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1 PHL2009: Studies in Ancient Philosophy Plato's Ethics: The 1 Rachel Barney PHL2009: Plato's Ethics: The Virtues One by One Fall 2011 PHL2009: Studies in Ancient Philosophy Plato's Ethics: The Virtues One by One Tues. 12:00-3:00 JHB 418 Prof. Rachel Barney Office: Rm. 426, Jackman Humanities Building, 170 St. George (I can also often be found in JHB 404, and rarely at Lillian Massey 131) Office Hours: Thurs. 3:00-4:00 or by appointment [email protected] In this course we will read several of Plato's early 'Socratic' dialogues in as much depth as time permits, with the aim of coming to understand some of their central questions, principles and methods. After a brief overview by way of the Meno, we will focus on the Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, and Euthydemus, with glances at other dialogues and at the secondary literature as relevant; we will end with a look at the Hippias Minor, which presents a powerful challenge to their collective results. What these four dialogues have in common is that they depict Socrates investigating the nature, not of virtue as such, but of a specific virtue: piety [to hosion] in the Euthyphro, courage [andreia] in the Laches, temperance [sôphrosunê] in the Charmides, and wisdom [sophia] in the Euthydemus. (This last is somewhat controversial, like any claim about what the Euthydemus is fundamentally about). They also display strong family resemblances (though again the Euthydemus is an outlier). These include a connection to everyday practical dilemmas and/or questions about education; the interrogation of a claimant to the virtue in question; the deployment of Socratic dialectic to examine definitions of that virtue; a pattern in which those definitions become increasingly sophisticated, moving from non-co-extensive to coextensive, from behavioural to psychological, and from non-cognitive to cognitive; and the result that despite this trajectory no adequate definition is found, so that the dialogue ends in aporia, a state of being at a loss. Moreover, a common solution to the aporia seems to hinted at: each of the recognised virtues, Plato suggests, are best understood as a single thing, knowledge -- more specifically, the knowledge of goods and evils -- understood as a technê or skill. This account of virtue is arguably confirmed in the Protagoras and Meno, which discuss virtue as a whole. Yet those dialogues also complicate the picture -- the Meno by suggesting that true opinion can also be a kind of virtue, the Protagoras by seeming to make the solution dependent on the hypothesis of hedonism. Meanwhile the Hippias Minor voices a strong objection to the idea that virtue, and justice in particular, could be a technê at all. As a framework for discussion, I will offer a reading of these dialogues as belonging to a single complex philosophical investigation: a dialectical exploration of the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge. This investigation follows the general pattern laid down in the 2 Rachel Barney PHL2009: Plato's Ethics: The Virtues One by One Fall 2011 discussions of hypothesis in the Meno and Phaedo, in that it proceeds by consideration of the 'things that follow' from the hypothesis: these consequences include that virtue can be taught, that it has a certain determinate content (viz, the nature of good and evil), and that the virtues form a unity. To develop this reading will be my ongoing project in the course; refinements, corrections, objections and alternatives to it will be strongly solicited. But we should also have time to explore the dialogues in a reasonably open- minded way. Some of their special virtues to which we should be alive include: (1) particularly rich and philosophically telling use of characterisation, and of dialectic as a kind of narrative in which character reveals itself; (2) a wide variety of methods of argument, and reflection thereon; and (3) an ongoing engagement with broader Greek moral and cultural traditions -- for example, with traditional (and not-so-traditional) conceptions of piety in the Euthyphro, with stereotypes of the temperate man in the Charmides, with contested conceptions of wisdom in the Euthydemus, and with the authority of Homer in the Hippias Minor. No prior knowledge of Plato or Greek philosophy will be assumed; but any students who have not read the Apology and Protagoras should do so at the start of the term. (The Crito and Republic I are also very pertinent to our themes.) Classicists are welcome, and anyone with Greek is encouraged to read at least part of the texts studied in the original. If there is sufficient interest, a reading group will be held to work through some of the readings. (See also Evaluation, below.) Readings: Everyone should have Plato, Complete Works, ed. J.M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), which has been ordered at the U of T Bookstore. Students with Greek should have the OCT editions to refer to. Those who are planning to take option (ii) below should plan to read approximately 65 pages (selection to be determined in consultation) of the OCT texts. The secondary literature on Plato's early dialogues is appallingly vast and complex. A few copies each have been ordered of two overviews: Terence Irwin, Plato's Ethics (Oxford, 1995) and Charles Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue (Cambridge, 1996). Other overviews worth consulting on an ongoing basis are noted in the Bibliography, and bibliographies for each dialogue will be available as well. A range of scholarly papers will be available for photocopying in the course folder (in Room 415). Papers particularly likely to be discussed in any given session are listed (tentatively) below in the Schedule and will be flagged in the preceding session; most should be available in the folders. Chapters of my work in progress on the early dialogues will be available for download on the Blackboard site (and hard copies will be put in the course folder for copying). 3 Rachel Barney PHL2009: Plato's Ethics: The Virtues One by One Fall 2011 Requirements and Evaluation: Students taking the course will be expected to (1) attend and participate on a regular basis, with the option of an in-class presentation (20 minutes max.) (10% of final grade); (2) submit a 3-page critical comment on some aspect of my work in progress, due Oct. 25 (3-4 pages, no extensions, 10%); (3) submit a brief 'think-piece'/paper prospectus Nov. 22 (3-4 pages, no extensions, 10%); (3) for the rest of the evaluation, choose one of two options: (i) a long (18-20) page term paper, due on January 9 (70%); or (ii) a medium- length paper (8-10 pages), due December 15, and a translation-based final exam (35% each), to be held January 11. If there is a critical mass of demand, there will be a reading group meeting weekly to work through some of the text together, in aid of (but not restricted to) those taking option (ii). Tentative Schedule: For each week, the 'Core Readings' are expected to be the focus of discussion; 'Further Readings' are either other relevant ancient texts or particularly helpful or important secondary works. The Core Readings should be carefully read by all, every week; but the 'Further Readings' represent a range of suggestions rather than required reading: for most weeks they include more than any one person is likely to read, but only a small selection of the valuable secondary literature worth consulting. NB for the most part, comprehensive works (e.g., Kahn, Irwin) are not listed below; but you should consult at least one of them on a regular basis. Overlap with the readings included in the course folder is imperfect. Week 1 (Sept. 13): Course Plan and Introduction Week 2 (Sept. 20): Introduction: the Meno and the Method of Hypothesis Core Readings: Meno (esp. 86d-100b), Phaedo 98d-107b Further Readings: RB 'Introduction' and 'Chapters I-II' (esp. Ch. I), Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic excerpts Week 3 (Sept. 27): The Euthyphro: What is Piety? Core Readings: Euthyphro Further Readings: Taylor, McPherran, Weiss papers Week 4 (Oct. 4): The Euthyphro: Is Piety Knowledge? Core Readings: Euthyphro Further Readings: RB, 'Chapter III: Euthyphro' Week 5 (Oct. 11): The Laches: What Is Courage? Core Readings: Laches Further Readings: Devereux, Wolfsdorf papers, , Irwin Plato's Ethics excerpts 4 Rachel Barney PHL2009: Plato's Ethics: The Virtues One by One Fall 2011 Week 6 (Oct. 18): The Laches: Is Courage Knowledge? Core Readings: Laches Further Readings: RB, Laches chapter draft Week 7 (Oct. 25): The Charmides: What is Temperance? Core Readings: Charmides Further Readings: TBA Week 8 (Nov. 1): The Charmides: Is Temperance Knowledge? Core Readings: Charmides Further Readings: RB, Charmides chapter draft Week 9 (Nov. 15): The Euthydemus: What is Wisdom? Core Readings: Euthydemus Further Readings: ΤΒΑ Week 10 (Nov. 22): The Euthydemus: Socratic vs. Sophistic Wisdom Core Readings: Euthydemus Further Readings: RB, Euthydemus chapter draft Week 11 (Nov. 29): Core Readings: Hippias Minor Further Readings: TBA Week 12 (Dec. 6): Against Virtue as Techne Core Readings: Hippias Minor Further Readings: Republic I, IV; Gorgias 506c-8a, Hippias Minor chapter draft .
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