Persian Political Propaganda in the War Against Alexander the Great*
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Iranica Antiqua, vol. XLVI, 2011 doi: 10.2143/IA.46.0.2084417 PERSIAN POLITICAL PROPAGANDA IN THE WAR AGAINST ALEXANDER THE GREAT* BY Maxim M. KHOLOD (St. Petersburg State University) Abstract: The article deals with political propaganda, aimed at the Greeks, which the Persians practiced in their struggle against Alexander the Great. The author clarifies the goals, contents and forms of propaganda as well as the time of the beginning of such an activity of the Persians against the Macedonian king. The attention is also paid to the results of the Persian propagandistic work amongst the Greeks and the reasons for its failure. Keywords: propaganda, Persia, Greece, Darius III, Alexander the Great, King’s Peace It is well known that propaganda (or psychological warfare as it is often called) plays a vital role in the conduct of modern wars. The term propa- ganda is relatively new: it appears to become a part of the modern lexicon after 1622 when Pope Gregory XV established the Sacra Congregatio de propaganda fide charged with the spread of Catholicism and with the reg- ulation of Catholic ecclesiastical affairs in non-Catholic countries. How- ever, there is no doubt that the phenomenon itself is actually very old; it existed in the ancient East as well as in ancient Greece and Rome1. Although there is every reason to believe that the Persians practiced prop- aganda, too, this theme has not almost interested scholars2. Therefore, the aim of the present essay is not only to examine the political propaganda of the Persians in Alexander’s time, but also to try to attract more historians’ attention to the phenomenon of Persian propaganda as a whole. * * * * In this essay, I develop the ideas I had set out in an article written in cooperation with Prof. Dr. Eduard V. Rung, see Rung & Kholod 2006: 27–66. 1 On the history of propaganda, see Taylor 2003. See also literature cited in Kelly 2003: 173–174. 2 The recent paper of Kelly 2003: 173–219, is amongst the exceptions. 994066_Iran_Antiqua_46_06.indd4066_Iran_Antiqua_46_06.indd 114949 221/06/111/06/11 111:541:54 150 M.M. KHOLOD In the war that the Macedonian king Philip II launched against the Persian Empire in 336 B.C. and which was resolutely continued by his son Alexander the Great in 334, both sides used more than just their military forces. Besides those, the enemies also employed the powerful weapon of political propaganda. Both Persian and Macedonian propaganda3 was aimed mainly at the Greeks, and the reason for this is clear: the outcome of the campaign as a whole, especially at the beginning of military opera- tions, largely depended on the Greeks’ position. Unfortunately, it is to be admitted that there is an extremely small amount of evidence allowing us to judge Persian propaganda of that time (it is very likely that mainly this is the key reason why modern historians tend to be silent on the matter4). Yet, we do have some data on the subject. The fact of the Persians having used political propaganda in their struggle against the Macedonian monarchy, together with separate hints in our literary tradition, seems to be definitely confirmed by Arrian. He cites Alexander’s letter (written at Marathus in 333/2), which was an answer to Darius III’ first peace offer5. The letter contains, amongst other accusations, the one according to which the Persian king sent to the Greeks letters that called 3 Note that Alexander’s propaganda is described, to a varying extent, in many modern historical works; see recently Faraguna 2003: 107 ff.; Olbrycht 2004: 21 ff.; Cartledge 2004: 190 ff.; Heckel 2008: 38 ff.; Poddighe 2009: 99 ff. For Panhellenism in propa- ganda, see particularly Seibert 1998: 6 ff.; Flower 2000: 96 ff., both with detailed bibli- ography; also see Mitchell 2007: 191 ff. 4 Apart from separate phrases appearing from time to time in the works dealing with Alexander’s history (e.g. Schachermeyr 1973: 113 ff.; Green 1991: 37 ff.; Blackwell 1999: 51), slightly more attention to Persian usage of propaganda in the war against the Macedonian king is provided by Bosworth (Bosworth 1980: 74–75, 181–182). Further- more, it should be pointed out that there is no special study of the theme under considera- tion here, to my knowledge or to the knowledge of such authoritative experts on the Achaemenid Empire as Prof. Muhammad A. Dandamaev (St. Petersburg) and Prof. Pierre Briant (Paris). I wish to thank both scholars for this information. I also wish to express my gratitude to Prof. Andreas Mehl and PD Dr. Christian Mileta (Halle) with whom I had an opportunity to discuss the present essay. Likewise, I am grateful to Prof. Frank L. Holt (Houston) for having gone to the trouble to read a draft of this text and for his helpful comments on substance and on style. 5 In general for the number of Darius’ peace offers to Alexander and their contents, see Bosworth 1980: 227 ff. The letter’s text as a whole: Arr. Anab. 2.14.4–9; cf. Diod. 17.39.1–2; Curt. 4.1.7–14; Just. 11.12. On the dating, cf. Bloedow 1995: 93. There is disagreement about the letter’s authenticity in the modern historiography: while some scholars treat it as genuine, others do not. At any rate, it should be emphasized that the historical value of the data it contains has been recognized not only by the former (although they do not usually deny some tendentiousness of the data as a result of the propagandistic 994066_Iran_Antiqua_46_06.indd4066_Iran_Antiqua_46_06.indd 115050 221/06/111/06/11 111:541:54 PERSIAN POLITICAL PROPAGANDA IN THE WAR AGAINST ALEXANDER THE GREAT 151 for war against Alexander (kaì üpèr êmoÕ pròv toùv ÊElljnav grámmata oûk êpitßdeia diapémpontov, ºpwv próv me polem¬si). It also men- tions as a fact that Darius, besides sending money to the Spartans and some other Greeks (the Spartans alone accepted the money6), also sent to the Greeks his envoys who, in addition to instructions to bribe the Macedonian adherents, sought (evidently by the appropriate calls supported by bribing individual politicians) to destroy the Peace established by Alexander character of the letter, e.g. see Schachermeyr 1973: 223 ff.; and see, still valuable, Pridik 1893: 39 ff.; cf. Kovaliov 1946: 53–54). Most of the latter who treat the letter as false, have also adhered to the similar position in that case (however, not without reservation) suggesting that either it was written by a contemporary (one or another person of Alexander’s circle) or, at least, drawn up later based on the material preserved in the original sources (e.g. Pearson 1955: 449–450; Hamilton 1969: 77; Bosworth 1980: 231 ff.; cf. Bosworth 1988: 64, 299). Besides, the authors of books on the history of Alexander have, as a rule, given credence to the contents of the letter as well (e.g. see Berve 1926: 121–122; Wilcken 1931: 97; Tarn 1948: 36–37; Lane Fox 1973: 180, 520; Shifman 1988: 80; Green 1991: 240–241; Hammond 1994: 113; Nawotka 2004: 256–257; Heckel 2006: 67, 103, 264; cf. Heckel 2008: 73–74). The opposite opinion has been expressed by Badian who has claimed that the information the letter contains cannot be treated as historical at all (Badian 2000: 257). In my view, such a claim is unnecessarily critical: indeed, other than several, insignificant in principle, misrepresentations of the facts in the letter’s text that can be explained by its propagandistic character, there appears to be nothing here that would clearly demonstrate unreliability of the evidence as a whole. For analysis of the points of the letter in this connection, see Bosworth 1980: 227 ff.; Bloedow 1995: 98 ff.; cf. Briant 2002: 689, 770 ff. 6 This statement is supported by Aeschines’ evidence for Athens: according to him, Darius sent 300 talents to Athens, probably in 334 (see below), to organize a revolt against Alexander; but the Athenians refused to accept the money (Aesch. 3.239). The outcome in other Greek cities to which the Persian king offered gold, too, is uncertain, since, besides the information the letter contains, there is no further evidence. However, there appears to be no reason to reject the letter’s information. Most likely all these Greek states, except Sparta, renounced officially Persian money at that time really. Nevertheless, there was probably one more exception amongst them, namely Thebes: indeed, it is hard to imagine that this city, stirring up against Macedonia in 335 and demonstrating clearly its favor to Persia (Diod. 17.9.5), would not have accepted Persian gold, if it had been offered. Cf. Bosworth 1980: 232. For Agis III of Sparta’s receipt of 30 talents from Persia, see Arr. Anab. 2.13.6. Taking into account Aeschines’ report that Darius sent to Athens 300 talents, it is reasonable to suppose that Persian subsides to Sparta were not limited to these 30 talents; it is likely that this sum of money was only a regular payment given to the Spartans by the Persians for fighting against Macedonia. In general on the relations between Sparta and Persia in the time of Alexander, see Badian 1967: 174 ff. (who, I think, suggests a slightly understated date — not before 333 — for the beginning of the anti-Macedonian contacts between Persia and Sparta); Atkinson 1980: 101, 261–262, 290–291, 373–374; Bosworth 1980: 223–224, 233–234, 353; Bosworth 1988: 198 ff.; Marinovich 1993: 141 ff.; Cartledge & Spawforth 2002: 18–19. 994066_Iran_Antiqua_46_06.indd4066_Iran_Antiqua_46_06.indd 115151 221/06/111/06/11 111:541:54 152 M.M.