Joint Force Experimentation for Great-Power Competition Sean MacFarland

The war game at the Naval War College came direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of to a frustrating conclusion for the “blue” Staff, General Mark Milley, the Naval War Col- players representing the U.S. Their attempted lege recently war-gamed a real-world scenar- dash across the Pacific with powerful naval io against potential adversaries. It was a good forces to reinforce positions near the enemy start, and more such war games are expected to homeland had been stopped well short of their follow as are other forms of experimentation. destination by shore-based airpower. Friendly If they do, these opportunities to learn will losses due to the enemy’s pre-war investment in once again play a vital role in the development anti-access/area denial capabilities had been of a joint doctrine that supports our National  staggering. A quick American victory would Defense Strategy, addresses the challenges and not be possible, and a new strategy would be opportunities created by technological change, needed to defeat this potential adversary. and responds to rising threats to both national and global security. If fully supported, they will lthough‌ the location of this war game might help America’s defense establishment to make Anot surprise you, the date and opponent cost-effective investments and reduce stra- might. It took place in 1934, and the adver- tegic risk by tapping into America’s greatest sary was Japan (“Orange” in the war game). asymmetric advantage: our ability to innovate. Fortunately, the U.S. Navy, informed by the results, changed its war plan in time, and the Global Challenges rest, as the saying goes, is history. In fact, the In his article “The Thucydides Trap,” Gra- war game was so prescient that after the war, ham Allison observed that a rising power and Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz said that “the a dominant power do not usually exchange war with Japan had been enacted in the game places peacefully. This is the trap into which rooms at the War College by so many people Athens, as a rising power, and Sparta, as the and in so many different ways that nothing that dominant power, fell.2 How can the United happened during the war was a surprise—ab- States, as the world’s dominant power, avoid solutely nothing except the kamikaze tactics the fate of Sparta, which defeated Athens but toward the end of the war. We had not visual- was so weakened that it also soon collapsed? ized these.”1 The first requirement, of course, is to recognize War games and large-scale exercises like threats and—just as important—their nature. those conducted before the Second World War The fastest-rising power in the world today played an important role in our military his- is China, which has embarked on what Michael tory, and they are poised to do so again. At the Pillsbury calls a “hundred-year marathon”3 to

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 23 displace the United States as global hegemon. traditional domains of air, sea, and land. As Although most observers agree that Beijing our dependence on space and cyberspace has does not wish to use direct force to overthrow grown, so too have our vulnerabilities. The the American order and establish itself as the globe-spanning reach of these new domains new “sun in the sky,” China is clearly arm- has expanded the battlefield to the homelands ing itself in a way that is meant to challenge of our adversaries as well as to our own “forts American power in the Western Pacific. It is and ports,” rendering our Atlantic and Pacific also seeking to compete with the United States moats ineffective. through diplomatic, information, and econom- Advances in weapon technology are po- ic means. The implications of these efforts are tentially game-changing as well. Stealth, or profound not just for the United States, but low-observable technology, directed energy also for the entire world. for weapons, sensors and communications, From the end of the Cold War until recently, remote-controlled vehicles, and hyperson- we have lacked a clearly defined pacing threat: ic weapons are accelerating the speed of a nice problem to have had but a problem no war from supersonic to hypersonic and be- longer. A resurgent Russia and a rising China yond, to the speed of light. As if this were not took note of how the U.S. rapidly overwhelmed mind-boggling enough, advances in artificial the Iraqi military in conventional warfare in intelligence (AI), powered by big data and in- 1991 and again in 2003. Since then, both na- formation operations that exploit social media tions have embarked on acquisition strategies platforms, are creating additional challenges designed to neutralize our joint warfighting and opportunities. advantages, now enabled by new technolo- The ability of the human mind to close the gies like unmanned aerial systems and stealth OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop in aircraft. By investing in relatively low-cost a timely manner in response to these tech-

systems that are designed to prevent us from nological changes is increasingly at risk. The projecting our forces, our adversaries are now “cognitive domain” of war is not new, but its challenging our ability to achieve overmatch character has changed along with the other against our opponents on the battlefield. This domains, perhaps making it the most signifi- asymmetric approach is called anti-access/ cant domain of all. area denial (A2/AD). To undermine U.S. power, our adversaries This renewed geostrategic competition is are employing other asymmetric means that unfolding amid a revolution that has the po- stop short of traditional acts of war, blurring tential to rival the Industrial Revolution in the line between peace and conflict. The so- its impact. The technological revolution driv- called Russian gray zones, China’s civil–mil- ing these changes in the character of war will itary integration, Iran’s proxy forces, and change the 21st century battlefield as much as cyber-attacks by non-state actors have thick- the Industrial Revolution changed the battle- ened the fog of war. Doctrinal discussions have field in the 20th century. Space, which became moved away from the “pre-conflict phase” in accessible in the latter half of the 20th century, favor of a continuum of conflict that encom- is growing ever more congested and contested passes competition and hostilities. We are in the 21st. competing with our peer adversaries and have America, which pioneered space travel, been for a while, whether we realized it or not. no longer enjoys assured access to it, remov- Twenty-first century conflict, then, has ex- ing it as one of our asymmetric advantages panded not only spatially, but also temporally. over our enemies. Cyberspace, which the United States also pioneered, is now shared Our Doctrinal Response by the entire world and has joined space as a Our adversaries have reacted to our ac- new domain of warfare along with the more tions, and now it is our turn to counteract by

24 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength developing a new doctrine that leverages our also important, particularly in the space and asymmetric strengths to degrade, penetrate, cyber domains where management of the and ultimately disintegrate A2/AD measures electromagnetic spectrum and networks in and restores our strategic reach and ability to the competition phase of conflict will mean fight on favorable terms. Our response must striking a balance between civil and military address both geostrategic and technological requirements. changes. It must be sufficiently compelling to Getting the services to align doctrines achieve broad support both among U.S. poli- and acquisition programs and to integrate cymakers and among our allies. It must also operationally across domains is hard but not be affordable. The U.S. used a cost-imposition impossible. We came close in the final years strategy to defeat the Soviet Union during the of the Cold War under the rubric of AirLand Cold War. We cannot allow ourselves to be Battle (ALB). The Army aligned all elements driven down an unsustainable path in a similar of DOTMLPF to support ALB, and—critical- way, as A2/AD would have us do. ly—so did the Air Force, making the vision of To answer all of these challenges, the U.S. a seamless dual-domain operational concept Department of Defense (DOD) is developing a reality. Although we did not have the benefit a doctrine called Joint All Domain Operations of sophisticated computer modeling tools then, (JADO). It is still only a concept, but it builds we were able to test some ALB assumptions on the work started by the U.S. Army, joined by during the massive annual REFORGER exer- the Marine Corps, in developing the warfight- cises in Europe. We also benefitted from the ing Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) con- very real and bloody lessons gleaned from the cept. It will also incorporate subsequent work 1973 Arab–Israeli War. Acquisition efforts in done by the Air Force on the Joint All Domain the Army were tailored to ALB and vice-versa. Command and Control (JADC2) concept and Thus, the “Big Five” Army weapons pro-  eventually will include concepts from the Navy grams still widely in use today were ideally and Space Force as well. JADO recognizes the suited to the doctrine, and the integration of new domains of conflict and is intended to ex- joint effects in training and exercises became ploit them with cross-domain effects and will the norm. In the end, we were able to catch doc- leverage our armed forces’ unique and prov- trinal lightning in a bottle, as proven in Opera- en ability to orchestrate joint operations at tion Desert Storm against a combat-seasoned, all echelons. Soviet-trained, and Soviet-equipped enemy. But choosing the right doctrine is only the beginning. Multi-domain effects, by definition, The Role of Joint Experimentation transit through more than one domain. To America’s armed forces are again racing to fight and win in all domains, our joint doctrine refashion themselves and adjust to technolog- must achieve harmony across all services and ical innovations, just as they did before World across all elements of doctrine, organization, War II when the U.S. shifted from a constab- training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and ulary Army mounted on horseback and a bat- facilities (DOTMLPF) as well as policy (as in tleship-centric Navy to a Joint Force that is “DOTMLPF-P”). As we modernize our forces, able to project airpower around the world in new platforms and systems must be designed support of amphibious and mechanized land with cross-domain effects in mind. forces. Today, we are shifting our focus from As former Secretary of Defense Donald counterinsurgency to competition against Rumsfeld famously observed, “You go to war peer adversaries in peacetime and seeking to with the army you have, not the army you achieve overmatch against them in all domains might want or wish to have at a later time.”4 in conflicts. We need to ensure that the Joint Force we Experiments like the recent war game in have is the one we want. The policy aspect is Newport, Rhode Island, will play a vital role

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 25 in helping America’s military to reshape itself own, nor does it have teams of experienced effectively and efficiently. Experimentation observers schooled in joint doctrine or ded- through war games and exercises is conduct- icated opposing forces (“red teams”) trained ed in a mixture of live, virtual, or constructive to think differently. To the extent that these environments. In virtual environments, live assets exist, they reside for the most part in people interact with simulated systems, as in a the services. Nevertheless, by leveraging two flight simulator. In a constructive environment, initiatives called Globally Integrated Exercis- simulated people interact with simulated sys- es and Globally Integrated Wargames, the J7 tems, as in a command post exercise. The de- is doing a great deal to innovate and validate gree to which each environment is present in a joint warfighting concepts. war game or exercise depends on the purpose Any attempt to achieve change, however, of the exercise. Each form has advantages and will encounter resistance. To help overcome disadvantages, and when used for the purpose parochial service perspectives, the Joint Chiefs for which it is best suited, each form can pro- have created a cross-functional team to study vide useful insights for the development and JADO. The Joint Chiefs have also tasked the implementation of JADO. services with examining “orphan” functions. In the past, each service conducted its own The Air Force is studying command and con- experiments, developed its own respective trol, the Navy has the lead for fires, the Marines warfighting concepts or doctrines, and then are responsible for Joint Concept for Infor- acquired the capabilities required to execute mation Advantage, and the Army is analyzing them—and, of course, it sometimes happened the logistics requirements for this Joint War- the other way around. In either case, the role fighting Concept. The intent of this division played by the Joint Chiefs and the Office of the of labor is to help break down stovepipes and Secretary of Defense (OSD) resembled that of create consensus.

a referee, ensuring that the services played Exercises as Experiments. The results of by the rules. To fulfill the promise of JADO, these studies must be tested somehow. Despite the role of the Secretary of Defense and the the growing cost associated with deploying Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should be more live forces, exercises conducted under real- like that of a coach, directing the game plan istic field conditions are still the best way to for the services’ modernization efforts. The test some theories, particularly organizational playbook, however, must be informed by the designs. This will remain true as long as our lessons learned through experimentation, and ability to simulate cross-domain effects in the those must be properly resourced. In addi- constructive environment is limited. tion, as any coach will tell you, there is no gain As with war gaming, America has a history without pain. of organizational experimentation during ex- As important as modernization might be, ercises that goes back to the years preceding the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs its entry into the Second World War. Perhaps of Staff have many other responsibilities and the most famous example from this time peri- cannot devote their full attention to it. Since od would be the Louisiana Maneuvers (LaM), the 2011 inactivation of the United States which the Army conducted to test the doctrine Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as a and weaponry it would need to face modern cost-saving measure, the Joint Staff Direc- adversaries such as Germany. This massive torate for Joint Force Development (J7) has exercise placed experimental armored and assumed many functions related to modern- mechanized units and the Army Air Corps ization. It is responsible for doctrine, educa- into a scenario that helped leaders understand tion, concept development and experimenta- the potential of mechanized warfare and how tion, training, exercises, and lessons learned. to integrate airpower over vast operation- But as a staff directorate, it has no forces of its al distances.

26 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength Large-scale exercises like the LaM provide or validation of concepts and capabilities. For an unmatched opportunity to fully understand example, the Army created the Multi-Domain the capabilities and limitations of experimen- Task Force (MDTF) in the Pacific to test MDO tal organizations and new systems. However, doctrinal concepts. It combined units capable the larger the exercise, the greater the compe- of long-range precision fires with a provisional tition to prioritize exercise goals. Such goals Intelligence, Information, Cyber, Electronic might include validating a portion of a war Warfare, and Space (I2CEWS) Battalion. The plan, improving interoperability with regional MDTF then participated in the most recent partner forces, demonstrating a new capability Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. This as a deterrent to adversaries, or all the above. went well enough that another MDTF is being Sometimes, that does not leave much room for created in Europe. experimentation. The services are experimenting with organi- A more recent example of a large-scale ex- zational designs in a variety of exercises, large perimental exercise is Millennium Challenge and small. Each service has multiple examples, 2002 (MC02), sponsored by the then newly but two of them indicate their diversity and formed JFCOM. MC02 featured emerging doc- level of investment. The 88th Air Base Wing trinal concepts such as “dominant battlespace at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, knowledge” and “rapid decisive operations.” It Ohio, is researching how the Air Force can best also introduced “leap ahead technologies” that defend its strategic infrastructure—our home- were not yet fielded to the force, such as the land “forts and ports”—against attacks in the V-22 Osprey. The director of the exercise said emergent domains of warfare. Meanwhile, the that it would be a key to military transforma- Navy’s Surface Development Squadron ONE tion. It cost approximately $250 million and (SURFDEVRON ONE) will experiment with involved over 13,000 servicemembers at nine unmanned surface vessels and Zumwalt-class  -live-force training sites and 17 simulation cen- ships. Vice Admiral Richard Brown, Com ters. To justify the expenditure and the com- mander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, mitment of so many forces, additional exercise described SURFDEVRON ONE’s role as “de- objectives were added. Not surprisingly, the veloping warfighting capabilities and experi- exercise was unable to fulfill all of them. mentation.” It will also “[d]evelop material and MC02 was supposed to be a free play ex- technical solutions to tactical challenges” and ercise, but when red (enemy) asymmetric “[c]oordinate doctrine, organization, training, tactics inflicted unexpectedly heavy losses on material, logistics, personnel and facilities re- blue (friendly) forces in the opening turn of quirements for unmanned surface systems.”6 the game, the director had to intervene. Most Sometimes, an operational environment of the U.S. naval task force was “re-floated” so is the only way to stress test a concept or ca- that the rest of the exercise could continue pability. Last year, the Navy embarked a full and achieve other objectives such as unit live- squadron of Marine F-35B Joint Strike Fight- fire training. In other words, experimentation ers on the amphibious assault ship USS Amer- had to give way to training. Many lessons were ica, converting it into a mini-aircraft carrier, learned from this experience, but perhaps the or “Lightning Carrier,” capable of conducting biggest is that it is difficult for large exercises sea-control operations. to achieve every goal.5 Service-Led Experimentation. After nu- Organizational Experimentation. This merous unsuccessful attempts to find a solu- is not to say that large exercises are not useful tion to an experiment, Thomas Edison said, “I for experimentation. Combatant Command have gotten lots of results! I know several thou- (COCOM)–level exercises such as DEFENDER-​ sand things that won’t work!”7 Many live, vir- Europe and Pacific Sentry have served as tual, and constructive exercises are conducted valuable opportunities for the development around the globe each year. They can and do

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 27 serve as laboratories; their results help us to testing new equipment and doctrines in harsh find out more efficiently what will or will not field conditions at Fort Bliss and White Sands work. Smaller-scale exercises sponsored by the Missile Range. Cyber operations by and against services provide low-cost opportunities to gen- a sophisticated and robust cyber opposing erate feedback from lower echelons. Some of force were a recurring feature of these exer- these are done primarily for training and read- cises. The cyber warriors tested the partici- iness; others are intended as experiments with pants to their limits—and sometimes beyond collateral training benefits. In either case, if them—because failure is often a better teacher the number of objectives is manageable, they than success. Although it was not the princi- can all generally be achieved. pal reason for the exercise, the rest of the di- For example, the Baltic Operations vision gained training value from supporting (BALTOPS) fleet exercises led by the recently and participating in the JWAs, particularly reactivated U.S. Second Fleet have helped to because the Air Force, Marine Corps, and our iron out interoperability issues with allied na- allies were also involved. Today, the JWAs have vies and have enabled experimentation with moved from Fort Bliss and alternate between concepts for Arctic operations and trans-At- Europe and the Pacific and are now “coming lantic convoy tactics, among other benefits. Al- to a theater near you” in order to test concepts though these are not new types of operations, and capabilities in possible theaters of opera- the Navy is learning how to conduct them in a tion against peer adversaries. multi-domain environment and in the more Even routine training exercises serve as op- accessible Arctic Ocean. portunities for experimentation. As command- Each year, the Air Force brings units from er of the U.S. Army’s III Corps at Fort Hood, around the world to participate in its Red Texas, I was able to test a concept during a Flag Exercise at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. major command post exercise and improve the

Against a tough, well-trained “aggressor” unit, corps’ combat readiness at the same time. We the Blue forces learn how to employ space, cy- employed a Stryker Brigade Combat Team that berspace, and stealth to defeat integrated en- had been reorganized and retrained to perform emy air defenses such as those that character- in the role of a cavalry regiment in support of ize A2/AD environments. These exercises do the corps during a Warfighter Exercise. The a good job of combining training with concept purpose of the exercise was to train corps-level development even though they are not specif- and division-level staffs and prepare them for ically designed for the latter. upcoming operations, which it did in full. The The Army conducts an annual exercise experimental objective did not hinder our called the Joint Warfighting Assessment (JWA) training in the least. In fact, in some ways, it that is designed specifically for experimenta- helped. Despite its focus on unit training, the tion. As the commander of 1st Armored Divi- exercise yielded important results by validat- sion at Fort Bliss, Texas, I have seen its value ing the requirement for restoring a corps-level firsthand. JWAs are coordinated by the Joint reconnaissance and security brigade or regi- Modernization Command, formerly known as ment. It did not validate the Stryker Brigade the Brigade Modernization Command. As an solution, but like Edison, we did not fail; we aside, it is noteworthy that the word “Army” just found out what did not work. does not appear in the title of the exercise or its Collecting the insights from all of this sponsoring agency. This makes sense, however. exercise-based experimentation across the The purpose of the JWAs is to find solutions Joint Force and then applying them to the joint to multi-domain operational challenges in a concept development process is a challenge. joint context. Although it is a good problem to have, the J7 For several years, an entire Brigade Combat has its work cut out for it, sorting through Team (BCT) was dedicated to experimentation, the results to find the golden nuggets. These

28 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength exercises are yielding a great deal of innova- An actual and well-documented example tion, and it is important that this innovation of the war-game design pathology occurred is properly considered and exploited by the in 1990 when military models vastly overes- appropriate organization. timated the number of U.S. casualties during War Games as Experiments. Although Operation Desert Storm. Once word leaked exercises are becoming increasingly joint and out, widespread concern led to some chang- have begun to explore cross-domain challeng- es in the plan. A RAND paper published just es, the models, simulations, and war gaming before the Gulf War predicted the discrepan- (MS&G) that support experimentation offer cy, saying that “in many cases the models are a better opportunity to test concepts and ca- built on a base of sand.”9 Unfortunately, de- pabilities rapidly. MS&G is not without risk, spite significant DOD expenditures on models however. Professor Robert Rubel of the Naval and simulations—nearly $300 million in 2017 War College has identified several “wargaming alone—the problem persists.10 pathologies” that are failures in purpose, poli- Some important simulations still rely on tics (for example, preordained outcomes), de- Lanchester equations to estimate combat loss- sign, assessment, and analysis.8 Given the com- es. Frederick Lanchester, a British engineer, de- plexity and tempo of all-domain war games as veloped the equations in 1916 to conceptualize well as what is at stake, it will take a significant aerial combat and warned at the time that they effort to avoid such pathologies. were not applicable to ground combat.11 Per- As the noted British statistician George Box haps we should have listened to him. Although put it, “[A]ll models are wrong, but some are updated to account for the effects of modern useful.” If the COVID pandemic has taught us weapons, Lanchester-derived equations used anything, it is that Mr. Box knew what he was by pre–Desert Storm modelers failed to fully talking about. Naturally, the early predictions appreciate the dynamics of AirLand Battle and  -about how the virus would spread were off, but the use of precision-guided munitions in a des some of the most influential models were off by ert environment. This led to a miscalculation an order of magnitude, leading to governmen- of multiple orders of magnitude (fortunately, in tal decisions that could have effects equal to our favor). Presumably, the equations’ accuracy or worse than the disease itself. The medical will not improve when applied to non-kinetic profession tries to live by the code “first, do no cross-domain effects against logistics or com- harm.” Similarly, military doctrines need not mand and control functions. be exactly right, but they must at least avoid Obviously, this is an area begging for re- being “too badly wrong,” as British military search and development, and DOD is not blind historian Sir Michael Howard so memorably to the need. In February 2015, then-Deputy put it. As pandemics and military history have Secretary of Defense Robert Work issued a proven, failure by either medical or military memorandum titled “Wargaming and Innova- professionals to heed these cautionary words tion” in which he argued that war games can can have fatal consequences. “spur innovation and provide a mechanism for Avoiding a joint warfighting doctrine that addressing emerging challenges, exploiting is “too badly wrong” requires useful models new technologies, and shaping the future se- designed to replicate multi-domain conflict curity environment.”12 Later that year, he co- as accurately as possible. An apocryphal cau- authored an article with then-Vice Chairman tionary tale about the use of computer mod- of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) General els circulated during the Vietnam War. In 1969, Paul Selva titled “Revitalizing Wargaming Is Pentagon staffers asked a computer when the Necessary to Be Prepared for Future Wars.”13 United States would win based on all measur- He also implemented some MS&G innova- able military data. It quickly answered: “You tions, such as forming the Defense Wargame won in 1964!” Alignment Group (DWAG), the Wargame

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 29 Repository, and the Wargame Incentive Fund well-suited to adjudicating (solving) them. (WIF), which was funded at $10 million. These The Army’s Unified Quest (UQ) seminars initiatives helped to gain efficiencies across the have played an important part in helping to enterprise, but the sort of fundamental chang- identify challenges related to Multi-Domain es required by all-domain joint warfighting will Operations (MDO), but they have not been require a larger effort and a new way of doing used for adjudication. One of the key tasks business on the part of DOD. throughout the UQ 2019 study year was how Clearly, new MS&G software will be needed to operationalize artificial intelligence in to address the challenges of all-domain joint support of MDO,15 but adjudication of this warfare. Unfortunately, as current VCJCS automation-related question will require a General John Hyten said during his confir- more automated war game. mation hearings, the process of developing As Alexander Kott, chief scientist at the military software is “a nightmare across the Army Research Laboratory, has observed, board” compared to the commercial process as “[t]he actions of human actors teaming with practiced by American companies like Google, robots and other intelligent agents will be Amazon, and Microsoft.14 pervasive in the complex operational environ- Spending money on new simulations is only ments of the future.”16 In other words, human– half the battle, though. To achieve the best de- machine interaction will no longer be limited signs and avoid the other war-gaming pathol- to training scenarios: We have reached the ogies, the MS&G community will need to be point at which we will need to use machines populated and led by a cadre of officers and to help us learn how to use machines. civilians who fully understand the state of the The Marine Corps may be leading the way art and the warfighter’s requirements. The Na- toward this brave new world. War-gaming val Postgraduate School has created a field of experts at Quantico, Virginia, are working on

study, in which classes in war-game design are what they call the Next Generation Wargame exclusively electives, that can serve as a start- (NGW). The NGW will attempt to leverage ing point for the rest of the Joint Professional narrow applications of artificial intelligence Military Education (JPME) enterprise. Today, for “in-stride adjudication,” which would allow the Army is the only service with a career field a war game to unfold without the traditional dedicated to simulations, and Functional Area “turns.” This would literally be a game changer, 57 (FA 57) officers are assigned to all major allowing war games to replicate the temporal Army headquarters at the division level and aspects of conflict, which is increasingly rele- above. This is a best practice that the other vant in an age of AI, hypersonics, and speed- services should consider emulating while the of-light weapons. Army assesses whether its FA 57 officers are The other services are taking steps in the getting the right training. right direction. Ideally, in addition to learning the art of fed- erating simulations for distributed exercises, ll The Army’s Center for Army Analysis MS&G leaders would also learn how to avoid or (CAA), the Army War College, and The mitigate the other war-gaming pathologies. To Research and Analysis Center (TRAC) at do this, they must understand the capabilities Fort Leavenworth are leading the Army’s and limitations of both software and wetware: war-game innovation efforts. They are that is, the human element. Seminar-style war incorporating all domains into the Army’s games known as BOGSATTs (Bunch of Guys models and evaluating various scenarios Sitting Around a Table Talking), in which a against potential adversaries. roll of the dice is used as the stochastic meth- od to replicate uncertainty, can play a role in ll The Army Capabilities Integration Center identifying novel concepts, but they are not (ARCIC) has been renamed the Futures

30 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength and Concepts Center and absorbed into At the 2018 meeting of the National Train- a major new Army Futures Command. ing and Simulation Association, Tony Cerri, Supported by CAA and TRAC, the Futures then Director of Data Science, Modeling and and Concepts Center has been involved in Simulation for the Army’s Training and Doc- selecting and war-gaming potential future trine Command G2, said that “if we can marry technologies for ground combat. The big data and AI with [modeling and simula- results will be used to conduct additional, tion]…that’s an unbeatable advantage.”18 Cerri more detailed modeling. is right, of course, but the converse of his state- ment is also true. Russia and China are invest- ll The Air Force Research Laboratory and ing vast amounts of money in AI with the aim LeMay Center are leading the charge for of achieving superiority over the U.S. by 2030 the Joint Force in the development of in what they perceive to be a strategically im- Joint All Domain Command and Con- portant field. If our adversaries can experiment trol (JADC2). more realistically, faster, and less expensively than we can, there is no denying that we will ll The Navy’s Center for Naval Analysis be at a competitive disadvantage against them. (CNA) uses the same model as the one As stated previously, Russia has been joined used by CAA, which is called the Joint by China as a peer threat to the United States, Wargame Analysis Model (JWAM), an- and we will need more sophisticated models other indicator of joint thinking among if we are to understand the nature of the chal- the services. lenge that each poses. Chess, which requires the player to think multiple moves in advance ll The granddaddy of all war-gaming cen- to win, is a popular game in Russia. Not so in ters, the Naval War College Wargame China, where a game called Go—based on de-  Center, continues to refine its meth- ception and encirclement rather than direct ods. While it has retained analysis of attack—is preferred. In the early days of AI, competing hypotheses as the core of its IBM’s Deep Blue learned to play chess well methodology, the Wargame Center is enough to defeat grandmaster Gary Kasparov now using technology to enable joint, in 1997. It took nearly two more decades before semi-autonomous forces. Google’s AlphaGo was able to teach itself how to win against the world’s top Go player, Lee Another step in the right direction is the Ar- Sedol of South Korea. In fact, it learned so well my’s attempt to help bridge the gap between that Lee retired after the match. the military and industry by repurposing one Chris Nicholson, founder of a deep-​learning if its reserve component training commands. startup, said at the time, “You can apply [this The 75th Innovation Command’s mission is to software] to any adversarial problem—any- drive “operational innovation, concepts, and thing that you can conceive of as a game where capabilities to enhance the readiness and le- strategy matters. That includes war….”19 It thality of the Future Force by leveraging the seems the Russians and Chinese have figured unique skills, agility, and private sector con- this out. We must as well. nectivity of America’s Army Reserve.”17 These efforts can help to connect the civilian gaming A Guiding Hand “ecosystem” with the military’s war-gaming The MS&G community is spread across the ecosystem. The latter is a robust community of Department of Defense. In some ways, this is practice spread across the services, which are a strength as it has led to a large and diverse busily refining their models to include all six community of interest, but it also hinders our domains of warfare and applying themselves ability to share information and act efficient- to the challenges of future conflict. ly. Within OSD, the Office of Net Assessment

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 31 (ONA) conducts war games to see decades into of JADO. General Hyten said that the JROC the future, and Cost Assessment and Program will set its attributes and “the services will Evaluation (CAPE) uses models to evaluate build to those” attributes, flipping the cur- alternative capabilities and force structures. rent bottom-up acquisition approach to one Responsibility for coordinating the develop- in which the Joint Chiefs “send[] a ‘demand ment, validation, and verification of modeling signal’ to the services.” and simulation software rests with a small or- ganization called the Defense Modeling and The service then will be responsible for Simulation Coordination Office (DMSCO). building the pieces and coming back to Within the Joint Staff, both the J7 and J8 con- us, and then we have to make sure it fits duct modeling and simulation. Naturally, each all together…. That’s what the JROC is service has its own requirements and capabil- supposed to do, [but] that is something ities for MS&G. we haven’t done yet…. Meanwhile, our closest allies are experi- menting too. The European Defense Agency The JROC tended to be a receiver of re- is studying the applications of AI and big data quirements from services, not a generator of in training and simulations and using war gam- requirements for the services to meet…. That’s ing to analyze how to deal with complex sce- not what was intended by Congress when it narios such as hybrid warfare. There are many was established, by the processes we put in other examples. place, but that’s what we’ve come to. And so Unfortunately, we no longer have JFCOM that’s going to require some discipline at the to bring all these efforts together to acquire senior level to make sure that we are actually the necessary resources and make the nec- putting the demand signal out.20 essary changes to develop JADO. So who can If General Hyten applies this thinking to

coordinate interservice MS&G development MS&G research, design, and development, to enable better, faster, and less expensive the U.S. will be able to develop the right ca- experimentation through war gaming? Who pabilities to experiment with JADO concepts can ensure that we are taking full advantage and systems. of America’s edge in commercial software in- Second, and just as important, General novation? Who can find the right applications Hyten said that he will try to steer the JROC for big data, artificial intelligence, and cloud away from being overly prescriptive, which can computing for MS&G? And who will spear- increase program costs and cause delays. Rath- head the joint DOTMLPF-P effort needed to er, he sees the council’s role as blessing “the implement JADO? Important changes that attributes of the capabilities that we need to have been made indicate that the Joint Chiefs have and then monitor[ing] the service’s ability of Staff, supported by OSD and the services, to build that.”21 could succeed in leading the charge. There are This is an important acknowledgment, as at least two reasons for optimism. no one solution fits all domains equally well. First, the J7 is not attempting to experiment The Army and Marine Corps tend to operate alone. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in dirtier environments than do the Navy and of Staff is an essential player in turning JADO Air Force, while the Army has the additional re- into a fully developed and resourced joint quirement that it be able to scale any solutions warfighting doctrine. In his traditional role as to accommodate a force that is much larger chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight than the other services. A continuous flow of Council (JROC), the VCJCS has embraced the information and feedback through the JROC original intent of the 1986 Goldwater–Nich- members is the only way these concerns can ols Act and is using his position to push more be resolved. The approach will also allow these of a top-down acquisition process in support MS&G capabilities to evolve more quickly.

32 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength That said, the VCJCS and J7 will need some Conclusion help from OSD, the services, industry, and our A radically new approach to joint acqui- allies. Recently, the U.S. Army created its first sition is already underway. If it is supported new four-star command in a generation, the by an organization dedicated to joint experi- Army Futures Command, to lead its modern- mentation with the necessary resources and ization efforts. The reactivation of JFCOM authorities, perhaps the U.S. can avoid the is unrealistic and perhaps even unnecessary, multi-domain equivalent of the surprise we but a joint counterpart for AFC, an all-domain encountered at Okinawa. As Admiral Nimitz experimentation joint task force (ADE JTF) conceded, the Plan Orange war games failed to led by a four-star general or admiral, would be anticipate the Japanese kamikaze attacks that able to focus exclusively on acquiring the re- cost the U.S. Navy dearly at Okinawa, sinking sources and generating the momentum need- 34 ships, damaging 368 others, killing 4,900 ed to realize JADO’s full potential. It would sailors, and wounding nearly 5,000 more. be able to supervise the efforts of the JADO Perhaps someday, a future American com- cross-functional team and the services’ stud- mander may be able not only to paraphrase Ad- ies of its four “orphan” functions. It could ad- miral Nimitz and say that our Joint All Domain dress policy issues with interagency partners, Operation Doctrine and Plans were enacted in collaborate with allies, and coordinate the ef- games and exercises throughout the Defense forts of OSD with those of the services. It could Department and around the world by so many distribute experiments between exercises and people and in so many different ways that war games, perhaps even sponsoring some of nothing that happened during the war was a the latter, and serve as the repository for their surprise, but also to exceed Nimitz’s boast and results. The J7 is already doing much of this, say that this included the enemy’s asymmetric and the purpose of the ADE JTF would not be cross-domain tactics toward the end of the war.  -to replicate its role, but rather to complement More important still, robust joint experimen and support it. tation may allow the United States to avoid the Thucydides Trap entirely.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 33 Endnotes 1. Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, speech to Naval War College, October 10, 1960, Folder 26, Box 31, RG15 Guest Lectures, 1894–1992, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island; quoted in John M. Lillard, “Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for WWII,” PhD dissertation, George Mason University, October 1, 2013, p. 1, http:// mars.gmu.edu/bitstream/handle/1920/8747/Lillard_gmu_0883E_10462.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed August 19, 2020). 2. Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, https://www. theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/ (accessed June 2, 2020). 3. Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace the United States as the Global Superpower (New York: Henry Holt, 2015). 4. Eric Schmitt, “Iraq-Bound Troops Confront Rumsfeld over Lack of Armor,” The New York Times, December 8, 2004, https://www. nytimes.com/2004/12/08/international/middleeast/iraqbound-troops-confront-rumsfeld-over-lack-of.html (accessed August 14, 2020). 5. Micah Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy (New York: Basic Books, 2015), pp. 52–61. 6. Naval News Staff, “U.S. Navy Sets New Squadron for Emerging Surface Warfighting Capabilities Development,”Naval News, May 27, 2019, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/05/us-navy-sets-new-squadron-for-emerging-surface-warfighting- capabilities-development/ (accessed July 29, 2020). 7. Frank Lewis Dyer, Thomas Commerford Martin, and William Henry Meadowcroft, Edison: His Life and Inventions (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1929), p. 200. 8. Robert C. Rubel, Appendix 1, “Wargaming Pathologies,” in Christopher A. Weuve, Peter P. Perla, Michael C. Markowitz, Robert Rubel, Stephen Downes-Martin, Michael Martin, and Paul V. Vebber, Wargame Pathologies, Center for Naval Analysis, CRM D0010866.A1/Final, September 2004, pp. 45–55, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0010866.A1.pdf (accessed June 16, 2020), and Appendix 2, “Stephen Downes-Martin’s List of Pathologies,” in ibid., pp. 57–58. 9. Paul K. Davis and Donald Blumenthal, “The Base of Sand Problem: A White Paper on the State of Military Combat Modeling,” RAND Corporation, RAND Note No. N-3148—OSD/DARPA, 1991, p. v, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2005/ N3148.pdf (accessed June 16, 2020).  10. Govini, Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence, Big Data and Cloud Taxonomy, 2017, p. 7, https://en.calameo.com/ read/0000097792ddb787a9198 (accessed June 16, 2020). 11. Shawn Woodford, “Wargaming Multi-Domain Battle: The Base of Sand Problem,” Dupuy Institute Mystics & Statistics Blog, January 11, 2019, http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2019/01/11/wargaming-multi-domain-battle-the-base-of-sand-problem/ (accessed June 16, 2020). 12. Robert Work, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chiefs of the Military Services, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Director, Net Assessment, “Subject: ‘Wargaming and Innovation,’” February 9, 2015, p. 1, https://news.usni.org/2015/03/18/document-memo-to-pentagon-leadership-on-wargaming (accessed June 16, 2020). 13. Robert Work and Paul Selva, “Revitalizing Wargaming Is Necessary to Be Prepared for Future Wars,” War on the Rocks, December 8, 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/revitalizing-wargaming-is-necessary-to-be-prepared-for-future-wars/ (accessed June 16, 2020). 14. Jared Serbu, “Pentagon’s Number-Two Officer Vows to Fix Software Acquisition ‘Nightmare,’” Federal News Network, January 21, 2020, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/defense-main/2020/01/pentagons-number-two-officer-vows-to-fix-software- acquisition-nightmare/ (accessed June 16, 2020). 15. Unified Quest, unclassified “Unified Quest 2018 Deep Future Wargame Summary Report,” http://arcic-sem.azurewebsites.us/ App_Documents/UQ/Unified-Quest-18-Deep-Future-Wargame-Summary-Report_FINAL.PDF (accessed June 16, 2020). 16. Alexander Kott, “The Artificial Becomes Real,” U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, January 30, 2018, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/263969/artificial-becomes-real (accessed June 16, 2020). See also Alexander Kott, “Intelligent Autonomous Agents are Key to Cyber Defense of the Future Army Networks,” The Cyber Defense Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 2018), pp. 57–70, https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/CDR%20Journal%20Articles/Fall%20 2018/KOTT_CDR_V3N3.pdf?ver=2018-12-18-101632-597 (accessed June 16, 2020). 17. U.S. Army Reserve, 75th Innovation Command, “Mission,” https://www.usar.army.mil/75thIC/ (accessed June 16, 2020).

34 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength 18. Yasmin Tajdeh, “Big Data, AI to Advance Modeling and Simulation,” National Defense, January 3, 2018, https://www. nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/1/3/big-data-ai-to-advance-modeling-and-simulation (accessed June 16, 2020). 19. Cade Metz, “In a Huge Breakthrough, Google’s AI Beats a Top Player at the Game of Go,” Wired, January 27, 2016, https://www. wired.com/2016/01/in-a-huge-breakthrough-googles-ai-beats-a-top-player-at-the-game-of-go/ (accessed June 16, 2020). 20. Colin Clark, “Hyten: All Domain Drives Requirements Shakeup,” Breaking Defense, February 20, 2020, https://breakingdefense. com/2020/02/hyten-all-domain-drives-requirements-shakeup/ (accessed June 16, 2020). 21. Ibid. 

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 35  Building Resilience: Mobilizing the Defense Industrial Base in an Era of Great-Power Competition Jerry McGinn, PhD

ncreasing national security concerns about meet national emergencies has improved IChina’s military capabilities and mercantil- significantly. There is, however, still much ist economic policies, the growth of commer- work to be done. cial technologies like artificial intelligence Examining how the defense industrial base and robotics, and now a global pandemic has mobilized to meet crises from the 20th have put a spotlight on the U.S. defense in- century to more recent efforts, including the dustrial base. A robust, secure, and resilient response to COVID-19, can help us to separate  -defense industrial base has been an important fact from myth and start to identify best prac national priority in recent years. High-level tices for the future. reviews, increased investments, new legisla- tive authorities, and efforts to encourage new Nature and Structure of the entrants have been undertaken to grow and U.S. Defense Industrial Base strengthen this industrial base. The defense industrial base is an essential How are we faring? Does our industrial base element of the country’s national security and have enough capability and capacity for this can even be considered a central component era of strategic competition? And how resilient of the military force structure. The industrial would our industrial base be in response to a base develops and produces systems and pro- national emergency? vides services that enable our warfighters to The response to the current COVID-19 protect our homeland and to deter and defeat pandemic has given us a partial answer to adversaries on the ground, at sea, in the air and these questions. Although the public health space, and in cyberspace. focus is obviously different from a military The defense industrial base is comprised threat, the tools and authorities that are principally of private and publicly traded available to respond to this national emer- companies that range widely in size and com- gency are essentially the same. Despite the position. In general, these firms fit within three glaring weaknesses in our public health sup- major categories: ply chain that the pandemic has exposed, and despite the initially chaotic (albeit massive) ll A small number of large companies that response from government agencies and serve as prime contractors and integra- companies across the country, the ability tors on major weapons systems; of the U.S. to mobilize its industrial base to

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 37 ll A larger number of mid-tier companies and people” that “protects and enhances the that manufacture major subsystems or American way of life.”5 provide technical services to Department The NDS definitely reinforced the emphasis of Defense (DOD) customers; and on increasing the number of commercial en- trants in the defense industrial base that had ll A very large number of small companies begun with efforts such as the Defense Inno- that manufacture spare parts or provide vation Unit (DIU), self-described as a DOD material serving both commercial and de- organization that “strengthens our national fense customers, serve as nontraditional security by accelerating the adoption of com- start-ups developing innovative technolo- mercial technology throughout the military gies, or are focused on a particular defense and growing the national security innovation segment or customer set. base.” Specifically, “[w]ith offices in Silicon Valley, Boston, Austin, and the Pentagon, DIU All told, the number of firms that contrib- connects its DoD partners with leading tech- ute in some way to the U.S. industrial base nology companies across the country.”6 The likely well exceeds 100,000, according to Vice military departments have launched similar Admiral David Lewis, director of the Defense initiatives such as AFWERX and Army Futures Contract Management Agency.1 These firms Command.7 The overall thrust of these efforts all work closely with government customers to has been to focus on commercial innovation field capabilities for the national defense. because that is the nature of such key NDS In addition to these private and publicly technology focus areas as artificial intelligence, traded companies, there is a much smaller robotics, autonomy, and quantum computing. component of government-owned facilities Whatever its ultimate composition, the de- that produce and service systems: the organ- fense industrial base must have the ability to

ic industrial base. These facilities include mobilize to meet the country’s national secu- shipyards, arsenals, maintenance depots, and rity needs. This mobilization is driven by three ammunition plants.2 Their capabilities in- principal components: clude the expertise to “perform deep repair, the means to provide repair parts to the shop ll Capability. Do we have the defense floor, and the ability to deliver repaired sys- industrial capabilities we need? Are we tems to the time and place of the fight [that] investing in the right technologies and accompanies every military ship, plane, vehicle, building the systems necessary to face and weapon.”3 both current and future national securi- The “reemergence of long-term strategic ty challenges? competition” with China and Russia articu- lated in the 2017 National Defense Strategy ll Capacity. How much redundancy and (NDS) has led to substantial changes in DOD industrial capacity are appropriate? Are investment priorities that have shaped the we developing enough manufacturing efforts and even the composition of the de- competency to meet surge requirements fense industrial base. The NDS further notes in the event of protracted conflict? that “[m]aintaining the Department’s tech- nological advantage will require changes to ll Resilience. How can the United States industry culture, investment sources, and fully mobilize the capabilities and capaci- protection across the National Security In- ties of the defense industrial base to meet novation Base.”4 The term “National Secu- future contingencies? How quickly, for rity Innovation Base” was introduced in the example, can we ramp up production lines 2017 National Security Strategy to reflect the or adjust to emerging industrial require- broad “network of knowledge, capabilities, ments in the middle of a major crisis?

38 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength All three components are crucial. None of to help the war effort. This is illustrated most them is fixed, of course. Any of these compo- notably by the War Industries Board (WIB). nents can be increased or decreased through The WIB was an emergency agency created attention and resources. At the same time, and largely led by industry executives—so- however, getting the balance of capabilities called dollar-a-year men—on loan from their and capacities right is key because it takes respective companies to help oversee war time to change direction. As former Secretary production. While private enterprise played a of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously quipped, significant role in war mobilization, this rapid “You go to war with the army you have, not effort also included some heavy government the army you might want or wish to have at a intervention such as an “excess profits tax.” later time.”8 In addition, the government exercised what The key outcome of this balance of capabil- historian Mark Wilson calls “government ity and capacity is resilience. Resilience deter- coercion” and assumed control of private en- mines whether the defense industrial base can terprises like Smith & Wesson for periods of ultimately produce and deliver in response to time to overcome labor disputes or to direct a true national crisis. Let us examine how the production.12 defense industrial base has performed over The results of these efforts were significant. time to put that balance in context. The crash mobilization efforts ultimately suc- ceeded in building a sufficient number of car- Mobilization in the 20th Century go ships to move all of the men and materials World War I. By the start of the 20th cen- needed for the war, including 2 million rifles, tury, the United States had become a true in- 80,000 trucks, and 12,000 airplanes, in less dustrial power. In the early 1900s, U.S. industri- than two years. Unfortunately, however, most al capacity surpassed that of major European of this equipment arrived too late. General  powers like the United Kingdom, France, and John J. Pershing’s American Expeditionary Germany, but the United States was focused Forces, totaling almost 2 million men, used solely on commercial enterprises, and there a fair number of British rifles and machine was very little defense-focused industrial ca- guns as well as French airplanes during the pacity apart from a limited number of arsenals Great War. As Arthur Herman notes in his dra- and shipyards.9 As tensions in Europe grew and matic account (devoted principally to World war approached, countries formed alliances War II mobilization), “Of the 10,000 75mm and began to mobilize their industries to build artillery pieces the War Department ordered, rifles, trucks, artillery, airplanes, and other ve- only 143 ever reached the front—and not one hicles. Barbara Tuchman’s riveting account of American-made tank.”13 German and other European military planners’ After the November 1918 Armistice, the detailed mobilization plans in preparation for United States quickly dismantled the WIB war in her famous work The Guns of August in 1919, and the industrial base returned to vividly depicts this mobilization.10 its prewar focus. The Great War experience, This high state of alert was certainly not however, did significantly inform American present in the United States in 1914, when mobilization efforts in World War II. the Army was a very modest force of just over World War II. The United States watched 127,000 soldiers and there was little appetite during the 1930s as tensions again rose in Eu- for war. In fact, President Woodrow Wilson rope. Domestic attitudes remained hostile won reelection in 1916 in large measure be- toward involvement in another European war, cause of his slogan, “He Kept Us out of War.”11 and American industrial efforts reflected that That changed in 1917 when the United posture of neutrality. President Franklin D. States entered World War I. Businesses and Roosevelt, who had served as Assistant Secre- business leaders stepped forward dramatically tary of the Navy during World War I, clearly

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 39 L Comparing Peacetime and Wartime Production During World War II

Peak Product Prewar Baseline Output Wartime Peak Output Baseline Synthetic rubber  long tons ()  long tons ()  Aviation gasoline  barrelsday (June )  barrelsday (March )   Merchant ships  million dw tons ( )  million dw tons ( )  TNT  lbsday (June )  million lbsday (Dec )  Airframes  million lbs ()  million lbs ()  Magnesium  million lbs ()  million lbs ( )  Aluminum  million lbsyear ( )  billion lbsyear (late  )  Electric power  million kilowatts ()  million kilowatts (April )  Steel  million net tons ()  million net tons () 

SOURCE: Mark R. Wilson, Destructive Creation: American usiness and the inning of orld ar (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), p. 79. A heritage.org

recognized the domestic political constraints, Motors President Bill Knudsen, known as the

but he benefited from the need of the British “Big Dane,” who resigned his position after a and French governments to buy aircraft and phone call from President Roosevelt in mid- ships in the late 1930s to confront the growing 1940 requesting that he come to Washington; Nazi threat. industrialists such as the colorful Henry Kai- Congress passed the $1.1 billion Fleet Ex- ser, a high school dropout who became a pro- pansion Act in May 1938 to address these inter- duction wizard; government officials such as national orders as well as increasing domestic former cotton broker and head of the Recon- orders for ships.14 Although the United States struction Finance Corporation Jesse H. Jones; continued to remain neutral after war began and even New Dealers such as the President’s in Europe in September 1939, the need for in- close adviser Harry Hopkins.17 creased industrial mobilization had become Despite often being at odds with one anoth- clear. In May 1940, General George C. Marshall, er, these leaders achieved tremendous results the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, convinced Pres- in establishing industrial capacity in such ar- ident Roosevelt to increase the Army’s 1940 eas as materials, steel, ships, tanks, and aircraft. appropriation request dramatically from $24 They directed or oversaw significant govern- million to $700 million.15 These significant ac- ment investment through the alphabet soup tions helped to create the conditions for “the of government organizations created during great arsenal of democracy” that Roosevelt the war such as the War Production Board, its famously announced as his goal for America successor Office of Production Management, in a December 1940 fireside chat.16 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, This arsenal would be built by a diverse set and many more. Success was accomplished of characters that represented an underappre- principally through public investment to cre- ciated cohort of the Greatest Generation. They ate new shipyards and manufacturing plants included new dollar-a-year men like General that were run by private companies. These

40 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength government-owned and contractor-operated prime contractor Boeing, government pro- (GOCO) facilities were the largest investment gram managers, and the defense industrial in manufacturing capacity during the war and base, but through the persistent efforts of all became a successful business model that con- involved, the B-29 came into service and at the tinues today.18 end of the war played a pivotal role that includ- Most important, these GOCOs produced. ed dropping atomic bombs on the Japanese cit- As Knudsen and his successor, former Sears, ies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.23 Roebuck executive Don Nelson, worked with The extraordinary results of the overall ef- the President to establish ambitious produc- fort, however, speak for themselves. When the tion goals each year, the base would inevitably war ended, the United States was undeniably meet and exceed these goals. The sheer num- the world’s principal industrial power. But the bers and scale are breathtaking. Mark Wil- end of the war also led to rapid demobilization son’s analysis lays out the magnitude of this of the armed forces and the start of industrial increase in Table 1. “reconversion.” The government disposed of This level of production simply swamped many GOCOs through privatization, a trend that of America’s adversaries. “In 1943,” that continued across the defense sector.24 notes Arthur Herman, “American war pro- That, plus conflict on the Korean Peninsula duction was twice that of Germany and Ja- and the onset of the Cold War, helped to shape pan combined.”19 the defense industrial base for the remainder The private-sector companies that pro- of the 20th century. duced the output of the arsenal represented Korea and the Defense Production Act. all aspects of American manufacturing. The The Soviet establishment of puppet regimes in largest government contractors were major ex- Eastern Europe in the aftermath of World War isting businesses like Bethlehem Steel, Chrys- II and the North Korean invasion of the South  -ler, General Motors, Ford, Sperry Gyroscope, in 1950 led Congress to enact the Defense Pro and Wright Aeronautical, which expanded or duction Act (DPA), which was modeled on the modified their production lines to support the authorities of World War II. President Harry S. war effort.20 Thousands of other small and mid- Truman used the DPA principally to prioritize size companies similarly converted their oper- and direct production efforts. He continued, ations or were formed to meet the tremendous for example, the practice of government sei- war demand. Among the most dynamic and zures of private companies, although this prac- innovative sectors during the war was aircraft tice came to an end after the Youngstown steel manufacturing, with such companies as Lock- strike of 1952. Concerned about the impact of heed Aircraft, the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, the strike on the war effort, the President is- the Glenn L. Martin Company, the Allison di- sued an executive order in April to force the vision of General Motors, Pratt and Whitney, steel mills to stay open. The Supreme Court, Boeing, and the fledgling Grumman Aircraft however, ruled that Truman’s seizure of the in Long Island, New York, producing aircraft steel industry was unconstitutional.25 and engines throughout the war.21 Despite the Supreme Court ruling, the Not surprisingly, though, there were at DPA took shape over time. The law gave the times significant challenges in this mobiliza- President broad authority to ensure the time- tion. Government seizures of companies, la- ly availability of essential domestic industrial bor unrest, and tensions between government resources to support defense requirements. and industry over price controls and profit Congress continued to reauthorize three of the margins were also regular features during the original DPA titles, which were used regularly war.22 Numerous production efforts struggled throughout the Cold War and in the decades or spectacularly failed. The B-29 superbomb- following the fall of the Berlin Wall. er, for example, was a tremendous struggle for

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 41 ll Title I is focused on the distribution and government to “help provide for the allocation of goods and services. The national defense” in times of crisis.30 Only distribution authority of Title I permits one voluntary agreement on the mari- the government to prioritize contracts time industry currently exists, and it is to meet priority government needs. The managed by the Department of Transpor- Defense Prioritization and Allocation Sys- tation. Foreign direct investment is also tem (DPAS), overseen by the Department covered under Title VII and is governed of Commerce, uses this authority regular- by the Committee on Foreign Investment ly to prioritize orders and rate contracts in the United States (CFIUS). CFIUS is to meet government-mandated critical an interagency committee that, led by the infrastructure requirements.26 Department of the Treasury, reviews for- eign investment transactions for national ll The allocation authority of Title I permits security concerns. CFIUS was added to the government to prioritize industrial Title VII in 1988 through the Exon–Florio efforts to meet national defense priori- amendment to the DPA but received little ties. This authority was rarely used in the public attention until the Dubai Ports aftermath of the 1952 steel strike, but it transaction in 2007.31 This transaction, was central to the establishment of the which proposed the foreign purchase of Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). CRAF, six U.S. ports, led Congress to pass the managed by the Department of Transpor- Foreign Investment and National Security tation, gave the President the ability to Act to create CFIUS in statute.32 mobilize specific aircraft for government use in the event of national emergency.27 Industrial Base and Industrial Poli- CRAF planning efforts focused for exam- cy Trends. The privatization of the defense

ple, on surge requirements to deploy U.S. industrial base (which President Dwight D. troops and equipment to Europe to help Eisenhower famously dubbed the military– the North Atlantic Treaty Organization industrial complex in his 1961 farewell address) (NATO) defend Europe in the case of Sovi- continued during the Cold War.33 Throughout et military aggression. decades of East–West confrontation, dozens of major defense contractors developed ships, ll Title III focuses on the ability to “create, aircraft, and ground vehicles for the Depart- maintain, protect, expand, or restore ment of Defense. industrial base capabilities essential for The existential threat of nuclear war and national defense” through grants, loans, the militarized border between NATO and So- purchases, and purchase commitments.28 viet bloc forces led to a consistently large U.S. The President delegated authority to the defense budget—generally over 5 percent of Department of Defense to manage this gross domestic product—throughout the Cold authority. Over time, Title III became War.34 This changed dramatically after the fall focused almost exclusively on grants— of the Berlin Wall and Secretary of Defense principally congressional earmarks—to William Perry’s “Last Supper” meeting with increase industrial capacity in areas of major defense company CEOs, which sparked industrial base weakness such as complex a significant round of industrial consolidation forgings for naval propulsion shafts and within the defense sector as budgets declined the creation of a domestic production after the Cold War ended.35 facility for beryllium.29 Inside government, meanwhile, there was little coordinated focus on industrial policy ll Title VII focuses on voluntary agree- or planning. The Office of War Mobilization, ments between the private sector and which performed this function during World

42 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength War II, was abolished immediately after the vehicles. DPA Title I was even used to help pri- war. President Truman created a compara- oritize the production of body armor.38 Despite ble entity, the Office of Defense Mobilization, these improvements in force protection, how- during the Korean War, but President Eisen- ever, deaths from IEDs continued to mount. hower greatly reduced the stature of this office The Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected in favor of a market approach.36 Vehicle (MRAP) ultimately became the force Much of this was purposeful because of protection solution for American forces, but its long-standing American bias against indus- development and deployment were not with- trial policy. As the late Jacques Gansler not- out challenges. As James Hasik points out in ed, “[t]he U.S. economy is built on the strong his forthcoming book, the foremost challenge assumption of the benefits of free-market op- with respect to the MRAP was getting it estab- eration and has long been averse to industrial lished as a true acquisition priority. The MRAP planning, even in the defense sector.”37 Unlike was a radical departure in armored vehicle de- Cold War adversaries like the Soviet Union and sign, and it competed with other priorities. China, the United States did not put great stock Prioritization changed with the arrival of in five-year plans to achieve industrial results. Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense in 2007, Instead, U.S. leaders believed that, much like but challenges to the industrial base were not the perceived experience during World War II, insignificant. There were initial industrial the dynamic nature of the U.S. economic system bottlenecks for ballistic glass, axles, tires, and and the strength of the overall industrial base spare parts, but the biggest challenge was steel would be able to respond to any national crisis. plate. With extremely limited domestic capac- ity to produce steel plate for the MRAP, DOD Mobilization in the 21st Century qualified foreign-owned and foreign sources As the nation moved into the second de- to meet the demand. Secretary Gates also used  cade of the 21st century, national security the highest DPA Title I DPAS rating, DX, to officials began to rethink many of their as- prioritize steel plate procurement. Eventually, sumptions about mobilization and the defense these challenges were overcome, and tens of industrial base. thousands of MRAPs were produced and de- Post-9/11 Conflicts and the MRAP. The livered to Iraq, contributing significantly to the conflicts in Afghanistan and then Iraq in the dramatic reduction in IED casualties by 2008.39 wake of 9/11 spurred industrial mobilization Sharpening Focus on the Defense Indus- efforts that were substantially different from trial Base. The proliferation of high-tech com- those that had arisen in response to previous mercial technology and the shifting of manu- conflicts. During the early 2000s, most of the facturing and production to meet the demands industrial base focused on developing capabil- of the global economy have had tremendous ities to fight insurgents. economic benefits for the United States and Particularly in Iraq, improvised explosive countries around the world, but they also have devices (IEDs) became the greatest threat to given rise to trends and practices that would American forces. U.S. armored vehicles had be problematic in war. The limits of these ap- been very effective in toppling the Taliban proaches, which include just-in-time manufac- and Saddam Hussein regimes but were much turing and global supply chain optimization, less suited to protecting soldiers against IEDs. became increasingly visible in the defense in- Large and small companies focused on devel- dustrial base as the country entered the second oping systems to counter IEDs as well as addi- decade of the new century and troop levels in tional force protection for individuals and ve- the Middle East decreased. hicles. Overall, the defense industrial base was While national security priorities and Buy up to the task, developing more advanced body America laws ensured that the vast majority armor for soldiers and additional armor for of the development and production of defense

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 43 systems occurred in the United States, the pro- origin in CFIUS transactions began to shift duction of some critical subcomponents and substantially after 2010. From 2007–2009, materials migrated overseas. DOD’s annual for example, acquisitions originating from Industrial Capabilities reports to Congress companies in the United Kingdom, Canada, identified many of these weaknesses in the France, Australia, and Israel—traditional U.S. industrial base.40 They noted, for example, allies—accounted for 57 percent of 358 covered that the production of microelectronics and transactions. Transactions originating from materials such as rare earth elements as well Chinese firms were less than 4 percent of the as specialty chemicals and energetics used in total. In less than a decade, those ratios shifted explosives were increasingly produced only dramatically. From 2016–2018, transactions outside of the United States—in some cases, originating from China were the largest pro- almost exclusively in China. These compo- portion of cases filed: 26.5 percent. Moreover, nents and materials are used overwhelmingly the nature of the Chinese transactions drew for commercial purposes in electronics such increased scrutiny because the vast majority as computers and smartphones, but they also of these proposed acquisitions (84 percent) are essential components in critical advanced were focused on the manufacturing, finance, defense systems such as radars and precision-​ information, and services sectors.42 guided munitions (PGMs). This shift drew significant bipartisan con- The short-lived 2010 Chinese embargo of gressional and executive branch concern about rare earth elements following the Japanese the impact of increased levels of Chinese own- seizure of a Chinese fishing vessel brought at- ership or control in such critical sectors of the tention to the dominant position that China industrial base as microelectronics. On August had achieved, largely through state industrial 13, 2018, the President signed into law the Na- policy, in rare earth mining and processing. tional Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for

Although the crisis quickly passed, the lack of Fiscal Year 2019, which included the Foreign U.S. domestic rare earth capacity and conse- Investment Risk Review Modernization Act quent dependence on a foreign source of sup- of 2018 (FIRRMA).43 FIRRMA was the most ply remained.41 significant reform of CFIUS since the Foreign DOD’s focus on the industrial base sharp- Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) ened during this period as a result. The Office of 2007 and helped to modernize national se- of Industrial Affairs, which had been demot- curity reviews of financial transactions by “ex- ed in stature in the early 2000s, was elevated pand[ing] the scope and jurisdiction of CFIUS,” and eventually strengthened further in 2013 refining CFIUS procedures, and requiring “ac- with the creation of the Office of Manufac- tions by CFIUS to address national security turing and Industrial Base Policy (MIBP). In risks related to mitigation agreements.”44 addition to the traditional focus on industri- 2017–2018 White House Defense In- al base assessment, anti-trust reviews of de- dustrial Base Review. The galvanizing point fense-related mergers and acquisitions, and for sustained action in the defense industrial DPA Title III, the responsibility for CFIUS was base was the 2017–2018 whole-of-government transferred to MIBP. This reorganization and review launched by President Donald J. a direct-report relationship to the Under Sec- Trump’s Executive Order 13806, “Assessing retary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Strengthening the Manufacturing and De- and Logistics gave DOD a stronger focal point fense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resil- for industrial base analysis and mitigation ef- iency of the United States,” signed on July 21, forts across the department. 2017.45 Initiated by the White House Office of This sharpened focus played a significant Trade and Manufacturing Policy and led by the role in addressing the changing nature of DOD Office of Industrial Policy, this interagency foreign direct investment as the country of effort identified five macro forces shaping the

44 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength industrial base that included the decline of U.S. investment priorities across DOD. In addition manufacturing capability and capacity as well as to high-tech investment, the overall DOD bud- U.S. government business practices. These mac- get increased, and existing major acquisition ro forces manifest themselves in what the final programs were overhauled to align with NDS report called “risk archetypes” in the defense objectives. After almost two decades focused industrial base, ranging from single and sole on counterterrorism, however, there were sources of supply to fragile suppliers and mar- questions about whether the defense indus- kets as well as dependence on foreign suppliers trial base would have the resilience for a rapid and the erosion of U.S.-based infrastructure.46 ramping up of production in complex major The report reinforced many previous ef- systems such as satellites, aircraft, and ships forts, but one finding in particular—the “sur- in the event of a crisis. As noted in the White prising level of foreign dependence on com- House 13806 report and the annual industrial petitor nations”—stood out and became the capability reports to Congress, there are nu- focus for implementation.47 Of principal con- merous sectors of the industrial base, such as cern were areas in which Chinese firms had be- advanced radars, aircraft, shipbuilding, ground come single or sole-source suppliers of critical vehicles, and rocket motors, where there often materials well down the supply chain through are just two prime contractors.49 mercantilist economic policies and general In addition to these efforts to add capabili- global supply chain trends. In response, the ty and capacity to the defense industrial base, Administration initiated a significant number there have been a number of initiatives to sim- of DPA Title III and Industrial Base Analysis plify and increase the speed of the DOD acqui- and Sustainment program projects to address sition system. Congressional efforts through these shortcomings. These resulted in Presi- the NDAA in the past several years have cre- dential Determinations and funding opportu- ated authorities, for example, to facilitate the  nities for capabilities such as small unmanned greater use of Other Transactions Authority aerial systems, critical chemicals for missiles (OTA) contracts50 and to create a middle-tier and munitions, and heavy and light rare earth acquisition authority approach.51 The rationale separation and processing.48 behind these changes has been to encourage Adapting the Defense Industrial Base to greater innovation and more prototyping both Meet NDS Objectives. The defense industrial in research and development and in major ac- base has been financially healthy for most of quisition programs to help build resilience to the past two decades with substantial defense meet the dynamic challenges of today’s secu- budgets and strong market valuations in the rity environment. DOD has put together an wake of the 9/11 attacks, subsequent long-term Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF) to military operations in the Middle East, and outline these and other “pathways” for acqui- growing security threats from China and in sition professionals “to develop acquisition cyberspace. The basic structure of the industry strategies and employ acquisition processes has similarly remained stable with a handful of that match the characteristics of the capability large prime contractors that enjoy annual rev- being acquired” in support of the NDS.52 enues exceeding $15 billion, a larger number of Supply chain security has been a persistent mid-tier companies that are major subsystems challenge in the defense industrial base. Be- suppliers, and a much larger cohort of small yond the entry of companies from adversary businesses and component suppliers. Mergers countries into lower levels of the supply chain, and acquisitions have continued throughout two principal challenges stand out. the industrial base with the exception of con- The first of these challenges is supply chain solidation among the top system integrators. visibility. DOD does its business through con- The NDS focus on renewed great-power tracts with prime contractors, and those con- competition led to significant changes in tracts hold the prime contractors accountable

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 45 for having their subcontractors deliver. As a re- produce over 50 percent of the world’s N95 sult, DOD does not have direct visibility into masks and that they had temporarily halted the defense supply chain beyond the prime their mask exports as the virus spread in Chi- or tier-one or tier-two levels. Similarly, prime na.55 Furthermore, there was the troubling contractors do not have tremendous visibili- revelation that more than 90 percent of the ty beyond one or two levels further down the global production of antibiotics also takes supply chain. Most of the time, this is not an place in China.56 Much like the White House issue, but in certain cases, it can be very diffi- defense industrial base review, the pandem- cult. In 2017, for example, a fifth-tier supplier ic has demonstrated the problematic nature that provided a voltage control switch used of dependent economic relationships with in PGMs was purchased, and a subsequent nontransparent economies and undemocrat- end-of-life buy was insufficient to meet op- ic countries like China for items of strategic erational demands.53 This resulted in the ra- importance.57 tioning of PGMs being used in an operational The initial federal response to the pandem- theater at the time until a longer-term solution ic was chaotic, as it would be in any major crisis, was devised. but it was clear from the outset that the White The second persistent challenge is cyber- House and all U.S. government agencies were security. The threat to U.S. national security pursuing an all-of-the-above approach to ac- secrets and the damage caused by intellectual quiring the PPE and equipment needed to treat property theft in the defense industrial base COVID patients across the country. The Coro- are well documented and have played a central navirus Task Force and federal agencies led by role in the establishment of DOD’s Cybersecu- the Department of Health and Human Services rity Maturation Model Certification (CMMC) (HHS) worked with existing producers of ven- effort.54 CMMC is being implemented in 2020 tilators and other health care equipment to

with the goal of full implementation by 2025. surge production to unprecedented levels, and With these changes in investment and in agencies began to release quick-turnaround— how DOD acquires goods and services, the even same-day-response—solicitations to pur- question remained as to whether the defense chase PPE from all sources. Some also issued industrial base could deliver in the event of competitions to seek alternative solutions major conflict. The unexpected COVID-19 from suppliers that had never before produced pandemic early in 2020 has provided a health care equipment.58 Meanwhile, White partial answer. House advisers such as Director for Trade and Manufacturing Policy Dr. Peter Navarro got on The Response to COVID-19 the phone with leaders of commercial firms to In many ways, the current COVID-19 pan- find companies willing to adjust production ef- demic has been a testing ground for the ability forts to develop additional sources of ventila- of the U.S. industrial base to respond to a na- tors and PPE to meet the exploding number of tional emergency because, not surprisingly, the COVID cases in late March.59 challenges to public health supply chains are On March 13, the President announced that similar in many ways to those faced by defense he was invoking the DPA’s Title I distribution supply chains. For example, while innovation authority to enable HHS to speed the procure- and research and development are strong do- ment of PPE and other items. The executive mestically, the production of personal protec- order gave HHS the authority to prioritize tive equipment (PPE) and many pharmaceuti- contracts and orders to meet national defense cals has largely moved offshore. and emergency preparedness program re- The limitations of this approach were ex- quirements, specifically in the “areas of health posed in the early days of the pandemic when and medical resources needed to respond to media reports revealed that Chinese firms the spread of COVID-19, including personal

46 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength CHART 2 Federal Obligations Focused on COVID-19

SHARE OF TOTAL OBLIGATIONS AS OF JUNE ‡ˆ ‡‡ˆ BY DEPARTMENT

Health and Human Services 
 Homeland Security  Veterans A airs  Agriculture  Defense  Energy  Small Business Administration  Other  Total 

NOTE: Department of Defense data are not fully represented due to standard 90–day lag in reporting. SOURCE: Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation, https://www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/index.php/en/ (accessed July 10, 2020).

A heritage.org

protective equipment and ventilators.”60 In of March, federal obligations focused on  short order, there were heated debates about COVID-19 rocketed from $636 million on whether the President should invoke the DPA March 24 to just shy of $2 billion by March Title I allocation authority to direct ventilator 31.65 Cumulative obligations reached over $7 production—an action that he largely resisted.61 billion as of April 21 and $14 billion by the start Debates about how various aspects of the of June. Chart 2 breaks down these obligations DPA might be used in response to the public by government agency. health crisis tended to dominate media re- The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic porting, but these masked the real work that Security (CARES) Act further accelerated the was underway. Government agencies respond- immediate response and facilitated medium-​ ed immediately to the pandemic by invoking term efforts to rebuild the domestic public emergency clauses in the Federal Acquisition health supply chain. For the longer-term re- Regulation (FAR) to delegate approval authori- silience of that supply chain, the CARES Act ty, increase the use of streamlined commercial added $1 billion to the DPA Fund and removed contracting processes, and increase thresholds funding restrictions on individual Title III to help speed efforts.62 Funding opportunities projects.66 The tremendous infusion into the in such areas as 3D printing, biofabrication, DPA Fund was its largest-ever appropriation, and textiles63 as well as collaborative projects and some of these funds have already been between biomedical technology companies used as the Administration has greatly accel- and the Army64 also emerged rapidly. Compa- erated Title III projects. Whereas, for example, nies across the spectrum responded to those it has taken 18 months to get rare earth Title III opportunities to provide solutions during this projects to the point of award, two COVID-19 time of crisis. pandemic-focused Title III projects, each over The results coming out of the industri- $120 million, have been started in less than a al base were dramatic. In just the final week month utilizing those DPA funds.67

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 47 Most important, the impacts of these indus- pursued and won a series of COVID-19 trial base efforts were felt in the hospitals on contracts that began in early April.68 the front lines of the fight against COVID-19. Despite frightening projections and spiking There are still gaps and weaknesses that cases in early April, few hospitals suffered need to be addressed, however. The lack of ro- lasting shortages of PPE or ventilators, and bust capacity in areas of numerous industrial numerous temporary field hospitals that were base sectors such as ground vehicles, shipbuild- constructed were not even used for coronavi- ing, radars, and rocket motors, for instance, rus patients. raises concerns for potential NDS contingen- cies. In these and other sectors, there is often Building Resilience: Lessons for the Future one contractor with a preeminent market po- COVID was an important testing ground in sition and one or more other firms that strug- several aspects, but it was not as challenging to gle to keep up. Creating more opportunities the defense industrial base as, for instance, the for firms to compete for prototype contracts development of the B-29 or the atomic bomb through middle-tier acquisition authority ef- were during World War II. Certainly, should forts or through OTAs, such as the Army is do- the U.S. find itself in a longer-term conflict ing in its revamped timeline for the Optionally with an adversary such as China, the abili- Manned Fighting Vehicle, is one way to build ty of our defense industrial base to respond industrial capacity to meet NDS objectives.69 to the destruction or disabling of our F-35 A recent analysis of the defense industri- fighters or satellites would present a greater al base by a major defense trade association challenge. While DOD investment priorities and fast-rising analytics firm gave the base a and contracting approaches continue to pri- “C” grade based on “a business environment oritize capabilities and capacities focused characterized by highly contrasting areas of 70

on great-power competition, the essential concern and confidence.” Areas of concern question is whether we are building the real included workforce, intermediate goods and resilience that the nation requires to address services, and raw materials. While the mid- today’s—and tomorrow’s—defense challenges. dling overall grade is not terribly surprising, Overall, our defense industrial base is well coming as it does from a trade association, it postured on at least two fronts. is very interesting to note that some of the highest scores in the report related to the ll The basic authorities, regulations, struc- industrial base’s productive capacity and tures, and tools available to government surge readiness.71 are solid. Despite some initial hiccups, Turning back to the three components that this structure enabled an effective re- are key for mobilizing the defense industrial sponse to the multifaceted nature of the base, there are several areas that are ripe for COVID-19 crisis. Many tools such as OTAs additional action in the coming months: and DPA Title III that are supporting NDS priorities have similarly been deployed Capability effectively during the current crisis. ll Incentivizing new defense industrial base entrants will continue to be crucial. The ll Companies across the spectrum are get- trends in commercial technology are only ting involved. Many commercial start-ups accelerating, so DOD needs to continue to and nontraditional contractors engaged develop and scale business relationships with DIU and AFWERX, and other DOD with nontraditional suppliers. organizations immediately turned their efforts to support pandemic response ef- ll Eliminating industrial base dependence forts. One of those companies, for example, on China or another competitor nation

48 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength is imperative. Utilizing DPA Title III and Resilience other authorities or programs to address ll Planning and organizing in advance will this dependence will be critical to en- help to speed future mobilizations of the abling future crisis responses. defense industrial base. Detailed plans and standing organizations are in no ll Increasing the ability of companies and way solutions by themselves, but clearly agencies to use rapid and flexible con- outlining and aligning DPA and other tracting mechanisms will be essential authorities, policies, and responsibilities to successful responses to future crises. for future crises and taking an informed Carefully assessing the rugby scrum of approach to planning will help to bring contracting efforts used in the COVID-19 the best aspects of industrial policy to response, for instance, will help to deter- bear for the defense industrial base. mine which efforts are most successful at rapidly developing, producing, and ll Finally, the industrial base has clearly delivering the needed capabilities at the become an extended part of the battlefield needed time so that we are prepared in today’s environment. A catastrophic cy- for the future. berattack, an antisatellite attack destroy- ing our Global Positioning System net- Capacity work, or a deadly second wave of COVID ll Developing DPA Title VII voluntary could cripple facilities or large parts of the agreements could help to build the latent defense industrial base with little or no capacity of the defense industrial base to warning. Thus, efforts such as CMMC will address future mobilization efforts. be crucial to building longer-term resil- ience in the defense industrial base.  ll Prototyping efforts through OTAs as well as Section 804 middle-tier acquisition Conclusion authority can help to create additional This examination of past, recent, and ongo- industrial base capacity akin to that of the ing national crises and changes in the national numerous aircraft companies in World security environment has demonstrated the War II by increasing these prototyping tremendous dynamism and resilience of our efforts and linking them with produc- defense industrial base. When the chips are tion programs. down, our private and public sectors clearly can deliver. From the global conflicts of the ll Increasing visibility into defense supply 20th century and the post-9/11 world to today’s chains through an independent third-​ COVID-19 response and era of great-power party mechanism will help to identify ca- competition, companies across the industrial pacity challenges in the defense industrial base develop and produce systems and solu- base as they develop and mitigate them tions to meet our national defense needs. Gov- before they have an operational impact. ernment agencies and Congress have similarly formed organizations and adjusted policies, ll Stockpiling is a cost-effective way to created and aligned authorities, and otherwise build capacity in the defense industrial worked toward the same goal. base. Building on the expansion of the Building resilience across our defense in- Strategic National Stockpile in the CARES dustrial base is a national security imperative. Act, DOD should explore ways to build The dramatic federal spending on COVID-19 additional capacity by stockpiling re- has led to speculation that future defense bud- sources that are relevant for great-power get cuts are coming. Given the threats facing competition. the nation and the inherent “stickiness” of

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 49 defense budgets, significant cuts (at least in the near term) are not likely.72 Defense lead- ers need to use this time to build resilience in our industrial base for the future. Laws, regu- lations, plans, and policies can enable or inhibit how well the country can mobilize critical as- sets. There is no silver bullet, but the key is for government and industry to collaborate effec- tively and transparently to meet our evolving security needs. 

50 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength Endnotes 1. C. Todd Lopez, “DoD Focuses on Sustaining Industrial Base Through Pandemic,” U.S. Department of Defense, May 5, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2177093/dod-focuses-on-sustaining-industrial-base-through-pandemic/ (accessed July 10, 2020). 2. See, for example, Elizabeth Behring, “Army’s Organic Industrial Base Sustains the Greatest Fighting Force in the World,” U.S. Army, March 14, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/201827/armys_organic_industrial_base_sustains_the_greatest_fighting_ force_in_the_world (accessed July 10, 2020). 3. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, Industrial Capabilities: Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 2018, May 2019, p. 80, https://www.businessdefense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/Resources/2018%20AIC%20RTC%2005-23-2019%20-%20 Public%20Release.pdf?ver=2019-06-07-111121-457 (accessed July 10, 2020). 4. James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 2–3, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/ pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed July 10, 2020). 5. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, December 2017, p. 21, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed July 10, 2020). 6. See Defense Innovation Unit, “About,” https://diu.mil/about (accessed July 6, 2020). 7. See AFWERX, “Connecting Air Force Innovators and Accelerating Results,” https://www.afwerx.af.mil (accessed July 10, 2020), and U.S. Army, “Army Futures Command,” https://www.army.mil/futures (accessed July 10, 2020). 8. Eric Schmitt, “Iraq-Bound Troops Confront Rumsfeld over Lack of Armor,” The New York Times, December 8, 2004, https://www. nytimes.com/2004/12/08/international/middleeast/iraqbound-troops-confront-rumsfeld-over-lack-of.html (accessed July 10, 2020). 9. Jacques S. Gansler, Democracy’s Arsenal: Creating a Twenty-First-Century Defense Industry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), pp. 16–17. 10. Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August: The Outbreak of World War I (New York: Macmillan, 1962).  11. Jim Garamone, “World War I: Building the American Military,” U.S. Army, April 3, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/185229/ world_war_i_building_the_american_military (accessed July 10, 2020). 12. Mark R. Wilson, Destructive Creation: American Business and the Winning of World War II (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), pp. 8–21. “Coercion” quote from p. 11. 13. Arthur Herman, Freedom’s Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World War II (New York: Random House, 2012), p. 13. 14. Wilson, Destructive Creation, p. 51. 15. Herman, Freedom’s Forge, p. 10. 16. Wilson, Destructive Creation, p. 61. 17. Herman, Freedom’s Forge, pp. 37–57 and 66–78. 18. Wilson, Destructive Creation, pp. 59–76. 19. Herman, Freedom’s Forge, p. 248. 20. Gansler, Democracy’s Arsenal, p. 12. 21. Wilson, Destructive Creation, pp. 74–78, and Herman, Freedom’s Forge, pp. 86–88. 22. For detailed treatments of these issues, see Wilson, Destructive Creation, Chapters 4 and 5. 23. For the full story of the B-29 Superbomber, see Herman, Freedom’s Forge, Chapters 16–18. 24. Wilson, Destructive Creation, p. 242. 25. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/343/579/ (accessed July 10, 2020), and Joshua Waimberg, “Youngstown Steel: The Supreme Court Stands Up to the President,” National Constitution Center, Constitution Daily Blog, November 16, 2015, https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/youngstown-steel-the-supreme-court- stands-up-to-the-president (accessed July 10, 2020). 26. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Defense Priorities and Allocations System Programs (DPAS),” https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/other-areas/strategic-industries-and-economic-security-sies/defense-priorities-a-allocations- system-program-dpas (accessed July 10, 2020).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 51 27. Michael H. Cecire and Heidi M. Peters, “The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and Considerations for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress, updated March 2, 2020, p. 9, https://fas.org/ sgp/crs/natsec/R43767.pdf (accessed July 10, 2020). 28. 50 USC §4531(a)(1), https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title50/chapter55&edition=prelim (accessed July 10, 2020). 29. See “Earmark Declaration,” remarks by Representative Charles Dent of Pennsylvania, Congressional Record, Vol. 155, No. 116 (July 29, 2009), pp. E2057–E2058, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2009-07-29/html/CREC-2009-07-29-pt1-PgE2057-3. htm (accessed July 10, 2020), and Air Force Research Laboratory, ManTech, “Defense Production Act Title III Project Establishes Domestic Source for Beryllium,” Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, September 17, 2013, https://www.wpafb.af.mil/News/Article- Display/Article/819343/defense-production-act-title-iii-project-establishes-domestic-source-for-beryll/ (accessed July 10, 2020). 30. 50 USC §4558(c)(1), https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title50/chapter55&edition=prelim (accessed July 30, 2020). 31. See James K. Jackson, “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS),” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress, updated February 14, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf (accessed July 30, 2020). 32. Cecire and Peters, “The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and Considerations for Congress,” pp. 14–19. 33. Wilson, Destructive Creation, p. 266. 34. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex (accessed July 10, 2020). 35. Gansler, Democracy’s Arsenal, pp. 28 and 32–34. 36. Ibid., p. 11. 37. Ibid. 38. U.S. Government Accountability Office,Defense Production Act: Agencies Lack Policies and Guidance for Use of Key Authorities, GAO-08-854, June 2008, p. 6, https://www.gao.gov/assets/280/277418.pdf (accessed July 10, 2020). 39. James M. Hasik, Securing the MRAP: Lessons Learned in Marketing and Military Procurement (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, forthcoming January 2021); based on James M. Hasik, MRAP: Marketing Military Innovation, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, May 2016, https://www.slideshare.net/jhasik/hasikdissertation2016-70324459  (accessed July 10, 2020). 40. Reports for FY 2013 through FY 2019 are available at U.S. Department of Defense, Industrial Policy, “Congressional Interests and Reports,” https://www.businessdefense.gov/resources/ (accessed July 10, 2020). 41. Addison Wiggin, “The Truth Behind China’s Rare Earths Embargo,” Forbes, October 20, 2010, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ greatspeculations/2010/10/20/the-truth-behind-the-chinese-rare-earths-embargo/#21f1d76e7846 (accessed July 10, 2020). 42. Reports from December 2008 through calendar year 2018 are available at U.S. Department of the Treasury, “CFIUS Reports and Tables,” https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius/ cfius-reports-and-tables (accessed July 10, 2020). 43. Title XVII, Review of Foreign Investment and Export Controls, in H.R. 5515, John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public 115-232, 115th Cong., August 13, 2018, https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ232/PLAW-115publ232.pdf (accessed July 26, 2020). 44. James K. Jackson, “The Committee on Investment in the United States (CFIUS),” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress, updated February 14, 2020, pp. 1–2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf (accessed July 10, 2020). 45. President Donald J. Trump, “Presidential Executive Order on Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States,” The White House, July 21, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-assessing-strengthening-manufacturing-defense-industrial-base-supply- chain-resiliency-united-states/ (accessed July 10, 2020). 46. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States: Report to President Donald J. Trump by the Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, September 2018, passim, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN- RESILIENCY.PDF (accessed July 10, 2020).

52 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength 47. Ibid., p. 3. 48. U.S. Department of Defense, Industrial Policy, “Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III,” https://www.businessdefense.gov/ Programs/DPA-Title-III/ (accessed July 10, 2020), and U.S. Department of Defense, Industrial Policy, “IBAS Opportunities,” https:// www.businessdefense.gov/IBAS/Opportunities/ (accessed July 10, 2020). 49. See, respectively, notes 40 and 38, supra. 50. See Moshe Schwartz and Heidi M. Peters, “Department of Defense Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress, updated February 22, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45521.pdf (accessed July 10, 2020). 51. For a summary and links to DOD implementing instructions, see AcqNotes, “Acquisition Process: Middle-Tier Acquisition (Section 804),” updated December 31, 2019, http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/acquisitions/middle-tier-acquisitions (accessed July 10, 2020). 52. U.S. Department of Defense, “DoD Instruction 5000.02: Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework,” January 23, 2020, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500002p.pdf?ver=2020-01-23-144114-093 (accessed July 10, 2020). 53. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States, p. 49. 54. For details on CMMC, see U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification, “CMMC Model,” https://www.acq.osd.mil/cmmc/draft.html (accessed July 10, 2020). 55. Keith Bradsher and Liz Alderman, “The World Needs Masks. China Makes Them, but Has Been Hoarding Them,” The New York Times, updated April 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/business/masks-china-coronavirus.html (accessed July 10, 2020). 56. Ana Swanson, “Coronavirus Spurs U.S. Efforts to End China’s Chokehold on Drugs,”The New York Times, March 11, 2020, https:// www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/business/economy/coronavirus-china-trump-drugs.html (accessed July 10, 2020). 57. Jerry McGinn, “How to Safeguard and Rebuild Our Public Health Supply Chain,” Business Insider, April 14, 2020, https://www. businessinsider.com/dr-jerry-mcginn-safeguard-public-health-supply-chain-department-defense-cares-coronavirus (accessed

 .(July 10, 2020 58. Jerry McGinn and Eric Lofgren, “COVID-19 Response—Executive Update,” George Mason University, School of Business, Center for Government Contracting, April 8, 2020, https://business.gmu.edu/images/GovCon/Website/Center_for_Government_ Contracting_COVID-19_Executive_Update.pdf (accessed July 10, 2020). 59. Gavin Gade and Megan Cassella, “Days After Ventilator DPA Order, White House Has Done Little to Push GM,” Politico, April 2, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/02/white-house-general-motors-defense-production-act-161833 (accessed July 10, 2020). 60. President Donald J. Trump, “Executive Order on Prioritizing and Allocating Health and Medical Resources to Respond to the Spread of Covid-19,” The White House, March 18, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order- prioritizing-allocating-health-medical-resources-respond-spread-covid-19/ (accessed July 10, 2020). 61. The President ended up suing the DPA allocation authority in a very limited way by directing specific companies such as GM to produce ventilators and other items when negotiations on voluntary efforts broke down. See, for example, W. J. Hennigan, “Trump Bets on Powers of Persuasion to Compel Big Business to Produce Urgent Medical Supplies,” Time, March 24, 2020, https:// time.com/5809264/trump-big-business-coronavirus/ (accessed July 10, 2020), and Gavin Gade, “‘GM Was Wasting Time’: Trump Invokes DPA to Force GM to Make Ventilators,” Politico, March 27, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/27/trump- slams-gm-over-ventilator-production-delays-costs-151885 (accessed July 10, 2020). 62. Jerry McGinn, James Hasik, and Eric Lofgren, “COVID-19 Response—Contracting with Speed,” George Mason University, School of Business, Center for Government Contracting, April 22, 2020, https://business.gmu.edu/images/GovCon/Website/GMU_ COVID-19_Contracting_with_Speed.pdf (accessed July 10, 2020). 63. News release, “NIST Funding Manufacturing Institutes to Support Pandemic Response,” U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, updated May 18, 2020, https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2020/03/nist-funding- manufacturing-institutes-support-pandemic-response (accessed July 10, 2020). 64. Medical Technology Enterprise Consortium, “Project Awards,” https://www.mtec-sc.org/mtec-current-projects/ (accessed July 26, 2020). 65. McGinn and Lofgren, “COVID-19 Response—Executive Update.”

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 53 66. H.R. 748, Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Public Law 116-136, 116th Cong., March 27, 2020, https:// www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/748/text?loclr=bloglaw%23toc-H0D9C019E301D4A9584058F8DA59D1CC8 (accessed July 11, 2020). 67. News release, “DOD Awards $138 Million Contract, Enabling Prefilled Syringes for Future COVID-19 Vaccine,” U.S. Department of Defense, May 12, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2184808/dod-awards-138-million- contract-enabling-prefilled-syringes-for-future-covid-19/ (accessed July 11, 2020), and news release, “DOD Awards $126 Million Contract to 3M, Increasing Production of N95 Masks,” U.S. Department of Defense, May 6, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/ Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2178152/dod-awards-126-million-contract-to-3m-increasing-production-of-n95-masks/ (accessed July 11, 2020). 68. Thomas Brewster, “Palantir, the Peter Thiel-Backed $20 Billion Big Data Cruncher, Scores $17 Million Coronavirus Emergency Relief Deal,” Forbes, April 11, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2020/04/11/palantir-the-peter-thiel-backed- 20-billion-big-data-cruncher-scores-17-million-coronavirus-emergency-relief-deal/#7444944a5ed1 (accessed July 10, 2020). 69. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “OMFV: Army Revamps Bradley Replacement for Russian Front,” Breaking Defense, April 10, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/army-revamps-omfv-bradley-replacement-for-russian-front/ (accessed July 10, 2020). 70. National Defense Industrial Association, Vital Signs 2020: The Health and Readiness of the Defense Industrial Base, p. 5, https:// www.ndia.org/-/media/vital-signs/vital-signs_screen_v2.ashx?la=en (accessed July 10, 2020). 71. Ibid, pp. 52–59. 72. Eric Lofgren, “Will Defense Budgets Remain ‘Sticky’ After the COVID-19 Pandemic?” Defense News, May 26, 2020, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/26/will-defense-budgets-remain-sticky-after-the-covid-19-pandemic/ (accessed July 10, 2020). 

54 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength Strategic Mobility: The Essential Enabler of Military Operations in Great-Power Competition John Fasching

“If everyone is thinking alike, then somebody requirements of geographic combatant com- isn’t thinking.” manders in executing their operational war —General George S. Patton plans. This commitment is demonstrated by the four-star-level, joint United States Trans- merica’s‌ military instrument of national portation Command (USTRANSCOM), which Apower has prevailed over those of our ad- orchestrates American strategic mobility op- versaries because of an unparalleled ability erations in concert with interagency, intergov-  ,to project and sustain dominant force levels ernmental, multinational, nongovernmental rapidly around the globe. In concert with the and commercial stakeholders. diplomatic, information, and economic instru- ments of national power, the military helps to Growing Critical Challenges implement America’s national security and At the same time, however, America’s com- defense strategies,1 but success in great-power petitors and adversaries have been making competition and future conflict will require a their own investments in an effort to offset reinfusion of innovation and resources. American strategic mobility overmatch in fu- Traditionally, the Department of Defense ture armed conflicts. Our recent military suc- (DOD) has invested in a set of strategic mobil- cesses have been against nation-states that ity enablers that can move war-winning levels were not capable of global competition or non- of combat forces, equipment, and supplies to state actors with little to no ability to disrupt sustain military operations at the time and our strategic mobility capabilities. The nature place, and for the duration of, our choosing. of the competition through the conflict contin- DOD has developed and resourced the nec- uum vis-à-vis China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, essary strategic mobility–related doctrine, and even the fight against terrorism, or likely organizations, training, materiel, leadership combinations thereof, in an era of great-power and education, personnel, facilities, and policy competition and conflict demands strategic (DOTMLPF-P) in order to meet the force-flow mobility–enabling processes and capabilities

Retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel John Fasching has written and presented on strategic mobility issues for such organizations as the National Defense Transportation Association, the Association of the United States Army, and the National Academies of Sciences Transportation Research Board. The views expressed in this essay are those of the author alone and do not reflect the official policies or the positions of any DOD, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, nongovernmental, or commercial organization.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 55 that are different from those we have now. Our and contractor-enabled deployments to Iraq current deployment process must be enhanced, and Afghanistan. While we accepted risk in particularly for “early” deployers in contest- deferring modernization, adversaries were ed environments, because it is predictable and developing their own global-reach capabil- inadequate for ever-compressing, adequate ities that threaten to disrupt deployment military-response timelines and threat capa- operations both in America and en route to bilities for disruption of our force flow. theaters of operation the next time we de- Adversaries with advanced (and in some ploy a campaign-quality force in support of cases superior) weaponry, lethal global reach, large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Our and strategic mobility programs and capabil- adversaries have invested heavily in A2/AD ities of their own have combined to force us capabilities that directly threaten American to acknowledge the contested nature of our strategic mobility. military operating environments and adjust There are cultural challenges that stand in our concepts, strategies, plans, and capability the way of the necessary shift in our thinking development efforts. Concentrations of forces about what our strategic mobility solution set and supplies create target-rich environments, should look like and how it should be priori- and our operations must become more and tized to ensure the successful execution of more distributed to increase our survivability our national security and defense strategies. and resilience as we move further away from Undoubtedly, fiscal pressure and competition benign operating environments. for resources will limit significant investments Our most recent concerted, top-down di- in truly transformational programs of strate- rected strategic mobility investment occurred gic mobility capability development, so we in the 1990s with nearly $50 billion directed by must refocus our attention on reconfiguring Congress and applied across DOTMLPF-P. It our existing strategic mobility solution set in

garnered strategic military air and sealift plat- affordable ways for little-to-no-notice, rapid, forms and access to commercial lift capacities, expeditionary, contested deployments against globally prepositioned military equipment astute and dynamic great-power adversaries. and supplies, deployment training exercises, The $50 billion investment made 30 years railcars and equipment, deployment infra- ago has served us well, but it has run its course, structure, management systems, process im- and existing lift platforms and infrastructure provements, and other deployment enablers. should be reconfigured with the enabling of Over the 30 years since then, our deploy- future, contested LSCO in mind. As the over- ment capability has declined relative to the all size of America’s Joint Force has declined anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies since the end of the Cold War, so too has the and investments made by our adversaries to strategic mobility enterprise. Major portions counteract our long-standing strategic mobil- of our strategic sealift and airlift platforms, rail ity overmatch. deployment enablers, and deployment infra- While operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, structure have reached or are fast approaching we deferred most investments in the mod- the end of their serviceable lives, and spending ernization of strategic mobility enablers, and for modernization has been either woefully in- much of our current strategic mobility solution adequate or deferred entirely. These deferrals set now faces critical near-term age-out and have created a gathering tsunami of strategic obsolescence challenges. Our domination of mobility–related funding requirements. In the air, land, maritime, cyber, and space war- addition, our aging strategic mobility enabler fighting domains, which enabled unmatched set was designed for deployment operations force projection capabilities, has atrophied as and conditions that are vastly different from we have had the operational luxury of large- the operational challenges that we face today ly uncontested, long-lead-time, rotational, and will face in the near term. Combat vehicle

56 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength weights and dimensions have increased to personnel, equipment, and sustainment from improve fire power and crew survival rates; the Army and Marine Corps into conflict ar- however, this trend affects a key performance eas. Prepositioning some of their equipment, parameter for new equipment development: supplies, and ammunition allows some early the ability to transport and rapidly employ deployers to fly in, draw equipment, and rap- these vehicles. idly organize for combat, providing a deter- This constant friction between weapon rent effect through the rapid buildup of com- system lethality and survivability versus trans- bat power in a theater of operations. Recent portability and the cumulative impacts on stra- efforts to “combat configure” prepositioned tegic mobility is intensifying as military oper- stocks lessen the time it takes to issue the gear, ating environments become more and more thus “priming the pump” and accelerating the lethal. We are at an inflection point in the his- delivery of combat-ready forces to combat- tory of America’s dominance in strategic mo- ant commanders. bility capability and overdue for another hard The four services plan, resource, coordi- look at how to transform America’s strategic nate, and synchronize their independent ca- mobility capability not only across America’s pability development efforts for strategic mo- joint military organizations, but also within bility, and the United States Transportation the context of the interagency, intergovern- Command (USTRANSCOM) orchestrates mental, multinational, and commercial part- the joint deployment process when forces are ners that are critical to our strategic mobility alerted to deploy. operations in any conflict. ll The Navy’s Military Sealift Command The Strategic Mobility Triad (MSC), a component of USTRANSCOM, According to DOD’s joint doctrine: operates and maintains the 125 ships that  sustain maritime domain operations and Strategic mobility is the capability transport Army and Marine Corps forces. to deploy and sustain military forces These MSC ships, which perform a wide worldwide in support of national strategy. variety of missions that provide all man- Beyond the intrinsic capability of some ner of logistics support to maritime assets, US forces to self-deploy, the bulk of our include hospital, cargo, underway fuel and nation’s strategic mobility requirements dry cargo replenishment, and rescue and are met through common-user sealift, salvage ships. common-user airlift, and pre-positioned stocks, known as the strategic mo- ll The Air Force operates aerial refueling bility triad….2 and transport aircraft to support stra- tegic mobility through its Air Mobility Modernizing this triad requires plan- Command (AMC), also a USTRANSCOM ning, prioritization, coordination, and re- component command.3 The current air sourcing among joint, interagency, intergov- transport fleet includes 428 C-130 Her- ernmental, multinational, and commercial cules, 222 C-17 Globemaster, and 52 C-5 (JIIM-C) partners. transport aircraft.4 Joint organizations that contribute to stra- tegic mobility operations include the Navy, Air ll The Army’s USTRANSCOM component Force, Army, Marine Corps, geographic, and command is the Military Surface Deploy- functional combatant commands. Since Amer- ment and Distribution Command (SDDC). ica’s air and naval forces largely self-deploy, SDDC integrates and synchronizes sur- the strategic mobility triad predominantly face deployment and distribution capa- supports the rapid movement of land-domain bilities to project and sustain U.S. forces,

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 57 primarily through road, rail, and seaport for military operations. Interagency support operations and transportation engineer- also includes heavy reliance on Department ing assessments, coordinating the move- of Transportation (DOT) capabilities such ment of equipment from a unit’s home as those provided by the United States Coast station to its seaport of debarkation. Guard to ensure maritime and port security. Another DOT interagency partner, the Mar- Interagency Partners and itime Administration (MARAD), provides Strategic Mobility multiple types of ships to deploy and sustain Interagency partners play a critical role military operations through three programs in strategic mobility’s underpinning of U.S. that underpin the National Defense Reserve national security by rapidly introducing mil- Fleet (NDRF): the Maritime Security Program itary capabilities either domestically or abroad. (MSP); Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agree- The herculean effort involved in deploying ment (VISA); and Voluntary Tanker Agree- campaign-quality forces and sustaining them ment (VTA). These three programs collectively for the duration of combat operations requires give MARAD access to 185 ships. “At its height a vast network of non-military partners, start- in 1950,” however, “the NDRF consisted of ing with interagency organizations. In this 2,277 ships.”5 context, the joint doctrinal definition of strate- In contrast to the decline in America’s mar- gic mobility fails to account adequately for and itime capability, “China is seen as striving to describe enabling capabilities provided by the overtake the U.S. as the dominant naval power other “IIM-C” entities. Joint and service con- in Asia and already boasts the world’s largest cepts under development must account for the navy in numbers of vessels.”6 Even with fewer fact that America’s deployment process is only U.S.-flagged ships, the need to find trained and as reliable, fast, and effective as the JIIM-C qualified U.S. mariners, resources to recapital-

stakeholders that enable it. ize ships, and the necessary naval combatant Using sealift as an example, the Army can ship escorts in the event of an LSCO puts our be ready to deploy its equipment and initial maritime-domain strategic readiness at un- sustainment stocks to seaports of embarkation acceptable levels of operational risk. As aptly in time to load aboard ships, but if the ships summarized by national security expert Lo- are not on par with their own readiness rates ren Thompson: and abilities to meet force-flow synchroniza- tion timelines, the force will arrive late to the Washington…is not sending the right theater of operations, giving our adversaries message to Moscow and Beijing if its goal more time to fortify defenses and further delay is to deter aggression by demonstrat- our deployment process while undermining ing the means to respond quickly and the will of the American people to continue forcefully. Lack of sealift could prevent prosecuting military operations. Conversely, the world’s most capable ground force if Army units do not make it to the port on time, from getting to the fight in time to make the sailing schedule will be delayed, causing a difference—or being able to sustain an delays all along the joint deployment process effective defense over time without re- and negatively affecting the combatant com- sorting to use of nuclear weapons. To put mander’s ability to execute his plan according it bluntly, America could lose a Eurasian to operational timelines. war for lack of timely sealift.7 The role of America’s interagency partners in facilitating force deployments includes co- On the Military Sealift Command side of the ordination by the Department of State in ob- equation, our maritime readiness shortfalls taining diplomatic clearances, basing rights, were underscored during USTRANSCOM’s and overflight rights and building coalitions most recent TURBO ACTIVATION (TA)

58 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength readiness exercise: “Of the 61 ships assigned deployments through the Voluntary Inter- to the Organic Surge Fleet at the start of TA 19+, modal Sealift Agreement and Civil Reserve a total of 63.9% (39 of 61 ships) were ready for Air Fleet (CRAF) programs that leverage U.S.- tasking (RFT).”8 Given that about 90 percent flagged commercial strategic lift platforms to of the deploying equipment and sustainment deploy and sustain military forces in times of stocks are moved to a contingency on sealift, war. The armed services have largely relied on the negative trends in U.S. sealift capabili- outsourcing to commercial industry to fill ca- ty, capacity, resiliency, and readiness must pability gaps in deploying and sustaining forc- be reversed. es during recent operations. Operations Iraqi Intergovernmental (civilian) and multina- Freedom and Enduring Freedom saw unprec- tional (military) cooperation and agreements edented levels of contractors on the battlefield, provide basing and prepositioning sites, over- and those trends are extremely hard to reverse, flight rights, customs and transportation clear- particularly once the services have divested ances, and access to other required infrastruc- themselves of force structure by leveraging ture for coordinated global deployments. U.S. the support of contractors. forces flow through host-nation commercial Given the lethality and risks inherent in seaports and airports and clear them using dis- the changing character of war in contested tribution infrastructure alongside commercial environments the likes of which we have not cargoes. Commercial cargo operations must seen since World War II, we must reassess the be balanced with military force flows to avoid tactics, techniques, and procedures associ- both negative effects on host-nation econo- ated with fully leveraging commercial assets mies and the undermining of public support and civilian contractors for strategic mobility for U.S. deployments abroad. capability in anticipated contested environ- Public and geopolitical pressure can deny ments. We can ill afford losses on the scale of  U.S. forces the use of planned deployment in- the 1,614 ships and 9,521 mariners lost by the frastructure, as when Turkey denied access to Merchant Marine during World War II.10 Nor U.S. forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom.9 can we absorb the significant losses of com- Turkey’s decision precluded a large-scale ma- mercial aircraft in strategic mobility roles that, neuver operation into Iraq from the north given the proliferation of advanced anti-air- and caused a sealift logjam. It also delayed the craft weapons systems, are likely in fights with commencement of U.S. offensive ground oper- great-power adversaries and their proxy forces. ations. Fortunately, Iraq lacked the long-range, DOD is but one part of an extensive, com- precision strike capability to threaten Kuwaiti plex JIIM-C team, providing strategic mobility ports and could not turn the operational delay in response to almost every type of operation, into a significant military advantage. from disaster response and consequence mit- Today’s adversaries have studied recent U.S. igation to large-scale combat operations. The deployments and will precisely target the rel- COVID-19 pandemic response highlighted atively few world-class seaports and airports how defense support to civil authorities can on which U.S. forces largely depend for rapid, augment a whole-of-nation—or even a whole- efficient, and effective deployment operations, world—response. It also exposed national thus adding to force-flow planning and execu- vulnerabilities and areas where we may be ac- tion challenges as potential host nations weigh cepting unreasonable risk, particularly where the risks involved in granting access. supply chains originate in or run through com- petitor or adversary nations, thus threatening Commercial Assets and our strategic mobility capabilities. Civilian Contractors Great-power competitors and adversaries Commercial-partner airlift and sea- are developing and leveraging multi-domain, lift capacity is made available for military global reach, and strategic mobility capabilities

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 59 of their own to counter our phenomenal but Nine tasks have been identified as priori- aging and predictable joint deployment pro- ties: improving manufacturing innovation, cess and its enablers. Maintaining robust stra- integrating technology and industry, tegic mobility capabilities significantly deters strengthening the industrial base, fos- rational bad actors and is part of our calculus tering Chinese brands, enforcing green for military courses of action when adversaries manufacturing, promoting breakthroughs threaten U.S. national security interests. in ten key sectors, advancing restructur- Moreover, maintaining overmatch requires ing of the manufacturing sector, promot- a concerted strategy and the resourcing of ing service-oriented manufacturing and operational capability across JIIM-C stake- manufacturing-related service industries, holders and enabling organizations. When and internationalizing manufacturing. the information system screens go black and information and data stop flowing because of The above ten key sectors are: disruptions in the space and cyber domains, 1. New information technology our ability to operate depends on institution- 2. High-end numerically controlled al memory and training in the use of pre-digi- machine tools and robots tized battlefield tools, tactics, techniques, and 3. Aerospace equipment procedures. For example, if an adversary were 4. Ocean engineering equipment and to deny the use of GPS, U.S. forces would have high-end vessels to rely on celestial, terrain-associative, or oth- 5. High-end rail transporta- er navigational and target location techniques. tion equipment 6. Energy-saving cars and Weaknesses in the Joint new energy cars Deployment Process 7. Electrical equipment 8. Farming machines America’s adversaries understand that America’s recipe for success is its joint de- 9. New materials, such as polymers ployment process, and they understand the 10. Biomedicine and high-end medi- importance of contesting our strategic mobil- cal equipment.11 ity overmatch in any future conflict. Our adver- saries are fully leveraging opportunities during This list has implications for where we ac- competition across their own instruments of quire war materiel and enablers, particularly national power to offset our traditional over- within the maritime domain. According to Lo- match in strategic mobility. ren Thompson: For example, China invests heavily to gain a controlling interest in global seaports of In its bicentennial year of 1976, the United strategic value; owns about 90 percent of the States was the biggest builder of com- International Organization for Standardiza- mercial oceangoing vessels in the world. tion (ISO) shipping container manufacturing Dozens of ships were under construction market; and has constructed and is improving at domestic shipyards. The Reagan Ad- facilities on islands it has built as A2/AD de- ministration wiped out the industry (and fensive outposts in the South China Sea. Chi- 40,000 jobs) by eliminating construction na’s published “Made in China 2025” strategy subsidies without seeking reciprocal ac- clearly indicates that Beijing seeks to domi- tion from other shipbuilding nations. nate certain manufacturing industries—many of which are critical to U.S. national security That was a self-inflicted wound. But then and force-projection capability. According to in 2006, Beijing designated commer- China’s English-language website: cial shipbuilding as a strategic industry and began channeling massive state

60 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength subsidies to the sector. End result: China will change how we deploy and redeploy forc- has become by far the biggest producer es. We are going to have to fight our way to the of commercial ships in the world, while fights. Combat configuration–related reviews fewer than 200 ships in the global fleet of of the entire joint deployment process, from 44,000 oceangoing vessels are American. origin to destination, should be undertaken. JIIM-C operations against adversaries with The U.S. today barely manages to rank global reach and advanced weaponry in all do- among the top 20 commercial shipbuild- mains require whole-of-nation and multina- ing nations (it’s number 19), and all of the tional approaches, investments, and planning. oceangoing ships built recently in Amer- It is crucial that previous assumptions ica were for use on protected domestic about capital and combat losses be called into routes. Industry experts say without that question. The next version of the nation’s protection, the commercial shipbuilding strategic mobility solution set must reflect sector and the U.S. merchant marine the harsh realities of JIIM-C operating envi- would literally cease to exist.12 ronments and how our soldiers, sailors, air- men, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, Merchant In the candid words of former Mariners, Medical Service Corps personnel, USTRANSCOM Deputy Commander and and populations are trained and prepared to DOT Administrator Lieutenant General Ken respond to periodic windows of ubiquitous bat- Wykle (Ret.): tlespace and global combat operations. The October 1, 2016, missile attack on the The ability to rapidly deploy our forces former MSC Expeditionary Fast Transport suffers from two primary deficiencies. Ship HSV-2 Swift14 indicates the complexities The first is a lack of Merchant Marine of operating in a JIIM-C-enabled, contested  -ships, and the second is a lack of qualified environment in which the lines between com merchant mariners. petition and conflict are all but indistinguish- able. It also highlights how non-governmental First, the ships. This is a matter of sheer organization actors or their proxies can com- numbers. In 1951, the U.S. Merchant Ma- plicate deployment and sustainment opera- rine had 1,288 ships operating in interna- tions. The attack was carried out by Houthi tional trade. Today, there are 81 ships. This rebels off the coast of Yemen, and the vessel means the U.S. Merchant Marine does not was leased to the United Arab Emirates for have the shipping capacity our country a humanitarian aid mission—a potpourri of needs to deploy and supply the most JIIM-C operations on both sides. capable military in the world…. Dynamic Force Deployment The human capital shortage may be Another example of how we must change worse than the shortage in ships. A report our execution of global force projection in- by the Maritime Administration to Con- volves the joint reception, staging, onward gress highlighted the problem. The report movement, and integration phase of the joint “estimates that 11,768 qualified mariners… deployment process, which concentrates crit- are available to crew the Ready Reserve ical infrastructure, equipment, and personnel Force…the estimated demand for mari- into a target-rich environment. All-domain ef- ners [in an emergency] is 13,607.”13 fects on civilian populations and infrastructure that enable America to mobilize and deploy its As strategic risk to missions and forces forces can demoralize and undercut the popu- during future crisis response operations and lar will to support military operations. There- attrition continue to manifest, these pressures fore, as part of “dynamic force employment,”

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 61 DOD is exploring how to conduct more geo- realistic (defense) planning scenarios graphically dispersed, mobile, and distributed and defense support to civil authorities operations to offset increased risk to mission (DSCA) potential missions, particular- and forces. LSCO will test the nation’s charac- ly when the homeland is no longer a ter, and senior leaders must candidly address sanctuary, and the implications of this operational shift to contested environments in their strategic mes- ll The American strategic mobility capabil- saging and testimony before Congress. ity set and the joint deployment process Corey New, a retired Army colonel and used to execute it are JIIM-C partner– former commander of the Defense Logistics enabled, but the full complement of stake- Agency’s Susquehanna Depot, has said that holders have not performed all-domain, “building combat power begins at origin, not contested operations at scale and echelon in a theater of operations.” Extrapolating his since World War II. point, in globally contested operations, Amer- ica’s military may be employing combat power Studying Mobility at origin and en route, not just in theaters of Capability Requirements operations. How well we transition to this new The cyclical, congressionally mandated Mo- paradigm correlates directly with any deter- bility Capability Requirements Study (MCRS) rent effect on our adversaries. Acknowledging is currently underway and should ascertain the reality of increasingly lethal global operat- strategic mobility gaps and shortfalls associ- ing environments, our national military strat- ated with the execution of deployment oper- egy seeks to deter adversaries and win during ations in support of combatant commanders’ the competition phase before large-scale operational plans in the context of likely sce- armed conflict. If deterrence fails, our ability narios and adversary capabilities. In a June

to fight and win decisively hinges on a robust 2018 Airman Magazine interview, General and resilient strategic mobility set of enablers Darren McDew stated: and rapid, near-term offset strategy solutions. Our challenge is to respond operationally [I]f I had a crystal ball and talked about to—and navigate “gray area” warlike acts by— this new Mobility Capability Require- competitors and adversaries as they affect all ments Study…it will be different than all warfighting domains, as well as all instruments the ones we’ve had previous[ly] for a of United States national power (diplomatic, couple of different reasons. information, military, and economic). The National Defense Strategy (NDS) cites The biggest of which is we’re acknowl- “[r]esilient and agile logistics” as a key area edging a contested environment from of capability modernization and states that day one. That’s huge. DOD “will prioritize prepositioned forward stocks and munitions, strategic mobility as- We’re also acknowledging something that sets, partner and allied support, as well as we’ve got to come to grips with—attrition. non-commercially dependent distributed lo- We’ve never in our history, accounted for gistics and maintenance to ensure logistics sus- the attrition of logistics and mobility in tainment while under persistent multi-domain our war plans. For now, we’ve got num- attack.”15 Two challenges cascade from that bers we’ve subscribed to for a number of guidance for joint operating environments and years that say these are the numbers of adversary capabilities: assets we need to accomplish the mission. But, that assumes everything makes it. ll The lines between JIIM-C deployment On time. Every time. and sustainment operations blur in

62 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength We don’t believe that’s realistic in today’s DOD and others with a deployment mission environment. The character of war has could investigate the use of mobile, small-re- changed to a place not just with bombs actor power generators in plans for war, natu- and bullets, but also ones and zeros. ral disasters, or attacks on power grids in the It’s a reality that attrition will exist in homeland or theaters of operations. For ex- the next war.16 ample, reactor generators infused with sealift recapitalization could power sealift ship en- Those involved in MCRS are underappreci- hancements to enable self-defense; conduct ated American heroes with a wicked problem joint all-domain maneuver through contested to solve: informing strategic mobility decisions maritime operations; and power directed en- during persistent conflict and great-power ergy, railgun, and other new weapons systems competition with compressing response and platforms secured on sealift ships’ weather timelines and ever more complex and lethal decks, providing a new level of protection and operating environments. Contested operat- offensive capability en route. Joint experimen- ing environments require increased resilience tation, training, and readiness exercises should across JIIM-C partner organizations. We must include realistic scenarios requiring Army bolster our ability to defend key terrain and weapons systems live fire for cross-domain, operations globally and “harden” our strate- joint combined arms maneuver, providing gen- gic mobility platforms, systems, and processes eral-support/reinforcing fires in and/or from for better survivability and resilience. Our as- the maritime domain and for ship defense. sessments and analysis must leverage the full Other bolted-on or tied-down offset ca- power of JIIM-C enablers to deploy, redeploy, pabilities should be considered in the near and sustain LSCO across potential conflicts in- term.17 Mobile reactor generators could be volving China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and ship-based or unit-based and power modu-  counterterrorism efforts. lar, ISO-container-configured life support to Leveraging the Navy/Marine Corps dis- give combat-configured Army weapons crews tributed lethality concept and reimagining the a plug-and-play, scalable capability for con- Army “cargo” aboard MSC and MARAD ships tested JIIM-C operations. Increasingly, ad- as taskable-en route, Army-provided, cross-​ versaries with strategic reach will force us to domain effects–capable warfighting platforms innovate and rethink how we will fight our way can help to offset capability gaps and shortfalls to the fights. Mobile reactor generators would in naval escorts by leveraging Army-assisted also pay dividends if we should ever need to es- maritime defense and offense as a near-term tablish or repower portions of electrical power approach to alleviating the risks that confront grids or reestablish digital connectivity and a missions and forces. Reimagining the usable base for stability operations after an electro- stowage areas on the weather decks of MSC magnetic pulse attack on the homeland, en and MARAD sealift ships as Army maneuver route, or in theater during LSCO. space in and from the maritime domain pro- Rethinking strategic mobility would revive vides for the operational realities of contest- U.S. shipbuilding and encourage both innova- ed logistics required to meet NDS guidance. tive, militarily useful modifications, starting If adversaries continue to shrink our advan- with commercial ships that DOD is considering tages or if fiscal environments deteriorate to purchasing, and focused efforts to recapitalize austerity-measure levels for DOD, the next it- America’s sealift fleet, industry, workforce, and eration of air and sealift recapitalization will supply chains. This includes U.S.-based man- need to innovate quickly and cheaply to main- ufacturing industries supplying materiel for tain strategic mobility overmatch and enhance strategic mobility. Similar thinking and actions joint combined arms maneuver capabilities must reverberate among the airlift and prepo- over strategic distances. sitioning communities as well.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 63 The Secretary of Defense, Chairman operations; however, because there is no sin- of the Joint Chiefs, Commanding General gle conductor of planning, programming, bud- USTRANSCOM, and service secretaries and geting, and oversight, the services (and other chiefs have their work cut out for them. They JIIM-C partners) invest individually as they must influence the prioritizing of precious re- see fit. As a result, the U.S. strategic mobility sources by the JIIM-C enterprise as well as by overmatch is atrophying relative to advances each other and the National Security Council. in competitor and adversary capability. Ser- The strategic mobility enabling team must vices and interagency and commercial part- be cohesive, self-synchronizing, and moti- ners and allies prioritize capabilities based on vating with second-order, third-order, and their perspectives, authorities, and perceived fourth-order stakeholders understanding how return on investment, further adding to the to execute a complex joint deployment pro- difficulty of capability management. cess effectively in a slim-margin, volatile, and The point of convergence for action and hypercompetitive commercial marketplace. synchronization for JIIM-C capability devel- Commercial partners and civilians enable stra- opment is at the National Security Council tegic mobility and are a part of the capital and level, which implies that consideration should combat loss equation. be given to establishing this integrating over- As summarized by former Army Lieutenant sight function at this level of authority as well. General Sean MacFarland: Unfortunately (and again), legislation may be the only remedy for the strategic mobility Acting and reacting at the speed of conundrum short of failing militarily against multidomain warfare, executing cross one or more great-power adversaries as ugly domain fires and maneuver, will demand scenarios unfold. an unprecedented degree of integration Western military strategists and planners between the services at multiple eche- seek paths of least resistance and courses of ac- lons, and therein lies the problem. tion that minimize capital losses (such as ships, planes, and ports) and combat losses (such as A coherent force must be integrated soldiers, sailors, mariners, airmen, govern- across all elements of DOTMLPF-P ment civilians, and contractors) in obtaining (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, military objectives. The military’s capital is leadership and education, personnel, fa- blood and treasure, and our nation’s military cilities and policy). However, since August conflicts will reap a return on investment com- 2011, when the Joint Forces Command mensurate with yesterday’s and today’s strate- folded its flag, no organization has had gic mobility resourcing priorities. Barriers that sufficient authority and resources to prevent the rapid provision of combat-ready coordinate efforts across the services to forces to combatant commanders can increase develop joint warfighting concepts and risks for missions and forces exponentially by support their implementation….18 allowing adversaries more time to prepare their cross-domain defenses and/or execute The Joint Staff is continually updating and offensive strike operations against the U.S. and creating concepts to deal with the anticipated its partners. A combat multiplier for America’s operating environments, but ownership and military is working in concert with other stra- improvement of the joint deployment process, tegic planners within other instruments of from concepts to fielded capabilities, has be- national power, as well as with multinational come a shared responsibility extending beyond partners, and planning for disruptions all along the Joint Staff’s authorities and responsibili- the joint deployment process. ties. USTRANSCOM integrates efforts of the When Congress perceives that the resourc- “as is” strategic mobility capability set during ing being provided to project U.S. military

64 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength forces to our best advantage is inadequate, it JIIM-C partners. American strategic mobility acts—usually cyclically, as it did in the ear- has always been the differentiator for our mil- ly 1990s given the risks to mission and forc- itary wins and losses, and our investments in es during the Operation Desert Shield force its evolution will continue to play an essential buildup. Another large capital infusion from role in determining where America stands Congress, however, although critically need- geopolitically. ed, is unlikely, as are any changes in service Some of the nation’s best and bright- authorities under Title 10 of the United States est minds are applying excellent foresight Code. We will therefore have to think our way to America’s strategic mobility challenges through reusing, recycling, and repurposing through the congressionally mandated MCRS. what we have and how we use and maintain it. Their work produces our best realm-of-the- In chaotic operating environments, partic- possible recommendations with respect to ularly during large-scale deployments in de- what the nation’s strategic mobility solution fense of American citizens on American soil, set needs to get the military to the fight based the deployment of military forces in support on combatant commanders’ required force- of America’s national security interests can flow timelines and likely scenarios. However, rapidly become complex. Adversary efforts the MCRS must account for U.S. forces fighting to offset our strategic mobility overmatch their way to the fights and how that changes could soon manifest themselves in artificial the required platforms and force structures. intelligence–infused, machine-blended, bio- The MCRS could recommend joint engineered, quantum-computed, and hyper- war-gaming and experimentation to include sonically executed operations with effects in underway, Army live-fire, sealift emergency all domains. COVID-19 catalyzed our strategic deployment readiness exercises (SEDREs). It mobility response to a biowarfare scenario in could also recommend that DOD expand its  which JIIM-C capabilities were rapidly de- demonstrations of concept technology and ployed and sustained in the U.S. and its terri- inclusion of interagency partners such as tories. Deferred investments in our globally MARAD and the USCG in bolt-on/tied-down, focused strategic mobility solution set invite Army-provided, cross-domain maritime oper- failure in the absence of bold and audacious ations. Given the divestment of tanks from the steps from the Pentagon, which should provide Marine Corps, the Army may want to experi- specified guidance with targeted support from ment with a waterborne capability analogous the White House and Congress. to its current airborne and air assault capabil- From a national power perspective, ensur- ities. Recent training by Army tactical units ing strategic mobility is the best way to ensure through artillery live-fire operations from the success in great-power competition, as speed well-deck of a small Army watercraft vessel is and mobility matter more than ever. Winning indicative of the problem sets and solutions in rapidly in synchronization within all domains the Pacific that drive fully leveraged maritime-​ is precisely the issue on which military con- domain approaches to complex problems. cept developers and future plans strategists Shifting the armed services’ approaches are focusing their time and mental energy. No to how they meet their mission sets requires matter what the executives, think tanks, and whole-of-government capability development concepts and futures elements of joint and mil- to maximize return on taxpayer investments itary service staffs decide with respect to U.S. ahead of audits and accountability office in- strategic mobility, Pentagon programmers and quiries. Services focus on modernizing “strike” budgeteers must win the prioritization battles capability within their specific domains of op- with senior leaders to fund myriad, loosely eration, but investments in “lift” or (more im- connected, military components of capabili- portant) “movement and maneuver” capability ty woven together with those of other crucial must also keep pace.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 65 The MCRS offers near-term context for a windows of opportunity, expand in the force as useful USTRANSCOM product that looks into strategic maneuver becomes scalable. As Major mid-term and long-term prospects: the Future General Steve Farmen has said repeatedly, we Deployment and Distribution Assessment will fight by, with, and through our ports. We find (FDDA).19 Senior DOD leaders and their staffs ourselves in this new operational reality because dedicate time and talent to making informed, our adversaries are positioning themselves for bold, and audacious decisions to stay ahead of success during competition so that they can pre- geopolitical waves and the operational impli- vail if competition evolves into armed conflict. cations of near-term, mid-term, and long-term Army planners would be wise to adopt a “home strategic mobility. USTRANSCOM can help to station = line of departure” mindset. In the past, lead thinking about how to improve, but stake- the line of departure in potentially clashing with holders invest according to their individual enemy forces was always drawn on a linear bat- risk-reward calculations and trade-offs based tlefield in a distant theater of operations beyond on their funding. the unit’s tactical assembly area. We no longer have that luxury. Importance of Assumptions From a survivability-move perspective, Assumptions are of fundamental impor- agility matters; maritime lift platform recapi- tance to the planning of military operations talization, development, and fielding must fo- and can skew the selection of the best course of cus on strategic maneuver and multi-domain action to pursue. The concepts, plans, studies, operations; and mobility will increase the and assessments being deliberated will drive odds of survival in tomorrow’s highly lethal U.S. strategic mobility. In addition, the need to environment. Agility matters especially for a replace obsolescing inventory carries with it maritime nation whose adversaries are astute the opportunity not only to modernize equip- and dynamic at weaponizing things to affect

ment, but also to reimagine how our strategic its economy, a linchpin of which is maritime mobility capabilities might better support the commerce. More and more, adversaries will projection and sustainment of military power garner global reach with hypersonic-enabled in a changed world. warhead delivery, or electromagnetic gun Some assumptions that inform the MCRS, delivery, or high-powered energy delivery, or ongoing concept development, war-gaming cyber-​delivery, or effects creation in any of the and experimentation work, and future as- other domains within which we operate. sessments must also consider the possibility An example of the coopting of a ubiquitous, of significant DOD budget austerity. Russia is global transportation platform for covert mis- proof that ingenuity is the product of austerity: sile launches is the innovative Russian Club-K Its new icebreaker ship, for example, also fur- containerized missile system that can be hid- nishes capability as a movement and maneu- den in plain sight, most likely undetected, un- ver (kinetic effect–capable) maritime-based til it is employed.20 Imagine the scenarios that missile launcher. More dual-purpose, covert, could play out with just a few globally prepo- and nefarious coopting of traditionally be- sitioned or mobile Club-K systems leveraging nign transportation and enabling platforms trucks, trains, and maritime platforms. for military utility, including strike capability, are forthcoming, and U.S. strategic mobility Increasing Interdependence of Processes conceptualizers and planners should take note. Any evaluation of U.S. strategic mobility For Army early deployers like airborne and and Army deployment and redeployment must special operations forces, planning for contested account for the effects of increasingly interde- deployments from home station to initial objec- pendent processes among JIIM-C stakeholder tives has always been the norm, but that mindset operations that must be planned, coordinated, and capability, depending on threats, risks, and and synchronized at echelon and scale to meet

66 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength contested and ever-compressing combatant readiness, and degree of investment necessary commander force-flow requirements. Adver- to maintain dominance in strategic mobility on saries use disinformation operations against pace with adversary capabilities. Tomorrow’s vulnerable components of military opera- military operating environments will dictate a tions, such as the initial phases of deployments, proper reconceptualization of deployment as a coopting useful conduits on social media to component of movement and maneuver—and foment social unrest, division, and obstruc- therefore as a combat multiplier. tionism within the U.S. and its partners. They The first component of strategic mobility is leverage proxy and organic military forces to deployment, which remains the principal task produce both kinetic and “soft power” effects that underpins the movement-and-maneuver to interrupt force flows and have positioned warfighting function, enabling a nation’s forc- themselves to pressure nations economically es to gain a positional advantage over those to hinder U.S. strategic mobility operations, ap- of an adversary. The strategic repositioning plying all instruments of their national power of the U.S. military’s footprint from Europe against our ability to deploy and sustain com- to the United States after the end of the Cold bat forces rapidly and effectively. War has made defending Eastern Europe from We must rethink strategic mobility, our Russian military aggression exponentially development of plausible scenarios, and our more difficult. assumptions with an eye to developing con- With the clarity and focus of the Nation- cepts for joint, all-domain command and con- al Security Strategy and National Defense trol. These concepts must anticipate JIIM-C Strategy, and given the stark realities that and instantaneously formed and dissolved adversaries seek to disrupt deployment and Combined Joint Task Forces, and they must sustainment operations across all domains, be considered with a view to the execution strategic mobility must be categorized within  of broad ranges of missions, from delivering the Joint Staff as a movement-and-maneuver humanitarian aid, consequence-mitigation ra- and force-application issue with prioritized tions, and rapidly developed and manufactured requirements and investments commensu- vaccines or other life-sustaining supplies and rate with the criticality of the task. This nec- equipment in Air Mobility Command or Civil essary philosophical shift is resonating in the Reserve Air Fleet aircraft to rapidly forming Pentagon as the realities of joint all-domain and executing task forces in support of local operations in great-power competition take law enforcement or LSCO. root, and it has the potential to shape the next Our current operating environment ampli- iterations of joint concept development. fies the importance of national stockpiles, stra- The Joint Staff must renew its efforts to tegic reserves, and prepositioned equipment codify strategic mobility and deployment con- and supplies as critical enablers of strategic ceptually within the J/G-3 (plans and opera- mobility to garner tactical effects expeditiously tions) staff sections rather than under the J/G- at global points of need. Our developers of mil- 4 (logistics) staff section. Logisticians play a itary concepts, particularly those developing key, supporting role, but ownership and align- the family of joint and service concepts such ment of the “deploy” task, as a commander’s as the one that will address contested logistics, first mission-essential task, must reside in the must account for great-power conflict, military maneuver plans and operations staff sections workload for DSCA missions, and attrition in of organizations. the organic industrial base. Many American military leaders view stra- Conclusion tegic mobility as predominantly in the sustain- I believe that we are training the next ment or logistics portfolio. This is a philosoph- greatest generation of Americans not to ical error that has negatively affected the focus, storm distant beaches (though some levels

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 67 of amphibious assaults might be necessary), Clausewitz tells us that “[w]ar is not merely but rather to be experts in understanding a political act, but also a real political instru- and mastering the complex, interwoven “bat- ment, a continuation of political commerce, tlespace” of tomorrow’s conflicts (and the a carrying out of the same by other means.”21 condition-setting that is occurring during Enhancement of our strategic mobility offers competition). Military planning for the next us a unifying, pressing, and foundational is- battles must take into account all of the tools sue upon which JIIM-C stakeholders, both and domains available to the U.S., as well as all in America and in other like-minded nations, of the ways by which they might be countered can move forward. It also will have widespread by the most sophisticated opponents. benefits across all aspects of American mili- American preeminence in the ability to tary power and extend into and across a broad deploy, employ, and sustain our military glob- range of industrial sectors—a win-win in any- ally in concert with synchronized actions by one’s book and a reasonable first step to ensure other instruments of our national power un- America’s success in great-power competition. derpins our position as a global superpower. 

68 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength Endnotes 1. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed July 11, 2020), and James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy- Summary.pdf (accessed July 11, 2020). 2. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-35,Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, January 10, 2018, p. I-7, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_35.pdf (accessed July 11, 2020). 3. U.S. Air Force, Air Mobility Command, “About Us,” https://www.amc.af.mil/About-Us/ (accessed July 11, 2020). 4. Fact sheet, “C-130 Hercules,” U.S. Air Force, Air Mobility Command, June 14, 2017, https://www.amc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/ Display/Article/977514/c-130-hercules/ (accessed July 11, 2020); fact sheet, “C-17 Globemaster III,” U.S. Air Force, Air Mobility Command, May 14, 2018, https://www.amc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/977489/c-17-globemaster-iii/ (accessed July 11, 2020); and fact sheet, “C-5 A/B/C Galaxy and C-5M Super Galaxy,” U.S. Air Force, Air Mobility Command, December 18, 2017, https://www.amc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/977534/c-5-abc-galaxy-and-c-5m-super-galaxy/ (accessed July 11, 2020). 5. U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, “Vessels of the Maritime Administration,” last updated March 22, 2019, https://www.maritime.dot.gov/history/vessels-maritime-administration/vessels-maritime-administration (accessed July 11, 2020). 6. Associated Press, “China Home-Built Aircraft Carrier Tests Weapons at Sea,” Defense News, June 1, 2020, https://www. defensenews.com/training-sim/2020/06/01/china-home-built-aircraft-carrier-tests-weapons-at-sea/#:~:text=BEIJING%20 %E2%80%94%20China’s%20Defense%20Ministry%20said,enhance%20training%20of%20the%20crew (accessed July 11, 2020). 7. Loren Thompson, “How the U.S. Navy’s Aging Sealift Fleet Could Lose America’s Next War in Eurasia,” Forbes, January 21, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2020/01/21/how-the-us-navys-aging-sealift-fleet-could-lose-americas-next-war- in-eurasia/#66a22f8027f6 (accessed July 11, 2020). 8. USTRANSCOM J37, United States Transportation Command Comprehensive Report for TURBO ACTIVATION 19-PLUS, December 16, 2019, Executive Summary, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2019/ustranscom_turbo-activation19-plus_ aar_20191216.pdf (accessed July 11, 2020).  9. Richard Boudreaux and Amberin Zaman, “Turkey Rejects U.S. Troop Deployment,” Los Angeles Times, March 2, 2003, https:// www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-mar-02-fg-iraq2-story.html (accessed July 11, 2020). 10. “American Merchant Marine at War: U.S. Merchant Marine Casualties During World War II,” http://www.usmm.org/casualty.html (accessed July 11, 2020). 11. News release, “‘Made in China 2025’ Plan Issued,” People’s Republic of China, State Council, updated May 19, 2015, http://english. www.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2015/05/19/content_281475110703534.htm (accessed July 11, 2020). 12. Loren Thompson, “Coronavirus Highlights U.S. Strategic Vulnerabilities Spawned by Over-Reliance on China,” Forbes, March 30, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2020/03/30/coronavirus-highlights-us-strategic-vulnerabilities- spawned-by-over-reliance-on-china/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2003.31.20&utm_ term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief#324ff1f69a1c (accessed July 11, 2020). 13. Kenneth Wykle, “The US Armed Forces Have a Mobility Problem,” Defense News, August 14, 2018, https://www.defensenews. com/opinion/commentary/2018/08/14/the-us-armed-forces-have-a-mobility-problem/ (accessed July 11, 2020). 14. Kirk Moore, “Former U.S. Navy HSV-2 Swift Wrecked in Yemen Missile Attack,” WorkBoat, October 7, 2016, https://www.workboat. com/news/bluewater/hsv-2-swift-wrecked-yemen-missile-attack/ (accessed August 21, 2020). 15. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, p. 7. 16. “Power Conductor,” interview with General Darren W. McDew, Airman Magazine, June 25, 2018, https://airman.dodlive. mil/2018/06/25/power-conductor/ (accessed July 11, 2020). 17. An example is the use of Marine Corps weapons platforms embarked aboard U.S. Navy amphibious ships to provide ship defense as in the case of the USS Boxer (LHD-4) during a recent deployment to the Persian Gulf. Ryan Pickrell, “Marines Sailed Through the Strait of Hormuz with an Armored Vehicle on the Boxer’s Flight Deck,” Marine Times, August 15, 2019, https://www. marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-military/2019/08/15/marines-sailed-through-the-strait-of-hormuz-with-an-armored-vehicle- on-the-boxers-flight-deck/ (accessed July 11, 2020). 18. Sean MacFarland, “Joint Operations Need a Guiding Hand,” Association of the United States Army, February 25, 2020, https:// www.ausa.org/articles/joint-operations-need-guiding-hand (accessed July 11, 2020).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 69 19. Patrick McLeod, “Future Deployment and Distribution Assessment,” Military Operations Research Society, MORS Symposium, January 26, 2011, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a540695.pdf (accessed August 20, 2020). See also “Far-Term Technology Focus: Future Deployment and Distribution Assessment (FDDA),” in U.S. Transportation Command, “Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation (RDT&E),” USTRANSCOM Handbook No. 60-2, July 22, 2016, p. 26, https://www.ustranscom.mil/ cmd/associated/rdte/references/HB60-2.pdf (accessed August 20, 2020). 20. Michael Stott, “Deadly New Russian Weapon Hides in Shipping Container,” Reuters, April 26, 2010, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-russia-weapon/deadly-new-russian-weapon-hides-in-shipping-container-idUSTRE63P2XB20100426 (accessed July 11, 2020). 21. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Col. J. J. Graham (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1918), Vol. 1, Ch. I, https://oll. libertyfund.org/pages/clausewitz-war-as-politics-by-other-means (accessed July 11, 2020). 

70 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength The Intelligence Posture America Needs in an Age of Great-Power Competition David R. Shedd

he United States faces an expanded na- Intelligence Community (IC) shifted its focus Ttional security landscape of threats that from nation-state threats posed by a rising are interconnected by the rise of great-power China or a defeated Soviet Union to a new type competition from China, Russia, and their al- of adversary. The events of 9/11 demonstrated lies. The wide array of these threats to Ameri- that nontraditional enemies could do enor- ca’s security will require our national defense mous damage to our way of life while expend- and intelligence posture to adapt to a world ing few resources—either people or funds—in that for nearly 20 years has been fixated on the process. After 9/11, the IC rallied to shift a defeating international terrorists. For decades shrunken resource base—people, secret collec-  following the end of World War II and the on- tion, and analytic capabilities—and spent the set of the Cold War, America’s attention was fo- next five years rebuilding itself to address the cused almost entirely on the Soviet threat. Now new threat of Islamic radicals. our intelligence capabilities must be refocused Following those attacks, President George to counter the global challenges to American W. Bush called for a significant increase in re- national security interests from a rising Chi- sources for the IC, which had been starved by na and an emboldened Russia in order to give budget and personnel cuts during the 1990s. decision-makers options for addressing the There was an immediate redirection of in- nefarious activities of these two great powers. telligence capabilities to confront a new and In the decades preceding the collapse of growing threat from international terrorism the Soviet Union, America’s spies were almost and a war in Afghanistan aimed at denying the singularly focused on collecting secrets on the terrorists a safe haven. The IC acted expedi- USSR and its Communist allies. For the past tiously and effectively to undertake the neces- two decades, however, U.S. intelligence agen- sary shifts by becoming much more focused on cies have been dedicated to thwarting inter- finding terrorists and denying them the ability national terrorism and supporting two long to plan and execute their attacks. The intelli- unconventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. gence officer also moved to serve side-by-side In the 1990s, intelligence capabilities were with the warfighter, first in Afghanistan and hollowed out by President Bill Clinton under then in Iraq after the U.S. invasion in 2003. the false premise of a “peace dividend” from Obtaining intelligence to warn of, prevent, a defeated Soviet Union. That assumption and respond to the actions of an adversary re- of a safer world proved false in the wake of mains the core business of the IC. Yet Ameri- the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Al- ca’s intelligence agencies remain ill-postured most immediately, America’s slimmed-down to address the threats posed by China and a

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 71 reemergent Russia. These gaps must be closed “[i]ntelligence is needed to understand and an- while the IC continues to address the disrup- ticipate foreign doctrine and the intent of for- tive capabilities of non-state terrorist groups eign leaders, prevent tactical and operational such as al-Qaida, ISIS, and Hezbollah. surprise, and ensure that U.S. capabilities are Complicating the landscape, globalization not compromised before they are fielded.”1 is producing its own national security chal- Adversaries like China and Russia are now lenges. Propaganda campaigns to shape peo- mastering technology to build up their own ca- ple’s hearts and minds are but one example pabilities, which in turn are used to undermine of the global nature of these challenges. The U.S. interests at home and abroad. These same disinformation campaigns mounted by state adversaries are making significant investments and non-state players promoting unanticipat- in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine ed objectives leverage commercial mass-media learning (ML) initiatives for processing and outlets, further complicating the process of analyzing large quantities of data. Knowing warning, preventing, and responding. The specifically what our adversaries are doing re- IC’s shortfall in providing anticipatory warn- quires that the U.S. IC be able to understand ing about complex emerging threats is the their languages in addition to having the exper- result of insufficient resources. Even though tise to understand the scientific and technical the IC simply does not have sufficient capa- capabilities that they are pursuing. As they did bility and capacity to deal equally with every during the Cold War, U.S. spy agencies need to threat that America faces, it must adapt to this attract and retain deep country and regional changing reality. subject matter experts with ample foreign language capabilities and professional spies The 2017 National Security Strategy with technical proficiency in order to gain a and the Intelligence Community significantly increased understanding of the

President Trump’s 2017 National Securi- intentions of China, Russia, and their allies. ty Strategy states that our national security Spy tradecraft—the art of collecting secrets— requires that the U.S. be able to determine needs to be adapted to match today’s threats. whether and where geostrategic and regional We know, for example, that China is investing shifts are taking place that will threaten our vast sums of money in cutting-edge dual-use interests. To that end, the strategy calls on the technologies that will enable the government IC to collect, analyze, and develop options for to track its own citizens. These same technol- the decision-maker to address the panorama of ogies are being used to uncover the plans and threats. Policymakers expect the IC to engage intentions of China’s adversaries including the in aggressive collection of strategic-level in- U.S. A plan backed by Chinese President Xi Jin- telligence that enables the anticipation of geo- ping illustrates just how critical technology de- strategic shifts such as we see currently with velopment is to the Chinese government (and China and Russia. At the same time, American the Chinese Communist Party): intelligence also needs to obtain secret infor- mation essential to generating reliable tacti- China will invest an estimated $1.4 trillion cal intelligence so that decision-makers can over six years to 2025, calling on urban respond effectively to the actions and provo- governments and private tech giants cations of our adversaries. like Huawei Technologies Co. to lay fifth The President recognizes that modern- generation [5G] wireless networks, install ization of U.S. military forces to overmatch cameras and sensors, and develop AI America’s adversaries requires intelligence software that will underpin autonomous support. To have an improved capability, one driving to automated factories and mass has to have some idea of the opponent’s capa- surveillance.2 bility. Moreover, the strategy underscores that

72 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength Intelligence: What Is It and to US and partner interests worldwide, What Role Does It Play? particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the In the Intelligence Community, “intelli- Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast gence” refers to a dynamic set of actions that Asia. The development and application relies on collection requirements established of new technologies will introduce both by the customers of intelligence, sharing the risks and opportunities, and the US econ- information within the IC so that various types omy will be challenged by slower global of analysis can be performed, and then dissem- economic growth and growing threats to inating the results of insights to its customers. US economic competitiveness.5 Former longtime intelligence professional Mark Lowenthal provides a classic definition The role of intelligence, whether it is provid- of intelligence: “[I]ntelligence is the process ing information or identifying options for the by which specific types of information import- policymaker or the military commander in the ant to national security is requested, collect- field, is to protect American interests at home ed, analyzed, and provided to policymakers.”3 and abroad. This is not new. What has changed This essay focuses primarily on information is that intelligence must now be refocused to as intelligence: that is, the macro-world of cover a more diverse and complex set of na- ideas, propaganda, and perception and how tional security threats. U.S. intelligence faces our adversaries are working to shape public expanded threats emerging from cyber warfare, perspectives on the larger strategic competi- adversarial use of AI and ML, space-based capa- tion with the U.S. bilities, and very sophisticated counterintelli- From the standpoint of national securi- gence from competitor nations that are able to ty or military operations, intelligence needs invest in the most advanced technologies. to provide decision advantage: “Successful  intelligence provides advantages to decision- The National Intelligence Strategy makers they would not otherwise have, so an and the Intelligence Community analyst must know the frame of mind of the The IC published its National Intelligence decision-maker and the strategy to help the Strategy (NIS) in 2019 to provide its workforce policymaker to succeed.”4 In other words, one with strategic direction for the next four years. obtains a better understanding of the compet- While the NIS does not outline specific prior- itor and is able to hide that advantage so that ities (these are kept classified), the strategy the competitor is unaware that his efforts have asserts that “all IC activities must be respon- been compromised and his secrets discovered. sive to national security priorities.” It further In his 2019 worldwide threats briefing to specifies that: the U.S. Congress, then-Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats described the nature All our activities will be conducted con- of the emerging new threats: sistent with our guiding principles: We advance our national security, economic The post-World War II international strength, and technological superiority by system is coming under increasing strain delivering distinctive, timely insights with amid continuing cyber and WMD prolif- clarity, objectivity, and independence; we eration threats, competition in space, and achieve unparalleled access to protected regional conflicts. Among the disturbing information and exquisite understanding trends are hostile states and actors’ in- of our adversaries’ intentions and capa- tensifying online efforts to influence and bilities; we maintain global awareness for interfere with elections here and abroad strategic warning; and we leverage what and their use of chemical weapons. Ter- others do well, adding unique value for rorism too will continue to be a top threat the Nation.6

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 73 These four principles for the intelligence and ferret out spies working against the U.S. enterprise give the IC’s rank and file a clear and its allies. framework to adjust and identify needed re- After the USSR collapsed, the U.S. no longer sources to hone in collecting and analyzing had a clearly defined adversary. This so-called the intentions and capabilities of near-peer peace dividend, combined with disinvestment adversaries. in human talent and technical capacity, led To fully understand the challenges facing in the 1990s to a significant reduction in the the Intelligence Community as it adapts to nation’s intelligence capabilities. Then, when new circumstances, it is important to know al-Qaeda attacked the homeland in 2001, the its composition and how it is resourced. The Bush Administration directed the IC to shift IC is composed of 17 elements, including the its focus to countering Islamic terrorism. Soon Office of the Director of National Intelligence after the terrorist attacks, President George W. (ODNI).7 Of these, eight reside within the De- Bush assigned the Director of Central Intelli- partment of Defense (DOD),8 a fact that under- gence, George Tenet, the de facto responsibili- scores the importance of intelligence to Amer- ty to become America’s combatant commander ica’s defense posture and to the warfighter in for countering international terrorism while particular. These elements operate in a feder- also serving as America’s top intelligence of- ated fashion with each one receiving its own ficer. This informal designation for the DCI appropriated budget within the National In- underscored the role that intelligence would telligence Program (NIP). Supplementing the play for years to come in the war on interna- NIP funds is the Military Intelligence Program tional terrorism. applicable to some of the DOD-based intelli- The events of 9/11 provided an opportunity gence elements. both to revitalize our nation’s intelligence ca- The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), pabilities and to redirect resources to counter

a position established by the Intelligence Re- a very different type of adversary compared form and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of to the USSR during the Cold War. Acquiring 2004,9 is called upon to “lead a unified, coordi- new capabilities was given top priority. These nated, and effective intelligence effort. In addi- capabilities included recruiting Arab, Farsi, tion, the Director shall…take into account the Urdu, and other language proficient person- views of the heads of departments containing nel, adapting technical collection to pursue an element of the Intelligence Community and geolocational discovery, augmenting tactical the Director of the Central Intelligence Agen- collection to identify small terrorist cells, and cy” in guiding America’s disbursed intelligence identifying clandestine Internet communica- personnel and capabilities.10 tions by Islamic extremists. To address the redirection and rebuilding A Tale of Intelligence Transformation: of intelligence capabilities in the aftermath 2001 to the Present of the attacks in 2001 and the ensuing wars in America’s spy agencies have evolved since Afghanistan and Iraq: their establishment over an extended period following World War II and during the Cold [T]otal intelligence spending grew by War with the USSR and its allies. A certain about 110% from 2001 to 2012. National Sovietology discipline matured over the de- defense excluding intelligence grew by cades. The IC benefited from deep invest- 55% over that time period…. [W]hen ments in language skills; deep development measured from 1980, total intelligence of expertise on Soviet political, military, and spending by 2012 had grown 274%, while economic developments; and unique spy national defense spending without tradecraft driven by the need to develop, re- intelligence had grown 82% over that cruit, and handle Soviet and Soviet-bloc spies time period.11

74 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength Even with significant growth in the intel- we “will never have enough analysts to process ligence budgets, however, a side effect of the the available information so Artificial Intelli- rise of counterterrorism as the top priority for gence and Machine Learning are not ‘nice to America’s intelligence agencies was to down- have’ they are an imperative.” Travers quotes grade collection and analysis with respect to from the interim report of the National Securi- more traditional geopolitical issues around ty Commission on Artificial Intelligence: the globe. In effect, countering terrorist orga- nizations became vastly more important than With respect to data, the government is countering competitor countries. well positioned to collect useful informa- The demand for battlefield-level intelli- tion from its worldwide network of sen- gence increased significantly as American and sors. But much of that data is unlabeled, coalition warfighters went into Afghanistan hidden in various silos across disparate after late 2001 and after the 2003 invasion of networks, or inaccessible to the govern- Iraq. Geolocational data to detect the enemy’s ment… Even more data is simply expelled whereabouts was of paramount importance. as “exhaust” because it is not deemed to Our already limited resources shifted further be immediately relevant.12 away from clandestine collection on China and Russia to focus on electronically intercepting Travers adds that “[w]e have a long way to terrorist messages, honing imagery collection go to realize the benefits of Artificial intelli- at the battlefield level, and performing clandes- gence and machine learning.”13 Data analytic tine human intelligence at a more tactical level. processing that results in usable information The warfighter demanded that strategic-level for IC analysts will help to expand the range intelligence collection be fused with field-level of available sources and in turn facilitate the tactical collection and analysis to find and de- dissemination of better “indications and warn-  .stroy the enemy on the ground. ing”14 to the customer Our adversaries, both state and non-state, American Intelligence in a are resilient and adaptable. They continue Rapidly Changing World to invest in their own capabilities, ranging As U.S. intelligence collection and analytical from cyber-focused operations to advanced priorities shifted to address Islamic terrorism, weaponry, in order to upend our way of life those same enemies adapted their operational and that of our allies. Our intelligence agen- planning and activities. U.S. cyber-focused op- cies must therefore continue their own erations had to adapt to finding an enemy that journey of change—and in some instances was modifying its use of web-based presence transformation—to meet today’s more com- to communicate, recruit terrorists, and launch plex national security threats and stay ahead propaganda operations. America’s spies were of our adversaries. This includes a reexamina- essential to disrupting Islamic terrorists’ com- tion of how intelligence should be managed in munications and operational planning. a post-9/11 world: The buildup of counterterrorist (CT) ca- pabilities is now useful in meeting the intelli- The U.S. Government must fundamen- gence demands associated with today’s world. tally reexamine the manner in which For example, data analytics that was used in CT the Intelligence Community manages operations to identify and counter “fake news” intelligence information. In many instanc- now has widespread application in confronting es, the intelligence failures that preceded the national security challenges we face from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 nation-state competitors. were marked by an insistence—whether Former National Counterterrorism Center historically or legally grounded—that Acting Director Russell Travers has noted that intelligence information must be tightly

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 75 controlled by the intelligence collector. Despite the IC reforms enacted post-9/11, Often, this position was based on a mis- additional action is needed. Collaboration taken predicate, namely that an agency among the spy agencies needs to improve. “owned” information that it had collected.15 There is still a propensity among bureaucra- cies to avoid sharing information. The reasons The reforms in America’s intelligence en- for not sharing may include concerns by the terprise spurred by 9/11 focused on removing agency that collected the information that barriers to the sharing of two types of infor- the sensitive intelligence will be mishandled mation by U.S. agencies: information collect- by other agencies and perhaps even leaked to ed outside the U.S. and information lawfully the media or sourced in such a way that sen- obtained inside the U.S. Before September 11, sitive collection methods are exposed. Not- 2001, U.S. law (as it still does) prevented the withstanding significant changes in how the Intelligence Community from conducting sur- spy agencies work today, the evolving threats veillance of U.S. citizens. Once granted legal au- to the nation require that the IC and its 17 ele- thority pursuant to an investigation, U.S. law ments continue to adapt. enforcement agencies could surveil citizens, One area of adaptation is technology itself. but they could not share that information with In order to be more effective in driving the the Intelligence Community. integration of innovative technology within The terrorist attacks of 9/11 showed that American intelligence, the IC must shift its there was a gap between these two worlds culture mindset that expects any needed new where dangers inside and outside of the technology to be developed within the com- U.S. overlapped to create opportunities for munity. The IC needs to welcome commercial enemies—opportunities about which the fed- technology solutions, modifying them as nec- eral government was ignorant because of the essary to meet the mission requirements of the

prohibition on sharing information. The In- intelligence professionals. telligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention The IC leadership should consider how best Act of 200416 led to improvements that made to shift resources and capabilities as they per- critical CT information more readily available tain to the adoption of technical capabilities to those charged with disrupting terrorist plots (AI, ML, etc.) that can be applied to the rise against the homeland, but better information of great-power competition. Oracle Cloud’s sharing is still needed. Adaptable Business research project led to Designing and directing the nation’s intel- the interesting finding that business efficiency ligence capabilities requires a resilient and increases by 64 percent when the right tech- committed IC leadership operating with a nology is implemented alongside seven key sense of urgency. America’s adversaries are cultural factors within an organization—all of constantly and rapidly adapting their capa- which are factors that can be linked to char- bilities in cyber operations, social media, and acteristics in today’s intelligence enterprise: other means of technology. American intelli- gence must remain focused on improving its 1. Flexibility and embracing change, own intelligence tool kit and staying ahead of the enemy, but that is not enough. Ameri- 2. Learning culture, ca’s intelligence agencies also need to pursue improvements in their business processes so 3. Data-driven decision-making, that they not only can deliver better products to the decision-maker in a timelier manner, 4. Open communication and collaboration, but also will be able to operate more efficient- ly and effectively if significant resource con- 5. Shared digital vision and participa- straints reappear.17 tive leadership,

76 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength 6. Entrepreneurial culture, and began to trade concealment devices and human sources for military hardware. 7. Critical thinking and open questioning.18 Under a directive from President George W. Bush, it expanded its ranks to fight According to the research, many organiza- terror. It bulked up its abilities to track tions have invested in the right technologies and target a dispersed enemy fighting but lack the culture, skills, or behaviors nec- an asymmetrical war. Gone were the essary to fully reap their benefits. The study days, it seemed, of risky brush passes found that business efficiency increases by in a heart-pounding, adrenaline-filled only 27 percent when technology is imple- four-second period when an officer mented without the identified seven factors.19 was “black”—meaning free, just for a America’s intelligence professionals, in moment, from hostile surveillance and shifting their attention to the rising securi- able to pass a message to an asset. The ty threats posed by China, Russia, and their Cold War was over; we had a new ene- allies, are well postured to do so in only two my to defeat.20 out of the seven areas: critical thinking/open questioning and a learning culture. The IC as To address the security threats posed by a whole is reluctant either to embrace open China, Russia, and their allies effectively, our communication and collaboration across experienced operators and analysts must be its 17 elements or to demonstrate flexibility reprioritized to meet customers’ demands for and embrace change. The intelligence ele- accurate, relevant, and timely intelligence re- ments also fall short of applying data-driven lated to capable adversaries. These adversaries decision-​making at every level, having a are not only capable of mounting complex op- shared digital vision, or promoting an entre- erations against the U.S., but also able to detect  preneurial culture. If the Intelligence Com- sophisticated operational activities against munity is to meet the challenges of the 21st them. Reflecting on the challenges posed by a century, its leaders need to address these rising power, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo shortfalls with a sense of urgency. If imple- has pointedly characterized the nature of the mented, their strong and unwavering direc- threats presented by a rising China: tion can offer opportunities to enhance the effectiveness of the IC’s workforce. Under [Premier] Xi Jinping, the [Chinese The pivot of 2001 toward combating Islam- Communist Party] has prioritized some- ic extremism as the top intelligence priority thing called “military-civil fusion.”… It’s a and away from a focused attention on the technical term but a very simple idea. Un- rise of China and the geopolitical aspirations der Chinese law, Chinese companies and of Russia has shaped the mindset of today’s researchers must—I repeat, must—under collectors. For example, for two decades, an penalty of law, share technology with the entire generation of intelligence operators Chinese military. has not been schooled in how to conduct tra- ditional operations against state actors, much The goal is to ensure that the People’s less against our near-peer competitors. As a Liberation Army has military dominance. former CIA human intelligence operator ob- And the PLA’s core mission is to sustain served in 2017: the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on power—that same Chinese Communist Over the past 15 years, this “global war Party that has led China in an increasingly on terror” mindset has become the authoritarian direction and one that is default at the CIA. After accusations that increasingly repressive as well….21 it was stuck in the Cold War, the agency

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 77 Time to Accelerate presence in one’s own network. Detection Intelligence Transformation times vary based on the sophistication of the Technology. The IC agencies are keen- attacker and defender, but the average lingers ly aware that they are operating in a com- at well over a year. While defenders have im- plex world of information technology that is proved, in many cases, intruders can operate changing rapidly. How America’s spies respond for months within the target network, unno- to these changes is vital. The advent of fifth ticed and unconstrained.23 As cybersecurity generation (5G) technology is on the verge of expert Ben Buchanan has noted: establishing China as a near-peer competitor in telecommunications. Although there are Virtually every major cyber attack—such barriers to entry that limit Huawei’s access as Stuxnet, the two blackouts in Ukraine, to the U.S. market, the Chinese 5G footprint and NotPetya—has been preceded by is expanding at a rapid clip around the world months, if not years, of reconnaissance including among U.S. allies. The intelligence and preparation. This window offers an threat posed by Huawei is of a significance that opportunity. If machine learning can should not be underestimated: improve detection, interdiction, and attribution, it can dramatically reduce the As an adversarial power, China cannot potential dangers of cyber operations. be allowed to use its government-con- That said, machine learning has been trolled companies to gain a significant applied to cyber defense for several years foothold in the United States’ burgeon- already and challenges persist; it is thus ing 5G wireless networks. Such a pres- vital to ground the evaluation of machine ence would be a clear national security learning-aided cyber defense not just threat that could decisively compromise in theory but in practical—and ideally American telecommunications and data measurable—results.24  infrastructure—including the communi- cations integrity of the US military and Our intelligence professionals must have intelligence community… the very best technology at their disposal. To- day, technological innovation rests predomi- The U.S. must not be complacent. Bei- nantly in the private sector. To bridge this gap, jing’s “civil-military fusion” practices must IC leaders need to promote the development not be allowed to threaten U.S. national of deeper public–private partnerships to fa- security. Further, the U.S. must penalize cilitate rapid adoption of this technology. Un- Beijing’s blatant attempts to threaten fortunately, because of mutual distrust, these America’s critical infrastructure and to use partnerships are not easy to forge. Nonethe- its technology industry as an extension of less, commercial companies can help to find state espionage.22 innovative ways both to exploit the vast and increasing body of open-source information Technology is generally multipurposed and available to the intelligence analyst and to often integrated into multiple strands of hard- counter the sophisticated counterintelligence ware and software. For example, AI combined methods employed by China, Russia, and oth- with ML can be incorporated into the daily use ers to protect their secrets. of intelligence capabilities to support analysis, As Russell Travers noted in 2019, at least one counter cyber threats, and also address insider vehicle for such collaboration already exists: threats. Machine learning holds promise for cyber defense. Over the past two years, there has been The single biggest challenge for network a marked increase in Industries’ will- defenders is detection: finding the adversary’s ingness to work with one another, the

78 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength US government and foreign partners to collectors and analysts to tackle rough prob- counter terrorism through the Global lems such as breaking sophisticated encryption Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism related to leadership communications or ad- (GIFCT). Originally created by Facebook, vanced weapon systems and identifying deni- Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube, GIFCT al and deception tactics by adversaries. These has provided a vehicle for discussions and capabilities must be secure yet interoperable potential information sharing…. across intelligence and defense platforms. Information Integration. Managing The recent move to establish GIFCT as information sharing effectively in a classi- an independent organization, or NGO, fied world remains enormously challenging offers a formalized opportunity to better because of the need to protect our secrets. leverage the respective strengths of the Nonetheless, the balance between “the need private sector and the U.S. government to share” and “the need to protect” is askew against this dynamic problem. The new under the current paradigm among our intel- construct looks to sustain and deepen ligence professionals. It is imperative to have industry collaboration and capacity, while in place a data management system in which incorporating the advice of key civil soci- every person that touches a piece of classified ety and government stakeholders.25 information is monitored to ensure not only that mission needs are met, but also that se- The IC leadership needs to adapt com- crets are protected. mercially available “off the shelf” technology, IC analysts are inundated by information, even if modifications may be required to meet but the most important information needed a specific intelligence need. Simultaneously, to “connect the dots” can remain undiscovered the IC leadership should cut off funding for or unavailable because the right information is  -technology development within its agencies not always identified for the right user. Barri if it lags far behind what is available in the ers to information sharing persist among ana- private sector. This also requires a change lysts, operators, and military personnel even in the cultural mindset to make the IC more within the same agency and certainly between receptive to adopting commercially based the IC’s various elements. This shortfall must technology. Former Intelligence Community be addressed to improve the quality of analytic Chief Information Officer John Sherman has work. As Damien van Puyvelde, Stephen Coul- underscored that: thart, and M. Shahriar Hossain have argued:

Our adversaries are moving out quickly in Interest in data analytics has been many areas such as cyber, artificial intelli- growing due to the demand for more gence and machine learning, information reliable intelligence products following and asymmetric warfare, not to mention the controversies caused by the 9/11 other capabilities such as conventional attacks and the absence of weapons of weapons and space. We must respond mass destruction in Iraq. Prior to 9/11 the with equal urgency. We can and must US intelligence community lacked and win in an arena increasingly defined by missed specific pieces of information technology, data, and cybersecurity. This pointing to the terrorist plot. In 2002, a requires even greater innovation and national intelligence estimate made a partnerships between the government, series of erroneous assessments regard- industry, allies, and academia.26 ing Iraq’s WMD programme, which were later used to justify the US decision to go The IC requires commercial support in de- to war in Iraq. These events cast doubt veloping computer infrastructure that allows on the intelligence collection and analysis

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 79 capabilities of America’s spy agencies, the Information Age, including leveraging especially in the domain of human intel- technology to reduce cognitive burdens ligence (HUMINT). Big data capabilities, on the force and deliver intelligence at it was hoped, would compensate for the the speed of mission.28 limitations, and sometimes the absence, of HUMINT. Consequently, US intelligence The complexities associated with under- agencies began to embrace more system- standing, preparing, and as necessary respond- atic and sophisticated data collection and ing to more sophisticated adversaries calls for analysis techniques.27 the best possible integrated intelligence for our warfighters and planners. Enacting user-based access controls across Talent. Removing barriers to hiring and IC data repositories offers a way to take the retaining America’s top talent is essential to human intervention out of the information-​ addressing complex national security chal- sharing conundrum when accompanied with lenges. The backbone of the IC’s performance, data user rights. What good does it do for an effectiveness, and efficiency is the quality and analyst to learn after judgments have been retention of its people. The good news is that made that information was available but could the IC has no problem attracting prospective not be accessed because of artificial barriers? personnel with extraordinary skills and back- Information needs to be controlled, but in a grounds. The bad news is that the IC lacks world where threats are often interconnect- the ability to hire them quickly enough, and ed, the barriers to accessing mission-relevant significant expertise is lost because the hir- information need to be removed so that the ing process can takes as much as a year. Also, IC can provide the most accurate assessments once in the IC, talented officers leave because possible to policy customers. they become disaffected by bureaucracy that

Integrated intelligence assessments are discourages analytic dissent or by elements equally important for all customers. This is that discourage joint-duty career-enhancing underscored by the case of the U.S. military, assignments among the IC’s 17 components. which needs reliable intelligence to maintain As it relates to attracting and retaining the situational awareness and be prepared to pre- best and brightest personnel for the IC, two vent war but, if necessary, to fight and decisive- significant barriers need to be addressed. ly win the next one. With reference to the Army First, the granting of a security clearance for (although it is equally true for all of America’s an intelligence professional and/or support- uniformed services): ing government contractor with the requisite skills remains inefficient despite some grad- Army HUMINT must be prepared to ual improvements. In figures released in late operate within multiple domains and em- November 2019, the Defense Counterintelli- ploy materiel modernization to leverage gence and Security Agency “noted a dramatic artificial intelligence/fusion capabilities drop in security clearance processing times as to reduce cognitive burdens on ana- of FY 2019 Q4—295 days for Top Secret clear- lysts. The Army G-2X enterprise must ances (down from a high that reached over 500 adapt to meet the readiness demands days), and 181 days for Secret security clear- of great power competition by ensuring ances, down from over 300 days.” These “DoD/ our CI, HUMINT, and security personnel Industry only numbers…represent the fastest are prepared to deploy, fight, and win 90% of all clearances.”29 However, the most tal- across the spectrum of conflict. Through ented professionals are not likely to wait a year modernization, the Army G-2X enterprise or longer to start their jobs. must be able to build an agile CI, HUMINT, Second, when the time it still takes to get a and security force that fully embraces security clearance is combined with the time

80 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength needed for a hiring decision—often more than of IC personnel would also remove an import- a year—it is not hard to see why the new grad- ant reason for the IC’s talent drain. The ODNI uate in one of the highly sought-after technol- should establish policies that significantly ogy fields may well not wait to be hired by an reduce what are often many months of delay intelligence agency. It often takes much longer in having personnel move from one IC ele- for first-generation American applicants with ment to another. highly desirable native foreign language skills The Changing Persona of Clandestine to be cleared. It is difficult to quantify the loss Collection. The advent of biometrics and oth- of talent and capability this represents, but we er threats to secure operation make obtaining can assume that the Intelligence Community core secrets from clandestine human sources does lose badly needed talent. extraordinarily challenging. Many of the tech- A case study of graduates from the North nologies used by intelligence professionals are Carolina State University Master’s Program readily available to our adversaries, state and in Advanced Analytics provides some insights. non-state alike. Facial recognition and bio- If a graduate of this 10-month program were metrics more generally make the use of alias interested in a career in national security, it operational tradecraft nearly impossible. Hu- would be next to impossible for that individu- man intelligence collection must therefore al to be interviewed, offered a job, and cleared continue to evolve both to address the coun- through the process in less than 10 months. terintelligence threats to securely running Even assuming a somewhat faster hiring pro- foreign human spies and to protect its own cess, 40 percent of those hired will leave their operational capabilities from the watchful eye employment within two years because of per- of our adversaries. ceived opportunities for job growth elsewhere— A major shift in how human intelligence obviously a huge loss for any intelligence agen- operations are conducted is required. While  ,cy. Many leave for the private sector.30 not easy, and while tradecraft must be applied Suitability Barriers to IC Talent Man- online (or cyber-based) human intelligence agement. Different suitability norms (“suit- operations must be increased to spot, assess, ability” refers to judgments about a person’s develop, recruit, and handle human sources. character traits and conduct) among the IC At the same time, human-to-human interac- elements act as a significant constraint on the tion in a clandestine manner faces significant movement of talent within the IC to meet the hurdles. “U.S. spies are no longer being tailed highest intelligence priorities. This obstacle by foreign governments in about 30 different also undermines IC team building. The receiv- countries,” according to one report, “because ing element often raises subjective objections advances in facial recognition, biometrics under the guise of finding the prospective per- and artificial intelligence have made it almost son “unsuitable” for the rotational assignment impossible for the agents to [maintain a false even though the criteria for security clearance identity].”31 One former CIA senior officer not- are the same for all IC personnel. The resultant ed insightfully in 2015 that: delays, often measured in months, undermine the use of the best talent despite IC mission As we continue to advance technologi- requirements. cally, in essence making our world smaller, This obstacle must be removed if the IC is the potential threats posed by these going to be able to place its talent where it is advancements will make both protecting most needed to meet the requirements of the and exploiting real secrets exponentially nation’s political or military leadership and more difficult. In addition, as these chal- prioritize resource allocations to match the lenges continue to grow, those tasked greatest threats that appear on the horizon. with addressing them will need to adjust Removing the suitability barriers to transfers at a much more rapid rate. This applies

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 81 both to field operatives as well as to in the public sector as it competes with private their managers… industry because demand for the unique skills and knowledge needed to combat the growing The next generation of operatives and threats in the cyber domain has outpaced the their managers will need to be more supply of that talent for years. The public sec- familiar with, if not adept at, techno- tor struggles to attract the required numbers logical augmentation. Augmentation, of cyber-trained and experienced personnel not replacement. While the tendency because of its slow hiring process and lower to rely increasingly on technology to compensation compared to the private sector.35 make HUMINT collection more efficient For example, February 2015, the Pentagon had is commendable, adherence to the core reached only the midway point in staffing -Cy principals [sic] will ensure that human ber Command and was backing away from the operations remain as secure as possible.32 long-held goal of deploying a full force of 6,000 cyber personnel by 2016.36 As a top priority, the Cyber Integration. The DNI has the au- IC must spend whatever is necessary to train thority to assign responsibilities within the existing IC officers with transferable skills and IC, but the absence of clear policy direction on high potential to be cyber intelligence officers. cyber issues leaves intelligence professionals Training is available in the private sector.37 without the guidance they need with respect Executive Order 12333 as amended gives to the parameters of their cyber activities. In the DNI the authority to define roles and re- addition, because of the absence of a policy sponsibilities for elements of the Intelligence framework, the IC elements, alongside other Community.38 What is needed now to achieve elements of the executive branch, have been enhanced integration among the key cyber col- left to chart their own courses as individual de- lection agencies—the National Security Agency,

partments or agencies in executing offensive Central Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bu- and defensive cyber activities as an element of reau of Investigation—are clearly articulated U.S. national security.33 policies for defining their respective missions Adversarial threats in the cyber domain and how information will be shared among change quickly and are increasingly complex. them in a transparent manner. The IC lead- As for the appropriate governance to meet cy- ership needs to remain focused on achieving ber threats, Executive Order 12333, as amended “unity of cyber mission,” which must be the top by President George W. Bush in July 2008,34 did priority for anticipating and providing warning not specifically address cyber as an intelligence to the decision-makers about future threats. discipline. Nonetheless, in just the few years Under well-defined rules, the Cyber Threat since the IC’s principal presidential directive Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) may was amended, it has become apparent that spe- eventually be in a position to contribute a cific cyber “lanes in the road” need to be identi- strong analytic product on cyber threats. fied within the IC and throughout government. Some progress has been made, but it is Cyber intelligence informs a significant not enough. Cyber legislation was stalled for number of sub-disciplines such as cyber securi- years, but with passage of the cyber bill in 2015, ty, cyber defense, cyber offence, and cyber sup- a framework for addressing cyber-related ac- port to traditional military operations, as well tivities has begun to take form.39 The CTIIC, as the establishment of international norms on established at the instigation of the White cyber behavior during peacetime. These mis- House ostensibly to conduct analysis of cyber sions call for intelligence professionals who threats, appears to have an ill-defined mission. are competent to address the multi-strand It also has neither the resources nor the stand- demands associated with cyber operations, ing among the big departments and agencies to but there is a critical shortage of cyber talent assess cyber threats.40

82 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength Counterintelligence. Catching spies Today, “Moscow and other governments are and protecting our secrets is the traditional learning key disinformation tactics from non- framework for counterintelligence. In order state actors” that are using more sophisticated to counter highly sophisticated adversaries, cyber-generated influence operations. All ad- however, the scope of counterintelligence versaries are now in the cyber domain. needs to be expanded. This broader definition needs to include what our adversaries are do- These developments suggest a future in ing through disinformation and other forms which both non-state and state actors of information warfare to undermine both the will contest the United States through on- U.S. and its friends and allies. IC talent needs line disinformation campaigns, even while to be placed against this broader definition of more traditional global power competi- counterintelligence. tion tied to geography continues to play While the Chinese, Russians, and other out. Moreover, it seems inevitable that the adversaries have long wanted to steal our se- Chinese, Iranians, and others will escalate crets by any means possible, these nations now their malign social media efforts much leverage big data to promote their interests, as the Russians have done. FBI Director using all forms of media to foster a false nar- Christopher Wray recently acknowledged rative of events in and outside the U.S. Coun- that other countries have been exploring terintelligence requires identifying and then such influence efforts.42 protecting our national security information on a much broader level. CI must still include The opportunities for the IC to identify and its traditional focus on protecting our own se- then counter the broad range of counterintel- crets from foreign spies, but our security also ligence threats are coupled with the challeng- depends on identifying and countering disin- es and opportunities related to technology,  formation and insider threats, as well as re- information integration, people talent, and sponding to adversaries’ efforts to disrupt U.S. clandestine collection. All of these pieces must intelligence. As Christopher Costa and Joshua fit together to maximize the ability of our spy Gelzter have written: agencies to respond to a much higher national security threat environment for years to come. If the U.S. government is to fight off An effective response to these threats does not disinformation—which can now be require additional funding or personnel re- created on an industrial scale and spread sources for the IC, but rather reprioritization globally not just by states but also by of existing capabilities. terrorists and criminals—it must rein- vigorate and broaden the practice of Building a More Effective counterintelligence. Intelligence Enterprise As demonstrated after the terrorist attacks For too long, the focus of U.S. counterin- of 2001, the U.S. Intelligence Community has telligence has been safeguarding gov- demonstrated that it can redirect its resourc- ernment secrets and corporate intellec- es to meet a different type of threat. It did so tual property, particularly by thwarting immediately in the aftermath of the attacks in foreign efforts to recruit potential thieves. 2001 in order to pursue aggressive collection We must remember that counterintel- and analysis of Islamic terrorist groups. The ligence also means warding off efforts goals for intelligence are immutable. Intelli- to divide and weaken us. We can draw gence resources must be postured to give the on our Cold War experience and up- policymaker and warfighter alike the upper date our responses to reflect modern hand against the adversary. That upper hand technologies.41 requires collecting threat warnings that can be

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 83 prevented from becoming a reality or be coun- the past two decades, mission-essential tered by reliable intelligence. information sharing remains too restrict- The ability of America’s spy agencies to ad- ed within the IC due to the propagation of dress the wide array of complex threats emerg- data stovepipes and absence of user-based ing from the need to deter great-power rivals permissions. Fear continues to drive the requires IC leadership committed to applying risk calculus by the so called owners of the resources to address the highest threat vec- data (the agencies that obtain the classi- tors. It requires a strong sense of urgency with fied information). The result could be fail- a top goal of harnessing the power of emerg- ure to provide adequate warning because ing and disruptive technologies as applied to mission users are unable to access siloed data analytics, artificial intelligence, machine information. learning, 5G, and quantum computing while enabling the integration of autonomous sys- ll For the Top Secret/Sensitive Com- tems. Currently, America’s intelligence pro- partmented Information clearance, fessionals must be prepared to ensure un- the DNI should mandate and then ambiguous advantage in the event of conflict rigorously enforce time constraints escalation, but the IC needs to be able to act on the security clearance process. The preemptively and provide advance warnings IC must depend on state-of-the art CI of threats to our national security from both monitoring for its first ring of protection. state and non-state actors. Therefore, bureaucratic barriers that With this in mind, there are several actions prevent the timely entry of much-needed that can and should be taken. Specifically: talent must be eliminated, and every effort must be made to retain vital personnel ll The Director of National Intelligence and to facilitate ingress to and egress from

should require all IC members to the IC for that talent. Special allowances provide a plan with specific goals to are needed for compensation related to increase their partnerships with the highly desirable science, technology, engi- private sector to acquire cutting-edge neering, and mathematics (STEM) talent. technology and infrastructure sup- Interchangeability of intelligence person- port. Each plan should be accompanied nel talent must be promoted aggressively by a road map and timetable for adoption among the 17 elements of the IC to meet of that technology. In an era of signifi- the highest intelligence requirements. cant growth in data and data processing Suitability barriers to accepting transfers requirements, America’s intelligence of personnel need to be removed. professionals require the best technology that the private sector has to offer. They ll Clandestine human intelligence col- should therefore promote agile public– lection needs to reevaluate how it can private partnerships to assure their access identify, assess, develop, and recruit to the technological innovation that is foreign spies by using different tactics. constantly emerging from America’s Human intelligence operations can no vibrant commercial sector. longer rely solely on traditional tradecraft for in-person meetings using alias perso- ll The DNI needs to establish a needs- nas that are subject to discovery because based information-sharing model of microchip information and biometrics. with appropriate auditing functions A comprehensive revamping of clan- to enable enhanced data access by all destine human intelligence collection intelligence professionals with a need is needed. Today’s threats to traditional to know. Notwithstanding advances over spying will require far more reliance on

84 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength online cyber personas and far less reliance these challenges, the IC needs to attract and on foreign-based collection efforts by retain deep subject matter expertise, including American operators. foreign languages, and to focus on China and Russia (and their allies), enhanced operational ll The Acting DNI took an important tradecraft, and a significant increase in the use step in mid-May with the announce- of technology and STEM-trained personnel to ment that intelligence-focused cyber apply artificial intelligence, machine learning, efforts would be consolidated under and data analytics in an effective manner. Cy- an IC Cyber Executive. However, this ber-centric operational capabilities for U.S. in- does not go far enough to meet the chal- telligence personnel must become the norm lenges of cyber-centric requirements. for achieving success against determined and The IC’s capabilities against determined relentless adversaries. adversaries now need to be rigorously The Intelligence Community, with the ben- assessed with a view to ensuring the efit of clearly articulated requirements from IC’s ability to defend and respond as the policymaker and the warfighter, is capable necessary to an adversary’s capabilities of delivering invaluable intelligence. This re- in cyberspace. quires bold leadership that is prepared to in- vest in its people, technology, and security. The ll The DNI needs to lead in expanding leadership needs to incentivize the increase of the scope and depth of America’s coun- IC integration and strengthen public–private terintelligence focus to address our partnerships to maximize access to innovative adversaries’ ability to use aggressive technologies. cyber online operations to influence The challenges facing our intelligence the hearts and minds of Americans. professionals are not for the faint of heart.  This expanded application of CI can meet Dealing with these challenges will require the continued need to address more creativity and meaningful steps to break complex challenges pertaining to insider down the bureaucratic walls among the IC’s threats in a cyber-centric world and the 17 elements. America’s national security de- need to protect national security secrets. serves nothing less than a federated Intelli- gence Community that operates with unity of Conclusion effort and interdependence, confronting the The foundation of U.S. intelligence is sound, capabilities of our adversaries with an eye to but America’s intelligence agencies face a providing high-confidence decision advan- range of new national security challenges from tage for every customer of the world’s finest emerging great-power competitors. To meet intelligence organizations.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 85 Endnotes 1. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, December 2017, p. 32, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed June 17, 2020). 2. Bloomberg News, “China’s Got a New Plan to Overtake the U.S. in Tech,” updated May 21, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2020-05-20/china-has-a-new-1-4-trillion-plan-to-overtake-the-u-s-in-tech (accessed June 17, 2020). 3. Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2003), p. 8. 4. Jennifer E. Sims, “Decision Advantage and the Nature of Intelligence Analysis,” Chapter 24 in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, ed. Loch K. Johnson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), Abstract, https://www.oxfordhandbooks. com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195375886.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195375886-e-0024?result=4&rskey=0ztes9 (accessed July 26, 2020). 5. Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” statement before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, January 29, 2019, p. 4, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/ documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf (accessed June 17, 2020). 6. Office of the Director of National Intelligence,National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, 2019, p. [1], https:// www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/National_Intelligence_Strategy_2019.pdf (accessed June 17, 2020). 7. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the Central Intelligence Agency (other than the ODNI, the only element of the IC that is outside of a department); the National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office; the four intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps; the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Security Branch; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis; the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Intelligence Program; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis; the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; and U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence. 8. The National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the four intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. 9. S. 2845, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-458, 108th Cong., December 17, 2002, https:// www.congress.gov/search?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22cite%3APL108-458%22%7D (accessed July 17, 2020).  10. Executive Order 13470, “Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities,” July 30, 2008, in Federal Register, Vol. 73, No. 150 (August 4, 2008), p. 45326, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13470.pdf (accessed July 17, 2020). 11. Marshall C. Erwin and Amy Belasco, “Intelligence Spending and Appropriations: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress, September 18, 2013, p. 6, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R42061.pdf (accessed June 17, 2020). 12. Russell E. Travers, Acting Director, National Counterterrorism Center, “Counterterrorism in an Era of Competing Priorities,” remarks delivered at Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 8, 2019, p. 8, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/news_ documents/Travers_Washington_Institute_Remarks_as_Prepared.pdf (accessed July 17, 2020). Punctuation as in original. 13. Ibid. 14. “Indications” are signs or evidence that reveal an entity’s intent to perform some act, and “warning” connotes an immediacy of action that poses a danger. The unexpected recall of soldiers from leave or movement of supply trucks to an area indicate that an opponent is up to something of importance per an IC analytic customer’s stated interests. Similarly, the movement of fueling vehicles to a missile launch pad is a sign or warning that the launch of a missile is imminent. 15. Senate Report 108-258, To Authorize Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2005 for Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for Other Purposes, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 5, 2004, p. 7, https://www.congress.gov/ congressional-report/108th-congress/senate-report/258/1?s=1&r=42 (accessed July 17, 2020). 16. See note 9, supra. 17. David R. Shedd, “Intelligence and National Defense,” in 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2015), pp. 45–59, https://s3.amazonaws.com/ims-2016/PDF/2016_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_FULL. pdf (accessed July 17, 2020). 18. Oracle Cloud, “Adaptable Businesses and the Productivity Paradox,” in The Adaptable Business: Future Skills and Cultural Forces, 2019, pp. 3 and 11, https://www.oracle.com/a/ocom/docs/dc/the-adaptable- business. pdf?elqTrackId=28c5abc9c44d4a5d872b2e6cd1a92c68&elqaid=79966&elqat=2 (accessed July 17, 2020).

86 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength 19. Ibid., p. 3. 20. Alex Finley, “How the CIA Forgot the Art of Spying,” Politico Magazine, March/April 2018, https://www.politico.com/magazine/ story/2017/03/cia-art-spying-espionage-spies-military-terrorism-214875 (accessed July 17, 2020). 21. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “Technology and the China Security Challenge,” remarks delivered at the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, California, January 13, 2020, https://www.state.gov/silicon-valley-and-national-security/ (accessed July 17, 2020). 22. Klon Kitchen, “The U.S. Must Treat China as a National Security Threat to 5G Networks,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4952, April 16, 2019, p. 1, https://www.heritage.org/technology/report/the-us-must-treat-china-national-security-threat-5g-networks. 23. FireEye, M-Trends 2020, FireEye Mandiant Services Special Report, p. 11, https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 (accessed June 16, 2020). 24. Ben Buchanan, “A National Security Research Agenda for Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology Issue Brief, May 2020, p. 7, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-A-National-Security- Research-Agenda-for-Cybersecurity-and-Artificial-Intelligence.pdf (accessed July 17, 2020). See also Ben Buchanan,The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust, and Fear Between Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), Chapter 2. 25. Travers, “Counterterrorism in an Era of Competing Priorities,” p. 12. 26. John B. Sherman, Assistant Director of National Intelligence and Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer, “From the IC CIO,” in Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Strategic Plan to Advance Cloud Computing in the Intelligence Community,” June 26, 2019, p. 1, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/CIO/Cloud_Computing_Strategy.pdf (accessed July 17, 2020). 27. Damien van Puyvelde, Stephen Coulthart, and M. Shahriar Hossain, “Beyond the Buzzword: Big Data and National Security Decision-Making,” International Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 6 (November 2017), p. 1398, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/ files/images/ia/INTA93_6_06_VanPuyvelde%20et%20al.pdf (accessed July 17, 2020). 28. Lieutenant Colonel Marcus O’Neal, “Army G2X Support to Army Readiness and Modernization Priorities,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January–March 2020), p. 23, https://fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/2020_01.pdf (accessed July 17, 2020).

 //:Lindy Kyzer, “How Long Does It Take to Process a Security Clearance? (Q4 2019),” ClearanceJobs, November 20, 2019, https .29 news.clearancejobs.com/2019/11/20/how-long-does-it-take-to-process-a-security-clearance-q4-2019/ (accessed July 17, 2020). 30. Institute for Advanced Analytics, “Master of Science in Analytics: 2019 Alumni Report,” reported as of January 4, 2020, http:// analytics.ncsu.edu/reports/alumni/MSA2019.pdf (accessed July 17, 2020). 31. Emily Crane, “Will the Digital Age Kill Off Spying? CIA in Crisis as Facial Recognition, Biometrics and AI Make It Increasingly Difficult for Agents to Maintain Their Cover Abroad,”The Daily Mail, December 30, 2019, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ article-7837767/CIA-faces-crisis-intelligence-gathering-digital-footprints.html (accessed July 17, 2020). 32. John Sano, “The Changing Shape of HUMINT,” The Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Fall/Winter 2015), pp. 79–80, https://www.afio.com/publications/SANO%20John%20on%20The%20Changing%20Shape%20of%20 HUMINT%20Pages%20from%20INTEL_FALLWINTER2015_Vol21_No3_FINAL.pdf (accessed July 17, 2020). 33. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Cybersecurity: National Strategy, Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be Better Defined and More Effectively Implemented, GAO-13-187, February 2013, https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652170.pdf (accessed July 17, 2020). 34. See note 10, supra. 35. Amber Corrin, “Is There a Cybersecurity Workforce Crisis?” Federal Computer Week, October 15, 2013, https://fcw.com/ articles/2013/10/15/cybersecurity-workforce-crisis.aspx (accessed July 17, 2020). 36. Aliya Sternstein, “Need a Job? Cyber Command Is Halfway Full,” Nextgov, February 6, 2015, http://www.nextgov.com/ cybersecurity/2015/02/need-job-cyber-command-halfway-full/104817/ (accessed July 17, 2020). 37. See, for example, SANS Institute web site, www.sans.org (accessed July 17, 2020). 38. Federal Register, Vol. 73, No. 150 (August 4, 2008), pp. 45326–45327. 39. Rob Lever, “Congress Passes Long-Stalled Cybersecurity Bill,” Space War, December 18, 2015, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/ Congress_passes_long-stalled_cybersecurity_bill_999.html (accessed July 17, 2020). 40. “Fact Sheet: Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center,” The White House, February 25, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/25/fact-sheet-cyber-threat-intelligence-integration-center (accessed July 17, 2020).

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 87 41. Christopher P. Costa and Joshua A. Geltzer, “To Fight Disinformation, Rethink Counterintelligence,” Defense One, October 14, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/10/fight-disinformation-rethink-counterintelligence/160582/ (accessed July 17, 2020). 42. Ibid. 

88 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength U.S. Alliances: Crucial Enablers in Great-Power Competition Andrew A. Michta, PhD

he United States today is at a geostrategic depleted the capabilities of the U.S. military, Tdisadvantage that is significantly great- and the demands of these theaters have driven er than the “correlation of forces” (as Soviet a large portion of defense systems acquisition generals put it) that the U.S. confronted during programs and contracting.1 the Cold War. Unlike in the era of great-power competition with the Soviet Union when the The Grand Strategic Challenge U.S. faced a single geopolitical foe, today Amer- Meanwhile, the Russian Federation has ica is confronted by two great powers—one re- undergone two cycles of military moderniza- visionist, the other transformational—aligned tion. The scope of this effort may pale in com-  ,in the common goal of displacing the United parison to expenditures by the United States States from its dominant position as the hub but two decades of de facto disarmament by of the liberal world order. our European allies have allowed Moscow to Three decades of unequivocal and mis- change the balance of power along NATO’s guided commitment to globalization and the eastern flank. internationalization of our manufacturing More important, China’s investment in its have left America’s power significantly deplet- military—especially qualitative improvements ed. The post–Cold War era has seen persistent facilitated by massive technology transfers budget and trade deficits, deindustrialization from the United States and increasingly from and the attendant radical centralization of Europe, as well as the rapid expansion of its supply chains in China, and an overall decline navy—has begun to tilt the balance of power in the competitiveness of the American labor in the Indo-Pacific region against the United force, with U.S. STEM (science, technology, States, with the People’s Liberation Army Navy engineering, and mathematics) programs at (PLAN) staking an exclusive claim to the South premier universities increasingly catering to China Sea. While the PLAN is already challeng- foreign students, fewer of whom are choosing ing the sovereignty of Taiwan and putting Ja- to remain and work in the United States after pan on notice that its security can no longer be graduating. At the same time, two decades of taken for granted, it is also increasingly oper- low-intensity wars-cum-“state building” proj- ating in the Mediterranean, entering the Baltic ects in Afghanistan and the Middle East have Sea, and—with its tenders to buy 33,000-ton

Andrew A. Michta, PhD, is the Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 89 nuclear-powered icebreakers—preparing to pandemic, with the United States learning the punch through the Arctic Ocean. hard way how vulnerable it had become to its Last but not least, China’s Belt and Road principal adversary, China, on account of Bei- Initiative (BRI), with some 50 “special eco- jing’s radical centralization of supply chains nomic zones,” and its “17+1” initiative are for products critical to dealing with the crisis. critical steps toward tying the economies of The pandemic has made it imperative that Europe, Russia, and Africa to China as part of the United States relearn the lesson of the China’s larger effort to form a single Eurasian importance of allies who can provide diffuse supply-chain network. Once in place, centered and redundant supply chains in critical ar- on the yuan as the new reserve currency and eas while also serving as key enablers for the defended by Chinese military power, the BRI United States when it comes to its foreign and will be poised to effect a “grand inversion” in security policy. which the maritime supremacy over the land domain that for half a millennium has favored NATO the West would effectively be reversed. In such No alliance proved more essential to the a scenario, the European Rimland would cease United States’ victory in the Cold War than to be the transatlantic gateway to Eurasia, be- the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and no coming instead the terminal endpoint of a other alliance is in greater need of repair today. China-dominated Eurasian empire. In the first few decades following the Cold War, In short, the grand strategic challenge that NATO devolved into an essentially political this round of great-power competition poses structure used to integrate post-Communist​ for American security and for the democratic states into the transatlantic system and, al- West (as well as democracies in Asia) cannot be though membership in the European Union overstated. Consequently, the role of alliances was never expressly conditioned on NATO

as a fundamental enabler of American power membership, to help lay the groundwork for will be critical in the next decade and beyond. the EU’s acquis communautaire.4 In the first The Trump Administration’s realignment decade of the 21st century, the alliance became, of U.S. national security and defense priorities on the one hand, a growing source of friction toward great-power competition is encapsu- between the United States and the largest Eu- lated in the 2017 National Security Strategy2 ropean allies while, on the other hand, old al- and the 2018 National Defense Strategy.3 Both lies such as the United Kingdom and new ones, documents (the latter’s unclassified 12-page including Poland, enabled the United States’ summary having been released by then-Secre- global war on terrorism after 9/11. tary of Defense James Mattis) were long over- The process of deconstructing NATO into due, as changes in the balance of power world- a collective security organization of sorts con- wide have only accelerated following the 2008 tinued unabated through the 2014 Russian “great recession” that exposed deep structural seizure of Crimea and the invasion of eastern imbalances in the United States economy. Al- Ukraine. By then, NATO’s military capabil- though the United States government man- ities, including the residual forces deployed aged to stabilize the situation by flooding the by the United States to Europe, had become markets with liquidity in the aftermath of that a pale shadow of its once-formidable armies. crisis, the structural deficiencies of the U.S. Furthermore, logistical infrastructure across economy—especially our excessive reliance NATO had become degraded to the point that on foreign supply networks for ever-greater even moderate-scale joint exercises were portions of the economy, including military problematic. Recent efforts to reverse the contracting—were not addressed. trend—the DEFENDER-Europe 20 exercise, This weakness was exposed during the dev- for example, was to be the largest such exer- astating aftershocks of the Wuhan coronavirus cise along the eastern flank of NATO since the

90 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength end of the Cold War, combining some 20,000 foundational obstacle to properly resourcing U.S. forces and 18,000 European forces—were NATO and may in fact cause continued spikes effectively stopped by the “shelter-in-place” in disagreement within NATO like the one orders triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, triggered by reports that the Trump Admin- with only a portion of the troops exercised istration planned to remove 9,500 U.S. troops across the theater. from Germany.6 In addition to the fact that NATO’s forces The United States will continue to draw are inadequate to the task at hand, an even great benefit from its leadership role in the greater challenge may be that the alliance’s NATO alliance, which serves both as an effec- political consensus concerning the overarch- tive force multiplier and as a source of political ing strategic threat is fractured. I call the latter influence in Europe and Eurasia more broadly. problem the “regionalization of security op- NATO’s contribution to American security in tics,” whereby the nature and degree of threat an era of resurgent great-power competition perception morphs as one moves from east to rests on its ability to offset Russian and, in- west. Countries along the front line such as creasingly, Chinese pressure on and in Europe, Norway, the Baltic States, Poland, and Roma- especially the two powers’ ongoing efforts to nia see Russia as a clear and present danger, reduce U.S. influence on the continent and ad while countries in the middle of the continent extremis to separate European defense from such as Germany have an attenuated view of America’s. The critical importance of the the risk. France sees the principal pressure NATO alliance as a force multiplier and path- points as being in the Mediterranean and way to lowering the overall price tag for Amer- North Africa, and the Russian threat registers ican defense worldwide cannot be overstated. only remotely in Spain or Portugal. The question, however, that continues to This fractured threat perception—rather polarize the U.S. security community is the  -than the oft-discussed resentment against practical scope of what NATO should be con the alleged “transactionalism” of the Trump tributing to the common defense and how such Administration—is the key reason why the contributions address the challenges facing majority of the European NATO allies have the United Sates not only in the European consistently failed to meet their agreed-up- theater, but also in the Indo-Pacific region. on 2 percent of GDP defense spending tar- Some analysts have gone so far as to suggest gets, which have been in place since the that NATO has an important role to play in Warsaw summit of 2016.5 The much-touted Asia and that it should plan accordingly.7 Such argument that NATO is not just about shared a strategy would be yet another permutation interests but also about shared values (Pres- of the “burden sharing” that has been much ident Trump’s critics point to his alleged debated throughout NATO’s history, except de-emphasis of the latter) is a false binary that this time, the burden would be extended because NATO, as the most effective military to a theater that historically has not been part alliance of like-minded democracies in history, of NATO’s strategic domain, making such a has always been about both. strategy likely to fail. What has fueled the current turmoil in the What NATO needs is not more “burden alliance is the inability of key governments to sharing” but “burden transferring,” a term I see eye-to-eye with the United States on the use to indicate that the greatest contribution nature of the threat to the West that is posed NATO can make to the defense of the transat- by Russia, which wants to revise the post–Cold lantic community is for its European allies to War political settlement, and by the People’s resource their defense properly. This is nec- Republic of China (PRC), which wants to re- essary if the Europeans (with U.S. enablers in place it. The absence of a policy consensus place and a modernized core strategic nuclear on Russia in particular is likely to remain the deterrent) are to be able to deter and, if need be,

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 91 defend Europe against a revisionist Russia in consensus on defense-spending formulas that the event that the United States is pulled into does not include the United States. The cur- an emergency in the Indo-Pacific region. rent tenor of the European defense and secu- The imperative of “burden transferring” to rity debate—punctuated by occasional injudi- Europe reflects the twin dilemmas facing the cious outbursts by European leaders that the United States when it comes to collective de- NATO alliance is “brain dead”—only further fense: The geostrategic challenge we confront undermines the ability of the alliance to come is orders of magnitude greater than in the Cold together around a common strategy. War, but the size of the United States military is simply too small to meet the requirements Alliances in the Asia–Pacific Region in both theaters, deter aggression, and win Asia is fast becoming the principal area of decisively. The United States should main- concern for U.S. defense strategy. The expo- tain a significant component in Europe. U.S. nential growth of Chinese economic power Army Europe, as currently structured, serves over the past decade in particular has given a critical role as both an enabler and a fighting rise to military capabilities that increasingly force, with exercises on allied territory along challenge the United States Navy’s ability to NATO’s eastern flank essential to developing dominate the theater. China has one-fifth of the warfighting capability of U.S. troops and the world’s population, and its military bud- ensuring that they are fully interoperable with get is second in size only to that of the United our allies. The same goes for continued exer- States.8 Moreover, financial reserves accumu- cises that serve to demonstrate the ability of lated over decades of predatory trade practic- the United States to reinforce the European es will allow it to continue buying companies, theater in a crisis. technologies, and expertise unless the United However, these will never fully replace the States and its allies impose severe restrictions

manpower and resources that the Europeans on China’s access. As many as 200 million Chi- must bring to bear if deterrence in Europe is to nese citizens travel the world as tourists and hold. This is especially the case should a crisis work, study, and live abroad, and this number arise elsewhere, as the United States military could increase significantly when the current is no longer structured as it once was to fight pandemic restrictions are lifted. two major theater conflicts plus one smaller The Indo-Pacific theater is also dramatical- engagement in a secondary theater; rather, we ly different from Europe: It rests on a series of are—and are likely to remain—able to engage bilateral alliances between the United States in only one major theater and one smaller op- and its key partners, not on one bureaucratized eration if we want to prevail. structure like NATO’s. The region is increas- The key variable in a workable “burden ingly being transformed by China’s abandon- transferring” approach as NATO’s strategy ment of its former reticence and its growing in the unfolding era of great-power competi- geostrategic assertiveness, and the leadership tion is an urgently needed political consen- of the People’s Republic of China under Xi Jin- sus within the alliance. In this context, the ping sees the PRC as having effectively caught ongoing efforts, driven principally by France, up with the United States. to establish “strategic autonomy” for Europe China is a Communist neo-Confucian state in NATO—exemplified by programs such as marked by repression and rigidity at home, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and its foreign and military policy is marked Coordinated Annual Review on Defense by political and military mobilization and the (CARD), and the European Defense Fund as putting forth of ever-bolder claims, its claim to currently conceived—are counterproductive “exclusivity” in the South China Sea being per- and likely to fail because the divergent security haps the most visible example. The leadership optics mentioned earlier will block any such in Beijing seems certain that its path to global

92 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength economic dominance will soon be accompa- the center of the global system. The immediate nied by expanding military influence that, as targets of this expansion drive are Hong Kong, the PLAN’s power projection capabilities grow, where the process of dismantling its auton- will allow it to dominate militarily. omy is already near completion, and Taiwan, With this in mind, Beijing has been building which will face increased pressure once Beijing its hard power arsenal at a rapid pace, with the has bent Hong Kong to its will. This pattern expansion of the nuclear, conventional, space, of expansion targeting the three key U.S. al- cyber, and information components at an un- lies in Asia can be seen in the proliferation of precedented pace, posing a truly multi-domain Chinese port investments; the development of challenge to the United States military. Aided PRC naval capabilities (including tenders for by four decades of unprecedented freedom of several nuclear-powered aircraft carrier battle access to America’s technology, research, and groups); and the exponential investments in knowledge economy, Beijing is poised to com- anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities by pete for supremacy in the Pacific within the the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and PLAN. next decade. China’s overarching strategy is to break When it comes to China, Europe is unlikely out of a territorially based defense strategy, to become a close ally of the United States any harden its defenses of transcontinental and time soon. Although the devastation wrought overseas transportation routes, and leverage by the Wuhan coronavirus on EU economies its decades-long access to America’s research and Beijing’s aggressive information cam- and development (R&D) base and—even more paigns targeting Europe could change elite at- important—its manufacturing and materials titudes to some extent, Germany, France, and technologies to bring about a qualitative leap especially Italy (but also a number of other in PLA and PLAN capabilities vis-à-vis the countries, including some in Central Europe) United States. This is especially the case when  -see China principally in economic terms, with it comes to command, control, communica opportunities still outweighing risks, especial- tions, computers, intelligence, surveillance, ly for smaller, capital-starved European econ- and reconnaissance (C4ISR); strategic support omies outside the European Union and hence forces; cyber and information; and unmanned not eligible for recovery assistance funds. systems in space. The pivotal allies for the United States in Asia are Japan, South Korea, and Australia— Interlocking Alliances the Asian “troika”—whose continued alliance The United States continues to derive with the United States stands in direct con- great benefit from its leadership position in tradiction to Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” of the NATO alliance and its close bilateral al- a globally dominant PRC to be established liances with the troika in the Western Pacif- through a purposeful strategy of expansion ic. Our naval, air, and ground troop basing in across Eurasia and into the Pacific. The United Europe as well as in Japan, South Korea, and States also has formal alliances with the Phil- Australia continues to give us flexibility and ippines, Thailand, and New Zealand, but their supportability in power projection across both overall strength is derivative when it comes to the Atlantic and the Pacific with the ability to our core alliances with the troika. The future rely on the military resources of our allies as a of the troika depends on the future of each of force multiplier. its members: If China should succeed in isolat- In Europe, the effectiveness of NATO de- ing one of them, the risk to the security of the mands a strategy of “burden transferring” others would grow exponentially. with continued U.S. nuclear strategic guar- Chinese expansion is already well underway, antees and continued coordination with our though Beijing continues to face considerable enablers. This must be combined with a small obstacles to displacing the United States from but effective, trained, and integrated Joint

The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 93 Force component that both provides strategic Asia–Pacific region. The second element of Bei- linkage for the United States and Europe and jing’s strategy, which entails its close coopera- reinforces the credibility of the larger transat- tion with Moscow, is to accomplish the decou- lantic defense strategy. pling of the United States from Europe, with Arguably, the greatest challenge facing the long-term economic and population trends United States and its European allies, more favoring China in its de facto alliance with the than the interminable debates about the per- Russian Federation against the United States. centage of GDP to be allocated as a sign of These two trends inextricably connect commitment to the alliance, will be the im- America’s alliances in Europe and in the Asia– perative need to rebuild Europe’s real usable Pacific region: They mutually reinforce one military capabilities. This strategy of “burden another if successfully consolidated and con- transferring,” whereby the Europeans take versely contain within themselves the seeds core responsibility for the continent’s defense of each other’s destruction. Preserving and across multiple domains—not as an exercise in strengthening the two as part of a coherent “strategic autonomy” but as a clearly defined global defense strategy should be a key U.S. and agreed-upon task within NATO—will be policy priority. key to preserving European security and en- suring that the transatlantic bargain holds as Conclusion we enter arguably the most dangerous period Grand, bureaucratized alliances do not sim- of great-power competition. ply unravel. They become hollowed out over In Asia, the Western Pacific is also critical time as threat assessments change and po- to the security of the Eurasian landmass, with litical will atrophies. This is the risk if NATO continued close U.S. alliances with the troika continues along its current path of “burden presenting a direct challenge to Beijing’s mil- sharing” amid ongoing allegations of American

itary planners. Coupled with U.S. bases on its “transactionalism.” The preservation of NATO territory, in Guam, and in Hawaii, the United is vital to both Americans and Europeans be- States has the ability to develop a successful cause the alliance continues to serve both as strategy to contain, deter, and if need be de- a deterrent to Russia and as a values-based feat China in a future conflict in the Pacific, framework with which the West can confront provided it retains the flexibility to move its China. NATO offers the best existing format forces in the region in a crisis. We must there- for common defense and effectively ensures fore ensure that the troika can withstand direct that the North Atlantic remains the internal pressure from China and that its members do waterway for Western democracies. not become vassalized over time. Continued The preservation of America’s alliances close alliance with the United States will allow in Asia is essential to our ability to contain the three countries to exercise effective coun- and deter China, for without them we cannot terpressure against the advancing militariza- ensure that our rethinking of the U.S.–Chi- tion of great-power competition in Asia and na relationship will take place on American respond with effective force if deterrence fails. terms. If NATO were to unravel or the troika There can be little doubt today that the to fall out of its close alliance with the Unit- PRC’s primary goal is to reestablish itself as ed States, or if both were to occur, the entire a dominant power in eastern Eurasia and the Pacific Ocean west of Hawaii would become a Western Pacific, absorbing Taiwan, isolating contested space with the United States direct- and ultimately vassalizing Japan, and pushing ly exposed to the risk of being pushed into its the United States back to the margins of the own hemisphere.

94 2021 Index of U.S. Military Strength Endnotes 1. Thomas P. Ehrhard, “Treating the Pathologies of Victory: Hardening the Nation for Strategic Competition,” in 2020 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2020), pp. 24–26, https://www.heritage.org/sites/ default/files/2019-10/2020_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength_ESSAYS_EHRHARD_0.pdf. 2. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp- content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf (accessed June 17, 2020). 3. James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/ pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed June 17, 2020). 4. “The Acquis Communautaire is the accumulated body of European Union (EU) law and obligations from 1958 to the present day. It comprises all the EU’s treaties and laws (directives, regulations, decisions), declarations and resolutions, international agreements and the judgments of the Court of Justice. It also includes action that EU governments take together in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. ¶ New EU Member States must accept all the existing acquis—some elements of it during a transitional period—and put in place mechanisms to adopt future elements of the acquis. ¶ The Court of Justice has ruled that the EU acquis takes precedence over national law if there is a conflict, and that the acquis may have direct effect in the Member States.” Vaughne Miller, “The EU’sAcquis Communautaire,” British House of Commons Library Research Briefing, Standard Note SN/IA/5944, last updated April 26, 2011, p. 1, https://researchbriefings.files. parliament.uk/documents/SN05944/SN05944.pdf (accessed July 25, 2020). 5. Press release, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8–9 July 2016,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated March 29, 2017, https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm (accessed July 28, 2020). See esp. para. 34. 6. Hans Binnendijk, “The Folly of a NATO Troop Withdrawal Decision,” Defense News, June 10, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/ opinion/commentary/2020/06/09/the-folly-of-a-nato-troop-withdrawal-decision/ (accessed June 10, 2020). 7. See, for example, Ian Brzezinski, “NATO’s Role in a Transatlantic Strategy on China,” Atlantic Council, New Atlanticist Blog, June 1, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/natos-role-in-a-transatlantic-strategy-on-china/ (accessed June 17, 2020).  8. Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, “Global Defence Spending: The United States Widens the Gap,” International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance Blog, February 14, 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2020/02/global-defence-spending (accessed July 28, 2020).

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