THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION JUNE 4, 2021

VOLUME XIX, ISSUE 10

p.1 p.3 p.6 p.8

Jacob Zenn Jacob Lees Weiss Abdul Sayed Jacob Zenn

BRIEFS Burkan al-Ghadab ’s Pakistan ISWAP Launches Hearts Militants’ Display of Province Launches New and Minds Strategy to Force Highlights Jihadist Magazine Counter Nigerian Army Deepening Turkish Offensive Influence in Libya

MASSACRE IN PERU SHOWS SHINING PATH PER- police (peru21.pe, April 29). This is putting a strangle- SISTS IN APURIMAC VALLEY hold on the group’s revenue, which is forcing it into con-

flict with rival drug traffickers to control key routes. The Jacob Zenn group is also strongly opposed to Peruvian presidential For nearly a decade, Peru’s Shining Path (Sendero Lumi- candidate, Keiko Fujimori, whom it labeled a “traitor” in noso) Marxist militants have been in decline, with the its pamphlets. Ironically, the latest attack has actually group’s political wing becoming more active than the boosted Fujimori’s prospects, with her labeling her left- militant wing ( Monitor, May 15, 2014). Howev- leaning opponent, Pedro Castillo, as ideologically simi- er, on May 24, the group took Peru by surprise when it lar, and even sympathetic, to the Shining Path (lapren- carried out an attack in Satipo Province, Junín region in salatina.com, May27). At a pro-Keiko Fujimori demon- the Apurímac jungle valley, which for years has been the stration in Lima after the attack, her supporters also held group’s main area of operations. Unlike the group’s orig- banners stating “No to Communism” and “No to Terror- inal aim to create a Marxist state, now Shining Path fo- ism” (elperiodicodearagon.com, May 30). cuses on drug trafficking. The 18 victims of the May 24 The attack is also unlikely to win Shining Path any public attack accordingly were in a brothel area run by drug support. The Peruvian archbishop in Trujillo issued a traffickers, although as a reminder of the group’s ideolo- condemnation of the “cruel assassins” and called for gy, the fighters sprayed Marxist graffiti at the attack site respect for the “sanctity of life” (infovaticana.com, May (mercopress.com, May 26). Further, the fighters left 26). Given that the attack will seemingly work against Marxist pamphlets at the crime scene signed in the the group’s interests— which is likely to result in greater group’s now official name, the Militarized Communist policy monitoring of the drug trafficking routes and Party of Peru (Twitter.com/@Pedro_vrae, May 24). helping Fujimori's election campaign—one potential The Shining Path attack comes amid a growing number explanation for the decision to carry out this latest vio- of counter-drug trafficking operations by the Peruvian lence in Apurímac Valley is that the group is suffering

1 from leadership losses. The group’s deputy leader, Jorge SUPPRESSES COMEBACK ATTEMPT BY Quispe Palomino (a.k.a. “Raúl”), was killed by Peruvian MAUTE MILITANT GROUP police in March (elperuano.pe, March 31). Other long- time leaders from the 1980s, including Comrade Jacob Zenn Artemio, have also been arrested in the past decade Four years since the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Hot Issue, April 11, 2012). engaged in a multi-month battle against Islamic State Therefore, with an ideology whose legitimacy has been (IS)-allied militants in , led by Omar and Abdullah weakened as a result of global Communism’s downfall Maute and commander , the and whose history of massacres has lost it public sup- army is still working to prevent the resurrection of port, Shining Path is now primarily a drug trafficking Maute’s followers. While both Maute brothers and Hapi- group. However, its continued killings, including the lat- lon were killed in October 2017 during the battle in est May 24 attack, will do little to revive the group. Marawi, recent killings and arrests indicate their move- Moreover, Keiko Fujimori’s father, Alberto, who is in ment, though struggling, is still not defeated prison on corruption charges, is known for having dealt (abc.net.au, October 22, 2017). The first incident was on severe blows to Shining Path during his tenure in office May 6, when Philippine soldiers located a militant from 1990 to 2000. If his daughter wins the next elec- named Sarip in the Maute’s hometown of , killed tion, she will likely deliver the final knock out punch to him, and arrested three other militants. Assistance from the group's very existence. local villagers in making the arrests indicated that the army was winning support from the local population Jacob Zenn is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor (philstar.com, May 6).

On May 28, five members of the Maute Group also sur- rendered to the army. They claimed they had served the group as couriers to scout on army movements and buy food supplies, and were indoctrinated into the group’s jihadist ideology. Nevertheless, as a result of sustained pressure by special forces, they finally decided to give up the fight and called on other members to do the same (sunstar.com.ph, May 28).

Shortly after their surrender, nine other Maute Group members were arrested and two others escaped during a special forces operation near Marawi on May 29. Vari- ous weapons and types of ammunition were also cap- tured, indicating the group still poses a lethal threat, even though they have carried out increasingly few at- tacks since 2017. The arrested members had attempted to flee by shooting at the soldiers, but were ultimately subdued (sunstar.com.ph, May 29).

While the Maute Group threat may be subsiding, anoth- er related threat, however, persists. As these operations against Maute Group were underway, in early May, ap- proximately 200 Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) invaded the town of Datu Paglas in Maguindanao, and occupied the market in the town center. Unlike the multi-month counter-terrorism campaign in

2 Marawi in 2017, this time the army was able to remove the militants in six hours of fighting (inquirer.net, May 9). That the invasion occurred exactly four years after the Burkan al-Ghadab Militants’ battle of Marawi appears to be a coincidence, as no in- dications emerged that BIFF was attempting to symboli- Display of Force Highlights cally time their attack. Rather, it was the fifth time this year that BIFF had attempted to take the town, suggest- Deepening Turkish Influence ing that their growing confidence in attacking Datu Pa- in Libya glas.

Just as civilians aided the army’s capture of Maute Jacob Lees Weiss Group militants elsewhere, it was the Moro Islamic Lib- On May 7, armed militiamen stormed the Corinthia Ho- eration Front (MILF) who captured the BIFF members in tel compound that was being used as one of the head- Datu Paglas as they were retreating from the fighting quarters for the interim government in the Libyan capital (pna.gov.ph, May 11). BIFF, like its allied Maute Group, of Tripoli (al-Hadath, May 8). Social media videos is loyal to IS, and broke away from MILF when that or- showed militants searching cars and asking for the loca- ganization entered into a peace agreement with the tion of Libyan Foreign Minister Najla Mangoush (al- Philippines government in return for regional autonomy. Marsad, May 7). The militants eventually departed and Since then, MILF has assisted the army in cracking down were later promised a meeting with the President of the on BIFF fighters. This has proven to be a force enhancer Presidential Council, Muhammad Menfi (RT Arabic, May for the army, but as the series of recent BIFF invasions of 8). Data Paglas demonstrate, neither that organization, nor The militants were aligned with Burkan al-Ghadab (Vol- the Maute Group, are defeated. BIFF, however, appears cano of Rage), a coalition of militias tasked by the previ- more powerful than the Maute Group, which is no ous Tripoli-based government, the Government of Na- longer launching invasions of towns. Instead, the Maute tional Accord (GNA), to defend Tripoli from the assault Group is increasingly seeing its members killed or ar- launched by the eastern Libyan-based Libya National rested by the army. Army (LNA) in April 2019. [1] Earlier in the day on May 7, Jacob Zenn is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor the militia had met to discuss recent statements by Mangoush and the appointment of Hussein al-Ayeb as the replacement for Imad Trabelsi as head of intelli- gence within the new unified Libyan government (Al- Ain, May 8).

In a statement posted by Burkan al-Ghadab’s media of- fice, the militia insisted that Mangoush should be dis- missed for calling for the complete departure of all for- eign forces and mercenaries from the country, without making an exception for the Turkish military (Burkan al- Ghadab, May 7). The statement, praising “brotherly” Turkey for being the only country to answer the GNA’s call to intervene and protect civilians during the LNA assault, made clear Burkan al-Ghadab’s proximity to Ankara. Burkan al-Ghadab also denounced both al-Ayeb and Mangoush’s alleged previous alignment with Gen- eral Khalifa Haftar of the LNA.

3 Libya’s Continued Security Fragmentation military advisors. Ankara also attached itself ideological- ly to the more Islamist-leaning militias by housing in Tur- Libya made significant progress toward political unity key influential Mufti Sadiq al-Ghariani. Turkey has used after a ceasefire between the LNA and the GNA was Ghariani to legitimize and praise the Turkish role in brokered by the UN in October 2020, leading to a unity Libya. [3] Now with the GNA replaced by the interim government headed by interim Prime Minister Abdul unity government, Turkey has become the main patron Hamid Dbeibeh (DW, March 10). The government's of several once nominally GNA-aligned militias. agenda was to reunify state institutions before nation- wide general elections in December 2021. The interim government, which remains based in Tripoli, has a fading interest in appeasing the militias based in Despite the progress in the political realm, the Libyan the city, such as Burkan al-Ghadab, as the ceasefire con- security environment remains fragmented among a mul- tinues to hold and the frontline has solidified around tiplicity of various non-state actors. While in Tripoli the Sirte, which is 400 kilometers east of the capital. This has GNA has now been disbanded, the domestic militia significantly increased militia motivation to counter its groups that were aligned with and sponsored by the waning influence by further aligning with Turkey. GNA remain. The GNA had used militia groups to pro- vide law and order in Tripoli and they made up the bulk Burkan al-Ghadab’s strong reaction to Mangoush’s call of the fighting force that repelled the LNA assault on the for the absolute departure of foreign military troops capital. In exchange, militias burrowed themselves into from Libya is likely to have been directed by Turkey. the Tripoli-based state infrastructure, accruing significant Burkan al-Ghadab’s statement in condemnation of Man- influence. [2] The Hotel Corinthia incident showcases the goush mimics Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavu- continued intent of these militias to exert similar influ- soglu’s defense of the Turkish military presence in Libya ence on the new interim government. almost word for word. [4] A day before the incident at the Corinthia Hotel, Turkey-based Ghariani launched a Likewise, the foreign militia presence has remained verbal assault on Mangoush, describing her as insolent largely unchanged since the October 2020 ceasefire. and an agent of the enemy before calling on Burkan al- The expiration of the 90-day deadline for the complete Ghadab to equally denounce her (al-Arabiya, May 7). withdrawal of foreign forces from Libya, which was con- Media linked to the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood move- tracted within October 2020’s ceasefire agreement, ment, which has itself been strongly backed by Turkey passed without any reduction in foreign troop presence since 2012, also published edited clips of Mangoush (al Jazeera, May 15). While the UN has since agreed to criticizing previous GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj at deploy a small ceasefire monitoring team, none of the a 2019 seminar. Mangoush in the same seminar equally international powers involved in the Libyan conflict, in- criticized Haftar (al-Marsad, May 8). cluding Turkey, Russia, and the UAE, have shown any commitment to reducing military activity in the country Mangoush’s statements regarding the departure of for- (UN, April 16). eign forces cannot be seen as particularly controversial to anyone, except for Turkey. The withdrawal of foreign The Burkan al-Ghadab-Turkey Connection forces is contracted within the October 2020 ceasefire Burkan al-Ghadab’s attempted storming of the Corinthia agreement and has been backed by two unanimous UN Hotel represents Turkey’s success in turning the militia Security Council resolutions. group into a de facto Turkish proxy. Unintended Consequences Ahead The Turkish government is keen to safeguard its eco- For Turkey, influence over Tripoli’s militia groups is seen nomic interests in Libya, including almost $35 billion in as vital to maintaining its economic and military interests Libyan contracts and a 2019 maritime border delin- in the country in the longer term. Turkey’s military pres- eation agreement. Turkey’s strengthened links to the ence and the maritime border delineation agreement, GNA militias in the face of the LNA assault resulted in both agreed upon by the former GNA administration in the GNA benefiting from increased Turkish financial 2019, have received both tacit and explicit support by support, arms supplies, and coordination with Turkish

4 interim Prime Minister Dbeibeh (Andalou Agency, March [2] See Wolfram Lacher, “Tripoli’s Militia Cartel” (German 9). However, Turkey knows that Dbeibeh is likely to re- Institute for International and Security Affairs, April 2018) main an interim leader and December’s elections could [3] Ghariani publicly supported the GNA-Turkey Mar- lead to a very different Libyan position on both fronts. itime Memorandum (Andalou Agency, December 12 Turkey knows even if a new Libyan executive power or 2019), called upon Libyans to stage demonstrations in mounting international pressure forces it to withdraw support of Turkey’s cooperation with the Libyan gov- either its own troop presence or the portion of the ernment (Andalou Agency, July 9 2020), and claimed roughly 13,000 Syrian militants that it sent to fight in that anyone who denies Turkey’s benevolence does not Libya, it could still wield leverage in the country through deserve respect (Arab Weekly, May 12) its domestic militia groups. [4] Both claimed that the Turkish presence in Libya can- However, increasing alignment with Turkey is likely to not be compared to foreign mercenary groups fighting have unintended consequences for Burkan al-Ghadab. in the country (Associated Press, May 3) Many Tripoli militias attained their local legitimacy by defending the city from the LNA assault of 2019 and [5] See Karim Mezran, “Libya 2021: Islamists, Salafis and from participation in the 2011 revolution. If the militia’s Jihadis” (Wilson Center, March 2021) fighters continue to act as a tool used by a foreign coun- try, Turkey, to exert pressure against decisions or state- ments considered unfavorable, then they risk losing any remaining domestic credibility. This could lead to re- newed inter-militia conflict in Tripoli, particularly if the ceasefire continues to hold.

Turkey simply does not have the soft power to attract support from all of Tripoli’s militias, several of which have contrasting ideological orientations and loyalties. [5] Without the existential threat posed by the LNA’s as- sault, militias jealous of Burkan al-Ghadab’s clout could use Turkish influence over it as a pretext to commence hostilities. In sum, despite the political progress made in Libya since October 2020, without significant security sector reform leading to the monopoly of state control over armed force, long-term stability in the country re- mains unlikely.

Jacob Lees Weiss is an analyst specializing in the MENA region at Healix International and HX global. He holds an MA in Contemporary Arabic Studies from the Au- tonomous University of Barcelona. Prior to working at Healix, he spent time volunteering for NGOs and study- ing in Algeria and Egypt.

Notes

[1] See Jason Pack, “Kingdom of Militias: Libya’s Second War of Post-Qadhafi Succession” (Italian Institute for International Political Studies, May 2019)

5 that al-Qaeda’s senior Pakistani figures started NAJ and Islamic State’s Pakistan remained its founding figures in Pakistan after 9/11. Al- Province Launches New Qaeda strategically did not officially label NAJ as its own formal magazine despite that it promoted only al- Jihadist Magazine Qaeda’s narratives in Pakistan. [7]

Abdul Sayed Like Yalghar, NAJ’s first issue had only 16 pages of low- quality content. NAJ nevertheless helped al-Qaeda to The first Urdu-language magazine of Islamic State’s Pa- channel highly educated Pakistani youth into its training kistan Province (IS-P) called Yalghar (Invasion) was pub- camps in Waziristan. [8] Some of them later played cen- lished at the end of April 2021 on social media accounts tral roles in turning NAJ into a sophisticated propagan- that regularly disseminate IS-P propaganda materials. da arm of the group in Pakistan, and NAJ remains al- The magazine is IS-P’s first indigenous propaganda Qaeda’s main trademark for Pakistan-related propagan- product. IS-P propaganda materials have otherwise not da. [9] been nearly as attractive and original as the materials of A Look Inside Yalghar’s Contents its parent group, IS Khorasan (IS-K) Province. Rather, IS-P has mainly translated Islamic State’s (IS) central propa- The 30-page Yalghar magazine has ten articles and an ganda materials from Arabic and English into Urdu. editorial and two infographics, which cover topics about IS in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Syria. One infographic is IS central established IS-P in May 2019 by dividing IS-K about IS’ recent attacks in Pakistan and India, and the into branches for India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. [1] other is promoting a propaganda video series of IS. The Since then, IS-P has struggled to establish footholds in magazine encourages readers to send in their sug- Pakistan and has not capitalized on local dynamics to gestions and articles through an e-mail given on its back receive support in the country (BBC Urdu, January 15). page. [2] Five of the articles relate to the IS groups in Khorasan, Jihadist Magazines’ Utility for IS-P Pakistan, and Syria, and the remaining articles are about The history of jihadist groups’ propaganda efforts in Pa- IS ideology and Islamic history. Most of these contents kistan shows that magazines have always been an effec- were previously published by IS official media outlets in tive part of their recruitment of potential support bases English or Arabic. This first issue, however, lacks any en- in the country. Although IS-P has not shown any signifi- gaging content about IS activities in Pakistan. The two cant presence in the urban centers of Pakistan, its pro- articles related to IS-P are duplicates of old propaganda paganda efforts could provide it solid support in those materials. The first of the two articles include the IS-K areas in the long run. [3] For example, al-Qaeda unoffi- founding emir Hafiz Saeed Khan Orakzai’s interview with cially released its first Urdu-language monthly magazine the official IS English magazine, Dabiq, which was pub- for Pakistan, Nawai Afghan Jihad (NAJ) (Voice of Afghan lished in its thirteenth issue in January 2016. [10] The Jihad), in August 2008. Since then, NAJ has been pub- extract contains Orakzai’s general advice to IS members lished as an ‘independent’ jihadist magazine for Af- and supporters in Khorasan. ghanistan and Pakistan. [4] [5] The second of the two articles is a transcript of an IS-P The magazine quality improved with time and its propa- commander’s Urdu-language statement from a docu- ganda content became highly sophisticated. Finally, in mentary released by the group’s Nida-i-Haq Urdu (Voice August 2019, al-Qaeda’s regional franchise, al-Qaeda in of the Truth) media center in January 2021 (Archives, the Indian subcontinent (AQIS), which includes the January 12). The video was about Hazara Shia coal min- South Asian region from Pakistan to India, Kashmir, ers who were brutally killed by the group on January 2 in Bangladesh, and Myanmar, formally declared NAJ as its Mach town of Pakistan’s southern Baluchistan province official mouthpiece. [6] However, later evidence reveals (Dawn, January 5). The only important information con-

6 cerning IS-P was its recent assassination of senior [2] Mikail Shaikh, “Islamic State or Daesh in Pakistan in Afghan Taliban commander, Naik Muhammad Rehbar, in 2020,” Conflict and Peace Studies, Vol. 13, Issue. 1, pp. the provincial capital of the Pakistan Khyber 105-124. Pukhtoonkhawa Province (Militant Leadership Monitor, [3] With the announcement of IS’ so-called Islamic May 3). Rehbar played a central role in rooting out IS caliphate in June 2014, many Pakistani jihadists and Is- Khorasan from Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province, which lamist youths joined IS-K. They shifted to its strongholds remain IS’ traditional stronghold (Arab News, April 20). in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nangarhar provinces. IS-K’s Discrediting the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda founding Pakistani leadership was shortly afterwards killed in U.S. and Afghan forces’ counter-terrorism oper- Like other IS-K and IS-P propaganda materials, this ations that resulted in IS-K’s leadership transformation magazine also on several occasions included criticism of from Pakistanis to Afghans. IS-K’s brutal wars with the IS’ major regional jihadist rival, the Afghan Taliban, ac- Afghan Taliban and intense counter-terrorism operations cusing its members of being stooges of the Pakistani against the group in Afghanistan led to a decline in its spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Other than recruitment from Pakistani urban centers. In an interview with the author in January 2021, a leading expert on IS- the Afghan Taliban, the magazine also criticizes IS’ glob- K, Professor Amira Jadoon, also said that the establish- al jihadist rival, al-Qaeda, for its silence over the arrests ment of a separate Pakistani IS chapter could be to capi- and suffering of IS female members in Syria after the talize on local opportunities in Pakistan, which IS-K failed group’s territorial caliphate collapsed in 2019. The mag- to achieve due to the various challenges faced by the azine taunted those protesting Afia Siddiqui’s captivity in group in Afghanistan. In this context, IS-P, since its es- a U.S. prison, arguing that such people care only for one tablishment in May 2019, has, however, failed to estab- Muslim lady’s sufferings in the hands of “infidels” but lish its footprint in Pakistani urban centers, which had have neglected thousands of others faced with more provided a significant number of recruits to IS-K in its inhumane situations in Syria. This propaganda could be early years. particularly targeted against AQIS, which often protests [4] AQIS formerly announced renaming Nawai Afghan Afia Siddiqui’s imprisonment and employs it as a regular Jihad to Nawai Ghazwai Hind (Voice of the Battle theme in its propaganda materials for recruitment pur- against India) directly when the Afghan Taliban signed a poses. peace deal with the U.S. in Doha, Qatar on February 29, 2020. This name change was followed by the AQIS an- A final article admits to IS’ losses in Afghanistan, claim- nouncement that as the U.S. and allied ‘invaders’ are ing that the group lost its dominance and all its territo- withdrawing from Afghanistan, now the group had to ries there, which it claims to have controlled for multiple change its focus to the jihad against India. For details, years. However, the author of the article boasts that a see, Nawai Afghan Jihad, Issue 3, Vol 13, March 2020. day will come when IS rises again in the country and will [5] Nawai Afghan Jihad, Issue 1, Vol 1, Aug 2008. exact revenge on behalf of all of its slain and oppressed members. [6] AQIS press release, PR_104_AQS, August 25, 2019, “Recirculation of the Nawai Afghan Jihad through a new Abdul Sayed has a master’s degree in political science editorial board,” Nawai Afghan Jihad, Vol.12, Issue.8, from Lund University, Sweden, and is now an indepen- p.6. dent researcher focused on and the Af-Pak re- gion. He’s on Twitter at: @abdsayedd [7] “Editorials published in Nawai Afghan Jihad Part-1,” (Nawai Afghan Jihad publications: July 2019). Notes

[8] An unpublished data set prepared by the author in- [1] Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, “The Revival of the cludes 180 biographical details of post-9/11 al-Qaeda Pakistani Taliban,” CTC Sentinel, 14:4 (2021). Pakistani cadres. These biographies were published/re- leased by al-Qaeda official media outlets in text and audio-video formats from 2008-2020.

7 [9] A good example here is an current senior media offi- ISWAP Launches Hearts and cial of AQIS, Moeenuddin Shami, who joined al-Qaeda Minds Strategy to Counter in Waziristan in 2009 and was appointed to al-Qaeda’s Pakistani media and propaganda branch and was later Nigerian Army Offensive assigned Nawai Afghan Jihad responsibilities. For de- tails, see Moeenuddin Shami, “With Ustad Farooq,” Jacob Zenn Nawai Afghan Jihad, Vol.10, Issue.10, pp-26-27. Since ’s launched its jihad in 2009, the [10] “Interview with Wali of Khurasan,” Dabiq, Issue 13, group has undergone three major phases of territory- pp. 48-54. capturing military offensives. The Nigerian army turned the tide against Boko Haram after the first two phases with a ‘Plan A’ and ‘Plan B.’ However, Boko Haram’s on- going military campaign is more serious than previous ones. Following the recent statement by Nigerian Presi- dent Muhammadu Buhari, is there no clear ‘Plan C’ for the Nigerian army except a possible U.S. Africa Com- mand (AFRICOM) intervention? This article discusses such a prospect in the context of longtime Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau’s death in May.

Boko Haram’s First Two Territorial Military Offensives

Boko Haram’s first territorial military offensive occurred in mid-2013 when the group retreated from Borno State’s capital, Maiduguri, to Sambisa Forest in southern Borno. Boko Haram caught the Nigerian army by sur- prise when it raided military barracks and towns throughout Borno and neighboring Yobe State. This campaign included a raid on Chibok, where the militant group conducted its infamous kidnapping of more than 200 schoolgirls, as claimed by Shekau (vanguardngr.- com, May 15, 2014). Several reports and videos suggest that Nigerians who trained with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) provided tactical support to Boko Haram before this offensive, which explains why the Nigerian army underestimated the group’s ability to raid military barracks like AQIM’s allies had done in the Sa- hel. [1] Nevertheless, Nigeria was able to recover most of the territory Boko Haram captured in 2015 with as- sistance from neighboring countries’ armies, including Niger, Cameroon, and especially Chad, which inter- vened on Nigerian territory to oust Boko Haram from towns its fighters occupied near their shared borders (france24.com, March 21, 2015). This was Nigeria’s ‘Plan A’ for denying Boko Haram territory when the Nigerian army itself struggled to do so.

8 In March 2015, Abubakar Shekau pledged loyalty to Is- • Mainok, Borno on April 27; lamic State (IS) ‘caliph’ Abubakar al-Baghdhadi and the • Kanama, Yobe on May 5; group adopted the name, Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP). Although Shekau was removed by IS • Geidam, Yobe on May 6; and in August 2016 in favor of the comparatively more mod- • Bulabulin, Borno on May 8. [2] erate Abu Musab al-Barnawi, ISWAP in mid-2019 again began conquering territory in Borno and parts of Yobe. Besides this, ISWAP’s photo releases at the end of Ra- This time, ISWAP did not so much catch the Nigerian madan showed its fighters providing money to children army off-guard like in 2013-2014, but rather targeted and charitable goods to civilians and preaching to elders rural, poorly constructed military outposts where ISWAP and youths. [3] This approach revealed several things; maintained an asymmetric advantage (thisdaylive.com, first, that ISWAP has a population-centric insurgency June 4, 2019). By this time, some ISWAP commanders strategy to countering the Nigerian army; second, that had also trained with IS in Libya and the group became the group enjoyed significant freedom of movement more professional in terms of tactics, media, and even through Borno’s rural areas in an effort to win uniforms. This was largely a result of integration into IS’ local hearts and minds (icirnigeria.org, August 24). The global network (Twitter.com/@FulanNasrullah, July 14, restoration of Abu Musab al-Barnawi—who had a repu- 2019). Nevertheless, in late 2019 and early 2020, Nige- tation for leniency toward civilians during his first ISWAP ria’s ‘Plan B’ came into being. The plan attempted to leadership reign from August 2016 to March 2019—to deny ISWAP territory by establishing ‘super camps,’ ISWAP leadership around April 2021 suggests ISWAP which are large, highly fortified, and theoretically im- will seek to win further civilian support in its main opera- penetrable military bases surrounding Borno’s largest tional areas in Borno, Yobe, and northern Adamawa towns, camps for internally displaced people, and aid State’s rural areas, as well as parts of Diffa, Niger and facilities (guardian.ng, October 7, 2019). the Chadian and Cameroonian borderlands with Nigeria (Twitter.com/@VincentFoucher, May 11). With fewer outposts to attack and super camps too strong to overrun, ISWAP’s pace slowed down in 2020. Moreover, Shekau self-detonating a suicide vest rather However, the Nigerian army was now largely confined to than being captured by rival ISWAP fighters in May super camps with intermittent incursions into rural areas means the Islamic State branch will now take over the to target ISWAP hideouts. These incursions, however, Shekau faction’s bases in Sambisa, southeastern Borno often led to ambushes on rural roadways, and ISWAP (HumAngle.ng, May 21). This will allow ISWAP another began to hold territory in rural areas, where it recruited, access point to threaten Maiduguri, and provide logis- preached, and rebuilt its forces (HumAngle.com, No- tics routes into Cameroon and attack routes into north- vember 22, 2020). Since early 2021, ISWAP has been ern Adawama. Not only will Shekau’s death under al- able to thwart Nigerian army incursions into rural areas Barnawi’s leadership boost his credibility, but it will also and has even attacked the outer defenses of super reinforce IS’ commitment to ISWAP. This commitment camps and the towns they surround. They have raided was likely deepened following al-Barnawi’s reported other mid-size military barracks throughout Borno. purging of ISWAP ultra-hardliners only days after ISWAP’s photosets and claims of attacks since March, for Shekau’s death (globalupfront.com, May 28). IS, for ex- example, have shown military post attacks in: ample, recognized that al-Barnawi replaced Shekau in August 2016, and never recognized the fact that al-Bar- • Damasak, Borno on March 17; nawi was subsequently overthrown in March 2019 by the • Katarko, Borno on March 19; same ISWAP hardliners who he had just purged. IS seemingly re-designated al-Barnawi as leader specifical- • Ngagam, Diffa, Niger, on April 5; ly to launch the now successful campaign against • Kamuya, Borno on April 17; Shekau in Sambisa (Raid Media, May 2021). ISWAP’s civilian-oriented approach under al-Barnawi and new • Dikwa, Borno on April 20; hideouts in Sambisa will only enable it to further recruit

9 and launch insurgent attacks in the coming months as Anthony Blinken, that he wants United States Africa the new leader consolidates his position and tries to Command (AFRICOM) to moves its headquarters to reincorporate Shekau’s commanders into ISWAP. Africa (premiumtimes.ng.com, April 27). Buhari has not since expounded upon this announcement in any detail. Future Trendlines: President Buhari’s AFRICOM Gam- However, it raises the question as to whether, if current bit trends continue or even become worse, will Nigeria re- Given these trends, three possible futures for the Niger- quest foreign, and specifically U.S., aid to combat ian army’s counter-insurgency campaign against ISWAP ISWAP under the rubric of the global ‘counter-ISIS cam- can be foreseen. First, the Nigerian army may reduce paign’? This would be somewhat unprecedented for ISWAP’s freedom of movement and the number of Nigeria, which has historically rejected foreign military towns it controls in rural areas, such as Guzumala, which intervention on its territory. Nigeria even showed some has had no government presence for more than a year reluctance when neighboring countries’ militaries inter- (vanguardngr.com, February 1). However, no current in- vened in 2015. formation indicates that this will occur, given ISWAP’s At the same time, the situation could become desperate momentum, especially after Shekau’s elimination. Fur- enough that Nigeria has few other options but to seek ther, no reports indicate that the Nigerian army is deci- external support to combat ISWAP, especially if military sively improving its situation—including weaponry, re- support does not come from its neighbors. Buhari’s sources and capabilities, soldiers’ morale—to turn the ‘closed door’ meeting with the new Chadian transitional tide against ISWAP. military leader, Mahamat Idriss Deby, reportedly in- Second, a stalemate between the Nigerian army and volved counter-terrorism discussions (guardian.ng, May ISWAP may occur where the militant group can no 14). However, it would be premature to suggest Chad longer attack, let alone raid, Nigerian military posts or will divert military resources from combatting its own super camp perimeters. At the same time, however, the domestic rebels to ISWAP in Borno. This is especially army would not be able to dislodge ISWAP from all of likely as ISWAP’s attacks have been fairly limited in the its territories. While this seems possible, recent trends country since Chad’s post-March 2020 offensive against still indicate that ISWAP is on the upswing. This is, there- ISWAP and Shekau’s faction, primarily on the Chadian fore, a realistic, but still optimistic, possibility for the side of Lake Chad (Terrorism Monitor, May 1, 2020). Nigerian army. Foreign military intervention has not stifled jihadists in Third, ISWAP may continue to attack super camps and, Mali since France and other regional and Western pow- at times, raid military posts in Borno and Yobe. Whereas ers stepped up their military presence there in 2013. Nigeria’s ‘Plan A’ and ‘Plan B’ have already been tried Thus, even if AFRICOM were to relocate to Africa and (neighboring country support and establishing super focus on Nigeria, while generating controversy among camps), Nigeria may have to turn to a ‘Plan C.’ With Africans concerned about ‘neo-imperialism,’ it would Nigeria’s neighbors reluctant to enter Nigerian territory not necessarily lead to ISWAP’s downfall. It could even to oust an ISWAP organization that is stronger now than become a magnet for jihadists to come to Africa to it was in 2015 and thus risk retaliatory attacks, it is un- ‘fight the Americans.’ In the short-term, however, little likely ‘Plan A’ can be tried again. Moreover, Chad was news has emerged supporting the possibility that the most effective external counter-insurgency force in AFRICOM might relocate to Africa, let alone take part in Borno in 2015, but is now preoccupied with its own do- an intervention to combat ISWAP in Nigeria. All of this mestic rebellion. makes Buhari’s proposal to AFRICOM appear out of touch with reality. The Nigerian army, therefore, has no This third scenario is coming to fruition with ISWAP in- immediate ‘Plan C’ to combat ISWAP and must find creasingly controlling territory in Borno, including now other means to fight the group, but what those means also Sambisa, and in Borno’s borderlands, setting the will be are not immediately clear. Abubakar Shekau, stage for President Buhari’s announcement in late April however, will no longer be able to indirectly ‘assist’ after a virtual meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State, Nigeria by being a thorn in ISWAP’s side.

10 Jacob Zenn is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor

Notes

[1] For full discussion, see Chapter 8 of Jacob Zenn, Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO (2020).

[2] See relevant photostreams on tabs through the au- thor’s personal website: https://unmaskingbokoharam.- com/2019/08/06/iswap-photostreams-2015-onwards/

[3] See tab titled “iswapmay92021ramadanzakatnigeria” on the author’s personal website: https://unmasking- bokoharam.com/2019/08/06/iswap-photostreams-2015- onwards/. See also Aymenn J. al-Tamimi, “The Islamic State's Imposition of Zakat in West Africa,” aymenn- jawad.org, May 28, 2021: http://www.aymenn- jawad.org/2021/05/the-islamic-state-imposition-of-za- kat-in-west.

11