I • , ( )

POLAND and and the POST -WAR RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

by DR. MARIAN SEYDA

Disbibu~~d By

0 -- CLisH GOVERNMENT \NFORM4T\ON CENTER Foreword

For many months the problems of post-wa.r reconstruc­ tion of Europe with special reference to Polish-German relations are being discussed in Polish political and economic circles. This essay attempts to assemble into a whole the results of these considerations, the material being arranged in the following chapters: !.- Fundamental Prin­ ciples; II.- Disarmament of Germany and Reparations; III.- Frontier Problems, namely the Polish-German Frontier, the and the Polish-Russian Frontier; IV.- Organ­ ization of Central and South-Eastern Europe, and General International Organization; finall y, V .- International Economic Co-operation.

1 Naturall; , it is not the aim of this publication to discuss in detail the problems mentioned above, but the reader will find put forth the fundamental questions as a Pole sees them.

DR. MARIAN SEYDA I Funda111ental Principles

If th e sacrifices made by th e nations of both hemi spheres during this, th e greatest armed conflict of all time, shall not be in vain, the German Reich and its chief Axis partners must be di s­ abled so completely, as the result of the war and post-war world organization, that it will be impossible for them to hurl humanity into a further, still more terrible catastrophe, which would mean th e complete destruction of civilization. Basic conditions must be created for the new order of things which will guarantee to nations great and small the possibility of living in lasting peace, untroubled by fears of a new war, or by the pressure and threats of their more powerful neighbors. Further, these ]Jasic con­ ditions must enable the nations to pursue the creative develop­ ment of all their spiritual and material forces; thi s, of course; would not be possible without well-founded international co­ operation. The state of things which was created in Europe by the peace treaties of 1919-20, and the subsequent policy of the Great Powers did not stand the test of life, chiefl y because th ey failed to establish adequate guarantees of security. The essential consequences were not drawn from the fact th at in the very centre of Europe there lives a nation, the German na ti on, en­ dowed with outstanding organizing and technical ability, which for many centuries has been dominated by an urge to annex the lands of its neighbors, and which for at least several gen­ erations past has been educated in the idea of lordship over the world. The tendencies which distinguish the German nation from any other are the chi ef danger to the peace not only of Europe, but of the whole world. German imperialism and militarism together with Japanese rapacity in the Far East constituted the only real threat to world peace during th e period 1919-39. It was highly improbable that the frontier antagonisms of the smaller nations of Central and South Eastern Europe would ever

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( 5) In international agreements a distinction was . made have led to war, and Italy's military enterprises beca me pos­ between the security of Western Europe and the secunty of sible only because of the support given to Mussolini's policy Eastern Europe, the supreme expression of this be~ng the Lo: by Hitler. carno Pact. This differentiation was the result of its authors· The rev ival of German militarism and Germany's provoca­ profound reluctance to undertake any obligations i~ . Central tion of a new war for world domination are the result of a and South-Eastern Europe, and of the erroneous opm10n th~t number of fund amental mistakes committed by the authors of peace could best be assured by giving Ge~ma~y a free hand m the peace treati es and a consequence of the policy later pursued Eastern Europe and directing her expans10n mto that area. It by the victor nations. These mistakes were: was speedily revealed that this opinion wa s entirely wrong and (1) The military clauses of the Versailles Trea ty were that German policy treated the mastery of Ce~tral and South­ either not enforced, or the victor nations withdrew from th eir Eastern Europe solely as a means of creatrng bases fr?m execution without obtaining other effective guarantees in th eir which she could proceed to further conquests on a world-wide place ; scale; (2) The League of Nations, which was to have been the ( 6) A further factor contributin? to the unfortunate c.our s~ guardian of international security, was not endowed with any events took was the lack of co-operat10n among the countries of effective means of restraining aggression, and moreover was Central and South-Eastern Europe, their petty antagonisms and weakened from the beginning by the United States of America's short-sighted policy, which Hitler later cleverly exploited to their failure to become a member. Further, owing to the League's ruin; political treatment of Germany, the Reich was enabled to move (7) The most weighty factor of all was the "appeasem~nt" step by step towards the goal she had previously planned, policy during the last six years before 1939. It enabled Hitler throw off the 'yoke' of the Versailles Treaty, and organize all to prepare for war and to ensure that Gen:nany .had the most spheres of German life for a war both of revenge and world favorable conditions in which to wage it. Hitler attacked domination; Poland in 1939 convinced that Great Britain and France would ( 3) Poland with a key position in East Central Europe, not go to war on that account or, if they did declare war, and also a very difficult and dangerous geographical situation they would after Poland had been crushed ~onclude a pea.ce, with open fronti ers on all sid es except the south, did not obtain accepting the conquest once it was accomplished. But L~ s 1de from the Versa illes Treaty adequate strategic fronti ers which this he was convinced that in the military sphere he had achieved would render her capable of militarily checking Germany. a predominance over the Western European Powers, sufficiently Especially the retention by Germany of East and, de great to win the war, even if it proved to be a long on~. If facto , also Gdansk (Danzig) in the north, and part of Silesia it had not been for this conviction Hitler would never have nsked which curved dangerously into south Polish territory, threaten­ a war. ing the Polish industrial area, created a situation which from The lasting di sablement of Germany after this war to such the start left Poland in a hopeless military position and was in an extent that she will be unable to plunge humanity into a a very real sense an incitement to Germany to attack her; fresh catastrophe, and the creation of a new, constructive order ( 4) The Western Powers revealed extreme restraint when of things in Europe and throughout the world will depend on it was a question of affording credits to, and making investments a rational solution of the following problems: in the poor countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe, (i) The effective and lasting disarmament of Germany and especially Poland, who were orily in the initial stages of building her main Axis partners-in accordance with Article 8 up th eir economy. Such credits would, in particular, have of the Atlantic Charter- and the payment of full re­ increased their power of defense. On the contrary, th e Western parations by the Reich and her allies to the countries Powers sank enormous capital sums in Germany, and thereby which have suffered in consequence of war and enemy contributed to th e rebuilding of that country's military ma­ occupation; chine; 5 4 (ii ) The establishment of sound frontiers and therefore of a sound political, military and economic position for those . States which are Germany' neighbors, but especially those which are most threatened by her drive eastwards; (iii) The adequate organization of Central and South-Eastern Europe, and the general international organization ; '· II (iv) ~he durable regulation of' ihten rationa I economic relaf­ tions on a world-wide scale. ' Disanna1nent of Gennany and Reparations

Moral clisarnu1me11l A necessary preliminary to the moral disarmament of Ger­ many must be the occupation by allied troops of the whole of her territory for a sufficiently long period. This occupation, which will have to be accompanied by the calling of all Germans and their collaborators guilty of war crimes to th e sternest legal responsibility, will be an important psychologi cal factor, fo r it is a matter of making the Germans realize forcibly that they have militarily been beaten. From the psychological aspect the failure of the allied forces to march to Berlin at the end of the 1914-18 War wa a great mistake, as in consequence it was possible for the Germans to put fo rward the thesis that th e German army had never been defeated, and for thi s to become a fi xed concept of German mentality, thus maintaining the myth of invincible Prussian militarism. In the following period it will be a decisive factor in German moral disarmament to create in the mind of the German people the belief that any further war would end in Germany's inevitable defeat, and so it would not pay to undertake such a war. This conviction can be imprinted on the German nation only by the fact that on the other side their exists and always will exist a physical force sufficient to check any future aggression. The inculcation of this conviction on the German mind wil1 be the first fundamental prerequisite to th e success of efforts directed to curing if not all, th en at any rate a large proportion of the German people of the spirit of conquest, militarism, and extreme national megalomania. On the other hand, any policy of concessions to, and indulgent treatment of Germany after the war is won, would have decidedly unfortunate con equences. The result would be di ametrically contrary to that desired. This, of

6 7 course, does not mean that it is necessary to aim at the material must be destroyed or transferred to the victor nations : destruction of the German nation. The occupa ti on of Germany's territory will necessarily be of ( i ) the production of electro-steel and light metals com­ a more general and less rigid nature in the areas which con­ pletely; stitute the main body of the German State. On the other hand, (ii) the production of ordinary steel partly; on th e Wes tern and Eastern borders it ought to be of a stricter (iii ) the production of machinery partly- especially the character. This latter form of occupation should be entrusted machine-tools branch ; to Germany's neighbors, i.e., in the West to the Western Allies, (iv) chemi cal production partly. in the East to Poland and, in the area of Germany contiguous If this program is carried out it will effectively prevent all with Czechoslovakia, to this State. Just as in the West the main possibility of Germany's producing means of rearmament for natural boundary of the area requiring the stricter form of fifteen to twenty years after the end of the military occupation. occupation is formed by the Rhine, so in th e East the natural Apart from its immediate purpose, a period of absolute security boundary is provided by th e rivers Odra (Od er ) and the Nisa is necessary for th e States of Central and South-Eastern Europe Luzycka (Neisse) . most subject to the German menace'; in order that they can achieve a degree of industrialization which will level out the Material disarmament enormous disproportion now existing between their economic Material disarmament will have to consist primarily of the potential and that of Germany. abolition of the German perm!'ment land, sea and air forces, and The abolition of part of the German heavy industry will of the destruction or transfer to the vi ctors of all Germany's war render it necessary to find employment elsewhere for the work­ material. Apart from the previously mentioned allied armies ers engaged thereon. For this purpose it would be possible to of occupation, internal order in Germany will be maintained develop light manufacturing industries in Germany, such as solely by the German police, a small force, lightly armed, and textile, leather and fancy goods production. The factory plants with no central command. In addition all factories and wo rks required for these types of manufactures do not lend themselves directly producing wa r material must be destroyed or transferred to a rapid change-over to armaments production. to the vi ctor nations. These two steps will modify the basic structure of German However, the experience of history has taught that th e above foreign trade, and will compel the Reich to seek bases for raw specified measures, whi ch were applied in part even under the materials from overseas to a larger extent th an is now the case. Versailles Treaty, are not sufficient to ensure a lasting and This will simultaneously render it impossible for Germany to effective disarmament of Germany. The war potential is today attempt in any way to dominate Central and South-Eastern Eu­ based mainly on the economic potential, and modern technique rope economicaJly, by such means as monopoli zing these mar­ enables countries possessing a highly developed industry to kets through th e export of German machinery, apparatu s and achieve an extraordinarily rapid production of numerous and chemicals in return for vegetable and mineral raw materials. extremely dangerous armaments in a few years, i.e., Germany, In the case of Germany's other allies in Europe the prin­ 1933-39; Great Britain, 1939-42; the United States, 1940-42. ciples of disarmament should be applied in a correspondingly The possibility arises because certain branches of industry more leni ent manner; in these cases the policy of taking to can easily and swiftly be turned over from peacetim e to war quite a large extent the national interests of the respective states production: this especially applies to the machine and chemical into account, may prove a better method of educa tion. industries. Further, war needs have a natural production base in iron foundry, and particularly in the refined steel industry Re11arations and the light metal industry. · The German Reich must repair in toto all damage done to The foregoing factors lead to the postulate tha t the machinery other nations by war operations or during occupation of their and equipment in the following branches of German industry territory. Poland, the first country devasta ted by th e war, and

8 9 most exhausted by the ruthless occupation, is entitled to special privileges in this regard. After the experience of the handling of reparations under the Versailles Treaty, reparation for losses suffered must con­ sist chiefl y of payment in kind from Germany's national capital and n:ational income. As far as Poland is concerned, th e losses suffered can be partly covered by her receiving a large pro­ III portion of the industrial installations whi ch, as already said, have to be transferred from Germany to th e victor nations. In addition Germany must surrender to Poland considerable Frontier Problen1s quantities of equipment used in railway, road, sea and air com­ munications. 1. THE POLISH-GERMAI FRONTIER _ To facilitate the restoration of the devastated areas Germany must a lso supply various types of building materials, such as The aim of rendering it physically impossible for the Reich timber or cement, as well as various manufactures from those Lo commit new acts of aggression or to apply political terror branches of German industry which cannot be exploited for the against other States, excludes all attempts to build up a system development of a war potential. Such supplies will also be of security based on faith in German promises and pacifist necessary in order to prevent a too rapid increase in the standard declarations and on pacts signed by Germany. It is necessary of life in Germany ; for, free from the burden of having to main­ to avoid any delusion that after the overthrow of Hitlerism the tain armaments, the German standard of life might swiftly surpass e~ tff.1~lishment ?f a " democrati c" and _" li~)era l " re~i~e in G ~r ­ that of the victor nations. mariy would . imply the German nat10n s renuncrnt10n of 1ts The restoration of cultural devastation will hold a special aggressive and imperialist aims. The experience of the years place in the matter of reparations. The imperative principle to 1918 to 1939 has adequately shown how dangerous were illusions be applied must be Germany's return of all works of art and of this kind. other cultural values removed or, where they have been destroyed, The German nation takes accotmt only of realities, only of her supply of goods, of a value equivalent to th ose she has force. Therefore it must be confined within state frontiers which destroyed, from her own collections. will render it difficult for that nation to commit acts of aggression against its neighbors, and which will give those neighbors sound strategi c frontiers. Because the spirit of conquest of the Ger­ man people has for a thousand years been directed primarily eastward, th e needs of the two countries most immediately exposed to Prussian-German rapacity should be given special consideration in the new system of security. These two countries are Poland and Czechoslovakia. For centuries the German Drang nach Osten has attacked the very biological bases, as well \ as the territory of these two nations, and by violence has led to the German domination of considerable areas inhabited by Polish, Czech, Slovak and kindred populations. The Prussians were the initiators and the main executors of the Partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793 and 1795 and afterwards the Prussian rulers and politicians did their utmost for upwards of a hundred years to prevent Poland recovering her State inde­ pendence, and also incited Russia to stifle the Polish national

10 11 movements by all possible means. For over 150 years German Silesia, which has a preponderantly Polish population, hut after statesmen, scientists and publicists have openly preached the idea the 1921 plebiscite, carried out in conditions very adverse to of confiscating Polish lands and the enslavement, even the ex­ Poland, was left to Germany. termination, of the Polish nation. Plans to this end, already The unification of these two parts of a highly industrialized realized in part, found their full expression in the methods province, which constitutes an organic whole with the neighbor­ applied after the German army's invasion of Poland in 1939. ing Polish coalfields, is a prime condition of th e necessary terri­ The Germans applied a similar policy of annexation and torial consolidation of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The close extermination to the Czech nation. This nation, which regained co-operation of these two countries in all spheres will act as a its independence only after three hundred years of foreign dom­ ination, has again become the prey of brutal and ruthless German imperialism. The Polish nation has always had a defensive rampart against the German eastward pressure in the oldest Polish lands in the West: Pomerania, Poznania and Silesia, with their popula­ tions th e most essentially Polish: in 1931 89.9 per cent of the inhabitants in Pomerania, 90.5 in Poznania, and 92.3 in Silesia were Polish. By their political energy and creative economic and cultural labor these lands were experienced in effectively resisting German rapacity. Unfortunately in delimit­ ing the Polish-German frontier the Treaty of Versa ill es adopted the prejudicial standpoint of a too rigidly conceived ethnographic principle, making Poland no allowances for the violent process of Germanization which had been pursued for centuries especial­ D ly in East Prussia and the Pomeranian and Silesian lands. Moreover, the peace makers of Versailles took very little accow1t of Poland's economic needs, and completely ignored th e question of her military security. • Poland would he able to fulfill her historic m1 ss 1011 in the great expanse to the east of Germany only on condition that the position of Gdansk (Danzig) ostensibly as a free city, but in reality as an agent of th e German Reich and German intrigue; is aboi­ I( I POLAND AN D CERMANY "I ished, and also that East Prussia should cease to be a Reich - Dou ... dQ 'Y of Pola.net. .31.il[ 39 province constituting a place d' armes and sallyport against - ·- B011rn:to.r iu of otl1cr S'a.tu Bounct.a.,.it o( the r,., Poland and the lands east of Germany generally. If Gdansk _ ./ ••• •• Cdy of ,Da.11

(Danzig) and East Prussia are incorporated in Poland, the Polish 5CAL( 0 , .,,.l l [S : German frontier will be shortened from its present length of 9--.,J<> 1,263 miles to 785 miles. For purposes of comparison it is M .P.K worth pointing out that the German-French frontier is barely 210 brake on German expans10n, and so materially contribute to a miles long, and of this more than half consists of the deep and lasting peace in Central and South-Eastern Europe, and, there­ broad natural barrier of the Rhine. fore, in Europe as a whole. Opole Silesia constitutes a projec­ In the south-west all considerations speak in favor of incor­ tion of the menacing strategic wedge which is thrust between porating in Poland the other half of Upper Silesia, i.e. , Opole Poland and Czechoslovakia.

12 13 A further shortening of the Polish-German frontier will be Wladyslaw IV, a · a vassal of Poland. As the result of Frederick necessary by straightening it as far as possible and by moving it William's political intrigues (the Peace of Wehlau in 1657 westward in accordance with th e interests of Poland's security, and the Peace of Oliwa in 1660) Poland lost her political rights and especially the security of her ports. to this part of East Prussia. During all the time of th e dom­ It should be underlined that aggregations of Polish popula­ ination both of the German Knights and of th e German dukes tion are found also in other German provinces bordering Western who were vassals of Poland, both the Knights and the dukes Poland, namely in Silesian territory farther west, in the eastern worked to achi eve th e complete Germanization of the territory part of Brandenburg as well as of Prussian Pomerania. These which was under their rule. territories in various periods of their history either directly One part of East Prussia, consisting primarily of Warmia belonged to Poland or were under Polish cultural and political ( Ermeland), belonged directly to th e Poli h State up till the end influence. Their Germanization is of a recent date and their of th e 18th century, i.e., the time of th e Partitions of Poland. population has similar custom s and culture to that of Western Poland. National relations

(a) EAST PrrussIA The comparative position of the various nationalities inhabit­ ing East Prussia in the 19th century was as follows: in the East Prussia has an area of 14,284 square miles, i.e. , 7.6 per eastern part of the regency of Gab in ( Gumbinnen), Lithuanians cent of the total Reich area. Its population of 2,333,301 people were in large numbers; in the Krolewiec (Koenigsberg) regency constitutes 3.6 per cent of the total population of Germany, the Germans were in the majority; and the Olsztyn (Allenstein) 55.7 per cent of its inhabitants are engaged in agriculture and regency th e Poles were in th e majority; the Poles also had large forestry, 19.2 in industry and handicrafts, 12.2 in trade and aggregations of population in the K widzyn (Marienwerder) comm unications, and 12.9 are officia ls or engaged in oth er pro­ regency. fessions.* Germany did her utmost to Germanize the area by prohibit­ ing th e Polish language not only in the schools, but even in the History churches, wbether Protestant or Catholic, by settling colonists Up till the seventeenth century all the lands of East Prussia brought from Germany proper, by populating the towns with the were subject, eith er directly or indirectly, to the political in­ families of numerous German officials, and by permanently main­ fluences · of the Polish State. On Polish initiative, wi th th e object taining large garrisons. All these efforts led to a part of the of bringing Christianity to the heathen inhabitants, the German Polish population in Prussia losing their Polish political con­ Knights of the Cro s were settled in East Prussia in the 13th sciousness. Yet even this section of the population retained its century. In consequence of the victory of Poland over the feeling of national aloofness from the German inhabitants. Knights at th e Battle of Grunwald in 1410 and also following the The system of Germanization had a considerable influence on wishes of th e inhabitants, who were exploited and oppressed by the Polish population because the Poles were preponderantly the Knights of the Cross, part of East Prussia was integrally a peasant and working-class people, and economically dependent incorporated in the Polish State in 1466, while the Eastern part, upon the large German landowners. Almost 40 per cent of the including Krolewiec (Koenigsberg) became a fiefdom of Poland, arable land of East Prussia is in the hands of owners of property from 1525, however, not belonging to the Order, but only as a of more than 250 acres; these landowners constitute a compact secular duchy. caste, the Jtmkers, a class with a deci sive political influence in In the course of time the Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick Germany even up to the present time. William of Hohenzollern, known as the Great Elector, inherited The last German census which, despite its political tenden­ this vassal duchy, and in 1641 paid homage to the Polish King, ciousness, reflected to a certain extent the actual comparative position of nationalities in East Prussia, was the census of 1910. (*) Statistisches ! ahrbu.ch fiir das Deu.tsche R eich, 1935. From this census and the official Prussian statistics of children

14 15 .t

rn elementary schools in 1911 * the figure is obtained of over the employment of enormous quantities of forced labor from 300,000 Poles inhabiting the Olsztyn regency alone at that Poland and Czechoslovakia. Obviously East Prussia has never period. had any attraction for the main mass of German workers. With regard to the last census of 1933, the Statistisches Reichsamt (Reich Statistical Department) did not publish the The national income per head of population is lower in East detailed figures for nationalities. Estimates based on the highly Prussia than anywhere else in Germany. Equally, this province developed organized life of the Polish population in East Prus­ contributes the lowest amount in taxes to Germany, while its sia before this war indicate that some 300,000 Poles inhabited agricultural liability is three times as high as in the rest of the these lands on September 1, 1939. There are also numerous Reich. The national capital of the area is estimated at some 51/2 settlements of Lithuanians even today in the eastern part of thousand million gold marks, thus it is not two per cent of the East Prussia. total national capital of Germany. After the last war, in July, 1920, a plebiscite was held in a East Prussia is an expensive "colony" for Germany, and it part of the Olsztyn regency and in a part of the Kwidzyn is a "colony" which is economically bound up with its Polish regency. The result was unfavorable to Poland, for it was held hinterland. From the frontier of East Prussia to the capital of during a period of depression, when Poland was suffering in­ Poland, Warsaw, the distance is 75 miles, whereas it is over 230 vasion by the Soviet army. The intermediary and lower posi· miles to Berlin. From the frontier of East Prussia to the German tions in the administration, i.e., those positions in which officials industrial area of the Rhineland it is over 500 miles, whereas come into direct contact with the population, were in German to the Polish central industrial area it is only 190 miles. hands. Germans who had migrated previously from these locali­ For decades German economic policy has given much con· ties were also given the right to vote in the plebiscite. More­ sideration to the problem of East Prussia's distance from markets over, despite international control during the period of the (Marktferne). This problem can be solved only by incorporation plebiscite, German terrorist bands were rampant among the in Poland, its natural hinterland. For that matter, the Germans population. These bands were directed by the members of themselves realize East Prussia's economic tie with the Polish secret German military organization known as th e Black Reichs­ economic area. After September 1939 part of the Polish lands wehr (Schwarze Reichswehr). incorporated in the Reich, and lying to the north of the river Vistula, were included in the administrative and economic region of East Prussia and today form an integral whole with it. The westward efflu,x of population, and economic relations During the hundred years from 1840 to 1939 over 1,100,000 East Prussia's military importance people migrated from East Prussia to the center and west of Germany. This process was not restrained either by German East Prussia is a bastion of German militarism thrust out to legislation designed to tie the peasant to the land, or by th e the East, and as such it served Imperial Germany as a base for prov~s~on of inducements, such as increased pay, better housing the preparation of the main attack on Tsarist Russia in 1914. After 1918 the German Baltic corps under General von der cond1t10ns, advantageous possibilities of obtaining credits, tax ~ . relief, or even plain subsidies to remain in the eastern provinces Goltz operated from here against Soviet Russia. After the dis­ of Germany. From 1925 to 1933, 55 per cent of the natural banding of the German army under the Versailles Treaty a increase in population left East Prussia. In 18 out of the 37 number of secret German military bodies, the Freikorps, and the counties the efflux 0£ population was so large that there was Schwarze Reichswehr, were quartered on the great landed estates an absol~te fall in the number of inhabitants. The shortage of where in the guise of "Labor Battalions" they were concealed labor which resulted was made up by the influx of seasonal from the eyes of the Allied Commission. workers from Poland, while at present it is being made up by When Hitler swept away the military clauses of the Versailles Treat~ the ~trongest German army corps (/. Armee Korps) was * Gemeindelexikon des Regierungsbezirks Allenstein. Heft N r l, 1912, also th e orgamzed m East Prussia, under the command of General Statistik des Deutschen R eiches, 1910. Brauchitsch, later Field Marshal. This corps was maintained on 16 17 a permanent war footing. Simultaneously there were built up (Stettin) , was privileged by having the network of German inland strong fortifications. which wa s constructed in such a way that th e majority of In September 1939 Germany struck at Polish Pomerania (at the commodities exported from the eastern part of Germany Grudziadz) and also at the rear of the Polish capital, Warsaw were directed to the mouth of the river Oder. Krolewiec (Koenig~­ ( General von Kuechler's army) from East Prussia. Thus the berg) was given special railway tariff privileges. province still remained Germany's main war ba se for all her The partial economic linking up of Gdansk with Poland military operations in th e East. which ensued after 1918 had the result of increasing the turnover of Gdansk port to eight million tons per annum prior to the ( b) GDANSK ( DANZIG ) present war. Today, owing to the German occupation of Poland, Gdansk is in a serious position. Even the German press does Gdansk has an area of 731 square miles, and a population not conceal the fact that the inhabitants of Gdansk have been of 401,517- 70 per cent of whom live in urban localities. disillusioned by the changes which have occurred. Commodities • f~om Poznania, Silesia and the center of Poland are now mainly History duected by the Germans to Szczecin (Stettin) . Up till the end of the 18th century Gdansk was a component part of the Polish State as an autonomous unit. Originally the Considerations of security area was inhabited by a Slavonic population. At the beginning The creation of a Free City of Gdansk enabled the Germans of the 14th century the Knights of the Cross conquered Gdansk, to transform it into a bastion of Prussian chauvinism. Neither and murdered the Slavonic population. Gdansk was then col­ administratively nor militarily did Poland have any possibility onized by a population of German origin, yet again and again of influencing or controlling anything that happened in Gdansk. (in 1397, 1410, 1466, 1660, 1734, 1793 and 1813) they dem­ On the other hand, th e Germans had every possibility of politic­ onstrated their will to be united with Poland. ally dominating th e area. In Gdansk some 36,000 pensioned Germans of all kinds were The economic and communication link with Poland settled (almost 10 per cent of the total population) , all drawing Bismarck, Poland's greatest enemy, speaking to a delegation their pensions from th e German Reich and engaged in the organ­ from the German population of East Prussia on September 23, ization of German political life. Germans, citizens of the Reich, 1894, declared that any Polish State which arose at any time held the leading official positions in the city. The Gdansk police would have to demand the incorporation of the city of Gdansk in was organized by officers on the Reichswehr active list. The fact its territory. that Gdansk, as a Free City, was not included in Polish passport Poland cannot exist without possessing the mouth of the river restrictions, enabled prominent members of the German minority Vistula, whose basin constitutes the country's geographical axis. in Poland to travel there at their pleasure. On the other hand, the economic development of Gdansk is Gdansk became the center for training the German "fifth col­ conditional upon its trade turnover with the Polish economic umn" in Poland. It also simultaneously became a customs area. Gdansk owed its development till the end of the 18th cen­ breach favoring illegal trade between Poland and Germany. tury to its association with Poland. During the 19th and the Poland, on the other hand, owing to the political conditions early years of the 20th century th e city declined to the status of which developed in Gdansk, was unable to exploit adequately a small provincial garrison town. either the port facilities or the commercial possibilities of th ~ The chief railway line linking Berlin with Krolewiec (Koenigs­ city. berg) does not pass through Gdansk. Before th e last war the ( c) 0POLE SILESIA port had a turnover of barely 21/2 million tons per annum, for The area of Opole Silesia covers 3,751 square miles, and has Germany neglected Gdansk in favor of the ports of Szczecin a population of 1,482,771. 43 per cent of the population is (Stettin ) and Krolewiec (Koenigsberg). The first, Szczecin employed in agriculture and forestry, 34.7 in industry and

18 19 handicrafts, 11.9 in trade and communications, and 10.4 are the aggregate over 40 per cent of the population voted for Po­ officials and members of other professions and trades.* land. As a result of the plebiscite only part of the area went to Poland, the rest, including Opole ( Oppeln) , remained with Ger­ History many. The result would have been entirely different if it had not been decided that all Germans who had left Silesia to live, The history of Opole Silesia runs parallel with that of all even over a long period, in other parts of Germany were en­ the Silesian lands. The entire industrial area of Bytom (Beuthen), titled to vote. Over 16 per cent of the total number of voters Gliwice (Gleiwitz) and Zabrze (Hindenburg) formed part. of consisted of this category, i.e., migrants who had no connection the Cracow area. Till the 14th century these lands were umted whatever with Silesia. In addition the German owners of mines with Poland. In the following centuries, while governed by l and factories influenced the result of the plebiscite by bringing dukes of the Polish royal Piast dynasty, they fell first to the J economic pressure to bear on the poorer section of the Polish Czechs, and later to the Hungarians. In the 16th century Silesia population. Finally, Silesia was subjected to a similar terror passed under the rule of the Habsburgs, and in the 18th century from German bands such as East Prussi a had experienced during it was conquered by Prussia. the 1920 plebiscite. Through all the years of its varying history both Opole Silesia and Silesia generally remained in cultural association Economic relations with Poland, and the bishopric of Wroclaw (Breslau) was subject The agricultural part of Opole Silesia forms a structural to the Metropolitan of the Roman Catholic Church as Gniezno, unit with the neighboring rural areas of Poland. The industrial in Poznania. part of Opole Silesia- the coal mines and iron foundries-con­ stitute an indissoluble whole with the Polish Katowice and Sos­ Population nowiec industrial area. The population of Opole Silesia is not only of Polish origin Out of the annual production of 43.3 million tons of coal but considers itself Polish up to the present time. Even ac­ hewn in the area covered by the Silesian industrial region before cording to the tendentious German statistics for Silesia during 1914, only 12.5 million tons went to other parts of Germany the period from 1928 to 1867, Poles were continually in a proper, while over 25 million tons found a market in areas which majority of over 61 per cent. The German censuses show that became part of the Polish State after 1918. there were 58.2 per cent Poles in 1890, 56 in 1900, 56.9 in 1905 In 1924 the Silesian foundries marketed only 31 per cent and 54.6 in 1910. of the pig iron they produced in Germany. In 1926 the figures These percentages completely fail to take into account two rose to 35 per cent, but in 1929 they had fallen to 8.3 per cent. entirely artificial categories which were introduced into the The foregoing examples show that the industry of Opole German population statistics, namely, the bi-lingual and the 1 Silesia does not find the conditions necessary for its full develop­ Slonzaks, both categories obviously consisted of Poles. t The fall ment and thorough exploitation of its production possibilities in the percentage was the result of the increased intensity of l within the frontiers of the German Reich. The W estphalian and the Germanization which was applied throughout the 19th cen­ Rhineland industry is adequate to Germany's needs. In these tury, as well as of the increasingly strong political pressure conditions the Silesian industry was condemned to a vegetative brought to bear when censuses were carried out. After the last existence. It was maintained, just as was East Prussian agri­ war the pressure was so great that the statistics obtained are of culture, at the cost of considerable material sacrifice (lighter no value whatever. tariffs, export bonuses and, after the last war, the Osthilfe- Help In 1921 a plebiscite was carried out in Upper Silesia. In for the East-and so on). The Silesian industry can develop to its fulness only in association with the Polish economic area. ( *) Statistisches ]ahrbnch jiir das Deutsche Reich, 1935. ("!) Dr. Walter Geisler.- Die Sprachen imd Nationalitiiten- -Verhiiltnisse an den This economic unity with the Polish areas was realized by dentschen Ostgrenzen, Gotha, 1934. the German industrialists themselves. Before the last war the

20 21 central areas of Poland belonged to the Russian State. In 1913 the Handbuch des Oberschlesischen lndustriebezirkes, published The retention of Opole Silesia in German possession would by Berg- und Huttenmannischer Verein in Katowice on the occa­ render it impossible for Poland and Czechoslovakia to achieve sion of the " Twelfth German Foundry Day," contained the fol­ the necessary compactness of territory which is an elementary lowing remarks: basis of federation or confederation and security for these States against new surprises by German imperialism. "Till now the iron industry of Upper Silesia has only to a comparatively small extent been able to take advantage of the internal German sources of ores, as the cost of transport from (cl ) TI-IE PROBLEM OF THE GERMAN POPULATION the majority of these sources was disadvantageous to the Silesian The question of the inhabitants of German nationality in industry." the territories which ought to be incorporated in Poland will, These words emphasize the same problem of Marktfeme naturally, entail some difficulties, which can, however, be dealt (distance of markets) which affects East Prussian agriculture so with. A considerable part of the population began to use th e disa dvantageously. And further it is stated: only a relatively short time ago and will "In the Polish area across th e Russian frontier there are return spontaneously to Polish nationality. This process will large and rich deposits of ore directly adjacent to the Silesian undoubtedly he favored by the emotional shock which may be frontier, and these could supply our foundry industry with per­ expected as a result of Germany's military breakdown, and will fect and, owing to the low freight charges, very cheap alloying ore." be especially marked in her eastern provinces. In 1917 German economic representatives again and again The experience of the last war has shown that the really presented memoranda to the German Chancellor, Bethmann­ German population will to a very great extent leave these terri­ Holl weg, demanding that th e Polish Question be settled in such tories voluntarily, especially in th e first period after the cessation a fashion as to link up Silesia with the Polish economic area. of hostilities. It ought to be remembered, that from the western One of th ese memoranda declared: Polish provinces which after the Great War were returned to " Poland will remain extraordinarily important- one may Poland the majority of Germans left for the interior of the Reich even say an irreplaceable factor- for the development of the without any pressure on the part of Poland whatsoever. Upper Silesian industrial region owing to the latter's incon­ Independently from the spontaneous reflux it will be neces­ venient situation" (for Germany) . sary to transfer the German population to Germany in order to Finally, th e Germans again emphasized the unity of the two prevent the future forming of any "fifth column" in Poland areas after the occupation of Poland in 1939 when they joined such as played so disastrous a part in September, 1939. This Opole Silesia and that part of Silesia already belonging to Poland transfer, to a certain extent, could have the character of an with part of th e Cracow province and the Sosnowiec coalfield exchange of populations, for si multaneously Polish population to make one province with the capital of Katowice. ' consisting mainly of laborers already living in Western and Central Germany before the war, should return to Poland. Strategic considerations Opole Silesia formed a strongly fortified wedge dividina 2. THE BALTIC SEA Poland from Czechoslovakia. The Germans used it as the bas~ Even if the frontiers of the Polish State were modified quite for military operations when they occupied Bohemia in the rationally and if Poland were to obtain all the sea coast to which spring of 1939; again in the autumn of 1939 the chief German she naturally gravitates, this will still not be sufficient to secure attack against Central Poland came from this wedge and from territorially her peace, and with it that of Central and South­ the Breslaw (Wroclaw) district" (the armies of Generals von Eastern Europe, if she is not simultaneously assured the freedom Reichenau and Blaskowitz). In consequence of this blow the of the roads leading from the Baltic to the . Polish industrial area was attacked by Germany on the very first day of the war. During the latter half of the 19th century the Baltic Sea was swiftly transformed into a German inland sea. Bismark initiated

22 23 this process with the invasion of in 1864 and the an­ so enabled the German armed forces to threaten Leningrad. nexation of Schleswig-Holstein, which was followed by the From her naval and air bases in Norway Germany made attempts construction of the , running through Prussian terri­ Lo cut the northern sea route, linking Russia with the West via tory. From then onward Germany gained complete military th e ports of Murmansk and Archangel. The same German control of Denmark, and thereby of the Danish narrows. Because bases in Norway could also serve as a starting point for the of the Kiel Canal the German fleet was enabled to pass from one invasion of th e Scottish coast. All th e foregoing arguments make it obvious that in the event of war German domination of th e Baltic would always threa ten to cut Europe into two mutually isolated parts: West and THE llALTIC ROUTE East, with th e communications beween the two parts completely

SCALE V F ~IL ES paralyzed. For Poland this situation would be particularly 0 . 100. dangerous, yet it would also be a very serious threat to Great Britain, for it might easily deprive her of communications with her allies, and in addition would lay her open to attack on her northern coasts. In order to counter this danger, it is necessary not only to free from German control the roads linking the Baltic with the North Sea, but also to create an adequate defensive zone to protect those roads. This can be achieved only with Great Bri­ I tain's outstanding co-operation, in the following fashion: a: 1. The Kiel Canal must be internationalized, the best solu­ 0 tion being the acceptance by Great Britain of a mandate for the administration and defense of the Canal, while all the States of the Baltic Coast participate in its commercial exploita­ Q tion jointly with Great Britain. On both sides of the Canal ~ i ~ f_; th ere must be adequately broad defensive zones removed from ..J ~- 0 ,,,.) '.!:. ) German sovereignty. G E 2. British fortified naval and air bases must be constructed on the islands of the North Sea situated close to the German coast, especially at the mouth of the , and also on the islands in the western area of the Baltic Sea. Poland also should possess bases in the western part of the Baltic, and by the nature of things its north-eastern part would remain chiefly under the control of the sea to another in a few hours, and thus became capable 0£ countries lying on those coasts. simultaneously checking opponents in both seas. Only thus could European security be achieved and settled in practice along one of the most important and also most The results of all this were strongly felt during the first vulnerable lines of communication in Europe. World War. In September, 1939, German control over the approaches to the Baltic rendered it impossible for Great Britain 3. THE POLISH-RUSSIAN FRONTIER to provide naval assistance to Poland, while in the spring of 1940 it enabled Germany to achieve a rapid domination of As far as the other frontiers of Poland are concerned, they Denmark and Norway. In 1941 the German fleet played an call for no modifications. Poland must in particular retain the important part in the swift conquest of Latvia and Estonia, and Eastern frontier she has hithe1to possessed, as th e result of the

24 25 volw1tary compromise between her and the Union of Socialist selves as belonging to any nationality in censuses. The remain­ ing inhabitants consisted of small numbers of other nationalities Soviet Republics. ' Only lasting, friendly co-operation between P oland and among_which the Russians numbered 137,000, or barely 1 per cent of the total population. Russia, irrespective of the dominant system in either, can assure both countries security against Germany. But in order that such A considerable part of these territories, such as the regions relations can be established, both Poland and Russia must of Lonna, Ostroleka, Bialystok, Wilno, Lwow, and Tarnopol, mutually recognize th e principle th at both nations are great are eith er purely Polish in character, or possess an absolute nations, possessing th eir own rich historical, political and cul­ majority of Polish inhabitants. The city of Wilno, which is tural heritage and th eir own sphere of influence, and also that neither of th e partners will endeavor to deprive the other of EASTERN FRONTIER its position gained th rough centuries by th e labor of many OF POLAND generations. The basis of th e mutual relations must be com ­ Tlatio11a.I bo\lf'ld.Q.,.ict of Pola.nd. - JI A11911Jt t9l 9, E:a.sttrn bo1'"cta ,.iu o/ Polc1.11d. plete equality of status. All ideas of "patronage" or "leader­ d.oi.on l.o !ll'l. easttrfl bo1111da ron of Pclcl11d. ship" must be rejected. Neither of the partners can enter into 1ntlir.rrn ct11 t11 ry. Ttnltoritt cx.cuptd. bljtUl.S.S. agreements or undertakings directed against th e other partner, In 1g3g_ or work deliberately to surround it territorially or economically. r-"'- '\ ~, The Riga Treaty of March 18, 1921, must be recognized ' \....--...... , I as settling th e age-old Russian-Polish territorial dispute. In this I treaty Poland, desiring to achieve a lasting normalization of rela­ \ "'--,I tions with her Eastern neighbor, renom1ced close on half (some I I 120,000 square miles) of the area which belonged to her before c.. , \ the Partitions of 1772, 1793 and 1795. Consequently, Poland / made tremendous sacrifices. She retained only those territories (..~ which are indispensable to ensure her not becoming a small and ~ weak State. These territories are united most closely with her by historical, cultural, and economic bonds, and the Polish element is numerically th e strongest national group.

The Polish eastern provinces The provinces which came under Soviet occupation in Sep­ tember, 1939, had belonged to Poland either from the very dawn of her history (such as the northern part of Mazovia and, with interruptions, Eastern Galicia) or for many centuries, at least for four hundred years. These areas either never had '-~ ' ) . / c., / belonged to Russia at all (e.g., Eastern Galicia) or had belonged i I to her for a comparati vely brief period during the years when l_ / ...... all Poland was under foreign domination. - -- At the outbreak of the present war th ese eastern areas had a population of 13,199,000, of whom some 5,274,000 were referred to by certain foreign writers as a " Lithuanian" town Poles, 4,529,000 were Ukranians, 1,123,000 were White taken by Poland illegally, is decidedly Polish in its character'. Ruthenians, 1,109,000 were J ews, and 803,000 were "local At the outbreak of the war the Lithuanians in the city amounted people," i.e., inhabitants of Polesie who did not declare them- to barely 1 per cent of the total inhabitants. Also in the country

26 27 districts of Wilno, Poles are in the absolute majority. Similarly Lwow, the capital of south-eastern Poland, is a city with thor­ oughly Polish fea tures and characteristics. For centuries Poland has implanted a Christian and Western civilization in her eastern provinces, and the fl ower of Polish chivalry perished there in defense of western ideals. The uni­ versities of Wilno and Lwow and the Krzemieniec Lycee were IV fo rtresses of Polish and also of Western European culture. After the Partitions the eastern lands of Poland within the fronti ers delimited by the Riga Treaty once more entered upon a Organization of Central and South-Eastern period of swift development in the social, economic and cultural spheres. During the twenty years between the wars from 1920 Europe.-General International Organization to 1939, the revived Polish Republic exerted enormous efforts in this direction. This is confirmed by impartial foreigners who 1. THE ORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH­ visited these areas at various times after the last war, for EASTERN EUROPE instance, the eminent British scientist, Sir John Russell, who, in a lecture on November 3, 1941, expressed his admirati on of The Polish nation, which lives on the boundaries of Central the work achieved by Poland in her eastern provinces.* and Eastern Europe, is th e largest of all the nations in this area. The possession of these provinces is an absolutely vital mat­ It has accomplished many centuries of political and economic ter to Poland, whereas to Russia, with her enormous area, work, and possesses a traditional watchfulness against the Ger­ population and material resources, they are of no importance man danger. Yet, even if granted the indispensable frontiers whatever. The building of lasting friendly relations between already spoken of, Poland alone could not by her own strength Poland and Russia on the basis of the voluntary agreement of be equal to th e entire and extremely difficult task which will the Riga Treaty is in the interest not only of the two States, but always exi st in the area lying immediately to the east of the of the general peace and stability of all Europe. German Reich, and extending htmdreds of miles from the Baltic to the south. From the bitter experiences of the recent past it is necessary to draw clear and resolute conclus'ions for the future: the nati ons of Central and South-Eastern Europe must level out their previous disputes and antagonisms, and they must unite their economic and cultural, as well as political and military strength. In the considerations here dealt with, the region of Central and South-Eastern Europe comprises : Poland, Lithuania, Czecho­ slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Greece. These countries jointly cover 570,000 sq. miles with a population of about llO millions. In the North this zone is bordered by three Scandinavian States : Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and by three Baltic States : Latvia, Estonia and Finland. Although these countries always had, and undoubtedly in the future will maintain close rela· (*) The Geographical Journal, Vol. XCV/Il. Nos. 5-6; November-December, 1941. ti ons with Central and South-Eastern Europe, they form, how-

28 29 ever, when considering political and economi c gravitation, m on th e principle that Central and South-Ea tern Europe belongs many respects a di stinctive area . to th e nations inhabiting th at area, that th ese nations wish to live in concord with Russia, as well as with Germany and Italy, The block of the above-mentioned States of Central and but that they do not wish to allow the influence of any of these South-Eastern Europe may be organized either as one federa­ Powers to become predominant over th em. tion or confederation, or a two such associations closely co l­ laborating one with another. The latter possibility would co me Not only Poland, but all the countrie of Central and South-Eastern Europe must co-operate positively with Russia in into consideration if ~h e federation or confederation em bracing too many states of different structure and different social and th e task of maintaining the peace, which, however, does not in political trend s would be liable to be easily broken. In this the least mean th at they should be left under Ru sia's " leader­ case the first of the associations-strictly speaking that of Centra I ·hip." Only a political system based on the principle of Europe- would embrace Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia. voluntary associati on of States and th e equality of status of all th e component part of th e association will prove enduring in Hung~ry and ~umania , the second- the Balkans : Yugoslavia , Albama, Bulgana, Greece and possibly Turkey. this area . Such a state of thing could not be conceived under the . In the c~se of two political associations being formed, coun­ " leadership" of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. If in tnes b ~ l o n?mg t? both of th em could be united by mutual economic ties. 1he great human potential and th e consider­ one form or another the States of Central and South-Eastern able economic potential based on the possibilities of develop­ Europe were to become extensions of the Soviet Union, a ment would secure to the block a proper military strength. basis would be created for all kinds of German intrigues Poland . and Czechoslovakia are called upon to create the aimed at shattering Russia by exploiting th e natural tendencies first of the associa tions outlined above in Central and South­ of th ese nations to achi eve independence and autonomy. Rus­ Eastern Europe, aiming to oppose Hitler's " ew Order " whi ,h sian " leadership" in Central and South-Ea tern Europe would is crushing th e nation , and to replace it by a co n,s tru c ti ~e only be a source of th e greatest weakness for th at State, to Germany's own ati sfaction. Moreover, it is not in the interest y ~em ba sed on th e principles of freedom and equality of nations. of a fr ~ e economi c exchange of commodities for more European Lithuania ought to find her place in this association. As soon co untries to be included in the autarky of the Soviet Union, as she realizes her fundamental interests, close co-operation as thi s would finally exclud e th em from international economic bet:veen her and Poland would be an absolute guarantee of her exchange. nat1.onal and State ex istence. In the south it would be desirable The advancement of universal peace and the development to mclude Hungary in the a sociation, this country's popula­ of full international economic relations will require that ~ion being closely related to that of Poland and Slovakia Central and South-Eastern Europe organized along th ese lines, m c t~ t~m s and traditions. The in clusion of Hungary in the should not be left isolated from Western Europe and the Anglo­ asso c iat10I~ would be econ~m i ca ll y henefi cia], and would protect Saxon world. The periods of Locarno and Munich are an Hungary m future from falling under German influence. Both elbquent warning that- as we have already recalled--in ~conor:iic and ge1:eral p~liti c al considerations peak in favor of Hitler's conception th e mastery of the space and resources mcludmg Rumama also in th e Central European associati on. But of Central and South-Eastern Europe constituted only a basis above all else in its favor th ere is th e circumstance that th e for further German efforts in the direction of attempting to settlement of the most difficult question of thi s part of Europe, destroy th e British Empire and to gain the hegemony of the namely, the Tran s~ lvanian issue, is almost impossible purely by world. the method of carvmg up that province. A solution would be more Therefore, we judge, the interests of Great Britain and the easily found if Hungary and Rumani a were members of the same C nited States themselves require that, no matter what forms federation or confederation. their mutual co-operation may take and no matter how Western The block of nations in thi s part of Europe must be founded Eu rope comes to be organized- and · Central and South-Eastern

30 31 Eurnpe must remain in vital contact with Western Emope- the armament of the aggressor nations, provided for by article 8 of Anglo-Saxon Powers will play an outstanding part in the main­ the Atlantic Charter will serve this end ; the territorial, political tenance of security not only in Western, but also Central and and economic measures necessary for that purpo e have been dealt South-Eastern Europe. The experience of the two decades from with in the preceding chapters. 1919 to 1939 outstandingly show that peace and security are In th e immediate post-war period, which may be fairly long, one and indivisible, that th e division of th e European continent these measures will have to be carried out by the United Nations. into "guaranteed" and " non-guaranteed" zones is bound 111- Their wartime collaboration will lay the foundations of a world fallibly to lead, sooner or later, to a general conflagration. organization, which would not be confined by continents; inter­ national problems, ei th er political or to a greater extent even 2. GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION economic, can be solved only on a world scale. The world organization should be buil.t up gradually, using When considering post-war reconstruction, the principal prob­ all the experience of recent history. Doctrinary plans and hasty lem is that of organizing the world so as to guarantee lasting solutions should be avoided, for th ey might produce another peace and universal economic and cultural development to all meaningless and powerless international body. In the initial nations. There are many plans in this direction, inspired by the post war period, which will last many years, the admission best intention, but not always standing the test of sober realism. of nations which ei ther were aggressors or hampered th e war The above mentioned aims cannot Le attained by Lasing world effort of the United Nations as much as possible, would wreck organization, as it has been sometimes suggested, on federations and paralyze th e organization at the very outset. embracing continents. The progressive collaboration of the In the more di stant future all nations likely to assist th e American Nations is successful and certainly peaceful as well as international organization in its constructive task may be admitted constructive. A European federation on a continental scale, how­ to its membership. The former enemy nations can be admitted ever, would inevitably result in the predominance of Germany, only after they have progressed to a stage at which genuine primarily owing to her numerical superiority and central geo­ collaboration with th em, based on democratic freedom and equal­ graphical oosition. Germany could easily use her preponder­ ity, will be a practical possibility. ance in order to handicap the smaller nations. By exerting her political and economic influence on the federation, she might The preservation of peace will remain the principal objective. well afterwards turn it into a jumping-off ground for a new For that reason it is absolutely necessary to settle every terri­ attempt at world domination. The existence of federations on a torial dispute once and for all. The set up continental scale might also result in the formation of great a new world organization, but it simultaneously placed its per­ autarchi c units, which could promote strong antagonisms. manence in doubt, by admitting- in Article 19 of the Covenant Neither an Atlantic Federation, embracing- according to the of _the . Leag1~e. of N~tions-the possibility of applying for authors of the idea- the United States, Great Britain and th e terntonal rev1s10n. This allowed stronger Power to exert pres­ countries of North-Western Europe, could guarantee permanent sure on their weaker neighbors and to threaten the latters' peace. Such a federation, leaving Central and South-Eastern most vi tal interests. Such a si tuation helped to produce a gen­ Europe outside its boundaries, could easily promote a new kind eral feelin~ of insecurity in international relations. Under such of psychological and political isolationism, thus creating a si tua­ conditions th ere could exist neither political peace, nor per­ tion similar to that which prevailed after the last war, and manent economic well-being, nor steady work on the progress enco uragin~ Germany's eastward expansion. This would consti ­ of civilization. tute a direct threat to the independence of the Central and Eastern The system of security created by the new international European countries and, therefor e., to peace in general. organization, in accordance with Article 8 of the Atlantic Char­ The security of all the nations of Europe can be guarautee

32 33 ments concerning security th ere should be such guarantees as dealt with in Chapters 1- 111. The permanent political and economic collaboration of th e English speaking nations with the group of Central and South-Eastern European countries- in harmony with Russia- is an essential condition of peace and prosperity for Powers great and small alike. The part to be played by Great Britain in the future or­ v ganization of the European continent will be of a very far reach­ ing, and in many fields, leading nature. The political and moral authority gained by the British Nation everywhere, especially International Economic Co-operation in the course of this war, will be of great help in the completion of this task. Two groups of problems There is no doubt that a France, reborn after the war and The problems which will have to Le settled by means of again strong, will share in this constructive work together with international co-operation after this war fall into two separate the other Western Allies. groups. On the one hand, the tremendous convulsions through which the world is passing as the result of war operations in all the continents, forces to the front the necessity of ameliorating and levelling out their immediate effects. On the other hand there are economic problems of a lonµ; -term nature, problems in­ volved in such an ordering of international relations on a world wide scale that they may be based on principles of greater justice and equality than have hitherto prevailed. Each of these groups has its own peculiar character, and so each will require the applica tion of its own peculiar methods and solutions.

The main task of the immediate post-war period The dimensions of this war and its total character have very profotmd effects, the elimination of which will be a ta sk surpassing the power of individual nations. This applies most of all to the most devastated co tmtries, which are also countries of low economic development. Here the necessity of importing foodstuffs, medicaments and clothing into these countries comes to the front. After the ta sk of feeding, medically treating and clothing the devastated coun­

tries ha s been carried through on an extensive scale, for whicT1 ~ask .an international organization is already in its initial stages, it will be necessary to restore the devastated human centers and centers of employment as swiftly as possible. This task will, of course, be primarily the obligation of Germany as the aggressor power and the one responsible for the economic ruin of Europe. The principles of war repara-

34 35 annual increase in that population, leads to these countries being and inland seas. In that case the German na tion will he com­ outstandingly over-populated in rela tion to th eir present economic pelled to renounce its dream of turning Europe into a self­ structure, and even if their agriculture were raised to the hi ghest sufficient economic unit subordinated to the interests of th e possible level it could not provide employment for the entire dominating German industry, while it will still be able to population. The inadequate employment of the inhabitants of develop economically and become a valuable member of the these Sta tes, taking the form of a concealed unemployment internati onal community. among the rural population (in Poland some three million As previously stated, the spread of industry all over the people, or about 10 per cent of the country's entire popula­ world will increase international economic exchange. Yet world tion ) results in low standards of living and does not allow them trade should be so organized as to assure to each country the to participate extensively in international trade exchange. (In possibility of purchasing its raw material requirements by export­ 1937 Czechoslovakia's trade was 1.5 per cent of world trade; ing its own produce. The allocation of international credits Poland's was 0.9 per cent; Rumania's 0.7 ; Hungary's 0.6 ; should not be made from a purely financial aspect, in isolation Yugoslavia's 0.5 ; whereas Great Britain's share was 13.7 per from commodity exchange. On the contrary, credits should be cent; Germany's 8.6; France's 5; and Belgium's 3.4 per cent) . closely linked with this exchange, since it is the essence of The only way out of this situation is the industrialization of this international credit to make it possible for the country drawing part of Europe ; natural bases for this development already the credit to make additional imports. As credits, so con­ exist in the form of raw materials, such as coal, oil, iron, zmc, ceived, will increase the exports of the creditor country, that copper, bauxite, and timber. country must not simultaneously protect itself against the repay­ An additional advantage of industrializing Central and ment of the credit by refusing to accept an increased fl ow of South-Eastern Europe would be the absorption of the surplus imports from the debtor country. Thus the linking of th e flow agricultural produce grown in this area by its own internal of capital with the flow of commodities will contribute to market. The effect of this would be that these surpluses would greater activity in world trade. no longer be a drag on the world markets and would not com­ In addition to the problems mentioned above, other prob­ pete with agricultural produce of Canadian or South American lems, such as the currency question, movements of population, on gm. transport questions, etc., should be settled by way of inter­ The economic process above described will break the bonds national co-operation. which have hitherto linked the States of Central and South­ Whatever form that co-operation may take, one thing is Eastern Europe with the German Reich. Germany, being almost certain: it must be much more intimate and more systematic the sole custom er for their agricultural produce, brutally ex­ than it was in the pre-war period. The common la bor of the ploited her monopoly, forcing their economic systems to comply nations for a co mmon end, that of raising the standards of well­ with her needs and flooding them with her industrial manufac­ being universally, will crown the building of the new and better tures. If Germany is deprived of these politically convenient world. bases for raw materials and foodstuffs such a step will be a second means, in addition to the reorganization of German industrial production already proposed, of iz;iving th e Reich a new economic structure of less danger to the world than her present one. If Germany has to meet her requirements in food stuffs and raw materials for industry by purchase on non-European mar­ kets she will to a large extent be rendered dependent economi­ cally and politically on Great Britain and the United States, and it will be possible to control her imports in th e straits, canals,

38 39 PRIN TED IN U. S.A. Polish Information Center 1943