may topple a centralized monarchy protected by its own private police. Huntington wrote, “It [the military] snaps the thread of legitimacy and ends what had previously been peaceful (if policeful) rule.”16 This was the case with the police forces of the

Mexican dictator Porfirio Diaz, which protected him from the modernizing armies of the revolutionaries in the Mexican Revolution. The opposite was true when the Bolivian police forces, allied with modernizing urban intellectuals of the MNR and armed peasants, defeated the stand-patter Bolivian army, which supported the oligarchy.17 The role of police to political modernization in late developing countries is highly contextual.

A police force therefore may narrowly attempt to modernize itself or may fulfill a broader

14 Interview, August 16, 2017, Lusaka. For estimation of languages in Zambia, see

Raymond G. Gordon, ed., Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 15th ed. (Dallas, TX: SIL, 2005),

30.

15 Interview, August 6, 2017, Ndola.

16 Huntington, Political Order, 202.

17 Herbert Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2003), 207.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel role in national modernization, but to begin to answer the question of what role the police play, we must first know more about the nature of the police. Below is a description of the structure, function, and history of Zambia Police based on review of secondary sources and on observations from travels from the capital to the hinterlands of the country.

Zambia Police: Historical Origins and Current Structure

The Zambia Police today is a force of about 19,000 sworn officers with a supporting civilian staff of about 1,000. By comparison, US local police forces might have a 1:6 civilian to sworn officer ratio.18 Zambia has only a national police force, and this force has the same functions of maintaining order and enforcing the law19 that local forces in the US have. Zambia has a ratio of 108 police per 100,000 population, compared with 208, 300, and 85 for Nigeria,

Mexico, and Tanzania, respectively (see table 1). It is difficult to assign meaning to these crude numerical indicators without further context.

While Zambia Police is the only officially sanctioned force, it in fact competes with tribal chiefs and local authorities to act as the official enforcer of state policy. For instance, the Sunday

Times of Zambia reported that Kabwe Municipal Council had formed a task force to go around to bars and streets and arrest anyone below the age of 18. Kabwe Mayor Prince Chileshe said the

18 Zambia Police Service, “Annual Report 2016,” p. 12. There are 966 staff supporting

19,416 officers; For the estimate of sworn officer to civilian ratio in US police, see Brian A.

Reaves, “Local Police Departments, 2013: Personnel, Policies, and Practices” ([Washington,

DC?]: US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics), 1.

19 James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law Enforcement and Order in Eight Communities (New York: Atheneum, 1975), 16-7.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel task force would consist of both “Council Police and the Zambia Police.”20

The modern Zambia Police traces its origins to late 19th century police institutions associated with British colonialism. Some of the first forces of order21 deployed by the British

South Africa Company that in 1891 was granted by the British government the task of administering the areas north of the Zambezi River in a united Rhodesian administrative unit.

The company used Indian sepoys, Sikhs, and “Mohammedan Cavalry” for police functions in the region, and among their principal duties was the task of combating Arab slave traders. In 1911,

British colonial administrators formed the Northern Rhodesian Police, a force that had both military and civilian functions. Increased settlement along the Copperbelt necessitated the creation of a more modern police force, and administrators re-founded the Northern Rhodesian

Police in 1932. From its founding until 1964, when Zambia gained independence from Britain, all police executive officials were ex-patriots, but independence brought the indigenization of the officer ranks for the new Zambia National Police.22 In 1932, the Northern Rhodesia Police had seven supervisory officers, 73 “inspectors,” and 447 subordinates, and by 1970, the Zambia

20 “Kabwe council ponders task force,” August 6, 2017, p. 8.

21 David H. Bayley, Forces of Order: Police Behavior in Japan and the United States

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); All information on the history of the Zambia

Police comes from Rebublic of Zambia, “Zambia Police Annual Report for the Year of 1970,” pp. 1-3. National Archives of Zambia.

22 On indigenization of Indian Civil Service, see J.D. Shukla, Indianisation of All-India

Services and Its Impact on Administration (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1982).

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Police had 7,200 police officers.23

Police as Observed in a Trek from Lusaka to Mwinilunga

A cumulative forty-hour round trip bus tour allowed for direct observation of police posts, police patrols, and police interactions with citizens (see figure 1). Proceeding along the

Line of Rail, the developed corridor from Lusaka through Ndola and Kitwe, the heart of the

Copperbelt, the trip gave a cross-section of dense urban areas. Trekking westward through

Solwezi, a bustling entrepot, and to the relatively rural outpost of Mwinilunga provided a potentially representative sample of rural Zambia. However, all locations visited were on major thoroughfares, and therefore perhaps unrepresentative of rural areas not well connected to urban hubs by roads.

Police posts were present in all towns of any size, and each displayed a uniformity in appears that made them easy to identify. In Lusaka, the principal police station was a block from the centrally located intercity bus station near the landmark Cairo Road (see figure 2). A second police station, Woodlands Precinct, is near an upper middle class shopping center (see figure 3).

According to one source, a precinct of this sort would have over 200 officers with 5-10% as its command corps.24 Police headquarters, known to taxi drivers as “near the Finance Ministry,” houses a Research and Planning unit, charged with producing an annual report and providing data for strategic planning (see figure 4). Ndola has a similarly large and centrally located police station, and in it one finds a Forensic Section (see figure 5).

23 Numbers for 1970 were “superior police officers” 126, “subordinate officers,” 577, and

“Other ranks (sub-inspectors, sgt., constables,” 5,841, “Annual Report 1970,” p. 16.

24 Interview, Lusaka, August 14, 2017.

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Kitwe, the heart of Copperbelt, is a town with the feel of Denver in 1870. Burgeoning mining camps teem with activity. The un-careful traveler might find himself an austere flophouse run by young women or in the shabbily elegant—though not Catholic—Hotel Edinburgh. The sprawling open air Kitwe market, unlike other large city markets in developing countries, is not off-limits or neglected by police (see figure 6). By contrast, police are not as salient in ‘La

Cancha’ open air market in the densely urban setting of Cochabamba, Bolivia, and scarecrows, representing thieves hung in effigy, in Tepito, the longtime field site great anthropologist, Oscar

Lewis, suggest a lack of state presence in parts of Mexico City. Simply providing visible security forces in public markets or amorphous lower class neighborhoods falls short of the ambitious

“high modernist” state attempts to impose order on chaotic and organic societies, in the conception of James C. Scott,25 but presence of the state, in the form of uniformed police patrols, is not immediately visible in Cochabamba and Mexico City in the way it is in the Kitwe market.

Proceeding to the semi-rural Solwezi, I was surprised to find in the packed and dirty bus terminal, a manned and prominent police station (see figure 6). Waiting for my bus—for four hours—I witnessed an unfortunate man carried roughly by his belt by plain-clothes civilians, apparently, to the waiting uniformed officers.

In Mwinilunga, the precinct occupied a prominent location on the main road and was immediately recognizable by the Zambia Police colors and symbols (see figure 7). In my foray into the foyer of the station, I saw a flustered young man explaining something to a stoic uniformed female officer behind a large wooden bank. He had a broken cell phone in his hands

25 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human

Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998),

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel and was shaking his head. A sign on the wall read “Rights to house from government if you have

HIV/AIDS,” and another said, “Police Abuse: Who says you can’t denounce it?” In the Station

Inspector’s office, hidden from public view, were gruesome death scene photos.

The Mwinilunga police compound organization was telling. Nearby were criminal courts and a local jail. According to the District Administrator, a political neophyte who two months ago was a schoolteacher, the jail had a capacity of up to 102 inmates and currently had 71 male inmates, and no female inmates.26 Next to the police station, courts, and jail, is the “Glea and

Pleasure Club,” a dedicated bar for police. The purpose is precisely to keep the police from drinking in the bar district, clear on the other side of town. There is a police sub-station in the bar district, which also likely has prostitute houses (see figure 8). While the visible signs of police in

Mwinilunga suggest an institution with a broad scope,27 there is an insecurity suggested by the clumping of police institutions in one central compound. Hesitancy to let officers fraternize with drunks and prostitutes in the bar district seems a reasonable precaution. Insistence on co-locating police headquarters, criminal courts, and jails, in contrast, suggests a low-trust society with relatively superficial state institutions.28

In theory, the police report to the District Administrator in a form of civilian control of the security forces. In practice, this control was not in evidence on the day of the visit. Whether

26 Interview, Mwinilunga, August 10, 2017.

27 Scope is one of five metrics of institutionalization, Political Order, 12.

28 Mexico co-locates courts and prisons.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel substantive civilian control of the police29 exists or not, the concept is alive in Mwinilunga.

Preliminary Reflections on Zambia Police

The Mast, an independent—or anti-government—daily newspaper, ran a cartoon in which a police officer with baton in hand and shouting, “Enemy of progess!” chased a journalist.30 The meaning of this cartoon is unclear. Is the Zambia Police an agent of modernization, homogenization, and “progress,” while the journalists of The Mast are protectors of diversity, freedom, and messiness? Or is the Zambia Police a political or patrimonial force acting in the service of, in this case, a Bemba faction controlling the state, while The Mast is promotor of what

29 Signature monographs on civilian control of the military include Samuel P.

Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations

(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1985 [1957]) and Roderic Ai Camp,

Generals in the Palacio (New York: Oxford, 1992). I do not know of such a work for police institutions.

30 Wednesday, August 16, 2017, p. 5. The Mast is the reconstituted The Post, which the

Lungu-friendly police closed down during the elections of 2016. The Daily Mail and the The

Times of Zambia are unabashedly pro-Lungu and pro-government newspaper. The Times gives very sympathetic coverage to the Zambia Police. Consider the article, “Chipwalu Police Post

Cheers Kabanana,” The Sunday Times of Zambia, August 6, 2017, 6, which reports that

“Residents of Kabanana Township in Lusaka have expressed happiness on the commencement of operations at Chipwalu Police post.”

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel sociologist Talcott Parsons termed “universalistic definitions of merit”31 as the basic notion of the public good? Answers are not immediately self-evident.

Other messages are difficult to interpret. The Daily Mail ran an article titled “Allow Free

Campaign, directs [Inspector General of Police] Kanganja,” in which it conveyed the message of the IG that police commissioners were to allow political parties to hold preparatory meetings and campaigns freely.32 Was this a sign of progress in police professionalization as the chief warned the rank and file against political thuggery? Was it a reminder that until recently, and possibly even now, the police were politicized? Or was it a veiled threat, a reminder to opposition candidates that the IG might just as easily not order the police to allow free exercise of politics?33

Moises Naim warned that an international surge in reporting on corruption in the 1990s could just as easily be interpreted as a sign that leaders in developing countries were taking seriously the issues of corruption, defined as the use of public resources for private gain, as it

31 Talcott Parsons, “Evolutionary Universals in Society,” American Sociological Review,

Vol. 29:3 (1964): 344.

32 August 5, 2017, p. 1. In another article, the IG Kanganja warned that police should not

“spoil themselves with illicit behavior such as drinking on duty at the expense of service delivery to the people.” Chila Namaiko, “IG warns police officers,” Times of Zambia, August 16, 2017, p.

2.

33 Similarly, the Lungu government invoked article 31 of the Zambian constitution which allows law enforcement agencies to have enhanced powers to carry out their duties. It is entirely contextual as to whether these enhanced police powers might be used for ‘good’ or ‘evil.’

“Invocation of Article 31 beneficial in enhancing peace,” Times of Zambia, August 7, 2017, p. 4.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel was a sign that corruption had increased or was an insoluble problem.34 Similarly, newspaper reports on the Zambia Police are often ambiguous in their meaning.

There is little direct evidence to suggest that the Zambia Police is incorrigible or that it is overtly politicized within the Zambian context.

The deeper truth may be that the Zambia Police, some reasonable politicization notwithstanding, clearly possesses a certain level of legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and provides recognizable law enforcement functions. An Ndola officer described the crimes for which one could be arrested by Zambia Police: theft, assault, fraud (i.e., bouncing checks), counterfeiting documents. In urban areas, police stations acted as depots of wrecked cars, an uncontroversial public service (see figure 9). Citizens, or someone, thought to take a likely pickpocket or petty thief to the Solwezi police. Police arrested 10 suspects over suspected arson in a market fire in Kabwe,35 and this action, absent evidence to the contrary, seems to be a disinterested public service. There are many signs, direct and indirect, that the Zambia Police is providing basic and legitimate services of law enforcement and order maintenance.

This trust of state institutions in Zambia was unlike the dynamic described by the Indian prison official who suggested that the U.S. practice of a wife’s calling the police during a domestic dispute was unthinkable in his country. These things were better handled within the

34 Moises Naim, “The Corruption Eruption,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 2

(1995): 245-61.

35 Sylester Mwale, “10 arrested over Kabwe’s Kasanda market fire,” Sunday Times of

Zambia, August 6, 2017, p. 2. Similarly, police arrested 36 jerabos, or copper wire thieves, in

Kitwe. Sylvia Mweetwa, “36 jerabos nabbed in Kitwe,” Times of Zambia, August 14, p. 1.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel family in India, according to him. This is not the case in any simple way in Zambia.

Likely Questions To Be Answered in Comparative Analysis

What is to be gained from comparing Zambia police to police in Bolivia? Both are relatively poor, landlocked, multi-ethnic late-developing countries with large mining sectors. The first analytical goal would be to document the true nature of the modern police institutions in the two countries. I have made the case here that Zambia Police likely provide substantial and legitimate police services of order maintenance and law enforcement, but some have pointed out that Bolivian uniformed police in La Paz were actually office pages for municipal executives and others, uniform and insignia notwithstanding, acted as de facto untrained urban health inspectors in open air markets. Appearances aside, are the two institutions fulfilling the same function? It is likely that the Bolivian examples above are exceptions that prove the rule, and the two institutions are similar.

While world systems theory would suggest similarity on the periphery of the world economy,36 there are, nonetheless, likely to be important differences in the structure of police institutions in the two countries. For instance, La Paz together with its satellite city of El Alto, combined population of about 1.5 million, is policed by the Bolivian National Police and the La

Paz municipal police, while Zambia has only its national police. Further, the Bolivian armed forces and its police, who faced one another in combat in the Revolution of 1952, have an enduringly antagonistic relationship. In 2002, police in El Alto who had apprehended a delinquent reveled when they discovered that they had nabbed the son of an Air Force soldier.

36 See Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist

System,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 16:4 (1974): 387-415.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Such an antagonistic relationship is lacking in Zambia. Further, Zambia’s police showed a national scope as the field office in Mwinilunga dutifully called in to the central office in Lusaka for directives on what to do with a meddling foreigner and an impudent district administrator. It is unlikely that Bolivia, with its far-flung population, would display such a unified police force.

To the extent that variation in police forces exists, some variables might suggest themselves. Both Bolivia and Zambia have large mining sectors, but Bolivia’s sector has been around for about 500 years, while Zambia’s is scarcely 100 years old. Zambia is more rural than the urban-centric and bifurcated Bolivian society. Zambia is more ethnically diverse than is

Bolivia, though this facet of each society merits careful explanation. Leaders must matter, though their contributions are difficult if not impossible to measure quantitatively.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Figure 1

Red line identifies trek from Lusaka to Mwinilunga.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Figure 2

Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction.

Central Police Station, Lusaka. All photos by author unless otherwise noted.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Figure 3

Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction.

Zambia Police, Woodlands Precinct, Lusaka.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Figure 4

Photo omitted

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Figure 5

Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction.

Forensic Section, Ndola central police station, Zambia Police.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Figure 6

Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction.

Zambia Police patrol in Kitwe open air market.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Figure 6

Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction.

Zambia Police station in Solwezi bus terminal.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Figure 7

Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction.

Sign for Mwinilunga precinct, Zambia Police, on the main road.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Figure 8

Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction.

Zambia Police sub-station in Mwinilunga bar district.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Figure 9

Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction. Not for reproduction.

Wrecked car depot in Ndola Zambia Police compound.

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Appendix 1

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Brian Norris, Ph.D. Nov. 3, 2017 Providence, RI Int’l. Studies Assn./NE Regional Conf. The Citadel

Appendix 2

29