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On System Safety and Reliability Methods in Early Design Phases LINKÖPING STUDIES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY THESIS NO. 1600 ON SYSTEM SAFETY AND RELIABILITY METHODS IN EARLY DESIGN PHASES Cost Focused Optimization Applied on Aircraft Systems Cristina Johansson Copyright © Cristina Johansson, 2013 [email protected] http://www.iei.liu.se/machine/cristina-johansson/home?l=en On System Safety and Reliability in Early Design Phases Linköping Studies in Science and Technology, Thesis No. 1600 ISBN 978-91-7519-584-1 ISSN 0280-7971 LIU-TEK-LIC-2013:34 Printed by: LiU-Tryck, Linköping, 2013 Linköping University Division of Machine Design Department of Management and Engineering SE-581 83 Linköping, Sweden Only those who will risk going too far can possibly find out how far one can go. – T.S. Eliot 1888 Abstract YSTEM Safety and Reliability are fundamental to system design and involve a S quantitative assessment prior to system development. An accurate prediction of reliability and system safety in a new product before it is manufactured and marketed is necessary as it allows us to forecast accurately the support costs, warranty costs, spare parts requirements, etc. On the other hand, it can be argued that an accurate prediction implies knowledge about failures that is rarely there in early design phases. Furthermore, while predictions of system performance can be made with credible precision, within reasonable tolerances, reliability and system safety are seldom predicted with high accuracy and confidence. How well a product meets its performance requirements depends on various characteristics such as quality, reliability, availability, safety, and efficiency. But to produce a reliable product we may have to incur increased cost of design and manufacturing. Balancing such requirements, that are often contradictory, is also a necessary step in product development. This step can be performed using different optimization techniques. This thesis is an attempt to develop a methodology for analysis and optimization of system safety and reliability in early design phases. A theoretical framework and context are presented in the first part of the thesis, including system safety and reliability methods and optimization techniques. Each of these topics is presented in its own chapter. The second and third parts are dedicated to contributions and papers. Three papers are included in the third part; the first evaluates the applicability of reliability methods in early design phases, the second is a proposed guideline for how to choose the right reliability method, and the third suggests a method to balance the safety requirements, reliability goals, and costs. i Acknowledgements HE work presented in this licentiate thesis was carried out in the form of an industrial PhD T project at the Division of Machine Design at the Department of Management and Engineering (IEI) at Linköping University. The research was funded by VINNOVA’s National Aviation Research Programme (NFFP) and Saab Aeronautics. First of all, I’d like to thank my supervisor Prof. Johan Ölvander for his efforts in reviewing, discussing, and directing the research and for excellent guidance through the academic world. I also want to thank my industrial-supervisor Tech. Lic. Per Persson for always be open to discussions and providing rational advice from an industrial point of view as well as for the effort in reviewing. I thank the senior researcher involved in this project, Dr. Micael Derelöv for the guidance and advice from an academic and industrial point of view. I want to thank my colleagues at Saab Aeronautics, Division of System Safety and Reliability and Tech. Fellow Lars Holmlund for their support and sharing with me from their field experience within System Safety and the aviation industry. Special thanks go to my line manager Johan Tengroth for understanding and protecting my academic studies from drowning in industrial assignments. I also want to thank Dr. Birgitta Lantto for her help and support to start this project. I wouldn’t be here without her advice. Thanks also go to Dr. Hampus Gavel for inspiring me to start this project and letting me know that everything is possible. I want to give special mention to a mentor and former colleague I had the privilege of working with, Mr. Manfred Stein, who inspired my choice of career. To my family thanks for believing in me. Cristina Johansson May 2013 iii Appended Papers HE following papers are appended and will be referred to by their Roman numerals. The T papers are printed in their originally published state, except for changes in formatting and correction of minor errata. [I] Johansson, C; Persson, P; Ölvander, J. (2012), ‘On The Usage Of Reliability Methods In Early Design Phases, proceedings of PSAM11&ESREL2012, 25-29 June, Helsinki, Finland. [II] Johansson, C; Persson, P; Ölvander, J (2013), Choosing The Reliability Approach - A Guideline For Selecting The Appropriate Reliability Method In The Design Process, proceeding of Advances in Risk and Reliability Technology Symposium 2013, 21- 23 May, Nottingham, UK [III] Johansson, C; Persson, P; Derelöv, M; Ölvander, J (2013), Cost optimization with focus on reliability and system safety, proceeding of ESREL2013, 29 Sep- 02 Oct., Amsterdam, Holland v The following report is not included in the thesis but constitute an important part of the background. [IV] Johansson, C., (2010), A Review of the Reliability and System Safety Methods and Principles in Early Design Phases, Registration no. TDI-2010-0082 at Saab Aeronautics, Linköping, Sweden vi Contents 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Background ................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Product Development ................................................................................................... 2 1.3 Objectives ...................................................................................................................... 3 1.4 Research Questions and Method .................................................................................. 4 1.5 Thesis Outline ............................................................................................................... 5 2 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING 7 2.1 Reliability Analysis ....................................................................................................... 8 2.2 Methods and Techniques ............................................................................................... 9 2.2.1 The “Part Count” Approach ............................................................................... 10 2.2.2 Stress-Strength analysis ....................................................................................... 11 2.2.3 Parts derating and selection ................................................................................ 11 2.2.4 Functional Analysis ............................................................................................. 12 2.2.5 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) ..................................................... 13 2.2.6 Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) ....................................................................... 13 2.2.7 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) ................................................................................. 15 2.2.8 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) .................................................................................. 15 2.2.9 Markov Chains Models (MA) ............................................................................. 18 2.2.10 Petri Nets (PN) ............................................................................................... 20 3 SYSTEM SAFETY 23 3.1 Methods and Techniques ............................................................................................. 24 3.1.1 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) ................................ 25 3.1.2 Double Failure Matrix (DFM) ............................................................................ 25 3.1.3 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) ................................................................................. 26 3.1.4 Common Cause Analysis (CCA) ......................................................................... 27 3.1.4.1 Zonal (Hazard) Analysis (ZA or ZHA) ........................................................... 27 3.1.4.2 Common Mode Fault (CMF) .......................................................................... 28 3.1.4.3 Common Cause Failures (CCF) ...................................................................... 28 3.1.5 Hazard Analysis ................................................................................................... 29 3.1.5.1 Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) ............................................................ 29 3.1.5.2 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)............................................................... 30 3.1.5.3 Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA) ......................................................................... 30 3.2 Standards and Regulations ......................................................................................... 31 4 OPTIMIZATION 33 4.1 Genetic Algorithm ....................................................................................................... 34 vii 5 APPLICATION OF SYSTEM SAFETY AND RELIABILITY METHODS IN EARLY DESIGN PHASES 39 5.1 Usage of Reliability Methods in Early Design Phases ................................................ 39 5.2 Research versus Industry ...........................................................................................
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