The Review of Faith & International Affairs

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Religion and the Creation of European Identity: The Message of the Flags

Brent F. Nelsen & James L. Guth

To cite this article: Brent F. Nelsen & James L. Guth (2016) Religion and the Creation of European Identity: The Message of the Flags, The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 14:1, 80-88, DOI: 10.1080/15570274.2016.1145476

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2016.1145476

Published online: 24 Mar 2016.

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Download by: [Furman University], [James L. Guth] Date: 24 March 2016, At: 12:20 RELIGION AND THE CREATION OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY: THE MESSAGE OF THE FLAGS

By Brent F. Nelsen and James L. Guth

rom the very beginning, proponents of Schmitter 2000; Siedentop 2001; Schmidt European integration knew that ordinary 2006; Maas 2007). citizens would be crucial to achieving Many scholars have addressed the vital their ultimate objective: a new question of whether citizens of the EU have been Fsupranational identity, undergirding a united developing such a shared identity. Most find that continental polity. National leaders might at least some folks are coming to think of develop a deep mutual sense of community themselves as “Europeans,” not just as British, through interaction in European institutions and French, German, or Maltese. For a few citizens try to foster a “European” identity among their that European identity may be “primary,” or even publics, but if citizens did not feel that same sense “exclusive,” but for most it is added to a still- of community, unity would not be possible. dominant national identification. Of course, Economic, social, and political integration would many others still think of themselves exclusively proceed just as far as growth of a common in national terms (Bruter 2005). Scholars identity allowed. attribute the creation of existing “European” Although some theorists argue that the identity variously to factors such as economic European Union (EU) does not require a demos prosperity, expanded higher education, greater to achieve democratic legitimacy (Weiler 1995), international mobility, the decline of most scholars and EU political leaders have traditionalism, and the rise of “postmaterial” sought a common bond strong enough to unite values such as social tolerance (Keulman and peoples divided by language, nationality, class, religion, ethnicity, and other social markers. Brent F. Nelsen is Professor of Political Science at Furman Downloaded by [Furman University], [James L. Guth] at 12:20 24 March 2016 Indeed, from the very start of the integration University. He is the co-author (with James Guth) of Religion and the project its leaders sought to build a new Struggle for European Union: Confessional Culture and the Limits of identity, assuming that eventual union required Integration (Georgetown University Press, 2015). He is chair of the emergence of what Deutsch et al. (1957) South Carolina Educational Television Commission and serves on famously called a “we feeling” among national the Board of Directors of the U.S. Corporation for Public publics. Today, more than ever, the EU Broadcasting. He has written extensively on European Union politics. must have the support of a “people” to make James L. Guth is William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Political Science difficult policy choices, whether on preserving at Furman University. He has written extensively on the role of the Eurozone, revising basic economic religion in American and European politics. In 2008 he received the regulation, addressing the migrant crisis, or Paul J. Weber Award for the best paper on religion and politics dealing with terrorism (Delanty 1995; presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

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Koós 2014). All of these have encouraged at least later years greater devotion actually increased some Europeans to identify with a political entity support, perhaps because the growing ecumenism beyond their own national borders. in Protestant state churches encouraged more Most scholars have neglected the role that positive views of supranationalism. “Cultural” religion might play in identity creation. This is Protestants who do not regularly practice often rather surprising, given the origins of the remain most skeptical of supranational European integration project. The EU’s Christian cooperation. And scattered evidence strongly Democratic founders, mostly devout Catholics, suggests that the small groups of sectarian or “free saw themselves as “national identity constructors” church” Protestants are much less integrationist and often found common symbols for the than those in “established” churches. Despite budding European polity in Christian or some attrition over the past 40 years, these Carolingian iconography. And during this same patterns still persist in public support for the EU, period the Vatican and national Catholic at least until very recently (Nelsen, Guth, and hierarchies provided firm and often vocal support Fraser 2001; Nelsen and Guth 2003; Nelsen, for the “uniting of Europe.” The passing of this Guth, and Highsmith 2011). Christian Democratic generation and dramatic Does religion influence “European identity” secularization did not end elite identity in the same way that it shapes public support for construction efforts, but did result in less overt integration? A quick look at aggregate national use of religious symbolism (Foret 2015; Nelsen data suggests that it might. For example, a 2004 and Guth 2015). EB shows a fairly strong correlation (r=.42) Religion also played a role in bolstering between the proportion of Protestants in each public support for the European project. member state and those identifying only with Although the Eurobarometer (EB) series tapping their own nation—and not with “Europe,” while public attitudes toward integration since the “Catholic” countries have higher levels of early 1970s did not often include religion “Europeanness.” Of course, we need to examine questions, the few that did revealed substantial this relationship at the individual level and, given impact. The historic transnationalism of the recent trends, must expand the analysis in several Catholic Church made its adherents natural directions. First, we need to consider other supporters of a united Europe, while the religious groups, such as Eastern Orthodox nationalism of Protestant churches worked in Christians and Muslims, growing in numbers in the other direction. And generally, the most the expanded EU (Kaufmann 2010). Many observant members of each tradition exhibited scholars see religious minorities such as Muslims these confessional tendencies more strongly than as natural EU citizens, given the absence of long- less committed believers. Religious influences term national identification with their state of persisted or became even stronger under rigorous residence and the greater responsiveness of EU statistical controls for other determinants of institutions to their concerns (Pastorelli 2012; support for integration emphasized by most Keulman and Koós 2014, 217), while others see scholars (e.g. nationality, party identification, them reacting adversely to the EU’s reputation as Downloaded by [Furman University], [James L. Guth] at 12:20 24 March 2016 ideology, political engagement, postmaterial a “Christian club” (Nelsen and Guth 2016). In values, economic situation, gender, class, and addition, some observers have recently argued education). that general religiosity provides encouragement to From 1973 to 2006, Catholics in the Nine the development of broader European identities, (the Six, plus Britain, Denmark, and Ireland) whatever the religious tradition (Keulman and were significantly more favorable toward the Koós 2014), but others see Christian religion European Community/Union than those of implicated in the rise of nationalist parties in other faiths or no faith. Furthermore, devout many EU countries (Risse 2010). Finally, Catholics—regular Mass attenders—showed the secularization has created more atheists and strongest support. Protestants exhibited much agnostics, viewed by many scholars as the less enthusiasm for integration, although in some vanguard of cosmopolitan “Europeanness”

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(Inglehart 1970, 1990). The perspectives of all Table 1. European identity: religious identification with EU these groups deserve attention. flag and preference for use. Unfortunately, no recent EB permits a direct “Europeans”“Mixed”“Nationals” test of the relationship between religion and European identity: none includes explicit Entire sample (%) 39.2 37.9 23.0 Muslims 52.7 24.6 22.7 questions on both identity and religion. But EB Other non- 50.2 28.3 21.4 65.2 (Spring 2006) allows a strong, if indirect Christians test, asking several questions tapping public Catholics 45.5 38.3 16.3 attitudes toward the EU flag, which Risse has Majority 47.4 37.7 14.9 called an “identity marker” for Europeans (2010, Plurality 38.6 40.0 21.3 Minority 21.3 45.2 33.3 58). For illustration here, we consider two Eastern Orthodox 39.2 33.8 27.0 questions that best gauge the core of European Protestants 28.9 36.8 34.3 identity: whether respondents personally Minority 44.9 40.8 14.3 “identify” with the EU flag and whether they Plurality 39.4 36.7 23.9 think it should always be flown next to their Majority 16.2 36.4 47.3 fl Other Christians 28.8 36.3 35.0 national ag on public buildings. Arguably, those (mostly “free who answer both queries positively are the model church”) “Europeans” that EU elites and integration Atheists 28.7 44.5 26.8 scholars have long sought to create.1 Notes: “Europeans” are those who both identify with the EU How do religious groups react to the fl fl fl fl ag and want it own next to their national ag on all public European ag? In Table 1 we report the buildings; “Nationals” are those who neither identify with nor proportions of those in major religious traditions want the flag flown next to their national flag; “Mixed” are who react to the flag questions in various ways. those with more equivocal responses. To simplify things, we reduce the possible Source: EB 65.2, EU25; N=24,693, EU25 weight. combinations of “yes,”“not sure,”“don’t know” and “no” for the two questions into three variation within major religious groups, categories: those who identify with the EU flag depending on their status as a national majority, and want it flown on all public buildings next to plurality, or minority faith. their own (“Europeans”), those who neither First, Catholics and Protestants conform to identify with nor want the flag flown next to their expected patterns: Catholics are more likely to national flag (“Nationals”), and those with mixed identify with the flag and want it flown, while or more equivocal responses. Protestants are much more resistant (46 v. 29 First of all, note the distribution of public percent). Indeed, over one-third of Protestants attitudes toward the flag: almost two-fifths of EU neither identify with nor want the flag flown, citizens say they identify with the flag and want it compared to only 16 percent of Catholics. But flown everywhere in official settings, but a group members of both traditions vary in fascinating almost as large has more mixed reactions, giving ways according to the status of their faith in positive responses to only one of the queries or national settings. Among Catholics, the strongest Downloaded by [Furman University], [James L. Guth] at 12:20 24 March 2016 being undecided on at least one. Finally, about “Europeans” are those who live in majority one-quarter of EU citizens neither identify with Catholic countries, while those who live the flag nor want it flown on public buildings. In with Protestants in “plurality” societies are less sum, there is a substantial bloc of Europeans who enthusiastic, and Catholics who are small show solid “flag identity,” an equal number who minorities in (mostly) Protestant nations have the are not quite so sure, and a resolute minority that least liking for the flag. This suggests that some resists this symbol of the emerging European degree of “national” socialization may be taking polity. place: Catholic minorities may be adopting the How does religion influence such “European “Protestant” position on supranationalism and identity”?AsTable 1 shows, there are substantial Catholic pluralities may be making similar, if differences among religions, and substantial smaller adjustments.

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For Protestants, the pattern is reversed. Like exceed Protestants. Of course, it may be possible most other religious minorities, minority that these are sophisticates who simply refuse to Protestants are quite favorable toward the flag, salute any flag, but readily espouse supranational perhaps reflecting the attitude of their Catholic identity in other ways. That possibility seems neighbors. (Or perhaps, they see the flag as an unlikely, however, as we see similar findings for emblem of protection from national Catholic atheists on other markers of European identity majorities.) “Plurality” Protestants are a good bit (see Nelsen and Guth 2014). less positive than their minority brethren, while What are the effects of religious observance or Protestants in a majority status very seldom fall commitment? Does it contribute to European into the top layer of “flag identity”; indeed, identity as Keulman and Koós (2014) claim? Or almost half neither identify with nor want the EU does it foster anti-EU nationalism as Risse (2010) flag flown. Note that “Other Christians” look argues? Or perhaps, does the impact of religiosity very much like Protestants. And that is because depend on its context? The answer is actually they probably are: although the EB’s coding does quite complex. Looking at religiosity among all not allow us to be sure, their distribution suggests EU citizens there is a mild tendency for the that they are “evangelical” or “free church” observant to be more “European” on our flag Protestants, historically known for their strong measure (r=.12), but that effect varies slightly by anti-EU sentiments. religious group. Among Catholics generally, Second, as some scholars predict, non- observance has a positive effect on identity (r Christian religious minorities do have fairly = .09). Among all Protestant groups observance strong “European” identity, perhaps because of also has a mild “Europeanizing” tendency (r limited time for national socialization or = .10), although that effect attenuates or even perhaps because they see EU institutions as reverses among the most devout—a pattern we more receptive to their interests than national see among devout Catholics in some countries as governments. Given the large EB sample, we are well. And among the non-Christian minorities, able to separate Muslims from other non- religious observance works against support for the Christians, but both categories look about the flag. As we shall see below, however, these same in attitudes on the flag. That this finding is tendencies are modified by religion’s national not an aberration is suggested by the fact that we status. find similar results for other questions on support for the EU among Muslims and other religious A Test Against Competing Theories minorities in the 2009 and 2014 European Although most scholars have said little about Parliament Election Studies (Nelsen and Guth religion’sinfluence on European identity, they 2016). have churned out a variety of other theories Two other religious groups deserve some (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; McLaren 2006; comment. Eastern Orthodox Christians fall Jones, Menon, and Weatherhill 2012). Some about in the middle of the spectrum, with just have focused on utilitarian explanations, arguing slightly less “flag identity” than the whole sample. that those who benefit most directly from Downloaded by [Furman University], [James L. Guth] at 12:20 24 March 2016 As these 2006 respondents come primarily from European economic integration are most likely to Greece, we should not draw too many assume the broader identity of “European.” conclusions, as more recent accessions have added Usually these beneficiaries are identified by new Orthodox contingents from several eastern occupation, education, income, or social class: the European countries, with others in the EU “Europeans” are the high-status, mobile, well- pipeline. More telling perhaps, is the attitude of educated business and professional elites whose the large contingent of self-labelled atheists, often pocketbooks are fattened by the EU (Gabel seen as the vanguard of postmaterial, secular, and 1998). Other scholars have stressed cognitive or cosmopolitan values, taking Europe “beyond the political explanations: those who know a lot nation state.” In fact, this group is much less about European institutions, are interested in “European” than Catholics are, and they barely politics and politically engaged are more likely to

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be “Europeans” (Inglehart 1970). Some have somewhat weaker in plurality countries, and made the case for “value” explanations: those who actually reverses among Catholic minorities. have “postmaterial” values stressing the Among Protestants, commitment increases a environment, quality of life, social tolerance, and “European” response only among Protestants personal freedom are more likely to have broader living as small minorities; for Protestant identities than those who focus on “materialist” majorities and pluralities, commitment has values (Inglehart 1990). Finally, others argue for virtually no impact. Other Christians, as ideological explanations, seeing “Europeanness” suggested by Table 1, are less supportive of the as an artifact of left, right, or even centrist flag, but commitment has no added effect, while political thinking, or perhaps of “neo-liberal” non-Christian religious minorities (here ideology (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2012; combined for analysis) identify more strongly, Nelsen, Guth, and Highsmith 2011). but again, commitment levels do not have an We have included all these approaches in our independent influence. Finally, atheists are previous analyses and have found that each neither more nor less likely to identify with or explains at least some of the development of want the flag flown than the reference category, European identity (Nelsen and Guth 2014). The very close to the overall mean. The religious question for our purposes is whether the religious factors alone explain a very respectable 6.1 differences we have seen to this point are merely percent of the variance. the artifacts of more powerful influences. To Are these religious influences simply the consider this possibility, and to formalize artifact of more powerful demographic, somewhat our previous discussion, we have ideological, or sociological influences? In Model 2 produced a more rigorous test for the impact of we have controlled for a wide variety of alternative religious variables on attitudes toward the explanations, most of which demonstrate some European flag, reported in Table 2. utility in explaining attitudes. As we have The first model in Table 2 reports the results demonstrated previously, the most powerful of a multiple regression analysis of attitudes alternative explanations are utilitarian and toward the flag using only religious variables. political: those who benefit from the EU, hold (Religiously unaffiliated respondents, Eastern neo-liberal economic attitudes, are most Orthodox, and unidentified respondents optimistic about the economic future, and are constitute the omitted reference groups, as these most politically knowledgeable are the strongest in combination are very close to the overall mean supporters of the flag. In addition, trust in score on the flag variable.) As the first column national political institutions actually increases shows, most of the religious measures used above identification with European institutions have an impact on public views of the flag. (coefficients not shown). With these variables in Catholic affiliation combined with national status the analysis the variance explained jumps to 16.5 has a strong positive influence on “European” percent, an impressive result (cf. Nelsen and approaches to the flag, while Protestant affiliation Guth 2014).3 combined with national status has a slightly Nevertheless, this exercise does not eliminate Downloaded by [Furman University], [James L. Guth] at 12:20 24 March 2016 stronger one in the other direction. Thus, the or even reduce very much the independent effects larger the Catholic population in a country, the of religious factors. As Table 2 shows, the stronger the identification with the EU flag; the coefficients for most of the religious variables in larger the Protestant sector, the weaker the Model 2 are almost as large as in Model 1—and support.2 in some cases actually increase with the addition The impact of religious commitment also of controls. There are a couple of small twists: varies by each tradition’s national status. The when everything is taken into account, religious more observant the Catholic, the more he or she commitment becomes a negative predictor of identifies with the flag, although this tendency is European identity among both majority strongest in majority Catholic countries, Protestants and among non-Christian religious

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Table 2. European identity: multivariate test of religious influence (OLS betas).

Religious variable Model 1 religious variables only Model 2 with controlsa Catholic Catholic majority/plurality/minority .086*** .110*** x Majority Catholic commitment .108*** .080*** x Plurality Catholic commitment .047*** .061*** x Minority Catholic commitment −.036** −.072*** Protestant Protestant majority/plurality/minority −.105*** −.097*** x Majority Protestant commitment −.017 −.045*** x Plurality Protestant commitment −.010 −.015 x Minority Protestant commitment .110*** .098*** Other Christian affiliation (“free church”) −.035** −.029* x Other Christian commitment .001 .001 All other religions .061*** .061*** x All other religions commitment −.019 −.043*** Atheist −.009 −.005 Adjusted R2 .061 .165

Source: EB 65.2, EU25; N = 24,693, EU25 weight. aControls include ideology, postmaterial values, strength of national attachments and trust in national government institutions, political information and engagement, occupational status, education, size of place, age, gender, and diversity of national background. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

minorities. But aside from this, very little changes significant effect whatever (beta = .001), and right from Model 1 to Model 2, demonstrating the ideology having a modest negative impact (beta = strong independent effects of religion. Note also −.038). We might go on in this vein, but the that religious variables explain well over a third of upshot is clear: as recently as a decade ago, the total variation accounted for in Model 2, a religious factors were still strong and independent remarkable finding given the range and power of sources of European (and national) identities, the control variables. more influential than many factors more often Indeed, detailed scrutiny of the full results stressed by analysts. shows that religious factors are more powerful than some influences celebrated in the integration Conclusions literature. Just to provide two examples: As scholars and politicians alike have Inglehart’s “postmaterial” values battery has long discovered, the foundations of European identity Downloaded by [Furman University], [James L. Guth] at 12:20 24 March 2016 been a focus of analysis, supposedly have always been elusive. The persistent efforts of demonstrating the broad influence of “value integration enthusiasts to produce a “we-feeling” change” among Western publics generally among citizens of the EU have met with some (Inglehart 1990). And yet the postmaterialism success; studies have shown that utilitarian index virtually drops out of the analysis when assessments incorporating economic evaluations, religious variables are included (beta = .022). and ideological factors such as neo-liberalism, “Postmaterialists,” then, are not much more have had a considerable impact on citizens’ likely than “Materialists” to take on a European identification with the EU. We have identity. Similarly, ideological variables show demonstrated that religion, a neglected factor in little influence, with “left” ideology having no studies of European identity, also shapes that

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identity in significant, if complex ways. Generally concentrated in Catholic-majority nations, clearly our results parallel those in studies of individual producing more Euroscepticism. Indeed, there support for the EU itself: Catholics tend to seems to have been some remarkable changes in identify more strongly with the EU than religious group support for the EU between the Protestants do, but the direction and strength of 2009 and 2014 European Parliamentary (EP) the influence is dependent on the national elections. Preliminary analysis of the 2009 data religious context, with a strong “socialization” reveals that the “traditional” religious patterns effect that tends to minimize (or even reverse) the were still firmly in place, but Catholic support for effect of religion in minority contexts. Thus, the EU had dropped dramatically by the 2014 EP Catholic minorities in Protestant countries tend elections (authors’ forthcoming analysis). If the to distrust the EU (like their neighbors), and fate of European identity is bound up with Protestants in Catholic countries tend to feel support for the EU itself (the historic pattern), more “European” (like their neighbors). In most these findings do not auger well for the growth of instances, religious commitment now appears to such identity in the immediate future. bolster European identity modestly, even among The contemporary immigration and refugee Protestants traditionally crises have also influenced skeptical about “Europe,” religion’s contribution to EU although that effect is more CATHOLICS TEND TO IDENTIFY support and, most likely, uncertain among non- MORE STRONGLY WITH THE European identity. In the past Christian minorities. EU THAN PROTESTANTS DO, few years we see clear signs of Nevertheless, several BUT THE DIRECTION AND some Catholic movement recent trends suggest that the toward populist anti- identity construction project STRENGTH OF THE INFLUENCE immigrant parties in several in Europe has bogged down IS DEPENDENT ON THE European countries (Nelsen during the EU’s rapid NATIONAL RELIGIOUS and Guth 2015, 312–316), expansion since 2004. Recent CONTEXT movements which have the developments have probably ironic effect of reinforcing undermined the positive nationalism, often in the influence of Catholic (and, perhaps, Protestant) name of preserving or protecting “Christian devotion on public identification with “Europe.” Europe.”4 Although Catholic leaders from Pope The most obvious factor is the continuing Frances on down to many national bishops have secularization of the continent, which has sought to counter this trend, as have many reduced the number of observant Catholics (and Protestant leaders, it has considerable popular Protestants), the old and (perhaps) “new” core appeal in a continent seemingly under siege from support groups for the EU. Just as problematic Islamic terrorism and non-Christian are recent changes in the impact of remaining immigration. Perhaps a recent political decision Catholic devotion. In the 2006 data we already involving the EU flag, our chosen illustrative see attrition of support among the most devout “marker” of European identity, reveals the Downloaded by [Furman University], [James L. Guth] at 12:20 24 March 2016 Catholics. This tendency was strongest in Eastern convergence of these forces. Heavily Catholic European countries such as Poland and Hungary, Poland has, since the disintegration of the Soviet but also appeared elsewhere, as in Ireland. This bloc, been one of the most enthusiastic development no doubt reflected concern over the participants in the European project, reflecting in implications of EU social policies, whether on part the strong encouragement of the late Pope abortion, family planning, gay rights, or, perhaps, John Paul II and most of the Polish Catholic the failed effort to incorporate recognition of hierarchy, who saw Poland’s “return to Europe” Europe’s Christian heritage in the proposed EU both as an affirmation of essential identity and as Constitution in 2003. an opportunity to return Europe itself to its In addition, the strongest negative effects of Christian foundations. These efforts from the the financial and Eurozone crises have been beginning were challenged by ultra-traditionalist

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Polish Catholics who saw the EU as the carrier of undermine the utilitarian value of the EU itself, non- or even anti-Christian values. That and as the continent struggles to absorb new tendency has largely been given political populations of varying faiths and cultures, the expression through the Law and Justice Party, prospects for creation of a continental identity recently returned to power in Poland. And one of might seem dim. But then the idea of a peaceful, the first symbolic actions of that new government economically integrated, and united Europe was was to remove the EU flag from official not much more than a dim dream in 1945, governmental functions, reflecting the growing either. It became reality nonetheless through the Euroscepticism among its heavily traditionalist persistent efforts of European political and Catholic leadership and electoral constituency spiritual leaders striving to overcome the ruins of (Sobczyk 2015). war and depression. Perhaps the current Will the creation of European identity European crises will give rise to comparably resume in the near future? The auguries are not effective responses. If this happens, the good. As the traditional religious underpinnings European identity formation process may find of Europeanness erode, as economic crises new life. v

Notes 1. Elsewhere we have used a variety of alternative proxy “markers” for European identity, but these work in a very similar manner to the flag question (Nelsen and Guth 2014). We think the flag questions really tap a fundamental emotional vein in most respondents, essential to identity formation. Adding in other questions concerning the EU flag produces some additional insights but complicates the analysis unnecessarily for our purposes here. 2. Each of the “majority” variables is coded 1 “National majority,” 2 “Plurality,” and 3 “Minority.” The interactive terms for commitment look at the effect of commitment among Catholics and Protestants in each type of national setting and for other Christians and non- Christian groups as groups. 3. We have not shown the coefficients for these variables in the table, as we are focusing on religious influences, but interested readers may contact us for the full results. 4. We should note that analysis of the 2014 EP Elections Study shows that the constituencies of most of the new European “populist” parties on the right are much more secular than those of their Christian Democratic opponents—or sometimes, even, their Socialist antagonists. Nevertheless, many populist leaders make overt appeals to Europe’s “Christian heritage,” supposedly under threat from immigrants and religious minorities. References Bruter, M. 2005. Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Delanty, G. 1995. Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Deutsch, K. W., S. A. Burrell, R. A. Kann, M. Lee Jr., M. Lichterman, R. E. Lindgren, F. L. Loewenheim, and R. W. Van Wagenen. 1957. Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Eichenberg, R. C., and R. J. Dalton. 1993. “Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration.” International Organization 47: 507–534. Foret, F. 2015. Religion and Politics in the European Union: The Secular Canopy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Downloaded by [Furman University], [James L. Guth] at 12:20 24 March 2016 Gabel, M. J. 1998. Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Hooghe, L., and G. Marks. 2005. “Calculation, Community and Cues.” European Union Politics 8 (1): 37–59. Hooghe, L., and G. Marks. 2012. “Politicization.” In The Oxford Handbook of the European Union, edited by E. Jones, A. Menon, and S. Weatherhill, 840–853. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Inglehart, R. 1970. “Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity.” Comparative Politics 3: 45–70. Inglehart, R. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jones, E., A. Menon, and S. Weatherhill, eds. 2012. The Oxford Handbook of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kaufmann, E. 2010. Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? London: Profile Books.

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Keulman, K., and A. K. Koós. 2014. European Identity: Its Feasibility and Desirability. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Maas, W. 2007. Creating European Citizens. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. McLaren, L. M. 2006. Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Nelsen, B. F., and J. L. Guth. 2003. “Religion and Youth Support for the European Union.” Journal of Common Market Studies 41 (1): 89–112. Nelsen, B. F., and J. L. Guth. 2014. “Religion in the Creation of European and National Identities: An Empirical Test of Identity Construction.” Paper presented at the oxford symposium on religious studies, University Church of St Mary, Oxford University, December 8–10. Nelsen, B. F., and J. L. Guth. 2015. Religion and the Struggle for European Union: Confessional Culture and the Limits of Integration. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Nelsen, B. F., and J. L. Guth. 2016. “Religion and Support for the European Union: European Muslims in a Christian Club?” Paper prepared for a conference on Muslims and the European Union, Izmir University, March. Nelsen, B. F., J. L. Guth, and C. R. Fraser. 2001. “Does Religion Matter? Christianity and Public Support for the European Union.” European Union Politics 2 (2): 191–217. Nelsen, B. F., J. L. Guth, and B. Highsmith. 2011. “Does Religion Still Matter? Religion and Public Attitudes toward Integration in Europe.” Politics and Religion 4 (1): 1–26. Pastorelli, S. 2012. “Public Policies toward New Religions.” In Politics of Religion in Western Europe: Modernities in Conflict, edited by F. Foret and X. Itçaina, 213–240. London: Routledge. Risse, T. 2010. A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Schmitter, P. C. 2000. How to Democratize the European Union … and Why Bother? Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Schmidt, V. A. 2006. Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Polities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Siedentop, L. 2001. Democracy in Europe. New York: Columbia University Press. Sobczyk, M. M. 2015. “Poland’s Ruling Party Seeks to Replace Judges Who Have Final Say on Laws.” Wall Street Journal, November 26. Weiler, J. H. H. 1995. “Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos, and the German Maastricht Decision.” European Law Journal 1 (3): 219–258. Downloaded by [Furman University], [James L. Guth] at 12:20 24 March 2016

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