Lecture 17 Poland Under Occupation 1. Introduction 2. the September
- 1 - Lecture 17 Poland Under Occupation 1. Introduction 2. The September Campaign and the Polish Defeat Polish public opinion greeted the onset of the war with great equanimity. Government propaganda asserting the ‘Great Power status’ of the country and the ‘triumphs’ of 1938 had created an exaggerated idea of its strength, and it was generally believed that, in alliance with Britain and France, Poland would be more than a match for the German forces. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Roman Umiastowski, of the propaganda department of the Supreme Command, speaking on the radio on 4 September, Our Supreme Commander held command on the front in 1920, when he was 33 . The military experience of the commanders in the German army is limited . Our army is prepared for war like no other. It is true that it has less equipment than the enemy, but it has instead soldiers and commanders of a type not possessed by the enemy—above all, young commanders. These views were widely shared. According to the pro-German politician, Władysław Studnicki, ‘many sensible people’, including men like the peasant politician, Maciej Rataj, ‘were enthusiastic for war’. The prevalent optimism had no basis in the real situation. As a result of pressure from Britain and France, who were still hoping to reach a negotiated settlement with Hitler, general mobilization had been delayed by one day, and had only started on 31 August. Thus, though large sections of the Army had already been organized in earlier - 2 - ‘quiet’ mobilizations, it had not reached its full strength when the German attack began on 1 September.
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