Effects of Slum Upgrading on the Social Contract and Social Cohesion in Kibera, Nairobi

EAU0010.1177/0956247816689218Environment & UrbanizationMitra et al. 689218research-article2017

Developing risk or resilience? Effects of slum upgrading on the social contract and social cohesion in Kibera, Nairobi

SHREYA MITRA, JOE MULLIGAN, JANPETER SCHILLING, JAMILLA HARPER, JANANI VIVEKANANDA and LISA KRAUSE

Shreya Mitra, International Alert, London, United Kingdom Abstract In Kibera, an informal settlement in Nairobi, Kenya, major Address: International development efforts are underway – namely, the Kenya Slum Upgrading Alert, 346 Clapham Road, Programme (Kibera Pilot), the Nairobi Railway Relocation Action Plan, and the London, SW9 9AP, United National Youth Service-led Kibera Slum Upgrade Initiative. This paper assesses how Kingdom; e-mail: smitra@ such interventions affect the social contract and social cohesion, and hence the international-alert.org resilience of Kibera residents. We examine the extent to which different types of Joe Mulligan, Kounkuey slum upgrading efforts address risks in Kibera, particularly around conflict and Design Initiative, flooding. Our findings show that these interventions can reduce conflict, crime, Stockholm, Sweden insecurity and flood risks, and subsequently strengthen resilience in highly dense Address: e-mail: joe@ and complex urban environments, if they do three things: first, include processes kounkuey.org that build the social contract (such as meaningful consultation of residents and Janpeter Schilling, social accountability mechanisms); second, build bridging social capital between University of Koblenz- ethnic groups and avoid reducing bonding capital within groups; and third, Landau, Landau, Germany; integrate different sectoral interventions. International Alert, London, United Kingdom; University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Keywords conflict / flooding / Kibera / Nairobi / resilience / risk / social Germany cohesion / social contract / urban

Address: e-mail: schilling@ uni-landau.de I. Introduction Jamilla Harper, Kounkuey Design Initiative, Nairobi, Kenya Kibera, located in the centre of Kenya’s capital Nairobi, is one of the largest informal settlements in Africa. Population estimates for the large Address: e-mail: jamilla@ 225-hectare settlement, adjacent to the Ngong River, vary between kounkuey.org 200,000 and 700,000, while around 235,000 to 270,000 seems to be the Janani Vivekananda, most realistic estimate.(1) Kibera residents face many challenges including International Alert, London, United Kingdom unemployment, poverty, insufficient water and sanitation infrastructure, poor housing, and high rates of crime and insecurity. Kibera was a Address: e-mail: jvivekananda@ hotspot of the post-election violence in late 2007 and early 2008. Most international-alert.org Kibera residents are also subject to significant localized flooding due to poor drainage and solid waste management, as well as riverine flooding Lisa Krause, University (2) of Hamburg, Hamburg, in areas adjacent to the Ngong River and its major tributaries. Global Germany climate change is likely to aggravate flood risk in Kibera as the intensity of (3) Address: e-mail: extreme-rainfall events in East Africa is projected to increase, combined [email protected] with the effect of increased urbanization in the settlement and upstream. Environment & Urbanization Copyright © 2017 International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). 1 1–19.https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247816689218 DOI: 10.1177/0956247816689218 www.sagepublications.com ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION

In the last five years, major development efforts to improve the 1. UN-Habitat (2003), The living conditions in Kibera have included: 1) the Kenya Slum Upgrading challenge of slums: Global Report on Human Settlements Programme (KENSUP) Kibera Pilot, 2) the Nairobi Railway Relocation 2003, Earthscan, London, 344 Action Plan (hereafter Railway Project), and 3) the National Youth Service pages; also Lüthi, Christoph (NYS)-led Kibera Slum Upgrade Initiative. These three interventions (2016), “Slum improvement (4) lessons in Africa: Kibera”, in reflect different approaches to slum upgrading. KENSUP and the Railway Bolay, Jean-Claude, Jérôme Project have introduced multi-storey housing to the largely single-storey Chenal and Yves Pedrazzini settlement, with temporary relocation of residents. NYS is a multi-sectoral (editors), Learning from the initiative, targeting the involvement of youth in road widening and slums for the development of emerging cities, Springer paving, water and sewerage, solid waste management, income-generating International Publishing, Cham, opportunities. pages 115–124. Despite the magnitude of these efforts in Kibera, limited analysis 2. Mulligan, Joe, Jamilla Harper, has been carried out on the extent to which slum-upgrading efforts can Pascal Kipkemboi, Bukonola Ngobi and Anna Collins (2016), address fundamental risks, and the implications for broader resilience “Community-responsive building. A number of studies are available on gender-based or post- adaptation to flooding in Kibera, election violence,(5) health risks(6) and flooding in Kibera.(7) Lüthi(8) Kenya”, Proceedings of the draws general lessons from the “slum improvement” efforts in Nairobi Institution of Civil Engineers– Engineering Sustainability. 13 and Kibera. Against this background, it is the aim of this paper to assess pages. how slum-upgrading interventions affect the social contract and social 3. Rowell, David P, Catherine cohesion, and hence the resilience of residents in Kibera. A Senior, Michael Vellinga and The following section describes the methods used. This is followed by Richard J Graham (2015), “Can climate projection uncertainty results and a conclusion that considers the role played by slum-upgrading be constrained over Africa interventions in building resilience. using metrics of contemporary performance?”, Climatic Change Vol 134, No 4, pages 621–633. II. Methods 4. The term “slum” usually has derogatory connotations and a. Conceptual framework can suggest that a settlement needs replacement or can Figure 1 shows our conceptual framework, which in turn guides our legitimate the eviction of its methodology, the structure of the paper and our line of argument. residents. However, it is a We first examine the effects of slum-upgrading projects on flood and difficult term to avoid for at least three reasons. First, some conflict risks. We subsequently analyse how these projects can build resilience networks of neighbourhood to these risks via strengthening the social cohesion and social contract. organizations choose to identify In this paper, drawing on the Interagency Resilience Working Group themselves with a positive use of the term, partly to neutralize (IARWG) definition, we consider resilience as “the ability of countries, these negative connotations; communities and households to anticipate, adapt to and/or recover from the effects one of the most successful of potentially hazardous occurrences (natural disasters, economic instability, and is the National Slum Dwellers Federation in India. Second, conflict) in a manner that protects livelihoods, accelerates and sustains recovery, the only global estimates for and supports economic and social development”.(9) We specifically reference housing deficiencies, collected resilience to conflict,(10) insecurity(11) and flooding, given that these are by the United Nations, are for the risks that residents of Kibera face significant exposure to. We discuss what they term “slums”. And third, in some nations, there resilience at the community level, based on local perceptions of livelihood are advantages for residents opportunities, social networks and access to basic services. of informal settlements if Social contract and social cohesion are conceived as mediating their settlement is recognized officially as a “slum”; indeed, variables in the link between risk, slum upgrading and resilience (Figure the residents may lobby to get 1). This is supported by extensive research on conflict, and specifically the their settlement classified as a literature on urban fragility, resilience building(12) and social vulnerability “notified slum”. Where the term in urban contexts,(13) which demonstrates the importance of strong bonds is used in this journal, it refers to settlements characterized by both within and between communities, and between communities and at least some of the following governance providers, for resilience and sustainable peace.(14) features: a lack of formal We understand the social contract as a process by which everyone recognition on the part of local government of the settlement in a political community consents to state authority, thereby limiting and its residents; the absence

2 DEVELOPING RISK OR RESILIENCE?: KIBERA, NAIROBI

Figure 1 Conceptual framework

SOURCE: Kounkuey Design Initiative (KDI)/International Alert.

of secure tenure for residents; some freedoms, in exchange for the state’s protection of their universal inadequacies in provision for human rights and security and for the adequate provision of public infrastructure and services; (15) overcrowded and sub-standard goods and services. The social contract emerges from the interaction dwellings; and location on between the following key factors: a) expectations that a given society has land less than suitable for of a given state; b) state capacity to provide services, including security, occupation. For a discussion of and to secure revenue from its population and territory to pay for these more precise ways to classify the range of housing sub- services; and c) elite will to direct state resources and capacity to fulfil markets through which those social expectations.(16) with limited incomes buy, rent Social cohesion, as Stanley describes it, is “the willingness of members or build accommodation, see (17) Environment and Urbanization of a society to cooperate with each other to survive and prosper”. Social Vol 1, No 2 (1989), available capital, a core component of social cohesion,(18) refers to the networks at http://eau.sagepub.com/ and relationships among people that enable a community to function content/1/2.toc. effectively. This contributes to community resilience by providing an 5. Dercon, Stefan and Roxan informal buffer to those affected by disaster, “overcoming challenges to Gutiérrez-Romero (2010), “Triggers and characteristics adaptation through coordinated local processes, and enabling transformative of the 2007 Kenyan electoral change by strengthening the community’s collective voice”.(19) There are violence”, World Development different types of social capital. “Bonding social capital” refers to social Vol 40, No 4, pages 731–744; also Kihato, Caroline Wanjiku capital within an identity group, and is based on kinship, geography, (2015), ““Go back and tell religion or ethnicity. Marginalized communities often rely on bonding them who the real men are!” social capital to collectively gain access to resources.(20) “Bridging social Gendering our understanding of Kibera’s post-election capital” pertains to the building of cohesion between groups. It is based violence”, International Journal on external ties across distinct groups and can link these groups to outside of Conflict and Violence Vol 9, assets and socioeconomic identities.(21) No 1, pages 13–24; and Smedt, Johan de (2009), “‘No raila, no peace!’ Big man politics and election violence at the Kibera b. Research area grassroots”, African Affairs Vol 108, No 433, pages 581–598. The research was carried out in the Kibera villages Gatwekera, Lindi, 6. e.g. Gallaher, Courtney Makina, Silanga and Soweto East and the “decanting sites” Langata Maloof, Dennis Mwaniki, Mary and Magade, located on the southwest and northeast fringes of Kibera Njenga, Nancy K Karanja and (Map 1). Decanting sites are temporary housing sites where residents

3 ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION M ap 1 R esearch locations SOURCE: SOURCE: KDI/International Alert.

4 DEVELOPING RISK OR RESILIENCE?: KIBERA, NAIROBI

Antoinette M WinklerPrins of Kibera deemed entitled to new housing can move and stay until (2013), “Real or perceived: The their new housing units are completed in Kibera. The research sites environmental health risks of urban sack gardening in Kibera were chosen to be broadly representative of the villages of Kibera, to slums of Nairobi, Kenya”, cover the different types and levels of (flood, security and conflict) risk EcoHealth Vol 10, No 1, pages experienced in different areas, and to overlap with the slum-upgrading 9–20. efforts (Table 1). 7. See reference 2. Table 1 shows that the level of crime and insecurity varies significantly 8. See reference 1, Lüthi (2016). across the research sites in Kibera. In addition, two major types of 9. IARWG (2012), “The conflict can be identified: that between structure owners and tenants, characteristics of resilience building”, Interagency and intercommunal conflicts. Factors that lead to tensions, and in some Resilience Working Group cases to violent altercations, between tenants and structure owners discussion paper, accessed include an inability or unwillingness to pay rent, rent increases without 10 September 2016 at http:// technicalconsortium.org/ consultation or without commensurate refurbishments, and disputes over wp-content/uploads/2014/05/ who shoulders responsibilities for repairs of houses. Relations between The-Characteristics-of-Res_ structure owners and tenants are particularly strained during periods of Building.pdf. flooding when structure damage is at its highest. Intercommunal conflicts 10. Conflict is a situation run along ethnic lines, predominantly between Luos and Kikuyus. While where “two or more parties believe that their interests the perceived rigging of the presidential elections in 2007 triggered are incompatible, express violence across Kenya, with Kibera as a hotspot, the spread of conflict in hostile attitudes or take action the informal settlement reflected longer-term frustrations and grievances that damages other parties” (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium between the Kikuyus and Luos. (2012), How to guide to conflict Two types of flood risk are apparent in Kibera. Firstly, riverine sensitivity). It becomes violent flooding is characterized by overflow of the Ngong River and its major

Table 1 Characteristics of research sites

Average Flood risk (% of income households flooded Crime and Post-election Proximity to development Research site level in 2015 long rains) insecurity violence projects

Andolo (sub-area Low High (59%) High Low Not close to any past or of Lindi) current projects MSF Low High (64%) High Low Displacement due to NYS (in Lindi Village) sewer line Gatwekera Medium Medium Low High Adjacent to NYS sewer line and toilets Makina High Low Medium– Low Near incoming railway High housing Silanga Medium High (59%) Very high Medium Adjacent to NYS road widening Soweto East Medium Low–Medium (36%) Medium– Medium Immediately adjacent to High KENSUP and railway housing Langata (decanting Medium Low Low Not in place Part of KENSUP project site) in 2007/08 Magade (decanting Medium Low Medium Not in place Part of Railway Project site) in 2007/08

NOTE: The percentages, where available, are the results of a panel survey KDI conducted in Kibera of 963 households, before and after the long rains of 2015. In the survey, household flooding was defined as “water entering the door from the door or through the wall”, excluding roof leakage.

5 ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION tributaries. Secondly, localized flooding is prevalent across the settlement when parties no longer seek and is caused by insufficient or blocked drainage, usually associated with to attain their goals peacefully, but resort instead to violence in poor waste management. one form or another. 11. Insecurity is a situation where people fear for c. Data collection their human security; see Vivekananda, Janani, Janpeter In November 2015 and February 2016, we interviewed a total of 339 Schilling and Dan Smith (2014), “Climate resilience in fragile respondents in 36 focus group discussions (FGDs) and 55 individual and conflict-affected societies: interviews. Expert interviews were conducted with representatives Concepts and approaches”, of the Kenyan government (chiefs, members of parliament, county Development in Practice Vol 24, commissioners), development organizations (such as UN-Habitat), No 4, pages 487–501. community organizations (such as Muungano wa Wanavijiji), the 12. Aldrich, Daniel P (2012), Building Resilience – Social district peace committee and security providers (police). The FGDs Capital in Post-Disaster were organized in close cooperation with respected community Recovery, University of Chicago representatives (youth leaders, elders, representatives of community Press, Chicago, 248 pages. organizations, etc.) in each location. Participants were self-selected 13. Pelling, Mark (2003), through open invitations. FGDs were conducted with men only, women The vulnerability of cities, Earthscan, London, 212 pages. only, youth and mixed groups, in sizes from 5 to 12 participants. About 14. Boer, John de, Robert the same number of FGDs was carried out in each research location. Muggah and Ronak Patel We first asked respondents to identify positive and negative changes (2016), Conceptualizing City they had experienced over the past years in Kibera and then facilitated Fragility and Resilience, United Nations University Centre for a ranking exercise of the issues identified. Only following this exercise Policy Research, 24 pages. did we discuss conflict and flood risks, the slum-upgrading projects 15. UNDP (2016), Engaged and resilience as they related to the positive and negative changes Societies, Responsive identified by the group. Individual interviews were selected by KDI and States: The Social Contract International Alert based on level of involvement in issues related to the in Situations of Conflict and Fragility, United Nations research focus. Development Programme, New York, 36 pages. 16. OECD (2008), Concepts and III. Results Dilemmas of State-building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, OECD In this results section, we first examine the effects of the three development Publishing, Paris, 82 pages. efforts on resilience building, particularly relating to conflict and flood 17. Stanley, Dick (2003), risks (IIIa), before we discuss the impacts in more detail with respect to “What do we know about the local social contract and social cohesion (IIIb). social cohesion: The research perspective of the federal government’s social cohesion research network”, The a. Slum upgrading and resilience building Canadian Journal of Sociology/ Cahiers canadiens de A number of slum-upgrading efforts are underway that are intended sociologie Vol 28, No 1, pages 5–17, page 5. to address some of the underlying development challenges of Kibera 18. OECD (2011), Perspectives – Table 2 and Map 2 introduce the projects and show their respective on Global Development 2012: locations. Through their design and implementation, these projects to Social Cohesion in a Shifting varying degrees affect the different types of conflict (crime and insecurity, World, OECD Publishing, Paris, 263 pages. intercommunal tensions, and structure owner versus tenant conflicts) and the flood risks (localized and riverine) that Kibera residents face, 19. See reference 12, page 13. amongst other risks. These projects are not expressly framed as enhancing 20. Adger, W Neil (2009), “Social Capital, Collective Action, and resilience or addressing flood or conflict risks. However, in aiming to Adaptation to Climate Change”, reduce poverty and youth unemployment, reduce environmental hazards, Economic Geography Vol 79, deliver improved-quality housing (in the case of KENSUP and the Railway No 4, pages 387–404. Project), and ensure better water and sanitation service provision, they 21. See reference 20. can and do impact upon resilience.

6 DEVELOPING RISK OR RESILIENCE?: KIBERA, NAIROBI

Table 2 Overview of slum upgrading projects

Kenya Slum Upgrading Nairobi Railway Relocation (“KENSUP”) Kibera Action Plan (The “Railway National Youth Service (“NYS”) – Project name Programme – Zone A Project”) Kibera Slum Upgrade Initiative

Project type Predominantly single- Single-sector – housing and Multi-sectoral – road widening, sector – housing railway reserve rehabilitation water, sanitation, solid waste management, sewerage, micro- businesses, employment Location in Soweto East Adjacent to rail line passing Settlement-wide Kibera through (or affecting) 10 of Kibera’s 13 villages Lead agency Ministry of Lands and Kenya Railways Authority Ministry of Devolution and Physical Planning/ Planning/National Youth Service Ministry of Housing Key donors Government of Kenya/ World Bank under East Government of Kenya Cities Alliance/ Africa Trade and Transport UN-HABITAT Facilitation Project Status (as of Phase A opened In construction Stalled, with some elements July 2016) ongoing

Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) – Kibera Zone A KENSUP, a project by the Kenyan government and UN-Habitat, aims to improve the livelihoods of people living and working in Kenya’s informal settlements through the provision of security of tenure, housing improvement, income generation, and physical and social 22. UN-Habitat (2008), UN- infrastructure.(22) Soweto East was selected as the pilot for the project Habitat and the Kenya Slum for three reasons: first, it has good road access; second, Soweto East is a Upgrading Programme - Strategy Document, Nairobi, “cosmopolitan” village with high ethnic diversity and economic stability; 75 pages. and third, there are development efforts that the new project could connect to, including water and sanitation facilities, youth empowerment (23) 23. Interviews with the and sports initiatives. Settlement Executive Enumeration began in 2004, and Soweto East was divided into four Committee. zones (A to D). The plan was to start in Zone A and then expand the project to the remaining zones. Through household questionnaires, the residents living in Zone A were incorporated into the master register but they did not play a significant role in the planning and implementation of the project. All houses were numbered and all registered residents were given unique identification cards. The accuracy of this process was limited by the absence of many Zone A residents when the registration was carried out. Those registered were not consulted further before they received notice to relocate from Zone A to the 632 housing units in the temporary decanting site in Langata (Map 2).Thereafter, demolition of the structures began. The project faced several challenges. Structure owners in Soweto East opposed the project because they would lose their source of income (the rent from the tenants) without being compensated. During the period of initial notices and relocation in 2009, structure owners filed complaints

7 ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION M ap 2 Locations of the slum upgrading projects (relative to areas riverine flood risk) SOURCE: Joe Mulligan/Amos Wandera (KDI). Wandera Joe Mulligan/Amos SOURCE:

8 DEVELOPING RISK OR RESILIENCE?: KIBERA, NAIROBI

and lawsuits that delayed project implementation (demolition and 24. GoK (2009), Petition 498, construction).(24) In March 2012, the court injunction was dismissed, and The High Court of Kenya, final clearances of structures were completed to make space for the new Government of Kenya, 9 pages. six-storey houses.(25) 25. GoK (2015), Petition 304, The process of relocation was also problematic. According to our The High Court of Kenya, Government of Kenya, 10 respondents in Soweto East and Langata, rent in Langata is similar to that pages. in Soweto East. However, since residents of Langata were expected to save money through housing cooperatives to make the down payment on the new housing in Soweto East, respondents reported additional financial pressure. The down payment is 10 per cent of the cost of the new housing unit, where a one-room unit costs 600,000 Kenyan shillings, or KSh (approx. US$ 6,000) and a three-room unit KSh 1.35 million (approx. US$ 13,500). Affordability has been a significant drawback of KENSUP. Some people have opted out of the relocation process by illegally sub-letting their temporary housing unit in Langata for a higher price and moving to (26) 26. Interviews with the a different place within Kibera instead. Settlement Executive In terms of resilience, the decanting site in Langata offers improved Committee and residents of housing, hygiene, security, and local drainage in the interim period. The Langata. key disadvantage of living in the decanting site, located outside of Kibera, is the negative impact on people’s social and business networks and access (27) 27. See reference 26. to income-generating opportunities. Some respondents reported that their social cohesion had been better in Soweto than it was in Langata. “Togetherness was better in Soweto East. In Soweto East you can borrow from a friend”, said a woman in an FGD in Langata. The number of people (28) 28. See reference 26. enumerated also far exceeds the capacity of the new housing units. While no one had moved into the new houses in Soweto East at the time of the research (14 years after the launch of the project), residents started being rehoused into completed homes in Zone A in July 2016. Details about the impacts of the project for flooding, security and conflict risks are provided in Table 3, in terms of both the potential of the project once fully realized, and the actual outcomes to date.

Nairobi Railway Relocation Action Plan (“Railway Project”) The Railway Relocation Action Plan (RAP) originated from the need of the Kenya Railway Corporation to recover the railway reserve and establish an extended safety corridor for railway operations and maintenance in Nairobi. The railway reserve land in Kibera has been encroached upon by a large number of residents, who have established housing structures, shops, schools, and places of worship on both sides of the railway line, with the railway track itself functioning as a path for pedestrians. The project consists of building housing and business units and social institutions for residents living along and in the reserve of the Nairobi to Kisumu railway that passes through Kibera. Map 2 shows the Railway Project housing that 29. GoK (2014a), Petition 239, The High Court of Kenya, is completed or under construction at the time of writing. Government of Kenya, 35 The RAP identified eligibility through two community enumerations – pages; also interview with in 2005 and in 2010. As delays resulted in the failure to initiate construction, the Kenya Slum Dwellers Federation. AMT was after the 2005 enumeration and newly arrived residents and businesses established by Pamoja Trust were not allowed to register as project affected, a second enumeration, in 2003. led by Muungano wa Wanavijiji (the Kenya Slum Dwellers Federation) 30. GoK and Railways with technical and financial support from Akiba Mashinani Trust (AMT), Corporation (2005), Relocation occurred in 2010.(29) For both enumerations, the core enumeration team Action Plan for Improving the (30) Safety along Kenya Railway consisted of representatives from all the affected villages. The inclusion Line, 161 pages. of residents in the enumeration process was designed to ensure that those

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Table 3 Impacts of KENSUP on short- and long-term conflict and flooding risks

KENSUP

Project potential Actual outcomes to date

Conflict Structure •• Strong eventual mitigating effect as the •• Structure owners opposed the owners vs. individual structure owners/landlords project via lawsuits that delayed tenants dynamic would not exist anymore implementation of the project Inter- •• Potential mitigating effect as generally •• Concerns that the beneficiaries of communal people with a higher standard of the new housing may not be the conflict housing are less likely to participate in original inhabitants, with negative (intercommunal) violence implications for cohesion in the •• Potential aggravating effect only if one community group is favoured over another during the relocation process Community/ •• Potential aggravation of tensions •• Project delays and the lack of clarity residents vs. between owners of housing units and on enumeration have led to mistrust government government between residents and government •• Mitigating effect as opportunities to •• The lack of affordability for residents improve housing and living standards has been a significant cause of are given to residents grievance •• Residents living in the future Zone B expressed a lack of support for government initiatives during household interviews, suggesting concerns over the Zone A consultation process Crime and •• Potential short-term aggravating •• Mitigating effect in the decanting insecurity effect, as informal business owners or site, as overall security is reported to workers who have lost their source of be better than in Kibera income (given relocation to Langata) •• Loss or reduction of income- may resort to illegal activities to generating activities, mostly informal generate income •• Potential longer-term mitigating effect post-reoccupation if housing and associated safety accrues to residents Flood Local •• Mitigating effect because of improved •• Local drainage improved but the risk (drainage) housing and drainage infrastructure contribution to downstream flooding flood risk in the decanting site and in the new is the same or exacerbated as there houses are no strategies for slowing down or infiltrating surface floodwater Riverine •• Mitigating effect of downstream •• No evidence that downstream flood risk flooding considered as part of planning flooding has been considered as part of planning •• Solid waste collection adjacent to KENSUP (part of NYS) provided temporary reduction in environmental and flood risk

affected had confidence in the process of resettlement.(31) The Federation 31. See reference 30. and AMT ensured that the RAP made concerted efforts to mediate the different interests, whether between structure owners and tenants or among residential, business and institution uses. The project followed the principle 10 DEVELOPING RISK OR RESILIENCE?: KIBERA, NAIROBI

of one project-affected person (per household) receiving one new unit – be it a house or shop. Structure owners living along the lines similarly received one unit, regardless of their original number of structures. To mitigate conflicts, particularly with the structure owners, continuous negotiations were required and one-off financial payments were given to structure owners as compensation based on the number of structures they previously (32) 32. Weru, Jane (2004), owned. This approach recognized tenants as being the most vulnerable. “Community federations and In June 2014 project-affected persons in Soweto East were issued city upgrading: the work of notices,(33) and the project arranged for a decanting site in Magade for Pamoja Trust and Muungano in Kenya”, Environment and those residents living and/or operating businesses closest to the railway Urbanization Vol 16, No 1, track (Map 2). In Magade, people do not pay rent, although they pay pages 47–62. on average KSh 500 (approx. US$ 5) per month for water and electricity 33. See reference 29. depending upon individual consumption (significantly less than the average rent in Soweto East). Down payments for the new housing units in Soweto East are not needed, as people will rent these rather than own them. Given the close proximity to Soweto East, livelihoods of those relocated to Magade have not been significantly disrupted. Children did not need to change schools. The quality of houses, sanitation and exposure to flood risk in Magade is generally perceived positively. On security, responses were more ambivalent but overall security was stated to be better than in Soweto East. Local organizations have expressed concerns about the long-term strategy for access across the railway tracks and for security within the reserve once the housing is complete, that the reserve might become an unsafe area in the future, and that connectivity and cohesion between different villages might be affected. More details about the risk-related impacts of the project are provided in Table 4.

National Youth Service (NYS) – Kibera Slum Upgrade Initiative The National Youth Service, originally established in 1964, aims “to help (34) 34. GoK (2014b), “National the youth discover and develop their potential.” NYS was re-launched by youth service”, Government of President Uhuru Kenyatta in 2013, and a major new programme of works Kenya, accessed 2 September was initiated in 2014 under the Ministry of Devolution and Planning – 2016 at http://nys.go.ke/public/ index.php. The Kibera Slum Upgrade Initiative. Activities in Kibera under NYS fall into three main categories: youth employment and micro-businesses, road construction, and sanitation (including household rubbish collection, drainage cleaning, and construction of sewerage and ablution blocks). Youth receive a weekly sum of KSh 1,650 (approx. US$ 16.50) through mobile banking for work done under NYS. They are also a part of savings and credit cooperatives (locally called SACCOs), through which they save approximately KSh (35) 35. NYS group leader in 350 (approx. US$ 3.50) per week. Money from the SACCOs is lent to Gatwekera. members to start businesses. A majority of respondents reported on the numerous benefits of NYS for communities. Several respondents, for example in Silanga, Laini Saba and Lindi, drew a direct connection among NYS, its level of youth engagement, and reduced levels of crime and insecurity. According to a respondent in Lindi, “It’s a good programme because the youth are working for something. They are not worried about something to eat or buying clothes. It helped them forget evil things.” A woman in an FGD in Andolo stated, “Crime went down during NYS, even in Andolo. The youth was tired after working all day.” Despite road widening requiring structure owners to remove structures adjacent to the new construction, this element of NYS was also overwhelmingly supported by residents. It has been transformative for

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Table 4 Impacts of the Railway Project on short- and long-term conflict and flooding risks

Railway Project

Project potential Actual outcomes to date

Conflict Structure •• Strong eventual mitigating •• The RAP recognized tenants as the most owners vs. effect as the individual structure vulnerable and made concerted efforts tenants owners/landlords dynamic would to mediate the different interests that not exist anymore have been largely accepted Intercommunal •• Potential mitigating effect as •• As Soweto East is a cosmopolitan conflict people with a higher standard area, beneficiaries included people of housing are less likely to from different ethnic and economic participate in (intercommunal) backgrounds violence •• The project thereby shifted the •• Potential aggravating effect only if distinction from ethnic or economic one tribe is favoured over another groups to the (ethnically unifying) factor during the relocation process of being a beneficiary or not Community/ •• Potential for new conflict among •• Support of residents in Soweto East residents vs. tenants, structure owners and the (adjacent to railway housing) for government railway company government projects has risen in general, reflecting resident approval of the speed and completeness of the process Crime and •• Potential mitigating effect as •• Short-term mitigating effect on the insecurity integration of businesses into the decanting site as overall security is housing plan makes for a more better with less frequent muggings, rape balanced and active area cases and break-ins than in Kibera •• Long-term strategy for limiting •• The more open location in Magade gives access to (and across) the railway criminals less opportunity to hide before easement is not clear, raising or after an attack risks of the reserve becoming an unsafe area in the future Flood Drainage flood •• Mitigating effect because of •• Local drainage improved but the risk risk improved housing and drainage contribution to downstream flooding infrastructure in the decanting is the same or exacerbated as there site and in the new houses are no strategies for slowing down or infiltrating surface floodwater Riverine flood •• Mitigating effect if downstream •• No evidence that downstream flooding risk flooding is considered as part of has been considered as part of planning planning (the site is upstream of any major watercourses)

access within and to Kibera, and subsequently for business and security (new lighting and police security posts were introduced along the road side). Some respondents also noted that the cleaning of open drainage channels and solid waste collection have reduced the local flood risk from overflowing drains, in the short term at least. The NYS initiatives were not immediately welcomed in all target communities, however, and initially faced resistance in Gatwekera – an opposition stronghold.(36) There were concerns that NYS was a smokescreen 36. See reference 35. for the government to buy votes by employing youth. According to one respondent in Gatwekera, “We only embraced it [NYS] after seeing its impact in other places”. Beyond the implementation challenges in Gatwekera, the NYS initiative had some fundamental shortcomings, which have limited 12 DEVELOPING RISK OR RESILIENCE?: KIBERA, NAIROBI

37. For example, FGDs in Laini the potential long-term development impact.(37) Significant corruption Saba, Lindi, Soweto East and allegations emerged in 2015 and NYS activities in Kibera were largely stalled Makina. by the end of the year.(38) Several key persons in NYS and the Ministry of 38. Community interviews in Laini Saba and Soweto East. Devolution and Planning were accused of misappropriating KSh 1.4 billion (39) 39. Maina, Carole and Zipporah (approx. US$ 14 million). Recently, the NYS Director General stepped Weru (2016), “11 NYS scandal aside when the Director of Public Prosecutions ordered his prosecution.(40) suspects charged with money In addition to financial irregularities, technical challenges have plagued the laundering”, The Star, 22 initiative, in particular with the sewer line, which has ceased to function August, accessed 4 November 2016 at http://www.the-star. since the first stages were completed in 2015. A facilities survey by KDI co.ke/news/2016/08/22/11- in November 2016 showed that of the 125 ablution blocks completed to nys-scandal-suspects-charged- date, 94 (75 per cent) are currently not functioning, many due to the non- with-money-laundering_ c1407511; also Wafula, Paul completion of the main line, or to poor connections. The locations of the (2016), “Up to Sh1.4b was functioning and non-functioning blocks were geotagged and are shown stolen in NYS scandal, new in Map 2.The stalling of works and the failure of ablution blocks as viable audit now reveals”, The Star, 8 June, accessed 1 businesses have subsequently removed many of the new employment and November 2016 at http:// income sources for youth. The number of ablution blocks functioning is www.standardmedia.co.ke/ unlikely to increase significantly in the future, even when the remaining article/2000204386/up-to-sh1- sewer line is completed, due to ongoing flooding and blockages of the main 4b-was-stolen-in-nys-scandal- new-audit-now-reveals. sewer line. These shortcomings and the implications for resilience building 40. Standard (2015), “NYS are discussed further in Table 5 and the following sections. Director Nelson Githinji steps aside after DPP ordered his prosecution”, 16 November, b. Impacts of slum upgrading on resilience via the local social accessed 9 November 2016 at http://www.standardmedia. contract and social cohesion co.ke/article/2000182766/nys- director-nelson-githinji-steps- For slum-upgrading efforts to be effective in building resilience to risks aside-after-dpp-ordered-his- such as flooding and conflict risks in complex political environments prosecution. such as Kibera, the findings of this study suggest three things that are important for success. First, projects need to involve communities in consultation and secure community buy-in – this will ensure a robust understanding of the local context, including its risk dynamics, and enable transparency and accountability. Securing community buy-in through strong trust- building components will help strengthen the social contract between those implementing the intervention and the beneficiaries. The marked difference between the process for KENSUP and that for the Railway Project illustrates this clearly. In the Railway Project, stringent criteria for eligibility, awareness campaigns, dialogue, consultation and community meetings helped mitigate the risks of obstruction and conflict from local residents. Government acquiescence to community involvement in enumeration in the Railway Project ensured accountability and was a key component of the effectiveness of this relocation project. The community- led, relatively transparent and inclusive process of the Railway Project allowed Kibera residents to assert themselves in the relocation process and helped build the social contract with the government. The relative speed and momentum maintained among enumeration, reporting and re-housing built trust in the process. By contrast, the lack of transparency in housing allocation and limited buy-in led to structure owners opposing KENSUP via lawsuits that delayed the implementation of the project and undermined relations between the government and project beneficiaries. Where the social contract is already weak, projects need to be particularly sensitive to the political context. In the dense, heterogeneous, complex political environment of Kibera, technical interventions that lack

13 ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION Actual - Lack of clarity over compensation to structure owners/ displaced residents led to protests in some areas The eviction process - left structure owners susceptible to land by others grabs Distribution of facilities incomplete, uneven, and occasionally non- communal/privatized, leading to feelings of distrust Lack of clarity over displacement in some communities led to protests in some areas until compensation was provided Failure of ablution blocks Failure due to bad planning of the sewer line and connections reduced mitigating effects of youth employment - Due to poor design, line has the sewerage exposing ruptured, people to local flood risk and human waste Ablution blocks slated - Andolo to come the area never materialized Sanitation and sewerage Potential effect Aggravating when structures are removed for the ablution blocks and line sewerage Aggravating effect Aggravating as distribution of ablution blocks could be politicized Aggravating effect Aggravating when structures are removed for the ablution blocks and line sewerage The increase in public facilities could lead to reduction in safe and sanitary night-time options Strong mitigating effect as ablution blocks and the new sewerage line remove human waste from watercourses Actual Most roadside structures are businesses and road improvements helped increase residents’ access to them Mitigating effect observed in areas adjacent to the roads but not extended to all areas - Widening accepted due to - broad support and direct incentives for roadside structure owners - Marking of houses was swiftly followed by demolition/ construction, increasing trust in government delivery Areas along roads have reported less crime since road widening due to better access for police and to police posts/ No consideration of drainage of drainage No consideration exacerbating local and riverine flooding Potential Aggravating effect when structures are removed and structure owners lose their income and tenants their housing Road construction Potential mitigating effect as security providers have better access to conflict areas Potential effect aggravating when structures are removed Potential mitigating effect as security providers have better access to insecure areas Potential to increase or reduce flood risk depending on design drainage b le 5 Ta Actual - Income levels rose across the settlement in short term - Stalling of projects created tension as income sources halted - Many businesses are no longer functioning due to technical and resourcing constraints - NYS was politicized, was politicized, - NYS particularly in Gatwekera, where youth were incited to oppose the ablution blocks planned under NYS - Widespread community buy-in and desire for the project to return - Spike in youth-related crime and police response in late 2015 linked to and the the end of NYS Christmas period - Crime and insecurity reduced significantly while youth were employed - Increased crime when and direct employment NYS opportunities stopped abruptly Businesses that reduce flood risk (builders of ablution blocks and solid waste collectors) have not thus proved sustainable, reverting to the previous situation on short- and long-term conflict flooding risks Impacts of N YS Potential Mitigating effect as youth and other residents have formal income opportunities and therefore are better able to pay rent Youth employment and micro-businesses Youth Mitigating effect as well- employed youth are less by likely to be incited (e.g. political leaders) to use violence or attack others Mitigating effect as youth employed in government are more programmes likely to receive support Strong mitigating effect as youth employment and income could increase in the short (direct term long and employment) (creation of sustainable youth-run businesses) - Strong short-term mitigating effect with but youth cleaning drains no long-term drainage improvement - Potential long-term employment in sanitation businesses Structure owners vs. tenants Inter- communal conflict Community/ residents vs. government Crime and insecurity Conflict Flood risk

14 DEVELOPING RISK OR RESILIENCE?: KIBERA, NAIROBI

consultation have less likelihood of take-up. In Gatwekera, low levels of trust in government-led projects have led to them being politicized and opposed. Despite NYS being a Kibera-wide initiative, youth in Gatwekera were incited to oppose the project, and they set fire to the ablution blocks and physically 41. For example, the former harmed project supporters.(41) The political resistance to the sewerage and NYS group leader in Gatwekera. sanitation initiatives, due to the perception that this was a government vote- procurement strategy, led in effect to the rejection of a major new public health system with associated public health risks in the longer term. Second, projects that build social cohesion and social capital have positive outcomes for resilience. Social cohesion can be strengthened if programming balances interests across different groups transparently and equitably. The Railway Project, via Muungano wa Wanavijiji and AMT, organized a series of consultations and meetings between residents of Kibera and railway officers to bring clarity and build confidence in the relocation process.(42) This process helped mediate between the interests of structure 42. See reference 30. owners and tenants as well as those of residential, business and institution uses. The community-led enumeration process concluded that tenants were the most vulnerable. Continuous negotiation with structure owners, whose multiple units were not considered for commensurate structure compensation, helped mitigate conflict and the manipulation of allocations. NYS mandated youth to be part of SACCOs, which are owned, governed and managed by their members. These have been key in helping youth to save and manage their finances while becoming part of a supportive economic and social network. Membership in such groups is important in helping youth cooperatively and collectively to address their vulnerabilities related to unemployment. The SACCOs are forums for youth to support each other through exploring small business opportunities as well as to jointly identify and resolve community needs. Slum-upgrading efforts that enable youth empowerment through such group formation, cooperation and trust building have the potential to strengthen the social capital of members. Under NYS, youth convened in these groups tended to be from the same village/community, thereby strengthening bonding capital. Bridging capital was also realized across networks, as formal NYS graduates/recruits from different communities trained and led community youth volunteer teams throughout villages within Kibera. The networked nature of much of the infrastructure introduced (road, water and sewerage) required working across several villages, bringing youth and residents into communities they might previously have avoided. A comparison of the two relocation sites, Langata for KENSUP and Magade for the Railway Project, demonstrates the importance of social capital and networks to Kibera residents, who rely on them to access information and livelihood opportunities. The proximity to Kibera, making it possible to access these networks and livelihood and business opportunities, was critical to the success of the relocation to Magade. Respondents from Magade felt they were able to continue their livelihoods as before. Residents relocated to Langata experienced a disruption in their access to information and networks, and struggled to continue their income- generating activities at the same level. This was particularly problematic because they were expected to not only pay rent in the decanting site but also save a significant amount to make the down payment on the new housing units in Soweto East. In Langata, these higher costs even caused some people to opt out of the project by illegally sub-letting their housing units for higher prices to “middle class people”, essentially non-Kibera

15 ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION residents. Respondents from Kibera still living in Langata found it difficult to build ties with these new residents, who have (or own) cars and could drive to shopping malls and did not patronize the small shops and markets they had set up in Langata, affecting the cohesion among those living there. Third, we find that projects that are multi-sectoral and integrated have stronger potential to effectively address multiple risks compared to single-sector interventions. NYS, an urban networked infrastructure and livelihoods project, was designed to enable community-scale projects to connect to formal systems, lessening the gap between the formal and informal parts of Nairobi. Road widening under NYS facilitated improved services without large-scale displacement, and largely with support from affected people and the wider community. This will be a long-term and transformative legacy of NYS. Our research indicates that in the short term, NYS strengthened community resilience by providing income opportunities for youth, and contributed positively to the reduction of crime and insecurity in Kibera. These benefits, however, were not sustainable. After NYS was discontinued as a result of the corruption allegations, several respondents in Soweto East and Makina reported an increase in crime and insecurity. As one respondent explained, “When NYS ended, youth were going back to being gangsters again. Youth were now used to the money but the money stopped coming.” Levels of crime returned to (at least) pre-NYS levels, with a significant peak at than pre-NYS levels during the Christmas period in 2015, in particularly marginalized areas such as Andolo. Violent altercations between youth and the police led to the police instituting a “shoot to kill” policy aimed at youth suspected of bearing arms. NYS also had the potential to address through improved sanitation, solid waste management and major new sewerage. However, a failure to understand riverine flood risk hindered this potential impact. Flooding of the new trunk line for collecting sewage, constructed under the NYS programme immediately adjacent to the Ngong River, contributed to blockages and pipeline breakages. A lack of consultation with residents led to illegal connections and dumping in the sewer line, exacerbating blockages. Poor design of the connector pipes from the ablution blocks to the main sewerage left them exposed and susceptible to damage. As noted, 75 per cent of the ablution blocks that connected to the sewer line are not functioning at the time of writing (Map 2) – a figure unlikely to decrease significantly due to ongoing flooding and blockages in the main sewer line. In conception, NYS had the strongest potential to build community resilience compared to KENSUP and the Railway Project; it aimed to address multiple risks that Kibera residents face, namely livelihood insecurity among youth, crime and instability, and lack of access to basic services, public health and infrastructure. The gap between design and implementation, however, undermined the potential impact of the initiative, as evident in the sewer line and ablution block example. Despite these shortcomings, and the widely known corruption allegations, the majority of our respondents across all our research sites highly valued elements of the project, particularly the youth employment and road- widening components, and were keen for its return. When functional, the youth employment components were strongly valued for increasing incomes and for positively addressing crime and insecurity. Road widening has already the opportunity, enterprise and access to services

16 DEVELOPING RISK OR RESILIENCE?: KIBERA, NAIROBI

in the settlement. The improvement in access to Kibera has enabled the functioning of many small businesses (e.g. local shops) that have also engaged and benefited youth (in particular matatu (minibus) SACCOs). The support for the road widening and formalization, and the speed with which it occurred, built trust in the government’s ability to deliver projects and will leave a transformative legacy in Kibera. Table 6 summarizes the positive and negative outcomes of the three projects.

Table 6 Impacts of slum upgrading on the social contract and social cohesion

Social contract Social cohesion

Positive (+) No conclusive finding No conclusive finding

KENSUP Negative (-) •• The project delays and lack of clarity on enumeration •• Residents relocated to Langata led to mistrust between residents and government experienced a disruption in their •• Structure owners opposed the project via lawsuits access to information and networks that delayed project implementation in Kibera, negatively affecting their •• Lack of affordability has been a significant cause of livelihoods grievances •• Cohesion in Langata among Kibera •• Residents living in the future Zone B expressed a lack residents and the middle-class of support for government initiatives during household residents, sub-leasing flats (from interviews, suggesting concerns over the Zone A Kibera residents who cannot afford consultation process them), is low The Positive (+) •• The RAP made concerted efforts to mediate the •• Residents relocated to Magade Railway different interests, and this has been largely accepted felt able to connect to social and Project •• Stringent eligibility criteria, dialogue and consultation business networks at the same level, helped mitigate the risks of obstruction and conflict as they continued to access different from local residents areas of Kibera easily Negative (-) •• Prior to the interventions of AMT and the Kenya Slum •• Future phases of housing will be Dwellers Federation, the Railway Corporation in 2004 further away from Magade, which sent out notices of eviction to railway dwellers in might reduce the ability to access/ Kibera without prior consent or consultation. There maintain social and business were also allegations that political leaders were networks lobbying to be included in the list of beneficiaries and allocating themselves units in the project NYS Positive (+) •• Demonstration of impact in creating youth •• Bonding capital was strengthened employment opportunities and reduction in crime through youth participation in and insecurity built trust in the project and supported SACCOs that served as a support take-up (especially in parts of Kibera initially resistant network and as a forum for youth to to the project) work collaboratively •• Road widening facilitated improved services without •• Formal NYS graduates/recruits from large-scale displacement, and largely with support different communities trained and led from affected people community youth volunteer teams throughout villages within Kibera, contributing towards strengthening bridging capital Negative (-) •• Initial resistance in the political opposition stronghold •• No conclusive finding of Gatwekera, where youth were incited to oppose NYS. Resistance was partly due to the perception that the project was a government vote procurement strategy •• Corruption allegations brought NYS to a temporary and unexpected halt. The cessation of activities undermined the positive outcomes of NYS, and also caused a spike in insecurity in marginalized areas such as Andolo

17 ENVIRONMENT & URBANIZATION

IV. Conclusions The aim of this paper was to assess how slum-upgrading interventions affect the social contract and social cohesion, and hence the resilience of residents in Kibera. Our findings show that slum-upgrading interventions have the potential to reduce conflict and flood risks in highly dense and complex urban environments if they do three things. First, they need to include processes that build the social contract, such as meaningful consultation of residents and social accountability mechanisms like channels to air and resolve grievances. Second, they need to actively build bridging social capital between ethnic groups and not reduce bonding capital within groups. And third, projects that are multi-sectoral by design have a higher potential for impact and effectiveness. For example, KENSUP significantly reduced flood risks for residents in the decanting site and in the new houses in Kibera. However, project- affected people faced diminished access to their networks and income opportunities in Kibera through the relocation process and therefore found themselves with lower resilience in the medium term. The Railway Project adopted a consultative approach to identifying project-affected persons, determining compensation for displaced residents, and mediating the conflicting interests of tenants and structure owners. This approach promoted a positive perception of the project, building trust between community and government. NYS by design has the greatest potential for success compared to KENSUP and the Railway Project because it addresses the multiple risks that are at the heart of what make Kibera residents vulnerable – livelihood insecurity among youth, crime and instability, and lack of access to basic services, public health and infrastructure. The project had numerous failings and was temporarily discontinued due to corruption allegations. Despite the project’s shortcomings, the majority of respondents across all our research sites valued the project, particularly the youth employment and road-widening components, and were keen for it to recommence. Overall, we conclude that slum-upgrading projects in particular, and by extension development projects in general, can become a tool for strengthening resilience to risks such as flooding, conflict and security through building trust – both horizontal, between communities, and vertical, between communities and governance providers. Finally, development interventions adopting an integrated, multi-sector, consultative approach have stronger potential to increase resilience in multi-risk environments compared to single-sector projects.

Acknowledgements We thank the communities in Kibera, every person who volunteered information for this study, and the local KDI Kenya team, including Pascal Kipkemboi, Amos Wandera, Ibrahim Maina, Boniface Omwanda and Prisca Okila.

Funding This research is supported by the Economic and Social Research Council– UK Department for International Development (ESRC–DFID) programme Urban Africa Risk Knowledge, the Swiss Re Foundation and the University of Hamburg. 18 DEVELOPING RISK OR RESILIENCE?: KIBERA, NAIROBI

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