2018

Assad–Assad’sConscience–theEconomy–the IMF –Hydrocarbons

After six years of civil war, in 2017 Syria is a sadly devastated country. Over 400,000 people had been killed and many others had died due to a lack of med- ical facilities. Well over six million Syrians, one-quarter of the population, had left the country, seeking refuge in neighbouring states – especially , Iraq and Jordan. Nearly one million Syrians set off on dangerous migration routes to Europe, often via North Africa. As the fighting continued many more looked likely to follow. Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations (UN) special en- voy tasked with the almost hopeless task of seeking a peaceful resolution of the Syrian conflict described the situation as possibly ‘the beginning of the end of the war’; but doubted that ‘it was the beginning of peace.’ Mr de Mistura, had succeeded Lakhdar Brahimi (who had resigned) in the peace-facilitation role. BeforeMrBrahimi’sspell, KofiAnnanhadfilledtherole.

Idlib If indeed the war had ‘ground to a halt’ there were, according to Mr de Mistura, three places where warfare continued. However, the warfare was not between the Syrian government and the rebel opposition, but between the so-called Is- lamic State (IS, also known as Daesh) and differing combinations of armed forces. Thus, it was thought likely that in Raqqa, the combination of United States’ special forces and the Syrian Defence Force (SDF) would defeat the re- maining IS forcesbeforetheendof2017. In Deir ez-Zor where 200,000 people were surrounded by IS forces, it looked likely that the combination of Syrian and Russian forces would continue to make inroads against the IS. This left the city of Idlib where rebel al-Nusra (an al-Qaedaaffiliate)forcesstillheldsway. Idlib underlined one of the principal challenges confronting the Syrian gov- ernment. There would be little point in ‘liberating’ any of the three IS controlled cities if the IS or al-Qaeda forces were subsequently allowed to filter back. By ex- tension, unless an inclusive (Shi’a and Sunni) post-war government system was to be established, Syria would almost certainly return to civil war. To avoid an endless civil war, a political process would need to be established. This would require the disengagement of a host of militia answering to almost as many masters,bothwithinSyriaandabroad.

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Furthermore, the nations participating in the war against IS and Al-Qaeda will not do so indefinitely. Russia, casting its mind back to Afghanistan, needs an exit strategy. A beneficial by-product of this growing awareness is that for- eign powers are beginning to join forces to discuss their future involvement. Al- though the Astana meeting in mid-2017 ended without agreement, the de-escalation zones and the question of which countries would help maintain them, remained under discussion. But at least there was some agreement be- tween Russia, Turkey and Iran. In the south of Syria, Jordan, the US and Russia also made progress in reaching an agreement. Despite its fractious relationship with the Kurds, Turkey was at least talking. Further deals did not look impossi- ble.

TooManyCooks? Part of the problem is the very number of countries involved in the process, all with differing agenda. France, Iran, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) all have specific interests, but are increasingly united by their common in- terestindefeating IS. The question of whether President Bashar al-Assad should have any role in a putative political process remained vexed in 2017. In the view of the UN’s Mr Mistura the prospect of fair elections if the discredited President were at all in- volved was ‘fanciful’. However much support Assad might claim, he is disliked by most Syrians. It is doubtful that Assad would have anything to do with an election that he might lose. And any reconstruction of Syria would also first re- quirecommitmentsastowhowouldpay. President Assad’s simple view was that with the help of the Russians, whose support had been decisive, the rump government was ‘winning’ the war. It cer- tainly suited Assad to have other countries sorting out the problem for him. But the prospects were bleak; in the view of Jeremy Bowen, the BBC’s Editor, if Syria does not engage in a just, properly democratic political process, itrisks‘becominganincubatorfor Sunniextremism.’ In 2017 there were growing rumours that some Western governments no longer required the departure of President Assad as a precondition of a newly elected regime. It was seemingly impossible that any new government could be held without the involvement of the Ba’ath party. Whether Assad’s participa- tionwouldbeseenasatransitionalarrangementremainedinquestion. Assad’s participation, however, was no longer seen by all as a merely transi- tional arrangement. IS and other terrorist groups were never part of the Syrian revolution. Much of the fighting opposition is Wahaabi Salafist extremist and is not wanted by the Syrian population. An increasing number of Syrians are no