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ARTICLES ANTHRAX HOAXES IRA P. ROBBINS* TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ....................................................................................... 3 I. Federal Hoax Crime Legislation ................................................ 11 A. Constitutional Powers Justifying a Federal Hoax Crime B ill ........................................................................................ 1 1 1. Introduction ................................................................ 11 2. United States v. Lopez: Limits of the Commerce Clause as justification for a federal hoax crime bill ..... 12 3. Supremacy and preemption justifying a federal hoax crim e bill ........................................................... 14 4. Uniformity as a justification for a federal hoax crim e bill ................................................................... 16 B. Federal Hoax Crime Legislation Before September 11, 200 1 .................................................................................. 17 1. 18 U .S.C. § 2332a ....................................................... 17 2. 18 U .S.C . § 876 ........................................................... 21 3. 18 U .S.C. § 17 5(a) ....................................................... 23 4. 18 U .S.C. § 229 ........................................................... 24 C. Federal Hoax Crime Legislation After September 11, 2001 ..................................................................................25 1. 107th Congress ........................................................... 25 a. S. 1658 ....................................................................25 Barnard T. Welsh Scholar and Professor of Law and Justice, American University, Washington College of Law. A.B., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Harvard University. Author/Editor, HABEAS CoRPus CHECKLISTS (Thomson/West, 2005); PRISONERS AND THE LAW (Thomson/West, six vols., 2005). The author is grateful to Emily Aldridge, Elizabeth Betta, Christopher Clarke, Cecilia DeRobertis, Andrew Fausett, Sara Gillis, Kelley Hauser, Elizabeth Hays, Ed Hertwig, Sherie Girard Kristiansen, Lauren Randall, and Kristin Uhl for their excellent research assistance, and to the American University Law School Research Fund for providing financial support. 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1 b. S. 1666 ..................................................................26 c. S. 1719 .................................................................... 26 d. H .R . 3209 ............................................................. 27 2. 108th Congress ............................................................ 27 a. S. 22 ...................................................................... 27 b. H.R. 1678 ............................................................. 28 II. State Legislation ...................................................................... 28 A. Constitutional Issues and Challenges Facing Hoax Crime Legislation ........................................................... 28 B. State Hoax Crime Statutes Before September 11, 2001 ........................................................ 30 1. False reporting: misdemeanor offenses for disruption of public functions .............................. 31 2. Hoax crimes ............................................................... 33 3. Terroristic threats ....................................................... 35 C. State Hoax Crime Legislation Following September 11, 2001 ......................................................... 39 III. Problems with Current Anthrax Hoax Laws and Proposed Legislation .............................................................. 49 A. Definitional and Textual Problems ................................ 49 B . A cti R ei ............................................................................. 50 1. Terroristic threats ....................................................... 51 2. False reports ............................................................... 52 3. Hoax crimes ............................................................... 53 C. Problems with States' Current Mens Rea Requirements .................................................................. 55 1. Specific intent ........................................................... 55 2. The reasonableness standard and the victim's m ens rea ...................................................................... 57 3. Strict liability ............................................................. 57 4. Due process problems with mens rea requirements: unduly vague or overly broad mens rea .................... 58 D. Overly Severe and Disproportional Penalties ................ 58 IV. Recommendations .................................................................. 61 A. Introduction ................................................................... 61 B . A ctus Reus ........................................................................ 63 1. Introduction ................................................................ 63 2. Weapons of mass destruction definition for the three acti rei ................................................................ 64 3. False reports actus reus ............................................... 65 4. Hoax crime actus reus .............................................. 65 5. Terroristic threats actus reus ...................................... 66 C . M ens R ea ........................................................................... 67 1. False reports mens rea ............................................... 67 2. Hoax crime mens rea ................................................. 67 3. Terroristic threats mens rea ...................................... 68 D . Penalty ............................................................................. 69 E. Defenses to Hoax Crime Prosecution: Impossibility and M istake ...................................................................... 70 2004] ANTHRAX HOAXES C o n clusion ......................................................................................... 72 Proposed Statute ............................................................................... 73 INTRODUCTION "[Y]ou are a disgusting piece of dirt."' Judge Steven Shutter, a county judge in South Florida, used these words to describe a twenty- four-year-old woman whom he labeled a terrorist2 and who was condemned by the media.3 Aside from name-calling, Judge Shutter raised the woman's bail from $3,500 to $25,000 when he learned the nature of the offense, 'just in case" the woman might be able to afford the lower bond.4 Given the strength of Judge Shutter's animosity toward her, one might assume that Yasmin Kassima Sealey- Doe had provided assistance to the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Or perhaps she had participated in some scheme to infect the population of Broward County, Florida with anthrax? In fact, Sealey-Doe did not participate in, assist, or abet any terrorist activity.5 This young purported "terrorist" mailed flour and sugar to her ex-boyfriend because she was angry about their breakup.6 The flour-sugar combination leaked out of the envelope into a postal truck and a hamper in the annex of her building,7 leading to a day- long decontamination effort.8 Sealey-Doe immediately confessed. 9 She faced a maximum sentence of fifteen years in prison for her ill- considered prank.'0 While the case of Sealey-Doe is one of the more high-profile examples of an anthrax hoaxster confronting severe repercussions, she is hardly alone in her "crime." According to one account, more 1. Ardy Friedberg, Anthrax Hoax Guilt Denied; Powder Sent Through Mail, Police Charge, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 27, 2001, at 4B (quoting Judge Steven Shutter). 2. See The O'Reilly Factor: Follow-Up: Interview with Stephen Shutter, Stanley Cohen and Spencer Cronin (Fox News Television Broadcast, Nov. 14, 2001) (providing a transcript of an interview between Judge Shutter and television commentator Bill O'Reilly), available at 2001 WL 5081914. 3. See id. (quoting Bill O'Reilly's suggestion that Judge Shutter should preside over Sealey-Doe's trial because she deserves a "suitable punishment"). 4. See id. (providing a transcript ofJudge Shutter's interaction with Sealey-Doe). 5. See Friedberg, supra note 1, at 4B (describing the history of Yasmin Kassima Sealey-Doe's arrest and arraignment on charges of attempted use of a hoax weapon of mass destruction). 6. See id. (noting that the Sealy-Doe letter was sent "at the height of the anthrax scare in October [20011"). 7. Id. 8. Id. 9. Id. 10. Id. AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1 than 15,000 anthrax hoaxes were made between September 2001 and August 2002." These hoaxsters contributed to a national climate of 2 1 3 anthrax paranoia by mailing envelopes containing flour, sugar, cornstarch 4 Tylenol, 5 sand, 6 talcum powder, v body deodorant,' or, in one case, parmesan cheese.' 9 These attacks inspired strong ° 2 rhetoric from the federal government, galvanized local media, ' and polarized communities over the issue of how such anthrax hoaxsters should be treated.2 These scenarios could recur if homeland security tensions continue to escalate. 11. Wolf Blitzer Reports: Nine-Year-Old Kidnapped From California Home; Ricci Undergoes Surgery After Suffering Aneurysm; Is Iran Sheltering al Qaeda Leaders? (Cable News Network Television Broadcast), Aug. 28, 2002, available at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0208/28/wbr.00.html. 12.
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