Towards World Democracy Pascal Lamy

T O W A R D S W O R L D D E M O C R A C Y P A S C A L L A M Y

In Latin America, in Africa, in Asia, I am often questioned about the future of Europe. In the past, I would respond with assurance, with the conviction of the observer of a work Towards World taking shape. Although the difficulties are evident, the European project has never been so pertinent - for Europeans ourselves, but also for the rest of the world. What has been created over more than 50 years is also what the world needs today: a democratic system Democracy to tackle the enormous challenges that our societies face, and that states alone can no longer tackle. This European experience, with its successes and its setbacks, must be – I am convinced - our point of departure in search of a new global governance that combines the effectiveness that states have lost with the legitimacy that international organisations have yet to acquire. This new governance is what I call alternational democracy. Pascal Lamy

Pascal Lamy is the former EU Commissioner for Trade and President of Notre Europe, a European think tank based in Paris. From September 2005, he becomes the Director General of the World Trade Organisation. He is the author of l’Europe en première ligne, (Paris, Le Seuil, 2002). P O L I

ISBN 1-903805-05-8 Paperback O R RRP £5 K PASCAL LAMY

TOWARDS WORLD DEMOCRACY Translated by David Macey

Published in 2005 by Policy Network

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ii About Policy Network

Policy Network is an international think-tank launched in December 2000 with the support of Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder, Giuliano Amato and Göran Persson following the Progressive Governance Summits in New York, Florence and Berlin. In July 2003, Policy Network organised the London Progressive Governance Conference, which brought together twelve world leaders, and over 400 progressive politicians, thinkers and strategists. In October 2004, Policy Network built on this success by organising the Budapest Progressive Governance Conference, hosted by the Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány. Most recently, in July 2005, Policy Network has co-organised in Johannesburg, with the Africa Institute of South Africa and the Presidency of South Africa, the first Regional African Progressive Governance Conference, which will be followed by the Progressive Summit in South Africa.

A Progressive Network

Policy Network’s objective is the promotion and cross fertilisation of progressive policy ideas among centre-left modernisers. Acting as the secretariat to the Progressive Governance Network, Policy Network facilitates dialogue between politicians, policy makers and experts across Europe and from democratic countries around the world. By providing a forums that promotes debate and shares ideas, Policy Network strengthens the hand of modernisers and the case for permanent renewal.

Our Common Challenge

Progressive governments and parties in Europe are facing similar problems and looking for modern social democratic responses. There are increasingly rising fears for security - economic, political and social – combined with the contradictions of combining the traditional welfare state with employment policies, rapid change in science and technology, and pressing global issues, all of which should be tackled in common, as part of the need for fundamental democratic renewal. In the past, progressives worked independently to resolve these problems. Today, there is a growing consensus that we must engage with progressives from other countries, and to situate European and national responses within a broader international framework of progressive thinking, rooted in our social democratic values. For further information, http://www.policy-network.net

iii Contents

Foreword vii

Introduction 9

World Powers and their Discontents 15

The European Laboratory 27

Towards an Alternational Democracy: Contributions to the Debate 43

Conclusion - Towards a World Community 63

v Foreword

Pascal Lamy's latest work, Towards World Democracy, is here published for the first time in English by Policy Network, having first been published back in 2004 in French when he was my predecessor as European Commissioner for Trade in Brussels. Although the text is over one year old, he has decided not to update it to take account of recent developments such as the French and Dutch referenda. Why ? Because although he is writing - unabashedly - from the perspective of a European Commissioner, the lessons he draws have lasting value and are still relevant. Clearly we are now in a new European situation. Readers only loosely connected with the workings of the EU will still recognise some of the basic fault-lines of modern Europe set out in Pascal's original text. Indeed, if you read Towards World Democracy as a "pre-crisis analysis", it shows that what happened in the Spring of 2005 with the French and Dutch referenda has been coming for a long time. But on the other hand, others outside Europe will recognise from their own systems the need for legitimacy, the need for efficiency, and the need to belong. Indeed the lessons are less about “Europe” per se, and more about the nature of modern governance. Lessons about our collective failure to recognise the global nature of our political life. Lessons about how globalisation is starting to undermine our identities. Lessons about the sheer sense of no longer controlling our own destiny. In short, and not for the first time, Pascal Lamy challenges us, both citizens and policy-makers, to re-think fundamental questions about the way we are governed now.

Peter Mandelson European Commissioner for Trade Honorary Chair of Policy Network

vii ‘The sovereign nations of the past can no longer provide a framework for the resolution of our present problems. And the [European] Community itself is no more than a step towards the organisational forms of tomorrow’s world.’

Jean Monnet, Mémoires (Conclusion).1

1 Jean Monnet, Mémoires, Paris: Fayard, 1976, p. 617

viii Introduction

The planet is unwell. The construction of Europe has stalled. Our democracies are tired. I think the time has come to think in political terms about the new reality that suddenly emerged in the twentieth century. It is a single reality that hems in our lives. This reality is the outside world. The world is no longer something that exists separately from our domestic lives. It has burst into our everyday life, introducing new risks, new forms of competition, new challenges and new fears. The social and political arrangements of our societies have been turned upside down. We are faced with a challenge, and the twenty-first century must take it up: it must invent a global political life that is at once democratic and capable of dealing with issues on a planetary scale. I say ‘invent’ because, even today, it seems that only representative and national democracies can legitimise collective action. How did this great transformation come about? It came about thanks to a threefold upheaval that was decisive for the whole of humanity and indeed provided the initial impetus to construct Europe. The origins of the first upheaval lie in war. Between 1914 and 1945, the world reeled as it was torn apart by the convulsions of the old Europe and its nationalistic and totalitarian passions. Verdun and then Auschwitz taught us that our civilisations are mortal, as Paul Valéry put it.2 For the fathers of the new Europe, the failure of the League of Nations – which represented a first attempt to take collective responsibility for the international order – and the ravages of two conflicts in the heart of the continent and the world were disasters that had a fundamental importance. They taught a lesson that struck them with all the force of the obvious: a union of the peoples of Europe was the only thing that could provide the basis for a lasting peace. The second upheaval occurred at the end of the twentieth century, when the Berlin Wall came down, when the Soviet Empire collapsed and when new geopolitical instabilities emerged. It also made what had been a tacit project much more explicit: it meant acquiring the ability to act outside the boundaries of Europe. In the rest of the world, the same upheaval emphasised the need to regulate and take on global questions collectively. Powers like the United States can obviously allow themselves

2 Paul Valéry,’ La Crise de l’Esprit- première lettre’, La Nouvelle revue française, no. 71, 1 August 1919, pp.321-327. ‘Nous autres, civilisations, nous savons maintenant que nous sommes mortelles’ (‘We civilizations now realise that we are mortal’).

9 10 PASCAL LAMY the luxury of pursuing a unilateral logic, by resorting to force if need be. But that logic cannot last. It cannot eradicate the major political reality of the coming century: henceforth, the problems of the world concern us all, and there are no more sanctuaries. The global nature of an increasing number of phenomena – the growing shortage of energy resources, the destruction of the biosphere, the spread of pandemics, the volatility of financial markets, and the migratory movements provoked by insecurity, poverty or systemic political instability – is a product of a third upheaval: globalization. Globalization – by which I mean the growing interdependence of all the people on the planet as the distinction between ‘near’ and ‘far’ becomes blurred – now affects every dimension of the life of our societies, and not only their economic dimension. Globalization is already a reality, but it is also an on-going process. Even though forms of proto-globalization did exist in the past, we are now living through an unprecedented historical experiment.3 Globalization must therefore not be seen simply as the rise of the marketplace alone,4 but as the acceleration and deepening of a much more general dynamic originating in the way market capitalism has developed over many hundreds of years. This dynamic has now reached a stage of expansion that is unprecedented both in geographical terms and in terms of its social ramifications. It now extends to all human societies, and the logic of its growth and innovation is developing on a planetary scale, as is the logic of the social, cultural, environmental and political damage it is causing. This is the force that, like some historical tidal wave, is shaping and reshaping our world. These global issues are creating a new need for efficiency that cannot be met by nation-states alone. The new issues raised by global conflicts and crises, by political developments and by the crises that appear to be affecting the planet’s democratic governments, make it apparent that we need to contemplate new forms of governance. Europe is directly concerned. In 1945, its geopolitical model was exhausted. The destructive violence that had been inflicted upon Europe was a measure of its failure. The new Europe was the result of many long- term processes and numerous visions of the future, some of which were realised in the course of its history – plans for world governance systems –

3 See Suzanne Berger, Notre première mondialisation, leçons d’un échec oublié, Paris : Seuil’/La République des idées, 2003; GEMDEV, La Mondialisation, les mots et les choses, Paris : Khartala, 1999 ; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, New York and London : Academic Press, 3 vols, 1974, 1980 and 1989 ; Fernand Braudel, La Dynamique du capitalisme, Paris : Gallimard, 2001. 4 Kark Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Beacon Hill: Beacon Press, 1944. 11 but it now had to invent something new. It had to invent peace. It had, in other words, to be armed with a new utopia. According to the fathers of the European project, shared prosperity was to provide a concrete basis for that ambition. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was Europe’s first incarnation. In their view, the pooling of the two pillars of the European economy of the day, which were also powerful elements of national sovereignty, would probably have the strength to ward off the spectre of the impotence that had destroyed the League of Nations. When it established the ECSC, Europe turned its back on the logics of power. It was taking its first steps to what its founding fathers realised would be a model for ‘tomorrow’s world’. This is the world in which we now live. Because it was conceived as a long-term answer to the disorders of both the world and history, and because it gambled on the possibility that interdependence will succeed, Europe acquired the ability to act on the logics of market capitalism and, now, to respond to globalization. We live in a world that Europe’s founders foresaw when they created it.5 Some criticise Europe for its choice of origins. The classic sovereignist discourse which defends the survival of the nation-state against supranational ‘monsters’ is now overlaid by another discourse which accuses Europe of being no more than a prelude to ‘neo-liberal globalization’. Europe is, in other words, just another of the instruments of alienation. The way these discourses are currently combined leads me to make two points. First: is the conjunction of the two a historical coincidence, or do they stem from common roots? Is it ultimately a product of a classic sovereignism, even if means contradicting the universalist principles of some anti-globalization movements? My second point is that, whilst Jean Monnet’s vision of the future is now our reality, the way the world has burst into our societies has transformed the European project. It therefore seems to me that the reason why current debates are so confused is that we can no longer discuss Europe without discussing the world, and vice versa. We need to clarify the nature of the European project, and we cannot do that unless we also confront the issues raised by globalization. And if those who would like to turn Europe into an isolated fortress do not like it, that is their problem. States are powerless against many aspects of globalization. They can no longer hope to resolve problems that are now developing on a global scale by acting alone. At the same time, the indispensable democratic legitimacy that is essential if we are to deal with these questions is not migrating to

5 See Jean Monnet, Mémoires. 12 PASCAL LAMY the international stage: it only operates within nation-states. This contradiction has opened up a twofold fault-line in our political life; on the one hand, the international institutions that are, in theory, responsible for resolving global questions are suspected of being illegitimate; on the other hand, national democracies do not have the ability to control global mutations on their own. Basically, the institutions that work well lack legitimacy, and those that are legitimate do not work well. In Europe, this contradiction finds its main expression in the crisis in our democracies, which are affected by the return of various forms of populism and by the temptations of isolationism. How are we to resolve this contradiction in a democratic way? How are we to respond to what public opinion increasingly sees as a crisis in democracy? A democratic government stands upon three pillars. First, elements of legitimacy based on institutions and procedures. – A constitutional state must be based upon the separation of powers and the political representation of the people that guarantees its citizens the ability to choose their representatives collectively by voting for them. But it also relies on the political capacity of the system to bring forward public discourse and proposals that can produce coherent majorities. In other words, the political system must represent society, and allow it to see itself as a whole because all its members use the same language and experience the same feelings. The second pillar of a democratic government lies in its efficiency, or in other words its ability to identify public problems, to find solutions, to propose different options for a public debate and, ultimately, to resolve these problems. In that sense, a democratic government is a responsible government; it must be supported by a majority, but its must also be accountable for its actions. The final pillar is a public space for arguments and debates, a space where issues can be discussed and where political solutions can be outlined. If that space is to be both visible and comprehensible, it must be the arena for ritualised political battles between competing parties or candidates. It is the combination of these three aspects that helps to give citizens the feeling that they belong, that they can influence the choices made by their society, that they can recognise themselves in their representatives, and that they live, collectively, in control of their destiny within a space that is both clearly delineated and familiar to them. In my view, this lived dimension of democracy is its true and deepest inspiration. And it is by investigating this feeling of democracy that we can now diagnose the crisis affecting all democratic systems. For if citizens are no longer convinced that 13 they have a central role to play, institutional democracy’s finest mechanisms and most beautiful formal arrangements are lifeless puppets. There is no avoiding the conclusion that there is now a crisis. We need to consider three key levels at which power operates: the international system, Europe, and national democracies in respect of three key requirements: the need for legitimacy, the need for efficiency, and the need to belong. That is why the need to find a new and democratic way of organising power that goes beyond the framework of nation-states is now a matter of urgency. Once, with the exception of a few ‘continental elephants’ (the United States, China and India), the nation-state is beginning to fade away, the absence of any democratic international governance raises a crucial problem for democracy. At this point, we can neither abandon our pursuit of global common goods – which would mean surrendering to the current world order – nor allow our democracies to wither away because our fellow citizens increasingly feel that they are no longer in control of their own destinies. How are we to react? That is the question I propose to explore in this book. Our starting point has to be Europe. Nothing else on the planet provides such a clear example of how to create what I have described in French, as an alternational and non-hegemonic democratic system of government.6 If we analyse it in the light of the democratic contradiction identified above, we will be able to pursue our quest for new answers. These reflections draw upon my experience of both Europe and the world. I would like to dedicate them to all those who wish to be witnesses to the future and active players in the future.

6 Some authors are following other similar paths, such as David Held, ‘From executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism’, in David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Taming Globalization. Frontiers of Governance, London: Polity, 2003, pp. 160-86. 14 PASCAL LAMY Chapter I

World Powers and their Discontents

The new questions societies have to face today are to an increasing extent posed in global terms. We are very familiar with these questions. They have entered the sphere of our day to day preoccupations. They fuel new forms of militant mobilisation. They give rise to diplomatic conflicts of a new kind – consider, for example, the transatlantic trade frictions over genetically modified organisms (GMOs). These are not simply disputes between competing powers; they are also disputes between different social choices and collective preferences. They can even lead to open conflict: since 11 September 2001, an embattled America has been at war with a new international terrorism. In short, they are the basso continuo that runs through our collective life and our public debates. These questions come into two categories. First, there are those that pose a direct threat, in both the medium and the long term, to the survival of our planet as an ecological system (soil-erosion and the destruction of water resources, the greenhouse effect, threats to biodiversity, atmospheric pollution and so on) and to the well-being of humanity, particularly the rapid spread of pandemics and the continued existence of poverty and insecurity. These issues cannot be ignored as they now affect all territories and all societies, and pay no heed to political boundaries. Some States may well choose not to share the transnational responsibility for these problems, but one day they will have to explain to their citizens, or to future generations why they have not done so. By refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and cutting emissions of greenhouse gases,7 the United States has chosen to keep going down a road that will lead to a dangerous hyper-consumerism. But how long can the US go on pretending to ignore the implications of that model, given that it too is affected? The second category of questions is more directly related to the economic and political interdependence brought about by globalization. This interdependence is made particularly obvious by confrontations of various kinds: economic and trade disputes arising out of collective

7 United Nations Framework Agreement on Climate Change (UNFACC), adopted by the United Nations at the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in June 1992.

15 16 PASCAL LAMY preferences that are a priori divergent, rivalries over access to energy resources and natural wealth (oil, gas, uranium, minerals etc.) or ideologically-motivated armed conflicts. These tensions reflect, however, no more than one of the scenarios made possible by globalization. In the day to day life of our societies, globalization also takes the form of transnational links of a very different kind. Such links, as those established by trade and economic interests and underpinned by the geographical ubiquity of giant multinational companies or by the reorganisation of the international division of labour. Other and more painful links are those unleashed by new social forces grounded in the spectacular inequalities of wealth, forcing despairing and distressed populations to emigrate. But there are also the links established by the multiculturalism of our open societies, and by access to other cultures, information and far-away places. The world is no longer an unknown quantity. Our home is no longer defined solely by reference to one particular region or nation. States that once defined themselves as the legitimate, although essential voice of general interest) have to some extent been dispossessed. Globalization reveals a new sphere of common interests. We are seeing the gradual emergence of a second horizon of general interest that has no political basis because it transcends States, cultures and national histories.8 The appeal to a general interest that has no people or to a common good that makes no reference to any established political community: that is our contemporary reality. Societies no longer exist in a vacuum – always assuming that they ever did. Indeed, given that all societies are affected by globalization, an increasing number of serious questions no longer pertain solely to the internal sphere of states, to their ability to address them or to their capacity for decision-making. The private domain of national governments is shrinking as their links with their global environment become closer. What were strictly national questions increasingly tend to become global questions. To take only one example: the international context of greater instability characteristic of the 1990s gave a new urgency to the debate about security. In Europe, this took the concrete form of the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, which ratified the de-compartmentalisation of two fields of action that were traditionally distinct: internal and external security. The impact of September 11 and its aftermath simply confirmed this political

8 Thierry Pech and Marc-Olivier Padis, Les Multinationales du coeur. Les ONG, la politique et le marché, Paris: La République des idées/Seuil, 2004, p. 53. 17 choice: the legal competence that was once the sole preserve of the sovereign states must now be shared on a European level. The conclusion seems obvious: for better and for worse, globalization of the issues increases, on a daily basis, the need to organise democratic, global forms of governance that are both legitimate and efficient. In other words: democratic. And yet, even though it means flying in the face of the evidence and ignoring the urgent issues of the day, many people reject this argument, even refuse to discuss it seriously. There is a whole strain liberal thought, for example, sings the praises of competition between norms, between different levels of governance, and powers and denounces the project for global governance on the grounds that it will force us to lower our ambitions and involve us in a sort of political ‘Dutch auction’. It is true that competition between States and their citizens is now so profitable that preserving the status quo is in the interests of its beneficiaries. Another school of thought, which can be described as ‘sovereignist’ associates all global governance with a dangerous loss of state autonomy, or in other words a loss of sovereignty. Rather than asking how the competence of states can be complemented – and at the same time reinforced – by a global policy that would allow them to make a collective response to the main challenges of our times, ‘sovereignists’ believe this world only weaken states and look at history through a rear-view mirror. They would rather have states that were powerless but fully sovereign than see competences being shared by states on the one hand and supranational powers on the other. To take stock of what is now expected of governments, and of what this implies – the need to construct governance that can operate on a global scale – is therefore a political choice. I have made that choice. If humanity fails to realise that its only salvation lies in an international approach to problems that make a mockery of our frontiers, it is doomed in the long term. And in the medium term it will be faced with an increasing number of conflicts, inequalities and ‘imperial’ security solutions that will lead to endless armed interventions in every theatre that is deemed to pose a threat to the internal order of the state. Although there are those who reject the notion, there is a growing awareness of the problem. Paradoxically, every conflict heightens it. The war in Iraq in 2003 is the most recent example. The same awareness is heightened by globalization itself. National identities are being undermined by migration, access to cultures, the rapid circulation of information by transnational actors (NGOs, multinational companies), and by the growing political interdependence of states and the emergence of supranational powers, the 18 PASCAL LAMY

European Union being the most successful example to date. Of course these phenomena also lead us to fall back on national identities: they become the focus of fears and they fuel nationalism. But they still have a considerable ability to break down barriers – between value-systems and loyalties. The implications of this awareness have yet to be translated into clear and coherent political terms. This is also a linguistic issue: we have yet to find a way of describing in political terms the way the world has burst in upon our hitherto private, national lives. The global questions and problems that are transforming our daily lives have come up against a form of democratic aphasia. Our societies no longer live inside one-dimensional spaces but we have no common way of talking about this, unless, perhaps, we use the language of Kofi Annan, who is a UN Secretary-General of unrivalled stature. The explanation is that the only grammar available to us at the moment is that of nation-states. To that extent, the existing nation-state model that structures the system of international relations has become a trap. It is obvious to citizens that maintaining the fiction that state powers provide an adequate basis for the discussion of world issues has become a lie. It is not so much the lie itself that is the problem as the gap between the promise of power and the regular admissions of failure. This discrediting of politics and the consequent dramatic decline in democratic participation in so many countries are a direct cause of this feeling of remoteness and dispossession.

The failings of inter-national governance

Is inter-national governance or, in other words, the current system capable of responding to these difficulties? The system is cacophonous. The international institutions that structure it are profoundly flawed, not least because of their lack of coordination and coherence. They in fact constitute a sort of political archipelago that functions like a set of ministries with no government to organise them, or like a group of soloists with neither a conductor nor even a common set of music to play from. As a result, it is all but impossible to put forward common policies and what has been built with such difficulty in one place is regularly torn down in another. Specialists in international law have a simple explanation for this constitutional failing. They say that the international (inter-national) system is based upon Westphalian logic, and that is enough to give it both legitimacy and coherence. Basically, this means that there is no need for any governmental function at the international level because international 19 institutions and organisations are made up of States which ‘naturally’, or thanks to some sort of transitivity, give them their own internal coherence. Because France, for example, is in legal terms, a unified and sovereign state, the positions France adopts in any international institution, organisation or assembly are, of necessity, internally consistent: they are so many declensions of the same noun. And as the same is, in legal terms, true of every sovereign state, it is obvious that that the positions adopted by all state in any international assembly will eventually produce a faithful, indeed symphonic, representation of the state of the world. The argument may be valid in theory, but this beautiful music is rarely heard in the real world. Bringing together a variety of sovereign nations, or national sovereignties, within an assembly of nations has never produced a coordinated policy. It tends, rather, to produce a plastic monster that takes on a new shape in every organisation or institution to which it is admitted. Ultimately, the attempt to find a world political motor that can coordinate the actions of international institutions never provides an answer that is satisfactory in legal terms. Indeed, the way it distributes institutional legitimacy on an international basis is an obstacle to the emergence of any form of world governance that is both coherent and legitimate. For some thirty years, a second mode of governance, which might be described as ‘declamatory’, has been attempting to remedy this lack of overall vision in international summits. It has indeed allowed civil society to put a number of systemic questions on the agenda at international conferences: the environment, population, development, core labour standards and the rights of women. To what effect? What results have been achieved after all the decades of meetings, statements of good intentions and all the declarations that are made at the end of summits? The declarations are stirring but they do not usually translate into anything concrete. They are gestures made for the benefit of public opinion rather than signs of any commitment to taking global responsibility. And yet, the declamatory approach may prove useful in the long term, as we can see from past declarations: the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights now has a legal value. ‘Declamatory governance’ has promoted certain conceptions of how the world should be organised, even though many states regularly flout its principles. It now looks like a programme: witness the United Nations’ ‘millennium objectives’.9 This is

9 These are concrete objectives (such as increasing the amount of development aid supplied by the richest countries to 0.7 per cent of GDP by 2015), designed to put the question of development at the centre of the debate. The basic assumption is that the pressure of public opinion can force countries to make a combined effort. 20 PASCAL LAMY why the declamatory approach does have a certain legitimacy: it helps us to express collective expectations on a world scale. At the same time, it comes up against its own limitations because it is disconnected from the organisations that implement policies, it is difficult for it to produce concrete results. These modes of governance lead nowhere. Either the institutions concerned simply preach the good word and lose credibility because they have no power, or they take decisions and act independently of one another, and therefore expose themselves to the accusation that they have no legitimacy. As a result, the NGOs, the various lobbies, the political alliances, the trade-unions are beginning to occupy what was once an empty space. They represent an emerging and fragmented world public opinion that is not properly in the full sense of the word, representatives but which can have certain indirect effects. This third mode of governance is, therefore, developing within the private sphere, thanks mainly to the emergence of information campaigns and pressure groups designed to influence the choices of states or other private actors – primarily multinational companies but also consumers or shareholders. British and American-inspired ‘name and shame’ campaigns give NGOs or independent agencies the task of evaluating and making public the social and environmental performance of multinational companies, or the degree to which states are corrupt. The same privatisation of action and the establishment of codes of good conduct (companies’ ‘social responsibility’) can also be observed in the way that many multinational firms guarantee their customers that products are manufactured in accordance with certain standards (‘social labelling’, ‘green labels’). Other associations are trying to strike a new balance by investing in ‘fair trade’ and by guaranteeing the producer a decent income in exchange for higher than average prices. Some spheres of activity, if is true, are regulated in ways that are totally independent of national structures. This is especially true of the Internet. It is managed by private bodies and is one of the most effective ways of disseminating information within the new global public space. In the same way, international accounting norms evade the sphere of public regulation.10 Finally, different forms of public action, albeit distinct from that of the state, deserve mention here: notably, one come to mind: cooperation between local and

10 Philippe Crouzet and Nicolas Veron, La mondialisation en partie double. La bataille des normes comptables, Paris, En temps réel, Notes, n.3. 21 urban communities (such as transnational associations of twinned towns in border areas). The legitimacy of such approaches may seem dubious when measured by the standards of the model of national representative democracy. It is easy to criticise them on the grounds that they represent no one and have a narrow social base. But, in the world of our ‘second modernity’11 and cosmopolitanism, and given that coordinated action is impossible because there is no basic political language to discuss issues that concern us, the rule of private actors in some aspects of globalization can be regarded as a way of ‘redistributing national sovereignty’12 towards the market and civil society, and as an embryonic world public space. Elements of governance on an international scale do, then, exist but, at this embryonic stage, they do not possess the attributes of true democracy. Two criteria are enough to reveal the inadequacy of the present international system: legitimacy on the one hand, and efficiency on the other. In that respect, today’s international governance seems to be profoundly paradoxical. On the one hand, we have institutions and organisations that are legitimate but inefficient; on the other, we have institutions and organisations that are efficient but illegitimate. If the irony were not so cruel, we could formulate a law with a basic axiom: if a supranational institution is effective, it is not legitimate, and if it is legitimate it is not effective! And, to exaggerate a little, we could use the twin criteria of legitimacy and efficacy to paint a strange picture of contemporary international governance. To begin with the UN. The General Assembly lies at the heart of the UN system, and it looks like a monument to legitimacy. All, or almost all, the states on the planet sit around the same table. At first sight, it seems that we could not hope for anything better. The principle is similar to the one Noah used to organise his ark: all states appear to be guaranteed representation. Whether or not the Assembly is effective is another matter. I have already said that ‘declamatory governance’ may have its virtues in the long term. But it is pointless to maintain the fiction that this Assembly of Peoples has any influence when it comes to the concrete issue of solving the world’s greatest problems. Its resolutions are at best ignored, and at worst openly flouted. The real power of the UN lies in the Security Council and, more specifically, in the right of veto. That is the exclusive privilege of

11 See Ulrich Beck, Macht und Gegenmacht im globalen Zeitaller, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2002. 12 Zaki Laïdi, La Grande Perturbation, Paris: Flammarion, 2004, pp. 29-48. 22 PASCAL LAMY its five permanent members, whose legitimacy (based on who won the last world war) is, to say the least, 50 years out of date. The fate of the UN’s many agencies varies. When their action is restricted to the visible domains of the social and political sphere, the High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF or the World Health Organisation are recognised as legitimate. Their stated objectives give them a certain legitimacy, but they have neither the resources nor the coherence they need to be effective. Similarly, the legitimacy of the International Labour Organization is well established. The organisation was founded just after the First World War, and it brings together the representatives of the governments, employers’ associations and trade unions of every member state. Its charter and numerous conventions have allowed it to construct a real system of reference in terms of labour protection and workers’ rights. Yet it has no way of implementing its decisions or making them binding. The lack of adequate links with the legislation introduced by other organisations and institutions mean that it is rather like a general without any army. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is, for its part, a Janus-faced entity. It plays an effective role when, in the form of Dispute Settlement Body, it acts as the supreme arbiter of world trade. When, however, it functions as a negotiating forum, its legitimacy is challenged by sections of world public opinion – in whose name and in the name of what does it lay down rules and jurisprudence? – even though its voting system is the same as that of the UN (one State = one vote). When it functions as a court, it is a uniquely effective player on the stage of contemporary governance and places the WTO in a position to oversee other international institutions and organisations. The DSB can therefore resolve trade issues which sometimes affect different juridical realms (the environment, labour law, food safety and so on) Being the only effective court in the current system, the WTO stands out like an island that is cut off from the machinery of international regulation. It is therefore often suspected or accused – in symbolic terms – of dealing with global problems of all kinds because the tools international governance really needs are not available. The so-called ‘Bretton Woods’ international financial institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) are effective in the sense that they do have policies and can implement them. But as they are regularly criticised by antiglobalization movements and are poorly supported by public opinion, they obviously lack legitimacy. Almost all countries are indeed represented in their general assemblies, but their actual policies are decided by executive boards made up of members 23 nominated or elected by the General Assembly on the basis of how much they contribute to the finances of these institutions. Five of the seats on the IMF’s Board are held by the United States, Japan, France, the United Kingdom and Germany; the other one hundred and seventy-nine members share the remaining nineteen seats. To complete this rapid survey, we should be looking at the dozens of ‘technical’ international organisations within the UN system. Most of them remain completely unknown. Many of them are old, having been founded at the end of the nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth. Their main purpose is to improve intergovernmental cooperation so as to ensure the continuity of the infrastructures and services they manage in a world where borders are being opened up and where flows of all kinds are increasing. Their objectives, however, do not appear to tackle issues that are vital to the whole of humanity or political questions about collective preferences or social choices. This is true of the Universal Postal Union, the World Meteorological Organisation and the International Civil Aviation Organisation. All these organisations are effective, but citizens see absolutely nothing of what they do. They look after the ‘technical side’ of globalization and act, so to speak, as its ‘back office.’ When they do venture into the arena of active regulation, their effectiveness is much less obvious; witness, for example, the last general meeting of the International Maritime Organisation, which resolved to eradicate ‘dustbin ships’. Some technical organisations are, finally, effective at managing collective preferences that concern citizens directly. They are, on the other hand, alarmingly shadowy. One example is the UN’s Geneva-based Codex Alimentarius, which is responsible for food safety and consumer protection.

Is Democracy Impossible?

Observing the archipelago of contemporary world governance raises a stark question: are legitimacy and efficiency incompatible? Will we ever be able to devise a system of democratic governance that can combine the two dimensions, or do we have to resign ourselves to the following alternative: a governance that is declamatory but incapable of assuming its responsibilities towards its citizens, or a form of more or less enlightened despotism which, in the name of efficiency, expertise and competence, would address world issues without the support of citizens? Is governance without power the only alternative to governance without a heart? 24 PASCAL LAMY

In contemporary international relations, and in the institutions that structure them, power can be legitimised only at the level of the state. Once its legitimacy has been established and validated within the nation- state, we then make the hypothetical assumption that it can be automatically transferred to a higher level. We reproduce the fiction of a transitivity which, as I have already said, assumes that political coherence can automatically migrate from one level to another. If we make that assumption, we ignore the real underlying meaning of legitimacy, the feeling of citizens that they can debate the issues; the sense that their role in determining collective goals is not restricted to voting in elections. When, in other words, it comes to international governance, the only possibilities open to them are the unfamiliar and very indirect processes whereby the general will can be delegated. But in a democracy, a legitimacy simply based on procedures is not enough. The second element in the democratic validation of power is efficiency. Citizens expect governments to be able to identify the problems that have to be solved, and to be capable of solving them. Citizens expect results from institutions with political responsibilities. The ability to transform the real world and to influence the course of events is the raison d’être of a public power. It is the presence or absence of results that convinces its citizens that they should support it or reject it. But quantifying efficiency in concrete terms is not easy. Doing so becomes even more complicated as we move away from the seat of power. It is easier to hold the mayor of a town or village accountable for his actions than a national government. When power is remote and when there are multiple levels of government, as is the case with Europe or complex political systems, the task becomes even more complicated. In that respect, evaluating the effectiveness of political measures in terms of international governance may look like an impossible task. How, given the complexity of different levels of government, how can we devise an effective way of evaluating efficiency? In a democracy, this is a crucial issue. The picture becomes even gloomier when we observe that the principle that gives structure to contemporary international relations takes little heed of truly democratic demands. The principle in question assumes that the UN’s model of democracy gives States equal representation: one State = one vote. Now that principle is a long-standing fiction dating back to a distant period when democracies did not exist. It was a useful fiction in its day, but it is completely out of step with contemporary geopolitical realities. It can represent neither the diversity of the world nor the variety 25 of its actors. What is, perhaps, still more important is that it does not allow us to take collective responsibility for global issues. All it allows us to do is juxtapose national forms of legitimacy. There is therefore a danger that it will,at least de facto, abandon the pursuit of a common interest that is both broadly defined and of crucial importance to all. For good measure, we might add that, in many cases, this national legitimacy itself is only distantly related to democracy… Although the overall picture is gloomy, there are still some rays of hope, such as the elements of what we might call ‘communitarisation’ that we see at work in international law.13 The UN Charter is obviously a step in the right direction, as are the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or, very recently, the International Criminal Court. They are designed to deal with forms of international criminality and non- respect for the new provisions of international law. Jus cogens is a further step in the right direction. It removes a number of international legal norms from the domain of state sovereignty; these are now norms that states cannot ignore in the name of sovereignty. The seeds of an embryonic community have been planted in the international system, and they will help us to build a platform of collective preferences that can be shared by all actors. But given the urgency of certain contemporary issues, they are growing too slowly. Do we therefore have to conclude that democracy and international governance are almost incompatible? No, because all democratic systems are confronted with the same crisis: national democracies must respond to their citizens’ need for signposts, for road maps to help them find their way around this new world. The navigational aids provided by domestic sovereignty are no longer adequate. The emergent supranational powers are caught in a dilemma: do we have to turn our backs on the national democratic sphere which provides the basis to the legitimacy of a government in order to resolve global questions? Is it possible to democratise the upper storeys without destroying the foundations of representative democracy? This contradiction is contemporary international governance’s blind spot. It is also Europe’s blind spot. This blind spot is, to some extent, the reason why democracies are ‘in crisis’. As the reader will have guessed, I support the view that the construction of an ‘alternational’ democratic system is an unavoidable political necessity.

13 See Alain Pellet, ‘Mondialisation du droit international?’ in Serge Cordellier, ed., La Mondialisation au-delà les mythes, Paris : La Découverte/Poche, 2000, pp. 93-100. 26 PASCAL LAMY

An “alternational power, via revitalised institutional procedures, gives states effective means of wielding power, and clearly identifies common objectives and the means to construct a worldwide democratic stage. In my view, world governance and democracy are inseparable. The existence of one is a precondition for the success of the other. Without democracy, world governance cannot exist. That is not just an empty slogan. But the danger that we will simply maintain the fiction that currently prevails in international relations is not just a theoretical possibility. It is a very concrete and immediate danger. If we imitate the way nation-states interact at a supranational level, as we did in the past, there is a danger that we will deny democracy the means to establish itself. There is a danger that we will ‘de-democratise’ democracy.14 In our Western democracies, we can see what is at stake in a very immediate way. They stand by helplessly while extremists get more votes and as all kinds of populism grow stronger. The threat to democracy is that a growing number of citizens will turn away from politics. The threat is also from the increasing influence of critics whose denunciations may be justified to some extent, but who offer no real alternative means of tackling the crisis in the system. We have to respond in political terms. Thinking about how we construct a democratic system of power broking is therefore a matter of urgency. Now that the forms of national representative democracy have become a trap, we now have to invent an alternational democracy. But in any case, it is not true to say that we have no models and no experience. We have been constructing Europe for fifty years now. The founding fathers of Europe knew that what was going on in one corner of the planet would have global implications.

14 See Ulrich Beck, Macht und Gegenmacht. CHAPTER II

THE EUROPEAN LABORATORY

To create a supranational democratic system is what we have been trying to do in the European laboratory, since the middle of the last century. If I am to believe the evidence of the endless questions I am always faced with in Latin America, Africa and Asia, the whole world knows all about this experiment. I sometimes feel that these questions are an expression of hope. But in any event, they are always the expression of curiosity. For many years, I answered in positive terms. I shared the convictions of the EU builders, who were inspired by the future implications of what they were constructing. For some time now, I have been less confident. The weather has changed. I can see clouds gathering, and they may be a sign that a storm is brewing. And I see the barometer – what we call the ‘Eurobarometer’; a high-quality poll that regularly monitors the opinion of citizens of all the member states of Europe15 – is falling ominously. In late 2003, only 41 per cent stated that they had any faith in the European Union.16 There is another bad sign: only one on two citizens thinks that his or her country’s membership of the European Union is a good thing.17 When compared with earlier surveys, these figures indicate that we have hit a pocket of turbulence: they tell us that in the 25 countries of Europe, over 20 million people probably changed their opinion from positive to negative in the second half of 2003. If we compare these figures with those recorded during the last European elections (in both 1999 and 2004), when there was a high rate of abstention and when various populist forces performed well – we have to face the obvious: a democratic crisis is looming. Why? Why is public opinion no longer supporting an unprecedented and unique enterprise which has changed the face of our continent by banishing the spectre of war, by allowing democracy to take root and by building up

15 It can be consulted at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm.public_opinion/ 16 This represents a fall of three points since the first semester of 2003. The rate of distrust had risen to 42 per cent according to Eurobarometer 60, Second semester 2003. 17 This represents a fall of six points since the first semester of 2003.

27 28 PASCAL LAMY societies which, in comparison with the rest of the world, are free, open, prosperous and mutually supportive. Has the construction of Europe been hit by the same illness as the international system – which it was trying to transcend – and our national democracies – which it was designed to support and complement? Let us try to answer the question without lapsing into complacency, by taking a lucid look at the successes and failures, the promises and results of this attempt to invent a new form of governance.

Europe: towards governance

After the Second World War, having learned from the failures of the international system over the previous one hundred years, Europe’s founding fathers made a ‘technological’ jump towards governance by developing innovative tools that we have been perfecting over a period of fifty years. It was not so much the stated objective of the European project – ‘to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’18 – as the means of achieving it that allowed us to leave behind the only formula available at the time: namely, states have an exclusive monopoly on sovereignty. From the very start, we had things that, even today, cannot be found anywhere else in combination: effective tools and democratic procedures. We gradually learned how to use these innovations, and we have learned to make better use of them, though not without debates, clashes, quarrels and crises. But the transition was successful and completely new principles of governance did take root. These new principles have made it possible to move from an international (or ‘intergovernmental’, as we say in Europe) system to a ‘Community’ system (based upon autonomous institutions and common policies). They are generically described as the ‘Community method.’ They are: the pre- eminence of European law, subsidiarity, a re-worked principle of majority rule, and by granting of a monopoly of legislative initiative to the Commission. The fact that European law takes precedence over national laws is the first building block. It was gradually established through jurisprudence. This supranationality is guaranteed by the European Court of Justice, whose rulings are binding on national legal systems. To a large extent, this transgresses the principle of classical international law. The principle of subsidiarity, which has always figured in federalism’s

18 Preamble to the Treaty of Rome (1957). 29 tables of stone, divides legal competence between the level of the Union and the level of Member States. It is intended to ensure that the competence of the Union remains ‘subsidiary’ to that of its Member States or constituent parts, such as regions, and that it applies only when efficiency requires it to apply. Europe has, for example, a high degree of competence at the economic level: control over competition, rules governing the market, internal common negotiating position in international trade. Education and social security policies, in contrast, are within the remit of national competence. The third characteristic, namely, a renewed principle of majority rule has gradually been applied within both two institutional sources of legitimacy: the Council, made up of EU Member States and the European Parliament. In the Council, where States have relinquished their sovereignty in favour of a population-weighted voting system, decisions are usually taken on a ‘qualified majority’ basis (about two thirds of all votes) rather the ‘simple majority’ system used in the European Parliament (half of all votes plus one). The upper house or Council has gradually come to share legislative power, budgetary power and political control with the lower house, or the European Parliament, which has been elected by universal suffrage since 1979. Giving the European Commission a monopoly of initiative was perhaps the most innovatory principle of all and yet, even today, few people know about it or still find it very obscure. Contrary to the idea that still prevails even in distinguished academic circles, it has nothing to do with the executive nature of the College of European Commissioners, though it is true that the creation of a supranational executive did give birth to a new species: the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), then the so-called ‘executive’ commission of the European Economic Community (EEC), which was the daughter of the ECSC and finally the modern EU’s European Commission, which is the ECSC’s granddaughter. In fact, the monopoly of initiative stems from a recognition of the need to give an exclusive monopoly on policy initiatives or on ways of implementing policies, to a ‘third party’ independent of the States, which trust it (in a way that they do not trust each other) to draft the policies required by the general interest of the Union. This is the technology described as a ‘monopoly of initiative’, though the term is as off-putting as it is ugly. In concrete terms, it means that a proposal can only be made by the European Commission (for example, a legislative proposal) cannot be amended 30 PASCAL LAMY without the unanimous agreement of the Member States. They can refuse to agree to it. But without unanimity, they cannot amend it unless the Commission agrees. The Commission has the power to act as a force for integration and to act as an honest broker: it takes initiatives that encourage integration and amends them in such a way as to make them acceptable to a majority. This, as I know from personal experience, was probably the EU founding fathers’ greatest stroke of inspiration. After two fratricidal wars, curbing the logic of nation states required a great deal of imagination. Trust is the cement that gives all forms of integration the solidity they require. It is that trust that made possible major advances in the construction of Europe: the market, which represented a compromise between liberalisation and the drawing up of common rules; the Euro, which is a compromise between the different monetary ideas held by different Member States, and; the common European policy on external trade – one of the most integrated within the Union – which is a compromise between liberal and protectionist views on trade. The key to all this lies in a system that can capitalise on trust. In Europe, that function has been granted to the Commission. Its role is to guarantee the European project and its dynamic, to understand the various parties involved, to turn their expectations into possibilities, and to make them concrete in ways that promote the interests of all. Its role is, in a word, to construct a general European interest. This makes it a ‘trust catalyst’, and it is indispensable if we are to move ahead with the construction of Europe. Because it is driven by this completely novel set of institutional drivers, the European Union possesses, a priori, the attributes of efficiency and legitimacy which, as I have shown, the international system lacks. Montesquieu would have been delighted: separation of powers (legislative, judiciary and executive); a “parliament” with two chambers, Council and European Parliament, that are legitimate because they are made up of representatives elected by those who gave them their mandate; and finally, an executive that can be censored by the second chamber of the people. And as we discovered in 1999,19 that possibility is not longer just based on academic theory. Then why is public opinion so negative? Have we once more, and not for the first time in history, fallen victim to a fiction that makes us take dreams for realities? Have we been given ten out of ten for the theory, and zero out of ten for the practicalities?

19 The date of the resignation of the Commission chaired by Jacques Santer. 31

Bringing the machinery to life

I think that the basic answer lies in the truism that today’s Europe lacks political excitement. The machinery is there, but it has not been brought to life. That machinery is full of positive elements. There is, for example, a public debating chamber and it exists at the European level. It is a structured, sophisticated space and many of its actors can readily identify with it. All forms of representation – whether of states, national, parliamentary, trade-unions, associations (such as charities) and business – coexist within it and help to bring it to life. Yet this space remains stubbornly invisible to the citizens of Europe. Ever since it was first elected by universal suffrage, the European Parliament has been given more and more powers, and the draft Constitutional Treaty would give it an even greater role. And yet even that would not give it the magic that might be expected of an institution representing the peoples of Europe. There are also places where civil society, and specific interests – such as business interests – can be brought together. Lobbies, NGOs, European federations representing various branches of activity and society (such as European trade-union federations) are all represented in Brussels. They are active, put forward proposals, take part in formal and informal consultative processes which continue throughout the drafting of policies, and they cooperate closely with European institutions. And yet there is still a feeling that decisions are taken ‘in Brussels’ without any consultation, and that they do not relate to the active, living forces in European society. One thousand journalists are accredited to the European Commission’s press room, which gives a daily ‘Midday Express’ press conference that allows journalists to review the latest EU developments and to put questions to those responsible in the Commission. European institutions have imported the rigorous transparency rules of the Nordic democracies, despite a few clashes with more ‘Latin’ concepts. Brochures designed for both specialist and non-specialist readers are published. The web sites of European institutions explain what they are doing. There are many regional sources of information in Member States. There are associations committed to improving our understanding of Europe. There are countless departments of European studies in the universities. Every year, doctoral theses are submitted on European subjects, and in every conceivable European language. The list goes on and on, and yet the citizens of Europe still feel that this political system is both invisible and incomprehensible. 32 PASCAL LAMY

We have, then, good machinery but it has yet to come to life. Why? If we are to find the right answer, and draw the right conclusions from it, we must, I think, begin by sorting the wheat from the chaff.

On the wrong track

Arguments about the famous ‘democratic deficit’ at the institutional level will get us nowhere. That is the first mistake. As I have already said, even though it can (and must) be improved, the European institutional system offers all the guarantees one could wish for to ensure that its powers are, in procedural terms, independent, separate and subject to checks and balances. What is more, the Union’s self-imposed transparency criteria are stricter than those of many European States.20 And given, finally, that the European Union is neither a nation state nor a federation, criticising it on the basis of criteria elaborated with those systems in mind is simply bad faith. The Union’s citizens are, as it happens, under no illusion about this: a significantly greater number (46 per cent) have more faith in the European Commission than in their national governments (31 per cent).21 When it comes to political debates about Europe, the supporters of two conflicting conceptions – the sovereignist or Eurosceptic discourse, and the federalist discourse – clash over the institutional issue. According to the sovereignists, who are opposed to the building of a supranational system on the grounds that some elements of sovereignty will be transferred and shared with other states, the nation is the only framework that can guarantee democratic legitimacy. In their view, the debate is closed, or almost closed: the construction of Europe cannot be other than illegitimate and anti-democratic. According to their opponents, who support federalism, the idea that marginal institutional adjustments can improve things is just an illusion. The only thing that can remedy the deficit is a leap in the direction of federalism, or in other words an executive that is accountable to a parliament with greater and more extensive powers. And if the governments of Member States that still have constitutional powers do not like it, that is their problem. All that is needed to establish a constituent assembly of the peoples of Europe is an ‘international coup d’etat’. They are therefore denouncing a ‘federal’ deficit rather than a ‘democratic’

20 See especially, A. Moravcsik, ‘Le Mythe du déficit européen’, Raisons politiques, 10, May 2003, pp. 87-105. 21 Eurobarometer, n.60. 33 deficit,22 but they also have democratic ambitions as they want equal representation for both peoples and states, whereas the present system gives states the advantage, So there is, ironically, one common theme between both sides, namely that there is a ‘crisis in Europe’, a theme throughout this on-going ideological warfare.But this theme displaces the question of legitimacy on the one hand, to the point that we cannot really discuss it. Yet even if we reject both the sovereignist hypothesis and the ‘come the federal revolution’ hypothesis on the other – because one is suicidal and because the other threatens to sacrifice the Europe of today for the sake of an ideal and unreal Europe of the future – the feeling that there is a democratic deficit still persists. If the institutional solution cannot provide the right answer, we have to look elsewhere. The second mistake is to bury our heads in the sand and deny that there is a real problem. To argue that Europe is, by definition, a long way away and that we can never change that de facto situation borders on the tautological. Yes, European institutions are far removed from Europe’s citizens, or at least further removed than local or national governments. Yes, their remoteness is structural: a supranational government cannot be transformed into a local government. That is a fact. But this fact does little to promote the feeling that we are living in a democracy. This argument jumps to the wrong conclusions: it claims that the crisis in Europe is no more than a long shadow cast by the problems encountered by national democracies. In fact, it is quite obvious that the crisis in democracy is affecting all political actors and political interests, including the press and the political parties. There is, in our democracies, a widening gulf between the apparatus of power and society. Society feels that is no longer adequately represented and no longer believes that a political response can resolve its difficulties. It is equally obvious that distance, which makes Europe look less familiar to its citizens, also acts like a magnifying glass. But the fact that the crisis has becomes generalised does not mean that we have to abandon the attempt to resolve it. If my analysis is correct, and if the crisis does in part result from citizens’ feeling that politics cannot solve the new problems confronting our societies and that they themselves are therefore powerless to influence our future choices, part of the solution lies in our ability to put together a European and world system of governance that is legitimate, effective, and recognised as such.

22 See Alexi Dalem, Les Discours de légitimation de l’Union européenne, Mémoire de DEA, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, 2001. 34 PASCAL LAMY

The third mistake is to take the view that, given that there is no such thing as the ”European people”, it is not possible to create a ‘Europe’. This has always been a recurrent theme throughout the history of the construction of Europe. Any fool knows that the impossibility of finding the ‘European people’ is a cliché in discussions about both the Europe of today and the Europe of tomorrow. To summarise it briefly: the opponents of European integration claim that, because the diversity of its nations, the people of Europe is nowhere to be found, hence the subject is closed: if the people does not exist, democracy cannot exist and, if there can be no democracy, then Europe is a mirage, a blind alley and an impossibility. That is all there is to it! This argument overlooks the fact that we have, sometimes with unprecedented success, been constructing Europe day by day for the last 50 years and finding ways to unite its various peoples. For those who recognise only one possible form of democracy – a perfect match between one nation and one state – there can be no democracy outside the framework of the nation state. Democracy’s ability to invent truly alternational forms, or in other words to allow democracies to participate in international political life, is not even a legitimate hypothesis. The fourth mistake is the assertion that there is no desire for Europe, or that public opinion is hostile to Europe. The fact is that modern Europe has synchronised political, social, economic and demographic cycles. Most Europeans see the future in broadly similar terms. These ‘expectations’ of Europe definitely have an unrealised potential to lend democracy a new magic. All our political societies are now faced with the same evil, namely the rise of extremism. Sovereignism and nationalistic isolationism, often combined with xenophobia and a rejection of others, are its most obvious signs, as is the rising rate of abstention in elections from the 1990s onwards. This crisis in European democracies reflects the long demographic cycles characterised by the structural convergence of European societies: the ageing of the population, and the falling birth rate are two examples. Throughout Europe, these developments are producing, in various forms, the same questions, the same worries and sometimes the same plans for reform: how are we to guarantee that the young will support the elderly, that we can pay for pensions and go on providing adequate social welfare? European societies are all caught up in the same economic and social cycle: growth, the jobs market and the ‘offshoring’ of industry are no longer simply matters for domestic policy at the state level. Similarly, the quality 35 of the environment and of the products we consume has become a transnational issue. Civic activism over common issues at a European level is a recent phenomenon, but it was startlingly obvious in the demonstrations against the war in Iraq in 2003. The war and, in more general terms, the present American government’s policies, have given Europeans a more explicit awareness of the cultural specificity of Europe, even though it still remains somewhat vague. The citizens of Europe are well aware that they are Europeans. We now find the same sequences, the same cycles and the same preoccupations throughout Europe. And that is precisely when democracy begins: when people are all talking about the same thing. If we were trying to create a huge new state, the question of a European society would obviously be an issue from the outset. The federal project also comes up against the same difficulty. But it all depends on our vision of Europe. We should we see it as something quite new, but also as something that has its roots in the history of its people and that can transcend them so as to enable a new democratic and political framework that can strengthen governance at every level of public action.23 At that point, respect for, and celebration of, multiple loyalties could be a powerful foundation belief because it has deep roots in the reality of the diversity of the peoples of Europe. The problem cannot, however, be avoided: if there is no such thing as European society, does that mean that we have no common identity? I think not. So what is this feeling that we belong, and there can be no viable democracy? The European identity we have been constructing over the last 50 years is a day to day identity: European policies now have a direct impact on our lives. This European identity does not contradict the logic of belonging. It complements that logic: half of all Europeans state that they belong to both a nation and Europe.24 It is because this identity is grounded in day to day life that it is a powerful cohesive force. For the younger generations, it is self-evident that the future is European. Europe is an integral part of how they view their own lives. Freedom of movement across Europe, educational exchanges, transeuropean educational programmes, European financial backing for innovatory projects – including research and regional development – and, of course, the Euro are all examples of the policies that are making membership of Europe an important part of everyday life.

23 From the local level to the national level, and then the supranational level. 24 47 per cent of Europeans state that they feel themselves to be both nationals and Europeans; 7 per cent feel themselves to be purely European, and 40 per cent feel themselves to be just ‘nationals’. Half of all French people feel themselves to be French and European; 9 per cent feel that they are European and French. Ony 3 per cent feel that they are purely French. 36 PASCAL LAMY

Debates between Europeans obviously reveal a European identity too. When disagreements do arise, all the parties involved are aware of the shared destiny that binds them together. Conflict is obviously not the best way to bind a community together, but a political community never speaks with only one voice and the fact that debates occur demonstrates that our destinies are now linked, for better or for worse. And we should not be afraid of debates: there have been many crises in the course of European construction. But we also have to find ways of finding common ground, or, in other words, sharing our convictions and listening to those of others. That requires a political will that the European policy of Member States has all too often failed to display in recent years. Thanks to the upheavals of the 1990s and globalization, Europeans are discovering that they have a lot in common. Our common identity is revealed by the great moments of the history we share. Ten new Member States have now joined the European Union. We watched with emotion as most of them freed themselves from the Soviet yoke at the end of the 1980s. In some Member States, a majority is in favour of the enlargement of Europe.25 In others, fear is the dominant emotion, mainly because the authorities have failed to explain the meaning and historical reality of the process.26 Whilst they are worrying, these divergent positions also tell us – in negative terms – that Europe is a reality. These differences of opinion will no doubt fade, and the historians of the future will speak of the ‘reunification’ of Europe rather than of its ‘enlargement’. Our European identity is also, finally, a product of the way others see us. The construction of Europe was not a reaction against ‘the barbarians.’ It took place at the height of the Cold War, but its membership of the ‘Western bloc’ was not seen as a preliminary to a confrontation with the Communist bloc. Europe does not need to construct an ‘other’ in order to understand itself. It is, on the other hand, influenced by the way others see it. Others give Europe a role and capabilities of which it is often unaware. From the outside, it looks more united than it does to those who live inside it. Its colours are also more clearly perceptible: a particular sensitivity to the questions of development and sustainable development, the desire for better collective control over globalization, a willingness to establish

25 Denmark is the great champion of expansion, with 63 per cent in favour, followed by Spain, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Portugal and The Netherlands. Source: Eurobarometer 60. 26 France, with 55 per cent of the population opposed, leads the opposition to expansion, followed by Belgium. In Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom, 40 per cent of the populations is opposed to expansion. Source: Eurobarometer 60. 37 partnerships in the pursuit of common goals, the prioritising of peace rather than war. All this has recently been theorised by certain conservative intellectuals in America. Europe, they tell us, is the world of Venus and not Mars. It is the world of Kant and not that of Hobbes.27 These elements indicate that the construction of a new and unprecedented identity is under way. It is an identity that takes different forms, and it is based upon universal values and mature political choices. The fact that this identity is still under construction must not be allowed to become a problem: the feeling of belonging, without which no democracy can be constructed, is already there, even if it is still a matter for debate. This debate helps to reveal what its citizens are beginning to expect of Europe. And Europeans’ doubts about the real Europe are, in my view, a symptom of ‘European breakdowns.’

On the right track

The first real reason why Europeans have fallen out of love with Europe lies in what I would call its failure to produce results. In recent years, Europe has put the emphasis on certain types of mechanisms and has concentrated on procedures rather than on getting concrete results. The citizens of Europe are well aware that a change of emphasis has taken place. They are not holding forth about Europe. They are asking an important question: what is Europe doing for me, and what can it do? A distinction has to be made here between Europe as a means, and Europe as an end in itself. If we look at it in its historical context, the legitimacy of the process of European reunification stems not from some attachment to the European or to federal integration, but from what has been achieved. Common policies (the ‘actual solidarity’ and ‘concrete achievements’ of the 1950s) were developed in response to common concrete problems. The outcome, or in other words the criterion of efficiency, is an essential element in the legitimation of what Europe is about. If it is to be legitimate, three conditions have to be met: Europe must be a way of resolving or dealing with the pressing questions and major contradictions of the moment; those problems and contradictions cannot be dealt with appropriately and efficiently within a national framework; they must be common to all Member States and the ‘European response’ must be linked to

27 See Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America versus Europe on the New World Order, New York: Knopf, 2003. 38 PASCAL LAMY concrete proposals that can be implemented. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was seen as a first step towards the economic integration of France and Germany. In a similar way, consider the example of Jacques Delors’s proposal to do away with external frontiers and to create the Euro. The signs that the expectations of Europeans and what the European Union is doing are out of step are now increasingly obvious. Europeans are, for example, in favour of greater European integration in terms of foreign policy and defence, but governments are as reluctant as ever to share their sovereignty in these areas.28 The same question arises when we turn to economic policy. Although we have both a flat rate of economic growth and a powerful instrument that could promote growth – our single currency – we refuse to exploit all these possibilities to the full for fear that we might actually succeed in coordinating our economic and budgetary policies. This has serious implications: if we go on ‘looking after number one’, we will sacrifice growth and therefore the ability to reduce the level of unemployment or to ensure, in budgetary terms, that we will make choices that safeguard our welfare systems. Ultimately, Europeans have identified Europe’s second failure: the failure of the project. It was the future that gave Europe its original legitimacy. In that sense, Europe was a progressive development. And then the price of the future suddenly fell in the 1990s. The economic crisis, globalization, the end of upward social mobility – it was at this point that parents stopped believing that their children would have a better life than the one they had had – and the end of communism, which put a sudden end to the notion of progress. All of these factors had an impact on Europe. The price of Europe was – and, I think, still – is indexed to the price of the future. Because it relates to the future, the European project has still not recovered from this blow. From this point onwards, institutional and procedural legitimation became a substitute for the European project. It was, at first sight, easier to reach agreement over procedures than over policies: procedural neuroses became, so to speak, a substitute for policy neuroses. From where does this blockage come, this breakdown? Let us recall our common history, starting from one clear point: the process of European integration has, at least to some extent, unfolded in a non-explicit fashion, in a way that was not visible to Europeans. The pooling of certain elements of sovereignty has gone ahead without a real and strong commitment by

28 64 per cent of the citizens of Europe are in favour of a common foreign policy, and 22 per cent are against it. 70 per cent of the citizens of Europe are in favour of a European defence and security policy, and 19 per cent are opposed to it. Source: Eurobarometer 60. 39 either national or European policy-makers. In other words, Europe has rarely been the central focus of public debate. What began as the economic integration of Europe became a political issue, but the nature of debate now began to change. What had been an open debate became more closed. The introduction of the Euro as a single currency was preceded by 30 years of open debate. The technical debate about the single currency began in the late 1960s, and was transformed into a political debate in the 1970s and the 1980s as a result of the upheavals caused by the economic crisis. It was the need to regain a certain autonomy at the level of economic policy as well as to control inflation that began to confuse different views as to the role the single currency could play in shaping a European identity. The symbolic relationship with monetary sovereignty thus gave way to a more material relationship. Having long been dominated by ‘being’, the currency gradually came to be dominated by ‘having’. ‘The Euro in your pocket’ proved more important than big words about monetary sovereignty. The debate became still less open when the Single Act of 1986 extended European policy and allowed the establishment of the internal European market in which we have been living since 1993. Designed as a space in which people, goods, capital and services could circulate feely, it not only encourages trade but affects whole new areas of policy relating to the environment or social policy, for example. Europe has gradually moved into new territory. It now affects our social choices and our choice of identity, or in other words our collective preferences. From that point onwards, the debate about European policy gradually became less open, and more secretive. This happened almost without a word being said, not that it has proved to be an obstacle to further integration, but it has had a great impact on our shared values. The example of the recent introduction of a European arrest warrant is testimony to that. By doing away with procedures for extradition between European states, the European Union has acquired the legal means it needs to be able to act within its own sphere. As a result, the ability of states to say, within their own territories, what is right and what is wrong in legal terms, is now shared at a European level. Similarly, the fact that the European Commission has been given legal powers to regulate competition is not without an impact on our collective values and choices when it comes to regulating certain service activities that are in the common interest. The delicate balance of European construction has been upset as a result: there are fewer debates and more gradual progress, fewer great 40 PASCAL LAMY political ambitions and more technical norms, and less autonomy of action and more procedures. A ‘governance’ based essentially upon norms has taken over from a ‘government’ based upon more discretionary choices.29 In a number of cases we have, without always realising it, crossed the symbolic frontier that divides what we have – experience, the sharing of what can be exchanged and what can be touched – from what we are: identities, values and symbols. But when it acts in normative fashion, ‘power’ does not acquire the visible signs, the explicits criteria that citizens expect in seeing political power exercised. In my view, this explains why Europe is finding it so difficult to cross more symbolic barriers by committing itself to new policies. Europe has come up against a stumbling block. It is a symbolic stumbling block: power. States refuse to share power because doing so might, they believe, cost them their identity. The citizens of Europe are, I believe, ready to cross this frontier. This is the case when it comes to, for example, foreign policy and defence.30 In both these policy areas, where there is a strong element of ‘being’, there is still a very high threshold of political and symbolic resistance: it is the political strong room that is at stake. States are putting up resistance and trying to avoid the political choice involved by evoking norms and procedures. The best illustration of this is the decision taken at Maastricht in 1992, which saw a unanimous decision to eventually reach majority decisions on a common foreign and security policy. The same resistance is slowing down all attempts to coordinate economic and budgetary policies, and yet it has already been agreed that we cannot fight inflation unless we have economic growth and unless the Euro is fully taken up. We therefore have to go back to an open debate if we are to find a satisfactory balance between governance and government. Of course the establishment of norms allows a degree of arbitration between collective preferences. But if we are to return to the path that leads to democracy in Europe, we have to give collective political choices a new role and a new meaning. We must, then, relaunch the stalled project. Within the nation state, the question of the project is not posed in the same terms: having developed over a period of centuries, the will to live together is in a sense taken for

29 The same distinction is made by Jean-Paul Fitoussi, in La Règle et le choix. De la souverainté économique en Europe, Paris : Le Seuil/La République des idées, 2002. 30 64 per cent of Europeans are in favour of a CFSP (22 per cent are opposed to it) 70 per cent are in favour of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (19 per cent are against it). Source: Eurobarometer 60. 41 granted. But when we are dealing with a group of states that have decided their policies and frontiers on a voluntary basis, the question of the project is crucial. That is why, when we raise the issues of legitimacy and efficiency, further questions arise: what is the goal we want to give to the institutions we have established? What society are we building together, and what society do we want? In Europe, we stopped debating these questions a long time ago. For far too long, we have just been talking politics amongst ourselves. Unless we have a clear project, we will find it all the more difficult to recover from a third breakdown. It concerns Europe’s public debating chamber and representation. The legitimacy of any government is based largely upon the fact that its citizens recognise themselves in the way it signals its own existence, in the way it stages its policies so as to make them intelligible and in the light it throws on the issues it raises. It is becoming apparent that the European stage is dark, that we do not have the means to project our collective preferences, or to identify a political space. It is as though we were just beginning to realise that Europe is a political project, and that we have yet to invent the language it needs. Political violence is not ritualised on the European stage, as it is within the national spaces. Political battles are not fought by clearly identified champions supported by distinct political sides. The conflict is, at best and for a few feverish moments, restricted to a clash of national interests. And the reason why it is so difficult to ritualise political issues is that they are not yet associated with clearly identified political forces. European political forces have not (yet) emerged. Why not? Firstly because the European parties (the European Socialist Party and the European People’s Party are the most important) are, as yet, no more than remote outposts of national parties, and have been slow to establish themselves as autonomous trans-European political forces. The second reason is that political labels do not travel well – and partisan loyalties cannot be accurately reproduced on all European chess boards. The final reason is that Europe has for a long time been the product of a consensus between social democratic forces and Christian Democratic forces. It has made no attempt to dramatise the issues that are at stake. The audience is a long way from the stage, and it needs better lighting. What is more, the way democracy functions varies greatly from one country to another does nothing to facilitate or encourage the ability to project and identify with the European debates that take place in the European Parliament (the ‘Chamber’, so to speak) and the Council of Member States (the ‘Senate’, so to speak). What is more, not all Europeans 42 PASCAL LAMY structure the way they debate or represent political issues in the same way. Europe is dominated by two great structures: the coalition-based model on the one hand, and the binary-opposition model on the other. Democratic debates in, for instance, Britain and Germany do not use the same codes. The British have traditionally had head-on clashes between two clearly- identified sides, whilst the Germans sing the praises of their coalition culture because it promotes compromise. A parliamentary system that inevitably has to borrow from both models therefore looks very unfamiliar to the citizens of Europe. These very different functional logics, systems of representation and political languages mean that the citizens of Europe cannot identify European political issues. The absence of any script that can be read by all Europeans makes it difficult to identify and understand the signals European powers are sending out.

The lessons of Europe

In Europe, an innovative ‘technology of government’ has now gone far beyond the nation-state paradigm by introducing elements of a transnational government and by building a shared living space – and therefore a shared destiny – for the hitherto divided people of Europe. The model we are looking for is indeed democratic. Yet, despite the undeniable institutional progress that has been made, the citizens of Europe neither see it as democratic nor feel that it is democratic. We can learn two great lessons from the experiments that have been carried out in the European laboratory. The first is that there is an urgent need for Europe to produce tangible, quantifiable and concrete results that meet its citizens’ expectations; the second is that we need to make the political issues comprehensible to all. Both these great lessons teach us one thing: the European stage must be lit up by debates, compromises, and forms of arbitration that embody choices that have been made collectively and that facilitate a European project. The same lessons also apply to world governance. CHAPTER III

TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEBATE

The European experiment is therefore not a perfect model that can simply be exported to other continents in order to build the global political life we need so badly. Far from it. But it is the most successful attempt to-date to transcend national democracy. Both its successes and its failures can therefore guide us in our search for an ‘alternational’ democracy, or in other words for ways that allow democracies to exercise a different type of transnational power that can, democratically, visibly and transparently, address questions that concern the whole of humanity. Why have global questions become issues for democracy? In practice, the question of democracy arises only when the decisions taken by international actors oblige countries to act in ways that go against their national collective preferences. It arises in a much more acute form when, for example, the internationalisation of the economy means that we have to arbitrate between interests and values within the same country. Yes, we want cheap t-shirts, but not if they are made with forced labour; yes, we want smart, practical garden furniture, but not if it is made teak taken from a primal forest. The consumer and the moralist who lie dormant within us come into conflict. This is even more so when the values of one country come into conflict with the interests of another, as it can lead to potential trade disputes. This was, for example, the case when developing countries strongly opposed the inclusion of social norms in trade negotiations and argued that the developed countries wanted to use those norms to deny access to the producers of poor countries’ to their markets. In my own view, the objective is clear: when globalization in all its aspects makes arbitration between interests and values necessary, democracy has to be the arbitrator. The challenge is to identify common values that can prevail over conflicting identities. The emergence of a fragmentary and evolving ‘community’ based upon the idea of a common good and brought into existence by collective actions with respect to global public goods we have identified together is a way of giving democracy more power and a new meaning.

43 44 PASCAL LAMY

I do not propose to discuss institutional mechanisms. I am as tired of listening to the same old discussions of technical improvements and marginal changes to the present system as I am of listening to the speculative talk that would have us build a Frankenstein’s monster by borrowing from every existing system without bothering too much about its deformities. I am just as tired of listening to the same old discussions of utopia. I am therefore not going to outline yet another version of the universal polis, which is a sort of world democratic chimera. We are not starting from scratch. On the contrary, we have raw materials we can use. We can also capitalise on both the present archipelago of world governance – fragmentary as it may be – and 50 years of European construction. In my view, five elements provide the foundations for a democratic world governance. First, values. Values allow our feeling of belonging to a world community, embryonic as it may be, to coexist alongside national specificities. Second, we need actors who have sufficient legitimacy to get public opinion interested in the debate and who are capable of taking responsibility for its outcome. We need to define areas in which power can be exercised. We need mechanisms of governance that are truly effective. And, finally, we have to rely on the principles of transparency and solidarity. I offer a series of contributions to a debate that will allow us to construct each of these elements. Whilst they are mutually consistent, these suggestions do not constitute an “off the peg” system. Each of them is worth debating, and they do not necessarily all have to be implemented at the same time. I am not proposing an institutional revolution but, rather, a combination of global ambition and pragmatic suggestions. If we take this path we will be able not only to address the urgent questions facing the world, but also, perhaps, to breathe new life into our national democracies. To paraphrase Ferdinand Buisson, who was writing at the end of the nineteenth century, as we are all in the same boat, we cannot save ourselves individually.

Values

We now live in a global arena in which there are no shared values, except perhaps, ‘human rights.’ And the geometry of their interpretation is so variable that even they are surrounded by uncertainty. Now if we wish to construct a collective dimension, we have to want to live together. If we wish to build the ‘community’ we talk about so much, but which we find it 45 so hard to construct, the lesson of the European experiment is that the way to forge permanent links between nations – with different visions, cultures and social realities – is to project ourselves into a common future. It was the definition of such a project that has sustained Europeans up to now. How are we to create such a vision within a global arena? Can, in other words, diversity be transcended in such a way as to allow the ‘community of nations’ to become, thanks to a series of political measures, an ‘alternational’ community?

I: Global collective preferences

Globalization brings into contact peoples who have not always taken the same social choices. And when states state what they expect from the world-governance system, they have different priorities. There are many reasons for this: their history, their country’s level of development, the incompatible political and social projects they have drawn up, and so on. The only way to construct goods common to the whole of humanity and to give a meaning and a future to our policies and societies is to debate a ‘common’ project – even though anything that is ‘common’ on a global scale can only be ‘common’ in a limited sense. The controversies surrounding genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are a good illustration of these debates over different collective preferences. Some believe that they will improve the quality of the produce and the productivity of agriculture. Others insist that the spread of GM seeds poses a threat to the environment. So long as different countries imagine different risks, there will be contradictions between them. The GM question is therefore not so much a question of trade as a debate about risk management at both the national and the international levels. This debate cannot be avoided or evaded by technical measures. Debate must take place in public and must result in the expression of political choices. In this area, social concerns are intense and we must find a way of meeting them. Is this an illegitimate debate? I think not. Asking a state or people to abandon its collective preferences means its de facto exclusion from the international system. Assuming that they have been formulated in democratic terms, a preliminary recognition that such demands are legitimate is a precondition for any debate. And in the absence of any functional world government, we have to find other ways of identifying shared values. In the framework of a national 46 PASCAL LAMY democracy, citizens take an interest in the issues at stake because of the way the relationships between different sources of political power are brought to life on the stage. As we have seen, this does not happen at the international level: there is no equivalent debate. A debate about collective preferences is the only possible substitute. It will allow us to identify common goods in the strongest of senses. How are we to promote this debate? The vast majority of humanity has adopted values such as the right to health and education, and core labour standards. It is beginning to agree on how to identify common goods relating to concerns that cannot be addressed within the framework of national frontiers. This is true of environmental goods or, to take another contemporary issue, the question of migration and the global impact this is beginning to have: purely national responses are no longer considered adequate. A whole range of procedural devices could be used to stimulate the debate about our collective preferences – and I will mention some of them. But procedures alone are not enough. We have to decide which preferences are most important to us, where they sit in a hierarchy. And the hierarchy itself has to be a topic for debate; it too pertains to our choice of values.

II: Minimal norms

Given that we cannot achieve harmonisation in many domains – always assuming that harmonisation is needed in all domains, (and I am not convinced that it is) – we must first translate our common preferences into norms which, although their ambitions may be limited, are applicable to all. We then have to gradually raise the normative ceiling as our collective awareness of what is at stake becomes more heightened. The method used in Europe – to regulate working hours, for example – does not lead to a levelling down. It is a first step that makes it possible for collective preferences to live in peaceful coexistence as the threshold of expectations gradually rises. The ratchet effect of such norms guarantees that there can be no going back on the choices that have already been made by this or that society. The risk of backsliding can thereby be averted. The possibility of making further progress can thereby be maintained. Whether or not these different norms can be reconciled in the event of conflict remains to be seen. Reconciling them requires strict political arbitration, and not just technical competence on the part of some 47 international institution. In doing so, we cross the boundary between the norm-based governance that is now common practice at the international level, to choice-based government. Deciding how to reconcile two norms takes us to the very heart of political choice: arbitrating between different values. Let me give an example to illustrate my point: giving developing countries access to patent-protected drugs. How can we reconcile a medical emergency and the need to protect intellectual property rights, when we need them to finance future research? More to the point, how can we reconcile the two, given that in 1994, an agreement was reached on intellectual property that defined the exceptions too narrowly? In this case, the hierarchy of norms which prioritised intellectual property had to give way to a hierarchy of values which prioritised human life. As a result of the pressure brought to bear by the developing countries, with the support of the European Union, members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) adopted a more supple interpretation of the intellectual property agreement in the summer of 2003: developing countries that do not manufacture drugs but have to deal with major pandemics (AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis) are now allowed to set aside pharmaceutical patents and to import generics. It did, however, take two years of bitter and technically obscure debates before that agreement could be reached. Pessimists will see that as proof that it is impossible to make significant progress towards a better regulation of globalization. I do not share their view: the discussions were certainly difficult, but the outcome demonstrates that is possible to make collective choices at the global level, provided that we have the will power and the means to do so.

III: Collective world goods

Globalization can no longer be controlled by national institutions, and compensating for the failings of markets and states is therefore less important than it was. The goods that we choose to promote and defend collectively must therefore be defined in fine by a debate about shared values. These collective world goods provide the basis for world governance. Their systemic nature means that they are very different to the other objects of international cooperation: we have to appeal to the enlightened self-interest of all rather than to individual altruism. Collective global goods are defined by two criteria: the absence of consumer rivalry (whereby the amount I consume does not reduce the amount consumed by my neighbour) 48 PASCAL LAMY and the non-exclusion of potential consumers (whereby once the good has been produced, I cannot be prevented from consuming it). If, however, a collective good is to be ‘produced’ on a global scale, the need to produce it on that scale must first be demonstrated to be both useful and desirable; in short, the collectivity must express the appropriate collective preference. A collective good such as defence may, for example be pertinent at the national level, but it is much less pertinent at the world level because it does not meet both the above-mentioned criteria: we do not actually need to defend ourselves against extra-terrestrials (or perhaps I should say ‘not yet’). The capacity to produce the good in question must exist, preferably within existing institutions. This obviously raises the question of how to build collective trust. We then have to decide which collective goods are to be prioritised, and whether or not they have to be given greater priority than other goods. In environmental terms, protecting the ozone layer is one such collective good. In 1987 an international agreement was reached to ban CFC gases within 15 years;31 15 years after that agreement was reached, it was having discernible effects. The reduction of global warming is another example with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol – an international agreement on ways of reducing global warming. I take the view that we must, however, gradually identify other goods. Examples include: the reduction of acid rain, atmospheric pollution, desertification, and soil erosion in the environmental domain; access to water and to global fish stocks in the domain of access to resources; access to navigable waterways and maritime transport networks in the domain of shared transport infrastructures; preventing financial crises and halting the rise in organised crime in the financial sphere, and in health, the fight to stop the spread of infectious diseases (AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis).

Places

If we are to organise these debates on a democratic basis, we must also create and have places where power can be exercised and asserted.

31 For an extended discussion, see Laurence Tubiana and Jean-Michel Sévérino, ‘Biens public globaux, gouvernance mondiale et aide publique au développement’, in P. Jacquet, J. Pisani-Ferry and L. Tubiana, Gouvernance mondiale, Rapport de synthèse, Rapport du CAE, 37, Paris : La Documentation française, 2002. 49

IV: On regionalism

Regional structures that bring together a number of nation states are a first step towards alternational democracy. And yet there is nothing natural about regionalism: history is not a product of geography. Geography cannot transcend the long history of conflict between countries. But it does allow us to identify a collective living space, and it is probably easier to do so at the regional level than at the global level. ‘Actual solidarities’ are easier to identify and construct at the regional level. As I have already said so often, there was nothing obvious about the European project immediately after the Second World War. It required great will power to make the leap of faith involved. Europe had to devise mechanisms to promote a rapprochement and mutual trust based upon tangible elements such as common policies that could define concrete common interests and a new body – the European Commission – that could define and defend a European general interest. Many countries are, like the Europe of the ‘common market’ established by the Treaty of Rome, using trade as a vector for regional integration. It was the desire for a commercial union that brought the countries of South- East Asia together in ASEAN. The fight against terrorism has heightened the feeling that they share a common regional identity, as has the new omnipresence of China. Africa took a different path long ago. As it emerged from the ruins of colonialism, West Africa found itself in the novel situation of establishing a monetary union in the absence of any economic or commercial union. The CFA franc was a single currency that circulated in many countries long before Europeans succeeded in giving birth to the Euro. Attempts to create the corresponding economic or political structures have so far ended in failure, partly because France, as the former colonial power, acts as the ultimate guarantor of regional stability. The recent establishment of an ‘African Union’ and the clear assertion of its economic and commercial goals mark the beginning of a major project. And a new energy is being invested in the establishment of regional African sub-structures that are authentic intermediary stages. Outside Europe, Mercosur has been the most successful experiment to date. It was a product of the fall of the region’s dictatorships, and its stated ambition is to prevent war between nations that have all experienced the excesses of nationalism. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay are now trying to get beyond trade agreements by achieving a real political and economic convergence. The fact that Mercosur has had discussions with the 50 PASCAL LAMY

European Union about an ambitious partnership agreement is sign of its ambition. Successful negotiations between the two regional structures would represent a major step forward, and would demonstrate that regionalism is an essential component of global governance. In the same way that Jean Monnet began to build the Europe of tomorrow’s world, the future projects of these embryonic regional structures already transcend their actual frontiers. They are a response to the new order created by globalization. Any structure that wishes to play a role on this stage must achieve a certain critical mass; states such as the United States, China and India, which already have a continental dimension, are the exception. Sharing sovereignty is a way of meeting the challenge together. It is obviously easier for states of the same region to effect rapprochements – even though that truism does not have the validity of a general rule: we have only to think of the extraordinary popularity of the political slogan of ‘pan-Arabism’, and of the complete shipwreck of the project. We have only to think of the difficulties faced by Canada or Australia as they attempt to regulate relations with their immediate neighbours. We have only to think of the bloody wars that are tearing apart central Africa. But, because states in the same region share a space that has determined their history and because they share some elements of a political culture and, in some cases, economic features, demographic trends and linguistic similarities, they can be expected to make easier progress towards a rapprochement, common policies and joint sovereignty. Assuming, of course, that they are willing to do so. It is easier and quicker to build such structures when they are based upon a common culture: the Chinese diaspora of South-East Asia has, for example, established a closely-knit mesh of economic, human and cultural networks that takes no notice of the notion of frontier between the region’s states. Regional structures also provide raw materials that can be recycled at a world level. As they converge, their members begin to adopt a common stance, and that is a helpful first step in the direction of a global debate. These regional groupings allow the work of synthesis to begin. They are laboratories in which collective preferences can begin to be compared, where collective choices can be put to the test, where compromises can be reached and where suspicions can be overcome. Their position will become clearer and better defined when the time comes to discuss global issues at the international level. 51

Regional structures therefore make it possible to begin the political task of effecting a rapprochement between societies and their choices (which clarify the collective preferences of their peoples). When transposed to the international stage, it will allow them to clarify and strengthen their positions. The positions adopted by the European Union with respect to external trade policy – a policy adopted when the Treaty of Rome was signed – are the products of 50 years of debates and internal convergence; that is why the EU is now united and, in this domain at least, capable of adopting clear international positions that all its partners can understand.

V: Subsidiarity

The debate about values must also look into the pertinence of levels of political intervention in a world where power exists at so many levels. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty made the principle of subsidiarity fashionable again. Europe was facing a growth crisis and had to demonstrate that it was not trying to abrogate all the competence of its Member States. But, as historians know, subsidiarity is a common-sense principle with a long genealogy: policies are implemented at the level where they are needed and where they can be effective. The principle of subsidiarity is based upon a compromise between democratic proximity to citizens and political efficiency. The same applies at the world level. A world regulatory system with a strong centralising element would be alien to the spirit of democracy. The adoption of the subsidiarity principle makes it possible both to resist the temptation to concentrate power at the level of the State, and to meet the expectations we have of legitimate and effective political action. In a system based upon subsidiarity, power is wielded at the appropriate level, and interventions are therefore more likely to be effective. What is the appropriate criterion for subsidiarity? Action taken at the international level is legitimised by the emergence of questions to resolve at that level. Its legitimacy is then obvious because action has to be taken and because the need for action is then obvious to all. The example of European environmental law is a good example of this principle of emergence. It came into being thanks to Europe. Faced with environmental questions on a global and continental scale, the European Union began, from the 1970s onwards, to take responsibility for them at a time when environmental policy was not a central issue for national governments. Isolated and often powerless to influence their own governments, the ministers for the environment met in Brussels in 52 PASCAL LAMY order to devise the appropriate tools and define a field for legislative action. A policy was worked out and laws were devised at the appropriate level of governance, or in other words at a level where it was possible to identify problems that were not visible at lower levels. The legitimacy of action taken at the European level was therefore based upon the emergence, at that level, of questions that were not part of any national grammar, but which, when raised at the appropriate level, trickled down to the national level. No one would now challenge the importance of the political position ministers of the environment have within national governments. But it was action at a supranational level that gave them that position.

VI: Sites of coherence

Having more authoritative rules is not enough if the institutions that produce them and instil respect them for remain fragmented and if citizens cannot understand the “architecture” of such rules. There is no place within today’s system of global governance that has the coherence we need or that can facilitate the arbitration we need. Institutions remain isolated from one another, and do not have the ability to act together in the pursuit of common objectives. If we assume that the coherence of a national government can simply be transposed to other levels, we fail to realise that the positions of the ILO are not consistent with those of the WTO. Hence our collective inability to reach a satisfactory compromise between trade and social norms. The ‘horizontal’ question of relations between institutions goes hand in hand with that of achieving a more satisfactory ‘vertical’ consistency between the global level, the level of regional unions and the level of states. This is not a matter of turning international institutions into super- ministries that can intervene at every level – global, regional and national – but of finding a satisfactory way to articulate these levels so as to ensure that government-approved European and international rules are taken into account, are adopted inside national political systems. We also have to fill in the strange gaps that exist within the global system. The most obvious need is for a World Environmental Organisation and for an International Migration Agency. As Jacques Delors has suggested on so many occasions, we also have to establish an Economic Security Council, or what I would prefer to call a ‘World Council on Sustainable Development’. That Council’s mission would 53 be to resolve disputes that arise between ‘sectoral’ international institutions, to launch global initiatives and to ensure that they are implemented if and when agreed. There would be no permanent members with a right of veto; but such a Council should be made up of representatives from all continents (ideally, they would be designated by structured regional bodies). The heads of ‘sectoral’ international institutions would have observer status.

Actors

Once we have drawn up the project, identified the need for norms and applied the principle of subsidiarity, one essential decision remains to be made: do we want world governance to be the prerogative of diplomacy or the prerogative of politics? In my view, the answer is obvious: we need a common and representative debating chamber because there can be no collective appropriation of political will without it. We will not succeed in creating a real international ‘community’ unless we make a determined effort to create such an arena.

VII: Global actors

Big international meetings – the famous summits – are not places for political action. They are a theatre for delicate negotiations, for the ambiguous amendment of texts prepared months in advance, for advances that can be measured in millimetres and for stealthy retreats dressed up in formulae that are supposed to let everyone go home feeling victorious. The heads of state and government, and the ministers or ambassadors who address them are defending the legitimate interests of those who mandated them. They are not actors who deal with global issues. The traditional political countervailing powers – parliaments or representatives of civil society – are not represented at summits, except in informal fashion by groups of delegates or observers. Even when they do attempt to structure themselves at this level – as the trade unions did when they formed the European Confederation of Trade Unions or the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions – these actors are not adequately represented in either the debates or the decision-making process. The first, and relatively simple, steps that we have to take towards a more balanced representation of the world would be to encourage the 54 PASCAL LAMY establishment of parliamentary structures at the international level in order to bring together representatives from various national parliaments, and to admit representatives of civil society to an economic and social council capable of functioning as an effective UNECSOC.32 Various formulae have been suggested. In the framework of negotiations towards agreements between Europe and the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), a joint parliamentary assembly was established; and debates with representatives of parliaments and civil society have been organised at WTO ministerial conferences. These experiments have all proved positive. They should be extended to other institutions, We also have to go further than this by helping to build a stage on which both the terms of the debate, and the issues can be seen by all. As in Europe, the absence of any clear and deliberate way of staging the debates that have to take place, or the failure to dramatise the collective choices that have to be made, is detrimental to international life. There are no well known actors on the stage, and no clearly identifiable symbolic figures who can present the political issues to the citizens of the world. The issues need faces. They need to be identified with men and women who, thanks to the way they look, their language, their personal credibility or their speaking ability, can represent interests that are so general as to verge, at times, on the abstract. I think Kofi Annan succeeds in this respect. Gro Harlem Brundtland did so during her term as the WHO’s Director General. The ILO’s Juan Somavia, Sadaki Ogata and Alpha Konar, who chaired the Commission of the African Union were able to do the same. World democracy needs more faces like these.

VIII: Results

We judge trees by their fruit, not by their leaves. The information society in which we live overrates the short-term and likes to see the emergence of green shoots, even though there is a danger that they will quickly turn into dead leaves. It took over 10 years before we could evaluate the first effects of the measures taken to preserve the ozone layer, and the effect of trade policies has to be judged on the same time-scale. The effects of the measures that must be taken against global warning will be quantifiable in 100 years. And the issues surrounding storage and reprocessing of some of

33 UN Economic and Social Council. 55 the waste products from our nuclear power stations will take us well beyond the next millennium. We therefore have to find ways to demonstrate that some interim results have been achieved, and to draw up scenarios that will allow public opinion to judge the effectiveness of the measures taken. This type of approach was successfully used when Europe established a single market and introduced the single currency: an objective based upon a common interest was clearly identified, a calendar was drawn up from the start, and a system of incentives and sanctions was introduced to guarantee the collective dynamic. Tools were gradually designed, and developed to embody the objectives, to evaluate the achievements and to transform statements of intent into planned concrete interventions. This is what Kofi Anan is gambling on with his ‘Millenium objectives’, and what African leaders are gambling on with the NEPAD benchmarks (New Partnership for Africa’s Development).33

Mechanisms of real governance

Distance reduces legitimacy. A mathematician would say that legitimacy is inversely – and probably exponentially – proportional to the distance between a government and its citizens. We must therefore compensate for this distance by proportionately increasing its political recognition factor and visibility. This is what our day to day experience teaches us: the closer we are to power, the more easily we can identify it. The general perception is that power is in the hands of local politicians and those who wear the insignia of national unity and state power. When we move up the scale, as in the case of Europe, the need for legitimacy increases as we move further away from its source. In the context of the present discussion, this “law” tells us what we need to do: to find ways of making alternational power all the more legitimate because it is, by its very nature, so far away. If we want democracy to be the organisational principle behind world governance, we will have to build it.

33 Jean François Rischard, Vice-President of the World Bank for Europe, has also drawn up a convincing battery of indicators in his most recent book. See his High Noon: 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them, New York: Basic Books, 2003. 56 PASCAL LAMY

IX: Majorities

The basic majority principle is ‘one citizen, one vote’, ‘one State, one vote’. The representativeness guaranteed by this principle has established the least unsatisfactory of all the systems that coexist within the international sphere. It is this principle that gives the WTO, for example, a certain comparative advantage. But this does not necessarily means that the system is democratic, or that it works well. If democracy presupposes the ability both to produce a majority that is in favour of a given policy and to ensure that voters accept that majority decision, it is clear that we have yet to solve the problem of democracy in this context. We therefore have to agree to the following premise: if we are to avoid the danger – and it is considerable – of vacuity, we have to take a new look at formal democracy. We have to consider this if we are to improve the inefficiency of world governance at a time when social and social demands are rising, and when these institutions look less and less legitimate to a public that is quite entitled to demand results. Steps are being taken to ensure that the representation of actors is weighted more effectively. I am thinking of, for example, the current discussions about admitting India or Brazil to the UN Security Council. If, however, we wish to get out of the usual rut and ensure that voters actually agree to abide by majority decisions, we have to envisage making a qualitative leap: if the simple majority principle is inadequate, we have to look at it again and devise other types of majority. When it was faced with that question, Europe, at its start, did make such a leap. And with the constitutional treaty drawn up by the Convention, it is proposing to follow through this logic: decisions will be taken by a majority of states representing at least 60 per cent of the EU population. Revised voting systems that abandon the principle that all States are mathematically equal, or which combine it with demographic or geographical weighting, are two of the ways in which we may be able to persuade all actors to take a new interest in the international sphere.

Taking the initiative

Setting the system in motion and reducing the level of suspicion means making the ability to take initiatives central to the international system. Until now, the principle governing the way sovereign states act on the 57 international stage has been the principle of suspicion. International diplomacy could take as its slogan the phrase ‘your country has no friends for ever, and no enemies for ever’. Elements of collective trust have of course developed within the international relations system. International law has, in some cases, been able to police the brutality of state-to-state relations. Yet we cannot avoid the conclusion that suspicion is still a structuring factor in international relations. If we want to live together, we have to reduce the level of suspicion. What could be done on a regional scale in Europe when the Commission was established would, as things stand, be difficult to achieve on a world scale. For the foreseeable future, the world unlikely to become as fully integrated as the European Union. We have to advance one step at a time and ensure there is a basic level of trust in every international organisation that can put forward initiatives, reach compromises and propose solutions. The UN Secretary-General can play that role, assuming that the permanent members of the Security Council allow him to do so. Similarly, the Directors of the World Bank have the power to kick start their institutions. So, to a lesser extent, do the Directors General of the ILO and the WHO. The Director-General of the WTO, on the other hand, does not have that power because the consensus principle – however important in terms of the ethos of the WTO – makes it formally difficult for him to take real initiatives.

XI: Mechanisms for the arbitration of disputes

These could also be described as mechanisms that guarantee that the rules are respected, or as a form of international justice. Debates about the humanitarian right to intervene and about the repression of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the 1990s led to the establishment of International Criminal Tribunals (ICT) for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The International Criminal Court will make this a permanent development. In the area of trade, we now have several years of experience. It was in fact only the establishment of the WTO in 1994 that gave states a mechanism to make the settlement of disputes binding. This mechanism is an essential part of the trade system’s credibility. It gives all members a guarantee that their rights will be protected against abuses and infractions of the common rules. Any state can have the United States or the European Union, for example, condemned for breaking those rules. In 2003, Europe forced the United States to withdraw the measures it had introduced to protect its 58 PASCAL LAMY steel industry because they were detrimental to companies and workers in other countries. Peru has forced the European Union to revise what was ruled to be a protectionist definition of sardines. These mechanisms are essential if we wish to improve the system’s efficiency. They do, on the other hand, raise some delicate questions about legitimacy. What legitimacy does an expert sitting on an arbitration panel have, when compared with an elected representative of a sovereign state? Why should an ICT be in a better position to judge a war criminal than a national court? How can national authorities be made to accept the decisions of an International Criminal Court? There is one simple answer to these questions: it all depends upon the legitimacy of the rules that are being applied. And if they are to be legitimate, three preconditions must, I think, be met: the mechanisms whereby the rules are adopted must be democratic; the rules must be observed at the national level; they must pertain only to the areas in which the international organisation concerned is competent. If these preconditions are met, we can ward off the spectre of ‘government’ by international judges and, at the same time, retain the ability to compel nation states to respect accepted norms.

On Principles XII: Transparency

I am not one of transparency’s ayatollahs. Globalization, which is based upon the increasingly rapid dissemination of information, creates the illusion of transparency. All too often, the prevailing impression is that a mere knowledge of the facts is enough to create checks and balances and to ensure that democracy will function properly. Let us be quite clear about this. The spread of information, transparency of action and the ability of checks and balances to play their role are a sine qua non of democratic life. Without them, there is too great a danger that the executive will become too powerful, too autonomous and will lose touch with reality. We cannot, however, leave matters there. To do so would be tantamount to endorsing a purely liberal view of public action. As long ago as the nineteenth century, Guizot was arguing that the main reform that was needed was to make the state ‘more public’. In today’s climate, transparency must be associated with the bigger role given to checks and balances. This is not to say that they should take the place of the executive: democracy means that 59 responsibilities have to be identified and shouldered, and that the executive must not merge into the legislature or civil society, as that would undo all the good work that has been done. Transparency must therefore exist at every level of the decision-making process, and the counter opinions must be taken into account at every stage. Before mandates are given and before positions are adopted within the international arena, national parliaments and civil society must be consulted on a systematic basis. Detailed information must be made available during the main stages of the negotiating and decision-making process. And finally, the relevant watchdogs must voice their opinion or, in the case of parliaments, ratify the outcome. This permanent link with representatives of states or society is essential, if we are to convince our fellow citizens that they should have greater faith in the international system. At any given moment we have to make choices in the full knowledge of the facts, and be answerable to public opinion. Clearly defined choices, without any a priori judgement, will gradually reduce its legitimate suspicions of ill-defined powers.

XIII: Solidarity

Democracy cannot exist in the absence of solidarity. A system based upon universal suffrage implies universal involvement in the outcome of collective actions. Unlike some, I do not regard globalization as a machine that is designed to destroy all solidarity. Globalization is not destiny; it is a force to be made to serve the common good. From that point of view, the governments of the day reacted to the ‘first globalization’ that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth by reconciling trade with solidarity. They abandoned protectionism so as to encourage growth. But they also used every means at their disposal to ensure that growth promoted the redistribution of wealth. Progressive taxes on income were introduced, together with an inheritance tax. Similarly, the first social legislation emerged when Germany passed a law on industrial accidents in 1884, and when France adopted laws on the 10-hour day in 1900 and on pensions in 1910. Critics were already complaining loudly that these laws jeopardised the stability of the currency and the competitiveness of the economy. Their objections were overruled – rightly so, as we now know from experience. We now have to go back to that philosophy. We must also have an element of redistribution on a world scale and mechanisms to promote 60 PASCAL LAMY solidarity at a national level, as they are still of vital importance. The principle of subsidiarity obviously means that we do not have to develop mechanisms for education, pensions or housing at the supra-national level, but we do have a responsibility to see that the management of global public goods is based on solidarity. Taxation is not the answer to everything. In terms of the environment, it would be more appropriate to establish a link between liabilities and capacities. Given their wealth and technological capabilities, the developed countries have a special responsibility for cutting emissions of greenhouse gases, mainly by changing the way they consume energy. That would allow poorer countries to develop without upsetting the global environmental balance. When, however, we turn to the fight against poverty and disease, forms of financial solidarity are needed. Some already exist. The fight against AIDS is funded globally. At every summit, heads of state proclaim the need to make more public funds available for development. Every natural disaster gives rise to humanitarian relief operations that are widely publicised in the media. Whilst they are positive, we should have no illusions about the importance of such initiatives. They are sometimes influenced by the colonial past. State development aid is also sometimes used for political and diplomatic purposes, though that practice is beginning to die out thanks to the European Union’s attempts to change some of its member states’ political habits. More serious still, such actions follow the logic of charity, rather than that of a truly resolute solidarity involving all countries. We will have to go beyond this logic in the future. And it is well known that democracy has the means to do so: taxation. Taxation has always been closely associated with the democratic idea and with solidarity. Taxation provides the basis for a self-defined collectivity which wishes to act as a community. Thinking about the question of world taxation has made great progress in recent years, thanks largely to the debate about the Tobin tax. Attractive as it seems in theoretical terms, it seems to me that such a tax will get us nowhere as a low level of taxation will have no impact on the movement of so-called speculative capital so long as hopes of making a profit remain high. That is why I would rather see a tax on capital gains – in the form of a levy34 – than on foreign currency transactions. The European Union could lend such a tax greater credibility by introducing a European company tax; it could replace national company taxes and put an end to the

34 Jacquet, Pisani-Ferry and Tubiana, in Gouvernance mondiale, speak of levying a company tax. 61 way European companies use ‘fiscal tourism’ as a form of competition. Taxes could also be raised from other sources, and perhaps more easily. There have been proposals to tax the arms trade, or income from minerals and raw materials extracted from regions that belong to no one.35 The suggestion box is full. All we have to do know is to make use of it. Getting rid of structures that undermine solidarity from within would be a first step. Over a long period of time we have, consciously or otherwise, allowed black holes to develop. They pose a financial threat to solidarity at the national level. I think in particular of the tax havens that promise tax exemption to savers or companies who are concerned only with profit, and of the tax immunity guaranteed by the banks’ code of confidentiality. The capital they attract avoid national systems of taxation, reduce the resources of states and transfer the burden of financing public services to labour. In recent years the Financial Task Force (FATF) has helped to improve the situation by publishing a list of ‘non-cooperative’ states and territories, and it now plays an important role the fight against the laundering of dirty money. The FATF, which was established by world economic summits, demonstrates that the present system is, slowly and painfully, beginning to generate some elements of governance. There is still a long way to go. Removing the secrecy surrounding some banks would be a good way to begin. If that cannot be done, a levy on capital gains could be introduced. It could either be paid to the state from which the capitals originated, or used to finance a development fund managed by the World Bank. If we can make the redistribution of wealth amongst peoples – on even a minor scale – a central aspect of international action, we can get back to the sources of what anthropologists call the economy of the gift. The developed countries have received a lot in the past and have accumulated many financial, technological and human assets; they should now take responsibility for financing development in a real sense. At the moment, there is a soft consensus, punctuated with a few statements of good intent. We have to break that taboo.

35 See the suggestions made by, for example, President Lula, Michel Camdessus, Jean-Louis Bianco and Jean- Michel Sévérino.

CONCLUSION

TOWARDS A WORLD COMMUNITY

These suggestions do not constitute a global plan. But they certainly do contain an overall vision: that of the common good and of community. The building of a community is, in my view, the fruit of democracy. Democracy is probably the most precious of all human achievements. Democracy is a freedom that we can experience together. As we know, it is a precondition for reducing poverty, ending armed conflicts and fighting injustice. But it will not survive unless we can completely rework the forms history has given it. I believe that we must devise new forms and give them a concrete meaning as a matter of urgency if we are to stop a haemorrhage that, in the age of globalization, poses a threat to the very existence of democracy. Some will object that this is a frighteningly difficult task. I agree, and I am well aware of the dangers, the complexity and even the incongruity of this undertaking for both our European societies and other forms of society, and for the very different political, cultural and religious visions that have to be mobilised. We must, however, try, in the full knowledge that building the complete edifice will be no more than an ambitious dream for a long time to come. If we are to advance, we have to accept that we can advance only one step at a time, that we must enter the debate and be prepared to compromise. We have the raw materials. They cannot be overlooked and must be invested. The most important is the UN system of governance. Over half a century after the Second World War, the UN and the family of nations it brings together is the only available agora on the planet. Although it is incomplete, imperfect, open to criticism and shaken by regular crises, the ‘UN system’ is our starting point. We now have to take a new look at its foundations and structures and, most important of all, involve the greatest possible number in making it the capital of world democracy. I offer these suggestions. I leave it to others to make others. But we cannot ignore this building site: it belongs to our generation of men and women, both in Europe and throughout the world. And it is a matter of great urgency.

63 T O W A R D S W O R L D D E M O C R A C Y P A S C A L L A M Y

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