Inequality As a Multidimensional Process

Dædalus

Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Summer 2019

Inequality as a Multidimensional Process

Michèle Lamont & Paul Pierson, guest editors with David B. Grusky · Peter A. Hall Hazel Rose Markus · Patrick Le Galès Irene Bloemraad · Will Kymlicka Leanne S. Son Hing · Anne E. Wilson Peter Gourevitch · Jaslyn English · Parco Sin Jane Jenson · Francesca Polletta Paige Raibmon · Jennifer L. Hochschild Katherine S. Newman · Vijayendra Rao

Dædalus Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

“Inequality as a Multidimensional Process” Volume 148, Number 3; Summer 2019

Michèle Lamont & Paul Pierson, Guest Editors Phyllis S. Bendell, Managing Editor and Director of Publications Peter Walton, Associate Editor Heather M. Struntz, Assistant Editor

Committee on Studies and Publications John Mark Hansen, Chair; Rosina Bierbaum, Johanna Drucker, Gerald Early, Carol Gluck, Linda Greenhouse, John Hildebrand, Philip Khoury, Arthur Kleinman, Sara Lawrence-Lightfoot, Alan I. Leshner, Rose McDermott, Michael S. McPherson, Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Scott D. Sagan, Nancy C. Andrews (ex officio), David W. Oxtoby (ex officio), Diane P. Wood (ex officio)

Inside front cover: Titian (Tiziano Vecellio), Sisyphus, 1548–1549. Oil on canvas. 237 cm x 216 cm (height x width). Museo Nacional del Prado; inventory number P000426. Image provided by Fine Art Images, Wiesbaden. Contents

5 Inequality Generation & Persistence as Multidimensional Processes: An Interdisciplinary Agenda Michèle Lamont & Paul Pierson

19 The Rise of Opportunity Markets: How Did It Happen & What Can We Do? David B. Grusky, Peter A. Hall & Hazel Rose Markus

46 “Superstar Cities” & the Generation of Durable Inequality Patrick Le Galès & Paul Pierson

73 Membership without Social Citizenship? Deservingness & Redistribution as Grounds for Equality Irene Bloemraad, Will Kymlicka, Michèle Lamont & Leanne S. Son Hing

105 Failure to Respond to Rising Income Inequality: Processes That Legitimize Growing Disparities Leanne S. Son Hing, Anne E. Wilson, Peter Gourevitch, Jaslyn English & Parco Sin

136 The Difficulties of Combating Inequality in Time Jane Jenson, Francesca Polletta & Paige Raibmon

Commentaries

164 Political Inequality, “Real” Public Preferences, Historical Comparisons & Axes of Disadvantage Jennifer L. Hochschild

173 New Angles on Inequality Katherine S. Newman

181 Process-Policy & Outcome-Policy: Rethinking How to Address Poverty & Inequality Vijayendra Rao Dædalus

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Michèle Lamont & Paul Pierson

Rising inequality is widely seen as one of our most pressing social problems and a focal point for social science research.1 Much of the concern, ampli- fied by the argument in economist Thomas Piket- ty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, centers on the prospect that inequality may take extremely durable forms.2 It is not just that some are advantaged michÈle lamont is Professor of Sociology, Professor of Afri- or disadvantaged, but that structures of advantage can and African American Stud- and disadvantage may become more self-reinforc- ies, the Robert I. Goldman Pro- ing and cumulative.3 It is the persistence and deep- fessor of European Studies, and ening of inequality that raises many of the most Director of the Weatherhead troubling issues. Center for International Affairs One reason to fear that inequalities may be in- at Harvard University; and Codi- creasingly durable is the declining effective- rector of the Successful Societies program at the Canadian Insti- ness of key processes of equality generation. The tute for Advanced Research. “great compression” in social outcomes during the mid-twentieth century, witnessed across the af- paul pierson, a Fellow of the fluent West, rested in part on core social arrange- American Academy since 2016, is the John Gross Professor of Po- ments that both facilitated more equal econom- litical Science at the University ic outcomes directly and expanded social oppor- of California, Berkeley, and Co- tunities. These arrangements included improved director of the Successful Socie- and greatly expanded mass education; continu- ties program at the Canadian In- ing movement from rural to more densely popu- stitute for Advanced Research. lated areas that promised better economic oppor- (Complete author biographies appear tunities and improved prospects for social integra- at the end of the essay.) tion; an expansion of access to citizenship and its

© 2019 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license doi:10.1162/DAED_a_01748 5 Inequality associated benefits; and a social and po- In thinking about the durability of in- Generation & litical system that worked to mitigate equality, we thus find value in exploring Persistence as Multi- excessive inequalities by redistributing how transformed economic conditions dimensional wealth and by creating a strong welfare are potentially linked to other social, psy- Processes state. Even as some forces might generate chological, political, and cultural pro- inequality, these countervailing process- cesses that can either counteract or re- es served as critical correctives. inforce the likelihood that inequalities In addition to often reducing inequali- become durable. Only by drawing on a ty directly, these broad developments fre- wide range of expertise in the social sci- quently limited the extent to which eco- ences can such changes and interconnec- nomic inequalities carried over to other tions be understood. Our interdisciplin- aspects of social life. Indeed, these coun- ary inquiry has grown out of a sustained tervailing processes were in many re- dialogue within an international team of spects mutually reinforcing: for instance, scholars, from a range of social science when expanding educational opportu- disciplines, who share an interest in the nities pulled people toward urban loca- changing dimensions of social inequal- tions that offered other social advantages, ity. More important, they share a core or when welfare states provided a modi- conviction: that interdisciplinary work is cum of material security that gave people positioned to bring to light connections greater opportunity to develop their skills. among social phenomena that may be This collection of essays is motivated less visible to research anchored in a sin- by a recognition that these equality-gen- gle discipline.4 erating social arrangements have attenu- At a moment when societies struggle to ated and, in many ways, been supplanted deal successfully with inequalities, iden- by processes that are instead inequality- tifying and exploring connections be- inducing. We stress that it is not just the tween economic, social, psychological, case that economic outcomes have be- political, and cultural dimensions of income more unequal. There have also been equality holds great promise. It can clar- important changes in some of the core ify why many forms of social inequalities processes described above. In many in- appear so intractable, often deepening stances, we find evidence that these forc- or broadening over time. It also can pro- es have diminished in scope, effective- vide insights into the kinds of interven- ness, or both. While access to formal citi- tions that might attenuate, ameliorate, or zenship has been expanded, this has often counteract deepening inequalities. Our been accompanied by a fraying sense of group is unusually well-equipped to fully mutual obligation; levels of income in- deploy such a multidisciplinary approach equality have increased without an asso- to inequality, thanks to fifteen years of ciated strengthening of the welfare state regular exchange concerning our respec- or demand for redistributive policies; sys- tive disciplinary assumptions and analyt- tems of advanced education are trending ical tools. This issue of Dædalus capital- toward reproducing inequality rather than izes on this asset to broaden the study of encouraging social mobility; and many of inequality and advance new perspectives the most vibrant economic centers now for future research. promote social closure rather than wid- Two distinct sets of claims have de- ened opportunity, with skyrocketing veloped out of our conversations. The housing prices limiting the access of the first concerns the need to explore link- disadvantaged to critical social resources. ages, both temporal and across levels of

6 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences analysis, that may illuminate the sourc- levels of analysis. Connections ground- Michèle es of durable inequality. The second, ed in a temporal relationship draw one’s Lamont & Paul Pierson building on the first, focuses on relative- attention to dynamic processes. Connec- ly underexplored aspects of contempo- tions that link distinct levels of analysis rary social inequality: more specifical- draw one’s attention to important com- ly, the relationship between distribution binations of micro-, meso-, and macro- and recognition as intertwined dynamics phenomena. producing and reproducing inequality. Analyses of rising inequality have tend- In this introduction, we outline each of ed to focus on wealth and income dispar- these basic claims, before introducing the ities and their immediate determinants. individual contributions to the volume. They often concentrate on either struc- Most of these essays draw on empirical tural changes in the labor market (such as case studies, although some authors also the loss of blue-collar jobs), in econom- provide new interpretations of second- ic organizations (such as the financializa- ary data to reveal patterns that have been tion of firms and the sharp decline of la- overlooked up until now. While the es- bor unions), or on elite-driven changes to says examine different aspects and types laws and policies (such as lower taxes and of inequality, as well as different time- deregulation). Such forces are, of course, scales and social settings, they converge extremely important. Yet in adopting on a set of complementary claims. Togeth- these foci, analyses may miss cultural and er, the essays demonstrate the benefits other dimensions of inequality and the of an explicitly interdisciplinary analy- factors and relationships that feed into sis that explores linkages in over-time them, which are more likely to be under- processes or across levels of analysis. In- stood if inequality is seen as a multifacet- deed, they are generally coauthored by ed and multilevel unfolding process. A key social scientists who work primarily at potential contribution of our approach is different analytical levels (micro, meso, the ability to identify forms of social re- and macro) while focusing on different lationships and intergroup processes that dimensions of social life (economic, po- may intensify unequal distributions of litical, cultural, or psychological). Each resources, or cause them to spread from essay also provides an agenda for future one social domain to another. Either the research and identifies significant poli- deepening or broadening of inequality cy implications. To round off the issue, potentially makes it more intractable. As we invited commentaries by three lead- these processes unfold, the factors that re- ing social scientists from different disci- produce inequality may also shift, requir- plines to address the volume’s substan- ing that analysts attend to distinct social tive and applied implications. phenomena and relationships. We argue that in the post-Piketty era, it is impera- At the heart of our contribution to the tive that students of inequality refocus discussion of inequality is the identifica- their attention on such fundamental pro- tion and analysis of connections among cesses, which have many direct and indi- social phenomena that may be most vis- rect implications for inequality-reducing ible from distinctive disciplinary van- policy-making. tage points. We distinguish two important types of connections: one grounded A number of prominent scholars have in temporal relationships, the other in re- stressed the dynamic qualities of inequal- lationships that operate across different ity.5 They build on sociologist Charles

148 (3) Summer 2019 7 Inequality Tilly’s influential writing on “durable In this volume, we pay special atten- Generation & inequality.”6 Tilly argued that a criti- tion to a number of specific and common Persistence as Multi- cal vehicle for the entrenchment of ad- social mechanisms that illuminate how, dimensional vantage and disadvantage is the devel- over time, particular forms of inequality Processes opment of dichotomous categorizations may be reinforced. Among these mech- (white/black, immigrant/native, male/ anisms are those of evaluation, legitimi- female). These rest on a series of distinct zation, quantification, commodification, mechanisms operating in diverse settings and policy drift. These mechanisms have (schools, firms, policies) that are built been elaborated in particular disciplines, around such categorizations to produce but they are quite useful for identifying social closure and opportunity-hoarding specific linkages among social phenome- and allocate advantages and disadvantag- na that may intensify inequality: es differentially across categories. Sociol- • Evaluation typically involves the cate- ogists such as Donald Tomaskovic-Devey gorization of individuals and goods as and Dustin Avent-Holt are expanding our well as the legitimation of hierarchies.8 understanding of the role of organiza- It establishes hierarchies of value and/ tions as loci for growing inequality, while or status between units and builds a others, like Rogers Brubaker, have tak- consensus around the criteria on which en issue with Tilly’s claim that different such hierarchies rest. Evaluation is cen- types of categories (such as gender and tral to the creation of the standards of citizenship) work in fundamentally sim- deservingness and meritocracy that in- ilar ways in producing inequality. creasingly guide the distribution of re- An important aspect of our effort is to sources as well as recognition of status: further develop this type of analysis. The that is, the two faces of inequality. essays in this issue show that the social relationships and cleavages, psychological • Legitimization involves a bias to accept conceptions of self and other, and polit- the perceived status quo as appropri- ical contestations that reproduce, inten- ate. It leads to the justification of soci- sify, or deepen inequality are often quite ety and its institutions as fair, partic- distinct from the ones that may have gen- ularly when injustices are evident, as erated it in the first place. Recognizing such processes help to reduce discom- these unfolding sequences may not only fort and uncertainty and restore a sense 9 help identify distinctive sites that trans- of the world as a just place. It encour- form initial inequalities into durable ages the adoption of stratification be- ones, but also open the prospect of iden- liefs, such as social mobility, meritoc- tifying possible policy interventions that racy, and prejudice toward the poor. might disrupt such vicious cycles. • Quantification involves the introduction We share the conviction that interdisci- of metrics (quantitative measures of plinary analysis can help identify and ex- performance). While it is often advocat- plicate a variety of economic, political, ed as an avenue to increasing account- social, cultural, and psychological mecha- ability and fairness, quantification re- nisms that tend to increase or intensify in- quires commensuration between enti- equality in its various forms. In many cas- ties of different natures.10 Such metrics es, we can show how these mechanisms can reinforce inequalities. They may de- make important but underappreciated value criteria that might have favored contributions to broader processes pro- the disadvantaged and shift outcomes ducing or reproducing inequality.7 toward groups that have the greatest

8 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences capacity to adapt to the new guidelines may coincide with them but are distinc- Michèle for competition. What looks like fair- tive and produce important interac- Lamont & Paul Pierson ness and the rewarding of merit may in tion effects. For instance, in this volume, fact compound existing inequalities. David B. Grusky, Peter A. Hall, and Hazel • Commodification involves the transfor- Rose Markus, in “The Rise of Opportuni- mation of resources that were once pro- ty Markets: How Did It Happen & What vided as public goods into ones avail- Can We Do?” show how several of the able only as purchasable commodities. mechanisms just noted, especially com- In a context of rising economic inequal- modification, are at work in the current transformation of higher education, ity, commodification can play a signif- 12 icant role in spreading that inequality deepening social inequalities. As abili- to other domains. By gradually magni- ty to pay becomes more tightly linked to fying the implications of these income educational opportunity, economic ad- disparities for life chances and well- vantages become self-reinforcing. As the being, commodification processes can particular skills that schools value–built greatly intensify the long-term implica- into their systems of quantification and tions of purely economic inequality. evaluation–become increasingly strat- ified by class, seemingly neutral struc- • Policy drift refers to the effects that fol- tures become status-reinforcing rather low when rules or regulations remain than sources of mobility. 11 static while social conditions shift. “‘Superstar Cities’ & the Generation of It is especially likely when political re- Durable Inequality,” the contribution of form is obstructed (as it is in many Patrick Le Galès and Paul Pierson, simi- current institutional arrangements) larly focuses on how stunning new dis- during a time of rapid economic change parities in housing wealth in urban ag- and weakening political commitments glomerations can gradually intensify in- to equity. Because drift involves the inequalities.13 In the emerging knowledge terplay between (static) policy arrange- economy, economic inequalities have be- ments and (dynamic) social settings, it come increasingly intertwined with the is a mechanism whose exploration ex- spatial distribution of groups and social plicitly requires an interdisciplinary fo- opportunity. Understanding the long- cus. This low-visibility but important term effects of these spatial distributions mechanism can intensify inequalities, requires the investigation of a variety of for instance, when minimum wages or important sociological processes. Trans- social benefits are not adjusted for in- formations that follow initial econom- flation, or when regulatory arrange- ic inequalities potentially generate more ments fail to adapt to changing markets varied and extensive structures of in- or social relationships. equality. High-quality job opportunities, Process-focused analysis is central advantageous social networks (including to the essays to follow. Initial shifts in, marriage networks), and the benefitsof say, economic allocations emphasized in short commutes become concentrated standard accounts may be only one part in particular areas. Prohibitive housing of more multifaceted long-term develop- costs lock out those who cannot draw on ments that transform structures of op- preexisting economic advantages. Policy portunity. The long-term implications of drift plays an important role. Long-estab- economic changes may depend heavily lished housing policies have often been on other forces they may trigger, or that overwhelmed by the new dynamic of

148 (3) Summer 2019 9 Inequality rapidly escalating urban property values. to the advantaged, or that they are funda- Generation & The growing tilt of political power to- mentally different from them. The key to Persistence as Multi- ward the already advantaged can worsen sidestepping this dichotomy lay in taking dimensional these inequality-intensifying dynamics. a longue durée view of the historical pro- Processes Political resistance to efforts to increase cesses that caused and reproduced in- the availability of affordable housing can equality. Yet, in the course of the reform potentially bring the process of social clo- process, various political actors either sure full circle. acquiesced to or were unable to prevent In their essay “Membership without the rise of dehistoricized–often essen- Social Citizenship? Deservingness & Re- tialist–views of the group in question, distribution as Grounds for Equality,” views that fundamentally undermined Irene Bloemraad, Will Kymlicka, Michèle the reach, staying power, and effective- Lamont, and Leanne Son Hing consid- ness of the reform. Their essay illumi- er how evaluations of deservingness are nates how durable inequality can be un- shaping the transformation of social cit- intentionally reproduced by collective ef- izenship across advanced industrial so- forts that aim toward equalization and cieties.14 They point to evidence that de- destigmatization. clining formal barriers to membership Finally, Leanne Son Hing, Anne Wil- have coincided with a diminishing sense son, Peter Gourevitch, Jaslyn English, of shared obligations toward low-income and Parco Sin, in “Failure to Respond to groups, and identify various disciplinary Rising Income Inequality: Processes That explanations for this relationship. They Legitimize Growing Disparities,” exam- also highlight potentially contradictory ine another puzzling paradox.16 Promi- trends in the movement toward greater nent public choice models contend that equality: just as membership boundaries in a democratic political system, pub- based on ascribed characteristics (such lic demand for redistribution should as gender and sexuality and ethnoracial prompt the strengthening of the welfare differences) have become less exclusion- state, particularly under conditions of ary than in earlier decades, deserving- rising inequality. Instead, accumulating ness judgments toward the poor have be- evidence more often uncovers the oppo- come fraught, with arguably less solidari- site pattern (increasing inequality reduces ty around redistribution. support for redistribution), suggesting Similarly, in “The Difficulties of Com- that the democratic political process bating Inequality in Time,” Jane Jenson, once expected to curb excessive inequal- Francesca Polletta, and Paige Raibmon ity has become a system that instead may analyze three cases in which reformers contribute to its durability. They further made claims in favor of disadvantaged consider how psychological processes– groups for greater equality (for gender often in interaction with emerging pat- equality in the eu, the rights of indige- terns of social, economic, and political nous peoples in Canada, and women and inequality–lead people to legitimize ris- people of color in medical trials in the ing inequality and redouble their belief United States).15 In each case, activists in inequality-sustaining ideologies, with proposed policies capable of overcoming downstream consequences for inter- the notorious equality/difference dilem- group judgments of deservingness. They ma. That is, they sought to avoid the false also point to how inequality shapes polit- dichotomy between assuming that dis- ical action, reducing participation among advantaged groups have identical needs the economically disadvantaged, further

10 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences shrinking their influence on policy out- (elite colleges admitting and educating Michèle comes and reducing their trust in govern- meritorious low-income students free of Lamont & Paul Pierson ment to work on their behalf. All of these cost) can be subverted at the microlevels contributions have direct implications (for example, by processes that stigma- for addressing inequality. tize these students on college campus- es). Sociologists Wendy Espeland and A second focus of our interdisciplinary Michael Sauder have demonstrated how work explores how processes at the mi- similar isomorphic organizational re- cro-, meso-, and macrolevels may inter- sponses to the quantification of perfor- act to increase inequalities. As the essays mance by individual law school deans ac- in this volume demonstrate, collabora- centuate inequality throughout the field tion between psychologists, sociologists, of legal education.17 The result is an accel- and political economists enables a more erated “winner takes all” trend, as each detailed and specific comprehension of law school aims to improve its perfor- the interface between individual action, mance in terms of the very criteria they cultural repertories and institutions, and are being assessed on. The same happens broader social forces, all of which are in- in the American K–12 education system. volved in the production and reproduc- The quantified performance of public tion of inequality. schools, driven by isomorphic processes The microlevel refers to the intra- and as well as macrostructures of public pol- interindividual degree of analysis occur- icy, is exercising a growing influence on ring in personal interactions. The macro- microlevel home-buying decisions. This level refers to structural patterns of rein turn feeds into the concentration of sources and society-spanning institutions advantages in the top 20 percent of the (like governments) that characterize pop- population.18 In their contribution, Son ulations and societies considered in the Hing, Wilson, Gourevitch, English, and aggregate. Much of what is studied in the Sin outline how mesolevel phenomena– fields of comparative politics and com- that is, the increasing wealth segregation parative sociology falls under this um- of neighborhoods and socioeconomically brella. By mesolevel we refer to institutions homogenous social networks–affect mi- and cultural resources found in organi- crolevel phenomena–such as social com- zations, neighborhoods, and networks. parison processes and perceptions of in- While the mesolevel unfolds through on- come inequality. Within-class social com- going micro-interactions among individ- parisons lead the poor (comparing with uals, critical dynamics are often apparent other poor people in their community) to only when different levels are incorporat- overestimate their position in the income ed within the same analysis. distribution and the rich (comparing Work on inequality often focuses on with their wealthy neighbors) to under- one of these levels, in part because dis- estimate theirs. In both cases, changes in ciplines often emphasize one level over these meso-environments lead individu- others. Yet important dimensions of in- als to underestimate inequality. equality may only be apparent when one Identifying connections across levels examines linkages between two or more often requires simultaneous consider- levels. For instance, Hazel Markus has ation of distinct social realms. It might, shown how institutional (meso) process- for instance, demand attention to the in- es with a seemingly egalitarian charac- terplay between microlevel psychological ter governing access to higher education processes and mesolevel phenomena that

148 (3) Summer 2019 11 Inequality manifest themselves in the social, polit- of recognition. Echoing early arguments Generation & ical, or economic realm. Even when so- about poverty, some social scientists de- Persistence as Multi- cial scientists grounded in a specific dis- bate whether inequality should be con- dimensional cipline do seek linkages across multiple ceptualized as an economic or a cultur- Processes levels, they may be unable to theorize ad- al phenomenon. More recent studies are equately or write cogently about them for resolutely moving away from such di- lack of training or disciplinary overspe- chotomous framing to analyze how social cialization. Even if they are aware of such structures (such as class formations) and connections, disciplinary incentives may cultural repertoires (such as frames, nar- strongly discourage them from pursuing ratives, and institutions) enable and con- or emphasizing them if they lie outside strain access to various types of econom- their field. ic, social, and cultural resources.19 While This is why multidisciplinary inquiry is social scientists increasingly reject the cri- a particularly promising path for broad- tique that cultural approaches to pover- ening and enriching the study of inequal- ty are inherently conservative, a growing ity. Our group has been specifically de- number have come to understand inequal- signed to build the intellectual capacity ity and poverty as multidimensional: that to consider such linkages, including con- is, they combine economic, cultural, spa- nections that cut across disciplinary di- tial, and political dimensions.20 This sug- vides. For instance, the contribution of gests that an interdisciplinary agenda for Bloemraad, Kymlicka, Lamont, and Son improving our understanding of inequali- Hing analyzes tensions between more in- ty is particularly timely. clusive membership and less support for One of our premises is that meaning- redistribution across advanced industrial making is central to the social processes societies. They show how these tensions through which unequal relationships are can be accounted for by mobilizing con- set into motion and reproduced. In ap- trasting theoretical frameworks from po- proaching “inequality as a multidimen- litical theory, psychology, and sociology. sional process,” we underscore that in- Moreover, by combining the analytical equality involves both the distribution of tools of spatial and political analysis, Le resources and narratives concerning the Galès and Pierson show that national in- relative status and identity of groups (such stitutional arrangements heavily condi- as recognition and its counterpart, stig- tion both the capacity and willingness of matization). Differences in recognition local communities to respond to spatially are produced by narratives and manifest- reinforced inequalities. They argue that ed in the existence of pecking orders that effective responses to these seemingly lo- are revealed through the display of status, cal challenges require the provision of re- expectations of deference, and a myriad sources and the imposition of constraints of other signals. They are also legitimized that are only likely to occur in some na- and contested through equalization and tional political settings. stigmatization narratives and strategies. Thus, Jenson, Polletta, and Raibmon ex- While we are interested in demonstrat- amine the ways in which efforts to combat ing the broad and diverse advantages of inequality were undermined by the com- the interdisciplinary exploration of link- peting understandings of historical pro- ages, we place priority on exploring con- cess and progression from which political nections between social processes of re- actors operated. Particular understand- source distribution and cultural processes ings yielded quite different assumptions

12 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences about the sources of group disadvantage in debates pitting identity politics against Michèle and about the ways in which past inequal- class claims (as put in the original writing Lamont & Paul Pierson ity would yield to future equality. For their of social scientist Nancy Fraser on recog- part, Son Hing, Wilson, Gourevitch, En- nition).23 We now know that recognition glish, and Sin consider how various nar- is about class as much as gender and eth- ratives and ideologies, such as meritocra- nicity, that all groups aim to raise their cy, the American dream, and the belief in position within a status order, and that a just world, result in the heightened con- the latter is often correlated with access viction that the economically disadvan- to both symbolic and material resourc- taged in an unequal system must deserve es. Such findings call for a step away from their lot. As a result, spiraling econom- economic determinism, toward a broad- ic disparities ironically dampen rather er reconceptualization of the relationship than energize calls for redistribution and between the various aspects of inequality. a strengthened welfare state. Such psy- One of our objectives is to explore spe- chological mechanisms ultimately limit cifically how the construction of groups efforts toward greater equality when it is –particularly in terms of their perceived most needed, and are among the mutual- deservingness–may influence who gets ly reinforcing factors that are at the center what over the long term. This is exam- of our collective inquiry. ined in particular in the essay by Bloem- Issues of distribution have been the fo- raad and colleagues, which focuses on cus of the bulk of the vast social science changed feelings of solidarity toward the research on inequality, with a focus on in- poor in advanced industrial societies, come and wealth cross-nationally or gen- feelings that have been declining in some der and ethnoracial groups.21 While there societies precisely at a time when low- is increasing appreciation that access to income populations are being asked to resources may be contingent on recog- demonstrate self-reliance under the pres- nition of individuals as full members of sure of increasingly influential neoliberal the community, the independent impact standards of personhood.24 The authors of stigmatization on inequality and pov- document a general pattern of growing erty remains largely underexamined. For recognition and inclusion of women, instance, stigmatization is a cause of in- ethnoracial and religious minorities, and equality in the case of lgbtq youth, legal immigrants in advanced industrial who may be forced into homelessness as societies over the last decades, if we fo- a result of intense family conflict around cus on formal legal equality, social rela- their sexual or gender identity. Our issue tions, and cultural inclusion. But at the is part of a broader effort to more fully in- same time, in various places, the poor are clude the impact of stigmatization and more frequently judged as undeserving of recognition into our understanding of social support in the form of welfare re- dynamics of inequality.22 distribution. Mobilizing the analytical One step toward developing a more tools of their respective fields of special- comprehensive and multidimensional ization–political philosophy, social psy- approach to inequality is to investigate chology, cultural sociology, and politi- distribution and recognition in relation cal sociology–these authors articulate a to one another. Research suggests that broad agenda for exploring these chang- the relationship between recognition and es and the relationships between mem- access to resources may be much more bership, identity, social inclusion, and complex and contingent than suggested redistribution. Linkages among micro-,

148 (3) Summer 2019 13 Inequality meso-, and macrolevels are central to within the Successful Societies program, Generation & their argument: individual judgments of which has met three times a year since Persistence 28 as Multi- others draw on mesolevel cultural rep- 2003. Each team of authors developed dimensional ertoires and institutions and on macro- their contribution through extensive Processes level public policies, which in turn influ- discussions at meetings with the entire ence macrolevel political contestation group over two years. Program members and resource distribution. (Bloemraad, Grusky, Hall, Jenson, Kym- These essays also seek to deepen un- licka, Lamont, Pierson, Polletta, Raib- derstandings of how cultural and insti- mon, Son Hing, and Wilson) and adviso- tutional frameworks interact in the pro- ry committee members (Gourevitch, Le duction of inequalities and equality. This Galès, and Markus) have created teams is a topic that the Canadian Institute for to attack a question of mutual interest. In Advanced Research’s Successful Societ- all cases, authors focus on the core set of ies program tackled in two previous col- questions and theoretical concerns out- lective volumes.25 Here we are especially lined in this introductory essay, and their interested in how certain kinds of cultur- contributions draw on a continuing con- al frameworks (such as those associated versation among members of the group. with ethnoracial inclusion) acquire le- This results in a productive yet all-too- gitimacy and become institutionalized, rare conversation drawing on insights and how the operation of certain kinds from sociology, political science, social of institutions (such as those associated psychology, and history. with the welfare state) influence cultur- Our intensive collaboration, however, al frameworks of inclusion. This is paris not just intended to draw on insights ticularly central in the essay by Son Hing from these specific disciplines. Rather, it and colleagues, which is concerned with seeks to specify some of the important how beliefs about merit are formed and advantages of sustained dialogue across in turn influence beliefs about the distri- disciplinary divides. Ultimately, the goal bution of income. is to point to possible sites and strate- We conclude with a methodological gies for meaningful interventions to dis- note. Readers will recognize that we are rupt the generation and reproduction of in conversation with a broader litera- growing inequalities. To enhance this ef- ture that treats multilevel process-tracing fort, we are including commentaries by and configurational analysis as valuable three leading scholars/practitioners, each tools for exploring the social world.26 based in a different discipline, who have We are interested in understanding not researched or participated in a wide range only how things happen, but also why they of efforts geared to inequality reduction. happen.27 Again, this conception of cau- In an insightful essay, political scientist sality focuses on interactions among the Jennifer Hochschild praises our multi- micro-, meso-, and macrolevels as they disciplinary approach to inequality but evolve in space and time. It is intended to points out that we could well have paid help definea broader agenda for the in- more attention to properly political dy- terdisciplinary study of inequality as so- namics that feed inequality–and, histor- cial scientists realize the pitfall of consid- ically, have at times diminished it as well. ering social phenomena in isolation. She rightly insists on the need to continue to explore equality-producing pro- The essays included in this issue are cesses. Finally, she urges us to extend our the result of sustained collaborations agenda to the conditions under which

14 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences the relationships we identify would hold, with social scientists working in poli- Michèle and to pay even more attention to how cy and applied settings is particularly ap- Lamont & Paul Pierson time matters. propriate at a time when Robert Shiller, For her part, sociologist Katherine president of the American Economic As- Newman focuses on our contributions sociation, has turned his attention to to the role of deservingness, the legiti- “narrative economics” and when leading mation of inequality, and spatial segre- foundations such as the Gates, Casey, and gations as dynamics feeding inequali- Ford Foundations are focusing on narra- ty. She urges that more weight be placed tives as crucial to the study of inequality on growing xenophobia in the analysis of and mobility.29 This signals the growing the broadening of social inclusion over importance of moving away from narrow the last decades. She also points to the approaches to causal analysis of inequali- ways in which societies like the United ty that seek to isolate single causes and ef- States have attempted to counter the effects, in order to focus on intersecting and fect of spatial immobility and opportuni- complex causal pathways as they manifest ty-hoarding by the rich by opening elite themselves over time in the real world. universities to the poor, even if it often Each essay in this issue explicitly ad- appears to be too little, too late. dresses the policy implications of their Finally, World Bank economist Vijay- analysis. We maintain that in the long endra Rao locates our contributions in run, it is not simply the distribution of re- the context of the competing paradigms sources that matters, but the highly var- that have structured the discipline of eco- ied social processes that influencewhat nomics in the past few decades. He spells people can and cannot do with those re- out how much an approach to inequal- sources, as well as how individuals and ity focused on processes, instead of outgroups make sense of (and therefore re- comes, has to contribute to the broad en- spond to) these distributions. In many terprise that is the study of inequality. cases, disrupting or attenuating some of He urges us also to consider the global these related social and cultural process- South and the ability to “give voice” in es may be an essential part of any effort our attempts to broaden policy interven- to tackle intensifying inequalities of ma- tions addressing inequality beyond the terial resources. Compared with direct well-traveled paths of scholars studying efforts to generate redistribution of re- more affluent societies. sources, they may also represent more Bringing our analyses of “inequality as a plausible targets. multidimensional process” into dialogue authors’ note For their comments and reactions to this introduction, we are grateful to Nicolas Duvoux, Nonna Mayer, Leslie McCall, and Andrew Penner. We are especially thankful for the sustained collegial feedback we have received from all of the members of the Successful So- cieties program at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, and for the remarkable support of the Institute’s staff for all aspects of this project. Finally, we thank Kathleen Hoover for her technical assistance with the production of this volume, as well as the Dædalus staff.

148 (3) Summer 2019 15 Inequality author biographies Generation & Persistence michÈle lamont is Professor of Sociology, Professor of African and African American as Multi- Studies, the Robert I. Goldman Professor of European Studies, and Director of the Weather- dimensional head Center for International Affairs at Harvard University; and Codirector of the Successful Processes Societies program at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. A past President of the American Sociological Association, she is the author of Getting Respect: Responding to Stigma and Discrimination in the United States, Brazil, and Israel (with Graziella Moraes Silva, Jessica S. Welburn, Joshua Guetzkow, et al., 2016), How Professors Think: Inside the Curious World of Academic Judgment (2009), The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration (2000), and Money, Morals, and Manners: The Culture of the French and the American Upper-Middle Class (1992). paul pierson, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2016, is the John Gross Profes- sor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley; and Codirector of the Suc- cessful Societies program at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. He is the author, with Jacob S. Hacker, of American Amnesia: How the War on Government Led Us to Forget What Made America Prosper (2017), Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer– And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (2010), and Off-Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy (2005).

endnotes 1 By inequality, we refer not only to the unequal access and distribution of material and social resources (the most common focus of studies of inequality), but also to corollary status orders that signal unequal recognition (stigmatization and discrimination) for various segments of the population. 2 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014). 3 Thomas A. DiPrete and Gregory M. Eirich, “Cumulative Advantage as a Mechanism for In- equality: A Review of Theoretical and Empirical Developments,” Annual Review of Sociology 32 (2006): 271–297. 4 See also Leslie McCall, Derek Burk, Marie Laperrière, and Jennifer A. Richeson, “Exposure to Rising Inequality Shapes Americans’ Opportunity Beliefs and Policy Support,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114 (36) (2017): 9593–9598. 5 See, for example, Andrew Abbott, Processual Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016); Rogers Brubaker, Grounds for Difference (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015); Leslie McCall, Complex Inequality: Gender, Class, and Race in the New Economy (New York: Routledge, 2001); and Donald Tomaskovick-Devey and Dustin Avent-Holt, Relational Inequalities: An Organizational Approach (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019). For the perspective on intersectionality, see, for example, Sumi Cho, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, and Leslie McCall, “Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis,” Signs 38 (4) (2013): 785–810. 6 Charles Tilly, Durable Inequality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 7 In our definition of process and mechanism, we build on Michèle Lamont, Stefan Beljean, and Matthew Clair, “What is Missing? Cultural Processes and Causal Pathways to Inequal- ity,” Socio-Economic Review 12 (3) (2014): 598; “Mechanisms are usually treated as a chain of events that mediates between a cause and effect. To identify or formulate a mechanism means to explain what links a certain initial condition (X) to a certain outcome (Y). In contrast, processes can be studied without presuming any set cause or outcome. Here, analytic priority is given to describing the properties of a generative process or chain of events rather than to explaining an observed association between two variables.” 8 Michèle Lamont, “Toward a Comparative Sociology of Valuation and Evaluation,” Annual Re- view of Sociology 38 (2012): 201–221. 16 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 9 John T. Jost and Orsolya Hunyady, “The Psychology of System Justification and the Palliative Michèle Function of Ideology,” European Review of Social Psychology 13 (1) (2003): 111–153; and Melvin Lamont & J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion (New York: Plenum Press, 1980). Paul Pierson 10 Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell L. Stevens, “The Sociology of Quantification,” Europe- an Journal of Sociology 49 (3) (2008): 401–436. 11 Jacob S. Hacker, “Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States,” American Political Science Review 98 (2) (2004): 243–260. 12 David B. Grusky, Peter A. Hall, and Hazel Rose Markus, “The Rise of Opportunity Markets: How Did It Happen & What Can We Do?” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019). 13 Patrick Le Galès and Paul Pierson, “‘Superstar Cities’ & the Generation of Durable Inequali- ty,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019). 14 Irene Bloemraad, Will Kymlicka, Michèle Lamont, and Leanne S. Son Hing, “Membership without Social Citizenship? Deservingness & Redistribution as Grounds for Equality,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019). 15 Jane Jenson, Francesca Polletta, and Paige Raibmon, “The Difficulties of Combating Inequal- ity in Time,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019). 16 Leanne S. Son Hing, Anne E. Wilson, Peter Gourevitch, Jaslyn English, and Parco Sin, “Fail- ure to Respond to Rising Income Inequality: Processes That Legitimize Growing Dispari- ties,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019). 17 Wendy Nelson Espeland and Michael Sauder, Engines of Anxiety: Academic Rankings, Reputa- tion, and Accountability (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2016). 18 Annette Lareau and Kimberly Goyette, eds., Choosing Homes, Choosing Schools (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2014). 19 Mario Luis Small, David J. Harding, and Michèle Lamont, “Reconsidering Culture and Pover- ty,” ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 629 (1) (2010): 6–27. 20 See, for example, Matthew Desmond, Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City (New York: Crown, 2016); and Eva Rosen, “Horizontal Immobility: How Narratives of Neigh- borhood Violence Shape Housing Decisions,” American Sociological Review 82 (2) (2017): 270–296. 21 Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century; and Melvin L. Oliver and Thomas M. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality (New York: Routledge, 1995). 22 Michèle Lamont, “Addressing Recognition Gaps: Destigmatization and the Reduction of In- equality,” American Sociological Review 83 (3) (2018): 419–444; and, on poverty, Karen Long Jusko, Who Speaks for the Poor? Electoral Geography, Party Entry, and Representation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 23 Nancy Fraser, “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age,” in Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the Current Debate, ed. Cynthia Willett (Mal- den, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 19–49. 24 Peter A. Hall and Michèle Lamont, eds., Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 2013). 25 Peter A. Hall and Michèle Lamont, eds., Successful Societies: How Institutions and Culture Affect Health (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Hall and Lamont, Social Resil- ience in the Neoliberal Era. 26 Peter A. Hall, “Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research,” in Compar- ative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 373–406; Peter A. Hall, “Tracing the Prog- ress of Process Tracing,” European Political Science 12 (1) (2013): 20–30; Paul Pierson, Politics

148 (3) Summer 2019 17 Inequality in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Generation & 2004); Daniel Hirschman and Isaac Ariail Reed, “Formation Stories and Causality in Sociol- Persistence ogy,” Sociological Theory 32 (4) (2014): 259–282; James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds., as Multi- dimensional Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Processes and Norbert Elias, What Is Sociology? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978). See also Orlando Patterson, “Making Sense of Culture,” Annual Review of Sociology 40 (2014): 1–30. 27 For example, Deaton and Cartwright’s critique of randomized control trials. Angus Deaton and Nancy Cartwright, “Understanding and Misunderstanding Randomized Controlled Tri- als,” nber Working Paper No. 22595 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Re- search, 2016). 28 Successful Societies program at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (cifar), www.cifar.ca/research/programs/successful-societies. 29 See, for example, Robert J. Shiller, “Narrative Economics,” Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics Discussion Paper No. 2069 (New Haven, Conn.: Cowles Foundation for Re- search in Economics, Yale University, 2017).

18 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences The Rise of Opportunity Markets: How Did It Happen & What Can We Do?

David B. Grusky, Peter A. Hall & Hazel Rose Markus

Abstract: We describe the rise of “opportunity markets” that allow well-off parents to buy opportunity for their children. Although parents cannot directly buy a middle-class outcome for their children, they can buy opportunity indirectly through advantaged access to the schools, neighborhoods, and information that create merit and raise the probability of a middle-class outcome. The rise of opportunity markets happened so gradually that the country has seemingly forgotten that opportunity was not always sold on the market. If the United States were to recommit to equalizing opportunities, this could be pursued by dismantling opportunity markets, by providing low-income parents with the means to participate in them, or by allocating educational opportunities via separate competitions among parents of similar means. The latter approach, which we focus upon here, would not require mobilizing support for a massive redistributive project.

david b. grusky, a Fellow Is there any pressing need for another paper on the of the American Academy since effects of educational expansion and reform on so- 2015, is the Edward Ames Ed- cial mobility? Because the ongoing stream of com- monds Professor in the School mentary on education reform is so vast, it might of Humanities and Sciences and Professor of Sociology at Stan- seem unlikely that a new contribution to this liter- 1 ford University. ature could add much value. But however saturated the education reform lit- peter a. hall, elected a Fellow erature may be, existing commentary tends to gloss of the American Academy in 2019, is the Krupp Foundation Profes- over the rise of “opportunity markets,” a funda- sor of European Studies in the mental development that should be treated as a Department of Government at main threat to realizing our country’s long-stand- Harvard University. ing commitment to equalizing opportunity and in- hazel rose markus, a Fellow creasing mobility. We will show that the rise of op- of the American Academy since portunity markets makes it possible for parents to 1994, is the Davis-Brack Profes- convert money seamlessly into high-quality re- sor in the Behavioral Sciences in sumes for their children and thus create the per- the Department of Psychology at ception that merit just happens to coincide with Stanford University. money. We will also show that the task of build- (Complete author biographies appear ing a merit-projecting resume requires vast infu- at the end of the essay.) sions of parental money from the very moment of

© 2019 by David B. Grusky, Peter A. Hall & Hazel Rose Markus Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license 19 doi:10.1162/DAED_a_01749 The Rise of conception. Although we are hardly the the purpose of helping their children suc- Opportunity first to make this point,2 the extent to ceed.3 Moreover, because most high-in- Markets: How Did It which the merit-construction business come Americans are also skeptical of ag- Happen & has come to depend on financial resourc- gressive redistribution, it would be dif- What Can We Do? es has not been fully appreciated, nor have ficult to garner support for a transfer our reform efforts adequately taken the program that would allow low-income force of this development into account. families to participate fully in opportuni- The first step that any reformer should ty markets. The good news is that neither take is to diagnose well. We thus begin of these types of revolutions is necessary. our essay by describing the rise of oppor- We argue instead that, were a small hand- tunity markets and how they allow well- ful of education-sector elites to decide to off parents to buy elite education and oth- restructure the college admissions pro- er desirable outcomes for their children. cess, they could trigger a norm cascade As important as this diagnosis is, our es- that would counter the rise of opportu- say does not end with it. We also use this nity markets and lead to a substantial in- diagnosis for the purpose of prescrib- crease in social mobility. ing. In doing so, we do not insist on treat- It is rare indeed that an opportunity ing the “root cause,” given that there is for transformative change lies within the no iron law to the effect that a successful control of so few. We are, you could say, treatment must target the cause. When it writing this essay for those few. comes to reforming our mobility regime, The balance of our essay elaborates on our instinct is that present-day Ameri- this argument by providing prolonged cans likewise lack the stomach to deal di- answers to the following two questions: rectly with the causes of unequal oppor- 1) Why has the expansion of higher edu- tunity, as doing so would entail massive cation in the United States failed to bring redistribution. about an increase in social mobility? But that is not reason to despair. It only 2) How might selective institutions of means that we must find another way. We higher education be reformed to increase show that, although the mobility process social mobility and ultimately spawn has been deeply recast by the rise of op- norm cascades that would lead to more portunity markets, it is possible to count- far-reaching change? er this development by intervening at a We focus more on the diagnostic ques- late point in the process rather than at- tion than the policy question because, as tempting to undo the development of op- noted above, it is all-important to get the portunity markets themselves. diagnosis right. After describing the rise We do not mean to suggest that any- of opportunity markets, we introduce one operating under a Rawlsian veil of several policy options available to us, only ignorance would want to live in a soci- one of which might realistically be imple- ety based on opportunity markets. The mented in the near term. This prescrip- problem we now face, however, is one of tion entails convincing education-sector dealing with opportunity markets after elites to define merit in a way that adjusts they have emerged. In this context, most for the different environments in which it high-income Americans will aver that is constructed. We feature this solution as they should be allowed to spend their an important corrective to the view that hard-won dollars however they wish, a any far-reaching commitment to equal type of “liberty” that includes the right opportunity would require a massive re- to participate in opportunity markets for distributive effort.

20 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences It is easy to be disillusioned by the un- evidence deficit on long-run trends in David B. ceasing flow of small reforms that are U.S. social and economic mobility, es- Grusky, Peter A. Hall intended to equalize opportunities but pecially with respect to relative mobility & Hazel Rose that clearly have not made much head- rates.10 The deficit exists mainly because Markus way against far more powerful oppos- the available surveys are based on small ing forces. Although these incremental samples and do not extend far enough reforms are an important stopgap, they back in time. Although we cannot weigh fall short of meeting a democratic soci- in definitively on long-run trends, there ety’s obligation to act decisively to equal- can be no doubt but that present-day de- ize opportunity. As sociologist Michelle partures from equal opportunity in the Jackson argues, social scientists should United States are profound. The current be on perpetual lookout for more radical state of affairs simply cannot be recon- ways to get the job done.4 Even if our pre- ciled with an “American dream” in which ferred radical option is not taken up, there all children, even those with low-income is still value in synthesizing social sci- parents, are supposed to have the same ence insights–from sociology, econom- opportunity. ics, political science, and psychology–to When measured against the depth of imagine how a policy intervention could the problem, the policy response to this trigger an array of macro-, meso-, and state of affairs is disappointing. For the microlevel processes to equalize educa- most part, the response has taken the form tional opportunity. of either 1) admitting more “first-gen- But is the current state of affairs all that eration” students to postsecondary in- worrisome? Is such a radical defense of stitutions; or 2) providing postsecond- equal opportunity an overreaction? The ary loans or grants to low-income chil- available evidence suggests that we are dren. The former approach falls short not overreacting. We know that the test- because first-generation status is a poor score gap between children from low- proxy for income, and the latter approach and high-income families has widened falls short because it wrongly presumes by roughly 40 percent in the last three de- that the main barriers to access are cred- cades.5 We know that, at the thirty-eight it constraints at the very end of the train- highest ranked colleges, more students ing period (the postsecondary years). In- come from the top 1 percent of the family sofar as credit constraints are indeed in income distribution than from the entire play, we will show that they are likely to bottom 60 percent.6 We know that less be more problematic in the earlier years than half of the students in the bottom of childhood, when low-income families quintile of family income attend any col- cannot borrow the money needed to rent lege at all.7 We know that, because the re- or buy housing in neighborhoods that of- turns to education continue to increase, fer high-quality education. It follows that children without access to a high-quality low-income children are not receiving the education are ever more disadvantaged.8 early training that then positions them for We know that approximately two-thirds a high-quality college track. of the income inequality between poor It would be conventional at this point and well-off families is passed on to the to champion some new approach to “fix- next generation.9 ing” the primary or secondary schools As important as these facts are, there that low-income students attend. The are also profound gaps in our knowl- school-fixing literature, which is of course edge. There is, for example, a troubling vast, has so far been a disappointment.

148 (3) Summer 2019 21 The Rise of Because all prior efforts at equalizing set of institutions, with some of these Opportunity training have been tepid and weak, it is very likely to have yielded far lower levels Markets: How Did It best to look to solutions that do not re- of inequality. The theme of this Dædalus Happen & quire us to wait for an authentic effort issue, which resonates in our essay, is that What Can We Do? at rebuilding a training system that tru- a society’s inequality regime is the histor- ly provides equal opportunity. This will ically specific outcome of the cultural and likely be a long wait. After decades of in- institutional arrangements characteriz- terventions, we still find ourselves in a ing that society. These cultural and in- situation in which, for example, the test- stitutional arrangements come together score gap between children from low- and interact in ways that produce an in- and high-income families is widening, equality regime that is then naturalized not narrowing.11 This leaves us with the and understood as inevitable. decision of either 1) continuing to pre- Although this abstract formulation of tend that the next tepid intervention will the genesis of existing inequalities will somehow succeed where none other has strike many social scientists as unobjec- or 2) owning up to the inevitability of tionable, it is not the formulation that running a deeply unequal training regi- underlies the typical lay understanding men for the foreseeable future. The great of this process. It is instead convention- virtue of moving beyond the usual wish- al to treat inequality as the product of ei- ful thinking is that we can then turn di- ther inevitable variation in the talents or rectly to the task of building a college ad- proclivities of individuals or inexorable mission system that integrates well with forces at the heart of late industrialism or the unequal training system we actually market economies. For many commenta- have and will likely continue to have for tors, the extreme inequality in the Unit- some time. The prescriptive purpose of ed States and other well-off countries is our essay is to show how doing so could represented as a “necessary evil,” where- set in motion a norm cascade that would as inequality is in fact an implicit or ex- lead to far-reaching change. plicit policy decision arising out of historically specific cultural and institution- The foregoing raises the question of al arrangements. whether current levels of inequality are These arrangements tend not to be a too deeply entrenched to be addressed haphazard congeries of commitments. by everyday reform efforts. In suggesting We use the term inequality regime to express that we should own up to the “inevitabil- the relatively high level of integration that ity of running a deeply unequal training runs across macrolevel institutions (like regimen for the foreseeable future,” we the economy), mesolevel organizations only mean to suggest that, given our exist- (like the family), and microlevel processing institutional and cultural commitments, it es (like constructing the self ) that are im- will be difficult to dismantle the current plicated in the production of inequality. system of highly unequal training. The The rise of opportunity markets, for ex- United States has settled, in other words, ample, is an expression of a deeper cul- into a particular type of training regime tural and institutional commitment to al- that is backed by a wide range of insti- locate scarce goods and services through tutional commitments that then make it markets. This macrolevel commitment difficult to effect reform using conven- to opportunity markets travels downward tional approaches. In principle, the Unit- to the mesolevel in the sense that families ed States could have opted for a different become the main unit for mobilizing the

22 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences resources needed to make investments in that were a prerequisite for accessing David B. these markets. It also travels downward opportunities.12 The efficiency side of Grusky, Peter A. Hall to the microlevel as parents, teachers, and the neoliberal claim assumes that mar- & Hazel Rose peers pass on class-specific conceptions of ket competition maximizes total eco- Markus the self, conceptions that affect how chil- nomic production. The logic here is that, dren will fare in opportunity markets. were we instead to “give training away” The result of these integrative tenden- to everyone (via free college, for exam- cies is an inequality regime that functions ple), some students would opt for it even so smoothly that its many interlocking if the training would be wasted on them. components can be invisible. It is none- The market ensures instead that resourc- theless crucial for our argument that, be- es are only spent where justified by the neath this appearance of high integra- payoff. The justice side of the neoliber- tion, there remain some quite fundamen- al narrative asserts that market compe- tal inconsistencies and contradictions. By tition yields not only efficiency, but also drawing out the antecedents, correlates, a fair distribution of rewards. This jus- and consequences of opportunity mar- tice premise holds that the winners of the kets, our goal is to identify a point of inter- competition deserve the substantial re- vention that can unravel the regime. The wards bestowed on them because they unraveling will rest on exploiting a con- are the most diligent and talented. It as- tradiction between a commitment to mar- sumes, in other words, that universities kets as the preferred mode of allocating are making their admission decisions on opportunities (the “neoliberal commit- the basis of merit and that universities ment”) and a commitment to providing are processing their admitted students in opportunities to all children (the “equal ways that produce a merit-based ranking opportunity commitment”) even when that may then be profitablyused by em- their families cannot afford to buy them. ployers. The neoliberal vision is thus a This contradiction may seem too fun- tight and self-reinforcing model that le- damental to have been overlooked in gitimates the market as both efficient any existing inequality regime. How did (output maximizing) and just (merito- a society built around a commitment to cratic). It compactly inspires and defends equal opportunity end up putting oppor- some of the core inequalities now charac- tunity on the market? Although that may teristic of contemporary societies. seem an unlikely outcome, the neoliberal But are opportunity markets like all oth- commitment to defunding and privatiz- er markets? Can they be defended con- ing the public sector swept up everything vincingly in these terms? If a training sys- in its path, in effect blinding us to some tem is to have good neoliberal credentials, of the inconsistencies that this commit- it must at minimum ensure that investment engendered. The marketization of ments in children are made on the basis opportunity was in this sense a side effect of expected returns, not on the basis of of a host of smaller decisions, each un- the family’s capacity to afford them. With dergirded by a neoliberal logic, that cu- the rise of opportunity markets, a fami- mulated into an outcome never explicitly’s capacity to invest in the human capital ly chosen. of its children depends on its income and This sudden turn to neoliberalism was wealth, with the implication that many undergirded by a dual claim about the ef- low-income and low-wealth families are ficiency and justice of markets so seduc- locked out of making investments even tive that it was applied even to services when the expected returns to those invest-

148 (3) Summer 2019 23 The Rise of ments are very high. Although, in princi- ed to enter the middle class was so wide- Opportunity ple, this problem could be solved by allow- ly available that even poor families could Markets: How Did It ing for borrowing, in practice, there are not reasonably expect their children to secure Happen & well-developed markets that allow for bor- it and thus qualify for a good job in an au- What Can We Do? rowing in early childhood, when invest- tomobile factory, a steel mill, or a grocery ments are likely to have the highest pay- store. To be eligible for these types of off. Moreover, even if these markets did middle-class jobs, all that was needed, at exist, many low-income families would most, was the standard secondary school- not avail themselves of such loans because ing available in local neighborhoods. The they deem them too risky in the absence of road to the middle class did not entail par- fallback resources should the investment ents buying high-quality childcare, mov- go awry.13 The upshot is that children born ing to an expensive neighborhood, mak- into well-off families are protected from ing ongoing investments in off-season or a fair and open competition with their after-school training, or taking on debt to counterparts in poor families. afford years of college tuition.15 Although there were still vast inequalities of oppor- We now turn to the task of laying out tunity in the postwar period, it was not in very stylized terms how opportunity the case that the opportunity to enter the markets came into being. As discussed middle class was quite so baldly sold to above, we do not suggest that elite policy- the highest bidder. The profound restric- makers, operating under the spell of neo- tions faced by African Americans, for ex- liberal stories about efficiency and jus- ample, stemmed from segregation and le- tice, purposefully brought opportunity gal restrictions rather than from purely fi- markets into being. It was rather the case nancial obstacles.16 that they drifted into opportunity mar- We now live in a very different world kets via a series of small policy decisions in which financial obstacles have become that, each taken separately, could be nar- an increasingly fundamental challenge to rowly justified in neoliberal terms. realizing our commitment to equal op- We begin this story during that period portunity. The marketization of opportu- after World War II when the provision of nity has taken hold gradually and through mass education came to be seen as one of many seemingly distinct processes. Once the architectonic tasks of modern states. in place, it has been protected by a gen- Although mass education had long been eralized neoliberal commitment to the represented as a vehicle for increasing so- sanctity of markets, a commitment that cial mobility, this function was stressed as has made it difficult to challenge the pre- a key component of the emerging modern rogative of families to buy opportuni- welfare state. In one of the earliest defens- ty for their children on the new opportu- es of the welfare state, sociologist T. H. nity markets. Because these markets are Marshall accorded education a preemi- now well developed at every stage of the nent role in what he termed “class abate- life course, it is important to review how ment,” the process by which class-based a child, from the moment of birth up to differences in life chances would erode labor market entry, is processed through and allow social equality to be secured.14 them. Although everyone knows that ter- The U.S. educational system began to tiary education is directly purchased, this take on a form that approximated this is but the culmination of a shockingly ideal in the aftermath of World War II. deep penetration of opportunity markets The secondary schooling that was need- into our everyday lives.17

24 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Zone-1 opportunity markets. We begin this house for sale, or one type of vacation David B. review with the early childhood period. for sale. If childcare differentiates out of Grusky, Peter A. Hall The main macrolevel dynamic affecting the family and into the market, we would & Hazel Rose early childhood training is that it is in- likewise expect it to be offered at differ- Markus creasingly delivered on the market rather ent price points, with only well-off par- than via the family. In the postwar period, ents able to afford the highest-quality of- parents were the main providers of early fering. This differentiation in price would childhood training, with mothers respon- not matter for our purposes if the highest- sible for the bulk of it. Because mothers quality childcare entailed luxury add-ons are now more likely to work in the formal that did not much affect a child’s life labor market, childcare and early child- chances. The marketization of childcare hood education have become services to investments does, however, matter pre- be purchased. Although many countries cisely because the best available evidence have reacted to this “differentiation of shows that children exposed to high-qual- childcare out of the family” by convert- ity early education are profoundly advan- ing it into a state-provided or state-sub- taged in their lifetime earnings and em- sidized service, the United States has in- ployment.20 This is a textbook case, then, stead put it on the market and provided of putting a service onto the market, con- only modest means-tested childcare sub- verting it into a commodity, and thereby sidies to some poor families.18 It follows making money the arbiter of subsequent that poor parents who want to provide life chances. high-quality childcare to their children We are not suggesting that the neolib- are now often obliged to rely on their own eral narrative was responsible for the dif- resources to buy it. ferentiation of early childhood training When a function is wrested out of the out of the family. To the contrary, a broad family, it opens up an opportunity to re- constellation of historical, social, and duce the effects of the family on how that cultural processes led young mothers to function is met. The essence of modern- enter the labor market en masse, process- ization theory, as developed by sociol- es that then made it necessary for child- ogist Talcott Parsons and others, is that care to be delivered outside the family. Al- the differentiation of functions out of though the neoliberal narrative was not the family would have, for example, a the cause of this transition, it did make it class-abating effect.19 Because the fami- more difficult for the state to ensure that ly was seen as a conduit for class-specific childcare was delivered in a standardized cultures and sensibilities to be transmit- high-quality form, to define childcare as a ted across generations, any function that universal and guaranteed public good, or differentiated out of the family could in to deliver comprehensive means-tested principle be delivered in a standardized subsidies that would allow poor families way, thus “abating” the effects of class. to buy high-quality childcare. The Unit- Why didn’t modernization theory get ed States thus ended up with a childcare it right in the U.S. case? The simple an- system that is ensconced in the market, swer: the theory wrongly presupposed is subject to market logic, and according- that a newly differentiated function, such ly makes the quality of childcare increas- as childcare, would be delivered in a stan- ingly dependent on the capacity to pay for dardized way. When a service is put on it. This is the first critical step in the cre- the market, this is rarely true. We don’t ation of opportunity markets in the Unit- have one type of car for sale, one type of ed States.

148 (3) Summer 2019 25 The Rise of Zone-2 opportunity markets. The next though school effects are notoriously dif- Opportunity step in creating robust opportunity mar- ficult to establish, the best available ev- Markets: How Did It kets was to allow parents to buy differ- idence suggests that children attend- Happen & ent gradations of training for adolescent ing schools with high per-pupil funding What Can 22 We Do? children. This might seem difficult in the have higher earnings as adults. The so- context of the largely public system of cial organization of schools in high-in- primary and secondary education in the come neighborhoods is also distinctive United States. In the case of early child- by virtue of providing an academic ex- hood training, the state’s involvement in perience very close to the college experi- the delivery of care was quite modest and ence.23 The curriculum and social organi- indirect, mainly taking the form of ru- zation of these schools entail open access dimentary regulation, supporting Head to class materials, complex and varied Start and other public training programs, tasks, freedom of movement, and ample and providing limited childcare subsi- choice among tasks and activities.24 To dies to poor families. By contrast, prima- promote analytical thinking when solv- ry and secondary schooling in the United ing problems, teachers focus not on fol- States remains a largely state-provided lowing rules but on the importance of un- affair, thereby complicating the task of derstanding the logic behind the process commodifying it. How, in other words, of answering a question.25 This means are well-off parents allowed to buy higher- emphasizing the value of independent quality education for their children when work and creativity, encouraging stu- primary and secondary schooling have dents to ask questions and challenge as- been set up to be universal and public? sumptions, promoting individual expres- The well-known answer rests on 1) seg- sion in essays and class presentations, regating neighborhoods by household and developing big-picture thinking. In income and 2) allocating the funding for all of these ways, teachers in high-income neighborhood schools on the basis of lo- neighborhoods are carefully scaffolding cal property values. This two-part process the college-bound self, a type of scaffold- ensures that neighborhoods are income- ing that is likely to have a higher payoff in homogeneous and that the income level the labor market. associated with each neighborhood dic- What type of scaffolding is there in tates the amount of school funding and low-income neighborhoods and schools? quality. From the point of view of par- Because educators in low-income neigh- ents, the result is no different than sim- borhoods often assume that most of their ply allowing them to buy the desired level students will not enter the middle class, of school quality, although the sale comes many provide a scaffolding that prepares in the form of a package deal in which ac- the self for a low-wage world. In these cess to the school is sold in tandem with schools, the curriculum and classroom access to the neighborhood. practices emphasize more limits on indi- This solution sets up a zone-2 opportu- vidual freedom, less complex and more nity market that allows well-off parents structured activities, and more atten- to buy access to those neighborhoods that tion to following rules and instruction. increase the human capital and earnings Although this type of regimented class- of their children.21 These higher earn- room fits well with a home experience ings are partly attributable to the higher- emphasizing the importance of “keeping quality schools disproportionately found your head down” and following author- in more expensive neighborhoods. Al- ity, it can be fraught when students en-

26 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences ter secondary school and begin to assert with high-quality schools and other ad- David B. their own voice and autonomy. Because vantages has come to depend ever more Grusky, 29 Peter A. Hall the very same actions that are construed on the capacity to buy one’s way in. & Hazel Rose as “finding one’s voice” in a high-income Although there is much debate about Markus school can be read as defiance in a low-in- how this came to pass, one plausible ac- come school, these differences in school count is that the rise of the professional- organization produce corresponding dif- managerial sector and related technolog- ferences in the likelihood of being disci- ical changes increased the returns to col- plined with trips to the principal’s office lege, ramped up the competition for the or suspension.26 This in turn has implica- training and credentialing needed to at- tions for college attendance and earnings. tend top colleges, and thus induced par- We have so far argued that low-in- ents to buy this training and credential- come children tend not to attend oppor- ing via the highest-income neighborhood tunity-expanding schools because their they could afford.30 There are of course parents cannot afford the housing in the many other accounts. Whatever the caus- neighborhoods that deliver these schools. es of rising economic segregation, what The effects of neighborhoods on oppor- matters here is that it allows well-off par- tunity are not, however, entirely due to ents to buy opportunity for their children. such differentials in school quality.27 Al- By contrast, low-income parents can no though it is well-established that neigh- longer afford the high-amenity neighbor- borhoods have a profound effect on op- hoods that, before the recent intensifica- portunity, we know less about the forces tion of economic segregation, were more accounting for this effect. The best avail- open to them. able research suggests that the payoff to We are thus left with a pretend public- a high-income neighborhood is not re- school system at the primary and second- ducible to “school quality” effects alone ary levels. In reality, parents who send and may also be attributable to networks their children to “public” schools do so and cultures that cultivate high-status only after entering a market that metes preferences, develop skills for high-earn- out different levels of public school qual- ings jobs, and protect against exposure to ity, a market that is again legitimated by trauma, crime, discrimination, and oth- neoliberal sentiments about the sancti- er stressors that suppress later achieve- ty of markets for all allocative purposes, ment.28 For our purposes, we do not need even evidently the allocation of opportu- to know exactly why children growing nity. As with the early childhood market, up in high-income neighborhoods are this late childhood market was not creat- advantaged, since parents who buy into ed because of a commitment to neoliber- these neighborhoods will regardless have alism, but once it emerged it came to be access to the full package of effects. viewed as a legitimate–even sacred–ex- Have opportunity markets of this sort ercise of the right of a well-off parent to always been in play? As best we can tell, assist and protect one’s children. The neo- high-payoff neighborhoods have always liberal narrative was in this sense available cost more, but there is reason to believe at just the right moment to play a valuable that money figures ever more in securing legitimating role. Although the American entry into them. The key change here is commitment to “equality of opportuni- rising economic segregation. As neigh- ty” should have undermined the devel- borhoods become increasingly segregat- opment of such brazen opportunity mar- ed by income, access to neighborhoods kets, the ready availability of a generalized

148 (3) Summer 2019 27 The Rise of commitment to market-based allocation that when one asks why well-off chil- Opportunity successfully smoothed over any possible dren attend the best primary or second- Markets: How Did It legitimation problems. ary schools, the simple answer is that Happen & Zone-3 opportunity markets. The rise of their families are able to buy this school- What Can We Do? opportunity markets within the third ing for them, either directly (via private zone–the young-adult zone–is just as schooling) or indirectly (via the purchase critical. This is the zone where young of high-amenity neighborhoods). It is not adults settle on their initial investments the case, by contrast, that most well-off in tertiary training, undertake that train- families can simply buy slots for their chil- ing, and then attempt to convert it into dren at selective institutions. Although a full-time job. The simple problem that extremely rich parents can sometimes emerges in this zone, as with the two buy their children acceptance into top childhood zones, is that family mon- universities (either licitly or illicitly), the ey is again deeply associated with out- typical well-off parents must instead pro- comes. That is, the children from well-off ceed indirectly by making the requisite families not only end up in the best pre- investments that ensure that their proge- schools, primary schools, and secondary ny are seen as meritorious.33 The winning schools, but also in the best colleges and resume will display high grades and test universities. By contrast, children from scores, a high-status secondary school, less advantaged families often forgo ter- exposure to high-level classes in math, tiary training altogether, tend to drop science, and the arts, the right number of out quickly when they do opt for tertia- successful advanced placement exams, a ry training, or are frequently relegated to strong profile of volunteering activities, for-profit schools and other institutions and a self that is appropriately indepen- with relatively low returns.31 dent, confident, self-expressive, enthusi- These developments are troubling be- astic, optimistic, and high-energy.34 cause the pathway to the middle class It just so happens that it costs money to now depends critically on this transi- build such a resume. The well-off parent tion. In the past, it did not much matter cannot, then, directly buy access to elite that high-quality colleges were dominat- universities but must instead do so by ed by the children of well-off families, as spending the money necessary to build a the main pathway to middle-class jobs resume laden with signals of merit. These (such as union jobs) did not require col- investing and cultivating activities are a lege or any other type of tertiary train- direct form of money laundering: one of ing. The typical working-class or middle- the main reasons why well-off parents class family in the prewar and immedi spend so much money on high-quality ate postwar decades properly viewed preschool, the best primary and second- college as the irrelevant plaything of the ary schools, after-school and summer elite. However, now that college is a vir- training, and college coaching is to devel- tual prerequisite for entry into the middle op a personal portfolio for their children class, it surely matters that well-off fami- that signals merit and thus appeals to em- lies are deeply advantaged in getting into ployers and admissions officers at selec- the best ones.32 tive institutions.35 The key question that emerges is why It is surprising that more attention has children from well-off families are so been paid to the role of money in buy- much more likely to attend selective ter- ing information than to its role in buy- tiary institutions. We have already shown ing merit. The information problem,

28 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences as conveyed most famously by econo- These rising costs express a very direct David B. mist Carolyn Hoxby, takes the form of and simple way in which money increas- Grusky, Peter A. Hall low-income children with attractive ingly matters. We are reluctant, however, & Hazel Rose secondary-school profilesfailing to ap- to make too much of these trends in the Markus ply to selective institutions because they net price of college, since there is much have not heard of them or because they debate about the extent to which credit think that they would never be admit- constraints are indeed a deterrent to at- ted to them.36 This classic information tending college.41 Even if the rising price problem arises because poor children are of college is an important deterrent, it is raised in low-income neighborhoods that still likely less important than the mone- do not come with the peers, teachers, and tary deterrents in zones 1 and 2, in which counselors who know the college admis- low-income families face overwhelming sion process. When well-off parents buy price barriers to moving into neighbor- into high-income neighborhoods, they hoods that can reliably deliver a merit- are not just buying a certain caliber of signaling resume for their children. training, but also a mentoring network These costs cannot be mitigated, as they that provides high-quality information can in zone 3, by taking out loans. That is, on colleges and, more generally, assists in because home mortgages are based on a conveying middle-class mores and prac- family’s income and wealth, they cannot tices. This is yet another way in which op- be used to finance a zone-2 investment in portunities purchased in the second op- a child. The same applies to low-income portunity zone affect behavior and out- parents who would like to finance a zone-1 comes in the third zone. investment in early childhood training. We might also assume that children The clear implication: the truly conse- from poor families do not attend college quential borrowing constraints are likely because it costs too much.37 If poor chil- in opportunity zones 1 and 2. dren worry about going into debt or are especially risk averse, they may be de- To this point, we have emphasized the terred from attending college or invest- resume-building skills that money can ing in other forms of tertiary training.38 buy, including test-taking skills that gen- Over the last twenty years, the average erate high-achievement test scores (like net price of tertiary training, which is the sat scores), classroom skills that gener- difference between total costs (tuition, ate high grade point averages, and writ- fees, room and board) and total grant aid ing skills that generate appealing college and federal tax credits and deductions, application essays. We have also empha- has increased by $350 per year for public sized that money can buy valuable infor two-year institutions, $6,110 per year for mation about the types of colleges to which public four-year institutions, and $6,020 one might apply. We have focused on the per year for private nonprofit four-year sale of skills and information within new institutions.39 Although the per-year in- opportunity markets only because they crease is only slight for public two-year are the most easily identified mobility- institutions, many of these institutions generating commodities for sale. But are oversubscribed, meaning that stu- money also “gets under the skin” and af- dents cannot obtain the necessary class- fects how individuals come to view themes to fulfill requirements. This in turn ex- selves, how they come to understand their tends the time of enrollment and increas- role within the world, and how they come es the total cost of completing a degree.40 to understand their relationships with

148 (3) Summer 2019 29 The Rise of others. The purpose of this section is to individual needs, to promote and express Opportunity describe how the middle-class world pro- themselves, to stand out from others, and Markets: How Did It mulgates in children “neoliberal selves” to attempt to influence the world accord- Happen & who understand themselves as indepen- ing to their goals and aspirations. What Can We Do? dent self-interested actors, how this sen- By contrast, when children grow up in sibility pays off, and why it takes money low-income families or neighborhoods, to garner access to the habits of mind and they are less likely to have experienc- ways of being that constitute the neolib- es that foster neoliberal selves and are eral self. more likely to have experiences that fos- What is the neoliberal self? Through ter “interdependent selves” that are use- engagement with neoliberal systems of ful and appropriate for a less-advantaged ideas and practices, middle-class indi- world.43 In a world with fewer resources, viduals have increasingly come to under- it becomes important to relate to and fit stand themselves as separate from oth- in with others, since doing so builds net- ers, from the public, and from the civic works that can be relied upon for both or the social. They have come to construe material and emotional support. When their own behavior and that of others as one’s fate is more dependent on the ac- an expression of internal attributes and tions of others, it makes sense to pay at- the consequence of preference-based free tention to others, to be responsive to choice. By virtue of this heightened indi- them, to be aware of hierarchy, and to vidualism and independence, neoliber- maintain loyalty with in-groups.44 The al selves often devote less time and fewer resulting self is likely to prioritize inter- attentional resources on others and enjoy dependence, relationships, and family less connection to and empathy with oth- and community over individualism, in- ers.42 This sensibility provides answers to dividual accomplishment, and indepen- basic questions of identity such as “Who dence from family and community. am I?” and “How should someone like The neoliberal self is fine-tuned to suc- me act?” The answers on offer perpet- ceed in the upper-middle-class world of uate as obvious and good the priority of elite universities. This is partly because the unconstrained individual and the ex- adolescents under its sway are likely to pression of preferences and rights above approach college as something they need other possible foundational values, in- and as a natural next step that is, in effect, cluding equality, obligation to family and little more than “grade thirteen.” Because community, or the public good. of their family and neighborhood expe- The middle class and especially the riences, they are primed to receive pre- upper-middle class is the home ground cisely the message that selective colleges of the neoliberal self understood in this communicate, a message that celebrates way. It follows that, when a child lives in a the freedom “to be incredible,” “to be middle-class home or neighborhood, that unique,” “to make extraordinary contri- child will be exposed to practices and be- butions,” “to take risks,” “to chart one’s haviors that support the development of own course,” and “to choose from more a neoliberal self. Likewise, when a family than sixty majors, double majors, and moves from a poor to middle-class neigh- individualized majors.” The university borhood, the child’s exposure to neolib- pitch is appealing to neoliberal selves eral ideas and practices will increase. The because it allows them to express their children in middle-class neighborhoods uniqueness, focus on individual accom- learn, for example, to prioritize their plishment, make choices, and realize

30 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences their independence by separating from needed to gain access to and thrive in David B. family and community. Once admitted, top universities. It also cultivates an ori- Grusky, Peter A. Hall they will also be more likely to finish be- entation and sensibility (the neoliber- & Hazel Rose cause they experience a comfortable fit al self ) that tends to view the college ex- Markus between their own preferences, motives, perience as the logical next step, that fits goals, and aspirations and those fostered with the college and is accordingly attrac- by the university context.45 tive to college admission officers, and that For many adolescents who instead grow aligns well with the elite university’s so- up in low-income neighborhoods, there is cial world. It makes the university feel like often less interest in college, and not just one’s natural new home. Although there because they have not had access to the are doubtless many reasons why middle- types of primary and secondary schools class neighborhoods tend to increase the that provide them with college-oriented earnings of children who lived in them, skills and information. They are also less we suspect that it is partly because they likely to see college as “the answer”: the are exposed to sensibilities and orien- neoliberal self sees college as the solution tations that are fine-tuned for the col- to the problem of securing independence, lege experience.48 If low-income parents whereas adolescents raised in low-income want to secure this type of “cultural fit” environments are often more interest- for their children, they may well conclude ed in maintaining family and communi- that they need to raise them in middle- ty ties than escaping them.46 Moreover, class neighborhoods that are chock-full of low-income adolescents may not have neoliberal selves.49 This is likely, howev- previously traveled far from their homes er, to be prohibitively expensive. or spent time in unfamiliar environments, The obvious point is that it was not al- nor are they likely to believe that doing so ways this way. In the past, parents did is attractive or important. The universi- not have to try to finessetheir way into ty’s invitation to leave one’s home and a “neoliberal neighborhood,” as middle- become an independent, extraordinary, class union or office jobs could be se- choice-making self may be more bewil- cured by simply attending the local high dering than it is exciting. Some students school in a working-class neighborhood. may wonder, “What kind of a person do Because middle-class outcomes now re- I have to become to succeed in a place like quire a college degree, we have obliged this?” As one first-generation student put low-income parents to think about “cul- it, “I want to go to college so that I can give tural fit,” which has been put up for sale back. . . . It is just not about me and my suc- at out-of-reach prices. The rise of for-pay cess.” When children from low-income college application “advising services” neighborhoods do nonetheless opt for can be understood in this context as an college, they often report a lack of fit and effort to provide a shortcut to cultural fit a feeling of being like a guest in someone at a price point that’s at least lower than else’s house. Even when they are highly the cost of eighteen years of a middle- motivated and achieve good grades and class mortgage.50 test scores, they experience higher dropout rates, lower feelings of belongingness, We have sought to deliver a big-pic- and fewer close relationships with peers ture overview of where the United States and professors.47 stands on its commitment to deliver- This is all to suggest that money is not ing equal opportunity to all children. Be- just used to buy the skills and information cause the education field is so large and

148 (3) Summer 2019 31 The Rise of specialized, it is easy to fixate on just one and information required to construct the Opportunity part of the larger research literature or on appearance of merit. Markets: How Did It one class of narrow-gauge interventions, It would be difficultto imagine a setup Happen & often with the unfortunate result of ob- that more directly controverts our com- What Can We Do? scuring the larger forces at work that are mitment to equal opportunity. To be sure, transforming the distribution of oppor- middle-class parents cannot directly buy tunity in this country. a middle-class outcome for their children, The concept of opportunity markets al- but they can and do buy a higher proba- lows us to better understand how the land- bility of a middle-class outcome through scape of opportunity is changing in the their disproportionate access to the req- United States. We have shown that three uisite schools, neighborhoods, and infor- such markets have become increasingly mation. This laundering operation is in- prominent and that only the third one, the sidious because it creates the appearance early-adult market, allows low-income that universities are selecting on merit families to take out loans that make for when in fact they are selecting on the ca- fairer competition. In the two childhood pacity to build a merit-projecting resume. zones, many low-income parents would The emergence of opportunity markets of course like to assemble “high-merit re- becomes even more problematic when it sumes” for their children, but this is a dif- is combined with rising income inequali- ficult undertaking when they cannot af- ty.51 Although some economists have ar- ford private childcare, high-quality pre- gued that rising income inequality is in schools, the best primary and secondary and of itself incompatible with our com- schools, amenity-rich neighborhoods, mitment to equal opportunity,52 in fact and the usual complement of after-school it is the emergence of opportunity mar- and summer training activities. Because kets that gives rising income inequality there is no capacity for borrowing in these its teeth. If the United States had resist- childhood zones, they have become sim- ed putting opportunity on the market, it ple money-laundering operations in would not have mattered so much that which well-off parents are the only ones the well-off were securing ever-greater who can buy the schools, neighborhoods, shares of total national income. The ex- and peers that generate what is deemed tra money at the top of the distribution to be merit (such as accomplishments in could have been used to buy more yachts, music, theater, debate, test scores, grades, more Teslas, and more private planes, but or volunteering). In the tertiary zone, the not to buy more opportunity for those requisite financialaid is then delivered lucky children born into the top. It is only and a commitment to need-blind admis- when opportunity markets are also avail- sions is trumpeted, making it appear as if able that the well-off can use their extra there were now an equal and fair competi- income to reduce the chances of down- tion in which all children have a fair shot. ward mobility for their own children and The obvious problem with this arrange- the chances of upward mobility for oth- ment is that the potentially equalizing fi- er children.53 nancial aid is delivered far too late. Were it instead delivered earlier, when the chil- What can we do? It is easy to be disil- dren’s “merit resumes” and selves were lusioned by the unceasing flow of incre- being constructed, well-off parents would mental reforms that are well intended but no longer have an effective monopoly in ultimately overpowered by the combined accessing the schools, neighborhoods, effect of rising inequality and growing

32 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences opportunity markets. The purpose of even after redistribution, the higher- David B. this section is to lay out a radical inter- ranked families could continue to outbid Grusky, Peter A. Hall vention that could cut through all the in- lower-ranked families in key opportuni- & Hazel Rose crementalism and directly deliver equal ty markets.54 Moreover, insofar as low- Markus opportunity. income families face various environ- At any point in time, the likelihood of mental conditions (such as high incarcer- radical change is very small, but it would ation rates in their neighborhoods) that be a gross misreading of U.S. history to prevent them from reaping fair returns rule it out altogether. There is nothing to their human capital investments, it is more distinctively American than the possible that they would not make deep- idea that our principles should be taken er investments in their children even seriously and that our institutions should with an increased capacity to do so.55 It is be continually recast and perfected to en- nonetheless plausible that an aggressive- sure that we live up to them. At sever- ly redistributive program could substan- al points in its history, the United States tially reduce inequalities of opportunity. has acted decisively to effect a correspon- The second approach that might be tak- dence between its principles and insti- en entails reversing the rise of opportunity tutions, with the civil rights movement markets rather than acquiescing to them. perhaps the most recent–and ongoing– This “decommodifying approach” would example of this type of reconciliation. proceed by installing a full range of public The commitment to equal economic op- goods–including free high-quality educa- portunity, although arguably one of our tion, free high-quality childcare, and inte- most sacred principles, has not yet had an grated neighborhoods–that would allow equivalent “line in the sand” moment. lower-income families to access opportu- If ever that moment arrived, there are nities for their children without having to several ways in which it could play out. buy them. With this approach, an aggres- It might, for example, be judged that op- sive program for redistributing income portunity markets are here to stay and would presumably no longer be required, that we must therefore equip low-income since access to opportunities would be families to compete within them more directly delivered in the form of pub- fairly. This type of equalization could be lic goods rather than purchased in mar- achieved, at least partly, through aggres- kets.56 The obvious difficulty with this ap- sive income redistribution that makes proach would be identifying those key ser- it possible for all families to participate vices that, once delivered as public goods, more fully in zone-1 and zone-2 oppor- would best level the playing field. tunity markets. Alternatively, new finan- It is hard to imagine a more radical cial products might be developed to al- agenda. These approaches would require low loans to be taken out within these either the most radical redistributive ef- two markets, thus making it possible for fort in the history of the United States or low-income families to invest in their the most radical commitment to the uni- most talented children. Although either versal provision of services in the his- of these efforts would allow low-income tory of the United States. Although the or middle-income children to compete New Deal might, for example, be seen as on a fairer footing, some residual inequal- a precedent, it seems unlikely that suffi- ities in opportunity would inevitably re- cient support could be mustered for a new main. This is because, insofar as the orig- equal-opportunity project that would inal rank-order inequalities are preserved make even the New Deal seem small.

148 (3) Summer 2019 33 The Rise of Is there a third way? Is there anything the existing supercharged competition Opportunity the United States could do–right now– among high-income children to provide Markets: How Did It without spending a large fraction of the evidence on what happens when extraor- Happen & federal and state budgets? There indeed dinary resources are applied.58 The prem- What Can We Do? is. The simple way forward is to give up on ise behind this approach is that cross- the ideal of lavishing the same advantag- tranche competitions are intrinsical- es on low-income children as are currently ly incommensurate, that any attempt at lavished on middle-income children. We forced commensuration is folly, and that have been caught in the trap of thinking there is accordingly no alternative but to that, insofar as we are unwilling to forci- take a population-proportionate share of bly prevent middle-income parents from winners from each tranche. making large investments in their chil- We are not suggesting that a three- dren, our only alternative is to raise low- tranche approach of this sort should ac- income parental investments to a middle- tually be used. If the admissions process income level. The resulting “race to the were indeed based on just three tranches, top” is an immensely costly approach the winners in each of them would like- when the top has so much to spend.57 ly be drawn from near the top of their We thus need a third way that does tranche’s income distribution, an out- not rest on equalizing access to all income that would reflect residual within- vestments. The obvious starting point tranche differences in the capacity to for such a third way is to recognize that, make investments. This type of “cream- whenever investments in children are af- ing” could be mechanically reduced by fected by the parents’ capacity to invest, using a larger number of tranches. Un- the resulting investment tracks must der a decile approach, the within-tranche be viewed as incommensurate compe- heterogeneity in economic resources titions. It then follows that universities would be much reduced, and the compe- should take a proportionate share of win- tition within each decile would be fairer. ners from each track. By this logic, uni- For selective institutions using a holistic versities should admit students who win admissions process, each admissions offi- their within-tranche competition, with cer could concentrate on a single tranche, each “tranche” comprising children from allowing that officer to become a special- families of roughly the same economic ist in the types of accomplishment that circumstances. can emerge for any given amount of fam- This approach is inexpensive precise- ily income. The “equal opportunity” con- ly because we are not compensating for straint then takes the form of simply re- privately financed differentials in early quiring that the same number of students childhood investments. We are instead are selected from each of the ten deciles. using the existing competition among This approach could be straightforward- low-income children to provide evidence ly combined with existing racial, ethnic, on performance differentials (such as and first-generation policy. grades, test scores, musical performance, In practice, there would be no need to volunteering profiles) when investments divide applicants literally into deciles, are low. We are likewise using the exist- given that the admissions process could ing competition among middle-income instead be treated as an optimization children to provide evidence on perfor- problem subject to the constraint that the mance differentials under a middling in- selected class must have the country’s fusion of resources. And we are using family income distribution. If admissions

34 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences data were merged with tax or earnings affirmative action, therefore, is to ad- David B. data, it would in principle be possible dress the economic barriers that arise be- Grusky, Peter A. Hall to choose weights on the various input cause low-income families do not have & Hazel Rose measures, like grade point average, that the money to make investments in zone-1 Markus then serve to maximize long-run earn- or zone-2 markets. Because some selec- ings and other labor market outcomes.59 tive institutions have already developed This approach raises the possibility that, admissions practices that yield a racial- at least for some elite universities, the ly and ethnically diverse student body, constrained solution would yield expect- there is no need to develop new plans or ed earnings and other outcomes that are approaches for realizing that objective in fact higher than those of graduates ad- (unless existing approaches are deemed mitted under conventional admissions unlawful). At the same time, existing ap- protocols. Because recent research re- proaches for delivering racial and ethnic veals that elite-university graduates from diversity, as important as they are, do not low-income families earn nearly as much fully address inequalities that arise from as their counterparts from high-income differential capacities to invest in op- families, we know that imposing a family- portunity markets, a deficiency that eco- income constraint is not very costly, at nomic affirmative action does address. least not with respect to the anticipated It follows that any viable economic affir- earnings of graduates.60 mative action plan will have to be carried The conventional name for our pro- out in conjunction with existing admis- posal is of course economic affirmative ac- sions practices ensuring racial and ethnic tion. Although it has been implemented diversity.63 in many countries, economic affirmative The same applies to existing policies action has never gained much traction in for admitting students whose parents the United States, despite various pro- have not attended college (“first-genera- posals to introduce it.61 What accounts tion students”). Because the correlation for this lack of traction? The strong re- between family income and education is sistance to economic affirmative action is far from perfect, we cannot rely on eco- mainly the result of efforts to treat it as a nomic affirmative action to substitute for substitute for existing admissions proce- existing first-generation admission poli- dures that deliver racial and ethnic diver- cy, nor can we rely on existing first-gen- sity. In the aftermath of the first Supreme eration policy to substitute for economic Court challenge to affirmative action (Re- affirmative action. In many selective in- gents of the University of California v. Bakke), stitutions, there are very successful prac- economic affirmative action was pitched tices in place that ensure that first-gen- as an attractive substitute for “minori- eration students are admitted in ample ty quotas,” an approach that ultimately numbers, and such practices need to con- faltered because the association between tinue (and to diffuse more widely). These race and income is not strong enough to policies should be understood, however, treat the two variables as the same.62 The as addressing some of the “complemen- clear implication is that we should nev- tarities” that can reduce returns to in- er view economic affirmative action as vestments rather than directly address- a substitute for equally important mea- ing differing capacities to invest in op- sures that correct for inequalities of opportunity markets. portunity arising from racial barriers. The final practical problem of inter- The only defensible purpose of economic est, arguably the most daunting one, is of

148 (3) Summer 2019 35 The Rise of course that of cost. Although an econom- making an unprecedented commitment Opportunity ic affirmative action plan would be far less to equal opportunity. Because the associ- Markets: How Did It costly than the alternative of ramping up ated costs are substantial (from the point Happen & zone-1 and zone-2 investments in low-in- of view of the university), this commit- What Can We Do? come children, it would nonetheless be ment might be phased in gradually, with necessary to substantially increase finan- mandated signposts that ensure that pro- cial aid allocations within zone 3 (pre- portionate steps toward full implementa- sumably through some combination of tion are taken each year. federal and university grants). This in- It is worth considering how such an ini- crease, although hardly trivial from the tiative might unfold in a university bold university’s point of view, would be triv- enough to implement it. How, in oth- ial relative to the vastly larger amount er words, could an economic affirmative that would be needed to equalize zone-1 action program be implemented so well and zone-2 investments. The main rea- that other elite universities would under- son why economic affirmative action stand its logic, see that it is working, and could be implemented right now is pre- ultimately join the movement? If the first cisely that it allows the country to con- experiment were poorly implemented, tinue to save money by underinvesting it could prematurely cut off what could in high-quality training for low-income have otherwise been a transformative ini- children. Although our own view is that tiative. There is likely but one chance to the country ought to dramatically ramp get it right. up its investments in low-income chil- It is easy to see how a sudden infusion dren, doing so would require a stronger of low-income students into an elite set- commitment to tax-and-transfer policies ting could, if implemented poorly, lead to than seems viable at present. If we recon- problems. This is partly because students cile ourselves to this reality, we are left from different backgrounds bring sys- with our third-best option, a reform that tematically different understandings of we can afford and implement instantly. the self to college. It would therefore be In ordinary times, the board of trust- critical to devise ways to effectively teach ees at any top university would brand this students who, although highly motivat- type of initiative as too risky, with even ed and talented, may not fit well or expe- a small trial likely seen as irresponsible. rience a sense of connection or belong- But these are not ordinary times. In this ingness with institutions whose prac- moment in history, selective institutions tices were devised for well-off students. have been called to task on a host of eth- When low-income students arrive at col- ical matters, including tuition costs, in- lege, they can find themselves in institu- vestment decisions, admissions policy, tions whose practices are somewhat alien pay policy, athletics subsidies, outsourc- to them and incongruent, in particular, ing and deunionization, sexual harass- with their own priorities and understand- ment, and institutional racism and sex- ings of self. This may result in short-term ism. There are growing concerns that if deficits in performance, satisfaction, and universities do not act soon and decisive- well-being.64 There may also be internal ly, they may face tax and regulatory in- resistance from those who misinterpret terventions with profound financial im- economic affirmative action as relax- plications. This is precisely the circum- ing standards rather than revising them stance in which a bold university might to reflect the tranche-specific obstacles preemptively seize the high ground by that students faced. The solution to this

36 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences challenge is to openly and transparently markets are here to stay because we can- David B. discuss the evidence that merit has been not possibly come up with the money Grusky, Peter A. Hall wrongly conflated with the money need- needed to allow low-income parents to & Hazel Rose ed to buy it. participate in them equally. Because this Markus These discussions would have to be would be such a costly undertaking, the coupled with wide-reaching initiatives possibility of radical reform is immediate- to recast the culture and social organi- ly taken off the table, and we are left with zation of the university. It is now well- narrow-gauge reforms that at best tinker established that low-cost interventions on the margins of opportunity markets. addressing the challenges of cultural mis- We have suggested that we need not match can be highly effective.65 The avail- give up so quickly. Although it may be able evidence suggests that students ben- necessary, at least for now, to give up on efit from discussing strategies for adapt- the admirable objective of equalizing ac- ing to the demands of college, learning cess to human capital investments, this about the effects of family background does not mean that we must also give up on college experiences, and learning on our commitment to equal opportuni- how to feel more “at home” in the uni- ty. We have failed to appreciate that equal versity. These initiatives may include af- opportunity can be secured even without firming values or identities, shoring up a equalizing access to human capital invest- sense of belongingness, reducing stereo- ments. This alternative approach allows type threat, teaching a growth mindset, parents to continue to make variously encouraging the development of possible sized investments in their children, treats selves, developing activities that build re- the resulting investment tracks as incom- lationships across economic divides, pro- mensurate competitions, and then takes a viding counseling on majors and careers, properly proportionate share of winners providing loans or grants to relieve ongo- from each track. It is a relatively inexpen- ing financial stress, developing programs sive reform because it does not attempt to and curricula that address the concerns compensate for privately financed differ- of less advantaged students, and offering entials in childhood investments. mentoring programs that feature faculty Although an initiative of this magni- and older students who have shared simi- tude inevitably raises a host of practi- lar circumstances.66 cal concerns, we have discussed many of the main ones and shown that they can We began this essay with a big-picture be satisfactorily resolved. The more fun- description of the emergence and consol- damental worry, and one with which we idation of opportunity markets. Although would like to close, is that an economic opportunity is now thoroughly on the affirmative action initiative of this sort market and directly available for pur- might amount in the end to little more chase, this development has not been than a symbolic commitment. The crit- widely discussed, with the result that ical question, in other words, is wheth- well-off children are usually seen as earner a decision by a single selective insti- ing their impressive resumes rather than tution–such as Stanford University, having them bought for them. Harvard University, or Princeton Uni- This development, insofar as it is rec- versity–to implement such an approach ognized at all, tends to be viewed as nat- would trigger a wider norm cascade. ural, inevitable, or too entrenched to be In addressing this question, it is rel- taken on. It is presumed that opportunity evant that the twenty-first century is

148 (3) Summer 2019 37 The Rise of shaping up as a century of norm cascades just one more case of a deeply rigged Opportunity in which seemingly small events have un- game. Because this sensibility is, we be- Markets: How Did It leashed a host of cascading social move- lieve, widely shared, the resulting pres- Happen & ments, like #MeToo and Black Lives Mat- sure might be overwhelming enough to What Can We Do? ter. The commitment to equal opportu- put all selective institutions, save the trig- nity, although a bedrock principle in the gering institution, immediately on the United States, has not yet had a moment defensive. This might in turn lead to de- of this sort. The growing popularity of mands for transparent annual reporting “rigged game” commentary within the on 1-percent admits, legacy admits, bot- United States nonetheless suggests that tom-half admits, and much more. this moment could be approaching and What would happen next? It is possi- that the right triggering event is all that is ble that some selective institutions would needed. “dig in” on the defense that it just so hap- If a high-profile university were to an- pens that students from the 1 percent are nounce a new commitment to econom- intrinsically more meritorious and that ic affirmative action, it is not impossible their children benefit not one whit from that this would become just that trigger- access to elite prep schools, elite neigh- ing event. How would other universities borhoods, or after-school tutors. This react to such an announcement? It is pos- amounts to arguing that existing admis- sible that they would attempt to change sion practices are consistent with equal the conversation by pointing to their very opportunity and that the vast resources generous financial aid packages for those and legacy privileges lavished on 1-percent low-income students who are admitted. children are not distorting. The obvious This is of course disingenuous because so problem with this “aristocracy of merit” few students are the beneficiaries of such defense is that, while it would prove pop- largesse. It is easy to be generous when ular in hard-right circles, those are not the recipients of the generosity are so few. the circles in which elite universities typ- This long-standing “distraction strategy” ically like to run. Although unremitting deployed by selective institutions entails pressure would likely be required, we sus- focusing attention on the enormous size pect that in the end the decision would be of the financial aid packages awarded to to “give in” rather than “dig in.” the few low-income students who win The skeptic might still point out that the lottery and are admitted. Among se- only a minority of college students are ed- lective institutions, it seems that there is ucated in selective institutions and that a quiet agreement to “live and let live,” even a very successful movement within each university allowing the others the them will leave much unequal opportu- convenience of continuing with such dis- nity untouched. It is indeed possible that ingenuous claim-making. the movement would end at the gates of But could the ruse survive once a ren- the selective institutions. If so, it is still egade university broke ranks? This rene- no mean achievement to have at least de- gade would presumably embrace its new- mocratized them. ly adopted rebelliousness by directly con- It is also possible that a norm cascade, fronting other selective institutions on after coursing through the country’s the matter of just how many low-income most selective institutions, would gain students they were admitting. We suspect force rather than stall out. It could spread that this would in turn reveal that many by raising the aspirations of low-income people understand current practices as children, mobilizing well-off students to

38 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences demand more high-quality college slots, fundamental transformation, although David B. and delegitimating impediments to equal perhaps unlikely, cannot be ruled out in a Grusky, Peter A. Hall opportunity in government hiring and country that has long been defined by its & Hazel Rose other institutional settings. This more commitment to equal opportunity. Markus

authors’ note This essay was shaped through a series of conversations with the members of the Success- ful Societies program at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. It also profited from the comments of Amy Binder, Michelle Jackson, Andrew Penner, Debra Satz, Rob Reich, and Mitchell Stevens. In our concluding discussion of economic affirmative action, we benefited greatly from conversations with Raj Chetty and from his ongoing experimental work on college admissions with the Opportunity Insights team. author biographies david b. grusky, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2015, is the Edward Ames Edmonds Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences and Professor of Sociology at Stanford University, Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, and Director of the Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality; and a member of the Suc- cessful Societies program at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. His recent books include Inequality in the 21st Century (with Jasmine Hill, 2017), Social Stratification (with Kate Weisshaar, 2014), Occupy the Future (with Douglas McAdam, Rob Reich, and Debra Satz, 2012), The New Gilded Age (with Tamar Kricheli-Katz, 2011), and The Great Recession (with Bruce Western and Christopher Wimer, 2011). peter a. hall, elected a Fellow of the American Academy in 2019, is the Krupp Foun- dation Professor of European Studies in the Department of Government and a Faculty As- sociate of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University; and a member of the Successful Societies program at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. He is the editor of Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era (with Michèle Lamont, 2013), Successful Societies: How Institutions and Culture Affect Health (with Michèle Lamont, 2009), and Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (with David Soskice, 2001), and the author of Governing the Economy: The Politics of State In- tervention in Britain and France (1986). hazel rose markus, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1994, is the Davis-Brack Professor in the Behavioral Sciences in the Department of Psychology at Stanford Uni- versity, where she is also Co-Founder and Co-Director of Stanford sparq. She is the author of Clash! How to Thrive in a Multicultural World (with Alana Conner, 2014) and editor of Just Schools: Pursuing Equality in Societies of Difference (with Martha Minow and Richard A. Shweder, 2010), Doing Race: 21 Essays for the 21st Century (with Paula M. L. Moya, 2010), and Facing Social Class: How Societal Rank Influences Interaction (with Susan Fiske, 2012). endnotes 1 Michelle Jackson, Manifesto for a Dream, unpublished manuscript (2019). 2 Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1970). 3 Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child Relationships (Prince ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016).

148 (3) Summer 2019 39 The Rise of 4 Michelle Jackson, “Don’t Let ‘Conversation One’ Squeeze out ‘Conversation Two,’” Pathways Opportunity magazine, Spring 2017. Markets: How Did It 5 Sean F. Reardon, “Education,” Pathways magazine, Spring 2014. See also Sean F. Reardon, Happen & “The Widening Achievement Gap between the Rich and the Poor: New Evidence and Possi- What Can ble Explanations,” in Whither Opportunity? Rising Inequality, Schools and Children’s Life Chances, We Do? ed. Greg J. Duncan and Richard J. Murnane (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011). 6 Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Emmanuel Saez, et al., “Mobility Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in Intergenerational Mobility,” nber Working Paper No. 23618 (Cambridge, Mass.: The National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017). 7 Ibid.; and Susan Dynarski and Martha Bailey, “Inequality in Post-Secondary Education,” in Whither Opportunity?, ed. Duncan and Murnane. 8 Deirdre Bloome, Shauna Dyer, and Xiang Zhou, “Educational Inequality, Educational Expan- sion, and Intergenerational Income Persistence in the United States,” American Sociological Review 83 (6) (2018): 1215–1253. 9 Pablo A. Mitnik, Victoria Bryant, Michael Weber, and David B. Grusky, New Estimates of Inter- generational Economic Mobility Using Administrative Data (Washington, D.C.: Statistics of In- come Division, Internal Revenue Service, 2015). 10 Pablo A. Mitnik, Erin Cumberworth, and David B. Grusky, “Social Mobility in a High In- equality Regime,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 663 (1) (2016); David B. Grusky, Timothy M. Smeeding, and C. Matthew Snipp, “A New Infrastruc- ture for Monitoring Social Mobility in the United States,” The ANNALS of the American Acad- emy of Political and Social Science 657 (1) (2015); Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, et al., “Is the United States Still a Land of Opportunity?” American Economic Review 104 (5) (2014): 141–147; Bloome et al., “Educational Inequality”; and Raj Chetty, David Grusky, Maximilian Hell, et al., “The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940,” Science 356 (6336) (2017): 1–16. 11 Reardon, “Education”; and Reardon, “The Widening Achievement Gap.” 12 Peter A. Hall and Michèle Lamont, eds., Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 13 David B. Grusky, “What to Do About Inequality?” Boston Review, March/April 2012. 14 Thomas H. Marshall and Thomas Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950). 15 The road to the upper class did of course require investments of this sort, but it was a road that was relevant to but a small minority of children. Only 14.3 percent of Americans between eighteen and twenty-four years old were enrolled in tertiary education in the fall of 1950. See Thomas D. Snyder, Digest of Education Statistics (Washington, D.C.: National Cen- ter for Education Statistics, 1993). 16 These restrictions took the form of separate African American schools that were distinctly unequal. It was only with Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka (1954) that the legal under- pinnings of unequal treatment began to be dismantled. 17 The following discussion of opportunity markets draws heavily on the research and analyses of Richard Reeves, Charles Tilly, and Richard Putnam. See Richard Reeves, Dream Hoarders: How the American Upper Middle Class is Leaving Everyone Else in the Dust, Why That is a Problem, and What to Do about It (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2017); Charles Tilly, Durable Inequality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); and Richard Putman, Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015).

40 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 18 David B. Grusky, Marion Coddou, Erin Cumberworth, et al., “Why is There So Much Pover- David B. ty in California? The Causes of California’s Sky-High Poverty and the Evidence Behind the Grusky, Equal Opportunity Plan for Reducing It,” Pathways magazine, Spring 2015. Peter A. Hall & Hazel Rose 19 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., Markus 1951). 20 See, for example, James J. Heckman, Seong Hyeok Moon, Rodrigo Pinto, et al., “The Rate of Return to the HighScope Perry Preschool Program,” Journal of Public Economics 94 (1–2) (2010): 114–128; and James J. Heckman, “Schools, Skills, and Synapses,” Economic Inquiry 46 (3) (2008): 289. For good reviews of the Perry Preschool and Abecedarian studies, see W. Steven Barnett, “Effectiveness of Early Educational Intervention,” Science 333 (6045) (2011): 975–978; and James J. Heckman, “Skill Formation and the Economics of Investing in Disad- vantaged Children,” Science 312 (5782) (2006): 1900–1902. 21 Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, and Emmanuel Saez, “Where is the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States,” Quar- terly Journal of Economics 129 (4) (2014): 1553–1623; and Raj Chetty and Nathaniel Hendren, “The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility II: County-Level Estimates,” nber Working Paper No. 23002 (Cambridge, Mass.: The National Bureau of Economic Re- search, 2016). 22 C. Kirabo Jackson, Rucker C. Johnson, and Claudia Persico, “The Effects of School Spending on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms,” nber Working Paper No. 20847 (Cambridge, Mass.: The National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015). 23 Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Jeannie Oakes, “Classroom Social Relationships: Exploring the Bowles and Gintis Hypothesis,” Sociology of Education 55 (4) (1982): 197–212; and Nicole Stephens, Hazel Rose Markus, and L. Taylor Phillips, “So- cial Class Culture Cycles: How Three Gateway Contexts Shape Selves and Fuel Inequality,” Annual Review of Psychology 65 (2014): 611–634. 24 Jean Anyon, “Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum of Work,” Journal of Education 162 (1) (1980): 67–92. 25 Ibid.; and Shirley B. Heath, “What No Bedtime Story Means: Narrative Skills at Home and School,” Language in Society 11 (1) (1982): 49–76; and Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capital- ist America. 26 Stephens et al., “Social Class Culture Cycles”; and Jason A. Okonofua and Jennifer L. Eber- hardt, “Two Strikes: Race and the Disciplining of Young Students,” Psychological Science 26 (5) (2015): 617–624. 27 Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Maggie R. Jones, and Sonya R. Porter, “Race and Economic Opportunity in the United States: An Intergenerational Perspective,” nber Working Paper No. 24441 (Cambridge, Mass.: The National Bureau of Economic Research, 2018). 28 The late childhood opportunity market is likewise expressed in rising expenditures on after- school training, academic summer camps, and test preparation. Between 1972 and 2006, spending on “child enrichment” increased by 150 percent among high-income families, but only 57 percent among low-income families. See Greg J. Duncan and Richard J. Murnane, “Rising Inequality in Family Incomes and Children’s Educational Outcomes,” RSF: The Rus- sell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences 2 (2) (2016); Daniel Schneider, Orestes P. Hastings, and Joe LaBriola, “Income Inequality and Class Divides in Parental Investments,” American Sociological Review 83 (2018): 475–507; Patrick Sharkey, Uneasy Peace: The Great Crime Decline, the Revival of City Life, and the Next War on Violence (New York: W. W. Norton, 2018); Patrick Sharkey, Stuck in Place: Urban Neighborhoods and the End of Progress toward Ra- cial Equality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); and Chetty et al., “Race and Eco- nomic Opportunity.”

148 (3) Summer 2019 41 The Rise of 29 Kendra Bischoff and Sean F. Reardon, “Residential Segregation by Income, 1970–2009,” in Opportunity Diversity and Disparities: America Enters a New Century, ed. John Logan (New York: Russell Markets: Sage Foundation, 2013). How Did It Happen & 30 This simplified rendition does not consider other relevant forces, such as the effects of school What Can desegregation on “white flight”and other forms of residential segregation, a rising commit- We Do? ment to the “concerted cultivation” of children, and of course the takeoff in income inequality. See, for example, Annette Lareau, Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life (Berke- ley: University of California Press, 2003); Sigal Alon, Race, Class, and Affirmative Action (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2015); and Ann Owens, “Inequality in Children’s Contexts: Income Segregation of Households With and Without Children,” American Sociological Re- view 81 (3) (2016): 549–574. 31 Sean F. Reardon, “Education,” The Poverty and Inequality Report 2014 (Stanford, Calif.: Stan- ford Center on Poverty and Inequality, 2014). 32 See Alon, Race, Class, and Affirmative Action. 33 When the purchase is overt, it can become more controversial, as evidenced by the 2019 “Op- eration Varsity Blues” scandal that to date has resulted in fifty people being charged for using bribes to secure admission to top colleges or universities; see Jennifer Medina, Katie Benner, and Kate Taylor, “Actresses, Business Leaders and Other Wealthy Parents Charged in U.S. College Entry Fraud,” The New York Times, March 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes .com/2019/03/12/us/college-admissions-cheating-scandal.html. These types of payments are, by contrast, legal when they are made to the university itself and disguised as philan- thropy rather than anything more instrumental. The Kushner case is perhaps the most famous example of an unusually thin disguise. In 1998, Charles Kushner pledged to give $2.5 million to Harvard University, just when his older son, Jared, was beginning the college application process. Although Jared was not a top performer in his secondary school, he nonetheless was admitted to Harvard University. See Daniel Golden, The Price of Admission: How America’s Ruling Class Buys Its Way into Elite Colleges–And Who Gets Left Outside the Gates (New York: Random House, 2007). 34 Nicole M. Stephens, Stephanie A. Fryberg, Hazel Rose Markus, et al., “Unseen Disadvan- tage: How American Universities’ Focus on Independence Undermines the Academic Per- formance of First-Generation College Students,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 102 (6) (2012): 1178–1197; and Hazel R. Markus and Alana Conner, Clash! Eight Cultural Con- flicts That Make Us Who We Are (New York: Penguin Hudson Street Press, 2013). 35 This process of laundering money and socioeconomic status is well described in Raymond Boudon, Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality (New York: John Wiley, 1974). 36 Caroline Hoxby and Christopher Avery, “The Missing One-Offs: The Hidden Supply of High-Achieving Low-Income Students,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring 2013). 37 See College Board, Trends in College Pricing 2017 (New York: College Board, 2017). 38 Richard Breen and John H. Goldthorpe, “Explaining Educational Differentials,” Rationality and Society 9 (3) (1997). 39 The amounts here are in 2017 dollars. See College Board, “Average Net Price over Time for Full-Time Students, by Sector,” Table 7: Published and Net Prices in 2018 Dollars by Sector, Full-Time Undergraduate Students, 1990–91 to 2018–19, https://trends.collegeboard.org/ college-pricing/figures-tables/average-net-price-over-time-full-time-students-sector. 40 See College Board, “Net Price by Income over Time: Public Sector,” Figure 2013_12: Net Tu- ition and Fees, Net Room and Board and Other Costs, and Total Grant Aid in 2011 Dollars by Family Income, Full-Time Dependent Students at Public Institutions, 1999–2000, 2003– 04, 2007–08, and 2011–12, https://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing/figures-tables/ net-price-income-over-time-public-sector. The graph shown here does not take into account federal tax credits and deductions.

42 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 41 See George Bulman, Robert Fairlie, Sarena Goodman, and Adam Isen, “Parental Resourc- David B. es and College Attendance: Evidence from Lottery Wins,” nber Working Paper No. 22679 Grusky, (Cambridge, Mass.: The National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016); Pedro Carneiro and Peter A. Hall & Hazel Rose James Heckman, “The Evidence on Credit Constraints in Post-Secondary Schooling,” The Markus Economic Journal 112 (482) (2002): 705–734; David Cesarini, Erik Lindqvist, Robert Östling, and Björn Wallace, “Wealth, Health, and Child Development: Evidence from Administrative Data on Swedish Lottery Players,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 131 (3) (2016): 1455–1495; and Elizabeth Caucutt and Lance Lochner, “Early and Late Human Capital Investments, Bor- rowing Constraints, and the Family,” hceo Working Paper Series 2017-040 (Chicago: Hu- man Capital and Economic Opportunity Global Working Group, 2017). 42 Throughout this section, we view selves as mediating and regulating behavior, taking form as individuals engage in the many intersecting sociocultural contexts that configure their experience. As students grow up in neoliberal neighborhoods with neoliberal ideas, practices, policies, norms, and products, we assume they are likely to develop what we term neoliberal selves. As you change contexts, you change selves. Moreover, individuals who grow up in neoliberal contexts will typically reinforce and perpetuate neoliberal systems, given that their individual and collective action will sustain and legitimate them. For an extended char- acterization of this idea, see Glenn Adams, Sara Estrada-Villalta, Daniel Sullivan, and Ha- zel Rose Markus, “The Psychology of Neoliberalism and the Neoliberalism of Psychology,” Journal of Social Issues (in press), https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12305. In support of the concept of neoliberal selves, we draw heavily on research characterizing the “independent self,” which has been distinguished in form and function from an “interdependent self.” This research shows that independent selves are likely to develop and become active in relatively well-resourced middle-class contexts and that interdependent selves are likely to develop and become active in less advantaged contexts. For a fuller discussion of these ideas, see Hazel R. Markus and Shinobu K. Kitayama, “Culture and Selves: A Cycle of Mutual Consti- tution,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 5 (4) (2010): 420–430; Alana C. Snibbe and Ha- zel R. Markus, “You Can’t Always Get What You Want: Social Class, Agency and Choice,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88 (4) (2005): 703–720; Nicole M. Stephens, Hazel Rose Markus, and Sarah S. M. Townsend, “Choice as an Act of Meaning: The Case of So- cial Class,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 93 (5) (2007): 814–830; and Nicole M. Stephens, Stephanie A. Fryberg, and Hazel Rose Markus, “It’s Your Choice: How the Mid- dle Class Model of Independence Disadvantages Working Class Americans,” in Facing So- cial Class: How Societal Rank Influences Interaction, ed. Susan T. Fiske and Hazel R. Markus (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2012), 87–106. See also Hall and Lamont, Social Resil- ience in the Neoliberal Era; Adams et al., “The Psychology of Neoliberalism and the Neolib- eralism of Psychology”; Pia Dietze and Eric D. Knowles, “Social Class and the Motivation- al Relevance of Other Human Beings: Evidence from Visual Attention,” Psychological Science 27 (11) (2016): 1517–1527; Sebastien Goudeau and Jean-Claude Croizet, “Hidden Advantages and Disadvantages of Social Class: How Classroom Settings Reproduce Inequality by Stag- ing Unfair Comparison,” Psychological Science 28 (2) (2017); Hazel R. Markus and Nicole M. Stephens, “Editorial Overview: Inequality and Social Class: The Psychological and Behav- ioral Consequences of Inequality and Social Class: A Theoretical Integration,” Current Opin- ion in Psychology 18 (2017): iv–xii; and Rebecca M. Carey and Hazel R. Markus, “Social Class Shapes the Form and Function of Relationships and Selves,” Current Opinion in Psychology 18 (2017): 123–130. 43 Stephens et al., “Social Class Culture Cycles”; Carey and Markus, “Social Class Shapes the Form and Function of Relationships and Selves”; Hazel R. Markus, “What Moves People to Action? Culture and Motivation,” Current Opinion on Psychology 8 (2016): 161–166; Lareau, Unequal Childhoods; Adrie Kusserow, American Individualisms: Child Rearing and Social Class in Three Neighborhoods (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); and Michèle Lamont, The Dig- nity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000). 44 Markus and Conner, Clash! Eight Cultural Conflicts That Make Us Who We Are.

148 (3) Summer 2019 43 The Rise of 45 Nicole M. Stephens, Tiffany N. Brannon, Hazel Rose Markus, and Jessica E. Nelson, “Feel- Opportunity ing at Home in College: Fortifying School-Relevant Selves to Reduce Social Class Disparities Markets: in Higher Education,” Social Issues and Policy Review 9 (1) (2015): 1–24; Diane Reay, Gill Cro- How Did It UK Happen & zier, and John Clayton, “‘Fitting in’ or ‘Standing Out’: Working-Class Students in High- What Can er Education,” British Educational Research Journal 36 (1) (2010): 107–124; and Antony S. R. We Do? Manstead, “The Psychology of Social Class: How Socioeconomic Status Impacts Thought, Feelings, and Behaviour,” British Journal of Social Psychology 57 (2018): 267–291. 46 Jennifer L. Hochschild, “Social Class in Public Schools,” Journal of Social Issues 59 (2003): 821– 840; and Carmi Schooler, “Culture and Social Structure: The Relevance of Social Structure to Cultural Psychology,” Handbook of Cultural Psychology, ed. Shinobu Kitayama and Dov Co- hen (New York: Guilford Press, 2007), 370–388. 47 Teresa H. Housel and Vickie L. Harvey, The Invisibility Factor: Administrators and Faculty Reach Out to First-Generation College Students (Boca Raton: Brown Walker Press, 2009); Stephens et al., “Unseen Disadvantage”; William G. Bowen, Martin A. Kurzweil, and Eugene M. To- bin, Equity and Excellence in American Higher Education (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005); Ernest T. Pascarella, Christopher T. Pierson, Gregory C. Wolniak, and Patrick T. Terenzini, “First-Generation College Students: Additional Evidence on College Experi- ences and Outcomes,” Journal of Higher Education 75 (3) (2004): 249–284; Schooler, “Culture and Social Structure”; and Patrick T. Terenzini, Leonard Springer, Patricia M. Yaeger, et al., “First-Generation College Students: Characteristics, Experiences, and Cognitive Develop- ment,” Research in Higher Education 37 (1) (1995): 1–22. 48 Chetty and Hendren, “The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility II.” 49 Lauren Rivera, Pedigree: How Elite Students Got Elite Jobs (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015). 50 We have assumed to this point that low-income families have the same incentives for investment as well-off families but do not have access to the money (or loans) needed to act on those incentives. It is often argued, to the contrary, that low-income parents may be faced with a lower economic return to investing in their children. The return to investing in children with “neoliberal selves” might be higher, for example, because they are well-suited to the college environment (and hence have lower dropout rates). If there are indeed “complementarities” of this sort, it would imply that children born into high-income families are doubly advantaged. It is not just that, with the rise of opportunity markets, their parents can now make massive investments in them. If complementarities are also in play, it means that their parents will further benefit from foundational conditions (like neoliberal selves) that increase the payoff to those investments. The rise of opportunity markets thus adds fuel to the fire by allowing high-income parents to better exploit various environmental conditions that have long privileged them. These markets may in this sense be understood as very unfortunate catalysts. 51 Emmanuel Saez, “Striking It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States” (up- dated with 2015 preliminary estimates), first printed in Pathways magazine, Winter 2008, and revised June 2016, https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2015.pdf. 52 Miles Corak, “Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Intergenerational Mobility,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27 (3) (2013): 79–102. 53 David B. Grusky and Jasmine Hill, “Poverty and Inequality in the 21st Century,” Inequality in the 21st Century, ed. David B. Grusky and Jasmine Hill (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2017); and David B. Grusky and Alair MacLean, “The Social Fallout of a High-Inequality Re- gime,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 663 (1) (2016): 33–52. 54 Erzsébet Bukodi and John H. Goldthorpe, “Educational Attainment–Relative or Absolute–as a Mediator of Intergenerational Class Mobility in Britain,” Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 43 (2016): 5–15.

44 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 55 Gary Becker, Scott Duke Kominers, Kevin M. Murphy, and Jörg L. Spenkuch, “A Theory David B. of Intergenerational Mobility,” Journal of Political Economy 126 (2018): S7–S25; and Steven Grusky, Durlauf and Ananth Seshadri, “Understanding the Great Gatsby Curve,” NBER Macroeconom- Peter A. Hall & Hazel Rose ics Annual 2017, vol. 32, ed. Martin Eichenbaum and Jonathan Parker (Chicago: University of Markus Chicago Press, 2018). 56 Although the new public services would presumably be financed via income taxes, those taxes would not have to be progressive. 57 It would also founder insofar as low-income families face complementarities that reduce their returns to investing in their children. 58 This approach is consistent with a Roemerian view of equal opportunity. See John E. Roemer, Equality of Opportunity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000). We are grateful to Debra Satz for pointing this out to us. 59 We would presumably want to take into account many other outcomes in addition to earnings (such as taking public service jobs, volunteering, making charitable contributions). 60 Chetty et al., “Mobility Report Cards.” 61 The United Kingdom, Brazil, and Israel have experimented with economic affirmative action. It has also been partially and indirectly implemented in the United States by selecting top- ranked students from within each school. See Alon, Race, Class, and Affirmative Action; and Richard D. Kahlenberg, “From All Walks of Life: New Hope for School Integration,” Ameri- can Educator, Winter 2012–2013. 62 Alon, Race, Class, and Affirmative Action, chap. 5. See also Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor Jr., Mismatch: How Affirmative Action Hurts Students It’s Intended to Help, and Why Universities Won’t Admit It (New York: Basic Books, 2012). 63 It will likewise be necessary to continue existing approaches for ensuring that first-generation students are adequately represented. This result is again established in Alon, Race, Class, and Affirmative Action. 64 Although there can be some deficits in performance, this is not to suggest that low-income or first-generation students would have performed better in other less selective institutions (see Alon, Race, Class, and Affirmative Action). See also Jennifer L. Hochschild, Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class, and the Soul of the Nation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); and Stephens et al., “Unseen Disadvantage.” 65 Cecilia L. Ridgeway and Susan R. Fiske, “Class Rules, Status Dynamics, and ‘Gateway’ Inter- actions,” Facing Social Class: How Societal Rank Influences Interaction, ed. Fiske and Markus, 131–151; Anthony P. Carnevale, Stephen J. Rose, and Ban Cheah, The College Payoff: Educa- tion, Occupations, Lifetime Earnings (Washington, D.C.: The Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, 2011); and William G. Bowen, Matthew M. Chingos, and Michael S. McPherson, Crossing the Finish Line: Completing College at America’s Public Universi- ties (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009). 66 Judith M. Harackiewicz, Elizabeth Canning, Yoi Tibbetts, et al., “Closing the Social Class Achievement Gap for First-Generation Students in Undergraduate Biology,” Journal of Edu- cational Psychology 106 (2) (2014): 375–389; Nicole M. Stephens, MarYam G. Hamedani, and Mesmin Destin, “Closing the Social-Class Achievement Gap: A Difference-Education Inter- vention Improves First-Generation Students’ Academic Performance and All Students’ Col- lege Transition,” Psychological Science 25 (4) (2014): 943–953; David Yeager, Greg W. Walton, Shannon Brady, et al., “Teaching a Lay Theory before College Narrows Achievement Gaps at Scale,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113 (24) (2016); Markus, “What Moves People to Action?”; Hazel R. Markus, “In This Together: Doing and Undoing Inequality and Social Class Divides,” Journal of Social Issues 73 (1) (2017): 211–221; and Paul K. Piff, Michael W. Kraus, and Dacher Keltner, “Unpacking the Inequality Paradox: The Psychological Roots of Inequality and Social Class,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 57 (2017): 53–124.

148 (3) Summer 2019 45 “Superstar Cities” & the Generation of Durable Inequality

Patrick Le Galès & Paul Pierson

Abstract: The striking economic agglomerations emerging in affluent democracies are generating, reproducing, and expanding inequalities. A major mechanism for this is housing, which is both a repository for wealth and, under these conditions, a magnifier of wealth. Access to urban areas–the site of educational, labor, and marriage market advantages–is contingent upon access to housing. We use comparative analysis of cases in Europe (London and Paris) and the United States (New York and San Francisco) to consider the capacities of different societies to limit or ameliorate these new sources of diverging opportunity. These seemingly local issues remain shaped by distinct national political contexts, which vary dramatically in their capacity to support local affordable housing and reduce the collective action problems confronting major metropolitan areas.

“Unless we deal with the housing deficit, we will see house prices keep on rising. Young people will find it even harder to afford their own home. The divide between those who inherit wealth and those who don’t will become more pronounced.” –Theresa May, July 11, 20161 patrick le galÈs is Research Professor in Politics and Sociolo- gy at Sciences Po and the Nation- al Centre for Scientific Research, and Founding Dean of Sciences The economic processes of creative destruc- Po Urban School. tion, long ago defined (and celebrated) by political economist Joseph Schumpeter, have a pronounced paul pierson, a Fellow of the spatial dimension. The Marxist geographer David American Academy since 2016, is the John Gross Professor of Po- Harvey described “the spatial fix” of capitalism and litical Science at the University the increasing use of land and property as financial 2 of California, Berkeley; and Co- assets to be traded like any commodity. Some cit- director of the Successful Socie- ies and regions–their institutions, culture, econ- ties program at the Canadian In- omy, and political organizations–are made obso- stitute for Advanced Research. lete and marginalized. Mobile capital is reinvested (Complete author biographies appear in new places, cities, or states offering the highest at the end of the essay.) rates of return. These spatial transformations are

© 2019 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license 46 doi:10.1162/DAED_a_01750 central to the creation of new inequal- socioeconomic shifts. We then outline Patrick ities, as evidenced by the decline of old- the ways in which they both generate Le Galès & Paul Pierson er, once prosperous industrial centers, and, increasingly, perpetuate inequali- major cities and small towns alike, from ties. It is that perpetuation–the process Detroit and Milwaukee in the Ameri- of deepening inequality in which advan- can Rust Belt, to Northern England, Cov- tage builds upon advantage–that we entry, Liege, Lille Roubaix Tourcoing, wish to emphasize and explore. Leipzig, large chunks of Southern Italy, Our empirical focus is housing. Cen- and the nonmetropolitan parts of East- tral to this structural shift in opportuni- ern Europe. Working-class manufactur- ty is a sharp rise in property values as a ing cities are dying, along with their hin- result of these agglomeration process- terlands. Those living there–especially es, reinforced by the rapid growth of mo- young, white, working-class men–are bile capital at a time of cheap credit. The facing social decline and a sense of loss.3 combination of low growth and low in- Simultaneously, modern political econ- terest rates tends to create asset bubbles, omies are producing extraordinary ag- and the largest and most consequential of glomerations of wealth in key urban cen- these assets is housing in the most desir- ters well placed to benefit from the rise able and booming cities.6 of new technologies, services, and fi- On their own, rapidly rising housing nance. While a number of forces drive prices are a generator, repository, and this trend, including the search for safe transmitter of inequality.7 This is most havens among global economic elites, apparent in the distribution of wealth, the primary factor is the increasing val- which is probably the most important in- ue of density in a knowledge economy.4 dicator of durable distributions of advan- Ideas emerge, spread, and can be exploit- tage and disadvantage. Rising housing ed more easily in dense urban settings. wealth is a straightforward mechanism As a result, favorably situated cities be- for the intergenerational transmission of come vital centers for both attracting and assets, and is the most important one for generating human capital, radically re- the overwhelming share of households shaping the spatial structure of advanced who hold little or no financial wealth. In- capitalism.5 deed, some economists argue that Thom- The shifting spatial distribution of eco- as Piketty’s story of rising inequality in nomic activity has generated growing so- twenty-first-century capitalism (at least cial and political tensions in both North in the United States, which he sees as at America and Europe. Some of these are the vanguard of a broader transforma- within these agglomerations, as their rap- tion) is mainly a story of the growth of id development disrupts established so- highly unequal housing wealth.8 In many cial patterns and communities. Oth- countries, as we shall see, the erosion of ers are between these agglomerations and inheritance taxes has further enhanced less-favored areas outside these econom- these intergenerational wealth transfers. ic cores. With the increasing centrality of Yet rising housing prices have profound place in distributing economic and cul- indirect effects on the transmission of in- tural rewards and opportunities, these equality as well. Increasingly linked to urban concentrations constitute im- the sites of greatest economic opportuni- portant emerging structures of inequality, changes in housing prices have a pow- ty production and reproduction. We be- erful impact on the distribution of life gin this essay by briefly describing these chances. For those without access to this

148 (3) Summer 2019 47 “Superstar increasingly valuable property, the new income, globally connected metropoli- Cities” & the urban economy is becoming a landscape tan areas diverging from the rest of their Generation of Durable of exclusion. Economic advantage is in- respective countries: New York, the San Inequality creasingly concentrated and reproduced Francisco Bay Area, Paris, and London. through property, which carries with it The comparisons reveal important com- the cumulative advantages of social prox- monalities in both the processes gener- imity. If you don’t have it (or stand to in- ating these agglomerations and the pro- herit it) you are pushed down, into in- found social challenges associated with creasingly precarious conditions, or out, them. At the same time, we emphasize forced to relocate or remain at a distance. important differences. Public authorities Exclusion from these economic centers in these cities often are the ones direct- has consequences for life chances. Struc- ly responsible for facing these problems. tures of social advantage–access to elite Their responses, however, have varied in education, social networks, employment, both content and effectiveness. A prin- and the acquisition of cultural capital– cipal reason, we argue, is that these au- are geographically concentrated. Distance thorities operate within quite different from these structures, fueled by housing national contexts. National institutional costs, comes with an increasing penalty. arrangements remain essential determi- Akin to the changes in educational nants of potential reactions to emerging structures analyzed in the contribution of place-based inequalities, creating differ- David Grusky, Peter Hall, and Hazel Rose ent opportunity structures for local ac- Markus to this issue of Dædalus, the rise tors, as well as very different options and of these superstar cities contributes to the capabilities associated with existing poli- commodification of opportunity–highly cy structures. unequal opportunity–through property ownership. To see how this works, and Cities have always been cauldrons of why it plays out differently in distinct set- social change. In the late nineteenth cen- tings, requires an approach that pays at- tury, the rise of globalized large cities (Vi- tention to processes unfolding over time enna, Berlin, London, Paris, New York, and involving the interplay of actions at Buenos Aires) led sociologist Georg Sim- the micro-, meso-, and macrolevels. At mel to highlight their distinctiveness: the the microlevel, individuals choose loca- emergence of different mentalities, the tions for status and access to services and constant excitation of these spaces, their labor markets, with effects that shift the increased social diversity, and the accom- opportunity structures for both the priv- panying fears of the unknown and un- ileged and disadvantaged. At the meso- familiar. In the last third of the twenti- level, interest groups representing com- eth century, analyses typically (especial- peting claimants and organizations like ly in the United States and the United political parties struggle over how to re- Kingdom) dealt with urban decline: New spond. At the macrolevel, the available York’s bankruptcy, massive deindustri- options and pressures these actors face alization, or low quality of life (boring are shaped by changes in the global econ- and gray London or museifiedParis). 9 In omy, including the transformation of fi- many Western countries, the population nancial flows and the growing metropoli- of the national capital was stable or in de- tanization of capitalism. cline. Los Angeles, seen by many as the We examine these interlinked process- “new” urban model, yielded a new school es in four “superstar cities,” the high- of urban studies, preoccupied with the

48 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences dystopian challenges of brutal policing, greater differences between those living Patrick social unrest, and gangs. in cities and those living far away, partic- Le Galès & Paul Pierson Today, the allure of cities has returned. ularly in rural areas or declining industri- Urban prosperity, while accompanied by al towns. From life expectancy to access astonishing inequality and exclusion, is a to health services, from income to social defining feature of advanced capitalism. mobility, from education to voting be- A generation of political economists, eco- havior, social life is becoming more spa- nomic geographers, economists, and ur- tially polarized.13 The divide between banists has documented the urban reviv- core and periphery is intensifying. Clear- al. From the mid-1980s onwards, Euro- ly the vote for Hillary Clinton, for Remain pean cities began enjoying economic and in the United Kingdom, and for Emman- demographic growth along with greater uel Macron and Jean-Luc Melenchon in political capacities.10 In the United States, France has been a distinct “urban vote.” gloom about cities persisted longer, but By contrast, Donald Trump, Marine Le the trend was the same. Leading U.S. cit- Pen, and Brexit have done particularly ies have enjoyed considerable economic poorly there. As an example, Marine Le and demographic growth.11 New York and Pen’s share of the presidential vote in the Los Angeles contain 10 percent of the U.S. core of Paris was only 5 percent. population, and account for 13 percent of its gdp. The gap is even more pronounced The remarkable transformation of these in Europe. London and Paris account for urban areas has had a powerful impact about 20 percent of their national popu- not only on immediate wealth and in- lations and close to 30 percent of their re- come distribution, but also on the gen- spective gdps. Relative rates of growth in erational distribution of social and eco- income, employment, and the formation nomic opportunity. Economic dynamism of new enterprises have all shifted in favor in these geographically compact spac- of these dynamic urban areas.12 es operates as a kind of escalator. Those High-income globalizing cities are be- who can get on have improved opportu- coming more productive, attracting an nities for upward mobility in comparison increasing share of the skilled labor force, with the rest of the country.14 Those who and pulling in tourists along with new in- stay (or arrive) have a good chance to find habitants, firms, and capital. For those high-paying jobs, to build human capital, with economic means, “urban hubs” and to access social and cultural resourc- have become desirable places to visit and es that enhance the likelihood of passing to live, with unparalleled concentrations their improved social prospects, and the of amenities: job opportunities, social opportunity for more, on to their chil- networks, transport, elite educational in- dren. As a result, these urban hubs attract stitutions, sophisticated hospitals, and large numbers of newcomers from their media and communications networks. own countries and abroad. They are also places of conspicuous con- These “escalator” qualities are part sumption, with a prestigious cultural in- and parcel of the concept of agglomera- frastructure from opera to jazz clubs, mu- tion. Large cities absorb the high end of seums to theaters, and elite and special- the labor market, attracting skilled peo- ized shops, star restaurants, and trendy ple (the young in particular) and invest- cocktail bars. ment. New York, San Francisco, London, Those on the outside are affected too. and Paris all have per capita gdps sub- More and more indicators point toward stantially higher than national average

148 (3) Summer 2019 49 “Superstar incomes. New York’s per capita gdp is a Fourth, access to high-wage urban ar- Cities” & the full one-third higher than national aver- eas can mean access to economically fa- Generation of Durable ages, while San Francisco’s is almost 40 vorable marriage markets, particularly Inequality percent higher. High-income, larger Eu- for upper-middle-class women.18 Indeed, ropean cities (such as Paris, London, Mu- the rising participation of women in high- nich, Milan, and Stockholm) are becom- skilled labor markets increases the ap- ing increasingly different from the rest of peal of agglomeration cities. Whether al- Europe’s cities.15 ready part of a couple or anticipating the In the emerging knowledge-based econ- future, the highly educated wish to be in omy, spatial proximity confers multiple “thick” high-skilled labor markets where advantages.16 First, residents in these lo- both partners will have good employ- cations have access to high-wage labor ment prospects. Thus, restricted access to markets, providing future economic op- the economic opportunity structures in portunities. Wage dispersal among U.S. these high-wage cities may encourage ho- cities has grown.17 Some of this econom- mophily in marriage, increasing durable ic edge reflects the substantial benefits to inequality. The concentration of young, being near clusters of high-skilled work- high-wage individuals increases the pros- ers and firms. Your work is more valuable pects for widening inequalities between (and your wages higher) when it can be two-earner households able to access easily combined with that of others with these dynamic economies and those who high skills. The people and organizations cannot. There is good recent evidence of around you allow you to make more of the inverse pattern in deindustrializing the human capital you have. areas of the United States.19 Loss of man- Second, with density comes a “thick- ufacturing jobs leads to declining mar- ness” of labor markets that offers substan- riage prospects for men. With this decline tial protection against individual risks as- comes an increase in single-parent house- sociated with the knowledge economy. An holds and child poverty. increasing share of high-end economic Finally, the clustering of high-income activity is in highly volatile sectors. Con- households in particular areas makes it stant innovation means that new firms easier to provide a range of high-quality or even industries emerge quickly. Most public goods as well as cultural amenities. firms do not survive, while a few succeed This too can produce a self-reinforcing spectacularly. Since any single position cycle of advantage. Differentiation across carries considerable risk, skilled work- space in the quality of public goods ers gravitate to locations where there are (schools, parks, public safety) intensi- many firms seeking their talents. In short, fies incentives for the affluent to clus- they want to be in an agglomeration. ter, and to prevent these advantages from Third, there is growing evidence that leaking out to other groups. The poor, of part of what makes these agglomerations course, face the reverse situation: a lim- function is that they accelerate the accu- ited capacity to finance public goods dis- mulation of human capital. Initial oppor- courages all but those with no economic tunities in these economic clusters gen- alternative from living in those areas. In erate potential for learning more, which the United States, the increasing spatial in turn creates additional opportuni- segregation of income has accompanied ties. Proximity also allows you to gain growing income segregation in schools.20 access to better and more extensive job The escalator qualities in these eco- networks. nomically dynamic cities may have made

50 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences them sites of considerable upward so- There are reasons, however, to wor- Patrick cial mobility. A remarkable paper by ry that in agglomeration cities, the social Le Galès & Paul Pierson economist Raj Chetty and colleagues re- context that these researchers describe is veals large differences in social mobili- fading. Because Chetty’s research focuses ty across the United States depending on on cohorts born in 1980, it represents, in- where you are born and raised.21 Strik- evitably, a view of the recent past rather ingly, the “neighborhood effects” identi- than the present. And conditions in these fied seem to operate before an individu- agglomeration economies are changing al enters the labor market. The prospects rapidly. Those at the bottom are pushed of moving from the lowest to the highest toward increasingly precarious condi- quintile of the income distribution were tions, or out of these locations entirely. strongest where racial and class segrega- Perhaps even more important, it is be- tion and rates of single parenthood were coming increasingly difficult for those relatively low. San Jose (San Francisco’s not already economically advantaged to southern neighbor), San Francisco, and move to these escalator regions. A cru- New York are all among the top ten met- cial factor in both of these developments ro areas (among the fifty largest) for so- is the transformation of housing and ex- cial mobility. ploding housing prices in superstar cities, Similar escalator qualities have been in particular. identified in France. In the Paris Île-de- France region, for instance, the per cap- The comparison of house prices faces ita gdp is 60 percent above the French many obstacles. First and foremost, there average (with household income 26 per- is a lack of systematic, comparable, lon- cent above the national average after tax- gitudinal data. A second classic obstacle es and transfers). Paris Île-de-France has in comparative urban studies concerns a greater concentration of middle-class scale. Is the proper unit the core city (in residents and managers (41 percent com- London, “inner London” with fourteen pared with 27 percent nationally) and a boroughs and 3.5 million inhabitants), smaller share of working-class residents the extended city (the Greater London (9 percent compared with 15 percent na- Authority, with thirty-two boroughs and tionally).22 Recent research following the 8.6 million inhabitants), or the econom- work of Chetty and colleagues has shed ic region (London South East, population some light on the geography of social mobil- eleven million)? For our purposes, all of ity, defined as the percentage of children these units are relevant. Despite the chal- from working-class families that become lenges, we provide evidence of the pat- middle class.23 In deindustrialized re- terns of house price increases in London, gions with low levels of education (such Paris, New York, and San Francisco. as Northern France), the rate is less than London (here understood as the Great- 30 percent; it is the highest in the Paris er London Authority) is emblematic. Its Île-de-France region (47 percent). Quite remarkable property boom is linked to an strikingly, working-class children born in equally remarkable demographic turn- the Paris Île-de-France region who leave around. Between 1939 and 1991, London at an early age for another region have lost 2.2 million inhabitants, about 25 per- a rate of social mobility that is signifi- cent of its population. In the past quarter- cantly lower than those born in a differ- century, it has grown by two million in- ent region who move to Île-de-France as habitants. In just the first decade of children. the twenty-first century, it grew by one

148 (3) Summer 2019 51 “Superstar million, including large inflows from Eu- large firms and French investors. It is a Cities” & the rope. At the same time, the story of Lon- classic escalator region, with an ever- Generation of Durable don has also been a story of stagnant con- increasing proportion of professionals Inequality struction of new dwellings, except for and the upper-middle class and fewer top-end construction encouraged under manual laborers. Foreign investors have Mayor Boris Johnson. only become significantsince the mid- In the United Kingdom, house prices 1990s. have increased by almost 300 percent in Because of long-standing investments real terms between 1960 and 2010. Even in social housing and the rental sector, as housing prices have risen faster than the rate of home ownership is relative- income across the United Kingdom, Lon- ly low in France. In the Île-de-France ur- don has, especially since the late 1990s, ban region, the rate of home ownership pulled away from the rest of the coun- is lower still, only 48 percent (against 58 try.24 The bulk of the increase started in percent nationally). The rate is 35 percent the late 1990s, with an acceleration af- within Paris, the inner core, but 61 per- ter 2000. By 2015, the average home cent in the periphery. The rental sector is price in London (£536,000) was almost extensive in France. Forty percent of the twice the average for England as a whole population rents, with both a large pri- (£301,000). The average rent is about vate rental sector (23 percent of the pop- £15,000 a year. Wages and incomes have ulation) and a substantial public sector failed to keep up. Unsurprisingly, there (17 percent) of mostly affordable housing has been a decline in home ownership in supported by government subsidies.26 the United Kingdom since its peak in the Housing prices show a trend similar to early 2000s (from 70 percent to 64 per- London but with less intensity. The price cent). Many predict a sharp fall of new increase was greatest between 1998 and homebuyers for the next decade, as Lon- 2008, when prices rose 185 percent in Par- doners are increasingly priced out of the is and about 150 percent in the Métropole housing market.25 du Grand Paris, while disposable income Paris consists of three concentric cir- increased by only 43 percent. If one mea- cles: the Paris City Council with twen- sures the cost of housing in the Paris ur- ty arrondissements and 2.2 million inhabi- ban region as a percentage of household tants; the Métropole du Grand Paris, which disposable income (that is, for those who comprises 131 communes (basic local au- rent or pay a mortgage), the figure was thorities) and twelve territoires (groups of 14.4 percent in 1988 and 20.7 percent in communes) and 7.5 million inhabitants; 2013.27 The average masks an important and the Île-de-France region, with twelve variation: the growing burden is more million inhabitants. The population of evident for the worse off. For those with the Paris City Council has been relative- low incomes, the cost was 21.6 percent ly stable, while that of the Métropole du in 1988 and 36.2 percent in 2013. Howev- Grand Paris has begun to grow, with an er, they have benefited more from public increase of one million people in the past subsidies. decade. San Francisco and New York, despite The Paris urban region has, like Lon- important differences explored below, don, faced massive deindustrialization. have followed broadly similar trajecto- Unlike London, however, its main econ- ries. New York City consists of its five omic engines are still rooted within the boroughs, with a population of 8.5 mil- French economy in close connection to lion, within a metropolitan area of about

52 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences twenty million. San Francisco proper has population.30 In New York, the share of Patrick 850,000 inhabitants, an increase of about households spending 30 percent or more Le Galès & Paul Pierson 8 percent in the past decade. The San on rent rose from 41 percent in 2000 to Francisco Metropolitan Area comprises 52 percent in 2014. Unsurprisingly, those five counties with just under five million in the lowest income brackets are most people, while the larger Bay Area region likely to face these intense burdens. By contains nine counties and eight million 2014, three-quarters of low-income resi- inhabitants. dents in New York were rent-burdened.31 Like London, these cities have wit- In turn, these pressures create the kind of nessed a sharp rise in the cost of hous- precarious position that can easily spill ing, dramatically escalating already sig- over into eviction and homelessness.32 nificant issues of affordability. The same changes that make agglomeration cities While our main focus is on the im- increasingly attractive to those with high pact of rising housing prices on access skills have also driven up housing prices. to mobility opportunities, we wish to re- In turn, the sharp rise in housing prices turn briefly to a direct and powerful ef- has fed into inequality by triggering pro- fect of these rising asset values on dura- cesses of increasing spatial segregation. ble inequality, one that highlights the It is striking that San Jose, identified need to consider changes in housing mar- by Chetty and colleagues as the place of- kets and public policy simultaneously. A fering the greatest prospects for upward small number of cities–including New mobility for those born thirty years ago, York, Moscow, Hong Kong, San Francis- has become the least affordable place co, and Los Angeles–are home to a large in the country to buy a home.28 In near- share of the world’s booming class of bil- by San Francisco, only 14 percent of new lionaires.33 London in particular stands homes are affordable to a family with a out, having refashioned itself as a locale median income. Home ownership in the where the superwealthy can invest heavi- city is increasingly limited to those who ly in property as a useful tool for money already own, have a very high income or laundering, wealth diversification, and substantial wealth, or who can draw on hoarding beyond the reach of their home- the wealth of their parents. Thus, prostate’s public authorities.34 This is a dis- fessional/managerial groups are increas- tinctive dynamic, with particular causes ingly concentrated in these dynamic ur- and effects, which calls out for separate ban areas, which have also seen a sharp analysis. It does, however, have impor- growth of income in the past few de- tant ripple effects on broader property cades. In San Francisco, for instance, 44 markets, which are especially evident in percent of those over twenty-five had at London. least a bachelor’s degree, compared with Yet the wealth impact of the hous- an average of 28 percent in American cit- ing boom is not just, or even primari- ies as a whole.29 ly, a question of oligarchs parking (or In 1999, during the last tech boom, laundering) their assets. Rising proper- about one-third of San Franciscans spent ty values in high-income cities are driv- more than half of their gross income on ing large shifts in wealth inheritance. In housing (policy analysts generally re- a precursor of the argument we develop gard anything over 30 percent of spend- more extensively in the next section, pol- ing on housing as burdensome). By 2015, icy choices of national governments fig- that proportion was 47 percent of the ure prominently in this development. In

148 (3) Summer 2019 53 “Superstar all three of the countries where our super- ownership. The Institute for Fiscal Stud- Cities” & the star cities are located, governments have ies’ report on inheritance shows the Generation of Durable relaxed inheritance tax laws to make it scope of wealth accumulated by the most Inequality easier for the wealthy to pass these in- favored within the older cohort of prop- creasingly valuable assets on to their erty owners. According to the report, heirs. In the United Kingdom, the Cam- due to rising housing prices, “the aver- eron government’s 2015 budget includ- age wealth of elderly households (where ed a new exemption for the main family all members are 80 or older) increased home from inheritance tax, potentially by 45%” between 2002–2003 and 2012– allowing a couple to leave their children 2013.35 The richest 10 percent of the elder- up to £1 million tax-free. In France, the ly own 40 percent of the wealth to be in- Sarkozy government increased the ceil- herited. By contrast, within the following for tax-free transfers of inheritance ing generation, prices are too high, wages to children. In the United States, conser- too low, and rents too burdensome to al- vatives have repeatedly and successful- low an easy path to home purchase. For ly pushed to cut inheritance taxes, which many, the rise of rents has generated pre- now apply only to the superrich. The tax carious housing situations if not outright bill passed in late 2017 will allow a cou- homelessness (there are now eight thou- ple to transfer up to $22.4 million to their sand “rough sleepers” in London). At a heirs free of tax. minimum, it prevents most young people Thus, on one side of the housing di- from saving money for the future, with vide, one finds existing homeowners and potentially massive consequences for their children. Not only can they sustain long-term inequality. access to these sites of economic oppor- In Paris, again, those impacts exist but tunity and benefit from the forces push- are more muted. Economist Clément ing up the value of their property, now Dherbécourt has mapped the strong in- they can also pass more of this wealth crease of inheritance, which has grown across generations without tax. On the from the equivalent of 8 percent of other side are those within younger gen- household income in 1980 (€3.5 trillion) erations who face the specter of massive to about 19 percent of household income house price increases without the advan- today (€10.6 trillion), and is projected to tage of wealthy parents. Often, they must reach about 30 percent by 2050.36 Rising cope simultaneously with stagnating in- house prices explain most of the change. comes and declining prospects for pen- Indeed, since the early 1990s, the net as- sions. These young people cannot buy. sets of households increased much more Locked into renting in increasingly ex- rapidly than incomes, as house prices pensive markets, their housing condi- doubled between 1998 and 2008. From tions may deteriorate, or their tenancy 1980 to 2015, the level of inheritance went may become precarious. They may have from €60 to €250 billion (constant pric- to leave the high-cost region altogether. es). As in the United Kingdom, this goes All these effects restrict social mobility. together with an increase of inequality In the United Kingdom, those on the both between and within generations. short end of this transformation have Assets are far more concentrated than been dubbed “Generation Rent.” Indeed, incomes and therefore the increasing a wealth of evidence shows a stark gener- importance of inheritance is a power- ational contrast. Those born in the 1960s ful mechanism to create long-term in- and 1970s had good access to property equalities within generations. Without

54 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences reaching the levels of inequality seen in the crisis and to limit inequalities have Patrick London, Dherbécourt nonetheless shows been diverse, and generally insufficient. Le Galès & Paul Pierson that the average incomes of households Yet the degree to which this inequality has who inherit more than €100,000 are grown and become entrenched has varied. more than 30 percent higher than other Below we identify some of the proximate households. sources of these differences and then proceed to explore some of the deeper struc- So far we have examined general social tures that help account for the distinctive processes associated with high-income pathways that cities find themselves on. metropoles. These processes generate At least on the surface, housing policy higher housing prices and, in turn, cycles is led by the public and private actors– of concentrated advantage and disadvan- especially mayors–within these large tage. We now contrast the policy expe- cities who have struggled to create coali- riences of our four cities. All have been tions and mobilize resources to develop part of the broad spatial revolution con- affordable housing. But looking at cities centrating increased economic advan- themselves is not enough. The fragment- tage in urban areas. In key respects, how- ed governance of these metropolitan ar- ever, divergence among these cities is as eas requires a combined analysis of what evident as commonality. Housing pric- is done at the level of the municipality (or es have not increased equally in all these the borough in London) and at the level places. More important, the translation of the metropolitan government, where of high housing prices into durable mo- there is such a thing. Intermediate au- bility advantages is not fully automatic. thorities such as the regional council in Paris stands out as a site where both the Paris or the states of California and New run-up in housing prices and its impact York also possess financial and regulatory on the distribution of economic and so- resources that may be mobilized. cial opportunity have been more limited. In the end, we argue, national commit- The situation of housing today is part- ments are crucial. Cities are embedded ly the result of long-term policies and col- within national societies. Nation-states lective choices about what is public and have not disappeared, nor have welfare private, and about the priority of housing states. A major source of city robustness for the poor and those with modest in- in the past has been the redistribution comes. Public policy scholar Allen Scott and services that national welfare states and urban geographer Michael Stor- have provided for urban populations. per have stressed the urban-land nex- Despite strong pressures for austerity in us related to density.37 How do authori- some settings, these features continue to ties resolve the competition among in- shape the pathways of urban transforma- dividuals and groups who want to live in tion. Cities–even “global” ones–remain these high-income, dynamic metropoles? situated within particular national con- What mechanisms should be used to de- texts that continue to exert considerable cide land-use patterns that usually reflect influenceon the development of struc- a mix of power relations and efficien- tures of social and economic opportuni- cy concerns? In all of our cases, the in- ty. National policies influence the capaci- creased competition for housing has ben- ties, options, and incentives of more geo- efitedthe upper-middle classes and tend- graphically proximate actors. If, as we ed to limit access for lower-income groups, argue, Paris is different, it is primarily be- or expel them. Policy responses to address cause France is different.

148 (3) Summer 2019 55 “Superstar A useful place to begin this exploration number of new affordable housing units Cities” & the is to distinguish supply and demand pres- being built, typically by nonprofit hous- Generation of Durable sures on housing prices. On the demand ing associations, offset roughly 10 percent Inequality side, critical factors include the prosperi- of the number of properties sold. And ty of a region, flows of foreign investment more recently, under Conservative Trea- into property markets, and population sury Secretary George Osborne, the right trends. Increasing population, especially to buy was extended to housing associa- among those who can afford to pay more, tion properties as well. There is a gener- will bid up housing prices. On the supply al sense of a housing crisis in the Unit- side, one can distinguish between pub- ed Kingdom and in London in particular. lic and private construction. To the ex- Never-ending fiscalpressure on local au- tent that there is increasing supply from thorities (uk public expenditure is one of either source, upward pressure on pric- the three most centralized in Europe) has es will be diminished. By contrast, in the marginalized social housing. Report after presence of heightened demand, supply report emphasizes the lack of new con- constraints will generate what economist struction. The Conservative Cameron- Fred Hirsch long ago labeled position- Osborne government made only modest al competition, in which housing markets efforts to address this challenge. In 2010, begin to resemble an ever-faster game of the government developed its “First Buy” musical chairs.38 scheme, aimed at helping ten thousand The main point is that even within this households to buy new property by guar- group of dynamic, global cities, all of anteeing interest-free loans. The program which see rising housing prices as a huge has delivered but the scale is limited. The challenge, there are important differenc- Cameron-Osborne government’s “Help es in outcomes. We briefly sketch those to Buy” scheme offered interest-free loans differences before exploring some of the to first-time buyers and a guarantee to al- differing policy structures that generate low them to offer 95 percent of the mort- them–differences that help to illuminate gage with little risk. It was designed to some of the patterns of political and so- help seventy-four thousand buyers over cial responses to housing affordability three years for a cost of £3.5 billion. challenges as well. It is not just that these efforts were very modest; others cut in the direction London has experienced a long-term of worsening housing affordability. In decline of the role of the public sector, England, the number of new dwellings and the national government in partic- built as social housing for rent has de- ular, in providing affordable housing. clined from about twenty-five thousand The city was once characterized by social in 2006 to six thousand in 2015. A major housing–its famous housing estates– shift in policy was the decision to cap the built before and after World War II. In housing benefit,in particular in London 1980, the Thatcher government famously in 2013, a move that was strengthened in introduced the “right to buy” social hous- 2016. The importance of the housing ben- ing, leading to the sale of 1.8 million coun- efit in England (and in London in partic- cil homes nationwide at considerable dis- ular) had grown because of increasing count to their occupants. Sales were es- house prices. Capping the housing ben- pecially brisk in London, where rising efit provoked rent increases up to sev- home prices made the deal particular- eral hundreds of pounds a month in the ly attractive to tenants. On average, the worst cases. The likely result will be an

56 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences additional push on those at the low end with more lucrative alternatives are less Patrick of the market, leading either to worsen- and less willing to house them.41 Rath- Le Galès & Paul Pierson ing housing conditions or induced depar- er than address these long-term supply ture from London. shortages, scarce resources have been re- The housing charity Shelter issued directed to face the overwhelming imme- a critical report on housing policy un- diate crisis. As the National Audit Office der Cameron.39 It noted that the govern- report concludes, “local authorities have ment’s policies have done little to address increased their spending on homeless- the supply problem. In 2013, construction ness while reducing spending on prevent- was at a postwar low. Conservative May- ing it.” Since 2011, spending on overall or Boris Johnson worked closely with housing services (mostly for the low-in- leading private developers and interna- come groups) has decreased by 21 percent tional partners to attract money, but the in real terms despite a spending increase result was a limited amount of housing, on temporary accommodations. mostly at the very top end of the mar- Unsurprisingly, housing was the major ket. At the end of Johnson’s mandate, af- issue of the 2016 mayoral election in Lon- fordable housing in London represented don, figuring prominently in the mani- just 25 percent of new construction, com- festo of the winning Labour candidate pared with 40 percent when he was first Sadiq Khan. His long-term goal is both elected. According to government statis- to increase the production of housing in tics, there are about seventy-fivethou - London and ensure that 50 percent of new sand households in temporary accom- dwellings are affordable. Over £1 billion modation or homeless in the city. Shelter have been diverted to subsidize afford- reports that between 2011 and 2016, the able housing construction. Yet, forced to number of households in temporary ac- rely on local fiscal resources, Khan faces commodation increased by 60 percent. A the same challenge as New York and San National Audit Office study emphasized Francisco. The major resource of local the curtailment of private-sector tenan- governments is their control over zoning, cies, together with a general decline of af- which gives them regulatory authority fordability of private rentals, as the major over increasingly valuable land. Inclusion- reasons for the rise of homelessness.40 ary zoning has become the watchword for With the withdrawal of national gov- using this remaining form of government ernment, efforts to combat the afford- authority to address both the challenges ability crisis and homelessness have fall- of rising prices and rising exclusivity. en to fiscally stressed local councils. Yet Khan has implemented a number of re- the Cameron-Osborne government also strictions on luxury development. He is cut local budgets dramatically, up to 50 working closely with Transport for Lon- percent in some cases. As a result, coun- don (tfl), which has become a major cils in London faced intense pressure to developer, releasing land to build new raise capital by selling pieces of land or housing around stations. Yet the resourc- council estates to private developers. Giv- es generated in these projects are large- en tight budgets, most of the new dwell- ly destined to finance transport, another ings were built to sell or rent at market urgent need in an increasingly congested prices. And this comes on the heels of de- London. Like other booming cities, Lon- cades of decline for social housing. There don faces massive infrastructure needs is now a reduced social housing stock to that compete with subsidized housing house homeless people. Private landlords for limited local funds. Still, the mayor

148 (3) Summer 2019 57 “Superstar is requiring that 50 percent of homes on influx of foreign investment has been Cities” & the sites be “genuinely affordable.” more modest, although in New York it is Generation tfl of Durable The mayor is thus employing a carrot- still notable. In both New York and San Inequality and-stick strategy, working with private Francisco, the critical driver is their en- developers to enroll them in his agenda hanced status as economic magnets. This while exercising coercion when they are has created intensifieddemand, as high- recalcitrant. He has launched a number of end wages skyrocket and draw affluent new initiatives, including subsidies for a workers to these cities. Compared with new generation of “naked homes”–that London, however, population growth is, affordable housing stripped down to has been low, especially in San Francis- the bare essentials–that would sell for 40 co. Indeed, American economists have percent under the existing market price.42 been struck by what previously would In addition to working with private devel- have been seen as an economic paradox: opers and finance companies, Khan is de- booming economies coexisting with lim- veloping partnership deals with nonprof- ited population growth.44 The population it housing associations to build thousands of both cities has grown, but not nearly of new units. His team works on develop- as much as rising economic productivi- ing incentives and planning regulations ty might lead one to expect. Many high- at the borough level to deliver 35 percent skilled workers have entered, but many “genuinely affordable” housing in any with fewer skills have headed in the oth- new development. The mayor also plans er direction. Many more have been de- to introduce a “new private sector ten- terred from entering by prohibitive hous- ure” with rents set at one-third of average ing costs. They have instead chosen to lo- household incomes: that is, “genuinely cate where housing prices are lower, even affordable” for a couple earning around though economic opportunities are more £4,000 per month.43 Some new homes limited as well.45 would be accessible for £1,000 a month to That housing prices have skyrocketed rent instead of the market rent of £1,450. despite modest population growth points Mayor Khan has built a coalition to fuel to problems on the supply side, where affordable housing construction and ful- both American cities have faced severe ly use the regulatory power at his dispos- challenges. There is now widespread con- al. Whether these efforts are commensu- sensus that supply limitations are central rate with the scale of need, given the back- to escalating prices in both New York and drop of a pronounced long-term decline San Francisco. With an influx of high- in support for housing from the national income households and very limited new government, remains very questionable. construction, housing markets quickly At the end of the day, neither the Greater exhibit Hirschian-style positional com- London Authority nor the boroughs pos- petition. In this brutal game of musical sess the resources necessary to build the chairs, seats go not to those who are fast- houses needed by lower-income groups. est, but to those already in secure pos- These same challenges and constraints session of a chair and those equipped to are evident in major agglomeration cities win a bidding war for the few available in the United States. spots. Supply constraints in a context of increasing demand form the backdrop to The forces that have led to skyrocket- both the escalating prices and massive re- ing prices in San Francisco and New York source transfers to property owners de- City are similar to those in London. The scribed at the beginning of this essay.

58 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences There is some dispute about the rea- the financial crisis, and even within the Patrick sons for the restricted supply. Public re- booming Bay Area, San Francisco gained Le Galès & Paul Pierson sources to support affordable housing ground economically. Between 2010 and have always been relatively limited in the 2015, San Francisco and San Jose added United States. Today, national resourc- over one hundred thousand digital ser- es for such efforts are scant by compar- vice jobs; their share of the nation’s tech ative standards (and even by historical employment continued to grow to a re- standards in the United States). More- markable 17 percent.47 over, zoning restrictions and local oppo- The tenure of San Francisco’s Ed Lee, sition have placed marked restrictions who became mayor in 2011 (and was re- on new construction. Indeed, American elected in 2015), coincided with strik- housing economists and government of- ing changes in the city. Lee’s initial fo- ficials at both the state and national levels cus was on consolidating San Francisco’s now point to these supply restrictions as economic appeal to the already extensive a chief culprit in the affordability crisis.46 tech industry. His efforts reflected and They document that other American cit- reinforced a shift in the political econo- ies lacking such restrictions have seen a my of the Bay Area, with a growing share more limited run-up in house prices. De- of start-up and venture-capital activi- spite its booming economy, San Francis- ty (along with an influx of high-skilled, co, in recent decades, has built new hous- high-wage workers) moving from Sili- ing at a rate far below the norm for Amer- con Valley to the city itself. By 2010, new ican metros, as well as the pace it set in venture capital within the city’s limits prior decades. New York has done only a exceeded that in Silicon Valley. By 2015, little better. there were almost twice as many “uni- The two American cities we examine corns” (private companies with valua- have had somewhat different responses tions of over $1 billion) in San Francisco to the challenges associated with rising as in the Valley; indeed, San Francisco is housing prices. We begin with the more the headquarters for over 40 percent of modest actions of city officials in San all such companies in the world.48 Francisco before turning to New York’s This economic boom, combined with more aggressive policy response. There the influxof high-skilled workers, co- are clear differences between the two cit- incided with a sharp spike in housing ies, as well as over time (with each step- demand. Lee’s tenure in office was ac- ping up its efforts in recent years). But the companied by escalations in both hous- commonalities largely swamp the differing prices and the intensity of conflicts ences, revealing some of the key features over housing and development. Rents constraining effective policy responses in more than doubled between 2009 and the United States. 2015. Soaring housing costs in turn rapidly translated into growing signs of social In both New York and San Francisco, and political strain: activist challenges to housing affordability (along with its the tech industry’s prominence, increas- most alarming manifestation, widespread ingly visible encampments despite grow- homelessness on the same streets that ing city expenditures to combat home- display unprecedented affluence)has lessness, and dueling ballot measures come to dominate local politics. San seeking to finance affordable housing Francisco and the surrounding areas were and either curtail or facilitate private de- among the first places to recover from velopment. Housing has not only become

148 (3) Summer 2019 59 “Superstar the biggest issue on the city council’s since 2000. It now totals under $2 bil- Cities” & the agenda, it now also figures prominently lion, while the system faces $26 billion in Generation 52 of Durable in the state legislature in Sacramento and needed maintenance. San Francisco’s Inequality has spurred a number of state-wide bal- embrace of a pilot program to transfer lot initiatives. management of its public housing stock The city has responded to these chal- to nonprofits reflects these painful real- lenges on a number of fronts. It has sub- ities. It may not only preserve, but also stantially expanded resources dedicat- improve the quality of 3,500 units of af- ed to combatting homelessness, both fordable housing; it will not, however, in- through an extension of social services crease the supply. and efforts to increase the supply of per- Meanwhile, extraordinary prices in- manent housing for homeless families and exorably pull existing affordable hous- individuals. In 2015, the city spent $240 ing into the open marketplace. Property million on homelessness, about 3 percent owners face powerful incentives to cash of its budget and a 25 percent increase in in on the housing gold rush. The city’s real terms since Lee first took office.49 It own Housing Balance report, which ana- has attempted to increase the supply of af- lyzes efforts over a decade, is telling.53 It fordable housing by financing construc- estimates that between 2004 and 2015, the tion and rehabilitation. Notably, in 2015, city developed 6,559 new units of afford- the city passed a $310 million bond mea- able housing. Over the same period, 5,470 sure dedicated to affordable housing, with units were “removed from protective sta- 73 percent voter support. It has encour- tus” with, for instance, the movement of aged the rehabilitation of public housing owners into previously occupied apart- through partnerships with nonprofits.50 ments. In other words, despite its efforts, And, most extensively, it has–like Lon- the city was barely holding even in ab- don and New York–expanded the use of solute terms. Given the trends of sharp- inclusionary zoning both to increase new ly rising rents and growing population, it construction and leverage that construc- was almost certainly losing ground relation to generate new affordable units. tive to need. Despite the importance of some of The California Housing Partnership these initiatives, their overall impact estimates that state and federal fund- has been modest. The scale is simply ining for low-income housing in California sufficient given the extent of the chal- dropped by 67 percent between 2009 and lenge. San Francisco’s flagship bond ini- 2015.54 All told, federal, state, and local fi- tiative must be viewed against this back- nancial assistance for affordable housing ground. It will, at current prices, yield, in California has subsidized the construc- at most, 775 new units of housing–and tion of about seven thousand rental units probably less given escalating construc- a year. This amounts to only about 5 per- tion costs.51 It is telling that a large share cent of total construction in a state of al- of the city’s efforts (supported by mod- most forty million people, at a time when est state and federal funding) is required the total construction effort falls consis- just to keep the current stock of affordable tently and woefully short of estimated housing from disappearing. Budgets are need.55 far from sufficient for the maintenance of With the national government in ab- existing public housing. Nationwide, the sentia and local authorities lacking re- federal budget for public housing repairs sources and facing conflicting incen- has fallen by over 50 percent in real terms tives, the most interesting policy activity

60 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences in California is in the state capitol. State prominent campaign speech, de Blasio Patrick policy-makers are increasingly focused promised a robust response to what he Le Galès & Paul Pierson on housing policy and, in 2017, finally decried as a “tale of two cities” dividing brokered significant new legislation. The rich and poor: state has introduced new funding for af- Without a dramatic change of direction– fordable housing construction, but in an economic policy that combats inequal- the face of competing priorities, the imity and rebuilds our middle class–gen- pact of the modest new allocations is like- erations to come will see New York as lit- ly to be marginal. The bigger change is tle more than a playground for the rich . . . the introduction of zoning reforms that a gilded city where the privileged few pros- might foster private construction. That per, and millions upon millions of New the state is now weighing in on these reg- Yorkers struggle each and every day to keep ulatory issues to encourage more hous- their heads above water. . . . History has ing construction represents an impor- taught us that no economy–and no city– tant change, but the new rules are likely can thrive in the long-term under such to make only a modest difference against circumstances.57 a backdrop of entrenched local resistance, in which both cities and suburbs After winning office, de Blasio imme- are fiercely protective of their tradition- diately launched an unprecedented ef- al authority. fort to expand city support to preserve and extend social housing. He set what New York has faced a broadly simi- was by historical standards an ambitious lar housing crisis, fueled by roughly sim- goal: two hundred thousand units of af- ilar forces. It has, by most accounts, fordable housing over a decade. The pri- been more aggressive than San Francis- mary tools for meeting de Blasio’s aspira- co in its response, and its aggressiveness tions were two sets of incentives for de- has grown over time. The severity of the velopers. First, extending Bloomberg’s housing challenge was recognized under efforts, the city offered to relax zoning in Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who presided some areas. “Inclusionary zoning” would over New York’s booming economy from allow for more and denser construction. 2002 to 2014. The increasing burdens of In return, the city would get a commit- housing affordability, combined with a ment that a significant share of the result- spreading sense that the city was becoming housing would be reserved for those ing the exclusive preserve of the affluent with moderate incomes. Second, the city and superrich, was a growing blemish on (and state of New York) proposed to offer the mayor’s record. Bloomberg set a goal more generous relief from property taxes of creating or preserving 165,000 units of for developments providing a designated affordable housing, mostly through ex- share of affordable housing. In short, city panded use of inclusionary zoning. Yet policy-makers sought to exploit the main despite the city’s stepped-up efforts, it tool they controlled: regulatory authority lost more affordable units than it gained over private construction in a context of during Bloomberg’s tenure.56 exploding demand. The goal was to gen- This disappointing record was one of erate both an expanded housing supply the catalysts for the surprise election of and, within that expansion, a significant the progressive Bill de Blasio, who won affordable component. the mayor’s office over Bloomberg’s pre- Like public officials in San Francisco, ferred candidate in late 2013. In his most those in New York City are swimming

148 (3) Summer 2019 61 “Superstar against a very strong current. Their ef- to think federal housing programs may Cities” & the forts play out in an environment in which face steeper cuts in the near future. Generation of Durable rapidly rising property values create pow- Thus, despite the energy and resourc- Inequality erful incentives for private actors to re- es devoted to meeting the growing hous- move units from the affordable housing crisis, many of the city’s limited re- ing stock whenever possible. Each year, sources must be allocated to not slipping rent-stabilized units are allowed to in- backwards. Bloomberg’s administration crease rent modestly, but once they reach failed to meet even this test. De Blasio’s a specified threshold, these rents are de- aggressive plan calls for two hundred regulated entirely and can shift to mar- thousand units of affordable housing in ket rates. Since 2007, a staggering 172,000 a decade, but fully 60 percent of the total units have been deregulated.58 This is one refers to preserving existing units rath- of several examples of policy drift that er than producing genuinely new sup- are rife in the urban housing crisis in the ply. As in San Francisco, the city simul- United States.59 The interaction between taneously faces the additional challenge changing circumstances and frozen poli- of dealing with the expensive fallout of cies produces fundamental change. Fed- the housing crisis, most palpably home- eral housing programs were designed at a lessness. The population in city homeless time when rent burdens and prices were shelters has doubled, to over sixty thou- far lower. With each passing year of ris- sand, since Bloomberg entered office in ing prices, they become less adequate. 2000.60 Although declining affordabili- They cannot be adapted to meet current ty is not the only cause of homelessness, social demands without new laws that are it is a fundamental one. Just as has hap- impossible to pass in the current political pened in London and San Francisco, al- climate. ready scarce city funds must be shifted to On the contrary, the federal govern- deal with the immediate and severe hu- ment is retreating ever further from its manitarian challenges. limited prior support for low-income New York City’s housing efforts are on housing. As federal agreements on pre- a scale unmatched in the recent American viously subsidized units expire, some are past or in any other present-day Amer- not renewed, and formerly covered hous- ican city. In the words of Alicia Glen, de ing is converted to market rates. Local Blasio’s deputy mayor for housing and governments must devote their limited economic development: “I can’t even resources to offsetting the steep decline compare it to what other cities are do- in affordable housing that would occur in ing. At the risk of sounding like we’re the the absence of concerted efforts. Like San bee’s knees . . . we are the bee’s knees. New Francisco, New York struggles against York has always . . . been the place where long odds to preserve its stock of public the most interesting housing policy and housing, constructed long ago with mas- programs have happened.”61 And yet the sive (but now long gone) federal support. effort is clearly incommensurate with The New York City Housing Authority the scale of the challenge. The city re- faces an $18 billion backlog for repairs. ceives very limited support from the state Meanwhile, the already grossly inade- of New York or the federal government. quate federal spending that is supposed State officials are happy to see the city to finance those repairs continues to sacrifice its future property tax revenues dwindle. Given the current political and (and indeed developed a more generous budgetary climate, there is every reason proposal that would involve mandated

62 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences high wages for union construction work- zoning, to expropriate private owners, to Patrick ers), but it offers little financial assis- build complementary infrastructure, and Le Galès & Paul Pierson tance. The federal government, always a to develop social and affordable hous- marginal participant in housing, has re- ing on a large scale. The effort included duced its efforts sharply over time. In the the construction of the regional trans- absence of such support, the needed pub- port system, five new towns around Par- lic resources are certain to be lacking. is, and La Défense (the new business district). The working-class industrial belt Paris, as we have already suggested, rep- on the northern and eastern sides of Paris resents a distinctive case. It faces all the enthusiastically built up red bastions of same pressures as the other three cities, municipal communism, concentrating but in more limited form. It remains more social housing and workers alike. socioeconomically diverse, and the strains In the 1970s and 1980s, the French state of housing affordability and precarious made a partial retreat. The liberal govern- living are more muted. How has public ment of Prime Minister Raymond Barre policy contributed to this outcome? curtailed the effort to build social hous- France has had a long tradition of direct ing, substituting large-scale subsidies to- state and municipal intervention to build ward the building of new houses for first- affordable and social housing. That im- time buyers. This encouraged a form of pulse receded in the last part of the twen- “white flight,” as the departure of low-in- tieth century. Since then, however, it has come white families led to a growing con- not only returned, but has been adapt- centration of immigrants in social hous- ed and enhanced to meet contemporary ing, in particular in the biggest estates far challenges. New efforts at the local, re- away from Paris. The priority given to af- gional, and national levels have limited fordable housing declined as many mu- the scale of the housing crisis, as well as nicipalities in the Paris region became the extent to which rising prices gener- afraid of attracting low-income popula- ate more durable forms of exclusion. The tions or migrants. After 1982, housing pol- pressures remain severe. Yet concerted icy further decentralized. Jacques Chirac, public efforts, both local and national, the conservative mayor of Paris, expand- have made Paris a notably different type ed reliance on market mechanisms and of global city. encouraged a shift to upper-class housing. A great deal of the massive develop- Social housing was marginalized, falling ment of the Paris urban region took place to roughly 7 percent of housing in Paris. after 1945. The Ministry of Housing and Municipalities gained control of land-use the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (a planning. Although left-wing municipali- publicly owned, large financial institu- ties were often keen to build more houses tion) started an ambitious program of for low-income groups, elsewhere in the social housing estates (les grands ensem- region nimbyism (not in my backyard) bles) in the suburbs of Paris. The central- spread. Municipalities with middle-class ist technocratic Gaullist regime accentu- constituencies and conservative officials ated the effort and introduced together worked to prevent the building of new an ambitious regional strategy for Par- housing. is in 1965, designed to transform urban In 2000, however, the political winds planning and land use. It combined in- began to shift again, with renewed pol- novative policy instruments, granting re- icy efforts to mitigate the impact of sources to public authorities to impose housing-price increases on the social

148 (3) Summer 2019 63 “Superstar composition of Paris and the surround- funded municipality, with a budget of Cities” & the ing region. A major turning point was the nearly 10 billion for 2.2 million inhabi- Generation € of Durable sru (Solidarité et renouvellement urbain) tants and a powerful and capable admin- Inequality law passed by the left-wing Jospin govern- istration. The Paris City Council also de- ment. The law profoundly transformed ploys powerful regulations to control urban planning and housing policy in land use and expropriate reluctant prop- France. It stated that every municipali- erty owners where necessary. ty should have 20 percent, and eventual- The impact of these efforts has been ly 25 percent, social housing. Municipal- notable, and the pace has accelerated. ities had several years to comply, but if The Delanoe administration managed to they failed to do so they would face fines. build roughly five thousand new social Encountering resistance, new laws in or affordable dwellings per year; Mayor 2013 and 2017 strengthened the sru, sub- Hidalgo has increased the number to sev- stantially increasing fines on recalcitrant en thousand a year (to which we can add conservative municipalities in the Paris three thousand in the private sector). As region. a reminder, this is equal to the number A second policy change, led by centrist of social housing units being constructed Minister Jean-Louis Borloo (after 2003), annually in the entire state of California, was the creation of the national agency a jurisdiction with almost twenty times as for urban renovation (anru, Agence pour many inhabitants. All in all, the Paris City la Rénovation Urbaine). It sought to de- Council, backed by national policy, dra- molish and then restructure the massive matically changed the housing situation. housing estates, replacing them with af- The percentage of social housing (with fordable housing that would be more in- subsidized rents and strong rent-increase tegrated into neighborhoods. anru un- limitation) rose from 7 percent to 20 per- dertook a massive public investment– cent, and is scheduled to reach 25 percent about €1 billion annually for twelve years by 2021. To meet this goal, all new hous- –for four hundred neighborhoods in ing projects are supposed to include a re- France (including 119 in the Paris Île-de- markable 60 percent share of social or af- France region). Those projects supported fordable housing. the building of new social and affordable Finally, the encouraging developments housing, to be integrated with econom- within the core of traditional Paris were ic development projects, new infrastruc- flanked by the creation of new institu- ture, and expanded services. tional structures and initiatives for a Political and policy changes in Paris “Grand Paris” encompassing the broad- complemented these dramatic shifts in er metro area of seven million people. national policy. In 2001, the victory of a While on the 2007 presidential cam- left-wing coalition led by Bertrand Del- paign trail, the Conservative Party candi- anoe ended twenty-four years of conser- date Nicolas Sarkozy pointed to booming vative municipal government. Delanoe London and accused the city and region’s was reelected in 2008 and succeeded by transport, housing, and spatial planning his former deputy Anne Hidalgo in 2014. policies of lacking a “grand vision” for Housing has been a top priority for the the capital-city region. The ensuing polit- coalition. It introduced an ambitious pro- ical battle eventually led to three impor- gram to build social and affordable hous- tant developments: 1) a €40 billion investing, extending into more upper-middle- ment in a large-scale regional metro sys- class neighborhoods. Paris is a very well- tem, Le Grand Paris Express; 2) the creation

64 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences of a new local authority, Métropole du include substantial commitments to so- Patrick Grand Paris, in 2017, designed to boost cial and affordable housing. Le Galès & Paul Pierson the supply of new housing and overcome But questions remain. The commit- the collective-action problems regarding ment to social and affordable housing is housing and infrastructure that pervade extensive, but still must be fully imple- metropolitan regions; and 3) the recruit- mented. Risks for the most vulnerable re- ment of financial institutions and private main evident. Fifteen percent of the pop- developers to design and cofinance large- ulation lives in poverty (less than €1,000 scale investment in housing within this a month for one person). Almost 10 per- urban core. The changing scale of Par- cent of all those living in the Paris re- is and the making of a Grand Paris are a gion–about one million people–live in major opportunity for new development. bad housing conditions. Rising prices The massive expansion of transport in- have excluded increasing numbers from frastructure allows various actors to in- the private rental sector. New buyers are crease their investment beyond the city increasingly concentrated among the al- of Paris.62 New policy instruments have ready privileged. They are less likely to been put forward to allow public-sector have a mortgage (that is, often because organizations to preemptively purchase they are drawing on inheritances). As in land for future housing. The state and London, the rate of first-time homeown- the municipalities have identified thirty- ers has decreased by 20 percent between three strategic sites, many around new 1986 and 2016 (from 25 to 20 percent).63 metro stations, on which to build two According to the National Institute of hundred thousand new dwellings in the Statistics and Economic Studies, there coming decade. are about thirty thousand homeless peo- Paris thus stands out as a distinctive ple in the Métropole du Grand Paris, and case. French officials have marshaled eight to ten thousand in Paris. national regulatory and financial re- The new governance design for the sources, sought to coordinate local ef- Métropole du Grand Paris, intended to forts, and, where necessary, reformed restrict nimbyism, remains an untest- the division of labor among public au- ed arrangement. The making of Le Grand thorities. All of these actions have been Paris combines two objectives: to devel- on a scale at least plausibly commen- op social, affordable, and inclusive hous- surate with the scope of the challenging, and to increase the attractiveness es facing agglomeration economies. To of Le Grand Paris. At a minimum, these say this is not to ignore the obstacles or goals stand in tension with each other. the weaknesses within the French re- Public actors now have major resources sponse. Planning documents during the and have developed important policies to past two decades typically sought con- combat housing-price increases, or atten- struction of seventy thousand units of uate some of the negative effects. Some new housing every year in the Paris Île- groups, however, will be tempted to use de-France region, but for many years, those resources to increase the competi- the realized totals remained under forty- tiveness of Paris, to get rid of poor popu- five thousand. However, the set of poli- lations, and to build for the very affluent, cies described above has led production as in London. to rise to about sixty thousand in 2015, Finally, the deeply ingrained poli- and the tempo is increasing toward sev- cy commitments to house low-income enty thousand. All of the new schemes groups and to maintain forms of social

148 (3) Summer 2019 65 “Superstar diversity in Paris also may come under Thus, housing within these agglomer- Cities” & the threat because of the financialization of ations provides a stark illustration of the Generation 64 of Durable the housing sector. France is not im- broader theme of this volume: inequali- Inequality mune to the broad changes sweeping ad- ty is a process. Initial inequalities can trig- vanced capitalism. Power relations be- ger additional effects that intensify those tween private developers, private finance original divisions. Housing costs become organizations, and local authorities are a divider between those who either al- changing, with more expertise and finan- ready own or can bear the costs of owner- cial capacity concentrated in the hands of ship and everyone else. Sociologists have major market actors. pointed to “the spatialization of class.”65 There are indeed uncertainties and rea- Today, there is growing evidence that sons for concern that a shift in political these economic agglomerations can gen- coalitions and weakening of currently ex- erate, absorb (through in-migration and tensive policy commitments could lead gentrification), and then reproduce and to the dynamics on display elsewhere, expand enormous inequalities. Most dra- promoting durable inequalities. Yet even matically, this operates in the astonishing noting these anxieties suggests the dis- concentration of income at the very top. tinctiveness of the French experience. Housing unaffordability can come to The fear, after all, is that possible events dominate how people make critical choic- could eventually push Paris down a path es about location. In the United States, that London, New York, and San Francis- dramatic differences in the cost of liv- co have already traveled. ing are producing “movement to stagnation.”66 Geographic mobility in the Unit- Housing is a crucial mechanism ed States is declining and mobility to the through which the dramatic changes as- areas with the highest wages is increasing- sociated with the rise of the knowledge ly difficult. Instead, populations flow to economy, and its accompanying recon- places with lower productivity and wages struction of cities, generate new forms but much lower housing costs as well (the of durable inequality. Combined with median home price in Houston, for ex- changes in inheritance tax, exploding ur- ample, is just one-fifth of the price in San ban property values constitute a pow- Jose). Put differently, prohibitive hous- erful form of inequality production and ing costs cut off access to the escalator of reproduction. high-productivity metro areas.67 In the long run, the indirect impact of Two dynamics of exclusion are at work rising prices on inequality may be just here: exclusion within and exclusion from. as significant. The high and rising hous- The radically new conditions in superstar ing prices that characterize these set- cities operate not just as an escalator, but tings are not just a generator and store of as a filter. Filtering doesn’t just work wealth. Increasingly, access to these as- by blocking in-migration by those with sets becomes a prerequisite for opportu- fewer resources; it operates within cit- nity. The concern is that only those who ies as well, as rising prices push individ- already have significant economic ad- uals away from the escalator and into sit- vantages can make effective use of what uations of insecure housing or homeless- these urban agglomerations provide. It ness. In many European cities, there are is getting harder and harder to get on the strong logics of differentiation and seg- escalators present in high-income global- regation at the extremes: geographer izing cities. Sako Musterd and his colleagues have

66 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences provided evidence of increased segre- first has long been well-understood. Lo- Patrick gation in European cities. Sociologists calities are poorly placed to pursue ag- Le Galès & Paul Pierson Douglas Massey and Jacob Rugh have gressively redistributive policies.69 Mo- found similar trends in the United States, bile companies and wealthy individu- with the affluent in American cities in- als find it both attractive and possible creasingly segregated, both racially and to evade such efforts if they become too economically, from everyone else.68 burdensome. The dynamics of agglom- Those who find that the combination eration, in which companies and skilled of very expensive housing and a weak workers want to be in close proximity to market for their (low) skills renders life other firms and workers, may mitigate in these urban areas increasingly unten- this constraint to some extent.70 In No- able are also pushed out. Indeed, absent vember 2018, San Francisco voters passed immigration, San Francisco and New a controversial initiative, imposing sig- York would be losing population despite nificant taxes on large and profitable lo- their booming job markets. Disadvan- cal firms in order to address the hous- taged inhabitants exit to the declining ining crisis. The initiative, if it survives le- dustrial towns of New Jersey from New gal challenges, will be an important test York, or to the Midlands and Northern of this proposition. Redistributive ini- England from London, or to the periph- tiatives that would promote affordable ery of the Paris urban region, or far away housing and combat homelessness must from the coastal areas of California to less be primarily a regional or national re- expensive but much poorer towns to the sponsibility. east or out of the state altogether. Second, unconstrained by more over- The striking changes in superstar cit- arching authorities, local politics creates ies thus reveal shared patterns, highlight- powerful incentives for nimbyism. The ing the importance of global forces and politics are complex, and of course oppo- technological shifts. Yet the contrast be- nents of new construction rarely argue tween Paris, on the one hand, and New that they want to raise the value of their York, San Francisco, and London, on the homes. In local politics, these incentives other, demonstrates the continuing sig- coexist with mobilization against devel- nificance of national institutions, politi- opers stemming from concerns about cal coalitions, and policies in shaping the neighborhood preservation and fear of new contours of inequality. gentrification, as well as environmen- Both by comparative and historical tal issues. Nonetheless, the massive con- standards, contemporary national pro- tribution of zoning restrictions to rising grams to support affordable housing are property values, higher prices, and rising extraordinarily weak in the United States. wealth inequality is very clear.71 This structure of national weakness in ur- Existing property holders benefit from ban policy reflects a national institution- restrictive zoning rules that raise the val- al framework of decentralized federalism ue of their assets. Local political officials that leaves an unusual amount of politi- face incentives to curry favor with polit- cal authority in the hands of local offi- ically powerful blocs of existing home- cials. Much more than in most democra- owners, an incentive structure that has cies, cities are forced to rely on their own also been linked to the extraordinary lev- resources. els of incarceration in the United States.72 In the current context, such self-reli- Regional or national actors are much ance creates two massive problems. The better placed to limit such restrictive

148 (3) Summer 2019 67 “Superstar practices and encourage new construc- property boom push the disadvantaged Cities” & the tion. In the United States, however, such down, or out, it is all city officialscan do Generation of Durable forces (especially national ones) have to slow the tide. But unlike the United Inequality limited authority. Moreover, the strong States, British institutional arrangements rural bias built into American elector- concentrate relevant regulatory and fiscal al institutions makes the urban housing resources with national authorities. The crisis a very low priority for national offi- decision not to direct those resources to- cials. In short, one would be hard pressed ward coping with the housing affordabil- to develop a structure of political au- ity crisis has been a political one. In this thority less conducive to confronting the respect, the contrast between Britain and housing crisis than the one in place in the France could hardly be starker. For de- United States. cades, policy in the two countries has New York and San Francisco show that moved in opposite directions. The Unit- some institutional arrangements and pol- ed Kingdom has largely abandoned its ef- icy inheritances present formidable ob- forts to subsidize affordable housing and stacles for confronting these new inequal- sustain broad access to its most thriving ities. By contrast, London’s experience re- economy; France, by contrast, has redou- minds us that choices remain to be made, bled its energy. In light of the highly dis- and thus politics retains its vital impor- tinctive social outcomes in London and tance. Acting on their own, London’s Paris, the continuing centrality of these public officials face many of the same public decisions to the distribution of life constraints as their American counter- chances is clear. parts. As the currents associated with the

author biographies patrick le galÈs is Research Professor in Politics and Sociology at Sciences Po and the National Centre for Scientific Research, and Founding Dean of Sciences Po Urban School. He is the author of Gobernando la Ciudad de México: Lo que se gobierna y lo que no se gobierna en una gran metrópoli (with Vicente Ugalde, 2018), Reconfiguring European States in Crisis (with Desmond King, 2017), and Globalised Minds, Roots in the City: Urban Upper-Middle Classes in Europe (with Alberta Andreotti and Francisco Moreno-Fuentes, 2015). paul pierson, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2016, is the John Gross Profes- sor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley; and Codirector of the Suc- cessful Societies program at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. He is the author, with Jacob S. Hacker, of American Amnesia: How the War on Government Led Us to Forget What Made America Prosper (2017), Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer– And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (2010), and Off-Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy (2005).

endnotes 1 Theresa May, campaign speech, Birmingham, United Kingdom, July 11, 2016. 2 David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982); and Rodrigo Fernandez and Manuel B. Aalbers, “Housing and Capital in the Twenty-First Century: Realigning Housing Studies and Political Economy,” Housing, Theory and Society 34 (2) (2017): 151–158. 3 Michelle V. Jackson and David B. Grusky, “A Cultural Theory of Structural Loss,” British Jour- nal of Sociology (forthcoming).

68 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 4 Edward Glaeser and Joshua Gottlieb, “The Wealth of Cities: Agglomeration Economies and Patrick Spatial Equilibrium in the United States,” nber Working Paper No. 14806 (Cambridge, Le Galès & Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011); Enrico Moretti, The New Geography of Paul Pierson Jobs (New York: Houghton Mifflin,2012); Michael Storper, Keys to the City (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013); and Michael Storper, The Rise and Fall of Urban Economies: Lessons from San Francisco and Los Angeles (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2015). 5 Torben Iversen and David Soskice, Democracy and Prosperity: Reinventing Capitalism through a Turbulent Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2019). 6 Ben Ansell and Jane Gingrich, “The Political Economy of Secular Stagnation,” unpublished manuscript (2018). 7 Karen Kurz and Hans-Peter Blossfeld, eds., Home Ownership and Social Inequality in Comparative Perspective (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004). 8 Odran Bonnet, Pierre-Henri Bono, Guillaume Chapelle, and Etienne Wasmer, “Does Housing Capital Contribute to Inequality? A Comment on Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Centu- ry,” Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 7 (12) (2014); Gianni La Cava, “Housing Prices, Mortgage Interest Rates and the Rising Share of Capital Income in the United States,” bis Working Papers No. 572 (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements, 2016); and Matthew Rognlie, “Deciphering the Fall and Rise in the Net Capital Share: Accumulation or Scarcity?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2015): 1–54. 9 Robert Beauregard, Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of U.S. Cities (New York: Routledge, 2003). 10 Patrick Le Galès, European Cities, Social Conflicts and Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 11 Bruce J. Katz and Jennifer Bradley, The Metropolitan Revolution: How Cities and Metros are Fix- ing our Broken Politics and Fragile Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013). 12 Moretti, New Geography of Jobs; European Commission and un-Habitat, The State of European Cities Report (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/ en/policy/themes/urban-development/cities-report. 13 Anne Case and Angus Deaton, “Rising Morbidity and Mortality in Mid-Life among White Non-Hispanic Males in the Twenty-First Century,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci- ences 112 (49) (2015): 15078–15083. 14 Mike Savage and Tony Fielding, “Class Formation and Regional Development: The ‘Service Class’ in South East England,” Geoforum 20 (2) (1989): 203–218. 15 European Commission and un-Habitat, The State of European Cities Report. 16 Moretti, New Geography of Jobs; and Iversen and Soskice, Democracy and Prosperity. 17 Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti, “Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation,” unpublished manuscript (2018). 18 Alberta Andreotti, Patrick Le Galès, and Francisco Moreno-Fuentes, Globalised Minds, Roots in the City: Urban Upper-Middle Classes in Europe (Chichester, United Kingdom: Wiley Black- well, 2015). 19 David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson, “When Work Disappears: Manufacturing Decline and the Falling Marriage Market Value of Men,” unpublished manuscript (2018). 20 Sean Reardon and Kendra Bischoff, “Income Inequality and Income Segregation,” American Journal of Sociology 116 (4) (2011): 1092–1153; and Ann Owens, Sean Reardon, and Christo- pher Jencks, “Income Segregation Between Schools and School Districts,” American Educa- tional Research Journal 53 (4) (2016): 1159–1197.

148 (3) Summer 2019 69 “Superstar 21 Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, and Emmanuel Saez, “Where is the Land of Cities” & the Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States,” Quarterly Generation Journal of Economics 129 (4) (2014): 1553–1623. of Durable Inequality 22 The French class scheme combines education and job market variables. “Managers” typically refers to individuals with a master’s degree, working with and leading a group of people, with an income generally in the top 10 percent of the income distribution. 23 Clément Dherbécourt, Dynamiques territoriales et inégalités (Paris: France Stratégie, 2016). 24 Nordine Kireche, La dynamique du Grand Paris et ses perspectives pour le logement, regard compar- atif avec le Grand Londres et New York City (Paris: Sciences Po, 2018). 25 PricewaterhouseCoopers and Urban Land Institute, Emerging Trends in Real Estate: Canada and the United States (Washington, D.C.: PricewaterhouseCoopers and Urban Land Institute, 2017). 26 L’Institut d’améragement et d’urbisme Île-de-France, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, L’Atelier parisien d’urbisme, et al., Les conditions de logement en Île-de- France (Paris: Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, 2017). 27 Ibid. 28 Louis Hansen, “San Jose Tops List for Least Affordable Housing,” San Jose Mercury News, Sep- tember 6, 2018. 29 McKinsey Global Institute, Urban America: U.S. Cities in the Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: McKinsey Global Institute, 2012), 44. 30 Angela Woodall, “High Housing Prices Undercut Aid Programs,” San Francisco Public Press, January 21, 2016. 31 Richard Florida, The New Urban Crisis: How Our Cities are Increasing Inequality, Deepening In- equality and Failing the Middle Class, and What We Can Do About It (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 74. 32 Matthew Desmond, Evicted: Poverty and Profitin the American City (New York: Crown Books, 2017). 33 By one recent estimate, New York has more billionaires (116) than any other urban area, with the Bay Area (71) second, London (50) sixth, and Paris (20+) twelfth. If one casts the net more widely to include those with more than $30 million in assets, London jumps to first. Florida, The New Urban Crisis, 40–42. 34 Rowland Atkinson and Roger Burrows, “A City in Thrall to Capital? London, Money-Power and Elites,” Discover Society 15 (2014). 35 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Inheritances and Inequality across and within Generations (London: Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2017). 36 Dherbécourt, Dynamiques territoriales et inégalités. 37 Allen J. Scott and Michael Storper, “The Nature of Cities: The Scope and Limits of Urban Theory,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 39 (1) (2014): 1–16. 38 Fred Hirsch, The Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976). 39 Shelter, Far from Alone: Homelessness in Britain in 2017 (London: Shelter, 2017). 40 National Audit Office, Homelessness (London: National Audit Office, 2017). 41 Ibid. 42 Robert Booth, “Mayor to Subsidise ‘Naked’ Homes Solution to London Housing Crisis,” The Guardian, April 24, 2017. 43 Dave Hill, “How Sadiq Khan Has Been Tackling London’s Housing Crisis so Far,” The Guard- ian, November 3, 2016.

70 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 44 Peter Ganong and Daniel Shoag, “Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. De- Patrick clined?” Journal of Urban Economics 102 (2017): 76–90. Le Galès & Paul Pierson 45 Ibid; and Hsieh and Moretti, “Housing Constraints.” 46 Edward L. Glaeser and Bryce A. Ward, “The Causes and Consequences of Land Use Reg- ulation: Evidence from Greater Boston,” Journal of Urban Economics 65 (2009); Hsieh and Moretti, “Housing Constraints”; Mac Taylor, California’s High Housing Costs: Causes and Con- sequences (Sacramento: Legislative Analyst’s Office,2015), 14; and The White House, Hous- ing Development Toolkit (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2016), https://www.white house.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Housing_Development_Toolkit%20f.2.pdf. 47 Mark Muro and Sifan Liu, “Tech in Metros: The Strong are Getting Stronger,” The Avenue, March 8, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/03/08/tech-in-metros -the-strong-are-getting-stronger/. 48 Donald McNeill, “Governing a City of Unicorns: Technology Capital and the Urban Politics of San Francisco,” Urban Geography 37 (4) (2016): 494–513. 49 Heather Knight and Kevin Fagan, “sf Spends Record $241 Million on Homeless, Can’t Track Results,” San Francisco Chronicle, February 5, 2016. 50 Jenna Lyons, “Prop A, Affordable Housing Measure, Wins in S.F.,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 4, 2015. 51 Woodall, “High Housing Prices Undercut Aid Programs.” 52 Ethan Epstein, “How San Francisco Saved Its Public Housing by Getting Rid of It,” Politico, July 20, 2017. 53 San Francisco Planning, San Francisco Housing Balance: July 2015 (San Francisco: San Francis- co Planning, 2015). 54 Liam Dillon, “California’s Lawmakers Have Tried for Fifty Years to Solve the State’s Housing Crisis: Here’s Why They’ve Failed,” Los Angeles Times, June 29, 2017. 55 Taylor, California’s High Housing Costs, 7. 56 Peter Moskowitz, “The Best Affordable Housing Plan in the U.S. Isn’t Good Enough,” Slate, January 29, 2015, https://slate.com/business/2015/01/nyc-affordable-housing-plan-de-blasios -efforts-are-ambitious-and-laudable-theyre-also-inadequate.html. 57 Bill de Blasio, “A Foundation for Greatness,” speech, New York City, May 30, 2013, http:// archive.advocate.nyc.gov/jobs/speech. 58 Michael Greenberg, “Tenants Under Siege: Inside New York City’s Housing Crisis,” New York Review of Books, August 17, 2017. 59 Jacob S. Hacker, “Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States,” American Political Science Review 98 (2) (2004): 243–260. 60 Ford Fessenden, “A Homeless Epidemic in New York? Thousands Hit the Cold Streets to Find Out,” The New York Times, February 8, 2016. 61 Moskowitz, “Best Affordable Housing Plan.” 62 Charlotte Halpern and Patrick Le Galès, “From City Streets to Metropolitan Scale in Paris and Île-de-France Region,” in Transforming Urban Transport, ed. Diane E. Davis and Alan Alt- shuler (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 63 L’Institut d’améragement et d’urbisme Île-de-France, Les conditions de logement en Île-de-France. 64 Ludovic Halbert and Katia Attuyer, “Introduction: The Financialisation of Urban Produc- tion: Conditions, Mediations and Transformations,” Urban Studies 53 (7) (2016): 1–15. 65 Roger Burrows, Richard Webber, and Roland Atkinson, “Welcome to ‘Pikettyville’? Map- ping London’s Alpha Territories,” The Sociological Review 65 (2) (2017): 184–201.

148 (3) Summer 2019 71 “Superstar 66 “Moving Towards Stagnation,” The Economist, September 27, 2011. Cities” & the 67 Generation Edward L. Glaeser and Joshua D. Gottlieb, “The Economics of Place-Making Policies,” Brook- of Durable ings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring 2008): 155–239. Inequality 68 Sako Musterd, Szymon Marcińczak, Maarten Van Ham, and Titt Tammaru, eds., Socio-Eco- nomic Segregation in European Capital Cities: East Meets West (London: Routledge, 2016); and Douglas S. Massey and Jacob S. Rugh, “Isolation at the Extremes: The Spatial Concentration of Affluence and Poverty in Metropolitan America,” unpublished manuscript (2017). 69 Paul Peterson, City Limits (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 70 Iversen and Soskice, Democracy and Prosperity. 71 John Mangin, “The New Exclusionary Zoning,” Stanford Law and Policy Review 25 (1) (2014): 91–120. 72 Nicola Lacey and David Soskice, “Crime, Punishment and Segregation in the United States: The Paradox of Local Democracy,” Crime and Punishment 17 (4) (2015): 454–481.

72 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Membership without Social Citizenship? Deservingness & Redistribution as Grounds for Equality

Irene Bloemraad, Will Kymlicka, Michèle Lamont & Leanne S. Son Hing

Abstract: Western societies have experienced a broadening of inclusive membership, whether we consider legal, interpersonal, or cultural membership. Concurrently, we have witnessed increased tensions around social citizenship, notably harsher judgments or boundaries over who “deserves” public assistance. Some have argued these phenomena are linked, with expanded, more diverse membership corroding solidarity and redistribution. We maintain that such a conclusion is premature and, especially, unsatisfactory: it fails to detail the processes–at multiple levels of analysis–behind tensions over membership and social citizenship. This essay draws on normative political theory, social psychology, cultural sociology, and political studies to build a layered explanatory framework that highlights the importance of individual feelings of group identity and threat for people’s beliefs and actions; the significance of broader cultural repertoires and notions of national solidarity as a source and product of framing contests; and the diverse ways elites, power, and institutions affect notions of membership and deservingness.

irene bloemraad is Profes- This essay explores processes by which a broad- sor of Sociology at the University ening of legal, social, and cultural membership in of California, Berkeley. Western societies appears to be accompanied by a will kymlicka is the Canada reduction in the social rights of citizenship, in part Research Chair in Political Phi- due to harsher judgments concerning the deserv- losophy at Queen’s University. ingness of low-income populations. As more di- michÈle lamont is Professor verse groups are extended formal national mem- of Sociology at Harvard Univer- bership, fewer individuals appear deserving of so- sity. cial rights, such as welfare redistribution. Why is leanne s. son hing is Asso this the case? Some explain this decline in solidar- ciate Professor in the Department ity as a simple, even mechanical response to grow- of Psychology at the University ing diversity. We offer alternative approaches to un- of Guelph. derstanding these tensions and consider pathways (Complete author biographies appear for promoting inclusive membership and broad so- at the end of the essay.) cial rights. We do so by drawing on the analytical

© 2019 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license doi:10.1162/DAED_a_01751 73 Membership tools of four distinct fields that are rare- intergroup attitudes, school textbooks, without Social ly in dialogue, proposing that positive so- popular media, and public representa- Citizenship? cial change may emerge from 1) solidar- tions of the nation). By all three measures, ity, explored by normative political the- people previously thought to be “others” orists; 2) group identity and distributive –racial, sexual, and religious minorities justice, a focus for social psychologists; and immigrants–are more likely today to 3) boundary-drawing and destigmatiza- have access to legal citizenship, to marry tion, as analyzed by cultural sociologists; someone from the majority group, and to and 4) contestation and social move- be perceived as valuable and as belonging ments, studied by political sociologists to the nation than in the 1950s. and political scientists. Sociologist T. H. In contrast, we see increased tensions Marshall famously distinguished three around social citizenship over this pe- dimensions of citizenship–civic, politi- riod. Contestation plays out in differ- cal, and social–with corresponding types ent ways. In some societies, increasing- of formal rights pertaining to legal inclu- ly harsh judgments about who deserves sion, political participation, and econom- public help distinguish the “deserving” ic redistribution (social rights), respec- poor from others. According to this logic, tively.1 He argued that modern societies one must demonstrate cultural member- are characterized by a progressive exten- ship or moral blamelessness to access re- sion of these rights to a larger number of sources, rather than receive public assis- individuals. Marshall predicted that this tance as a formal right extended to any- extension would go hand in hand with one in the national community. Other greater economic integration of all citi- societies appear to embrace welfare chau- zens, and that the decades bookending vinism: the historical beneficiaries of re- World War II would see “the subordina- distribution continue to enjoy generous tion of market price to social justice” by assistance, but newer groups, such as im- “recognizing in principle the right of the migrants, are excluded. In still other soci- citizen to a minimum standard of civi- eties, the provision of social benefits has lized living.”2 become decentralized, which accompa- Contrary to Marshall’s expectations, nies a decline in a sense of mutual obliga- we provide some evidence that the broad- tion toward low-income groups. ening of legal, interpersonal, or even cul- What processes of social change lie be- tural membership has not gone uniform- hind these tensions, and what factors may ly hand in hand with a broadening of the mitigate them? One prominent analy- distribution of welfare resources, in part sis links expanded membership but re- due to a rigidification of moral boundar- stricted social citizenship to demograph- ies based on perceptions of deservingness. ic diversity: it is posited as corrosive for On the side of broadened inclusion, we social capital, redistribution, and/or sol- consider membership in three analytical- idarity.3 We find such a conclusion pre- ly distinct ways: legal membership (as mature, given very mixed evidence.4 defined by citizenship law or formal rules Moreover, such an answer is analytically about who has access to rights); social or unsatisfactory. It does not get at the pos- interpersonal membership (referring to sible processes behind the tensions over social distance via networks of friendship membership and social citizenship, ten- and romantic relationships); and cultur- sions that we believe must be captured by al membership (who is viewed as a valu- a multilevel analysis. We begin to do this able member of society, as expressed in by combining insights about solidarity,

74 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences group identity, destigmatization, and so- national-level dynamics, tracking deserv- Bloemraad, cial movements that draw on normative ingness judgments as manifest in mem- Kymlicka, Lamont & political theory, social psychology, cul- bership in national welfare states. In this Son Hing tural sociology, and political sociology/ view, prospects for a more equal society political science. depend on national-level inclusion. In oth- In aiming to bridge levels of analysis, er accounts, boundary-drawing emerges we view these insights as complementary, from dynamic psychological processes re- each highlighting a dimension of inequal- sponsive to localized situational cues or to ity. The macrolevel concerns formal law the contingencies of particular activities, and public policy that determine mem- workplaces, social networks, and politi- bership, whether through legal rights or cal coalitions; and appeals to local cultur- bureaucratic rules governing access to ed- al scripts or, alternatively, to cultural rep- ucation, social assistance, medical care, ertoires that transcend the “nation” (such and so forth. The microlevel captures on- as human rights). Another view focuses the-ground experiences of membership instead on power and political contesta- based on interpersonal interactions and tion, with the prospects for a more equal intersubjective meaning-making. The society depending in part on the outcome mesolevel is conceptualized as scripts of such struggles. In what follows, we lay of worth, available cultural repertoires, out membership and social citizenship and practices institutionalized by orga- tensions, grapple with a set of multilevel, nizations.5 Mesolevel institutions from multidisciplinary explanatory approach- schools to workplaces establish rules, es, and consider future prospects. procedures, and norms that generate and communicate membership, and mediate One of the striking successes of the last the relationship between individuals and half-century is the struggle against ex- the state.6 Each level interacts and exer- clusionary definitions of national mem- cises reciprocal influence. bership. This is reflected in the trajecto- The literatures on which we draw share ries of both legal and sociocultural inclu- an emphasis on boundary-drawing, a pro- sion across Western democracies, which cess by which we categorize others as show a rejection of the idea that national worthy, valuable, or legitimate along di- membership is based on or limited to an mensions of morality and deservingness. ascribed ethnic background. Such symbolic boundaries, ones that dis- With respect to legal membership, the tinguish insiders and outsiders, can be ac- formal rules for acquiring citizenship or companied by reinforcing consequen- nationality have become more open.9 A tial social boundaries, as manifested by common way of describing this shift is laws and institutional rules.7 At the same as a move from ethnic to civic concep- time, stigmatized individuals and groups tions of nationhood. The former defines can resist and struggle for recognition in membership in terms of blood or ances- opposition to dominant groups that jus- try, with attendant affiliation to a cultur- tify opportunity-hoarding via moral cri- al or ethnic community. The latter defines teria.8 These literatures vary, however, in membership by residence on a state’s ter- how they understand boundary-drawing, ritory with attendant loyalty to a political including in where they locate the pro- community. Under an ethnic model, eth- cess. This then leads to different views on nic Germans living for generations in Po- how to ensure inclusive membership and land still had the right to German citizen- social solidarity. Some accounts focus on ship, even as ethnic Turks born and raised

148 (3) Summer 2019 75 Membership in Germany were effectively denied it.10 nations at three time points (1980, 2000, without Social Under the civic model, immigrants can and 2010) as indicators of “some level of Citizenship? acquire citizenship through a straightfor- public recognition and support for mi- ward naturalization process and their chil- norities to express their distinct identi- dren can acquire automatic citizenship ties and practices.” Contrary to percep- through birth in the country’s territory. tions of a retreat from multiculturalism, Over the past fifty years, the ethnic they find that cultural diversity policies definition of nationhood has been sig- have largely expanded across countries nificantly delegitimized in the Western and over time.13 world. Today, virtually all Western coun- Beyond formal policies, there are also tries accept that citizenship should be changes in public perceptions of cultur- available via naturalization to those who al membership: that is, who is viewed as have settled permanently in the country. belonging. Examining twentieth-century This logic extends to children of immi- American opinion polls, sociologists grants. They are assumed to be part of the Claude Fischer and Michael Hout have national community by their birth and documented declining “social distance” presence in the country. Thus, in their articulated by white Americans vis-à- survey of citizenship laws in eighteen vis ethnoracial or religious minorities. West European countries from the 1980s Americans across time are more willing to 2008, political scientist Maarten Vink to have someone from a minority group and law scholar Gerard-René de Groot be a citizen of the country, a coworker, a find a trend toward broader territori- friend, or even a family member, with the al birth-based citizenship, and some- most significant change happening in the what facilitated naturalization, among 1970s and 1980s.14 Changes in stated opin- countries previously holding strong de- ion are also somewhat reflected in behav- scent-based citizenship rules.11 Political ior, such as by increased intermarriage.15 scientists Marc Howard and Sara Good- Another indicator of cultural member- man’s Citizenship Policy Index yields ship is the global spread of multicultural similar results: tracking the fifteen long- education in school textbooks (see Table standing eu countries from 1980 to 2016, 1). Such texts expose students “to a depic- they have found a general opening of for- tion of their own societies as ones filled mal citizenship, although the trend has with validated diversity along many di- stalled since 2008 (see Figure 1).12 mensions.”16 In the United States, schol- The diffusion of the civic model has ars document how legislation and orga- made national membership more di- nizations in higher education and the verse. For instance, once German na- corporate world have institutionalized tional membership became available to criteria of selection and promotion that long-settled ethnic minorities, a multi- favor various diversities.17 These chang- plicity of ways of “being German” took es result in representations of societal life root, one of which is to be a German that emphasize a broadened definition of of Turkish ethnicity and Muslim faith. cultural membership in terms of gender Shifts to a more pluralistic conception and sexuality and ethnoreligious and ra- of national identity are also reflected in cial identity. diversity policy. Political scientist Keith Whether viewed as formal citizen- Banting and philosopher Will Kymlicka ship and government policy, social atti- have measured eight types of multicul- tudes and interaction, or cultural repre- tural policies across twenty-one Western sentation, membership has become more

76 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Figure 1 Bloemraad, Changes in the Citizenship Policy Index between 1980, 2008, and 2016 Kymlicka, Lamont & 6 Son Hing

3 Score cpi 2

Italy Spain Austria Finland France Greece Ireland Sweden BelgiumDenmark Germany Portugal LuxembourgNetherlands United Kingdom 1980 2008 2016

Note: Where there is no bar, a cpi score of zero is recorded for that year. Source: Marc Morjé Howard and Sara Wallace Goodman, “The Politics of Citizenship and Belonging in Europe,” in Debating Immigration, 2nd ed., ed. Carol M. Swain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). inclusive across Western democracies, al- conceptions of national membership is though with varied speed and extent and now arguably part of world culture. including moments of backlash. Ideas of These ideas do not penetrate equally civic and pluralistic nationhood are now across social strata.19 Over one-third of part of “world culture.” The postwar pe- citizens in most oecd (Organisation for riod has witnessed the “rise of global Economic Co-Operation and Develop- models of nationally organized progress ment) countries–including the United and justice” that articulate the appropri- States–believe that someone must share ate goals of state action, such as economic the dominant religion to be truly a mem- development and individual rights, while ber of the nation, and over two-thirds be- delegitimizing older goals, such as the lieve that one must be born in the coun- pursuit of divine missions or racial and try to be “truly” American (or French, or religious purity.18 These global models Austrian, and so on; see Table 2). While provide the cultural frameworks within recent data suggest that the importance which state elites establish the “modern” of birthplace may be declining for coun- and progressive credentials of their countries that have experienced high immi- try. The transition to civic and pluralistic gration in the last three decades, support

148 (3) Summer 2019 77 Membership Table 1 without Social Textbook Depictions of Discrimination and Group Rights over Time Citizenship? Groups Experiencing Discrimination 1950–1974 1975–1994 1995–2010 Women 0.12 0.15 0.34**** Other Minorities 0.13 0.25*** 0.33* Immigrants and Refugees 0.06 0.19**** 0.28** Workers 0.21 0.27 0.24 Indigenous 0.10 0.22*** 0.21 Children 0.06 0.06 0.20**** Gays/Lesbians 0.01 0.02 0.04* Groups Bearing Rights 1950–1974 1975–1994 1995–2010 Women 0.14 0.16 0.32**** Other Minorities 0.08 0.15* 0.23** Immigrants and Refugees 0.05 0.06 0.13* Workers 0.19 0.24 0.22 Indigenous 0.03 0.07 0.09 Children 0.09 0.09 0.19*** Gays/Lesbians 0.01 0.01 0.03* Humans (Human Rights) 0.26 0.32 0.45***

Note: **** p < .001, *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1; two-tailed tests. “Human rights” refers to rights that are de- picted as being owed to people because of their membership in the human race. Source: Luke Terra and Patricia Bromley, “The Globalization of Multicultural Education in Social Science Textbooks,” Multicultural Perspectives 14 (3) (2012): 136–143; analyzing 548 secondary social science textbooks–history, civics, social studies, and geography–from ninety-three countries published from 1950 to 2010.

for exclusionary conceptions of nation- population seen as deserving of redistrib- hood has been relatively stable over the utive support has arguably shrunk, at least past twenty years (see Table 3). This helps in some Western countries, although the to explain why there is a significant pool empirical evidence is less clear-cut here of support for populist parties seeking than for expanding national membership. to “take back” the nation. In particular, Public attitudes toward the welfare state the American National Election Survey are complex. Examining the British Social reveals an increase in xenophobia since Attitudes Survey from 1986 to 2009, the 2016.20 It remains to be seen whether this data show, at first glance, resilient support trend will persist moving forward. for redistribution. British respondents express strong support for the idea that We turn now to social citizenship, the state has an obligation to redistrib- which refers to the responsibilities that ute income from the better-off to the less- the state has to its citizens, including “the well-off, and this commitment has not right to a modicum of economic welfare changed significantly over the last twenty- and security.”21 Whereas national mem- five years.22 This finding is consistent with bership has expanded, the segment of the other studies showing stability in support

78 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Table 2 Bloemraad, “To Be Truly [National Identity], How Important Is It to Be a [Religion]?” Kymlicka, Lamont & Son Hing Percent Saying “Very Important” or “Fairly Important” Country 1995 2003 2013 2016 Australia 31.5 36.9 29.0 Austria 54.2 53.1 Bulgaria 71.1 76.2 Canada 24.5 54.0 34.0 Czech Republic 22.2 29.3 28.6 Denmark 33.2 23.9 Finland 23.0 21.0 France 17.5 18.5 23.0 East Germany 21.7 13.3 13.3 West Germany 33.8 37.1 29.4 Hungary 35.9 43.2 46.5 66.0 Ireland 54.4 57.8 31.4 Israel (Arabs) 23.7 5.8 Israel (Jews) 84.1 69.0 Japan 26.5 25.4 20.9 Latvia 35.4 22.5 25.1 The Netherlands 7.3 13.1 24.0 New Zealand 30.2 37.4 Norway 21.4 20.3 20.2 Philippines 82.9 84.4 85.9 Poland 52.7 74.8 71.0 Portugal 65.6 36.3 Russia 39.7 58.3 73.6 Slovakia 27.0 49.7 54.1 Slovenia 33.8 32.5 22.8 South Korea 41.0 46.3 Spain 46.7 44.0 33.9 19.0 Sweden 17.4 17.2 10.4 17.0 Switzerland 39.3 30.7 Taiwan 26.1 19.8 United Kingdom 35.5 34.8 31.1 37.0 United States 53.7 65.8 45.8 51.0 Average across Countries 36.8 39.7 35.8 37.1

148 (3) Summer 2019 79 Membership Table 3 without Social “To Be Truly [National Identity], How Important Is It to Have Been Born Here?” Citizenship? Percent Saying “Very Important” or “Fairly Important” Country 1995 2003 2013 2016 Australia 55.7 58.8 31.0 Austria 72.2 75.3 Bulgaria 87.6 89.9 Canada 45.4 75.1 43.0 Czech Republic 69.4 78.5 83.8 Denmark 67.5 58.9 Finland 69.2 59.3 France 61.1 64.4 47.0 East Germany 56.5 65.6 62.5 West Germany 50.7 57.4 55.1 Hungary 67.9 71.2 81.6 81.0 Ireland 85.9 84.7 80.4 Japan 68.5 76.5 69.3 77.0 Latvia 66.3 71.2 70.1 The Netherlands 52.1 49.2 42.0 New Zealand 69.4 76.9 Norway 62.2 64.8 60.4 Philippines 96.4 95.6 96.0 Poland 81.5 87.8 80.0 Portugal 90.8 74.3 Russia 72.2 84.9 87.4 Slovakia 65.3 60.2 84.7 Slovenia 69.1 68.3 56.4 South Korea 80.5 82.2 Spain 78.0 88.4 72.8 58.0 Sweden 50.4 48.2 41.0 20.0 Switzerland 52.0 52.9 Taiwan 66.1 61.2 United Kingdom 78.5 73.4 77.5 56.0 United States 68.8 77.4 65.5 55.0 Average across Countries 69.1 72.9 71.5 53.6

Note: The 2016 Pew Research data are for respondents reporting “very important” or “somewhat important.” For 1995, 2003, and 2013, the average includes data for the sixteen countries with data for each wave. Source: Interna- tional Social Survey Programme, ISSP 1995–National Identity I, za2880 (Köln: gesis, Leibniz Institute for the So- cial Sciences, 1995); International Social Survey Programme, ISSP 2003–National Identity II, za3910 (Köln: gesis, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 2003); International Social Survey Programme, ISSP 2013–National Identity III, za5950 (Köln: gesis, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 2013); and Bruce Stokes, “What It Takes to Tru- ly Be ‘One of Us’” (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2017). 80 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences for redistribution in most Western coun- this day, Americans remain approving of Bloemraad, tries for the past forty years.23 the rich, especially if they maintain con- Kymlicka, 29 Lamont & However, when the British surveys ask ditions for creating wealth for all. The Son Hing about support for redistribution to partic- basic American structure of moral class ular groups of welfare beneficiaries, nu- boundaries continues to condemn “the ances emerge. The perception that some lower half” and to validate the “people beneficiaries are untrustworthy and un- above.”30 deserving has grown markedly.24 Oth- This sort of “responsibilization” may be er European data have found that deserv- one effect of the global turn toward neo- ingness judgments are becoming more liberalism, which emphasizes the privat- harsh toward single mothers, the unem- ization of risk, market competitiveness, ployed, the disabled, and immigrants, and a definition of cultural membership but not, significantly, toward the elderly grounded in entrepreneurialism.31 Con- or the sick.25 Thus, beneath the apparent sistent with such an argument, in France, stability in supporting the welfare state, survey data from 1983 to 2003 show that there has been a decline in solidarity to- the proportion of French residents who ward particular groups of recipients. think that welfare may lead the poor to be Similar trends have been observed in satisfied with their situation and conse- the United States. While social distance quently not want to work increased from has decreased and mixed-race partner- 23 to 53 percent. The number of those who ships have increased, blacks continue to think that the poor receive too many re- be seen by many as responsible for their sources from the state also rose from 25 own disadvantaged status. For example, percent in 1992 to 54 percent in 2012.32 the percentage of whites who believe that Unfortunately, we do not have compa- blacks just need to try harder to succeed rable long-term data from most other ad- increased from 70 percent in the 1970s vanced economies. Crossnational sur- to approximately 80 percent by the mid- veys only started to ask about responsibil- 1980s.26 The passage of the Personal Re- ity for disadvantage in 1987, well into the sponsibility and Work Opportunity Rec- neoliberal era, and the questions are not onciliation Act (prwora) in 1996 is of- sufficiently specific to get at deserving- ten interpreted as reflecting, and further ness judgments.33 One country with long- fueling, a view of the poor as undeserv- term data on deservingness judgments, ing. Psychiatrist Helena Hansen and col- the Netherlands, appears to present a con- leagues have argued that these policy trast to the United States and Great Brit- changes forced the poor to rely on psy- ain. The Cultural Changes in the Nether- chiatric diagnoses to justify disability lands survey asked deservingness ques- benefits, thereby stigmatizing poverty as tions about specific beneficiary groups a “permanent medical pathology.”27 The between 1975 and 2006.34 Survey respons- prwora also excluded various catego- es show some hardening in deserving- ries of noncitizens from benefits, shifting ness judgments for various beneficiaries the boundaries of social citizenship from between 1995 and 2002, but this is sand- territorial residence to a narrower deter- wiched between periods in which atti- mination of legal status. For the Ameri- tudes became more solidaristic; the over- can working class, self-reliance, laziness, all thirty-year trend line is positive, not and responsibility gained centrality in negative (see Figure 2). Thus, the trend framing the moral stigmatization of the toward more exclusionary deservingness poor, and especially of poor blacks.28 To judgments does not appear to be universal.

148 (3) Summer 2019 81 Membership Figure 2 without Social The Percentage of People Who Believe That Recipients of Benefits Are Deserving of More, 1975–2006 Citizenship? 60

0 1975 1981 1977 1991 1983 1985 1978 1987 1993 1995 1979 1997 1982 1976 1988 1992 1984 1989 1998 1986 1994 1999 1996 1980 1990 2001 2003 2005 2002 2004 2006 2000 Old Age Pension Unemployment Benefit Social Assistance Benefit Sickness Benefit Disability Benefit

Source: Marjolein Jeene, Wim van Oorschot, and Wilfred Uunk, “The Dynamics of Welfare Opinions in Chang- ing Economic, Institutional and Political Contexts: An Empirical Analysis of Dutch Deservingness Opinions, 1975–2006,” Social Indicators Research 115 (2) (2014): 731–749.

Still, considering crossnational In- the accomplishment of deserving indi- ternational Social Survey Programme viduals, as opposed to more structural ex- (issp) data over a shorter time period, planations.36 The evidence thus remains we can identify three tendencies. First, incomplete, but it does appear that peo- there is relative stability in citizens’ be- ple in many Western countries are more liefs regarding the deservingness of the likely to say that members of particular sick and elderly.35 Second, we find a de- low-income groups are responsible for crease in sympathy for the unemployed: their own fate, and so disavow obliga- the issp data show a fairly consistent tions of solidarity toward them. crossnational decline in support for the Of course, deservingness judgments unemployed across the five waves (1985, are not the only factor that affects atti- 1990, 1996, 2006, and 2016) among six- tudes about the welfare state. Political sci- teen of the twenty-four countries (see Ta- entist Charlotte Cavaillé has argued that ble 4). And third, we see a greater likeli- since the less-well-off have a strong self- hood to attribute societal success to hard interest in supporting the welfare state, work: that is, to see inequality in terms of they will continue to do so, even if they

82 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Table 4 Bloemraad, “Do You Think the Government Has a Responsibility to Provide a Decent Standard of Living Kymlicka, for the Unemployed?” Lamont & Son Hing

Percent Saying Either “Definitely” or “Probably” Country 1985 1990 1996 2006 2016 Australia 59.0 55.7 65.2 57.3 55.2 Canada 65.5 63.1 Czech Republic 44.7 48.4 48.2 France 80.9 70.2 70.2 East Germany 94.1 91.6 79.7 70.2 West Germany 85.4 78.4 80.4 66.7 72.9 Hungary 72.3 62.8 69.2 73.1 Ireland 90.6 91.5 81.8 Israel 62.1 62.5 65.3 65.8 Palestine 85.5 60.3 Italy 84.8 77.8 75.1 Japan 73.0 56.5 53.4 Latvia 82.6 64.9 63.3 New Zealand 63.5 49.2 62.7 Norway 90.6 92.7 88.5 89.3 Philippines 72.5 79.3 Poland 81.2 81.6 Russia 80.6 68.2 75.0 Slovenia 86.4 82.8 80.0 Spain 93.9 92.8 96.2 Sweden 90.3 83.4 76.4 Switzerland 71.6 67.0 72.5 United Kingdom 85.6 80.1 78.7 57.3 60.2 United States 50.3 52.9 47.7 52.0 56.6 Average across Countries 73.0 75.5 75.9 68.9 69.0

Source: International Social Survey Programme, ISSP 1985/1990/1996/2006 Cumulation–Role of Government I–IV, za4747 (Köln: gesis, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 2008); and International Social Survey Pro- gramme, ISSP 2016–Role of Government V, za6900 (Köln: gesis, Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 2018). become increasingly harsh in their de- this out (see Figure 3). If she is correct, the servingness judgments toward (other) political impact of shifts in deservingness recipients.37 But she has suggested that judgments may have been blunted due to harsher deservingness judgments are like- subgroup variations in opinion. ly to erode support for the welfare state among the well-off, and evidence from We have evidence that over the past Great Britain and Denmark seems to bear fifty years, definitions of membership

148 (3) Summer 2019 83 Membership Figure 3 without Social Predicted Support for a Decrease in Spending and Taxes: Citizenship? Top versus Bottom Income Quintiles in Great Britain and Denmark Great Britain .8

.2 Probability of Supporting Retrenchment 0 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5 Deservingness Beliefs (from Undeserving to Deserving) Top Income Quintile Bottom Income Quintile

Denmark 1

.2 Probability of Supporting Retrenchement 0 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5 Deservingness Beliefs (from Undeserving to Deserving) Top Income Quintile Bottom Income Quintile

Source: Charlotte Cavaillé, “Deservingness, Self-Interest and the Welfare State: Why Some Care More about Deservingness Than Others,” lis Working Paper Series No. 652 (Luxembourg: Luxembourg Income Study Cross-National Data Center, 2015).

84 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences have become more pluralistic and inclu- terms, people are not just “rational” in Bloemraad, sive, but judgments about social citizen- the sense of efficiently pursuing their per- Kymlicka, Lamont & ship (welfare redistribution) have become sonal good, but also “reasonable” in the Son Hing more restrictive or more fraught. These sense of acknowledging the legitimate two trends are not universal or linear; they claims of others. A more egalitarian so- vary in strength across different coun- ciety requires that the advantaged–the tries, and across public opinion and public strong, the fortunate, the talented–mod- policy. Still, we believe that these tensions erate their claims and forgo opportuni- are relevant for a politics of equality, and ties to exploit their power and privileges. that the prospects for a more equal and in- A sense of justice can motivate the advan- clusive society depend in part on whether taged to accept these constraints in the we can sustain the move toward inclusive pursuit of their self-interest. national membership while avoiding the Political theorists typically distinguish potential for exclusionary and stigmatiz- two dimensions of this sense of justice, ing deservingness judgments. which we might call universal humanitari- We draw from four disciplinary per- anism and bounded solidarity. Universal hu- spectives to make sense of these two manitarianism is a direct response to the trends, highlighting micro-, meso-, and suffering of others, whoever and wher- macroprocesses. ever they are. We can be moved to pro- From the perspective of normative po- vide aid to famines in distant societies, litical theory, these trends can be under- or to provide emergency health care for stood through the lens of solidarity, which tourists who fall ill, whether or not they in turn implicates people’s sense of justice. are members of our society. Some people Here, we firstdescribe these concepts, even protect members of other species and then show how they can shed light from harm. These humanitarian respons- on our two trends. es do not depend on shared membership Political theory is a field of normative in a bounded community. inquiry: its aim is not to explain how Other obligations, however, are tied things are, but rather to identify how to membership, and hence to bound- things ought to be. It is also an exercise in ed solidarity. Most political theorists in- “practical reason”: it is supposed to give clude the welfare state in this category. us reasons for action. And, if political The welfare state is not just a humanitar- theory is to be action-guiding rather than ian impulse to relieve suffering. The wel- idle fantasy, its conclusions about what fare state, in the robust form endorsed by ought to be must be feasible. Political the- progressives, has historically been root- ory is about “realistic utopias,” in politi- ed in an ethic of social membership. Social cal philosopher John Rawls’s phrase, and justice is about the mutual obligations so must be consistent with what we know we have to one another as members of about human capacities to act justly.38 a shared society; it rests on some image There is little point in elaborating a vi- of a decent, good, or just society that be- sion of justice if people are unable to rec- longs to all of its members, and of the ognize the legitimate claims of others, or sort of egalitarian relations that should moderate the pursuit of their own self-in- characterize it. We might say that justice terest to help the disadvantaged. Hobbes among members is egalitarian, not just aside, most political theorists have as- humanitarian. sumed that people do indeed have the ca- If this is correct, it raises two ques- pacity for a sense of justice. In Rawls’s tions. How are the boundaries of social

148 (3) Summer 2019 85 Membership membership determined: that is, how do relation to social rights. Access to welfare without Social we determine who can claim the benefits resources has eroded, or at least become Citizenship? of bounded solidarity in addition to uni- more conditional on deservingness judg- versal humanitarianism? And what does ments, which in effect means it is not re- the ethic of membership require: that is, ally a right of membership at all, but rath- what do we owe our comembers in re- er something stigmatized groups need to gards to social rights and redistribution? earn in the face of suspicions about their On the first question, most political the- need or effort. orists assume that the primary basis for As a result, a wider range of people can bounded solidarity is the nation. There now claim national membership, but the is no logical necessity for this. Through- sense of bounded solidarity triggered out history, a wide range of social units by inclusion within the national “we” is have played this role, some below the na- blunted by stigmatizing deservingness tion (such as kin groups) and some above judgments toward the poor and racial- (such as global religions). But over the ized minorities. Recognition of member- past two hundred years, the nation-state ship calls on us to care for and share the has become the primary focus for bound- fate of our conationals, but deservingness ed solidarity. And many political theorists judgments allow us to disengage morally argue that nationhood is a particularly from the fate of our fellow citizens. powerful basis for solidarity, since nation- Many political theorists despair about hood is often defined as a community of the rise of moralistic deservingness judg- shared fate. To inculcate a sense of shared ments, and some seek a conception of nationhood among citizens–as modern bounded solidarity that preempts ques- nation-states seek to do–is in part to in- tions of deservingness. However, this culcate a sense of mutual obligation, in- may not be possible. It is not enough, in cluding redistributive obligations.39 making membership-based claims, to While nationhood remains the primary say that one is human or has urgent in- basis for bounded solidarity, the evidence terests: that is the logic of humanitarian- discussed previously suggests that defini- ism. Rather, membership-based claims tions of national membership are chang- require individuals to have certain types ing. In the past, ideas of nationhood were of social relationships and affiliations. culturally assimilationist and racially ex- Someone is part of the national “we” be- clusionary. More recently, the boundar- cause she has made a life here, complies ies of membership have expanded to in- with its social norms, shares in the bur- corporate previously excluded ethnic, ra- dens of social cooperation, participates cial, and religious groups. In principle, in its institutionalized forms of reciproc- this entails an obligation to reconstruct ity and risk-pooling, shows concern for social relations on a more egalitarian ba- its collective well-being and collective fu- sis. If someone is a member of society, ture, and contributes in ways that suit her then society belongs to them as much as capacities. It is these membership-based to anyone else, and the common institu- attitudes and behaviors that justify dis- tions that govern the society should be tinguishing solidaristic obligations to as responsive to their interests and per- comembers from humanitarian obliga- spectives as to anyone else’s. Unfortu- tions to tourists or foreigners. nately, this expansion in national mem- This suggests that the demands of bership has not been accompanied by bounded solidarity prompt certain feelings of mutual obligation, at least in types of deservingness judgments. Some

86 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences commentators suggest that deserving- judgments–this may be characteristic Bloemraad, ness judgments reflectthe triumph of of any bounded solidarity–but that they Kymlicka, 43 Lamont & neoliberal tropes about self-reliance over make these judgments in biased ways. Son Hing bounded solidarities, but in fact, bound- All too often, citizens privilege those who ed solidarity generates its own logic of de- belong and contribute in the same way servingness. Our solidaristic obligations that they do, while discounting the co- to comembers depend on the assumption operation and affiliation of those who that they have a depth of commitment to differ from them. Inherited conceptions and engagement in our society that non- of membership have been defined by members do not have. And this, arguably, and for historically dominant groups, in is what many deservingness judgments ways that valorize their specific modes track. Surveys suggest that deservingness of being and belonging. This suggests judgments are composed of five dimen- that the route to a more equal society re- sions, four of which we highlight here.40 quires challenging biased perceptions of The first–control, or the extent to which the (non)contribution and (non)affilia- someone’s disadvantage was under their tion of people with disabilities, the poor, voluntary control–may indeed reflect or immigrants, just as feminism chal- neoliberal ideas of individual responsi- lenged biased perceptions of women’s bility. Three other dimensions, however, contributions. seem to reflect perceptions of social com- In short, struggles for a more equal so- mitment. These three dimensions are: ciety require attending to bounded sol- attitude (the extent to which recipients are idarity, which rests on an ethic of mem- seen as accepting benefits in the spirit of bership, which in turn rests on expec- civic friendship); reciprocity (the extent to tations of belonging, contribution, and which recipients are seen as likely to help allegiance that underpin deservingness other members when it is their turn to do judgments. Insofar as these expectations so); and identity (the extent to which re- are biased, a crucial political task is to de- cipients are seen as belonging to a shared velop new narratives of national mem- society).41 While much of the literature bership that recognize a wider range of on deservingness focuses on the control legitimate modes of being, participation, dimension–and hence on perceptions of contribution, and affiliation. laziness or work ethic–the evidence sug- This may sound overly theoretical, but gests that perceptions of social commit- the real-world politics of equality argument are equally powerful.42 ably fit this diagnosis. Claims to equali- The salience of these criteria should ty are rarely articulated solely in the lan- not be surprising if, as Marshall argued, guage of shared humanity, but rather the welfare state is rooted in a “sense of stake claims to belonging and member- community membership.” Judgments ship. Equality-seeking groups typically of identity, attitude, and reciprocity ask want to be recognized, not just as fully whether someone displays the attitudes human, but as fully American or fully and behaviors that distinguish members French. They want to be recognized as from nonmembers (or conversely, wheth- belonging here and as participating in er someone has renounced the respon- and contributing to a shared society.44 sibilities of membership and shown no Claims to membership and contribution commitment to society and its future). are often central to people’s sense of mor- This suggests that the problem is al worth, and to the way they understand not that citizens make deservingness the claims they can make on others.

148 (3) Summer 2019 87 Membership How then can we challenge biased per- such as beliefs about what others de- without Social ceptions of belonging? Ideas of multicul- serve, result from individual differences Citizenship? turalism might help. Multiculturalism is that vary depending on the situation and often understood as simply a feel-good context. celebration of diversity. Within political At an individual level, people form con- theory, however, multiculturalism does ceptions of their own and others’ social not simply celebrate diverse identities, identities that can be nested. Superordi- but recognizes them as modes of partic- nate groups can consist of multiple sub- ipating in and contributing to the nation- groups. Thus, for instance, while we may al society, and hence as valid ways of ex- all be Canadians, there are also English- pressing an ethic of membership. A soli- Canadians, Chinese-Canadians, and so darity-promoting multiculturalism starts on. Notably, despite a conscious recogni- from the premise that one way to be a tion that a variety of ethnic subgroups are proud and loyal Canadian is to be a proud citizens, people may hold different associ- Greek-Canadian or gay-Canadian or Crip- ations at an automatic or implicit level.46 Canadian, and that the activities of one’s There is empirical evidence that Ameri- group are understood as forms of belong- cans–of multiple ethnicities–associate ing and investing in society.45 The politi- “American” with the category “White” cal task of multiculturalism, in part, is to more quickly than with “Black,” “Latino,” provide opportunities for differences to or “Asian.”47 Thus, an acknowledgment be visibly manifested in spaces that mark of the legal membership of diverse eth- them as manifestations of civic friend- nic groups may not necessarily align with ship, engagement, contribution, and alle- an implicit categorization of who is truly giance. In this way, a politics of recogni- one of “us.” Such categorization process- tion aimed at affirming cultural member- es are highly consequential: people have ship is intimately linked to the politics of a strong tendency to ascribe more posi- redistribution aimed at social citizenship. tive characteristics to, place greater trust The specifics of what this would rein, and allocate more outcomes to ingroup quire vary from group to group, in part than outgroup members.48 because the stigmas and prejudices that The process of demarcating boundar- discount people’s membership and con- ies between us and them is strongly de- tribution vary from group to group. But termined by situational and contextual by confronting the sources of the ma- threat cues. At the most basic level, peo- jority’s biased deservingness judgments ple’s experience of fear can lead them and creating opportunities for minorities to more readily designate others as out- to exhibit their adherence to an ethic of group members.49 Perceiving a difficult membership, we might combine inclu- economic context and intergroup com- sive definitions of nationhood with social petition can cause a rise in people’s social citizenship. dominance orientation (sdo), which is a general preference for group-based hi- From a social-psychological perspective, erarchy, and right-wing authoritarian- a movement toward more inclusive na- ism (rwa), which involves an author- tional membership may result in harsh- itarian desire to punish outgroups seen er deservingness judgments for some but as deviant.50 In turn, sdo and rwa pre- not others, and only in certain contexts. dict prejudice toward immigrants be- Social psychologists take a contingen- cause they are seen to be threats and to- cy approach: understanding responses, ward the poor because they are assumed

88 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences to be ethnic minorities who are respon- and immigrants, attitudes toward immi- Bloemraad, sible for their fate.51 An international grants become more positive.58 Howev- Kymlicka, Lamont & survey found that the more cultural and er, the same priming does not affect Ger- Son Hing economic threat respondents felt, the man participants’ attitudes toward im- more they excluded those without com- migrants.59 Presumably, Canadians and mon ancestry or birthplace from nation- Germans still differ in the malleability of al identity.52 their beliefs that immigrants belong to For some, the opening of civil, social, the ingroup due to differences in policy and cultural membership can act as a history or popular or elite discourse that source of threat. For those who strongly employ civic (or multicultural) frames of identify with a subgroup (such as white nationality. Notably, when people are in- Americans), an emphasis solely on a su- duced to consider how immigrants and perordinate identity (such as “we are all the national group do not share a mor- Americans”) threatens their distinctive al community, they show less ethical ob- identity.53 The integration of former out- ligation for the welfare and interests of groups can be viewed as a form of cultural people with a different religion, ethnicity, or identity threat (they are not really “one and beliefs, and they are more supportive of us”), social threat (they are pushing to of social policies that restrict outcomes be included where they do not belong), or for immigrants.60 economic threat (“reverse discrimination Unlike political theorists’ conception harms me”). Thus, ethnic outgroup mem- of deservingness judgments, which re- bers seen as pushing for inclusion could quire civic participation and reciprocity, be met with backlash consisting of sharp- for social psychologists, deservingness er ingroup-outgroup boundaries and judgments are often tied to the distribu- meager outgroup resource allocations.54 tive justice principle of equity. Outcomes These processes can be manipulated by are equitable if, as a target’s inputs (such political elites.55 Thus, fear of outsiders as abilities, traits, effort, and so on) in- can be used to bolster ingroup identities crease, so do outcomes (such as money or and to maintain political power.56 jobs), in relation to a relevant compari- Framings of citizenship can affect these son other.61 In an ideal world, when using psychological processes and deserving- the equity principle, it would be possi- ness judgments. In countries where an ble to: identify appropriate inputs, mea- ethnic model of citizenship is widely ensure these inputs accurately, and weigh dorsed, people with a stronger nation- these inputs appropriately. However, al identification hold more negative atti- such judgments are prone to a variety of tudes toward immigrants, including the biases.62 belief that the government spends too People tend to evaluate whether out- much money on them.57 The same re- come allocations are fair in ways that fa- lation does not hold in countries where vor themselves and their ingroups at the an ethnic model of citizenship is less expense of outgroups.63 They will place strong. Thus, restrictive grounds for cit- more weight on inputs that favor in- izenship narrow conceptions of the ingroups over outgroups, while stereo- group and lead to less generosity. On types of outgroups bias assessments of the flip side, civic framings of citizen- their competence and worth.64 Both ex- ship create opportunities for inclusion. plicit and implicit prejudices affect judg- When Canadians are primed to think of ments of others’ deservingness and, con- Canada as including native-born people sequently, allocation decisions.65 Indeed,

148 (3) Summer 2019 89 Membership people who more strongly believe that sustained interaction, stereotypes can without Social society is a properly operating meritoc- be challenged, friendships built, anxi- Citizenship? racy engage in more prejudice, stereotyp- eties lessened, and superordinate identi- ing, and harsh deservingness judgments ties formed.69 This should reduce oppo- of disadvantaged group members, such sition to inclusion based on biases or per- as women or ethnic minorities.66 These ceived threat.70 Further, when social re- biases are ostensibly made on the basis of lations are more proximate and marked merit and, as such, people can discrimi- by similarity, liking, or long-term inter- nate against outgroup members without actions, we see a stronger preference for necessarily appearing prejudiced. equality or need-based allocations than Political sociologists may consider the equity-based allocations.71 Thus, judg- psychological processes and judgments ments of deservingness could be by- of normal people to be unimportant if passed altogether. they fail to influencepublic policy. How- These interventions may, in the short ever, such a view ignores the importance term, be met with resistance, but they of such judgments for people’s daily af- all draw on an understanding of how to fect, thought, and behavior: Whom to shape people’s social, economic, politi- hire, fire, or promote? What is some- cal, and cultural contexts so that social- one’s worth? Who are desirable neigh- psychological processes may lead, over bors and friends? Such responses in turn time, to more inclusive conceptions of affect marginalized group members’ feel- “us” deserving greater equality. ings of belongingness, experiences of discrimination, livelihoods, well-being, and From a boundary perspective, the ten- health.67 sions between more inclusive national So how can psychological processes membership and exclusionary or tiered that lead to harsh deservingness judg- social citizenship are not surprising. This ments be mitigated? Moreover, if socie- is because a boundary approach distin- tal shifts toward greater inclusion create, guishes between symbolic and social for some, a feeling of threat that exacer- boundaries. Symbolic boundaries refer bates these processes, what might bring to the evaluative distinctions made be- about greater equality and inclusion? tween groups of people (class, ethnora- First, macrolevel interventions that cial, religious, and gender groups, includ- promote a multicultural yet united na- ing the poor, immigrants, and others) or tional identity could lead people to be through practices (such as cultural con- less biased in their application of the eq- sumption, expressions of masculinity, uity principle as ethnic and other minori- or national sentiments). Social bound- ties come to be classified as prototypical aries refer to patterns of associations as ingroup members. Second, mesolevel in- manifested in degrees of separation and terventions should increase diversity in proximity between groups (through in- institutions such as workplaces, schools, termarriage, homophily in friendship, and universities. According to the con- spatial segregation, and so on).72 Both tact hypothesis, if people have the oppor- are bases for opportunity-hoarding and tunity to interact with outgroup mem- closure, including access to social rights bers in contexts in which they have equal (welfare resources).73 As such, recogni- status and shared goals that they work tion and distribution are distinct but in- on interdependently, prejudice will be terconnected dimensions of inequality. reduced.68 Through opportunities for Recognition is about extending cultural

90 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences membership to the widest segments a boundary approach explicitly frames Bloemraad, of the population, defining the largest boundaries as highly variable and tied Kymlicka, 77 Lamont & number as worthy. But how this can be to varying degrees of groupness. De- Son Hing achieved depends on cultural process- grees of groupness result from pathways es that are different from mechanisms of involving 1) us/them self-identification the distribution of resources.74 and group categorization experienced at A boundary approach considers the sa- the individual level; 2) widely available lience of boundaries, how they interact, narratives about the deservingness of their characteristics and properties (such groups and about the institutionalization as whether they are crossable, bright, or of criteria of worth (not only moral, but blurred), the processes of their trans- also cultural and socioeconomic); 3) so- formation, and how cultural producers cial boundaries, or the degree of separa- (such as politicians and journalists) make tion and proximity between groups; and some boundaries more visible than oth- 4) other background factors pertaining to ers.75 For instance, Michèle Lamont and the institutional and legal context, the ex- colleagues analyzed the electoral speech- tent of inequality, and more.78 es of Donald Trump in his 2016 presiden- The boundary approach locates indi- tial campaign and demonstrated how the viduals in multidimensional environ- candidate’s negative and positive refer- ments, with time, spatial, network, and ences to various polarizing groups (the organizational dynamics. Individual po- poor, lgbtq, illegal and legal immi- sitions are defined relationally (through grants, Muslims, and others) resonat- fields dynamics) and entail experiences of ed with some of the symbolic boundar- relative group position or group competi- ies drawn by white working-class men tion. Also, while social psychologists con- twenty years ago, thus helping to validate sider how microsituations (such as lev- their sense of dignity and bolstering their els of interdependence) influence iden- claim of superior relative positioning.76 A tity, the boundary approach is concerned primary focus of the boundary approach with how boundary patterns change is to understand how cultural member- over time as well as cultural and social ship (worthiness) is extended to various structuring factors, such as the taken- groups. This framework has been applied for-grantedness of scripts. to cases such as the construction of the An important focal point is understand- public sphere in Norway, the everyday ing stigmatization and destigmatization cosmopolitanism of British blue-collar processes. For instance, how have groups workers, how the French army excludes that were formally stigmatized, such as Muslims, the destigmatization of Turks people living with hiv/aids, come to be in Germany, how noise serves as a marker more included as compared with groups of ethnic boundaries in Israel, and more. that remain stigmatized, such as the While there is a great deal of varia- obese? Michèle Lamont and colleagues tion in social-psychological approach- Caitlin Daniel and Matthew Clair show es to identity, these typically focus on in- that the transformation of the relative ingroup/outgroup dynamics at the intra- clusion of the former group involved the individual or interpersonal levels. The collaboration of knowledge producers opposition between us and them is often (medical, policy, legal, and social science said to result from evolution (in the form experts) and advocates and moral entre- of tribalism) and to be a standard fea- preneurs (social movements leaders).79 ture of human psychology. In contrast, They mobilized widely available cultural

148 (3) Summer 2019 91 Membership resources, such as the ideology of equal- sibility toward the needy, and a decline without Social ity, to build bridges with social move- of social solidarity more generally.82 To Citizenship? ments, and progressively legitimized understand these changes, one consid- and diffused shared cultural scripts de- ers not only how the poor are stigmatized finingthe destigmatized group as ratio- morally, but also broader cultural chang- nal (capable of self-control) or deserves: the rise of market fundamentalism ing (in terms of merit, morality, self-re- and individualism, shared views about liance, or other criteria). The role of the what defines a polity and what are the media and journalists is also important, shared responsibilities that bind comem- as well as organizations that institution- bers, and so on.83 Such cultural changes alize practices reinforcing equality be- can be studied empirically through pro- tween groups (corporations, higher edu- cess-tracing, which requires considering cation, politics, and so on). The symbol- not only which groups get most exclud- ic boundaries toward such groups (such ed (illegal immigrants, the poor, Mus- as feelings of social distance and dislike) lims) and how this varies across nation- weaken, at the same time that individuals al contexts, but also what factors make come to experience weaker social bound- boundaries become more or less perme- aries (through legal change and access to able or porous.84 For example, sociologist resources, for instance). Andreas Wimmer gives an account for Power struggles around status order changes in boundaries, focusing on 1) the are central to the transformation of these political salience of ethnic boundaries; social and symbolic boundaries, as illus- 2) social closure and exclusion along eth- trated in countless histories of the wom- nic lines; 3) cultural differentiation been’s and civil rights movements. The lat- tween groups; and 4) stability over time.85 ter require the progressive construction An advantage of the boundary ap- of groups as having agency and a mod- proach is that it does not predefinewhat icum of cultural coherence and shared arguments ground the beliefs of ordinary identity. Such transformations are often people concerning similarities and differ- described in terms of available cultural/ ences between us and them, whether that cognitive repertoires, and intergroup and we are all worthy as “children of God,” organizational dynamics, which make human beings, consumers, citizens, or some individual prejudices/stereotypes conationals. The salience of arguments more or less likely. The emphasis is typ- is studied empirically and is generally ically not on the immediate (proximate) found to vary across populations. This situation but on mesolevel changes, even contrasts with sociologists Luc Boltanski if “carried” by individuals.80 While these and Laurent Thevenot’s work on cités, frames may be contested and fought over, which predefines orders of justification an agreement builds around them to the that are used across types of situations.86 point at which they become progressive- Their approach specifies criteria based ly taken for granted and new collective on types of logic of legitimation found in identities consolidate, converging with the political philosophy literature (such the social mobilization approach de- as criteria of industrial efficiency, mar- scribed below.81 ket rationality, civic bonds, “domes- In this view, exclusion of the poor de- tic” proximity, and so on). The bound- pends not only on shared views about ary approach instead proceeds inductive- their deservingness, but also on the de- ly to document the relative salience of cline in scripts about collective respon- arguments about worth, and to account

92 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences for patterns in reference to macrosocial cultural scripts. The ideals, schema, and Bloemraad, changes, such as the diffusion of neolib- scripts in people’s minds may be conse- Kymlicka, Lamont & eral arguments concerning who is worthy quential if we believe that public opinion Son Hing (such as the association of worth with fi- has a direct influence on the provision of nancial success and self-reliance). social benefits and enactment of policies What does the boundary approach sug- that enhance social citizenship. However, gest concerning how to extend cultural public opinion can be divided, and politi- membership to the largest number? In- cal decisions invariably entail much more stitutions and cultural repertoires play than aggregated public opinion. Here we a crucial role in providing shared scripts direct attention to an analysis of pow- about the positive and negative defini- er and political institutions: who or what tion of groups. Laws and policies are cen- shapes laws and institutional processes, tral to conveying such messages. For in- how, and for what reasons? These ques- stance, the adoption of same-sex mar- tions draw attention to political conflict riage legislation in thirty-two American and the institutionalization of “winning” states led to a 7 percent decline in sui- outcomes. cide attempts among lgbtq-identified Public opinion may matter. In democ- high school students.87 Moreover, various racies, we presume that public opinion– groups of knowledge and cultural produc- based on notions of solidarity, ingroup ers (journalists, social scientists, medical, affinities, and symbolic boundaries, as legal, and policy experts, and artists in detailed above–has an impact on social the performing and visual arts) contrib- policy through the electoral process. Pub- ute to shaping shared representations of lic opinion could also provide guidance groups. By studying how destigmatiza- to nonelected officials, including admin- tion has operated in the past through pro- istrators and judges, shaping their deci- cess-tracing, it is possible to better un- sions. But a “democratic” politics is not derstand how such professional groups necessarily inclusive, as can be seen in can contribute to social change, especial- Donald Trump’s election to the U.S. pres- ly when collaborating with social move- idency or the success of far-right parties ment activists and religious and political across Europe. Considering the tensions organizations concerned with social in- between broadening membership and re- clusion. Such groups may be particular- stricting social citizenship, lack of inclu- ly well equipped to amplify the impact of sion may flow from biases in the public’s transnational cultural repertoires, such as assessments of contribution, exclusion- human rights and neoliberal frames, that ary views of prototypical members, or influence who can be included among stigmatization of certain groups. Greater those worthy of protection and solidari- inclusion would thus require shifting the ty, and under what conditions. hearts and minds of the public. Yet it is not clear that public opinion Our interest in deservingness judg- drives political decision-making or ad- ments is animated by a normative concern ministrative rule-making when it comes over socioeconomic inequality, a concern to allocating rights, resources, and recog- that we believe should be addressed by nition. Some researchers argue that nar- some degree of government action rather row subsets of the population or particu- than just private charity. What then drives lar interest groups dominate policy-mak- state action? So far, we have considered ing, including on issues of solidarity or normative ideals, cognitive schema, and equality. Who has the right to vote, and

148 (3) Summer 2019 93 Membership who actually casts a ballot? In general, cultures may push inclusive membership without Social voters tend to skew richer, whiter, and further than some members of the pub- Citizenship? older than the general population. As po- lic want. Economic or ideological elites litical scientist Kay Schlozman and col- may also advance harsher deservingness leagues have concluded, studying po- judgments than many in the public sup- litical engagement in the United States, port, in part out of belief in meritocracy. “those who are not affluent and well-edu- Research on elite education suggests that cated are less likely to take part politically many elites believe in merit and ignore and are even less likely to be represented their own structural privileges, partly be- by the activity of organized interests.”88 cause this offers a positive story about The apportionment of seats in the legisla- how their position derives from their tive body might favor rural interests over own talents and abilities.91 If ascriptive urban ones.89 discrimination has been eliminated in Imbalances in who has a voice might formal law and policy, the thinking goes, grow after the votes are counted. Once then residual inequality must be based on elected and faced with crafting policy, individual achievement. Elites may thus politicians may listen more to the views support expanded political, social, and of rich constituents or business interests cultural membership, but put up less of that can fund their next campaign, or who a fight over social redistribution or affir- share their backgrounds and worldviews. mative action. Public policy scholar Martin Gilens has If elites have political, economic, or argued that in the United States, when moral power, then they–and the insti- the policy preferences of low- or middle- tutions they direct and the laws that they income Americans diverge from those of pass and enforce–can produce or rein- the affluent, policy outcomes are more force symbolic and social boundaries. likely to align with the preferences of the Laws, for instance, carry a moral weight well-off and rarely reflect the wishes of that can reconstitute notions of deserv- the less advantaged.90 The implications ingness. This can work in inclusive or ex- for our puzzle may be that inclusive for- clusionary ways. U.S. welfare reform leg- mal membership is pushed by businesses islation in 1996 strengthened the idea that benefit romf immigration or tapping that social benefits should only go to citi- talented minorities and educated wom- zens by excluding various classes of non- en, but these same businesses do not sup- citizens from access. Conversely, Califor- port redistribution. Those who would fa- nia’s decision to charge undocumented vor redistribution have few resources to residents the same tuition fees as oth- fight for such policies. In this scenario, er California residents at public colleges expanding membership, twinned with and universities reduced stigma for “ille- harsh deservingness judgments, reflects gal” students and drew a more inclusive the relative power of groups in a political “Californian” membership circle.92 De- system. pending on who has the levers of power, An implication of such an analysis laws, rules, and resources can shape in- is that the norms and cultural views of clusionary or exclusionary dynamics in a elites matter more for the institution- top-down direction. This shapes notions alization of inclusion and equality than of solidarity among the public and can broad-based feelings of solidarity among spur claims-making by excluded groups. the public. Earlier, we noted that elites Institutions can also affect member- embedded in more cosmopolitan world ship and social citizenship by channeling

94 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences the ebb and flow of claims-making. So- more open to the ebbs and flows of legis- Bloemraad, cial spending data suggest a paradox: lative decision-making. Kymlicka, Lamont & there is not much evidence that countries More generally, a focus on politics and Son Hing are spending less on social policies, even power draws our attention to contesta- if voters want to spend less money on cer- tion and change. Our earlier discussion tain types of people. One possible reason of normative ideas, cognitive schema, is that governments have “veto points” in and cultural scripts is relatively silent on which organized collective interests can the question of how social change occurs. exert pressure to stop policy changes. Po- How do people make claims to member- litical actors can appeal to the executive ship or advance social citizenship? How branch to stop the legislative branch’s do political institutions shape who is actions, or push one legislative chamber heard and has power? Drawing on our to block another, as when lobbyists turn earlier discussion, in battles over the di- their attention from the House of Rep- rection and purpose of state action, nor- resentatives to the U.S. Senate. In fed- mative narratives can matter. In the lan- eral systems, organized groups–from guage of social movement scholars, these business interests to social justice move- are battles around “framing” an issue, ments–can pit levels of government which involves “the struggle over the against each other. production of mobilizing” and “counter- Attention to veto points and institu- mobilizing ideas.”93 Such ideas iden- tions raises important questions about tify what is wrong and why, and what whether the legislative, executive, or ju- needs to be done. As other political ac- dicial branches are more open to inclu- tors articulate different frames, fram- sive membership or expansive social cit- ing contests are carried out in legisla- izenship. For instance, in most liberal tures, courtrooms, and the media on is- democracies, citizens can challenge pro- sues ranging from sexual harassment to posed policy in the courts. The decision immigration.94 Framing contests provide by the Trump administration to bar peo- a bridge between attention to power and ple from certain Muslim-majority coun- institutions, on one hand, and notions of tries from entry, including settled per- solidarity, judgment, and cultural scripts, manent residents, was halted by court on the other. injunction, modified, and then further Still, the success of a political movement fought through the court system. This almost never turns on only the resonance can be read as a battle over the boundar- of an idea. One must pay attention to the ies of membership. In the United States, resources deployed by different political courts have historically deferred to the actors, be they financial, human, or orga- other branches of government when it nizational, and the “political opportunity comes to regulating migrants’ entry into structure” of institutions that constrain the United States, even as U.S. courts or channel action. If we consider the icon- have also expanded membership at var- ic twentieth-century movement for full ious times to racial or sexual minorities. membership of the U.S. black civil rights Courts also tend to be more likely to pro- movement, the ideals of racial equality as tect “negative” rights related to antidis- articulated by charismatic leaders such as crimination measures, which may ad- Martin Luther King Jr. clearly mattered. vance inclusive membership, than to en- But so did black churches as mobilizing force “positive” rights to social benefits, structures for direct protest, the tactics of leaving the contours of social citizenship nonviolence used by demonstrators, the

148 (3) Summer 2019 95 Membership role of legal activism, the human and fi- and robust social citizenship is old-fash- without Social nancial resources provided by white sup- ioned power politics. For example, in Citizenship? porters of the movement, and the context some countries, immigrants over time of the Cold War, which influenced the do- will gain enough voting clout to muscle mestic calculations of the White House in their way into the welfare state, even in the face of continued congressional op- the face of xenophobia. But the willing- position to voting rights or racial equali- ness of states to grant citizenship to im- ty legislation. migrants depends in part on perceptions Thus, a political sociology of member- of their membership and contribution, ship demands attention to multiple lev- so it is not clear that this route avoids els of analysis, from public opinion and the need to confront deservingness judg- voting behavior to the actions of collec- ments. A simple “politics and power” ap- tive groups and analysis of institutions. proach risks reducing the social world to It directs attention to identifying who clashing resources, and outcomes to one advances inclusive or exclusive views of group’s mastery of the institutions that membership and how much power they determine policy and enforce it through have to diffuse these ideas and embed laws. We believe that power matters, them in policy. Consider, for instance, but so does paying attention to norma- noncitizen permanent residents’ access tive claims and cultural scripts, which to social benefits. In the mid-1990s, some adds an important ideational and cultur- scholars claimed that civil, political, and al element. A successful politics of inclu- social rights were increasingly given to sive solidarity requires rewriting cultural residents based on universal humanity, narratives of membership and belonging a “cosmopolitan” view grounded in res- alongside the exercise of political muscle. idence within a liberal, democratic state. One response to the tensions between Universal personhood norms and human membership and social citizenship is to rights were held by lawyers, judges, and articulate an ethic of solidarity and con- other elite actors who institutionalized tribution that is genuinely multicultural. these views in international or region- But while this approach provides an ob- al bodies such as the European Court of jective to which we can aspire, it is silent Justice or within the domestic judiciary, on the means required to enact it. Here, an institution somewhat insulated from social psychology helps us to identify the countervailing public opinion pres- mechanisms by which ideas about sta- sures faced by politicians.95 Yet, as im- tus or meritocracy are enacted in partic- migration, citizenship, and migrants’ ular contexts. Existing research suggests rights became increasingly politicized in that more expansive, plural member- the twenty-first century, political entre- ship views should come with more gener- preneurs in far-right or even center-right ous deservingness judgments. To the ex- parties adopted exclusionary member- tent that we do not see this, at the collec- ship ideals and appealed to voters on tive level, we must consider the impact that basis. Many such parties gained sig- of threat perceptions in reinforcing ex- nificant electoral ground. In both cas- clusionary ingroup boundaries. From a es, membership narratives matter, but in boundary approach, those wishing to ad- radically distinct ways. vance inclusionary membership and social citizenship must destigmatize groups Some pessimists argue that the only such as the poor and immigrants, redefin- clear route to more inclusive membership ing symbolic boundaries.

96 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences But how do we enact social change? neither offers magic formulas for how Bloemraad, Clearly this can occur from the bottom- they can be successful. Kymlicka, Lamont & up: changing norms of interaction among In all of this, there are framing contests. Son Hing people at a local level can be diffused Thus, while cultural repertoires matter, through social movements, and then en- multiple narratives of merit or blame, de- shrined in law or policy, thanks to chang- servingness or stigma, coexist and vary ing cultural norms or the electoral pres- across place and subgroup. These narra- sures of public opinion. But just as clear- tives can be in strong competition. How ly, this can also be a more elite-driven do we understand which ideas “win”? process, involving top-down restructur- This is an important agenda for future ing of norms, cultural scripts, and social scholarship. From a power-and-politics interaction patterns (such as through the view, researchers must pay attention to influence of knowledge-workers, the me- resources, political opportunity struc- dia, or affirmative action policies). Many tures, and the “rules of the game” shap- progressive changes to advance equali- ing decisions about law and policy. Once ty have led rather than followed public enacted, policies generate new cultural opinion, from views on interracial mar- schema. What we know from social psy- riage to the extension of public resources chology suggests that people strongly de- to undocumented immigrants. sire a positive self-image and react nega- The accounts we elaborate differ some- tively to perceived threats to their status what in identifying who serves as a vec- or interests; inclusive narratives must be tor of change, and the processes by which framed so as to reduce threat and miti- symbolic boundaries of the ingroup shift. gate ingroup/outgroup distinctions. How A power-and-politics approach is atten- much of this foundation is laid by routine tive to who has financial and political interactions in workplaces and neighbor- power, and the people and institutions hoods, and how much of this can be shift- that define and interpret legislation. A ed by political entrepreneurs or social boundary approach points to the ide- movement advocates? Given the current ational work of knowledge producers and politically fraught moment, as populist mesolevel organizational infrastructures narratives of exclusion challenge alterna- that affect how we interact at work, at tive narratives of inclusive membership, school, and in our leisure time. Both be- the challenge has never been greater. lieve that social movements matter, but

authors’ note Authors’ names are listed in alphabetical order. We thank Jonathan Mijs (London School of Economics), who served as a research assistant for this essay. For helpful comments, we are grateful to Nicolas Duvoux, Matthias Koenig, Nonna Mayer, Leslie McCall, Andrew Penner, Sarah Song, and the members of the Successful Societies program at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research.

148 (3) Summer 2019 97 Membership author biographies without Social is Professor of Sociology, the Thomas Garden Barnes Chair of Canadi- Citizenship? irene bloemraad an Studies, and Director of the Berkeley Interdisciplinary Migration Initiative at the Univer- sity of California, Berkeley. She is the author of Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada (2006) and editor of The Oxford Handbook of Cit- izenship (with Ayelet Shachar, Rainer Baubock, and Maarten Vink, 2017) and Migrants, Mi- norities, and the Media: Information, Representations, and Participation in the Public Sphere (with Erik Bleich and Els de Graauw, 2017). will kymlicka is the Canada Research Chair in Political Philosophy at Queen’s Univer- sity in Canada. He is the author of Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995) and Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (with Sue Donaldson, 2011) and editor of The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies (with Keith Banting, 2017). michÈle lamont is Professor of Sociology, Professor of African and African Amer- ican Studies, the Robert I. Goldman Professor of European Studies, and Director of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University; and Codirec- tor of the Successful Societies program at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. A past President of the American Sociological Association, she is the author of Get- ting Respect: Responding to Stigma and Discrimination in the United States, Brazil, and Israel (with Graziella Moraes Silva, Jessica S. Welburn, Joshua Guetzkow, et al., 2018), How Profes- sors Think: Inside the Curious World of Academic Judgment (2000), and The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration (2002). leanne s. son hing is Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at the Uni- versity of Guelph in Canada. She has published in such journals as Journal of Experimental Social Psychology and Journal of Personality and Social Psychology and contributed to the Sage Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination.

endnotes 1 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950). 2 Ibid., 68, 69. According to Marshall, by the 1950s, Britain had incorporated “social rights in the status of citizenship and thus creating a universal right to real income which is not proportionate to the market value of the claimant.” Ibid., 47. He acknowledged that the inherent inequalities of the market created “status differences,” but argued that these are compat- ible with democratic citizenship “provided they do not cut too deep, but occur within a population united in a single civilization; and provided they are not an expression of hereditary privilege.” Ibid., 75–76. 3 For example, Robert D. Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty- First Century,” Scandinavian Political Studies 30 (2007): 137–174. 4 Maria Abascal and Delia Baldassarri, “Love Thy Neighbor? Ethnoracial Diversity and Trust Reexamined,” American Journal of Sociology 121 (3) (2015): 722–782; and Tom van der Meer and Jochem Tolsma, “Ethnic Diversity and Its Effects on Social Cohesion,” Annual Review of Sociology 40 (2014): 459–478. 5 Michèle Lamont and Laurent Thévenot, eds., Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology: Reper- toires of Evaluation in France and the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey and Dustin Avent-Holt, Relational Inequalities: An Organizational Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). 6 One might think of U.S. colleges that draw up explicit policies to allow undocumented immigrants to attend university, despite state legislation or public attitudes discouraging this. Or, alternatively, a business may institute hiring practices that produce discriminatory outcomes, even if law proscribes discrimination and public opinion rejects hiring decisions based on race, religion, gender, or sexuality.

98 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 7 Michèle Lamont and Virag Molnar, “The Study of Boundaries across the Social Sciences,” Bloemraad, Annual Review of Sociology 28 (2002): 167–195. Kymlicka, Lamont & 8 Michèle Lamont, Graziella Moraes Silva, Jessica Welburn, et al., Getting Respect: Responding to Son Hing Stigma and Discrimination in the United States, Brazil, and Israel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 2016); and Charles Tilly, Durable Inequality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 9 Marc Morjé Howard and Sara Wallace Goodman, “The Politics of Citizenship and Belonging in Europe,” in Debating Immigration, 2nd ed., ed. Carol Swain (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2018); and Marc Helbling and Dorina Kalkum, “Migration Policy Trends in oecd Countries,” Journal of European Public Policy 25 (12) (2018): 1779–1797. 10 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: Har- vard University Press, 1992). 11 Maarten Vink and Gerard-René de Groot, “Citizenship Attribution in Western Europe: In- ternational Framework and Domestic Trends,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36 (5) (2010): 713–734. They also note the universal trend to remove gender-based inequalities in the descent-based attribution of citizenship such that mothers and fathers can pass down citizenship in the same way. 12 Howard and Goodman, “The Politics of Citizenship and Belonging in Europe.” 13 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, “Is There Really a Retreat from Multiculturalism Policies?” Comparative European Politics 11 (5) (2013): 577–598. See also Matthias Koenig, “Governance of Religious Diversity at the European Court of Human Rights,” in International Approaches to Governing Ethnic Diversity, ed. Jane Boulden and Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford Universi- ty Press, 2015), 51–78. 14 Claude S. Fischer and Michael Hout, Century of Difference: How America Changed in the Last One Hundred Years (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), 23–56. 15 Zhenchao Qian and Daniel Lichter, “Social Boundaries and Marital Assimilation: Interpret- ing Trends in Racial and Ethnic Intermarriage,” American Sociological Review 72 (1) (2007): 68–94. 16 Francisco Ramirez, Patricia Bromley, and Susan Garnett Russell, “The Valorization of Hu- manity and Diversity,” Multicultural Education Review 1 (1) (2009): 29–54. 17 John D. Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); Ellen Berrey, The Enigma of Diversity: The Language of Race and the Limits of Ra- cial Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Frank Dobbin, Inventing Equal Op- portunity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009); and Natasha Warikoo, The Di- versity Bargain: And Other Dilemmas of Race, Admissions, and Meritocracy at Elite Universities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 18 John W. Meyer, John Boli, George Thomas, and Francisco Ramirez, “World Society and the Nation-State,” American Journal of Sociology 103 (1) (1997): 144–181. 19 Michèle Lamont, Bo Yun Park, and Elena Ayala-Hurtado, “Trump’s Electoral Speeches and His Appeal to the American White Working Class,” British Journal of Sociology 68 (S1) (2017): S153–S180. 20 Michèle Lamont, “From Being to Having: Self-Worth and the Current Crisis of American Society,” British Journal of Sociology (forthcoming). 21 Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, 72. 22 Charlotte Cavaillé and Kris-Stella Trump, “The Two Facets of Social Policy Preferences,” Journal of Politics 77 (1) (2015): 146–160. 23 Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza, Why Welfare States Persist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

148 (3) Summer 2019 99 Membership 24 Cavaillé and Trump, “The Two Facets of Social Policy Preferences.” without Social 25 Wim van Oorschot, “Making the Difference in Social Europe: Deservingness Perceptions Citizenship? among Citizens of European Welfare States,” Journal of European Social Policy 16 (1) (2006): 23–42. 26 Lawrence D. Bobo, “Racial Attitudes and Relations at the Close of the Twentieth Century,” in America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences, ed. Neil J. Smelser, William Julius Wilson, and Faith Mitchell (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2001), 264–301. 27 Helena Hansen, Philippe Bourgois, and Ernest Drucker, “Pathologizing Poverty: New Forms of Diagnosis, Disability, and Structural Stigma under Welfare Reform,” Social Science & Med- icine 103 (2014): 76–83. 28 Michèle Lamont, The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Im- migration (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 135. 29 Leslie McCall, The Undeserving Rich: American Beliefs about Inequality, Opportunity, and Redistri- bution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 30 Lamont, The Dignity of Working Men. 31 Peter A. Hall and Michèle Lamont, eds., Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 2013). 32 Centre de recherche pour l’étude et l’observation des conditions de vie, Enquête conditions de vie et aspirations des Français (Paris: Centre de recherche pour l’étude et l’observation des conditions de vie, 2012). 33 Most attitudinal research has focused on general support for the principle of redistribution, rather than attitudes toward specific groups of beneficiaries. 34 Marjolein Jeene, Wim van Oorschot, and Wilfred Uunk, “The Dynamics of Welfare Opinions in Changing Economic, Institutional and Political Contexts: An Empirical Analysis of Dutch Deservingness Opinions, 1975–2006,” Social Indicators Research 115 (2) (2014): 731–749. 35 International Social Survey Programme, ISSP 2016–Role of Government V, za6900 (Köln: gesis, Leibniz Institute for the Social Scientists, 2018). 36 Jonathan J. B. Mijs, “Visualizing Belief in Meritocracy, 1930–2010,” Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 4 (1) (2018). Using the European Values Survey, Mijs, Bakhtiari, and La- mont suggest that the effects of neoliberalism on deservingness attitudes differed in East- ern and Western Europe, drawing tighter boundaries against the poor in the East, but tighter boundaries against Muslims in the West. Jonathan J. B. Mijs, Elyas Bakhtiari, and Michèle Lamont, “Neoliberalism and Symbolic Boundaries in Europe: Global Diffusion, Local Con- text, Regional Variation,” Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 2 (2016): 1–8. 37 Charlotte Cavaillé, “Deservingness, Self-Interest and the Welfare State: Why Some Care More about Deservingness Than Others,” lis Working Paper Series No. 652 (Luxembourg: Luxembourg Income Study Cross-National Data Center, 2015). 38 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). 39 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). There is a “post- nationalist” strand of political theory that seeks to sever the welfare state from national membership and to rely on universal humanitarianism instead. For doubts about this strategy, see Will Kymlicka, “Solidarity in Diverse Societies,” Comparative Migration Studies 3 (1) (2015): 1–19. 40 Wim van Oorschot, “The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare and Welfare Deserving- ness,” in The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare, ed. Wim van Oorschot and Femke Roosma (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2017).

100 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 41 The fifth criterion is “need” (the extent to which need is genuine). This criterion is common Bloemraad, to both an ethic of membership and an ethic of humanitarianism. Attitude, reciprocity, and Kymlicka, identity, by contrast, are tied to expectations of social membership. Lamont & Son Hing 42 Keith Banting, Will Kymlicka, Allison Harell, and Rebecca Wallace, “Beyond National Iden- tity: Liberal Nationalism, Shared Membership and Solidarity,” in Liberal Nationalism and Its Critics: Normative and Empirical Questions, ed. Gina Gustavsson and David Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). 43 British citizens made these judgments even in the “golden age” of postwar social democracy. See John Hudson, Neil Lunt, Charlotte Hamilton, et al., “Nostalgia Narratives? Pejorative Attitudes to Welfare in Historical Perspective,” Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 24 (3) (2016): 227–243. 44 Kenneth Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989). 45 Many people within the contemporary disability rights movement self-identify as “Crip,” reclaiming the historically derogatory term “cripple” (akin to the reclaiming of “queer” by gays and lesbians). Robert McRuer, Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability (New York: Temple University Press, 2006). 46 Thierry Devos and Mahzarin Banaji, “American=White?” Journal of Personality and Social Psy- chology 88 (3) (2005): 447–466. 47 Rupert Brown, Prejudice: Its Social Psychology (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2011); and Thierry Devos and Leakhena Heng, “Whites Are Granted the American Identity More Swiftly Than Asians: Disentangling the Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes,” Social Psychology 40 (4) (2009): 192–201. 48 Marilynn B. Brewer, “In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-Moti- vational Analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 86 (2) (1979): 307–324. 49 Saul Miller, Jon Maner, and Vaughn Becker, “Self-Protective Biases in Group Categorization: Threat Cues Shape the Psychological Boundary Between ‘Us’ and ‘Them,’” Journal of Person- ality and Social Psychology 99 (1) (2010): 62–77. 50 John Duckitt and Kirstin Fisher, “The Impact of Social Threat on Worldview and Ideological Attitudes,” Political Psychology 24 (2013): 199–222. 51 Victoria Esses, John Dovidio, Lynne Jackson, and Tamara Armstrong, “The Immigration Di- lemma: The Role of Perceived Group Competition, Ethnic Prejudice, and National Identity,” Journal of Social Issues 57 (3) (2001): 389–412; Gordon Hodson, Sarah Hogg, and Cara Mac- Innis, “The Role of ‘Dark Personalities’ (Narcissism, Machiavellianism, Psychopathy), Big Five Personality Factors, and Ideology in Explaining Prejudice,” Journal of Research in Person- ality 43 (4) (2009): 686–690; Felicia Pratto, Lisa M. Stallworth, and Sahr Conway‐Lanz, “So- cial Dominance Orientation and the Ideological Legitimization of Social Policy,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 28 (20) (1998): 1853–1875; and Catherine Cozzarelli, Anna Wilkin- son, and Michael Tagler, “Attitudes toward the Poor and Attributions for Poverty,” Journal of Social Issues 57 (2) (2001): 207–227. 52 Matthew Wright, “Diversity and the Imagined Community: Immigrant Diversity and Con- ceptions of National Identity,” Political Psychology 32 (5) (2011): 837–862. 53 Marilynn B. Brewer, “The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 17 (5) (1991): 475–482. 54 Walter G. Stephan and Cookie White Stephan, “An Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice,” in Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination, ed. Stuart Oskamp (Milton Park, United Kingdom: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 33–56. 55 Marilynn B. Brewer, “The Importance of Being We: Human Nature and Intergroup Rela- tions,” American Psychologist 62 (8) (2007): 726–738.

148 (3) Summer 2019 101 Membership 56 Indeed, after a week of fear-tactic political ads targeting a caravan of illegal immigrant “in- without Social vaders,” cnn exit polls of the American 2018 midterm elections reveal that 75 percent of Citizenship? those who voted Republican stated that immigration is the most important issue facing the nation. cnn, “Exit Polls,” 2018, https://www.cnn.com/election/2018/exit-polls. 57 Samuel Pehrson, Vivian Vignoles, and Rupert Brown, “National Identification and Anti- Immigrant Prejudice: Individual and Contextual Effects of National Definitions,” Social Psychology Quarterly 72 (1) (2009): 24–38. 58 Esses et al., “The Immigration Dilemma.” 59 Victoria Esses, Ulrich Wagner, Carina Wolf, et al., “Perceptions of National Identity and At- titudes toward Immigrants and Immigration in Canada and Germany,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 30 (6) (2006): 653–669. 60 Simon Laham, “Expanding the Moral Circle: Inclusion and Exclusion Mindsets and the Cir- cle of Moral Regard,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45 (1) (2009): 250–253; and Aline Lima-Nunes, Cicero Roberto Pereira, and Isabel Correia, “Restricting the Scope of Justice to Justify Discrimination: The Role Played by Justice Perceptions in Discrimination against Immigrants,” European Journal of Social Psychology 43 (7) (2013): 627–636. 61 J. Stacy Adams, “Inequity in Social Exchange,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 2 (1965): 267–299. 62 Leanne Son Hing, Ramona Bobocel, Mark Zanna, et al., “The Merit of Meritocracy,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 101 (3) (2011): 433–450. 63 Jan-Willem van Prooijen and Jennifer Coffeng, “What is Fair Punishment for Alex or Ahmed? Perspective Taking Increases Racial Bias in Retributive Justice Judgments,” Social Justice Re- search 26 (4) (2013): 383–399. 64 John Dovidio, Samuel Gaertner, Kerry Kawakami, and Gordon Hodson, “Why Can’t We Just Get Along? Interpersonal Biases and Interracial Distrust,” Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Mi- nority Psychology 8 (2) (2002): 88–102; Rupa Banerjee, Jeffrey Reitz, and Phil Oreopoulos, “Do Large Employers Treat Racial Minorities More Fairly? A New Analysis of Canadian Field Experiment Data,” Canadian Public Policy 44 (1) (2017): 1–12; and Alice Eagly, Mona Makhijani, and Bruce Klonsky, “Gender and the Evaluation of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 111 (1) (1992): 3–22. 65 Leanne Son Hing, Greg Chung-Yan, Leah Hamilton, and Mark Zanna, “A Two-Dimension- al Model That Employs Explicit and Implicit Attitudes to Characterize Prejudice,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 94 (6) (2008): 971–987. 66 Emilio Castilla, “Gender, Race, and Meritocracy in Organizational Careers,” American Jour- nal of Sociology 113 (6) (2008): 1479–1526; Emilio Castilla and Stephen Benard, “The Paradox of Meritocracy in Organizations,” Administrative Science Quarterly 55 (4) (2010): 543–676; Shannon McCoy and Brenda Major, “Priming Meritocracy and the Psychological Justifica- tion of Inequality,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (3) (2007): 341–351; and Son Hing et al., “The Merit of Meritocracy.” 67 Leanne Son Hing, “Responses to Stigmatization: The Moderating Roles of Primary and Sec- ondary Appraisals,” Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 9 (1) (2012): 149–168. 68 Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954). 69 John Dovidio, Samuel Gaertner, and Tamar Saguy, “Commonality and the Complexity of ‘We’: Social Attitudes and Social Change,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 13 (1) (2009): 3–20. 70 Miles Hewstone and Hermann Swart, “Fifty-Odd Years of Inter-Group Contact: From Hy- pothesis to Integrated Theory,” British Journal of Social Psychology 50 (3) (2011): 374–386. 71 Karen Cook and Karen Hegtvedt, “Distributive Justice, Equity, and Equality,” Annual Review of Sociology 9 (1) (1983): 217–241; Jerald Greenberg, “Allocator-Recipient Similarity and the

102 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Equitable Division of Rewards,” Social Psychology 41 (4) (1978): 337–341; and Gerold Mikula Bloemraad, and T. Schwinger, “Liking towards One’s Partner and Need for Social Approval as Determi- Kymlicka, nants of Allocations of Group Rewards,” Psychologische Beiträge 15 (1973): 396–407. Lamont & Son Hing 72 Lamont and Molnar, “The Study of Boundaries across the Social Sciences.” 73 Tilly, Durable Inequality. 74 Michèle Lamont, “Addressing Recognition Gaps: Destigmatization and the Reduction of In- equality,” American Sociological Review 83 (3) (2018): 419–444. 75 Richard Alba, “Bright vs. Blurred Boundaries: Second-Generation Assimilation and Exclu- sion in France, Germany, and the United States,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28 (1) (2005): 20– 49; Andreas Wimmer, “The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries: A Multilevel Process,” American Journal of Sociology 113 (4) (2008): 970–1022; Christopher A. Bail, “The Configura- tion of Symbolic Boundaries against Immigrants in Europe,” American Sociological Review 73 (1) (2008): 37–59; and Bart Bonikowski and Kristina Simonsen, “Boundaries against Mus- lims in Europe,” Council for European Studies annual meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 2017. 76 Lamont et al., “Trump’s Electoral Speeches and His Appeal to the American White Working Class.” 77 Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism,” Annual Review of Sociology 35 (2009): 21–42. 78 Richard Jenkins, Social Identity (London: Routledge, 1996); and Lamont et al., Getting Respect. 79 Matthew Clair, Caitlin Daniel, and Michèle Lamont, “Destigmatization and Health: Cultural Constructions and the Long-Term Reduction of Stigma,” Social Science & Medicine 165 (2016): 223–232. 80 Frank Dobbin, Inventing Equal Opportunity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009). 81 Francesca Polletta and James Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” Annual Re- view of Sociology 27 (2001): 283–305. 82 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 83 Margaret Somers and Fred Bloch, The Power of Market Fundamentalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014); Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Hall and Lamont, Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era; and John Mey- er and Patricia Bromley, “The Worldwide Expansion of ‘Organizations,’” Sociological Theo- ry 31 (4) (2013): 366–389. 84 Michèle Lamont, Stefan Beljean, and Matthew Clair, “What is Missing? Cultural Processes and the Making of Inequality,” Socioeconomic Review 12 (3) (2014): 573–608. 85 Wimmer, “The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries,” 972. 86 Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, On Justification (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006). 87 Julia Raifman, Ellen Moscoe, S. Bryn Austin, and Margaret McConnell, “Difference-in- Differences Analysis of the Association between State Same-Sex Marriage Policies and Ado- lescent Suicide Attempts,” JAMA Pediatrics 171 (4) (2017): 350–356. 88 Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry Brady, The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Po- litical Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer- sity Press, 2012), 5. 89 Crossnationally, the impact of public opinion could vary by the type of political and electoral system, with a possibly greater role for ordinary voters in systems with direct democracy through referenda.

148 (3) Summer 2019 103 Membership 90 Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (Prince- without Social ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012). Gilens does find that policy responsiveness to Citizenship? the less affluentis better (but not complete) in the domain of social welfare than with economic policy or national security. See also Larry Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008); and Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer–And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010). 91 The flip side of this might be working-class or middle-class whites’ populism and anti-immigrant turn. If social status is no longer about the inherent superiority of being white vis-à-vis African Americans or colonial subjects, and if society is now supposedly merit-based since ethnoracial and religious restrictions are eliminated, then the fault of stagnant wages or unemployment is individualized, absent a strong class-based evaluation of the situation. See, for example, Monica McDermott’s ethnography of Atlanta and Boston, or Victor Chen’s fieldwork in Detroit and Winsor. Monica McDermott, Working-Class White: The Making and Unmaking of Race Relations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); and Victor Tan Chen, Cut Loose: Jobless and Hopeless in an Unfair Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015). 92 Leisy Abrego, “Legitimacy, Social Identity, and the Mobilization of Law: The Effects of As- sembly Bill 540 on Undocumented Students in California,” Law & Social Inquiry 33 (2008): 709–734. 93 Robert Benford and David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (1) (2000): 613. 94 Abigail Saguy, “Employment Discrimination or Sexual Violence? Defining Sexual Harass- ment in American and French Law,” Law and Society Review 43 (4) (2000): 1091–1128; Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy, Contested Citizenship: Immi- gration and Ethnic Relations Politics in Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005); Rodney Benson, Shaping Immigration News: A French-American Comparison (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Irene Bloemraad, Fabiana Silva, and Kim Voss, “Rights, Economics, or Family? Frame Resonance, Political Ideology, and the Immi- grant Rights Movement,” Social Forces 94 (4) (2016): 1647–1674. 95 For example, Yasemin Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); David Jacobson, Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); and Christian Joppke, “The Legal-Domestic Sources of Immigrant Rights: The Unit- ed States, Germany, and the European Union,” Comparative Political Studies 34 (4) (2001): 339–366.

104 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Failure to Respond to Rising Income Inequality: Processes That Legitimize Growing Disparities

Leanne S. Son Hing, Anne E. Wilson, Peter Gourevitch, Jaslyn English & Parco Sin

Abstract: Why is there not more public outcry in the face of rising income inequality? Although public choice models predict that rising inequality will spur public demand for redistribution, evidence often fails to support this view. We explain this lack of outcry by considering social-psychological processes contextualized within the spatial, institutional, and political context that combine to dampen dissent. We contend that rising inequality can activate the very psychological processes that stifle outcry, causing people to be blind to the true extent of inequality, to legitimize rising disparities, and to reject redistribution as an effective solution. As a result, these psychological processes reproduce and exacerbate inequality and legitimize the institutions that produce it. Finally, we explore ways to disrupt the processes perpetuating this cycle. leanne s. son hing is As- sociate Professor in the Depart- ment of Psychology at the Uni- he last few decades have seen a marked trend versity of Guelph. T toward rising income inequality in many nations, anne e. wilson is Professor rooted in an increasingly large share of wealth con- of Social Psychology at Wilfrid trolled by the rich.1 Heightened income inequali- Laurier University. ty within a society has been linked to adverse out- peter gourevitch is Distin- comes, including reduced social capital, trust, and guished Professor Emeritus of community support; higher rates of mortality; and Political Science and Founding increased violent crime.2 Under such conditions, Dean of the School of Global people–particularly those disadvantaged by in- Policy & Strategy at the Univer- sity of California, San Diego. equality–might be expected to protest income inequality and vote for politicians who promise jaslyn english completed to reduce it. Such an assumption is contained in her master’s degree at Wilfrid classic public choice models of self-interested, ra- Laurier University. tional voters, such as the Meltzer-Richard Model parco sin is a Ph.D. student at (mrm).3 This model contends that, as income in- the University of Guelph. equality increases–and the median income drops (Complete author biographies appear in relation to the mean income–the median voter at the end of the essay.) will prefer greater redistribution, vote accordingly,

© 2019 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license doi:10.1162/DAED_a_01752 105 Rising Income and thereby influence tax and public noting also the constructs and paths that Inequality: goods policies that counter excessive in- we believe are missing, or are only implic- Processes That Legitimize come disparities. Yet in many nations, it, in this model. We consider and provide Growing this is not the case. Instead, public op- examples of how people’s experiences Disparities position to escalating income inequality and responses to income inequality are and support for redistribution are often affected by, and in turn can reciprocally surprisingly underwhelming. influence, macrolevel factors (such as cul- In this essay, we consider the social-psy- tural narratives and economic conditions), chological processes that contribute to mesolevel factors (such as spatial segre- the maintenance and acceleration of in- gation based on socioeconomic status), equality, particularly in a highly unequal and microlevel factors (such as ration- environment. We propose that, as income alization processes). The purpose is to inequality grows over time, some people use the model as a tool for breaking down may indeed recognize and revile it. How- the distinct perceptual, behavioral, and ever, the very context of rising inequali- institutional steps that would have to oc- ty may trigger processes that dampen op- cur for the context of rising inequality to position to inequality. As inequality rises, result in greater redistribution, thereby people may become increasingly blind to illuminating why this outcome so rarely its true magnitude. Heightened inequali- occurs. ty may lead people to rationalize and legitimize greater disparities, and to find We present three models of reactions redistribution inappropriate. We articu- to income inequality. In Figure 1, we de- late how each of these psychological pro- pict the processes explicitly hypothesized cesses are situated within and causally by the mrm.5 In this model, as objective connected to broader, multilevel systems levels of income inequality increase with- (such as media and political processes) in a nation, the median voter will prefer that trigger them. greater redistribution (path 1). Preferenc- To analyze these processes systemat- es for redistribution are expected to result ically, we use the influential mrm as a in more support for the candidate prom- foil. Although many theorists challenge ising redistribution (path 2). Finally, this the assumption that rational voters make public support is expected to result in the informed choices, the model has none- implementation of policies supporting theless motivated an enormous amount greater redistribution (path 3); that is, of research in fields such as political sci- public policy will be responsive to pub- ence, political economics, and sociolo- lic opinion. Consequently, equilibrium is gy.4 Many of these studies have failed to predicted: as macrolevel income inequal- find support for the mrm. Most of these ity increases, there will be greater mac- studies, however, have not considered the rolevel redistribution (path 4). However, failure of this intuitively appealing model evidence reveals that increases in income through a social-psychological lens. Thus, inequality are only rarely linked to great- we provide a novel contribution to a vari- er redistribution, and often predict de- ety of disciplines by analyzing the social- clining generosity of the welfare state in- psychological processes that can disrupt stead. To understand why the mrm is so each step in the mrm. often empirically refuted, we must con- We structure this essay by breaking sider each of the steps in the model and down the mrm into its principal assump- interrogate the social-psychological pro- tions, key constructs, and evident paths, cesses underlying each assumption.6

106 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Figure 1 Son Hing, Meltzer-Richard Model of Redistribution Wilson, Gourevitch, English & Sin 4

1 2 Votes for 3 Increasing Preference for Candidate Income Redistribution Redistribution Who Supports Inequality by Median Redistribution Voter

Note: The model specifies the steps of the original Meltzer-Richard Model: objective inequality to redistribution. Assumptions/boundary conditions include majority rule, decisive median income voter, single issue election, and universal suffrage. Source: Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard, “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,” The Journal of Political Economy 89 (5) (1981).

In Figure 2, we provide an Extended assumes a negative path B: as people sub- mrm, which makes explicit those im- jectively perceive more income inequali- plied microlevel processes intervening ty, they will evaluate it less positively. We between macrolevel income inequali- propose instead that the heightened in- ty and preference for redistribution by equalities people do perceive will often the median voter. The top row outlines be rationalized and justified due to pro- the mrm. The shaded circles and paths cesses of legitimization. Thus, we expect A, B, C, D, and E outline what we add to a positive path B: those who perceive the model by unpacking potential psy- more inequality may evaluate inequality chological mechanisms at work. Here, more favorably. Path C depicts how peo- the mrm implicitly assumes a positive ple’s evaluations of inequality are related path A: as objective income inequality in- to their preference for redistributive pol- creases, people will accurately perceive icies. The mrm implicitly assumes that more inequality. In contrast, we pro- path C is negative: people who judge in- pose that due to socioeconomic residen- equalities more unfavorably should sup- tial and work segregation, and to social port more redistribution by the govern- comparative, informational, and motiva- ment. However, we propose that even if tional factors, path A will in fact be weak people believe that there is too much in- or nonsignificant. The mrm implicitly come inequality, they may not believe

148 (3) Summer 2019 107 Rising Income Figure 2 Inequality: Extended Meltzer-Richard Model of Redistribution Processes That Legitimize Growing Disparities 4

1 2 Votes for 3 Increasing Preference for Candidate Income Redistribution Redistribution Who Supports Inequality by Median Redistribution Voter

DE A C

Perceived Evaluation of Inequality Inequality B

that redistribution by the government is Paths 2 and 3 of the Extended mrm appropriate, effective, or fair. Thus, path again depict how greater preference for C may be weak. We also note path D and redistribution leads to more support for E in Figure 2: some research we reviewed the candidate promising redistribution, examines the link (path D) between ob- which translates to actual redistribu- jective inequality and evaluations of in- tion. We denote these circles in the mod- equality (without measuring subjective el with dotted (rather than solid) lines. perceptions of inequality), or the link We consider this process, but in relatively (path E) between perceived inequali- less depth due to our focus on the social- ty and redistribution demand (without psychological processes that disrupt the measuring evaluations of inequality). We explicit and implicit assumptions of the suggest that these paths are likely medi- mrm. We assert that although paths ated through the variables we identify 2 and 3 from public opinion to votes to in Figure 2 and, because of the process- policy are assumed to be positive, these es outlined above, are likely to be weak. links are likely attenuated or disrupted Of course, for each of these paths, sig- by a variety of political processes that are nificant individual differences in beliefs themselves affected by levels of income about and attitudes toward inequality inequality. can feed into and/or moderate these pro- In Figure 3, we depict how macro-, cesses. Therefore, we discuss for whom meso-, and microlevel factors can affect, these effects are more or less likely. moderate, or be influenced by the pro-

108 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Figure 3 Son Hing, Son Hing-Wilson-Gourevitch Multilevel Model Wilson, Gourevitch, English & Sin

Macrolevel Factors Economic Conditions Political Institutions Cultural Norms, Narratives, Myths Mainstream Mass Media

Votes for Increasing Preference for Candidate Income Redistribution Redistribution Who Supports Inequality by Median Redistribution Voter

Perceived Evaluation of Inequality Inequality

Microlevel Factors Mesolevel Factors Socioeconomic Status ses Spatial Segregation Threat, Uncertainty, Disillusionment Homophily Motives to Rationalize Status Quo Ethnoracial Inequality Meritocracy & Social Mobility Beliefs Information Echo Chambers Social Comparison Processes Participation in Political Processes Social Dominance Orientation Political Polarization Sociopolitical Orientation Intergroup Relations Prejudice & Stereotypes

148 (3) Summer 2019 109 Rising Income cesses by which people respond to in- better balance. The model has been test- Inequality: creasing inequality (see the inner lighter ed in a variety of ways. The first compo- Processes That Legitimize circle). First, macro-, meso-, and micro- nent always represents objective income Growing level factors may act as antecedents of el- inequality operationalized with measures Disparities ements in the inequality model. For in- such as the Gini index. Some studies ex- stance, macrolevel cultural narratives amine how inequality leads to demand and myths about meritocracy or pover- for redistribution (public opinion); oth- ty can affect people’s preference for re- er studies assess actual redistribution (redistribution. Second, macro-, meso-, and distributive policies, social spending). microlevel factors may moderate the pro- There is good reason to presume that de- cesses or paths within the model. For in- mand for redistribution will not always stance, the strength of the relation be- map onto actual redistributive policy.7 tween objective income inequality and Redistributive policies can take vari- people’s perceptions of such inequality ous forms, including new tax rates, wel- may depend on the mesolevel spatial seg- fare support, social security, public health regation that exists along socioeconomic care, public education, unemployment status (ses) lines. Third, the processes insurance, and old-age pensions. Where- whereby people experience and respond as some policies are more directly redis- to income inequality can also affect tributive (like welfare), others can be cat- broader macro-, meso-, and microlevel egorized as social safety nets (like unem- factors. For instance, the rationalization ployment or pensions) or as public goods of inequality can lead to prejudice toward fostering equality of opportunity (like the poor and more conflictual intergroup public education).8 Although different relations: examples of consequences that types of redistribution may be viewed extend beyond public support for redis- quite differently by the public, here they tribution itself. are all treated as metrics of the same over- As inequality rises, broader contextu- arching construct of redistribution. al and social-psychological processes will According to the mrm, as levels of in- impede the likelihood of people correct- come inequality increase, so should de- ly recognizing high inequality, evaluating mand for redistribution (see Figure 1, it as extreme, and supporting greater re- path 1) and actual redistribution (path 4). distribution. A critical point of our essay In general, support for path 4–objec- is to articulate the conditions that result tive inequality leading to more redistrib- in blindness to, legitimization of, and re- utive policies or actual redistribution– production of inequality, thereby allow- is mixed. Some analyses find support or ing us to consider how to facilitate the mixed support, others find no relation- conditions that could result in less, rath- ship.9 Indeed, some researchers find the er than more, inequality. To begin, let us opposite pattern: in both crossnational consider the most basic test of the mrm: and longitudinal studies, greater objec- do systems and people act to maintain tive inequality sometimes predicts lower some equilibrium between inequality levels of redistribution.10 and redistribution over time? Does rising inequality prompt the hypothesized demand for redistribution, Meltzer and Richard offer a self-cor- even if not always translated to policy? recting model of how democracies keep Support for path 1 is also inconsistent: inequalities in check: when inequality ris- Some analyses suggest that high inequal- es too much, voters mobilize to demand ity increases demand for redistribution;

110 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences other studies link higher inequality to more than 50 percent of the time.15 Fur- Son Hing, lower support for redistribution, across thermore, people seem to be limited in Wilson, Gourevitch, countries or within-country across their ability to track large-scale changes English & time.11 For instance, as income inequal- in inequality over time. Although income Sin ity rose over twenty-fiveyears in the inequality rose dramatically in the United United Kingdom beginning in the mid- States between 1980 and 2000, one-quarter 1980s, public support for redistribution of Americans reported being unaware of fell.12 Other studies examining multiple any change.16 Likewise, longitudinal, mul- nations find no consistent relation be- tinational studies have revealed at times no tween objective inequality and public link between objective levels of inequality demand for redistribution.13 Given the and perceptions of inequality and, at oth- mixed evidence, we conclude that the er times, only a small association, leaving mrm’s hypothesized positive links be- considerable room for slippage.17 tween inequality and redistribution (Fig- Knowing that people incorrectly esti- ure 1, paths 1 and 4) appear to be largely mate levels of inequality does not tell us unsupported. whether their perceptions are under- or A related body of research, however, overestimates. Evidence is mixed, but demonstrates that although actual in- most frequently, people’s misperceptions equality fails to predict support for re- of inequality err in the direction of un- distribution, higher perceived levels of in- derestimation. For example, Americans equality are sometimes linked to both estimated that the richest quintile owned greater demand for redistribution (Figure 59 percent of the wealth, while the bot- 2, path E), and more generous redistrib- tom two quintiles combined controlled utive policy.14 It makes sense that pub- roughly 10 percent; in fact, the richest lic opinion would be shaped more by the quintile controls 84 percent of the wealth inequality people perceive than by what and the bottom two quintiles–the bot- goes unnoticed; these findings point to tom 40 percent of Americans–control a meaningful disconnect between actual 0 percent.18 The phenomenon seems to and perceived inequality levels (Figure 2, be driven especially by underestimation path A). How accurate are people’s judg- of the staggering incomes and wealth ments of income inequality? controlled at the top, as well as dramatic underestimation of the economic dis- Implicit in the mrm is the assumption advantage still faced by minority groups that people estimate with reasonable ac- such as Black Americans.19 This underes- curacy the level of inequality in a society timation is not a uniquely American phe- at any given time (Figure 2, path A). How- nomenon; it has been demonstrated in- ever, there is good reason to doubt that ternationally, with the most pronounced people’s subjective perceptions correctly underestimations in countries with the track objective levels of income inequali- highest levels of actual inequality.20 Un- ty. Psychological mechanisms may inhib- derestimation is significant because peo- it the detection of true levels of inequali- ple who do perceive higher levels of in- ty; paradoxically, estimates may become equality tend to report greater support more inaccurate as actual inequality levels for redistribution (Figure 2, path E).21 rise. Across forty countries, people were Although misperceptions often under- quite poor at guessing their nation’s pat- estimate inequality, any bias that some- tern of wealth distribution: in only five times veers in one direction can conceiv- of forty countries were estimates correct ably also lean in the opposite direction.

148 (3) Summer 2019 111 Rising Income Accordingly, evidence suggests that al- States, as inequality rose between 1980 Inequality: though respondents from many nations and 2000, print media reporting on this Processes That 28 Legitimize tended to underestimate inequality on issue declined. Media and political nar- Growing average, respondents from some nations ratives may be crafted by economic and Disparities were fairly accurate and others tended to political elites to shape public opinion.29 overestimate true levels of inequality.22 Under conditions of greater inequality, Political leaning may also play a role: in economic elites have an even larger share one recent study, American political lib- of control over these forms of influence, erals were more likely than conservatives along with a heightened incentive to dis- to overestimate rising inequality.23 Taken courage unwelcome scrutiny.30 together, the available evidence suggests Second, there are mesolevel or social- that people’s ability to track real levels ly contextualized ways in which people of inequality is tenuous at best, often un- access media–and more recently social derestimated, sometimes overestimated, media–that could influence how peo- and can be affected by how the question ple perceive income inequality (Figure 3). is asked and by preexisting ideologies. People may choose partisan media and curate social media networks that cre- What affects people’s perceptions of inate informational echo chambers limit- equality levels? People do not form their ing exposure both to ideas inconsistent impressions of inequality levels after por- with their ideology and to people dissimi- ing over years of data; they rely on cog- lar from them.31 Such informational echo nitive shortcuts and highly accessible in- chambers are increasingly intensified by formation.24 It is important therefore to online algorithms selectively providing understand the micro-, meso-, and macro- attitude-consistent stimuli and undercut level contextual factors (Figure 3) that can the likelihood that people will receive ac- shape perceptions of inequality and con- curate information about inequality.32 tribute to the disconnect between objec- It is also worth acknowledging differ- tive and perceived levels of inequality. ential access to institutional sources of First, media portrayals of income in- knowledge other than media. People do equality may be a macrolevel contextu- not experience “inequality levels” direct- al factor that weakens the link between ly via lived experience; rather, they expe- objective income inequality and its accu- rience levels of economic hardship rela- rate recognition (Figure 3). People rely on tive to those in their local environment. the media to make sense of complex is- People’s awareness of actual levels of in- sues when information is otherwise not equality may be contingent on formal ed- available to them, and media coverage ucation and access to and ability to criti- can affect people’s beliefs and positions cally evaluate aggregate evidence. As ris- on economic issues.25 Awareness of lev- ing inequality compounds educational els of inequality could rise during periods disparities, access to detailed aggregate of increased coverage (such as during Oc- information about economic inequali- cupy Wall Street). However, mainstream ty might increasingly become available media provide incomplete information mainly to the wealthy.33 about economic issues, such as the im- Third, accurate perceptions of inequal- plications of the Bush 2001 and 2003 tax ity may be inhibited by mesolevel factors, cuts for income inequality.26 Further, such as spatial segregation based on ses news coverage does not necessarily track (Figure 3). Because people tend to cluster actual economic trends.27 In the United in socioeconomically homogenous rural/

112 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences urban milieus, neighborhoods, and so- rises sharply with people’s wealth.40 If Son Hing, cial networks, they may have little first- people base their judgments on what they Wilson, Gourevitch, hand knowledge of “how the other half can observe (such as conspicuous con- English & lives.”34 This tendency toward residen- sumption patterns), they may underesti- Sin tial segregation on the basis of income mate the wealth of the rich, who spend has become increasingly pronounced as far less of their available money.41 Con- inequality has risen, especially for black versely, talk of debt may be uncomfort- families.35 Hence, rising inequalities can able or embarrassing for the disadvan- paradoxically shield people from recog- taged, rendering it invisible and sub- nizing the full extent of the economic ject to pluralistic ignorance. In addition, gap. Residential and spatial segregation low-income people often use credit to ac- limit awareness of the true range of eco- cess consumption goods they could oth- nomic circumstances in broader society; erwise not afford (obscuring their genu- at the same time, it further perpetuates ine level of disadvantage). Middle-class inequality over time via access to resourc- households, too, may incur considerable es, education, jobs, and mates.36 debt to meet local standards or gain entry Fourth, at a microlevel, social compar- into good neighborhoods and schools.42 ison processes work in tandem with in- Because the rich may hide their wealth creasing residential segregation to dis- while the poor hide their debt, the extent rupt accurate comparative assessments of income inequality is further masked. of inequality (Figure 3). Because social The mrm contends that rising objec- comparisons are predominantly made tive inequality will increase demand for with relevant, close others, people may redistribution. A key (implicit) assump- limit comparisons to people in their (in- tion of this model is that people’s subjec- creasingly) income-segregated networks. tive perceptions of inequality accurately As a result, comparisons may fail to gauge track its reality (path A). Evidence over- real levels of societal inequality and may whelmingly fails to support this assump- dampen dissatisfaction with one’s rank.37 tion. We offer a multilevel account for the By comparing themselves with econom- disconnect between actual and perceived ically similar others, the poor overesti- inequality, and argue that subjective estimate their societal-level ses and the rich mates may become increasingly inaccu- underestimate theirs, contributing to un- rate as inequality rises. derestimations of overall inequality in both cases.38 The Extended mrm (Figure 2) suggests Fifth, at the level of culture, people may that as objective levels of income in- limit the economic information that is equality increase, people should come to visible, displayed, or willingly shared. judge the level of inequality more harsh- Open talk of money and wealth can be ta- ly (a negative path D). However, repeat- boo, especially among the wealthy.39 Fur- ed studies of crossnational differences re- ther, aware that mounting resentment veal no relation between actual levels of of the rich can have unwelcome conse- income inequality and people’s belief that quences for them, elites may avoid full income differences are too large.43 This disclosure out of self-interest (which is nonsignificant path D may be a conse- also reflected in their opposition to for- quence of the disconnect between objec- mal pay-ratio disclosures such as in tive and subjectively perceived inequali- Dodd-Frank). The likelihood of actively ty. People will not decry inequalities that hiding assets to evade taxes and scrutiny they fail to perceive. But when people do

148 (3) Summer 2019 113 Rising Income subjectively perceive heightened levels of in their nation is “too large.” Ample ev- Inequality: inequality, does it predict more negative idence points to people’s disapproval of Processes That Legitimize evaluations of the disparity? high inequality. In a study of thirty coun- Growing The Extended mrm in Figure 2 sug- tries (from 1999 to 2000), 45 percent of Disparities gests that when people perceive increased respondents strongly agreed that income income inequality, they should come to differences were too large.44 Subjective evaluate it more disapprovingly (an in- perceptions of higher inequality predict- verse path B). This relationship has been ed judgments of “too much” inequality tested in numerous studies; however, find- across twenty-three countries.45 Ameri- ings are complicated because “evaluations can participants who learned how much of inequality” can be conceptualized and inequality had risen expressed stronger tested in multiple ways that reveal differ- beliefs that levels were too large, unnec- ent patterns of findings. We summarize essary, and chiefly beneficial to the rich.46 two central patterns that at firstblush ap- We propose that those who evaluate in- pear contradictory, but that can both be come inequalities as too great do so be- understood as psychological responses cause they view the disparity as unjust. to rising inequality. First, research shows High levels of income inequality may be that when people are asked whether lev- seen as violating the distributive justice els of inequality are “too large,” they of- principle of equity.47 The equity princi- ten indicate that high inequality is indeed ple states that fair allocation of outcome excessive. This pattern suggests a nega- (pay, rewards) should be based on inputs tive path B (higher perceived inequali- (that is, by merit: effort, skill).48 If some ty leads to lower approval). But a second people are rewarded far more handsome- pattern emerges when people are asked ly for their inputs than others, this equi- to estimate how much inequality exists ty violation should result in disapproval (their descriptive beliefs) and indicate of the disparity. Supporting this justice- how much inequality should exist (their violation view, people are more likely prescriptive beliefs). Measured this way, to see income inequalities as too large if a positive path B emerges: the more in- they believe that nepotism and intergen- equality people believe there is, the more erational advantage (as opposed to mer- they believe there ought to be. We sug- it) determine outcomes in life.49 gest that these different patterns are not People vary in the degree to which simply a methodological artifact. Rather, they care about equity. People who be- these distinct patterns each provide crit- lieve more strongly that outcomes ought ical information about how people re- to be distributed on the basis of merit spond to inequality and how these evalu- are more apt to oppose exceedingly high ations change over time. inequality. In our own recent research, First, in cross-sectional studies in we found that those who believed more which people were asked whether in- strongly that outcomes should be merit- come inequalities in their nation were based reported greater disapproval of “too large,” evidence has been general- very high ceo-worker wage gaps be- ly consistent with the Extended mrm. cause the excessive disparity violated eq- Perceptions of greater income inequali- uity principles.50 ty predict less positive evaluations of in- Together, evidence supports the con- come inequality. In these studies, inequal- tention that, at a single point in time, peo- ity evaluations are typically conceptual- ple who perceive more income inequal- ized as the belief that income inequality ity will evaluate that inequality as too

114 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences large because the disparity violates equi- reveal that over time, people come to be- Son Hing, ty. However, these patterns reflect what lieve that growing inequalities are legiti- Wilson, 54 Gourevitch, occurs in a snapshot in time, when peo- mate. For instance, as levels of inequal- English & ple face the inequality before them. What ity increased in the United States from Sin happens over time, as people process and 1987 to 1999, people’s judgments of ap- understand the income inequalities they propriate wage gaps widened.55 An in- perceive around them? ternational longitudinal study found that As noted earlier, although one pattern increases in perceived levels of income of evidence reveals that people who per- inequality mediated judgments of pre- ceive higher inequality judge it as too ferred disparity, especially during rapid large, a second pattern shows that the political and economic change.56 More- more inequality people believe there is, over, when people are experimentally ex- the more they think there ought to be. posed to higher levels of income inequal- Before exploring that second pattern, ity (versus a no-information control con- let’s consider the relation between these dition), the level of disparity they judge conceptualizations. as legitimate increases.57 Across these For people to judge income disparities many contexts, the more inequality peo- as too large, they must have made two ap- ple think there is, the more inequality praisals: what level of inequality they be- they believe there should be. lieve to exist, and what level they believe Putting these pieces together, we pro- to be ideal. If the actual level of inequal- pose that the relation between perceiving ity far outstrips the ideal, they are like- greater income inequality and judging in- ly to judge inequality as excessive. Sup- equality as excessive flips,depending on porting this view, respondents in multi- whether we are considering a cross-sec- ple countries who perceived a greater gap tional perspective (differences between between what the wage gap is and what people at any point in time) or a proces- it should be more strongly agreed that in- sual perspective (differences over time). come differences in their country were On one hand, people who perceive more too large.51 What, then, predicts people’s income inequality to exist will, all else be- judgments of how much income inequal- ing equal, judge those inequalities as ex- ity ideally ought to exist? cessive compared with those who see less A remarkably strong predictor of peo- inequality. On the other hand, as people ple’s ideal levels of income inequali- come to experience greater and greater ty is their perceptions of actual inequali- levels of inequality over time, they will ty (now suggesting a positive path B). The come to view higher levels of income in- greater a wage gap between low and high equality as increasingly appropriate and occupational wage earners that people even desirable. perceive to exist, the greater a wage gap How can it be that, despite sensitivity they believe should exist.52 In one study of to equity violations discussed previous- twenty-seven countries, fully 78 percent ly, people can witness spiraling income of the variance in people’s beliefs about inequality and judge it to be good? This how big the wage gap should be was ex- may be due to a general psychological plained by their perceptions of the actu- tendency for people to believe that what al wage gap.53 is (the status quo) is what ought to be.58 This pattern is not simply an artifact of Two theories describe people’s powerful similarly worded questions asked con- motivations to legitimize injustice (in- temporaneously. Longitudinal studies cluding excessive income inequality):

148 (3) Summer 2019 115 Rising Income “belief in a just world” and “system justi- cused by drawing on legitimizing ideas Inequality: fication theory.” about how such inequalities emerge and Processes That 66 Legitimize Belief in a just world. First, people are what their consequences are. Key ide- Growing motivated to believe that the world is a ologies that provide seemingly legitimate Disparities fair place in which good things happen reasons for inequality include 1) beliefs to good people and bad things happen to that society is meritocratic; 2) beliefs in bad people.59 This conviction can lead to social mobility; and 3) beliefs in the mar- the legitimization of income inequalities. ket system. This motive is heightened when confront- Meritocracy beliefs. First, the belief that ed with more threatening injustices.60 For outcomes currently are distributed on instance, American income inequality the basis of merit (not to be confused from 1973 to 2006 rose in tandem with be- with the justice principle that outcomes lief in a just world.61 Individual differenc- ought to be distributed by merit) predicts es in this belief matter too: people with acceptance of income inequality. The be- a stronger belief in a just world evaluate lief (however unwarranted) that society income inequality more favorably when is currently a meritocracy serves to legiti- they learn a big income gap exists.62 Over- mize inequalities because those at the top all, when faced with evidence of unjustly are seen as deserving of their better out- high income inequality, people’s desire to comes and those at the bottom are seen see the world as a fair place can motivate as underserving.67 The more people be- them to believe that vast economic dis- lieve that outcomes are rewarded on the parities are deserved and appropriate. basis of ability and hard work, the more System justificationtheory. Second, and they accept income disparity as accept- similarly, the motivation to uphold the able and even as necessary.68 Notably, status quo and therefore to rationalize its crossnational evidence shows that people institutions could lead to the legitimiza- endorse stronger meritocracy beliefs as tion of income inequality. According to income inequalities rise over time.69 system justification theory, when peo- Social mobility beliefs. The belief that so- ple are faced with their own illegitimate cial mobility is possible can also justify low status and their personal lack of ac- rising income inequality. The notion that tion to correct it, they either live with un- people, through their own hard work, can comfortable cognitive dissonance or they rise through the ranks to a status higher rationalize the inequalities as fair to alle- than their parents can be comforting and viate discomfort.63 This view contends empowering. People who more strong- that people are motivated to legitimize ly endorse the possibility of social mo- income inequality, even when it conflicts bility view income inequality as more de- with self-interest, because of its palliative sirable.70 Further, when Americans were function.64 In countries with higher lev- experimentally induced to believe that els of objective income inequality, people there is greater social mobility, they re- more strongly endorse system-justifying ported greater tolerance for income in- statements like “In general, I find soci- equality in their country.71 ety to be fair.”65 Thus, as people face ris- Market system beliefs. Third, ideologies ing income inequality, they may become concerning how markets operate can increasingly motivated to rationalize it as also serve to legitimize inequality. If peo- justified. ple believe that incentives and competi- How do people justify a system with tion are necessary to motivate hard work, high inequality? Inequality can be ex- and that large income inequalities have

116 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences positive economic consequences, such as Europeans, believe that hard work pays Son Hing, spurring economic prosperity, they eval- off in the long run.74 The more consen- Wilson, 72 Gourevitch, uate larger wage gaps as desirable. Fur- sually people within a country endorse English & ther, in new market democracies in Cen- ideologies of meritocracy, social mobili- Sin tral and Eastern Europe, the more people ty, and the market system, the more indi- believe that the market economy im- viduals accept high levels of inequality.75 proves the standard of living for ordinary Second, macrolevel economic factors people, the less they evaluate current so- are likely to condition people’s respons- cial inequalities in their country as too es to income inequality. For instance, in large.73 nations that are less prosperous (as mea- Although it may be the case that, at any sured by gdp) or that have low social single point in time, people who perceive mobility, people are more likely to eval- greater income inequality will be more uate levels of income inequality in their apt to judge it as excessive; over time, countries as too large.76 we have little reason to expect a nega- Third, a society’s economic system tive evaluation of objective or perceived may predict attitudes toward income in- inequality as suggested by the Extend- equality. Specifically, between 1987 and ed mrm. Instead, due to a desire to see 1992, as post-Communist Central and the world as fair and one’s system as le- Eastern European countries transitioned gitimate, people are likely to justify grow- into free-market systems, their residents ing inequalities as meritocratic, aiding increasingly desired greater wage gaps social mobility, and creating competitive between skilled and unskilled workers.77 markets. Consequently, over time, it be- However, countries that had more suc- comes increasingly more likely that peo- cessfully transitioned to a market econ- ple will judge the income inequalities omy (such as East Germany, the Czech they see as warranted and acceptable (a Republic, and Germany) showed more positive path B). However, the proposed acceptance of inequality than countries positive link between inequality and its with less successful transitions (Russia evaluation is qualified by several fac- and Bulgaria).78 These data suggest that tors. As we will discuss, people do not al- tendencies to legitimize inequalities will ways correctly perceive income inequal- be constrained by macrolevel conditions: ities as they grow. Further, in some cul- when one’s sociopolitical and economic tural and economic contexts, it should be reality is too dysfunctional, disruptive, or harder or easier to legitimize income in- despairing, people are less likely to legit- equality; some people will be chronical- imize it.79 ly more likely to legitimize inequalities Fourth, our Multilevel Model takes than others. demographic and individual difference variables into account. For instance, con- What affects people’s evaluations of sistent with our model, people who per- inequality? Our Multilevel Model (Fig- sonally have higher income or status ure 3) explores these factors. First, how tend to prefer a higher level of wage in- people respond to inequality should be equality than less advantaged respon- affected by broad macrolevel factors, dents.80 Chronic personality differenc- such as cultural scripts. There are large es matter, too. For instance, people high crossnational differences in ideas about in social dominance orientation (a so- meritocracy. For instance, a greater per- ciopolitical ideology that purports that centage of Americans, compared with inequalities between groups are natural

148 (3) Summer 2019 117 Rising Income and desirable) perceive less inequality to inequality levels as excessive, and oth- Inequality: exist between the rich and the poor and er times to legitimize the disparity. Now Processes That Legitimize are more accepting of greater wage gaps we consider the implications of people’s Growing between ceos and bottom line work- evaluations of income inequality on pub- Disparities ers.81 Finally, we theorize that these pro- lic demand for redistributive policies. cesses should depend on people’s polit- The mrm contends that as inequality ical orientation. International surveys rises, support for redistribution should reveal that those who identify on the po- increase. Indirectly, this implies a nega- litical right are less likely to judge income tive path C of the Extended mrm (that inequality in their nation as too great.82 as people judge inequality levels more Conservatives may favor income inequal- unfavorably, demand for redistribution ity in part because they more strongly en- should increase). We argue that although dorse system justification ideologies that judging inequality as excessive can in- legitimize inequality. For instance, con- crease support for redistribution, the link servatives believe more strongly that is likely to be weak and influenced by nu- the current system is a true meritocracy, merous factors that reduce the likelihood overestimate social mobility, and assert that redistribution will be seen as the that “economic positions are legitimate right solution. For instance, people’s be- reflections of people’s achievements.”83 liefs about how markets function, their Internationally, greater income inequali- trust in government, and harsh evalua- ty predicts lower trust in institutions for tions of the economically disadvantaged those on the political left, whereas those can all moderate support for redistribu- on the right appear to be impervious pre- tion.86 We also outline how redistribu- sumably because their beliefs legitimize tion beliefs are affected by macrolevel the system producing the disparities.84 processes, such as the elites’ power to In sum, the Extended mrm may not control media narratives; mesolevel pro- hold because people may fail to correct- cesses, such as increased income-based ly perceive the level of inequality in the segregation; and microlevel factors, such first place, or come to see higher lev- as personal income, personal mobility, els of inequality as desirable. Despite the and feelings of threat. fact that people are concerned about in- Does the judgment that income income inequality, would prefer less of it, equality is excessive result in demand and may regard it as inequitable, we sug- for redistribution? Although a strong gest that, over time, many are also moti- link is sometimes observed, the effects vated to legitimize the inequalities they are typically weak.87 For instance, across see.85 Processes of legitimization should twenty-seven European countries, par- be less likely in failing political sys- ticipants’ belief that income inequali- tems and where cultural narratives do ty is excessive accounted for just 3 per- not assume meritocracy, social mobili- cent of the variance in redistribution pol- ty, or market ideals. Finally, people high- icy support.88 Given the weak direct link, er in ses, social dominance orientation, it is important to consider factors that and right-wing political ideology should might moderate this link: when does de- be more prone to legitimizing income crying inequality result in demand for inequalities. redistribution? Although people often would prefer We have considered how rising in- a society that is less unequal than their equality sometimes leads people to judge current reality, these preferences do not

118 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences readily translate into increased demand prosperity.98 Although this functionalist Son Hing, for government redistribution.89 Some view that inequality is needed typically Wilson, Gourevitch, of this ambivalence may be due to an in- predicts less disapproval toward inequal- English & complete understanding of how redis- ity, people can simultaneously believe Sin tributive policies affect inequality.90 Peo- that large differences in income are nec- ple may also react differently to redis- essary and that there is too much inequal- tributive programs perceived to increase ity.99 Notably, the belief that inequality is equality of opportunity versus equali- necessary for competition and prosperity ty of outcome: education or health care dampens demand for redistribution.100 policies, for instance, may be more pop- Furthermore, the more people believe ular than social support for the poor.91 in the existence of a meritocracy that re- Although a detailed analysis of specif- wards hard work and talent, and that en- ic redistributive policies (and how these ables upward social mobility, the less they policies are framed or perceived by the support redistribution.101 In contrast, be- public) is beyond the scope of this essay, liefs that luck and social location strong- these variations clearly matter.92 ly determine outcomes is linked to both Why might people fail to support redis- desired and actual redistribution.102 Be- tribution even when they see excessive cause rising inequality may intensify peo- inequality? There are multiple microlev- ple’s belief in status quo–legitimizing el factors that might affect support for ideologies such as meritocracy and so- redistribution (Figure 3). First, consis- cial mobility, mounting disparities may tent with mrm assumptions, economic paradoxically dampen support for redis- self-interest plays a role: the wealthy are tribution just when it is (arguably) most less apt to demand redistribution.93 Even warranted.103 those who expect to become wealthier When people believe that the poor de- (believing themselves upwardly socially serve their own fate, they tend to op- mobile) show less support for redistribu- pose redistribution. This belief is tied tion.94 In fact, the rich appear to become to the legitimizing ideologies previous- even less generous as inequality rises: in ly described: if an individual believes higher-inequality contexts, wealthy in- the system is meritocratic and social mo- dividuals adopted less generous views of bility is possible, they are more likely to redistribution due to a heightened con- blame the most disadvantaged for their viction that they were entitled to their misfortunes. These assumptions under- wealth.95 It may be unremarkable that mine support for redistribution that ben- the rich oppose redistribution, however efits the disadvantaged.104 The irony is there are too few very wealthy individu- that because conditions of excessive in- als for their votes to represent a majority equality tend to amplify legitimizing be- in a democracy. More interesting to con- liefs, the poor may be most likely blamed sider is why the nonrich also often fail to for their fate under the very conditions in support redistribution.96 which they are least able to escape their People may oppose redistribution (even disadvantage. when they believe inequality is exces- Further, attitudes toward the poor and sive) because they believe that inequali- support for redistribution can depend on ty is necessary to motivate hard work and respondents’ beliefs about the ethnora- striving.97 Internationally, there is strong cial composition of beneficiaries of redis- support for the notion that large income tributive policies. In nations where a vis- disparities are necessary for a country’s ible minority group is poor (or perceived

148 (3) Summer 2019 119 Rising Income to be poor) relative to a dominant major- What affects people’s support for re- Inequality: ity, redistribution can be seen as dispro- distribution? Certainly, favorability to- Processes That 105 Legitimize portionately benefiting minorities. ward redistribution varies across macro- Growing When paired with the view that the poor level economic factors, such as national Disparities are lazy or undeserving of help, redis- wealth (gdp) or type of welfare regime tribution support wanes. Stereotypes (Figure 3).111 Public support for redistri- of the disadvantaged may be exacerbat- bution can also be shaped by communi- ed by minority status (for instance, poor cations from political elites (who them- Blacks are viewed as less hard-working selves may have a disproportionate in- than poor Whites).106 Thus, white vot- centive to maintain the status quo, and ers, even those at an economic disad- power to influence narratives under con- vantage, may vote against their own re- ditions of high inequality). For instance, distributive interest if they believe (typ- political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul ically incorrectly) that benefits will go Pierson describe twin U.S. right-wing po- primarily to outgroups.107 Versions of litical strategy and rhetoric that involves this pattern are evident internationally, first sabotaging effective governance, and countries with a larger poor ethno- then decrying government as dysfunc- racial minority tend to have a smaller tional, exemplified in Ronald Reagan’s public sector, suggesting effects on ac- often-repeated quote: “the nine most ter- tual redistribution.108 It is important to rifying words in the English language are: emphasize that it is not ethnoracial di- ‘I’m from the government, and I’m here versity itself that drives opposition to to help.’”112 To the extent that fostering public goods, but the economic dispari- mistrust in government fuels opposition ty between ethnoracial groups. When an to redistribution, this may well be an ef- ethnoracial minority group is poor rela- fective strategy for antitaxation elites.113 tive to the dominant majority group, the Intergroup hostilities can also be ignit- majority opposes redistribution. ed top-down by powerful communica- People also may not support govern- tors, divisions further fueled by the anx- ment redistribution even when they view iety of rising economic inequality. For ex- inequality as excessive because they do ample, politicians can strategically shift not trust government to do the job of re- support away from redistribution (and distribution. Increased mistrust in gov- even toward policies that overbenefit the ernment reduces support for government wealthy) by not only drawing on existing redistributive programs in favor of pri- outgroup prejudice (for instance, toward vate charities. Notably, rising income in- poor ethnoracial minorities), but also by equality can itself result in greater mis- actively fostering racial resentments and trust in government.109 Across twenty contributing to the creation of new ani- democratic European countries, higher mosities.114 Political and economic elites levels of objective income inequality pre- may focus blame on powerless minorities dicted lower trust in, and satisfaction to shift scrutiny away from their own role with, political institutions.110 Thus, in in perpetuating economic hardship. the very context in which redistribution Earlier we noted that the mesolevel is needed–high income inequality–peo- process of ses-based segregation like- ple are least likely to trust the govern- ly inhibits accurate perceptions of in- ment to do this job, which in turn can equality. We also contend that residential lead to a cycle of even greater inequality and workplace segregation likely reduc- and further mistrust. es support for redistribution, both due to

120 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences underestimations of inequality and to an needed to fuel increased intergroup hos- Son Hing, inflated belief that differences are merit- tility, expressed in part through opposi- Wilson, Gourevitch, based. People are increasingly only ex- tion to redistribution. English & posed to others of a similar income brack- Sin et at work. Infrequent contact with those So far we have considered multiple fac- of disparate incomes may constrain so- tors that might lead people to either high cial comparisons to limited networks in or low support for redistribution. The which meritocracy appears to work rel- mrm assumes that voters who support atively fairly (such as more competent redistribution will also vote for it (Fig- and hardworking people getting promot- ures 1 and 2, path 2). Is this assumption ed).115 This may lead to the erroneous be- warranted? That is, does public support lief that meritocracy works at a socie- for redistribution, particularly among tal level too, even though the range of in- lower-income individuals, reliably trans- comes they see within their workplace is late into votes?118 Support for redistribu- but a small fraction of the wage discrep- tion translating to action may be damp- ancies that exist within society. Likewise, ened–even among those who would income-based residential segregation benefit from it–by the mesolevel politi- may contribute to the illusion that merit cal process of “policy bundling.” For in- is linked to mobility within narrow social stance, in the United States, the Demo- contexts. Further, by limiting social com- cratic Party has come to represent racial/ parisons to economically similar others, social progress and redistribution; the Re- even the relatively wealthy may feel that publican Party has come to stand for ra- they need more of their income to com- cial/social conservatism and opposition pete in their social networks (reducing to redistribution. Therefore, voters must redistribution generosity). align with the issues they prioritize most Finally, in terms of microlevel factors, even if all of their interests are not rep- rising inequality makes social mobility resented. In such cases, people may vote (or the “American dream”) increasing- against their own redistributive interests ly unattainable for the disadvantaged, in order to express support for some iden- while, at the same time, intensifying peo- tity or culturally relevant value.119 ple’s belief in social mobility. This may Further, although the Meltzer-Richard lead to a cycle of false hope, failure, self- hypothesis assumes that all eligible mem- blame and shame, and threatened self- bers of a society are equally likely to vote, worth. People are particularly likely to this is rarely the case. Asymmetry in vot- lash out at outgroup members when ing patterns is well-documented: peo- their self-worth has been threatened.116 ple who are lower-income, less educat- When the disadvantaged are faced with ed, and a minority ethnicity are relatively a choice between blaming themselves for less likely to vote.120 Moreover, lower-in- failure to achieve social mobility (osten- come voter turnout is particularly damp- sibly due to lack of merit) and the alter- ened under conditions of high inequali- native view (often provided by political ty.121 Rising inequality may affect voting elites) that undeserving minorities–via asymmetries by exacerbating the struc- unjust government redistribution–have tural barriers to voting among lower-ses cut ahead of them in line, they may find people (that is, less time, knowledge, and scapegoating the more palatable op- resources), decreasing their psycholog- tion.117 Hence conditions of rising in- ical sense of power, control, and politi- equality once again provide the backdrop cal efficacy.122 Rising income inequality

148 (3) Summer 2019 121 Rising Income therefore begets political inequality, strategically redrawn to concentrate a Inequality: which in turn begets greater income in- particular party or group in some dis- Processes That Legitimize equality. These microprocesses dampen- tricts and weaken its numbers in other Growing ing voter turnout are worsened by meso- districts, thereby diluting representation Disparities and macrovoter suppression mecha- of some groups relative to others. Thus, nisms that disproportionately affect not all preferences are weighed equally in lower-income and minority voters, in- election outcomes. cluding residence requirements, voter id Further, although the democratic ide- laws, limited early voting, and felony dis- al assumes each person’s preference is enfranchisement. All of these laws affect weighed equally in determining out- poor and minority voters disproportion- comes, reality often diverges. Not all peo- ately: for example, one in thirteen Afri- ple’s preferences matter equally to polit- can American men are unable to vote due ical decision-makers. The public opin- to (often lifetime) felony disenfranchise- ions voiced by high-income voters are ment. The disproportionately high arrest more likely to hold sway among politi- rates among minority and low-income cians than the opinions of middle- or groups exacerbate this disparity.123 Sti- low-income voters, particularly for eco- fled political participation matters: sup- nomic (versus social) policy.125 How does port for redistributive policies is higher this happen? First, higher-income vot- when voter turnout is high.124 ers engage in more political action, including donating to political candidates, The final link in the mrm (Figures 1 and and as such, the wealthy exert more in- 2, path 3) presumes a simple direct step fluence on who runs for office and whose between demand for redistribution (via concerns are heard.126 Here again, insti- voting) and actual generous, effective re- tutions play a key role in the disconnect distributive policies. However, the link between preference and policy. On one from public opinion to policy is far from hand, the interests of the affluent are like- straightforward. Even when support for ly to align with many lobbyists, special redistribution is high and reflected in interest groups, and political action com- voting patterns, policies may not be re- mittees, which have increased dramati- sponsive to demand due to the realities of cally in number and influence as inequal- the political process, particularly in con- ity has risen; on the other hand, interest texts of rising inequality. groups representing the less affluent (like First, the nature of national political in- unions) have declined precipitously in stitutions strongly shapes the degree to number and power.127 which aggregate preferences lead to re- Finally, we point out a psychological sponsive policy. Different institutions side effect of the impact of institutions produce divergent policy outcomes, even that fosters inequality of voice. The dis- holding preferences constant. The voting advantaged in society may correctly per- system (such as proportional representa- ceive that even when they vote or public- tion versus majoritarian once-past-the- ly express their preferences, their prefer- post rules, presidential versus parliamen- ences are rarely borne out in observable tary institutions, federalism, two-party policy change. This apparent lack of im- versus multiparty systems) meaningful- pact may reduce voter trust and confi- ly impacts this relation (path 3). Further, dence that the government can be relied gerrymandering alters the outcomes of upon to effect positive change.128 It may an election as district boundaries are also increase feelings of powerlessness

122 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences and system inescapability for the poor, social scientists Christopher Achen and Son Hing, which can heighten the tendency to jus- Larry Bartels offer a compelling alterna- Wilson, 134 Gourevitch, tify the status quo and thereby reduce tive account. Often, voter behavior is English & their support for redistribution.129 Over derived from ingroup identification rath- Sin time, the attitudes of the poor toward re- er than substantive policy preference. distribution follow those of the rich and Thus, it is more likely for voters to start become more conservative.130 However, with their party affiliation, work back- in some circumstances, people may opt ward to determine what policy positions for resistance instead, attempting to dis- they hold (that is, those espoused by their mantle the system they recognize as un- party leaders), and then develop post- fair or illegitimate.131 Disillusionment hoc rationalizations for policy support.135 with political elites, paired with anger Psychologists, too, have recognized that about economic circumstances, may lead party affiliation can often override policy to attempts to change an ineffective po- content, especially when it serves belong- litical system. Status quo–rejecting ges- ingness or identity needs.136 People may tures like the Brexit vote, rising popular- become more likely to vote against their ity of populist movements, and support interests economically in times of rising for authoritarian leaders with disre- inequality because economic uncertainty gard for democratic norms may all be re- heightens the need to belong to a tribe.137 sponses to the perception that the system Economic inequality has also been linked has failed the people.132 As Bill O’Reil- to higher political polarization, which ly opined, “They want someone to blow heightens the inclination to uncritical- that system to hell. That’s why Trump is ly accept ingroup views and to reject any- winning. He pinpointed festering disen- thing the opponent group prefers.138 chantment long before anyone else.”133 Of course, Trump’s version of populism This essay considers a nearly world- criticized the system and decried both wide phenomenon: the dramatically ris- corrupt elites and low-power minori- ing levels of economic inequality. There ty groups such as undocumented immi- are many reasons to imagine that in a de- grants and Muslims. Disillusioned vot- mocracy, people would perceive these ers may be swayed by different aspects of trends, judge them as undesirable, and this rhetoric, with some taking aim at the demand a strengthened welfare state via powerful and others tempted to blame redistribution. Although public outcry in minority groups for their struggles. Fol- the face of such extreme gaps in income lowing his election, it became evident seems both warranted and intuitive- that Trump would not act to disman- ly plausible, evidence for it is strikingly tle the status quo benefitingthe rich (in- hard to find.Indeed, there is clearer evi- stead exacerbating it with further tax cuts dence that in the face of rising inequality, for the wealthy), but would instead be in- public transfers and various redistribu- creasingly willing to follow through on tive social programs often become mark- scapegoating the powerless. edly less generous. Although the Meltzer-Richard Model To explore the factors that produce or of voter behavior (assuming rational, hinder support for redistribution in the self-interested voters consider policy im- face of high inequality, we have used the plications) is common in much of the lit- simple and elegant logic of the mrm as erature, the validity of this model of voter a means of systematically unpacking the behavior is highly questionable. Indeed, considerably more complex and nuanced

148 (3) Summer 2019 123 Rising Income reality.139 We show why this model’s lack middle-income citizens may not trans- Inequality: of support can be understood by consid- late into policy (relative to policy pref- Processes That Legitimize ering the host of psychological processes erences of the affluent). Each of these Growing that can contribute to slippage between processes in turn exacerbates inequality, Disparities each of the links in Figure 2. Ultimately, reinforcing the cycle of status quo–legit- we build a multilevel account for why ris- imizing perceptions and further contrib- ing and extreme inequality so often fails uting to voter disillusionment. to prompt action. Our primary focus is on microprocess- First, does greater objective income in- es: that is, the psychological reasons why equality lead to greater perceptions of in- rising inequality may indeed sometimes equality (path A)? No. People are often produce perceptions of rising inequali- inaccurate, both about the extent of in- ty, negative evaluations of it, and a pref- equality and their own rank in the sys- erence for redistribution, but also–in tem. The context of rising inequality con- stark contrast to the expected outcry– tributes to the residential segregation, inequality blindness, system-legitimiz- comparison patterns, and cultural norms ing responses, victim blaming, and rejec- that underlie this phenomenon. tion of redistribution as a solution. How- Second, do perceptions of greater in- ever, we situate those microprocesses equality lead people to evaluate it nega- within the context of macrolevel factors tively (path B)? Although people are like- like other economic conditions and me- ly to judge high perceived levels of india coverage and mesolevel factors such equality as too large, over time, they tend as social networks, political institutions, to legitimize rather than revile it. Neo- and neighborhood and work segregation liberal societies are particularly rife with (Figure 3). As a result, we reveal some legitimacy-supportive ideologies (such ways that social and psychological pro- as that markets are highly meritocratic cesses may influence groups and institu- and foster social mobility or that individ- tions, and also how macroforces like ris- uals are responsible for themselves) that ing inequality foster legitimizing pro- justify the system. cesses, feelings of threat, perceptions of Third, does evaluating inequality as blame, and loss of trust that have pro- excessive lead to support for redistribu- found effects on intergroup animosities. tion (path C)? Surprisingly often, the an- In turn, waning feelings of trust and sol- swer is no. Inequality may trigger inter- idarity as a nation may deeply affect peo- group divisions that reduce willingness ple’s faith in government contributions to reallocate to outgroup members per- to the public good. ceived as undeserving. Rising inequali- The Meltzer-Richard Model assumes ty may hinder trust in the government to a linear process from conditions of in- solve the problem, resulting in a feedback equality to political backlash toward it loop producing greater inequality and yet to policy outcomes that correct it. Simi- more mistrust. larly, the Extended mrm and the struc- Finally, we consider both psychologi- ture of our analysis may still invoke the cal and institutional reasons why a pref- assumption that people consider their erence for redistribution may still not available evidence (however imperfect), translate into votes (especially among evaluate the evidence, and make a judg- low-income voters), and the broader ment about their policy preference. In political and institutional reasons why contrast, our Multilevel Model suggests public opinion and votes of lower- and that the processes at play are circular

124 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences and crosscutting. As a case in point, po- recipients of redistribution), more po- Son Hing, litical identification has been recognized litical polarization, and more social un- Wilson, Gourevitch, in our analysis as a driver of perceptions certainty and instability. All of these English & and evaluations of inequality, fundamen- processes triggered by rising inequali- Sin tal beliefs about meritocracy and person- ty may result then in societal-level inal responsibility, rejection of redistribu- creases in opposition to redistribution, tion, and voting behavior. More central- which then contributes to the perpetua- ly, we propose that people’s perceptions tion and reproduction of the same cycles of how much inequality is excessive is it- of inequality. However, understanding self influenced by the level of inequali- these processes may also illuminate le- ty, which feeds on itself through cultural, vers for change. What can be done to in- social, political, and psychological pro- tervene in these processes to reduce in- cesses. In other words, income inequal- come inequality? ity over time generates self-reinforcing processes and leads the disadvantaged to It is possible to identify points of inter- adopt self-defeating beliefs. vention for any component or path with- Because our main focus is to add a psy- in our Multilevel Model. We highlight chological lens to understanding reac- just a few that specifically target psycho- tions to income inequality, the bulk of our logical processes that lead people to mis- analysis ends with the issue of voter sup- judge or legitimize inequality. port for redistribution. Although we rec- First, at multiple points in our analy- ognize that public opinion alone does not sis we highlight the importance of ses- determine redistributive policies, its role based segregation (residential, organi- is nonetheless important. Politicians and zational, educational). As people’s so- special interests spend vast sums to influ- cial worlds become more homogenous ence public opinion. Voters can, in some because their neighborhoods and work- cases, contribute to dramatic change in places afford little opportunity to interact public policy, for instance by voting for a with those of a different income bracket, drastic leadership change (such as popu- people are less able to identify where they list or authoritarian leaders who eschew fall in the economic hierarchy or cor- political conventions) or for democrat- rectly perceive the amount of income in- ic shifts such as the American New Deal, equality that exists. People are also more the French Popular Front, or the British apt to overestimate meritocracy and so- Labor Party triumph of 1945.140 cial mobility because they appear to op- Further, public opinion–or more spe- erate effectively within their narrow so- cifically, people’s beliefs about inequal- cial context, increasing legitimization of ity–carry weight in the social world. income inequality and reducing support If the context of rising inequality trig- for redistribution. Accordingly, we pro- gers psychological processes and moti- pose that interventions should broaden vations that lead people to blame the dis- people’s social worlds and provide op- advantaged for their outcomes, to believe portunities for positive intergroup con- outcomes in the world are merit-based tact: by creating housing developments and anyone can achieve rags to riches, it in mixed-income neighborhoods, by sup- forms the backdrop for a society of rising porting income-contingent affirmative intergroup animosity and mistrust, more action programs for elite postsecond- racial discrimination (if disadvantaged ary institutions, and by facilitating inter- minorities are cast as the undeserving actions among those at the top (higher

148 (3) Summer 2019 125 Rising Income earners) and bottom (lower earners) of politicians–even liberal ones–have in- Inequality: the organizational hierarchy.141 Contact creasingly avoided highlighting the (pos- Processes That Legitimize yields greater benefits when groups are itive) role of government and indirect- Growing of relatively equal status, when there is ly capitulated to the notion that less Disparities interdependence and shared goals, and government is better.144 Ironically, this when there is a common, valued identity, hesitancy to celebrate government pro- making workplaces, schools, and neigh- grams may be an additional reason peo- borhoods excellent contexts for cross- ple undervalue the importance of pub- ses contact.142 lic goods and redistribution: they fail to Second, because many people tend to recognize the benefits they actually re- legitimize the systems in which they are ceive. Political scientist Susan Mettler embedded, they come to see higher lev- describes how redistributive programs els of income inequality as increasingly are often designed to be nearly invisible desirable and necessary. Inequalities are and hence are underappreciated by many often legitimized by appealing to deserv- citizens.145 This may suggest that trust in ingness and meritocracy, making redistri- the government to manage redistribu- bution appear unfair. To disrupt this cy- tion effectively may increase to the ex- cle, emphasis should be placed on predis- tent that the “submerged state” is sur- tributive programs: policies that minimize faced and its invisible benefitsbecome initial levels of income inequality in the more evident.146 workplace by increasing the minimum In this essay, we identify how psycho- wage, employee gain-sharing, increasing logical factors (in concert with larger in- employee benefits,and capping ceo sal- stitutional- and societal-level processes) aries. Rather than fighting the norms for may operate to hinder the workings of ef- meritocracy and competition, predistrib- fective democracy in which the interests utive policies can appeal to these same of the few are balanced against those of valued principles. ceo salaries could the many. Most worrisome, these coun- be better calibrated against lower-level terproductive processes are especially employees, and bonuses could be more likely in the context of rising inequality closely tied to longer-term firm perfor- in which redistribution may be most war- mance rather than short-term gains. ranted. Although we articulate how these Third, for many people, the American processes may trigger a self-perpetuating dream casts high inequality as a motiva- cycle of increasing inequality, we also il- tor for social mobility when in fact ex- luminate some interventions that might cessive inequality inhibits mobility. This disrupt these processes and contribute faulty narrative could be adapted to a new to the societal rebalance promised by a one that emphasizes the value of shared healthy democracy. Critically, these pro- public goods.143 The ways in which re- cesses operate at multiple levels and tar- distribution policies heighten equality get social, cultural, and economic factors. of opportunity and support genuine so- This approach underlines the value of in- cial mobility should be heralded, and so- terdisciplinary collaboration for inte- cial safety nets can be framed as essen- grating research insights and translating tial components of a system aimed to them into practical strategies for mitigat- provide the security necessary for peo- ing inequality. ple to innovate, take risks, and get ahead. Moreover, given that inequality has prompted declining trust in government,

126 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences authors’ note Son Hing, Wilson, The writing of this essay was mainly undertaken by Leanne S. Son Hing and Anne E. Wil- Gourevitch, son, with assistance from the remaining coauthors. Thank you to Leslie McCall and all the English & members of the Successful Societies program at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Re- Sin search for their feedback on this essay author biographies leanne s. son hing is Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at the Uni- versity of Guelph in Canada. She has published in such journals as Journal of Experimental Social Psychology and Journal of Personality and Social Psychology and contributed to the Sage Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination. anne e. wilson is Professor of Social Psychology at Wilfrid Laurier University in Cana- da. She is Co-Editor-in-Chief of Social and Personality Psychology Compass. She has published in such journals as Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Social Cognition, and Journal of Environmental Psychology. peter gourevitch is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Found- ing Dean of the School of Global Policy & Strategy at the University of California, San Di- ego. He is the author of, most recently, Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Glob- al Politics of Corporate Governance (with James P. Shinn, 2005) and editor of The Credibility of Transnational NGOs: When Virtue Is Not Enough (with David A. Lake and Janice Gross Stein, 2012). jaslyn english completed her master’s degree at Wilfrid Laurier University in Cana- da. She contributed, with Anne Wilson, to The Science of Lay Theories: How Beliefs Shape Our Cognition, Behavior, and Health (edited by Claire M. Zedelius, Barbara C. N. Müller, and Jon- athan W. Schooler, 2017). parco sin is a Ph.D. student at the University of Guelph in Canada. He has published in such journals as Personality and Individual Differences. endnotes 1 Anthony B. Atkinson, Inequality: What Can be Done? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015); and Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013). 2 Ichiro Kawachi, Bruce P. Kennedy, Kimberly Lochner, and Deborah Prothrow-Stith, “Social Capital, Income Inequality, and Mortality,” American Journal of Public Health 87 (9) (1997): 1491–1498; Kate E. Pickett and Richard G. Wilkinson, “Income Inequality and Health: A Causal Review,” Social Science & Medicine 128 (2015): 316–326; and Martin Daly, Killing the Competition: Economic Inequality and Homicide (Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2016). 3 Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard, “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,” The Journal of Political Economy 89 (5) (1981): 914–927. 4 Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Pro- duce Responsive Government (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016). 5 Meltzer and Richard, “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government.” 6 Ibid. 7 Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12 (3) (2014): 564–581; and Vincent A. Mahler, “Electoral Turnout and Income Redistribution by the State: A Cross-National

148 (3) Summer 2019 127 Rising Income Analysis of the Developed Democracies,” European Journal of Political Research 47 (2) (2008): Inequality: 161–183. Processes That Legitimize 8 Notably, program expenditure does not solely capture the generosity of the redistributive ef- Growing fort, but also captures the need. For instance, a society with more unemployed or aging peo- Disparities ple may spend more on unemployment insurance or pensions independent of its intended redistributive generosity. 9 For analyses that found support, see Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard, “Tests of a Rational The- ory of the Size of Government,” Public Choice 41 (1983): 403–418. For analyses that found mixed support, see Lars-Erik Borge and Jorn Rattso, “Income Distribution and Tax Struc- ture: Empirical Test of the Meltzer-Richard Hypothesis,” European Economic Review 48 (4) (2004): 805–826; Lane Kenworthy and Jonas Pontusson, “Rising Inequality and the Poli- tics of Redistribution in Affluent Countries,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (3) (2005): 449–471; and Mahler, “Electoral Turnout and Income Redistribution by the State.” For analyses that found no relationship, see Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A World of Difference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Ben Ansell and David Samuels, “Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach,” Compara- tive Political Studies 43 (12) (2010): 1543–1574; Carina Engelhardt and Andreas Wagener, Bi- ased Perceptions of Income Inequality and Redistribution, cesifo Working Paper Series No. 4838 (Munich: Center for Economic Studies, 2014); Malte Lubker, “Inequality and the Demand for Redistribution: Are the Assumptions of the New Growth Theory Valid?” Socio-Eco- nomic Review 5 (1) (2007): 117–148; and Karl Moene and Michael Wallerstein, “Earnings In- equality and Welfare Spending,” World Politics 55 (4) (2003): 485–516. 10 Alesina and Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe; Engelhardt and Wagener, Biased Perceptions of Income Inequality and Redistribution; Lubker, “Inequality and the Demand for Redistribution”; Moene and Wallerstein, “Earnings Inequality and Welfare Spending”; and Andreas Georgiadis and Alan Manning, “Spend it Like Beckham? Inequality and Redis- tribution in the uk, 1983–2004,” Public Choice 151 (3) (2012): 537–563. 11 Henning Finseeras, “Income Inequality and Demand for Redistribution: A Multilevel Analy- sis of European Public Opinion,” Scandinavian Political Studies 32 (1) (2009): 94–119; Wil- liam R. Kerr, “Income Inequality and Social Preferences for Redistribution and Compen- sation Differentials,” Journal of Monetary Economics 66 (2014): 62–78; and Alberto Alesina and George-Marios Angeletos, “Fairness and Redistribution,” American Economic Review 95 (4) (2005): 960–980. 12 Georgiadis and Manning, “Spend it Like Beckham?” 13 Ansell and Samuels, “Inequality and Democratization”; Lubker, “Inequality and the Demand for Redistribution”; Ursula Dallinger, “Public Support for Redistribution: What Factors Explain the International Differences?” Journal of European Social Policy 20 (4) (2010): 333– 349; and Vladimir Gimpelson and Daniel Treisman, “Misperceiving Inequality,” Economics and Politics 30 (1) (2018): 27–54. 14 Gimpelson and Treisman, “Misperceiving Inequality”; Andreas Kuhn, “The Individual Per- ception of Wage Inequality: A Measurement Framework and Some Empirical Evidence,” iza Discussion Paper No. 9579 (Bonn, Germany: Institute for Labor Economics, 2015); Judith Niehues, “Subjective Perception of Inequality and Redistribution Preferences: An International Comparison,” IW-Trends 41 (2) (2014): 75–91; and Engelhardt and Wagener, Biased Perceptions of Income Inequality and Redistribution. 15 Gimpelson and Treisman, “Misperceiving Inequality.” 16 Larry Bartels, “Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (1) (2005): 15–31. 17 Lane Kenworthy and Leslie McCall, “Inequality, Public Opinion and Redistribution,” Socio- Economic Review 6 (1) (2008): 35–68; and Kuhn, “The Individual Perception of Wage Inequality.”

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148 (3) Summer 2019 133 Rising Income 113 Nancy MacLean, Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for Inequality: America (New York: Penguin Random House, 2017). Processes That Legitimize 114 Haney López, Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Growing Wrecked the Middle Class (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). Disparities 115 Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Nina Bandelj, Irene Boeckmann, et al., “The Comparative Orga- nizational Inequality Network: Toward an Economic Sociology of Inequality,” Economic So- ciology 19 (1) (2017): 15–21. 116 Steven Fein and Steven J. Spencer, “Prejudice as Self-Image Maintenance: Affirming the Self through Negative Evaluations of Others,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73 (1) (1997): 31–44. 117 Arlie R. Hochschild, Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right (New York: New Press, 2016). 118 Brown-Iannuzzi et al., “Political Action in the Age of High Economic Inequality.” 119 Lee et al., “Racism, Xenophobia, and Redistribution”; and Lilliana Mason, Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018). 120 Brown-Iannuzzi et al., “Political Action in the Age of High Economic Inequality.” 121 Valentino Larcinese, “Voting Over Redistribution and the Size of the Welfare State: The Role of Turnout,” Political Studies 55 (3) (2007). 122 Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America-Political Democracy and Social Equality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); and Michael W. Kraus, “The Inequal- ity of Politics: Social Class Rank and Political Participation,” Institute for Research on La- bor and Employment Working Paper No. 120-15 (Berkeley: University of California, Berke- ley, 2015). 123 Christopher Uggen, Sarah Shannon, and Jeff Manza, State-Level Estimates of Felon Disenfran- chisement in the United States, 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Sentencing Project, 2012). 124 Larcinese, “Voting Over Redistribution and the Size of the Welfare State”; and Kenworthy and Pontusson, “Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Affluent Countries.” 125 Gilens and Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics”; and Larry M. Bartels, “Politi- cal Inequality in Affluent Democracies: The Social Welfare Deficit,”Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Working Paper No. 5-2017 (Nashville: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Vanderbilt University, 2017). 126 Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba, and Kay L. Schlozman, “Beyond ses: A Resource Model of Political Participation,” American Political Science Review 89 (2) (1995): 271–294. 127 Gilens and Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics”; Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer–And Turned Its Back on the Mid- dle Class (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011); and Virginia Gray, David Lowery, Mat- thew Fellowes, and Andrea McAtee, “Public Opinion, Public Policy, and Organized Inter- ests in the American States,” Political Research Quarterly 57 (3) (2004): 411–420. 128 Kuziemko et al., “How Elastic are Preferences for Redistribution?” 129 Kristin Laurin, Steven Shepherd, and Aaron C. Kay, “System Inescapability and Defense of the Status Quo: System-Justifying Consequences of Restricted Exit Opportunities,” Psycho- logical Science 21 (8) (2010): 1075–1082. 130 Nathan J. Kelly and Peter K. Enns, “Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self-Reinforcing Link between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences,” American Jour- nal of Political Science 54 (4) (2010): 855–870. 131 Kristin Laurin, Aaron C. Kay, and Gavan J. Fitzsimons, “Reactance Versus Rationalization: Divergent Responses to Constrained Freedom,” Psychological Science 23 (2) (2012): 205–209.

134 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 132 Jonathan Krieckhaus, Byunghwan Son, Nisha Bellinger, and Jason Wells, “Economic In- Son Hing, equality and Democratic Support,” The Journal of Politics 76 (1) (2014): 139–151. Wilson, Gourevitch, 133 Bill O’Reilly, The O’Reilly Factor, April 27, 2016, available at Fox News, “Bill O’Reilly: Why English & the Voters Are Propelling Donald Trump,” April 28, 2016, https://www.foxnews.com/ Sin transcript/bill-oreilly-why-the-voters-are-propelling-donald-trump. 134 Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists. 135 For instance, during the 2000 U.S. election, candidates presented alternative visions of old- age social security: government-regulated (Gore) or privatized (Bush). Partisans did not first prefer a policy and then select a candidate accordingly; instead, they selected their preferred candidate, then gradually came to adopt the corresponding pension attitudes. Ibid. 136 Mason, Uncivil Agreement; and Geoffrey L. Cohen, “Party Over Policy: The Dominating Im- pact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85 (5) (2003): 808–822. 137 Jost, “Working Class Conservatism.” 138 James N. Druckman, Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus, “How Elite Partisan Polarization Af- fects Public Opinion Formation,” American Political Science Review 170 (1) (2013): 57–79. 139 Meltzer and Richard, “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government.” 140 Krieckhaus et al., “Economic Inequality and Democratic Support.” 141 Hall et al., “When Education Becomes an Engine of Inequality.” 142 Eric D. Knowles and Linda R. Tropp, “The Racial and Economic Context of Trump Support: Evidence for Threat, Identity, and Contact Effects in the 2016 Presidential Election,” Social Psychological and Personality Science 9 (3) (2018): 275–284; and Mai B. Phan, “We’re All in This Together: Context, Contacts, and Social Trust in Canada,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 8 (1) (2008): 23–51. 143 Engelhardt and Wagener, Biased Perceptions of Income Inequality and Redistribution. 144 Hacker and Pierson, American Amnesia. 145 Susan Mettler, The Submerged State: How Invisible Government Policies Undermine American Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 146 Ryan W. Buell, Ethan Porter, and Michael Norton, “Surfacing the Submerged State: Opera- tional Transparency Increases Trust in and Engagement with Government,” Harvard Busi- ness School Working Paper No. 14-034 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 2018).

148 (3) Summer 2019 135 The Difficulties of Combating Inequality in Time

Jane Jenson, Francesca Polletta & Paige Raibmon

Abstract: Scholars have argued that disadvantaged groups face an impossible choice in their efforts to win policies capable of diminishing inequality: whether to emphasize their sameness to or difference from the advantaged group. We analyze three cases from the 1980s and 1990s in which reformers sought to avoid that dilemma and assert groups’ sameness and difference in novel ways: in U.S. policy on biomedical research, in the European Union’s initiatives on gender equality, and in Canadian law on Indig- enous rights. In each case, however, the reforms adopted ultimately reproduced the sameness/difference dilemma rather than transcended it. To explain why, we show how profound disagreements about both the histories of the groups included in the policy and the place of the policy in a longer historical trajectory of reform either went unrecognized or were actively obscured. Targeted groups came to be attributed a biological or timeless essence, not because this was inevitable, we argue, but because of these failures to historicize inequality.

Efforts to legislate or judicially confirm rights to equality often prove disappointing, even for those with clear-eyed aspirations. There are many reasons for the gap between the aspiration and the result, but a deceptively simple one is that political actors define equality in ways that restrict its scope and substance. On some accounts, the problem can be characterized in terms of the sameness/differ- jane jenson is Professor Em- ence dilemma.1 Equality sometimes has been de- erita of Political Science at the fined as meaning that members of the disadvan- Université de Montréal. taged group should be treated the same as mem- francesca polletta is Pro- bers of the advantaged group. Yet disadvantaged fessor of Sociology at the Univer- group members are different. They have differ- sity of California, Irvine. ent needs and priorities. To treat them the same paige raibmon is Professor as members of the advantaged group takes as uni- of History at the University of versal the needs and priorities of the advantaged. British Columbia. However, when policy does recognize different (Complete author biographies appear needs and priorities, pitfalls emerge. Categories at the end of the essay.) meant to ameliorate inequalities may become the

© 2019 by Jane Jenson, Francesca Polletta & Paige Raibmon Published under a Creative Commons 136 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license doi:10.1162/DAED_a_01753 basis for evaluating group members in that one cannot have equality with differ- Jane Jenson, ways far beyond the arena originally tar- ence. Rather, the answer lies in the ways Francesca 2 Polletta & geted. Whether or not group members that reformers situated difference and Paige Raibmon are stigmatized, they may be essential- equality in time. Key actors differed over ized: expected to have the same needs, how to account historically for the ori- abilities, and priorities, now and forever.3 gins and perpetuation of inequality. Mul- The problem for political actors–ac- tiple historical narratives vied to become tivists and policy-makers alike–is to de- the departure point for policy. These con- fine equality without succumbing to the tests over history were sometimes unac- deforming effects of the sameness/differ- knowledged by, and even invisible to, key ence dilemma. This essay analyzes three actors. Yet their stakes for equality were cases in the 1980s and 1990s in which high. In each of our cases, deeply histori- political actors appeared to have solved cal understandings of difference were re- the problem. That is, they put forth pol- placed or sidelined by ones that set dif- icies that accommodated various forms ference against a shorter-term horizon. of difference as they promoted equali- In Braudelian terms, longue durée expla- ty. In the United States, reformers sought nations of inequality conflicted with, and both to eliminate the barriers that ex- eventually lost ground to, “event-ish” cluded women and racial and ethnic mi- ones.4 Transformative, equality-produc- norities from clinical research, and to re- ing change required policy that took acquire that researchers analyze differences count of the former; yet forces both prag- in findings across groups. They sought to matic and ideological strengthened the treat members of diverse groups both as latter’s gravitational pull. What we term the same as white male research subjects, dehistoricized understandings of differ- and as having different characteristics ence and inequality won out. and needs. In the European Union (eu), Simply calling the problem one of de- feminists developed a discourse of equal historicization, however, risks missing opportunities in order to claim that real the complex ways in which history was gender equality required some special invoked and obscured, unrecognized opportunities for women. Simple equal and misrecognized. We identify two de- treatment was inadequate. In Canada, In- historicizing dynamics: one linking past digenous activists critiqued state prom- to present, the other linking past to fu- ises to treat all individuals equally and ture. In the first, political actors were ul- asserted equal status as nations. Their timately unable or unwilling to recognize points of reference for equality were the the histories built into the categories on collective rights of peoples, not the hu- which policy was based: racial and ethnic man rights of individuals. minorities, women, Indians. They failed In each case, political actors used novel to recognize inequality as a process sus- combinations of sameness and difference tained through informal norms as much to pursue equality. However, the results, as formal policies, often by mechanisms while hailed as victories by many partici- distinct from those that created inequal- pants and observers, fell short. Each re- ity in the firstplace. They likewise failed form ultimately reproduced rather than to discern the very different histories of surmounted tensions between sameness groups that were included in the same and difference. The puzzle is why. categories. They either presented mem- The answer, we argue, is not that equal- bership in the category as natural or ity and difference are inevitably at odds; treated it as the result of implicit societal

148 (3) Summer 2019 137 The Difficulties consensus. This simplification flattened period of neoliberal reform preferred ap- of Combating differences of need and priority among proaches to gender inequalities that justi- Inequality in Time groups. Advocates for particular groups fied their reluctance to intervene in “pri- then found themselves having to protest, vate” life. In Canada, a government that often futilely, that the multiple groups faced land claims and international pres- lumped into the disadvantaged catego- sure to consult Indigenous peoples resist- ry were different both from each other ed dynamic definitions of the collective and from the advantaged group in conse- rights of Indigenous peoples in favor of quential ways. frozen bundles of individual rights. The In the second dehistoricizing dynam- surprise is not that those with power act- ic, political actors made conflicting ased in ways consistent with their interests. sumptions about how past inequality The surprise is that reformers were either would yield to future equality. Apparent unable to prevent or actively acquiesced consensus about the prospects for reme- to the rise of dehistoricized–and some- dying inequality through reform sometimes essentialist–understandings. times concealed real differences about The conflicts we describe took differ- how that would happen over time. Again, ent forms. In Canada, the conflict was be- activists and policy-makers arrived at ne- tween diverse Indigenous activists and gotiations with each other via distinct various levels of government actors; in historical trajectories. Accordingly, they the eu, it was among activists ostensibly situated the resulting policy in distinct on the same side; and in the United States, ways. Policies that policy-makers saw as there was little conflict among political the capstone to reform were often only actors at all. Yet we see continuities across a first step for activists. Such differences the cases with respect to how inequality, did not prevent policy from being made equality, and difference were represented in the moment, but they did lead to con- in time. After providing somewhat sche- flicting assessments of what the reform matic accounts of each case, we highlight represented, what it could accomplish, these parallels. In so doing, we point to and what to do next. In another version obstacles that characterize efforts to com- of this problem, reformers took up essen- bat inequality more generally. tialist (and thus ahistorical) conceptions of difference strategically–and some- We consider first the reform of bio- times, they believed, temporarily–to ad- medical research in the United States. In vance future equality for the group they the early 1990s, a group of advocates, pol- represented. In the end, however, these iticians, bureaucrats, and scientists mo- actors underestimated the inertia of es- bilized to combat inequalities in Amer- sentialist conceptions, especially when icans’ health by transforming the prac- those conceptions coincided with long- tice of biomedical science. Along the lines held stereotypes. of an equality-as-sameness argument, re- Admittedly, the self-interest of pow- formers demanded that women and racial erful groups aligned with these dehis- and ethnic minorities be included as sub- toricized understandings of difference. jects in biomedical research. At the same In the case of American biomedical re- time, and along the lines of an equality- form, pharmaceutical companies had a as-difference argument, reformers de- stake in defining racial differences as bi- manded that researchers measure dif- ological and therefore pharmaceutically ferences among groups before generaliz- treatable. In the eu, policy-makers in a ing findings. They challenged what they

138 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences saw as the false universalism of medical themselves recognized that differences in Jane Jenson, research: the assumption that findings populations were, at most, averages and Francesca Polletta & from the study of adult white men could therefore not easily translated into treat- Paige Raibmon be generalized to the population at large.5 ment for individuals. So why were those Reformers were, by some measures, views sidelined in favor of essentialist extraordinarily successful. Beginning in and reductionist explanations that made 1993, a series of federal laws, policies, and biological difference the source of health guidelines were created to transform the disparities? Timing is part of the answer. paradigm of biomedical research, cur- The fields of genomics and of ethnic and rently a $94 billion industry in the Unit- racial health disparities emerged at the ed States. Scientists came to see the inclu- same time, and the former energetically sion of diverse populations in clinical re- and effectively staked a claim to the lat- search as both ethically important and as ter.11 Pharmaceutical companies’ eco- good science.6 The reforms encouraged nomic interest in biologically reduction- the new science of genomics, which ini- ist conceptions of difference is another tially refused to recognize racial differ- part of the answer. ence, to energetically commit to remedy- But we focus on yet another developing racial disparities in health.7 And they ment. Reformers and researchers knew led pharmaceutical companies, which the federal categories–American Indi- had vehemently opposed the reforms on an or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Is- the grounds of their cost, to eventual- lander, Black, White, and so on–were ly embrace race-, ethnicity-, and gender- administrative, not biological. They jus- based medicine.8 tifiedusing these categories in research And yet, the reforms were also re- nonetheless because of how they fit them sponsible for the development of expen- into a longer history of reform. As re- sive drugs targeted, variously, to African searchers and reformers saw it, treating Americans, certain ethnic groups, and race as if it were a discrete biological cate- women on the basis of questionable sci- gory was part of the effort to bring about ence.9 And they ended up producing dis- a racially egalitarian society, and it was tinctively individualized understandings temporary: the development of “person- of group inequalities, even by genomic alized medicine” would make reliance on scientists who were committed to the no- group categories as proxies for genetic tion that health disparities reflected so- variation obsolete. cial conditions.10 In these respects, the However, those justifications for using reforms failed to lessen inequalities in race as a research category had the effect health. of keeping in circulation folk understand- What explains these paradoxical re- ings of race as discrete groups whose bio- sults? When reformers called on med- logical traits matched their physical ap- ical researchers to compare drug ef- pearance and were passed across gener- fects and biological processes across ra- ations intact. These folk understandings cial groups, they did not intend it to be persisted alongside newer nontypologi- the end point of analysis, with the differ- cal understandings of race, even after the ences attributed to putative racial biolo- much-vaunted individualized treatments gies, rather than to experiences of pov- became available. Moreover, insofar as erty, stress, discrimination, and poor cutting-edge genomicists pushed be- medical care that combined and persist- yond stereotyped understandings to view ed over generations. Medical researchers race in terms of statistical continuities in

148 (3) Summer 2019 139 The Difficulties gene frequencies, the individualizing ap- outcomes since a federal task force in the of Combating proach that came with that view–again, mid-1980s cited sixty thousand annu- Inequality in Time enabled by a narrative that race would be- al “excess deaths” among African Amer- come obsolete–made it more difficult to icans.15 The Caucus called for the inclu- recognize difference as the result of group sion of racial and ethnic minorities in the inequalities. Paying attention to the ways bill to combat those disparities. Accord- in which reformers and researchers his- ingly, reformers added “and minorities” toricized the reform, and the categories to the reauthorization bill.16 that made it up, thus helps to explain the The nih Reauthorization Act passed in otherwise surprising embrace of essen- 1993. The fda followed suit, eliminating tialism by people who were sensitive to barriers against the inclusion of wom- its dangers. en in testing in 1993 and, in subsequent The policy process. To call efforts to re- years, issuing guidelines that called for form biomedical research a “movement” the inclusion of women and minorities risks overstating its grassroots charac- in testing, the assessment of drugs’ safe- ter. While grassroots aids, feminist, ty and efficacy across subpopulations, and disease advocacy groups both raised and the reporting of race and ethnici- public consciousness and served as mod- ty information in applications for fda els for how to bring publicity to bear on drug approval. In 2001, the nih man- legislators, the key actors in pressing for dated the use of federal categories in re- reform were professionalized advocacy porting race and ethnicity: American In- organizations and establishment insid- dian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific ers: staffers at the National Institutes for Islander, Black, White, Hispanic origin, Health (nih), the world’s largest funder and not of Hispanic origin.17 From that of biomedical research, and the Food and point on, what sociologist Steven Epstein Drug Administration (fda), which li- calls “the inclusion and difference para- censes new therapies for sale.12 digm” diffused through other federal bu- Women’s health advocates’ first wins reaucracies, the pharmaceutical industry, were a 1985 Department of Health and and biomedicine generally.18 Researchers Human Services report calling for more should seek to include diverse groups in research on women’s health, and a 1986 their studies and they should compare bi- policy encouraging nih-funded clinical ological processes and treatment effects trials to include women.13 When the re- across those groups. port and the policy were largely ignored Historicizing equality. If one’s concern by researchers, a new advocacy organiza- were with racial disparities in health out- tion, the Society for the Advancement of comes, why focus on differences in how Women’s Health Research, joined with blacks and whites metabolized a protein the Congressional Women’s Caucus to or responded to a diabetes medication? push for reform. Advocates took advan- No one was claiming that race as a vari- tage of the fact that the nih was up for able impacted, say, the progression of reauthorization to include provisions in heart disease more than income or insur- the bill for women’s inclusion in health ance status did. And insofar as race was research.14 associated with patterns in heart disease, The text of the reauthorization bill ini- was that not likely to be as a result of pov- tially referred only to women. Howev- erty, stress, discrimination, and other so- er, the Black Congressional Caucus had cial factors? Viewing health disparities focused on racial disparities in health in terms of biological difference risked

140 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences raising one dimension of difference into reformers now embrace the inclusion Jane Jenson, the sum total of the explanation for those and difference paradigm’s reliance on Francesca Polletta & disparities. It risked shifting attention ostensibly biological categories of race? Paige Raibmon away from the social and economic caus- And why was the use of racial categories es of health disparities.19 There was an- not criticized more forcefully as the par- other risk. Often, the subgroup compar- adigm diffused across science, pharma- isons that the reforms required did lead ceutical development, and medicine? to the identification of differences, but To be sure, there were some critics. these were in group averages. For exam- Otis Brawley, who headed an office of ple, one meta-analysis of clinical trials “special populations” at the nih, op- of antihypertensive drugs found that al- posed the Revitalization Act for “fos- though whites on average responded better[ing] the racism that its creators want ter to beta blockers than blacks did, and to abrogate” by relying on essential- blacks on average responded better to di- ist conceptions of race.25 Later, especial- uretics than whites did, 80 to 95 percent ly with the introduction of race-targeted of blacks and whites had similar respons- medicine, charges of “racial profiling” in es to both treatments.20 Treating the av- medicine began to surface.26 Still, the fact erage differences as categories might lead that medical researchers, pharmaceutical to improper treatment for any one indi- executives, policy-makers, and advocates vidual. Moreover, even if the reason for for racial and ethnic minorities so enthu- a documented difference was unclear or siastically embraced the use of racial and spurious (often, subsequent studies re- ethnic categories in medical research and vealed no difference at all), pharma- drug testing deserves explanation. ceutical companies could then market The explanation lies, in part, in two ac- the treatment to the group.21 As we will counts of the place of race in biomedical show, this ended up being more than an research that circulated during this pe- abstract risk. riod. Both accounts were historical, al- That women’s advocates were relative- though one was about the future more ly indifferent to the risks of emphasizing than the past, and the other was embed- biological differences is perhaps not sur- ded in the very categories themselves prising. The Society for the Advancement rather than recounted explicitly. Invoked of Women’s Health Research, which led by advocates, policy-makers, administra- the reform effort, was firmly commit- tors, researchers, and pharmaceutical ex- ted to the project of sex-based medicine, ecutives, these accounts defended essen- which it pursued into the 2000s.22 The tialist conceptions of race against critique. greater surprise is that concerns about bi- In one account, subgroup comparisons ological reductionism were not voiced by were harnessed to the cause of racial jus- advocates for people of color. Like wom- tice. The categories themselves were a en’s health reformers, minority health re- legacy of the civil rights movement: they formers were mainly medical profession- were first used by the Equal Employ- als who favored a biomedical rather than ment Opportunity Commission, which a public health perspective on minority was created by the 1964 Civil Rights Act health generally.23 Still, after World War to combat workplace inequality. The cat- II, scientists had largely abandoned bi- egories were thus not only administra- ological conceptions of race and accept- tively familiar, but also associated with ed social scientists’ view of race as a so- the cause of racial equality. The cate- cial construct.24 Why did researchers and gories’ political past and purpose thus

148 (3) Summer 2019 141 The Difficulties legitimated their use in biomedical re- medicine.”31 The National Association of Combating search. Leaders of the Human Genome for the Advancement of Colored Peo- Inequality in Time Project, for example, initially rejected ple (naacp), the oldest American civil race as a valid biological category, insist- rights organization, partnered with the ing that all dna was “equal” and relying drug’s manufacturer to help company on dna samples of convenience from representatives promote it in black com- around the world. After the institution- munities.32 For the naacp, as for the fed- alization of the federal standards, how- eral government, BiDil was an advance ever, project leaders began to claim that for the cause of individualized medicine genomics could combat racial and ethnic and an advance toward a society charac- health disparities.27 Genomicists aban- terized by racial equality.33 doned their earlier unwillingness to rec- In fact, it was neither. When research- ognize genetically meaningful racial cat- ers first came up with the drug, which egories as they promised to identify the combined two generic vasodilators, they racial and ethnic basis of disease suscep- sought approval for it from the fda for tibility. They used the language of “social general, not race-specific, use.34 Because justice,” according to sociologist Cather- the study they cited had been conducted ine Bliss, “a kind of health-focused Affir- for purposes other than testing the drug mative Action.”28 and lacked proper statistical controls, At the same time, and this was the sec- however, the drug was not approved. But ond historical account, the use of race in at that point, researchers noticed that the medicine was treated as a “way station,” small number of African Americans en- a “step,” a “phase,” a “temporary stage” rolled in the study seemed to have bene- between a past of one-size-fits-all med- fited more from the drug than others. (As icine and a future of treatment tailored we noted earlier, it is not uncommon to to each individual’s genetic makeup. As see subgroup differences that turn out to an official at the fda put it, to treat race be spurious.) Researchers sought a patent as biological was a “stepping stone” to for the drug and conducted a larger study, “target treatment.”29 Even researchers enrolling only African Americans. The who criticized the concept of race wrote: drug showed such benefit to subjects rel- “There is potential utility in using race la- ative to a placebo that the study was end- bels as a surrogate for genetic informa- ed early and BiDil was approved in a dra- tion, as a means to the ultimate goal of in- matically shortened review for self-iden- dividualized therapy.”30 In this account, tified blacks suffering from congestive researchers justified treating race as a heart failure. The drug was priced at six bounded concept because it was only for times the price of the two generic drugs the short term. that made it up and Wall Street analysts Race-based medicine. Accounts connect- predicted sales of $1 billion by 2010.35 ing the use of biological concepts of race Despite the fda’s bold proclama- and ethnicity to the past of civil rights action that BiDil was an advance for per- tivism and the future of individualized sonalized medicine, no genetic mecha- medicine were evident in the announce- nism accounting for BiDil’s effectiveness ment of the first of several race-specific was identified. Rather, self-identified drugs. The fda proudly hailed BiDil, a race was accepted as a proxy for unex- treatment for congestive heart failure plained genetic variation. This was true in self-identified black Americans, as “a even though the study provided no ev- step toward the promise of personalized idence that there was genetic variation.

142 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences After all, the study included only African physical markers. Physicians took racial Jane Jenson, Americans. appearance as a proxy for genetic varia- Francesca Polletta & Although BiDil’s profitability did not tion in people of color. As one physician Paige Raibmon live up to expectations, drug companies explained: developed and marketed other ethnic- The Human Genome Project has proved and gender-targeted drugs to capitalize beyond a doubt that African American on the potential for niche-based market- 36 males get prostate cancer at younger ages, ing that BiDil revealed. There was cer- African American hypertensive patients tainly a financial motivation to believe respond better to certain classes of medica- genetic differences caused racial health tions. So to operate blindly, literally, blind disparities. However, BiDil was em- to the ethnic and racial is, I think, ridicu- braced not only by pharmaceutical com- lous. Because the medical science is there panies, but also by federal government now to say, “No you have to consider it.” . . . officials, medical professionals, scien- You know, “You happen to be Black so we tists, and advocacy groups. Again, an es- should put you on this.”39 sentialist conception of race became acceptable, both in the development of Bi- The Human Genome Project showed Dil and, more broadly, because it seemed none of this. But the story of individu- to be a temporary measure on the way to alized medicine on the horizon justified a postracial science in a postracial society. physicians’ folk understandings of race Yet these essentialist understandings of in the meantime. race were not temporary. Even when ge- Indeed, when the researchers asked netic information became available that physicians what would make genetic sci- made individualized medicine possible, ence more useful to their clinical prac- medical researchers still relied on racial tice, fully 20 percent of respondents categories. For example, in establishing skipped personalized medicine altogeth- the proper dosing for Warfarin, an anti- er and asked for more guidance on how coagulant, researchers found that once to treat people differently by race. One patients’ genetic factors were taken into commented, “When they develop drugs, account, race was irrelevant to the drug’s if they could tell us how the drugs react efficacy. Yet they still advised physicians with different races. We already know to use a race-based dosing regimen.37 that some diseases are more prevalent What legal scholar Jonathan Kahn calls in different races. So to know the effects the “inertial” power of race is also evident that drugs have on different races would in interviews with primary care physi- be quite useful.”40 In other words, the cians in the 2010s about their views of ge- notion of a future of personalized, “pre- nomics. Physicians talked frequently and cision” medicine made acceptable the confidently about personalized medicine use of racial categories in the present, but being “just down the road” or “coming it also sat comfortably alongside the as- down the pike”: again the story of future sumption that such categories were not promise.38 None of the fifty-eight physi- historical but biological, and thus time- cians who were interviewed actually used less. Because race is still so deeply em- genetic testing. But they did pay attention bedded in American institutions, it re- to family ancestry–when the patients mains, as anthropologist Claude Lévi- were white. When the patients self-iden- Strauss would have put it, good to think tified as Black, Asian, and/or Latino, they with.41 Stories of the categories’ history paid attention to racial and ethnic group and their provisional status in medicine

148 (3) Summer 2019 143 The Difficulties accompanied rather than undermined insofar as they described a future world, of Combating beliefs about their naturalness. a world that researchers referred to ad- Inequality in Time Genomicists construct race. By the early miringly, in which individual differenc- 2000s, many genomicists had broken de- es would eclipse group-based ones. For cisively with a view of races as discrete Shim and her colleagues, the danger was categories.42 And contrary to early pre- that researchers’ valorization of a mea- dictions that they would ignore the social sure capturing the ancestral complexi- causes of health disparities, genomicists ty of an individual as an individual made have sought to capture the interplay of ge- it easy to skip over the disease risks that netic and social factors in accounting for people confronted as members of groups, disease and disease disparities. Howev- risks that arose from discrimination, er, genomics research has still given short poverty, environmental toxicity, and so shrift to the social, economic, and politi- on. Once again, difference was dehistori- cal realities of race, whether because ge- cized; made into a characteristic of indi- nomicists have the upper hand in collab- viduals rather than the outcome of un- orations with social scientists or because equal relationships. And once again, that efforts to understand gene/environment dehistoricizing tendency was made pos- interactions define and operationalize sible by a story that was told about a fu- “environment” in ways akin to a gene: an ture free of group-based inequalities. individual attribute that produces health Difference and history. Scholars have ar- risks at the molecular level.43 gued that efforts to alleviate inequality by Interesting, in this regard, are genom- recognizing disadvantaged groups’ dif- icists’ relationship to the classifications ference from advantaged groups inevita- created by the nih reform. The research- bly stigmatizes that difference. But in this ers interviewed by sociologist Janet Shim case, as in the two others, that denoue- and colleagues used the nih categories ment was not inevitable. Rather, it owed for the sake of convenience.44 But they to the ways in which the emphasis on dif- also criticized the categories for arbitrari- ference was accounted for historically. ly lumping together people of diverse Scientists, policy-makers, and advocates ancestries and experiences. Researchers knew race was a historical and political were more excited about the use of An- category, but they believed they could cestry Identity Markers (aims) to classi- treat it as a fixed and biological one be- fy subjects. aims identify proportions of cause doing so would help advance a ra- an individual’s genetic ancestry originat- cially just society, and because they would ing in different geographical regions. Re- only do so temporarily. However, these searchers’ excitement stemmed not from understandings of what it was that they the immediate utility of aims (which were doing, and how long they would be have not yet provided clues to disease doing it for, made it difficult to challenge risk), but from the prospect of a classifi- those who believed race was a “natural” cation system that reflected the precise category.45 When genomicists later re- and unique genetic makeup of individu- jected the notion of race as a discrete cat- als in a world, they said repeatedly, that egory, their ability to develop classificato- was becoming more ethnically diverse ry tools that prefigured a world in which and multiracial. aims had social and eth- individuals were equally diverse made it ical value because they captured the com- easy to ignore the continuing salience of plex mix of ancestries in any one indi- race as a group category. In both cases, vidual. They had value, in other words, the stories that reformers and researchers

144 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences told about the past and especially the fu- could be only part of a much larger agen- Jane Jenson, ture of race and inequality made it more da of necessary interventions. Francesca Polletta & difficultto combat racial inequalities in In the first decades of the European Paige Raibmon the present. project from the late 1950s through the 1970s, feminists claimed and policy-mak- Varied understandings of historical ers addressed inequality via equal treat- cause and ideal future likewise impact- ment. But then over the following deed gender policy in the European Union. cades, feminists pushed the eu to insti- The European Union paid precocious at- tute programs to advance their vision of tention to equality between women and equal opportunities, which was derived men; the 1957 Treaty of Rome included from second-wave feminists’ use of the Article 119, a commitment to “maintain concept of difference in theorizing gen- the application of the principle that men der inequality.48 And they were quite and women should receive equal pay for successful. Feminists worked for several equal work.” But the constitutional trea- years to prepare important policy chang- ty said nothing about how to achieve es.49 Programming and funds followed.50 equality, and the sameness/difference di- Through the 1990s, the broader agenda lemma confounded policy actions over and its understanding of the historical decades.46 roots of gender difference and inequali- Should women be treated the same way ty seemed to predominate, but it was ul- as men via equal treatment or did histori- timately pushed aside in favor of a return cally generated gender inequalities re- to an antidiscrimination approach. quire different treatment to achieve The policy process–stretching history. The equal opportunities? This second posi- 1970s was the era of equal treatment.51 tion eventually became a call for “posi- Direct discrimination could supposed- tive action” in the form of preferential ly be overcome with legislation requiring treatment (quotas on company boards or equal treatment; fiveeu directives be- political party lists, for example) or neu- tween 1975 and 1986 sought to do this.52 tral treatment that would benefit women But feminists and some eu institutions most (childcare available to all employ- knew that discrimination did not have to ees, for example).47 be direct to have real effects. By the ear- Each of these positions historicized ly 1980s, the European Court recognized claims and actions differently. The tem- the possibility of indirect discrimination poral horizon was short for those embrac- and propounded the concept of “dispa- ing the equal-treatment strategy. The rel- rate impact” on women and men, mea- evant difference was essentially the sex sured statistically, while the European of individual workers, and the source of Commission came to understand that ap- inequalities was discrimination against parently neutral measures could have a women in the employment office or work- “preponderant effect on workers of a giv- place. The horizon of those calling for en sex.”53 positive action was longer. They identi- These measures shared the goal of en- fied recurring cultural and socioeconomic suring that women could function in the processes as the causes and perpetuators labor market in the same ways and under of unequal gender norms and relations. the same conditions as men. In order to To remedy inequality, then, would require achieve the capacity to function like men, intervening in that range of processes. For they might require some recognition of them, antidiscrimination policy efforts bodily difference (pregnancy, childbirth,

148 (3) Summer 2019 145 The Difficulties size and strength standards for jobs, and feminized European Parliament and its of Combating so on). But the overriding goal was to Committee on Women’s Rights and Gen- Inequality in Time reach similar levels and kinds of labor der Equality (femm). It also had strong force participation by eliminating dis- connections with social movement or- crimination against the category “wom- ganizations, particularly those based in an.” The general strategy was to limit national women’s movements or fos- corrective actions to employment. The tered (or at least supported) by the eu it- presumption was that women arrived at self.56 In search of legitimation strategies the employment office or the workplace to overcome the widely evoked “dem- unencumbered, and that discrimina- ocratic deficit,”the eu provided plen- tion arose from inappropriate actions of tiful funding for transnational organi- employers or coworkers. These actions zations, including the European Net- could be discouraged by making discrim- work of Women, the European Expert ination–direct and indirect–illegal. Network on Women in Decision-Mak- There were, however, feminists already ing, and the European Women’s Lobby working in the Commission and elected (ewl), which was created and funded to the European Parliament who promot- by the eu in 1989 as an umbrella organi- ed other views on the sources of gender zation for national-level women’s groups differences and inequality. Already by the and an active intervener in policy dis- late 1970s, they were working with femi- cussion and design.57 Generous research nists outside the European institutions to grants also went to academics studying develop policies in line with a more his- gender relations, whose results circulat- toricized understanding of women’s ined back to the Equal Opportunities Unit equality. They understood that “equal and the ewl via conferences and meet- treatment of unequals only reproduced ings organized by the Commission. The the existing inequality between women Equal Opportunities Unit policy machin- and men.”54 Changing such norms and ery also included several European net- practices required positive actions that works on equal opportunities funded by recognized, and could ultimately over- the Commission to recruit outside exper- turn, the historical positioning of women tise.58 The outcome was a dense network as unequal because of the gender roles as- of activists, advocates, elected officials, signed to them. and feminist Eurocrats that stood behind Ironically, even as the Commission au- an agenda of equal opportunities. thorized only a narrow view of the sourc- Many in this network identified a his- es of women’s inequality, it provided in- torical source of gender inequality that stitutional support for Eurocrats within reached well beyond discriminatory eu institutions and in alliance with civ- practices in the labor market. They ar- il society feminist groups to promote ac- gued that by the time women approached tions that were more ambitious. In line the factory or office door, historically with usual practice, the existence of di- powerful social and cultural effects al- rectives required that the European bu- ready situated them in a position of “dif- reaucracy engage in institutional stabili- ference” that made formal commitments zation of its approach.55 A first step was to equal treatment far too limited a tool the creation of a Women’s Bureau (later to create equality. Commitments to hu- the Equal Opportunities Unit) to moni- man rights, important as they were, were tor member state compliance. That unit insufficient to overcome the conditions developed close ties with the increasingly of women’s and men’s lives, including

146 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences the cultural norms about care and par- incentives to take time off from work to Jane Jenson, enting and male superiority that under- care and thereby develop more responsi- Francesca Polletta & lay the social construction of gender rela- bility for children. They argued for gen- Paige Raibmon tions. They adopted the by-then standard der quotas in elected and civil-society feminist position that the unequal distri- decision-making, and they pressed for bution of responsibilities for care–for more women in leadership positions in children, vulnerable family members, the business and science. For these feminists, house–needed to change, as did cultural meaningful equality required overcom- values that diminished women and their ing long-standing differences between contributions to work and society, which the lives of women and men. were in turn often made through care Feminists in these networks kept up work. Women needed access to political pressure to harness the influence and and cultural as well as economic power. power of Europe to make cultural change; For example, pressed by femm and the at the start of the 1990s, eu institutions Parliament more generally, the Commis- responded.63 Much of the eu institution- sion’s Action Programme (1991–1995) al machinery and several member states asserted that the member states need- nonetheless continued to reject any his- ed to go beyond attention to equal pay to torical narrative of the inequality-gener- promote the active participation of wom- ating norms and consequences of family en in decision-making. relations and care work. Thus, even as the A network of collaborating feminists network concerned with gender equali- sought to move the agenda out of the ty grew more dense, proposed directives narrow realm of jobs (pay, benefits, and (legislation) were weakened and “often working conditions) and called for a turned into much less potent recommen- broader understanding of the many spac- dations and resolutions.”64 es where inequality was socially con- The preference for an ahistorical un- structed.59 This understanding of the his- derstanding of inequality was strong. For torical nature of inequality led to policy example, because the European Court demands for childcare support, parental of Justice saw its jurisdiction as cover- and maternity leaves, as well as protec- ing only work, and therefore only work- tion from sexual harassment, overcom- ers, it refused “to resolve questions rel- ing cultural stereotypes and stigma, and ative to the organization of family life or increasing women’s involvement in deci- to modify the distribution of responsibil- sion-making. All of these policy demands ities within the couple.”65 The Commis- were significant themes in the Action sion and Council seemed to agree with Programmes through the 1990s.60 Such the Court about not crossing the public- changes could, feminists claimed, alter private divide. In the context of rising the behavior of men and male-dominat- neoliberalism that turned individual ed institutions so as to provoke a cultur- rights and market fundamentalism into al revolution in practices, within families the new common sense, proposals that in- and civil society alike.61 Feminists tar- volved social engineering to change gen- geted the distribution of care work, par- der relations in the private family or pri- ticularly the “double day,” and claimed vate sector provoked skepticism. eu en- “sharing” of care was an essential out- largement did not help: a more diverse come they could promote through good set of member states made finding con- policy design.62 They pushed, for exam- sensus even more difficult. It was easi- ple, for parental leaves that gave fathers er to maintain a short temporal horizon

148 (3) Summer 2019 147 The Difficulties focused on employment offers and hiring jettisoned, however; indeed, major at- of Combating than to tackle concerns about the condi- tention to preventing violence against Inequality in Time tions under which women might under- women was added in 1997 and contin- take an employment search, or about the ues today. There was also a reinforce- type of job they might consider desirable ment of the reliance on equal treatment given their circumstances. This horizon as the policy solution.68 This return was ensured families’ decisions about recon- not only because of retrenchment in the ciliation of work and care responsibilities social domain, but also because from the stayed in the “private sphere.” At the same late 1990s into the new century, multiple time, however, and in line with the goal of social movements that focused on struc- making women workers more like men, tured inequalities and claims for inclu- increasing support for childcare was justi- sion had joined the conversation about fied as removing a barrier to employment. sameness and difference. Movements for In this policy pirouette, the treatment of sexual rights, antiracist movements, and gender inequalities was assimilated into movements of immigrants and Roma all other hindrances to employment, for mobilized around claims for antidiscrim- men as well as women, that required vari- ination protections and equal treatment ous kinds of policy tools, such as training, in the labor market and beyond (for ex- human capital investments, and other ac- ample, in family law about marriage and tions designed to overcome blockages to adoption). Moreover, activists had made the eu’s economic development. Poli- intersectionality a common theme, as cies to improve reconciliation of family they argued for the multiplication effects and work appeared as “an element con- of cross-cutting and reinforcing inequal- tributing to a good working environment ities. For many activists, social categories for all.”66 This sidelined other norms and were fluid, rooted not in social structures relations that shaped women’s lives be- but in identity, whether of gender, sexu- fore they appeared at work or during their al orientation, ethnicity, or race. These double day of care for family and home. movements also demanded recognition Other movements, other times. By the late and inclusion as proponents and protec- 1990s, childcare and practices to promote tors of equality for numerous categories equal opportunities had become poli- of individuals, and they began to gain po- cy tools that enabled rates of female em- litical space (and funding) in the Europe- ployment to rise significantlybut were an institutions.69 stripped of broader goals to alter cultur- As social movements’ approaches to al and social norms. Or rather, the focus identity and equality diversified,the fem- was on changing women workers’ behav- inist movement itself divided. Some fem- ior, not changing male workers’ behav- inists resisted this shifting focus toward a ior. By then, moreover, member states multiplicity of diversities and their inter- were generally disgruntled about over- sections. Instead, they adopted a “parity” ly ambitious social goals pursued by the stance, in which they essentialized differ- Commission.67 Therefore, less ambi- ence when making claims to equal num- tious actions to promote gender equality bers of women and men in political repre- conformed to the eu’s concentration on sentation. This position was announced market-building and ensuring the labor in the Athens Declaration of 1992, a doc- force needed for it. ument signed by twenty prominent fem- The eu’s formal commitment to equal- inists after a summit organized by the ity between men and women was never European Women’s Lobby, the Expert

148 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Network on Women in Decision-Making, the mid-1990s, Article 13 of the 1997 Trea- Jane Jenson, and the European Commission.70 The ty of Amsterdam confirmed the constitu- Francesca Polletta & parity movement that emerged after Ath- tional competence of European institu- Paige Raibmon ens argued that gender difference was bi- tions to “take appropriate action to com- ological and binary. In this way, adher- bat discrimination based on sex, racial or ents of the parity position made a signif- ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, icant change; they dehistoricized where age or sexual orientation.” Although Ar- previously they had insisted on histor- ticle 2 of the same treaty insisted on one ically constructed gender inequalities. form of inequality (“In all its activities, For them, the world was divided into two the Union shall aim to eliminate inequal- sexes, a division they took as fundamen- ities, and to promote equality, between tal to humankind. It thus merited unique men and women”), inequalities between treatment in representation.71 The par- women and men quickly became one of ity movement embraced one difference several forms of inequality, rather than as different from all others, and based the priority. The eu assumed a “similar- claims for equal access to political pow- ity of inequalities.”73 er on that difference. Other social move- In its policy actions, eu institutions ments contested this narrative that ele- dusted off the antidiscrimination equal- vated biology to primordial status, even treatment stance initially developed for when its application was limited to elec- women in the 1970s in order to apply, tions. These social movement organi- elaborate, and institutionalize it with re- zations disputed the very binary of fe- spect to race and ethnic origin. In 2000, male and male. In their own claims-mak- two directives legislated the requirement ing, these movements sought equal civil for member states to implement more rights for their chosen identities and pro- stringent equal treatment with respect tections against discrimination. to race and ethnicity than had previous- In other words, by the late 1990s, there ly been done for gender; in effect, the re- was no standard social movement narra- quirement, for the firsttime, reached tive motivating claims for gender equal- well beyond labor market consider- ity and equal treatment.72 For some, the ations. Four years later, a matching direc- problem remained inequalities in the tive for gender discrimination narrowed gender division of labor, both in employ- down broad feminist demands, thereby ment and in the family, and positive ac- revealing “that anti-discrimination had tions were required. For others, the prob- become the driving area at the European lem was racism, and antidiscrimination level and that gender equality policy had measures were needed. For yet others, it to conform to this anti-discrimination was antipathies to sexual difference and model.”74 All used an equal-treatment respect for sexual orientation, and equal approach.75 rights was the solution. And even for With these actions, the eu moved back some, the issue was the cultural embed- to “a rights-based, anti-discrimination dedness of certain religions in European approach [that] necessarily involves an history, and greater willingness to accept individualist approach in the eu con- cultural difference was needed. text.”76 This position avoided conflict This variety enabled eu institutions to with many social movements, for which continue to drive toward bundling mul- intersectionality and the fluidity of dif- tiple differences together under a diag- ference were to be celebrated. They de- nosis of the need for equal treatment. In fined lived experience as fluid and

148 (3) Summer 2019 149 The Difficulties identities as multiple, generating claims of diminishment of Indigenous rights under of Combating the right to be different in multiple ways. the Canadian legal order.79 More expan- Inequality in Time Gender equality had been folded into on- sively, s.35 was considered by many at the going, well-rehearsed antidiscrimination time to be a “box of treasures” poised to discourse that relied on rights-based advance legal pluralism and decoloniza- frames to achieve “sameness” of rights. tion.80 On several counts, s.35 appeared While “history” had a place in each nar- a victory. The government squared group rative, it was not the same history. Each rights with its commitment to individu- located the source of women’s disadvan- al equal rights. Indigenous peoples spoke tage along a different historical trajectory; up and prevented diminishment of their in turn this oriented them toward a dis- rights. All this was a full quarter of a cen- tinct future horizon. tury before the United Nations Declara- tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Our third case study of the process Yet s.35 has fallen short of these antici- through which Canada constitutional- pated gains. Since 1982, Indigenous peo- ized “Aboriginal and treaty rights” com- ples have had relatively little success at- plicates our story in interesting ways. taining self-government or acquiring ju- Here, the sameness/difference dilem- risdiction over their territories. Facing ma was mapped out not simply onto the profound limitations and inertia at gov- binary of individual/group rights, but ernment negotiating tables, Indigenous onto plural sovereignties. Although In- peoples have pursued their rights incre- digenous actors eschewed the vocabulary mentally through the courts. Scholars de- of equality, they sought a kind of equal- bate whether s.35 has done harm or good. ity among nations. Arguments for plu- For some, it is an “empty box”; for oth- ral sovereignties challenged the federal ers, it is “another colonial disaster” that government’s foundational assumptions limited Indigenous freedom.81 Thus, about the basis of the nation’s legitimacy. Ladner sees it not only as a “monumental This was–and remains–a big ask. achievement,” but also as a “monumen- In the early 1980s, many observers tal defeat”; in other words, “an Indige- saw Canada at the global forefront of ef- nous constitutional paradox.”82 forts to reconcile difference and equali- We can unlock this paradox if we situ- ty within its legal order. Canada was the ate it in time. Careful attention to what first country to constitutionally protect came before and after the constitution- multiculturalism and its wide-ranging al struggles shows that Indigenous lead- bill of rights incorporated language, ed- ers and federal politicians did not sim- ucation, Indigenous peoples, and gen- ply have competing policy agendas. They der equality.77 Its Constitution Act (1982) engaged, rather, in fundamentally dis- comprised the Charter of Rights and tinct historical projects. Every side (and Freedoms, which guaranteed equal rights there were more than two) sought to im- to individuals, and also section 35 (s.35), plement its own concept of sovereignty which constitutionally entrenched the rooted in its own constitutional order, an group rights of Indigenous peoples. This order whose primacy each side took for was, in the words of political scientist granted. They came together from differ- Kiera Ladner, a “monumental achieve- ent places; having met, they headed again ment” for Indigenous peoples.78 The pro- toward different destinations. phylactic outcome alone was important: This divergence results from Canada’s combined with section 25, s.35 prevented settler colonial status. Any democratic

150 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences settler state in pursuit of equal rights for Rights Act (1977) were signposts along Jane Jenson, citizens confronts a contradiction: its ex- the way to the human rights–based legal Francesca 84 Polletta & istence as a nation that champions equal- order that he sought to institutionalize. Paige Raibmon ity depends upon abrogation of Indige- Patriation was the necessary next step. nous rights and occupation of Indigenous His anticipated obstacles lay in Quebec lands. In settler states, serious friction ex- and the Western provinces; Indigenous ists between equal individual rights and peoples were not on his radar.85 the rights of original peoples. Like cit- Indigenous activists and leaders trav- izens of other settler states, Canadians eled a different road to the constitutional have been slow to acknowledge this fric- discussions and protests of the late 1970s. tion.83 Conflicts between group and in- For Indigenous peoples, treaties, declara- dividual rights are not unique to Indig- tions of alliance, wampum belts, territo- enous struggles: in Canada, feminists rially based practices–in short, their own and Québécois nationalists likewise have legal and constitutional orders–marked challenged individualized definitions of the time line that led to the present mo- equality in favor of collective concep- ment. Moreover, activists and leaders of tions of historical disadvantage and con- the 1970s were the first in a generation to temporary rights. Yet the stakes of Indig- grow up when political organizing was enous struggles remain distinct because not illegal. Their generation had first mo- they question the settler nation’s claim bilized to defeat the 1969 White Paper, on democratic values in any form, indi- another of Trudeau’s equality propos- vidual or collective. als. The White Paper proposed to elimi- The constitutional conversations of the nate legal distinctions–including trea- 1980s became a way station–albeit an im- ties and reserves–between Indigenous portant one–that failed to divert any of and non-Indigenous people. The White the parties from its own historical pathway Paper was the liberal tradition’s “equality onto that of another. Each subsequently as sameness” par excellence, and Indige- resumed course on a distinct time line that nous activists resoundingly rejected it. stretched forward to its own anticipated For these leaders and activists, the source horizon: Canada toward a multicultural of Indigenous inequality lay neither sim- nation rooted in singular sovereignty; In- ply with disregard for the human rights digenous peoples toward self-determina- of Indigenous individuals, nor with the tion embedded in plural sovereignties. existence of their collective differenc- The reform effort: Converging and diverging es. It lay with the settler state’s denial of time lines. Prior to 1982, only the British their collective rights and order as Indig- Parliament could alter the Canadian Con- enous peoples. The White Paper’s individ- stitution. In the late 1970s, Prime Minis- ualizing impulse toward sameness, they ter Pierre Trudeau sought to change this. argued, would not render them equal to The Constitution was a double-sided Canadians, but would instead culminate plank in Trudeau’s equality agenda: with longstanding assimilation efforts. it he sought to guarantee equal rights and And so, in Trudeau’s efforts to patri- to sever residual colonial ties to Great ate the Constitution, Indigenous activ- Britain. In Trudeau’s terms, the former ists perceived a new threat to an ongoing task advanced equality among individu- movement.86 But in addition to a threat, als; the latter equality among nations. they saw opportunity. They seized upon For Trudeau, Confederation (1867), the national interest in Trudeau’s agen- the Bill of Rights (1960), and the Human da to attract publicity and international

148 (3) Summer 2019 151 The Difficulties attention to their cause. Indigenous lead- Indians; the Native Council of Canada of Combating ers astutely turned the trajectory of their represented off-reserve, non-status, and Inequality in Time long-term self-determination project to Métis people; and the Inuit Committee intersect with the federal constitution- on National Issues represented the Inu- al program. Thus, the constitutional pro- it.88 Provincial- and tribal-level organi- tests and negotiations prior to 1982 be- zations also played important roles, as came moments of convergence engi- did the Native Women’s Association of neered by Indigenous strategists between Canada. distinct historical time lines. Each organization’s position shift- Indigenous leaders and activists who ed over time, as did relations between turned to engage the federal patriation membership and leadership. All organi- agenda were diverse; there was no sin- zations shared at least one thing in com- gle “Indigenous movement.” Multiple mon: a claim to differential treatment as Indigenous agendas intersected with the the remedy for present-day legacies of in- federal one, each grounded in its distinct justice. They rejected the antidiscrimi- historical trajectory. Coalitions formed, nation tenet that being treated the same dissolved, and re-formed multiple times as other individuals within the Canadian over the course of the constitutional de- polity would generate equality for them. bates and protests.87 They demanded instead to be treated in Indigenous diversity–political, cultur- ways that were the same as, or at least al, economic, linguistic–predated Euro- analogous to, other nations. While Can- pean arrival. Nineteenth- and twentieth- ada sought national maturity by cutting century colonial and state powers drew its colonial ties to Great Britain, Indige- new distinctions (and thereby new differ- nous peoples brandished their historic ences) among Indigenous peoples based ties to the British Crown as evidence of on factors ranging across an individu- their jurisdictional and self-government al’s gender, marital status, place of resi- powers.89 dence, education, and treaty status. By the Beyond this commonality, the path for- 1970s, such legal distinctions were gener- ward was unclear and contested. Some ations-old lived experience. By this time, organizations believed constitutional an Indigenous individual might find that entrenchment of their rights would pre- Canada understood her to be a “status In- serve nation-to-nation status; others be- dian” (under the Indian Act), an Inuit (an lieved it would be its death knell. Lead- “Indian” under the British North America ership struggled to stay aligned with Act of 1867, but not under the Indian Act), shifting views among members, many or, if the state denied her indigeneity alto- of whom engaged in large direct-action gether, a “non-status Indian” or Métis. campaigns and street protests. If we sit- These historically produced categories uate Indigenous peoples in time, these carried material implications. The stakes shifting positions are unsurprising. But of what stood to be lost or gained varied government actors held an ahistorical by one’s historical experience. Accord- orientation that branded such differenc- ingly, many who sought to make their es as factionalism; they expected Indig- voices heard used these categories as their enous organizations to work in concert. basis for political organization. Three na- This was only sometimes possible. tionwide Indigenous organizations ex- For example, the nib was the first or- isted in the late 1970s: the National Indi- ganization to intervene. In 1978, it dean Brotherhood (nib) represented status manded entrenchment of Aboriginal and

152 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences treaty rights and a seat at the negotiating members of Indigenous nations. Métis Jane Jenson, table. The federal government respond- and non-status people, on the other Francesca Polletta & ed with an invitation for all three nation- hand, started from a different place: one Paige Raibmon wide organizations to attend upcoming in which government was reluctant to ad- first ministers’ meetings as observers.90 mit they were Indigenous at all. For ex- To the extent that it conceded a mea- ample, where status Indians lived on re- sure of Indigenous participation in the serves–tiny, remote, and barren as these process, the federal government sought were–Métis communities resided on the a single solution for distinct Indigenous road allowances that the Crown set aside groups where none existed. for road construction.93 Whether they Each organization responded to oppor- conceived of themselves as members of tunities to engage with government in its sovereign nations–as many did–the ini- own way. The nib launched a campaign tial step for Métis and non-status peo- that put its nation-to-nation claim into ple was necessarily different than for sta- practice. In July 1979, it led several hun- tus Indians. They were a long way from dred delegates to London to petition the equality with status Indians, let alone Queen to block patriation. At its 1980 non-Indigenous Canadians. When op- general meeting, it adopted the “Decla- portunity arose to communicate with a ration of First Nations.” And in 1982, it Special Joint Committee of the House of re-formed into the “Assembly of First Commons and Senate, the non-status or- Nations.”91 ganizations, as well as several tribal-level, The nib allied with the Union of Brit- status-Indian organizations, participat- ish Columbia Indian Chiefs (ubcic), an ed; the nib and the ubcic boycotted. organization of nations with unceded, Indigenous organizations did not reach untreatied territories. The ubcic was a lasting consensus. Nor did their efforts adept at mobilizing direct action and at- to halt patriation in the British courts tracting media attention. They launched succeed. But their direct action and le- the “Constitution Express” train that gal efforts put serious pressure on federal gathered protesters as it traveled from and provincial governments.94 Forced to Vancouver to Ottawa. Like the nib, respond, the government turned to con- they developed tactics that enacted their stitutional entrenchment, an option that self-conception as nations. They strate- most Indigenous organizations opposed. gized a British court action and sent del- The alternative route to nation-to-na- egations and petitions to the United Na- tion status, the one favored by most In- tions in New York, the International digenous organizations–halting patri- Court of Justice in the Hague, the Fourth ation altogether–would have derailed Russell Tribunal on the Rights of Indians Trudeau’s ambitions. In turning their of the Americas in Rotterdam, and the struggle to intersect with Trudeau’s, In- World Council of Indigenous Peoples in digenous peoples had done more than Canberra.92 cross paths; they created a roadblock. Colonialism rendered it less straight- Faced with this roadblock, the gov- forward for non-status peoples to de- ernment took up the position of the mi- mand and exercise nation-to-nation sta- nority of organizations that support- tus. Recognition as a “status Indian” ed entrenchment. Other federal parties was a form of discrimination, but nev- got behind it, too. The progressive fed- ertheless it was a position from which eral party, the New Democratic Party “Indians” might argue for their due as (ndp), analogized across women, ethnic

148 (3) Summer 2019 153 The Difficulties minorities, and Indigenous peoples and representatives, the prime minister, and of Combating assumed that entrenchment would serve the provincial first ministers for this pur- Inequality in Time them all, even though each group was dis- pose. These conferences–four of which advantaged in historically distinct ways. were eventually held in 1982, 1984, 1985, The federal “equality as sameness” pro- and 1987–failed to significantly specify posal that sought social justice for ev- s.35’s scope. eryone through a single policy–rights Horizons of equality–and possibility. The guaranteed under the Constitution–relate 1970s through the final constitution- lied upon a synchronic snapshot of inal conference in 1987 was a historical mo- equality. But inequality existed in time; ment when distinct nation-building proj- a diachronic perspective was necessary ects intersected. A problem of scale char- to make headway. Because groups were acterized the meeting of Indigenous and unequal for different historical reasons, government actors at this crossroads. For they required different future solutions. Trudeau, pressured by successful Indige- ndp mp Ian Waddell and the Aborigi- nous lobbying and media tactics to some- nal rights lawyer Jack Woodward helped how accommodate Indigenous leaders, draft the clause that became s.35.95 In- s.35 became a necessary part of a larger digenous leaders and activists did not. whole: the effort to patriate the Consti- The ndp expended its political capital tution and pass the Charter of Rights and for an Aboriginal rights clause that ulti- Freedoms. In so doing, he sought to con- mately satisfied almost none of the Indig- cede to Indigenous peoples the minimum enous stakeholders; the Métis Associa- necessary to allow his own agenda to pro- tion of Alberta was s.35’s sole Indigenous ceed. For Trudeau, the major goal–patri- supporter in the end. When the Constitu- ation–was achieved in 1982; the confer- tion Act passed, the nib declared a day of ences were a formality. mourning. The ubcic branded Indige- For Indigenous peoples, the inverse nous participation in patriation celebra- was true. The battle over patriation was tions a “treasonous act against the Indian no end in itself. It was an installment in nations and their citizens.”96 a centuries-long sovereignty struggle. Deeply contested, the victory of en- For them, there was real work to do at trenchment was also inherently incom- these mandated conferences, the work plete. S.35 created a new legal catego- of reconciling a multiplicity of Indige- ry called “Aboriginal and treaty rights.” nous constitutional and legal orders with It did not, however, specify their nature that of the Canadian state. These confer- or scope. This vagueness was intention- ences were the moment when the poten- al. Greater specificity would have forced tial promise of s.35–unsatisfying on its to the fore the divergent worldviews, as- own–might be realized. sumptions, and interests of the federal Nowhere were the unequal tempo- government, provinces, and Indigenous ral horizons and different historical tra- peoples that s.35 papered over. Great- jectories more apparent than during er specificity would likely have scuttled these conferences. Participants’ vastly the clause entirely. The chosen wording different orientations toward the sub- shielded existing rights from erosion un- stance and stakes of the agenda doomed til agreement on the nature of “Aborigi- the meetings to failure. After passing the nal and treaty rights” could be reached. Constitution Act, the federal government Section 37 of the Act mandated a se- had little political incentive to elaborate ries of conferences between Indigenous the definition of “Aboriginal and treaty

154 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences rights” in the thorough, transformative authentic cultures. It defines the Indige- Jane Jenson, fashion that Indigenous leaders want- nous differences that matter as belonging Francesca Polletta & ed. The conferences became an elabo- inexorably to the past. In so doing, it de- Paige Raibmon rate show in which the federal govern- historicizes Indigenous people and peo- ment’s minimal tolerance for the exercise ples by fetishizing their history, effective- of Indigenous constitutional order–self- ly placing them out of time. determination in the language of the The s.35 jurisprudence since Van der Peet day–was on display. It was easy for each has produced increasingly racially based, side to view the other’s position as unrea- culturalist definitions of Indigenousness sonable, ill-mannered, and overreaching as a bundle of traits that inhere within the because each side saw something differ- individual. The Supreme Court of Canada ent when it looked back over its shoul- rejects the assertions of living Indigenous der, and each had its gaze fixed on a fun- people that their difference inheres in- damentally different endpoint. stead in the exercise of collective political Consequences. After the failure of the rights. This approach is discriminatory in constitutional conferences, Indigenous multiple ways and scholars have critiqued peoples looked to a different, more ad- it heavily.100 From the vantage point of versarial policy-making body to define today, the results of s.35 jurisprudence ap- s.35: the judicial system. In this setting, pear to have been foretold in 1981 by Chief as in 1982, it is still not Indigenous peo- George Manuel, former president of the ple, but mostly non-Indigenous actors– ubcic and the nib, who wrote: “When notably, Supreme Court of Canada judges the Government talks about Aboriginal –who define the scope of Aboriginal Rights it means no more than our cultur- and treaty rights. The results so far have al rights to perform Indian dances and been disturbingly restrictive and ahistor- songs, and to make bannock.”101 ical. The Supreme Court’s 1996 Van der As long-time Indigenous rights activist Peet decision introduced a test to identi- Mildred Poplar put it, s.35 set diverse In- fy s.35 rights.97 The test requires demon- digenous peoples along a path not of their strated continuity with precontact prac- own making: “In some ways, s.35 has di- tices that are “integral to a distinctive verted our people, and the new leader- culture.” Consistent with other rights- ship instead of fighting for our rights, is based jurisprudence, Van der Peet defines negotiating to help Canada and the prov- Aboriginal rights in piecemeal fashion inces define them.”102 This work of defi- through protection of specificpractic - nition has incorporated diverse Indige- es conducted by individuals.98 It does not nous peoples into settler institutions that recognize these individuals as members set the terms to which Indigenous people of sovereign collectives. Moreover, to must adhere if they are to be legible to the meet the test, the claimed rights must be state. S.35’s affirmation of Aboriginal and found in the past. This follows an “orig- treaty rights set in motion several coun- inalist” approach that is common in the terintuitive maneuvers that have defined United States but infrequent in Canada group rights in an individualizing man- where “living-tree” interpretations dom- ner; dehistoricized Indigenous peoples inate constitutional law except in the area by relegating them to the past; and less- of Aboriginal rights.99 Van der Peet’s prec- ened rather than increased Indigenous edent-setting “frozen rights” or “per- access to freedoms enjoyed by Canadi- mafrost” approach relies upon outdat- an citizens at large. As Poplar urged peo- ed, ahistorical stereotypes of primitive, ple to remember in 2003, “We were never

148 (3) Summer 2019 155 The Difficulties fighting for s.35, we were fighting to pre- that history mattered: not as a set of facts of Combating serve our Nation-to-Nation relationship, about the past, but as contested, or con- Inequality 106 in Time for recognition as Sovereign Nations, testable, stories or schemas. These un- and to re-build and Decolonize Our Peo- derstandings of the past shaped actors’ ple.”103 But the story is not over yet. S.35 views of the viability, necessity, and de- lies within the Constitution like an “en- sirability of present-day actions and fu- crypted code” for realizing decoloniza- ture outcomes. One such set of under- tion, thus far “the road not taken.”104 standings identified the sources of the inequality somewhere in the past, and a Taken together, the reform efforts we second placed the reform in a future-ori- describe differ in many ways, yet never- ented trajectory of efforts to remedy in- theless share some instructive features. equality. Together, they shaped and limit- Each effort initially seemed to avoid the ed the practical possibilities that accom- sameness/difference dilemma. And each panied the reform. ultimately fell prey to it. Our analysis In each of the cases, activists and some- shows that this outcome was not a fore- times policy-makers recognized that gone conclusion. It derived from histori- the unequal status of the disadvantaged cally contingent processes, from the ways group or groups had been socially pro- in which political actors understood induced over a long historical duration. equality in time–in relation to past, pres- Minority health advocates in the Unit- ent, and future. ed States firmly believed that differenc- At a minimum, history mattered here es in group responses to treatment were in the familiar sense of chronology or more likely to lie in history than in biol- timing. In the case of biomedical reform ogy: that is, in long-term experiences of in the United States, the field of genom- discrimination, poverty, and associat- ics emerged as new federal standards ed stresses. Problems like these required encouraged researchers to take up the reform outside the field of medical re- question of race. The field of genomics, search and were unlikely to draw phar- in turn, powerfully shaped the way re- maceutical companies as partners. That searchers used and understood racial cat- such an agenda was overshadowed in egories. In the case of gender policies in some respects by a focus on the putative- the eu, the sidelining of ambitions for ly biological causes of health disparities “social Europe” and the rise of neoliber- was not activists’ or policy-makers’ inal commitments made policy-makers less tent. In Europe, the pursuit of a “differ- likely to adopt solutions that they casti- ence” agenda by feminists in the 1980s gated as social engineering. In the case and 1990s included significant efforts of constitutional reform in Canada, the to stretch the temporal horizon of poli- federal government’s rights-based liber- cy analysis and policy-making. They ar- alism generated political conditions that gued that longstanding social relations of failed to take Indigenous peoples specif- gender not only placed women in social ically into account, and that nevertheless and political positions unequal to men as provided them the opportunity to enter they sought employment and political of- the national stage. In each case, the his- fice, but that these ongoing and histori- torical timing of the reform partly ac- cally rooted structures of inequality had counted for its effects.105 to be changed by interventions that ad- We have focused, however, on a more dressed power relations in a wide variety substantive, less well-recognized way of realms before women could achieve

156 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences full equality. This history required what individualized medicine made it difficult Jane Jenson, they called an equal opportunities policy for anyone to challenge the use of biolog- Francesca Polletta & treatment rather than simple protection ically reductionist and essentialist expla- Paige Raibmon against workplace and other discrimi- nations for health inequalities. In the eu, nations. Indigenous activists in Canada feminists called for systemic change in likewise referenced centuries-long in- deeply rooted and socially produced his- equality-producing processes. In their torical patterns. Antidiscrimination mea- case, colonialism had undermined their sures were insufficient; creating equali- distinct status as self-governing nations. ty required interventions in private life. They sought “equality”–though they did This stretch of public action was resist- not use that term–through a major reed both by institutions under the influ- allocation of authority that would entail ence of neoliberalism, with a short time recognition of plural sovereignties with- horizon about the source of inequalities, in the Canadian state. and by activists who rejected binary dif- These deeply historicized arguments ference in gender and sexual identity and for recognizing difference would have norms. This new political coalition side- changed the circumstances of the advan- lined the more ambitious reform agenda. taged groups and disadvantaged groups The policy world preferred short tempo- alike. In all three cases, the “haves” would ral horizons and “rights fixes” matched have been required to give something well with fluid, cultural conceptions of up in order to advance equality for the identity. Indigenous activists in Cana- “have-nots.” These historicized perspec- da, for their part, staked claims to dy- tives understood resources such as time namic, collective forms of political pow- and land to be finite, rather than ever- er and membership by invoking treaties, expanding. Asserting the group’s differ- covenants, and proclamations from pre- ence was one way to draw attention to the vious centuries. This activist pressure re- deeper roots of the problem at hand and sulted–albeit unsatisfactorily and some- highlight the need for more thorough- what inadvertently–in constitutionally going reforms. In this sense, demands for protected “Aboriginal rights.” Yet when recognition and redistribution were fun- it fell to the Supreme Court of Canada to damentally connected: to recognize the define these rights, it did so in essential- group’s difference was to recognize the ist ways that fixed those rights in a pri- historical processes that produced and mordial past, severely limiting their ma- sustained that difference. terial bearing on present and future con- Yet in each case, assertions of histori- figurations of Canadian jurisdiction and cally produced difference either evolved sovereignty. into or were sidelined by essentialist Interestingly, of the cases at hand, In- claims. In the United States, the new digenous peoples alone staked a claim for federal standards were appropriated permanent recognition of difference. In by medical researchers and pharma- the other two cases, actors placed a time ceutical companies in the drive to iden- limit on the need to recognize difference. tify and treat racial and ethnic diseas- In the United States, differential treat- es. The fact that all actors–reformers as ment of racialized groups was meant to much as pharmaceutical executives–em- be a stepping stone to a future in which braced an account in which the identifi- everyone enjoyed the benefits of individ- cation of group-based genetic differenc- ualized medicine. In Europe, the goal was es was a stopgap measure on the way to to achieve the same equality for women

148 (3) Summer 2019 157 The Difficulties and men, by means of an equal-opportu- failure to confront the historical assump- of Combating nities strategy of different treatment. tions embedded in these distinct stories. Inequality in Time In every instance, policies and/or prac- Our cases also suggest the utility of re- tices were eventually based on dehistori- framing the so-called sameness/differ- cized–prejudicial, partial, or otherwise ence dilemma. The challenge is not so imperfect–understandings of the source much to decide between an emphasis on of inequality. Each policy “victory” failed sameness or difference. Rather, the chal- in the end to account for the processu- lenge is to gain recognition–in policy as al nature of the originating and ongoing well as public discourse–for historical- causes of inequality.107 Each was dual- ly produced differences, without allow- ly myopic: in how it looked back and in ing recognition to remake those differ- how it projected forward. This was de- ences into a biological or otherwise time- spite many activists understanding the less essence. deep historical roots of the problem and Finally, our cases demonstrate the risks offering concrete policy solutions that of basing long-term, often costly policy could have been enacted. decisions on dehistoricized explanations What are the implications of our cases for inequality. Such explanations gain for efforts to reduce inequalities by way traction for many reasons, and often ap- of government action? Our cases call for pear to point toward expedient or useful greater scrutiny of the stories circulat- policy solutions. But as these cases show, ing among reformers that link present in- apparent victories can fall short in star- equalities to their past causes and future tlingly disappointing ways. If inequality remedies. Such stories or schemas shape is recognized as a process–or better, as the reform effort’s trajectory and likeli- multiple processes–then efforts to rem- hood of success, yet they are rarely laid edy it must attend to the deeply rooted, out in full. This may be, in part, because ongoing character of those processes. to do so would reveal that the process- Policy must combine temporal horizons: es targeting some groups for remedy and combatting discrimination in the here excluding others are political rather than and now while taking account of the con- natural or consensual. Or it may reveal tinuing effects of earlier exclusionary his- that members of the reform coalition in tories. Short-term policy time lines may fact work from quite different stories and be politically inevitable, but it does not histories about the place of their efforts follow that the policy, in its conception, in a longer trajectory. Or it may simply must be tethered to short-term horizons. be that the stories mesh with widespread, We insist instead that policy can accom- seemingly commonsensical ideas about modate deeply historicized understand- the inevitability of progress. Whatever ings of difference; indeed, that it must the explanation, our cases show that dis- do so if it is to advance equality fully, over advantaged groups lost the most from the the long term.

158 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences author biographies Jane Jenson, Francesca jane jenson is Professor Emerita of Political Science at the Université de Montréal. She Polletta & is the author of Defining and Measuring Social Cohesion (2010) and Who Cares? Women’s Work, Paige Raibmon Child Care and Welfare State Redesign (with Mariette Sineau, 2001) and editor of Reassem- bling Motherhood: Procreation and Care in a Globalized World (with Yasmine Ergas and Sonya Michel, 2017). francesca polletta is Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Irvine. She is the author of It Was like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics (2006) and Freedom Is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements (2002) and editor of Passion- ate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements (with Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, 2001). paige raibmon is Professor of History at the University of British Columbia. She is the author of As I Remember It: Teachings (ʔəms taʔaw) from the Life of a Sliammon Elder (with El- sie Paul, Davis McKenzie, and Harmony Johnson, 2019), Written as I Remember It: Teachings (ʔəms taʔaw) from the Life of a Sliammon Elder (with Elsie Paul and Harmony Johnson, 2014), and Authentic Indians: Episodes of Encounter from the Late-Nineteenth-Century Northwest Coast (2005). endnotes 1 For classic formulations, see Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Joan W. Scott, “Decon- structing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Post-Structuralist Theory for Femi- nism,” Feminist Studies 14 (1) (1988): 33–50. 2 Michèle Lamont, “Toward a Comparative Sociology of Valuation and Evaluation,” Annual Review of Sociology 38 (2012): 201–221. 3 Nick Haslam, Louis Rothschild, and Donald Ernst, “Essentialist Beliefs about Social Catego- ries,” British Journal of Social Psychology 39 (1) (2000): 113–127. 4 Fernand Braudel, “History and the Social Sciences: The Longue Durée,” trans. Immanuel Wallerstein, Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 32 (2) (2009): 171–203. 5 Steven Epstein, Inclusion: The Politics of Difference in Medical Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 6 Janet K. Shim, Katherine Weatherford Darling, Sara L. Ackerman, et al., “Reimagining Race and Ancestry: Biomedicalizing Difference in Post-Genomic Subjects,” in Reimagining (Bio) Medicalization, Pharmaceuticals and Genetics: Old Critiques and New Engagements, ed. Susan E. Bell and Ann E. Figert (New York: Routledge, 2015), 68–90. 7 Catherine Bliss, Race Decoded: The Genomic Fight for Social Justice (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012). 8 Epstein, Inclusion; Catherine Lee and John D. Skrentny, “Race Categorization and the Regu- lation of Business and Science,” Law and Society Review 44 (3–4) (2010): 617–650; and Jon- athan Kahn, Race in a Bottle: The Story of BiDil and Racialized Medicine in a Post-Genomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 9 Troy Duster, “Medicalisation of Race,” The Lancet 369 (9562) (2007): 702–704; and Kahn, Race in a Bottle. 10 Bliss, Race Decoded; Shim et al., “Reimaging Race and Ancestry”; and Sara Shostak and Mar- got Moinester, “Beyond Geneticization,” in Reimagining (Bio)Medicalization, Pharmaceuti- cals and Genetics, ed. Bell and Figert, 216–238. 11 Barbara A. Koenig, Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, and Sarah S. Richardson, “Introduction: Race and Genetics in a Genomic Age,” in Revisiting Race in a Genomic Age, ed. Barbara A. Koenig, San- dra Soo-Jin Lee, and Sarah S. Richardson (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2008).

148 (3) Summer 2019 159 The Difficulties 12 Sheryl Burt Ruzek and Julie Becker, “The Women’s Health Movement in the United States: of Combating From Grass-Roots Activism to Professional Agendas,” in Women and Health: Power, Technol- Inequality ogy, Inequality and Conflict in a Gendered World, ed. Kathryn Strother Ratcliff (Boston: Allyn in Time and Bacon, 1999), 293–302; and Carol S. Weisman, Women’s Health Care: Activist Traditions and Institutional Change (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1998). 13 Judith D. Auerbach and Anne E. Figert, “Women’s Health Research: Public Policy and Sociol- ogy,” Journal of Health and Social Behavior (1995): 115–131. 14 Ibid.; and Karen L. Baird, “The New nih and fda Medical Research Policies: Targeting Gen- der, Promoting Justice,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 24 (3) (1999): 531–565. 15 Drew Halfmann, Jesse Rude, and Kim Ebert, “The Biomedical Legacy in Minority Health Pol- icy-Making, 1975–2002,” in Health Care Services, Racial and Ethnic Minorities and Underserved Populations: Patient and Provider Perspectives, ed. J. Jacobs Kronenfeld (Bingley, United King- dom: Emerald Group Publishing, 2005), 245–275. 16 Epstein, Inclusion, 79. 17 Lee and Skrentny, “Race Categorization and the Regulation of Business and Science.” 18 Epstein, Inclusion. 19 Kahn, Race in a Bottle. 20 Epstein, Inclusion, 220. 21 Epstein, Inclusion. 22 Ellen Annandale and Anne Hammarström, “A New Biopolitics of Gender and Health? ‘Gen- der-Specific Medicine’ and Pharmaceuticalization in the Twenty-First Century,” in Reimag- ining (Bio)Medicalization, Pharmaceuticals and Genetics, ed. Figert and Bell, 53–67. 23 Halfmann et al., “The Biomedical Legacy in Minority Health Policy-Making.” 24 Rogers Brubaker, Grounds for Difference (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015). 25 Quoted in Epstein, Inclusion, 96. 26 Epstein, Inclusion; and Kahn, Race in a Bottle. 27 Bliss, Race Decoded; and Catherine Bliss, “Biomedicalization and the New Science of Race,” in Reimagining (Bio)Medicalization, Pharmaceuticals and Genetics, ed. Figert and Bell, 175–196. 28 Bliss, “Biomedicalization and the New Science of Race,” 179. 29 Quoted in Kahn, Race in a Bottle, 163. 30 Ibid., 165. 31 Ibid., 110. 32 D. Devine, “naacp Goes to the Grassroots for BiDil,” Bay State Banner, October 5, 2006, http://www.baystate-banner.com/archives/stories/2006/10/10. 33 Dorothy E. Roberts, “What’s Wrong with Race-Based Medicine: Genes, Drugs, and Health Disparities,” Minnesota Journal of Science & Technology 12 (1) (2011): 1–21. 34 Kahn, Race in a Bottle. 35 Sheldon Krimsky, “The Art of Medicine: The Short Life of a Race Drug,” The Lancet 379 (9811) (2012): 115. 36 Duster, “Medicalisation of Race”; Epstein, Inclusion; and Kahn, Race in a Bottle. 37 Kahn, Race in a Bottle. 38 Linda M. Hunt and Meta J. Kreiner, “Pharmacogenetics in Primary Care: The Promise of Per- sonalized Medicine and the Reality of Racial Profiling,” Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry 37 (1) (2013): 226–235, 230.

160 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 39 Ibid., 232. Jane Jenson, 40 Francesca Ibid. Polletta & 41 Claude Lévi-Strauss, “The Structural Analysis of Myth,” in Structural Anthropology, trans. Paige Raibmon C. Jacobson and B. G. Schoepf (New York: Basic Books, 1963). 42 Bliss, Race Decoded; and Pamela Sankar, “Moving Beyond the Two-Race Mantra,” in Revisit- ing Race in a Genomic Age, ed. Koening, Soo-Jin Lee, and Richardson, 271–284. 43 Bliss, Race Decoded; and Shostak and Moinester, “Beyond Geneticization.” 44 Shim et al., “Reimagining Race and Ancestry.” 45 Lundy Braun, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Duana Fullwiley, et al., “Racial Categories in Medical Practice: How Useful Are They?” PLOS Medicine 4 (9) (2007): 271. 46 Myra Marx Ferree, “Framing Equality: The Politics of Race, Class, and Gender in the U.S., Germany, and the Expanding European Union,” in Gender Politics in the Expanding European Union: Mobilization, Inclusion, Exclusion, ed. Silke Roth (New York: Berghahn, 2008), 339. 47 Positive action is European terminology for what in North America is labeled affirmative action. 48 Sophie Jacquot, Transformations in EU Gender Equality: From Emergence to Dismantling (Hound- mills, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 7. 49 Petra Ahrens, Actors, Institutions and the Making of EU Gender Equality Programs (London: Pal- grave Macmillan, 2018), 29–36. 50 George Ross, “The eu: An Actor without a Role,” in Who Cares? Women’s Work, Childcare and Welfare State Redesign, ed. Jane Jenson and Mariette Sineau (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 192–193. 51 Catherine Hoskyns, Integrating Gender: Women, Law and Politics in the European Union (Lon- don: Verso, 1996). 52 Jacquot, Transformations in EU Gender Equality, chap. 2. 53 Ibid., 29; and Ross, “The eu,” 182. 54 Quoted in Ross, “The eu,” 183. 55 Jacquot, Transformations in EU Gender Equality, 36. 56 Petra Ahrens, “The Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in the European Parliament: Taking Advantage of Institutional Power Play,” Parliamentary Affairs 69 (4) (2016): 778–793. 57 Ahrens, Actors, Institutions and the Making of EU Gender Equality Programs, chap. 1. 58 Ibid., 31, 35. 59 Hoskyns, Integrating Gender, 143; Agnès Hubert, “Du sommet d’Athènes à la révision de la Constitution: Les dogmes de la République à l’épreuve de la démocratie paritaire en Eu- rope,” in Les défis de la République: Genre, territoires, citoyenneté, ed. Bruno Perreau and Joan Scott (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2017), 111–134. 60 Ross, “The eu.” 61 Hubert, “Du sommet d’Athènes à la révision de la Constitution,” 129–130. 62 Maria Stratigaki, “The Cooptation of Gender Concepts in eu Policies: The Case of ‘Reconcil- iation of Work and Family’,” Social Politics 11 (1) (2004): 31–32. 63 Hoskyns, Integrating Gender, 143. 64 Ahrens, Actors, Institutions and the Making of EU Gender Equality Programs, 33. 65 Quoted in Jacquot, Transformations in EU Gender Equality, 28.

148 (3) Summer 2019 161 The Difficulties 66 Stratigaki, “The Cooptation of Gender Concepts in eu Policies,” 49. of Combating 67 Inequality George Ross and Jane Jenson, “Reconsidering Jacques Delors’ Leadership of the European in Time Union,” Journal of European Integration 39 (2) (2017): 113–127. 68 Mieke Verloo, “Multiple Inequalities, Intersectionality and the European Union,” European Journal of Women’s Studies 13 (3) (2006): 211–228. 69 Jacquot, Transformations in EU Gender Equality, 169–170. 70 Hubert, “Du sommet d’Athènes à la révision de la Constitution.” 71 Agnès Hubert, “From Equal Pay to Parity Democracy: The Rocky Ride of Women’s Policy in the European Union,” in Has Liberalism Failed Women? Assuring Equal Representation in Europe and the United States, ed. Jyette Klausen and Charles Maier (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 153. 72 Jacquot, Transformations in EU Gender Equality, chap. 5. 73 Verloo, “Multiples Inequalities, Intersectionality and the European Union,” 215. 74 Jacquot, Transformations in EU Gender Equality, 105. 75 Mark Bell, Critical Review of Academic Literature Relating to the EU Directives to Combat Discrimi- nation (Brussels: European Commission, D-G Employment and Social Affairs, 2004), 12. 76 Jane Lewis, “Work/Family Reconciliation, Equal Opportunities and Social Policies: The In- terpretation of Policy Trajectories at the eu Level and the Meaning of Gender Equality,” Journal of European Public Policy 13 (3) (2006): 428; and Jane Jenson, “The Fading Goal of Gender Equality: Three Policy Directions that Underpin the Resilience of Gendered Socio-economic Inequalities,” Social Politics 22 (4) (2015): 539–560. 77 Dominique Clément, Human Rights in Canada (Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 2016), 112. 78 Kiera Ladner, “An Indigenous Constitutional Paradox: Both Monumental Achievement and Monumental Defeat,” in Patriation and Its Consequences: Constitution Making in Canada, ed. Lois Harder and Steve Patten (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2015), 267–289. 79 Section 25 of the Constitution Act shielded the collective rights in s.35 from the individual rights enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Ladner, “An Indigenous Consti- tutional Paradox,” 271; and P. G. McHugh, “A Common Law Biography of Section 35,” in From Recognition to Reconciliation: Essays on the Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, ed. Patrick Macklem and Douglas Sanderson (Toronto: University of Toron- to Press, 2016), 137–163. 80 Ardith Walkem and Halie Bruce, eds., Box of Treasures or Empty Box? Twenty Years of Section 35 (Penticton, Canada: Theytus Books, 2003). 81 Ibid.; John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism (Toronto: University of Toron- to Press, 2016), 110, 179; Dimitrios Panagos, Uncertain Accommodation: Aboriginal Identity and Group Rights in the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2016); and Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Cana- da (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014). 82 Ladner, “An Indigenous Constitutional Paradox.” 83 In 1969, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau declared “we must not sign treaties amongst ourselves” [quoted in Louise Mandell, “The Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs Fights Patriation,” Socialist Studies 2 (1984): 169]; in 2009, Prime Minster Stephen Harper stated that Canada has “no history of colonialism.” See Aaron Wherry, “What He Was Talking about When He Talked about Colonialism,” Maclean’s, October 1, 2009, https://www.mac leans.ca/uncategorized/what-he-was-talking-about-when-he-talked-about-colonialism/. 84 Clément, Human Rights in Canada, 105.

162 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 85 Kiera Ladner and Michael McCrossan, “The Road Not Taken: Aboriginal Rights after the Jane Jenson, Re-Imagining of the Canadian Constitutional Order,” in Contested Constitutionalism: Reflec- Francesca tions on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ed. James B. Kelly and Christopher P. Polletta & Manfredi (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009), 267. Paige Raibmon 86 Mandell, “The Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs Fights Patriation,” 165. 87 Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, 115–120; Douglas Sanders, “The Indian Lobby,” in And No One Cheered: Federalism, Democracy and the Constitution Act, ed. Keith Ban- ting and Richard Simeon (Toronto: Methuen, 1983), 301–332. 88 Simon McInnes, “The Inuit and the Constitutional Process, 1978–1981,” in As Long as the Sun Shines and the Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies, ed. A. L. Getty and Antoine S. Lussier (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983), 317. 89 Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, 113–114. 90 Sanders, “The Indian Lobby,” 304. 91 Ibid., 305–306. 92 Sanders, “The Indian Lobby.” 93 Maria Campbell, Stories of the Road Allowance People (Saskatoon: Gabriel Dumont Institute, 2010). 94 Sanders, “The Indian Lobby”; and Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, 115–120. 95 Ian Waddell, “Building a Box, Finding Storage Space,” in Box of Treasures or Empty Box? ed. Walkem and Bruce, 15–20. 96 Quoted in Sanders, “The Indian Lobby,” 324. 97 Dorothy Marie Van der Peet v. Her Majesty the Queen (1996) 2 S.C.R. 507. 98 Jane Jenson, “Naming Nations: Making Nationalist Claims in Canadian Public Discourse,” Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 30 (3) (1993): 348. 99 Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, chap. 4. 100 Chris Andersen, “Residual Tensions of Empire: Contemporary Métis Communities and the Canadian Judicial Imagination,” in Canada: State of the Federation (2003): Reconfiguring Ab- original State Relations, ed. Michael Murphy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill Queen’s Uni- versity Press for the Institute, 2005), 295–328; John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Re- surgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press: 2003), chap. 3; Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, chap. 4–6; Ladner, “An Indigenous Constitution- al Paradox”; and Dale Turner, “White and Red Paper Liberalism,” in Philosophy and Aborig- inal Rights: Critical Dialogues, ed. Sandra Tomsons and Lorraine Mayer (Don Mills, Canada: Oxford University Press, 2013), 160–169. 101 George Manuel, “President’s Message,” Indian World 3 (10) (1981): 7. 102 Mildred C. Poplar, “We Were Fighting for Nationhood Not Section 35,” in Box of Treasures or Empty Box? ed. Walkem and Bruce, 28. 103 Ibid., 27–28. 104 Ladner and McCrossan, “The Road Not Taken.” 105 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, N.J.: Prince- ton University Press, 2011); and James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociolo- gy,” Theory and Society 29 (4) (2000): 507–548. 106 William H. Sewell Jr., “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation,” Amer- ican Journal of Sociology 98 (1) (1992): 1–29. 107 Andrew Abbott, Processual Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

148 (3) Summer 2019 163 commentary

Political Inequality, “Real” Public Preferences, Historical Comparisons & Axes of Disadvantage

Jennifer L. Hochschild

Abstract: The essays in this issue of Dædalus raise fascinating and urgent questions about inequality, time, and interdisciplinary research. They lead me to ask further questions about the public’s commitment to reducing inequality, the importance of political power in explaining and reducing social and economic inequities, and the possible incommensurability of activists’ and policy-makers’ vantage points or job descriptions.

jennifer l. hochschild, a Fellow of the American Academy The essays in this issue of Dædalus are fantastical- since 1996, is the Henry LaBarre ly provocative and informative. That is no surprise. Jayne Professor of Government, They are written by many of the Western world’s Professor of African and Afri- leading scholars of inequality; they have germinat- can American Studies, and Chair ed and developed over many years and many drafts; of the Department of Govern- they combine moral passion with empirical and an- ment at Harvard University. She alytic rigor. The three dominant themes–integrat- is the author of Do Facts Matter? ing scholarship across disciplines, taking time seri- Information and Misinformation in American Politics (with Kather- ously as an explanatory force, and directly connect- ine Levine Einstein, 2015), Cre- ing three levels of analysis with one another–are ating a New Racial Order: How Im- important, innovative, and revealing. Although I migration, Multiracialism, Genom- venture no predictions about economic inequality ics, and the Young Can Remake Race itself, I confidently predict that scholars, students, in America (with Vesla M. Weav- and even policy analysts will be reading and dis- er and Traci R. Burch, 2012), The cussing this issue of Dædalus for years to come. American Dream and the Public Schools (with Nathan Scovron- Before burrowing into the academic’s favorite ick, 2004), and Facing Up to the habitat of critique and query, let me embody that American Dream: Race, Class, and praise by pointing to particular arguments in each the Soul of the Nation (1996). essay that seem to me to get at the heart of their

© 2019 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license 164 doi:10.1162/DAED_a_01754 innovation. Each of these arguments is process: how many department chairs Jennifer L. a direct progenitor of one or more of my have done what I am now doing, enticing Hochschild comments below. David Grusky, Peter a job candidate and her partner to accept Hall, and Hazel Markus, in “The Rise of a job offer from my university in part by Opportunity Markets: How Did It Hap- pointing to so many other exciting schol- pen & What Can We Do?” develop the ars in the vicinity, so many job opportuni- rich concept of opportunity markets, ties for the partner, so many cultural ame- showing when and how individuals and nities and good local schools? The move- institutions can create and reinforce tra- ment from country to city is centuries jectories of inequality while simply going old, has never been voluntarily reversed, about their usual, essentially benign busi- and is perhaps reaching its inevitable cli- ness. Americans endorse public educa- max. And yet, Le Galès and Pierson, like tion, meritocratic rules, a family’s right to Grusky, Hall, and Markus, point us to- help its children, markets, and equal op- ward policy interventions that can ame- portunity: all perfectly defensible norms liorate if not eliminate the most harmful and practices that nonetheless culminate or inegalitarian features of the trajecto- in a new “inequality regime that func- ries they so convincingly depict. tions so smoothly that its many interlock- “Membership without Social Citizen- ing components can be invisible.” The ship? Deservingness & Redistribution as idea that I found most compelling was al- Grounds for Equality,” by Irene Bloem- most a throwaway line: raad, Will Kymlicka, Michèle Lamont, Our instinct is that present-day Americans and Leanne Son Hing, directly targets an likewise lack the stomach to deal directly issue that many left activists have evad- with the causes of unequal opportunity ed for some decades: can a society effec- . . . but that is not reason to despair. It only tively engage with more than one major means that we must find another way. dimension of inequity at a time? That is, can intersectionality move beyond being And they do find another way, a rela- an important academic trope into being a tively small and targeted policy interven- sustainable focus for political mobilization that “could trigger a norm cascade tion and policy intervention? Bloemraad that would counter the rise of opportu- and her coauthors worry that full-fledged nity markets and lead to a substantial in- attacks on multiple axes of disadvantage crease in social mobility.”1 What liberat- cannot be, or at least so far have not been, ing ideas: that social scientists need not sustained. As the authors put it: tether themselves to tight causal expla- Whereas national membership has ex- nations of important problems in order panded [to incorporate women, ethnic or to think incisively about effective solu- racial minorities, and immigrants–and I tions, and that seemingly small solutions would add people with disabilities and in- may under the right conditions have big dividuals with unconventional sexual ori- effects. entation or gender identity], the segment In “‘Superstar Cities’ & the Generation of the population seen as deserving of re- of Durable Inequality,” Patrick Le Galès distributive support has arguably shrunk.3 and Paul Pierson also produce a depress- ingly compelling structural explanation That is, to put the point more crude- of rising inequality.2 The concept of ag- ly, as leftist positions on race, gender, glomeration perfectly captures an indi- and nonnormative behavior have gained vidual, organizational, and economic ground, leftist positions on class and

148 (3) Summer 2019 165 Political material distribution have lost ground. favored greater equality for groups that Inequality, There is no logical reason for that seesaw, all saw as being unfairly disadvantaged, “Real” Public Preferences, but there is plausible empirical reason to with the only question being how best Historical fear its occurrence. to promote equality. Nonetheless, the Comparisons Son Hing (again!), Anne Wilson, Pe- outcome at best was ambiguous and at & Axes of Disadvantage ter Gourevitch, Jaslyn English, and Parco worst harmed the people ostensibly be- Sin explore, in “Failure to Respond to ing granted their just desserts. Jenson and Rising Inequality: Processes That Legit- her colleagues show vividly how difficult imize Growing Disparities,” an updat- it is to grant genuine recognition, balance ed version of Werner Sombart’s classic the equally compelling claims of same- question: “Why no socialism in the Unit- ness and difference, and put ideological ed States?” Just as many of the essays in commitments of passionate advocates this issue move across levels of analysis, through the meat grinder of a political sys- so does the issue as a whole, with this es- tem. Time is an active force in this essay say focusing substantially on the micro, as both a cause of deep structural inequal- Jane Jenson and her colleagues on the ity and a challenge to efforts to overcome meso, and Le Galès and Pierson on the it, joining perhaps inevitably conflicting macro. Son Hing and her colleagues an- perspectives of judicial systems, bureau- swer Sombart with arguments not about cratic standard operating procedures, and the structure of capitalist production, politicians dependent on election. As the but rather about the many ways in which authors put it: “pitfalls emerge.”5 people in the bottom half of the economic distribution experience what the old Despite the near despair of their au- Marxists would have called false con- thors, the quality of the essays in this is- sciousness. There are a surprising num- sue makes them exhilarating to read. ber of ways in which rational self-inter- That quality also spawns observations est–which in a majoritarian democracy and questions. should lead to downward redistribution First, a particular complaint with larger in response to rising inequality–gets de- ramifications for the goal of ameliorating flected. The authors wrestle those ways inequality: As a card-carrying political into an analytically coherent catalog of scientist, I was disturbed not to see more how psychological processes that should attention in these essays to the issue of po- lead to calls for less inequality in fact “ac- litical inequality.6 The authors addressed tivate the very psychological processes ways in which a political system has that stifle outcry, causing people to be tried, can try, or should try to alleviate so- blind to the true extent of inequality, to cial, economic, educational, psycholog- legitimize these disparities, and to reject ical, or cultural inequality; a few analy- redistribution as an effective solution.”4 ses even invoked power. But none dis- Possibly the most frustrating of all the cuss felon disfranchisement, registration explanations for inequality presented in and voting restrictions, gerrymandering, this issue of Dædalus lies in “The Difficul- geographic imbalances of the Electoral ties of Combating Inequality in Time,” College and Senate, the rich-tilting ele- by Jane Jenson, Francesca Polletta, and ments of campaign finance law, descrip- Paige Raibmon. In none of the three tively unrepresentative legislative bodies, cases that they describe–disparate and the wealth of members of Congress, the fascinating–was there inegalitarian vil- costs of judicial redress, imbalances be- lains to persuade or override; all actors tween interest and advocacy groups,

166 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences undocumented migrants’ statelessness, cent).7 In another, Democrats’ highest Jennifer L. or equivalent inequalities in the design priority for the nation is improving the Hochschild and practice of purported democracies health care system (31 percent), followed outside the United States. This list rep- by reducing economic inequality (21 per- resents more than the solipsistic wish cent) and reducing discrimination (18 per- that my own issues mattered as much to cent).8 As many or more young adults the authors as they do to me. Although identify health care (37 percent), racism some of these issues might individual- and education (23 percent each), terror- ly be too narrow in scope for this issue of ism (19 percent), the environment and Dædalus, collectively the list points to an climate change (18 percent), immigration inequality of human dignity that argu- (18 percent), or gun control (17 percent) as ably matters as much as do failures to rec- a more important problem for the United ognize and redistribute in the society and States than taxes, the national debt, or in- economy. The list might even point to an come inequality (14 percent each).9 underlying inequality of power that causes Scholars have given us many reasons to failures to recognize and redistribute. If discount survey results and even election the United States and other Western na- outcomes, and the essays in this issue add tions were more truly democratic, might powerful new reasons. I do not want to elected officials be more easily pushed claim that surveys report “real” opinions into finding ways to offset structural, eco- or that electoral totals reflect “real” vot- nomic, and recognition failures? er preferences–never mind the fact that Perhaps not; these authors provide deep structural forces can swamp any set many explanations for why the pursuit of of opinions, votes, or policy preferences. greater equality could readily be derailed Nonetheless, we need to engage seriously even in a more democratic polity. But the with expressed opinions and cast votes if issue of political inequality and its mani- we are to claim democratic legitimacy for festations points to three questions about the fight against inequality. After reading the relationship between citizens’ activi- these essays, I am left wanting more di- ty and policy outcomes. rect wrestling (by these or other authors) First, what if policy-makers in West- with the assumption that the disadvan- ern countries are, roughly speaking, dem- taged ought to place a very high priority ocratically responsive, and the real issue on redistribution and recognition, or that is that a majority of voters do not want they do hold those priorities but are al- more equality, or at least not as much as ways thwarted. they want something else? That is, the This wish for more direct wrestling authors in this volume assume that re- with expressed views and political ac- ducing inequality is normatively and em- tions points to my second question about pirically necessary (as do I), and that the the relationship between citizens’ activi- failure to do so is what needs to be ex- ty and policy outcomes. The essays in this plained. But what if the failure to reduce issue of Dædalus all focus on explaining inequality has a straightforward expla- rising inequality. Yet, at various points nation: even left-leaning voters care as over the past century, residents of West- much or more about something else? In ern nations have sought and their policies one recent survey, almost as many Demo- have promoted a diminution of inequali- crats want their party’s top priority to be ty. These essays could give us more help making gun laws stricter (34 percent) as in understanding the circumstances un- combatting economic inequality (37 per- der which inequality has been reduced.

148 (3) Summer 2019 167 Political Can we simply take the theories and ex- justice, or the fact that citizens of many Inequality, planations proffered here and add a “not” Western nations are less willing to redis- “Real” Public Preferences, to them to explain those opposite trajec- tribute downward and more willing to Historical tories? Surely not. Alternatively, were blame the poor for their plight compared Comparisons the forces that promoted equality at some with some years or decades ago. My point & Axes of Disadvantage point in the past unique and nonreplica- is rather that we would learn a great deal ble? Perhaps, but it would be useful to see if Bloemraad and her colleagues, as well those analyses. Thus, ironically, I wish as other scholars of inequality, paid atten- that some of these essays were even more tion to when societies do promote great- historically oriented than they are al- er recognition, redistribution, and social ready, so that they gave readers a greater rights as well as to when they do not. understanding of when, how, and why in- It is useful to bring in the essay by Son equality might decline as well as increase. Hing and her colleagues here. They do To focus on only one example: Bloem- such a fine job of showing why people do raad and her colleagues point out that not seek redistribution (or recognition) “one of the striking successes of the last when basic theory suggests that they half-century is the struggle against ex- ought to that we are left with an incom- clusionary definitions of national mem- plete understanding of when they do de- bership. . . . The formal rules for acquiring mand social citizenship. As the authors citizenship or nationality have become note, there have been periods of “pub- more open. . . . There are also changes in lic outcry in the face of rising income in- public perceptions of cultural member- equality”–under what conditions, and ship” for women, racial and religious mi- through what dynamics, does that oc- norities, lbgtq individuals, and people cur?11 Perhaps perceptions of the level of with disabilities.10 These were momen- inequality change, or people reverse their tous reductions of inequality, attained understandings of what constitutes a just only after intense and sometimes mur- world or merited advantage, or routine- derous conflict. And although the authors ly accepted inequities come to be seen as do not so characterize them, these chang- intolerable. Political scientist Ira Katznel- es manifest a dramatic lowering of the son once commented that the most im- barrier of deservingness. People with dis- portant question in social science is “un- abilities are no longer warehoused; gays der what conditions?” I interpret that to and lesbians must no longer hide; racial mean, “the stronger an explanation, the apartheid is no longer legal; women can more essential it is to set boundary condi- no longer be sexually assaulted with legal tions.” These authors hint at those bound- impunity. These are indicators of newly ary conditions, but it would be illuminat- recognized deservingness. Furthermore, ing if they spelled them out more clearly. many members of these groups have been I can make the same point more brief- incorporated economically in a way that ly in reference to two other essays in this they were not a half-century ago; argu- issue. As Grusky and his coauthors point ably more than half of the population in out, the “cultural and institutional com- many Western countries who had been mitment to allocate scarce goods and ser- denied Marshall’s “right to a modicum of vices through markets” promotes “the economic welfare and security” can now rise of opportunity markets” in schools lay claim to social rights. that “create the perception that merit None of that is to deny continuing den- just happens to coincide with money.”12 igration, discrimination, inequality, in- That dynamic now makes schooling in

168 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences the United States, and presumably else- politics always and inevitably a struggle Jennifer L. where, an engine for reinforcing econom- among incompatible goods as well as be- Hochschild ic inequality and inhibiting upward mo- tween good and evil? Bloemraad and her bility. And yet, as the authors also point colleagues argue that as recognition of out, in earlier eras, Americans vastly in- ill-treated groups rose over the late twen- creased the number of schools, children’s tieth century, so that categories of citizen- access to grade school then high school ship and inclusion expanded in law and then college, and public commitment to became more generous in spirit, willing- (if not usually the practice of ) equal ed- ness to redistribute to the needy shrank ucational outcomes for all. Schools were, in policy and became more mean-spirit- at least sometimes, the engine of upward ed. My brother claims that there is a con- mobility. When, and why? The huge ex- servation of bustedness, such that if you pansion of high schools, for example, oc- repair your dishwasher, your refrigerator curred in the early decades of the twen- will break. Perhaps there is (also?) a con- tieth century: not an era with less com- servation of social rights, such that if a mitment than the present to allocating polity shrinks one dimension of inequal- scarce goods and services through mar- ity, it enables another to expand. The log- kets, or less commitment of wealthy par- ic here, beyond my brother’s excuse for ents to opportunity hoarding. So, what home-repair inaction, is that the well-off was different then, and can any of those and powerful can be induced or pressured historical forces be reinvented and new- to yield only so much of their advantage. ly harnessed? Perhaps not, but knowing If recognition becomes so widespread as that too would be illuminating. to threaten meritocracy and prestige, and Finally, on this point, as Le Galès and if redistribution becomes so extensive as Pierson observe, in the latter third of the to threaten economic hierarchy, those twentieth century, “analyses typically . . . with power will ensure that one or anoth- dealt with urban decline: New York’s er change is curtailed or even reversed. bankruptcy, massive deindustrialization, Bloemraad and her colleagues do not say or low quality of life.” Now, the largest that, but their analysis points in the direc- cities are so vibrant, wealthy, and excit- tion of the conservation of social rights. ing that their very success is an engine of Jenson, Polletta, and Raibmon point inequality for countries, regions, and indi- even more explicitly to the struggle viduals. The authors’ depiction of how cit- among incompatible goods. ies are “extraordinary agglomerations of Categories meant to ameliorate inequal- wealth” is so compelling that it makes one ities may become the basis for evaluating wonder why they have not always been so, group members in ways far beyond the are- and whether we can learn anything from na originally targeted. . . . Each reform [an- eras in which “urban” and “nonurban” alyzed in the essay] ultimately reproduced did not connote what now seems like an rather than surmounted tensions between irreversible gulf between doing better and sameness and difference. doing worse.13 My last question about the relation- The authors explain the frustrating out- ship between citizens’ activity and pol- comes for African Americans in Ameri- icy outcomes is more speculative: is it can health research, European women in ever possible to mediate different visions eu regulations, and Indigenous peoples of equality, or to reduce simultaneously in Canada’s constitutional law through multiple dimensions of inequality? Or is the lens of time: “Each policy ‘victory’

148 (3) Summer 2019 169 Political failed in the end to account for the pro- or develop new drugs over many years. Inequality, cessual nature of the originating and Researchers and reformers, in contrast, “Real” Public 14 Preferences, on-going causes of inequality.” Differ- could more readily change or dissolve Historical ent actors operated from a different sense categories as appropriate in their work, Comparisons of the relevant historical trajectory and and in fact they often want to do so: pro- & Axes of Disadvantage appropriate goals for the future. Seldom moting fluidity and reinvention may be has time been portrayed as such a vivid an intrinsic part of their mission of recti- and impelling causal force. fying inequities in health care and, more All of this is richly described and ana- broadly, in group recognition. But the lyzed, but I see a simpler, perhaps even tension here is deeply embedded in the deeper, incommensurability in these cas- structures of governance and reform- es. Policy actors view the world, and be- ist activism–neither nefarious nor, per- have, differently from advocates and ac- haps, correctable. tivists; the two groups need dissimilar In the third case, on gender issues in eu resources to do their jobs and follow dif- policy-making, ferent imperatives to achieve their goals. as social movements’ approaches to iden- In the Canadian case, for example, “the tity and equality diversified, the feminist policy world preferred short tempo- movement itself divided . . . shifting focus ral horizons and ‘rights fixes,’” and had toward a multiplicity of diversities and no incentive to upend repeatedly sever- their intersections. . . . By the late 1990s, al centuries of practice and law around there was no standard social movement government sovereignty. That is neither narrative motivating claims for gender surprising nor nefarious, given the van- equality and equal treatment. tage points and constraints of public officials and agencies. In the Indigenous pop- Reformers focused variously on the ulation, in contrast, “each organization’s gendered division of labor, racism, in- position shifted over time, as did rela- tolerance for normative sexual orientations between membership and leader- tion, or religious and cultural disrespect. ship. . . . The path forward was unclear and That array may make good sense to ac- contested.”15 That too is neither surpris- tivists and researchers, who can specify ing nor reprehensible, given the vantage historical dynamics, future trajectories, points and constraints of morally driven contemporary evidence, and policy pro- activists venturing into new terrain. But posals as warranted for each narrative. even setting aside their different tempo- But it is something of a nightmare for ral horizons and definitions of equality, policy-makers who, among other things, the two sets of actors were almost inevi- needed to develop consensus for innova- tably on a collision course. tion among fifteen (and later more) dis- A similar tension between imperatives parate countries. No wonder that the eu of policy-making and activism holds for “bundl[ed] multiple differences togeth- biomedical research. Even though all ac- er under a diagnosis of the need for equal tors understood that U.S. federal racial treatment”–and that many aspirants to and ethnic categories are “administra- equality were disappointed.16 tive, not biological,” agencies and corpo- Both Jenson and her colleagues and rations had to have some fixed categories Bloemraad and her colleagues assert that with which to do their work from day to there is no necessary conflict between day. They also needed stable categories equality and difference, among types of to be able to fund and regulate research equality, or between recognition and re-

170 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences distribution. But there are certainly ten- lator, or judge would analyze Jenson and Jennifer L. sions–across time, activists, norms, and her colleagues’ cases, or would adjudicate Hochschild institutional imperatives–and perhaps among the dynamics that promote inclu- clashes among actors with different prior- sion but weaken interclass solidarity. ities are inevitable. What comes through To repeat: these are fascinating essays most strongly to me as a scholar of pub- on a crucial subject. The cross-cutting lic policy is that egalitarian commitments themes are important; the idiosyncrat- that feel essential to intense policy de- ic analyses are intriguing; and the com- manders may feel impossible or irrespon- mitment to greater equality is inspiring. sible to policy officials who must try to I hope this issue of Dædalus has the life- implement any new program. It would be span it deserves. fascinating to see how a legislator, regu- endnotes 1 David B. Grusky, Peter A. Hall, and Hazel Rose Markus, “The Rise of Opportunity Markets: How Did It Happen & What Can We Do?” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019): 20. 2 Patrick Le Galès and Paul Pierson, “‘Superstar Cities’ & the Generation of Durable Inequality,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019). 3 Irene Bloemraad, Will Kymlicka, Michèle Lamont, and Leanne S. Son Hing, “Membership without Social Citizenship? Deservingness & Redistribution as Grounds for Equality,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019): 78. 4 Leanne S. Son Hing, Anne E. Wilson, Peter Gourevitch, Jaslyn English, and Parco Sin, “Failure to Respond to Rising Income Inequality: Processes That Legitimize Growing Disparities,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019): 105. 5 Jane Jenson, Francesca Polletta, and Paige Raibmon, “The Difficulties of Combating Inequali- ty in Time,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019): 136. 6 Another complaint: Lamont and Pierson’s portrayal, in the introduction to the issue, of quantification as a culprit in rising inequality seems overdrawn. They are surely correct that quantitative measures of performance “can reinforce inequalities. They may devalue criteria that might have favored the disadvantaged.” However, the tool of quantification can be deployed for many purposes, including redress of unfairness. After all, the foundation of each essay in this issue is quantification of economic or some other form of inequality, and the authors use numerical data to analyze inequality and propose ways to combat it. Michèle La mont and Paul Pierson, “Inequality Generation & Persistence as Multidimensional Process- es: An Interdisciplinary Agenda,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019): 8. 7 cbs News Poll, “Public Divided on Whether the Country Would Be Better Off with a Democratic Congress,” conducted March 8–11, 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ public-splits-on-whether-things-would-be-better-or-worse-with-democratic-congress/. 8 Washington Post–abc News Poll, January 21–24, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/polling/washington-postabc-news-poll-jan-2124/2019/01/25/411bc1f2-20cf-11e9 -a759-2b8541bbbe20_page.html. 9 “Young adults” in this survey includes oversamples of African Americans, Latinxs, and Asian Americans. nbc News and GenForward at the University of Chicago, “November 2017 Toplines Survey,” conducted October–November 2017. Opening the Pandora’s box of votes and opinion surveys reveals another puzzle. We must ask not only, as these authors do, “What’s the matter with Kansas?” such that relatively poor people frequently do not seek redistribution, but also “What’s the matter with Connecticut?” such that the well-off frequently do. (See Andrew Gelman, Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans

148 (3) Summer 2019 171 Political Vote the Way They Do [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009]). In the 2016 presi- Inequality, dential election, as many voters with incomes over $100,000 voted for Hillary Clinton as vot- “Real” Public ed for Donald Trump. Were they motivated by the view that market values should not drive Preferences, educational opportunity, that cities should not belong only to the rich, that the poor are in Historical fact deserving, that a just world requires redistribution, that disadvantaged groups warrant Comparisons & Axes of policies to promote true equality, or by something else? In other words, I urge these authors Disadvantage to apply their analyses to advantaged entities that do, as well as those that do not, seek to reduce inequality. 10 Bloemraad et al., “Membership without Social Citizenship?” 75–76. 11 Son Hing et al., “Failure to Respond to Rising Income Inequality,” 105. 12 Grusky et al., “The Rise of Opportunity Markets,” 22, 19. 13 Le Galès and Pierson, “‘Superstar Cities’ & the Generation of Durable Inequality,” 48, 47. 14 Jenson et al., “The Difficulties of Combating Inequality in Time,” 137, 158. 15 Ibid., 157, 152. 16 Ibid., 148–149, 149.

172 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences commentary

New Angles on Inequality

Katherine S. Newman

Abstract: The trenchant essays in this volume pose two critical questions with respect to inequality: First, what explains the eruption of nationalist, xenophobic, and far-right politics and the ability of extremists to gain a toehold in the political arena that is greater than at any time since World War II? Second, how did the social distance between the haves and have-nots harden into geographic separation that makes it increasingly difficultfor those attempting to secure jobs, housing, and mobility-ensuring schools to break through? The answers are insightful and unsettling, particularly when the conversation turns to an action agenda. Every move in the direction of alternatives is fraught because the histories that brought each group of victims to occupy their uncomfortable niche in the stratification order excludes some who should be included or ignores a difference that matters in favor of principles of equal treatment.

The past twenty years have seen an explosion of interest in the causes, consequences, and remedies for inequality across the entire spectrum of the social sciences. Political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, decision scientists, education katherine s. newman, a researchers, public health scholars, and a host of Fellow of the American Acade- others have recognized that throughout the devel- my since 2011, is the Torrey Lit- tle Professor of Sociology and the oped and, even more so, the developing world, the Interim Chancellor of the Uni- specter of inequality is threatening the internal sta- versity of Massachusetts, Bos- bility of nations, propelling millions to leave their ton. She is the author of fourteen homes in search of refuge from brutal wars and books, including Downhill from natural disasters that are themselves symptoms of Here: Retirement Insecurity in the inequality, and upending the post–World War II Age of Inequality (2019), Reskill- international order. ing America: Learning to Labor in the Twenty-First Century (2016), Attention to inequality, which was something and After Freedom: The Rise of the of a new enterprise as recently as the millennium, Post-Apartheid Generation in Dem- is flowering in every corner of academia. Perhaps ocratic South Africa (2014). even more important, it has become a leitmotif, if

© 2019 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license doi:10.1162/DAED_a_01755 173 New Angles not an animating force, in political cam- Second, what is the relationship be- on Inequality paigns. Mayor Bill de Blasio was per- tween the spatial distribution of op- haps the first to sound this theme, and his portunity and the policies that under- “tale of two cities” found a receptive au- gird or ameliorate increasing segrega- dience among New York City voters. Ber- tion? How did the social distance be- nie Sanders was not far behind. And Eliz- tween the haves and have-nots harden abeth Warren has made the ravages of in- into geographic separation that makes it equality–and the imperative to reign in increasingly difficult for those attempt- elites who have profited from it–the cor- ing to secure jobs, housing, and mobility- nerstone of her presidential bid. ensuring schools to break through? “The With this much firepower trained on Rise of Opportunity Markets: How Did the problem, one could be forgiven for It Happen & What Can We Do?” by Da- thinking that we have covered our bas- vid Grusky, Peter Hall, and Hazel Markus es. This collection of essays tells us that and “‘Superstar Cities’ & the Genera- nothing could be further from the truth. tion of Durable Inequality” by Patrick Le There are still deeply rooted problems Galès and Paul Pierson train our atten- to be explored and the social sciences re- tion on the geography of inequality and main essential to uncovering and explain- warn against thinking of these trends as ing what we must understand if we are to natural or inevitable rather than political. speak conclusively to the damage done by Power increasingly determines how ad- unchecked power and resources accumu- vantage will accrue within particular cit- lating in the hands of the few, while dis- ies, neighborhoods, and communities.2 placement, rejection, and economic inse- Finally, “The Difficulties of Combat- curity increasingly plague the many. ting Inequality in Time” by Jane Jenson, The essays in this issue of Dædalus come Francesca Polletta, and Paige Raibmon at the problem from a variety of angles, reminds us how hard it is to reach a con- but two questions underlie them. First, sensus–even among like-minded pro- how should we understand the growing gressives–about whether and how these vitriol aimed at those on the losing end trends in inequality should be reversed of the trend toward inequality, especial- or resisted.3 Every move in the direction ly immigrants and minorities? What ex- of alternatives excludes some “victims” plains the eruption of nationalist, xeno- who should be included or ignores a dif- phobic, and far-right politics and the abil- ference that matters in favor of principles ity of these extremists to gain a toehold in of equal treatment. the political arena that is greater than at any time since World War II? Two essays The Bloemraad and Son Hing essays in this volume, “Membership without agree on one key observation: exclu- Social Citizenship? Deservingness & Re- sion is growing everywhere in the West- distribution as Grounds for Equality” by ern world. For the former, this is an iro- Irene Bloemraad, Will Kymlicka, Michèle ny because for decades, the authors ar- Lamont, and Leanne Son Hing and “Fail- gue, most countries have been migrating ure to Respond to Rising Income Inequal- toward a more inclusive society. For the ity: Processes That Legitimize Growing latter, this is no surprise. We have been Disparities” by Leanne Son Hing, Anne entirely too optimistic about the rela- Wilson, Peter Gourevitch, Jaslyn English, tionship between the perception of in- and Parco Sin, can be considered together equality and the rejection of it. Instead along these lines.1 there is growing evidence of acceptance

174 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences and justification, undergirded by exact- In some respects, “Membership with- Katherine S. ly the “othering” stance identified by out Citizenship” catches this history in Newman Bloemraad and her colleagues. midstream. It points quite legitimately “Membership without Social Citi- to the progressive sentiments underlying zenship” opens with an apparent para- birth-based citizenship and naturaliza- dox. Barriers to racial and ethnic inter- tion and rising rates of intermarriage and marriage have been falling in Europe and focuses on the growth of welfare chau- the United States, and naturalization pol- vinism as a growing reaction that rein- icies increasingly embrace the foreign forces boundaries of “us” and “them.” born who can now claim citizenship in Post 2008, though, I believe it is fair to countries from which they were former- say that reactionary elements have grown ly excluded for life. At the same time, so strong and politically successful that welfare chauvinism–the view that safety the universalist thrust is nearly dead in nets are legitimate for insiders but not for the water, or at least very compromised. “others” deemed unworthy–is growing. Closing borders, restricting legal immi- From one perspective, those others “r us.” gration, overthrowing decades-long poli- From another, their undeserving status cies designed to incorporate immigrants, means they will never truly “be us,” re- ordering rescue boats to leave refugees to gardless of their citizenship or their legal drown in the Mediterranean, and simi- rights. This is characterized as a jarring larly harsh measures in the United States contradiction. (like separating children from families, A case can be made that the trend to- throwing asylum seekers into detention) ward inclusion identified by Bloemraad strike me as a nearly fatal blow to the pro- and her colleagues came to a near com- gressive and inclusive trends of the past. plete stop in the last decade, especially in This is more devastating than “deserv- Western Europe. They note this in pass- ingness,” for that could always discover ing, with a reference to a “halt” in 2008. exceptions and hence forms of inclusion. But from my perspective, not enough is Nativism, right-wing populism, and na- made of this reversal. As the storm over tionalism strike me as incompatible with illegal immigration grew–exacerbated the relativism implied by a “deserving” by accounts of thousands of Africans paradigm. They are extreme illustrations drowning in the Mediterranean and “car- of political scientist Robert Putnam’s dis- avans” of migrants camping outside the tressing observations about the role of di- entrance to the Channel Tunnel–the versity in the growth of intolerance, con- right-wing turn we have seen in the rise clusions these authors believe are prema- of Victor Orban in Hungary, the rejection ture, but strike me as on point in this era. of Angela Merkel’s pro-immigration pol- It would be instructive for Bloemraad icy in Germany, the growth of extremism and her coauthors to consider what this in Poland, and the success of the “Leave” right-wing surge means in their theoreti- movement in England has brought us full cal universe. Can it be accommodated by circle back to sentiments and elector- their model? Or do we need some addi- al victories not seen since World War II. tional sociological studies of the far right Donald Trump’s election on the backs of (and its success) to come to grips with demonized migrants cemented the par- these developments? ticipation of the United States in this un- Son Hing and her colleagues have an holy xenophobia. There is likely more to explanation for these developments come in Venezuela and elsewhere. that is not particularly comforting: the

148 (3) Summer 2019 175 New Angles greater inequality becomes, the more moguls like Rupert Murdock, who have on Inequality that forces of segregation (in media con- an interest in masking this issue, active- sumption and residential location) create ly retards social awareness of inequality. the conditions of ignorance or blindness This blindness, Son Hing argues, is most to its extent, and tendencies toward “sys- pronounced in countries with the highest tem justification” sustain acceptance of actual levels of inequality. its pernicious distributional consequenc- Most distressing of all the findings in es. On this account, we have been entire- this essay is that the more inequality, the ly too optimistic and there is no paradox. more strongly subjects endorse the notion Rising inequality actually triggers psy- that inequality is desirable and, over time, chological responses that justify and ap- this inclination grows as the pattern of plaud outcomes that are wildly disparate distribution comes to be seen as norma- because they are seen as part of the nat- tive. The power of “belief in a just world” ural order and critical to motivation for and “system justification” underwrite self-help and success. Redistribution, the these perspectives. For people to reject the remedy espoused by progressives when legitimacy of what they perceive seems to reckoning with inequality, here generates be too destabilizing and the reversion to a response that suggests redistribution visions of normalcy is comforting. will weaken a society, dampen the neces- Disturbing as it may seem, this argu- sary energy for forward motion, and cre- ment helps us to understand how peo- ate dependency where there should be ple now living under a government like resilience. Hungary’s, which is demonizing immi- “Failure to Respond to Rising Income grants and harkening back to the darkest Inequality” argues that we have com- days of the Nazi regime, would come to pletely misunderstood the psychological accept extremism as something quite dif- mechanisms triggered by a recognition ferent: the status quo. At the same time, of inequality. The more inequality grows, Son Hing’s essay does not help us under- the more it is rationalized and legitimat- stand how that kind of worldview can flip ed. What follows then is not the desire to on its head and become a source of popu- help or support those who are on the re- lar criticism. History is full of such rever- ceiving end, but instead “prejudice to- sals, of collective revulsion for what was ward the poor and more conflictual inter- once seen as the norm. In countries like group relations.”4 Son Hing’s work helps Germany, entire generations followed us understand why this would be partic- World War II with blistering critiques of ularly pronounced among the working what their parents and grandparents had class, who are uncomfortably vulnera- contributed to murderous fascism. The ble but psychologically inclined to dis- Roosevelt era saw a public embrace of re- tance themselves from those who are tru- distribution, public employment, social ly disadvantaged. security, and a host of other policy moves This essay makes it clear that the ability that would have been unthinkable only a of most survey respondents to assess ex- few years before. How did those reversals isting levels of inequality is weak at best. come to pass? And how does the frame- Respondents typically underestimate in- work in Son Hing’s essay help us under- equity, particularly by failing to understand that social history? I would argue it stand how wealthy those at the top of the is better at accounting for the acceptance income distribution actually are. The con- of inequality than it is at explaining those centration of media power in the hands of periods when the opposite was in vogue.

176 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences If the first two essays focus on psycho- increased) is a testimony to French social Katherine S. logical processes of determining de- policies that support social housing and Newman servingness and justification for inequali- rental sectors. Home ownership is low- ty, the second two are united by a concern er in France than in the neoliberal econo- for the spatial organization of inequality mies where housing is a critical aspect of and the ways in which segregation trans- the safety net, given weaker welfare pol- lates into social immobility that plac- icies. London under Margaret Thatch- es those at the bottom ever farther from er sold off much of its council housing, the possibilities of upward mobility in and in a nod to the working class, enabled the form of employment, marriage pros- a single generation to benefit from these pects, and the accumulation of wealth. sales, but locked out succeeding genera- They argue that spatial segregation and tions from the ability to live in England’s all that follows in the way of sociologi- capital city at all. cal consequences is a creature of politics New York and San Francisco, both of and policy. These are not “naturally oc- which have become stratospherically curring” forms of inequality, however expensive (and hence a haven for inter- much they may be self-reinforcing. They national investors looking to park their happen when those with power are able wealth), are embedded in policy regimes to bend public investment, zoning, lend- that enable intergenerational transfers of ing policies, inheritance taxes, public ex- wealth that intensify class stratification. penditures in education, transportation, Thus, while adult children of the very rich and the like to their advantage. Accord- can often count on their parents enabling ingly, the spatial sorting process either the accumulation process in the next gen- accelerates where elites have been par- eration, those who chose their parents ticularly influential or is dampened by poorly will find themselves locked out of progressive policies that mitigate capital the sweepstakes, facing high prices, low- accumulation. er wages, and costly rents. Le Galès and Pierson provide a fasci- These dynamics lead to geographic im- nating account of the evolution of “spa- mobility because the costs of moving to tial polarization” in the “superstar cit- a high opportunity zone are prohibitive, ies” of London, Paris, New York, and San which in turn imposes limits on occupa- Francisco. Of course, it has not gone un- tional and earnings opportunities. Even noticed that housing prices are astro- in an era of electronic communication, nomical in at least three of these four physical proximity matters, and not just examples–Paris being somewhat less for dating. It opens and closes doors of all costly–as the concentration of finance kinds. capital, lucrative tech industries, and the While I agree with virtually all of these cultural amenities that appeal to well- observations, I also reluctantly acknowl- heeled consumers proceeds apace. With edge that market dynamics can (and do this agglomeration of wealth comes so- seem to be) intervening in the concen- cial sorting, bringing well-educated wom- tration of opportunity. The tech giants en and men of marriageable age into that were once confined to Silicon Valley proximity with one another, promoting are spreading out. Their employees can- assortative mating that yields new cycles not afford and do not want to indenture of class stratification. themselves to pay for exorbitant real es- That Paris has remained relatively im- tate. As a result, we see states like Tex- mune to this pattern (even as prices have as and Utah jump into the high-tech act.

148 (3) Summer 2019 177 New Angles Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh For those who stick by the rules, the on Inequality becomes a first-class engineering school scramble to access the proving grounds and it catalyzes the development of a that will yield necessary accomplish- once deindustrialized city and the attrac- ments (from high test scores, to oppor- tion of a tech class that does not want to tunities to demonstrate leadership in pay Bay Area prices. Amazon decides to clubs or contests, to ap courses or musi- hold a contest for its second headquarters cal training) is coveted. It is also spatial- and it steadfastly avoids some likely (but ly confined to areas that can afford to pay high-priced) prospects like Boston and for it, which in turn means that the abil- suburban Virginia. Those communities ity to accumulate this kind of intellectu- fear the “Seattle-ization” of their com- al capital is not randomly distributed. It is munities, but for now we have an engine part and parcel of a system of opportunity of economic prosperity plunked down in markets, underwritten by an educational a less likely spot because they were look- system paid for by local real estate taxes. ing to avoid precisely the kind of segre- Recognizing that this becomes an ex- gated wealth that Le Galès and Pierson ercise in inequity, universities have built point to. systems of financial aid and affirmative It is one of the ironies of contempo- action that are designed to at least par- rary inequality that it is intertwined with tially level the playing field. Grusky and forms of meritocracy. As “The Rise of Op- his colleagues argue that this is general- portunity Markets” argues, it is no longer ly too little, too late. Accumulated advan- sufficient for the wealthy simply to pass tage is simply too hard to compete against on material advantages to their children. for those who come from less privileged The gates of Harvard and Stanford do not neighborhoods. We do not enable par- swing open as easily for the scions of rich ents to borrow money for high-quality families as they once did. Instead, chil- childcare to create a better shot at the dren of privilege must compete for entry. next stage of educational competition. Even though one can point to the legacy We simply correct for inequality at the admissions process as a “thumb on the back end and hope the diamonds in the scale,” on the whole it would be regard- rough somehow get noticed. ed as illegitimate to admit a low scor- They argue instead that we should ing, poorly performing freshman from adopt variations on the theme of the a wealthy family unless there was some “Texas 10 percent” policy, admitting stu- compensating talent (an extraordinary dents who are at the top of each of the athlete, for example). Outside of those ten deciles (or more) of the American examples, Grusky and his colleagues ar- income distribution. Whether this is a gue, the rich must now pass through a workable approach or not, the fact that similar sifting process as the rest. Noth- it seems plausible owes a great deal to the ing testifies more keenly to the pressures interventionist culture that has grown up this produces than the college admissions alongside massive stratification and in- scandal that brought to light the “pay to equality. As a society, we are clearly not play” schemes of wealthy parents who comfortable with the opportunity mar- bribed university coaches at Yale, Stan- kets they point to and hence we inter- ford, and, most notoriously, the Univer- vene to reset the competition. Even if not sity of Southern California to admit chil- completely effective, these efforts have dren who did not participate in the sports made high-prestige universities far more in question. accessible to low-income and minority

178 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences students than they ever were in the past. know we are seeking. We want equali- Katherine S. It may be “too late” for some, possibly ty of outcome and oscillate over whether Newman even for millions. But it is also “just in that end can be pursued without invoking time” for millions more who have ben- means that point away from similarity efited from our inadequate, but not neg- and toward difference. The historical ex- ligible, attempts to correct for hoarding, amples though do seem to point toward a zoning, educational inequality, and the consensus that the outcome is really what like. a just society looks to produce. Imperfect means of arriving at that end may be the The final essay in this remarkable vol- price we pay for that, and caution is clear- ume takes a more philosophical and ly warranted lest those means turn out to comparative approach, looking at three have pernicious consequences of their case studies in which progressives have own. struggled to define who should be treat- If personalized medicine reifies the ed through the lens of equality and who meaning of race, turning it into a hard- should be treated differently in order to ened reality that progressives reject, then achieve equalities of outcome. In each in- we must still find a way to acknowledge stance, well-meaning advocates initially the reality that the history of disadvan- argue for treating the disadvantaged just tage leaves a physical trace. Environ- the same as everyone else as a means of ment matters. Stress accumulates and avoiding discrimination, and are brought leaves a mark in physical differences. The up short thereafter when it becomes ob- production of biological difference is vious that the traces of oppression have not necessarily testimony to genetic en- created such profound differences that dowments; it may be instead the mark equal treatment is not enough. Instead, of stress, as public health researcher Ar- some kind of special dispensation is nec- lene Geronimus instructed us long ago in essary in order to create the conditions of her pioneering work on accelerated aging fair competition. among young black women. Yet this very recognition runs the risk of “essentializing” the parties in ques- I began this commentary by noting tion. If women need time off from work that inequality has been a hot topic now because they are uniquely able to breast- for more than twenty years. It is hard to feed their infants, then formal equiva- imagine an interdisciplinary field of this lence will never be enough. Instead, dif- kind remaining for so long a source of ference must be recognized in order to such creative social science. Yet as these truly level that playing field. If African essays make clear, there is still a great deal Americans appear to react differently to left to understand about the causes, con- a medication than whites, personalized sequences, and remedies of this strik- medicine may–all at once–create a bet- ing feature of the modern era. Our fields ter treatment regime and call into ques- lost two giants in the study of inequality tion a sacred assumption: that race is not in the last year: sociologists Devah Pager biological but social. As the authors quote and Eric Olin Wright. Each of them one European feminist: “equal treatment would have agreed that these essays add of unequals only reproduce[s] the exist- a great deal to our understanding of ining inequality.”5 equality and that there nevertheless is a The authors struggle, as we all do, with very long way to go before we have ex- figuring out how to justify the ends we hausted the topic.

148 (3) Summer 2019 179 New Angles endnotes on Inequality 1 Irene Bloemraad, Will Kymlicka, Michèle Lamont, and Leanne S. Son Hing, “Membership without Social Citizenship? Deservingness & Redistribution as Grounds for Equality,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019); and Leanne S. Son Hing, Anne E. Wilson, Peter Gourevitch, Jaslyn English, and Parco Sin, “Failure to Respond to Rising Income Inequality: Processes That Legitimize Growing Disparities,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019). 2 David B. Grusky, Peter A. Hall, and Hazel Rose Markus, “The Rise of Opportunity Markets: How Did It Happen & What Can We Do?” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019); and Patrick Le Galès and Paul Pierson, “‘Superstar Cities’ & the Generation of Durable Inequality,” Dæda- lus 148 (3) (Summer 2019). 3 Jane Jenson, Francesca Polletta, and Paige Raibmon, “The Difficultiesof Combatting Inequal- ity in Time,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019). 4 Son Hing et al., “Failure to Respond to Rising Income Inequality,” 110. 5 Jenson et al., “The Difficulties of Combatting Inequality in Time,” 146.

180 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences commentary

Process-Policy & Outcome-Policy: Rethinking How to Address Poverty & Inequality

Vijayendra Rao

Abstract: Process matters not just for diagnosing the causes of inequality, but also for how policy is shaped. The dominant paradigms for policy-making–neoliberalism, neo-Keynesianism, and neo paternalism–largely address inequality via “outcome-policies” that manipulate the levers of government and, more recently, draw on randomized trials and “nudges” to change behavior, in a manner that is not only easy to measure, but also easy to reverse. This commentary draws on the essays in this special issue of Dædalus to make the case for “reflectivism,” which shifts structural inequalities in agency, power, social structure, empathy, and aspiration in an incremental manner that is more uncertain and difficult to measure, but that can result in more lasting change.

The essays in this special issue of Dædalus represent a major attempt to move the diagnosis of inequality from a static to a process view. Sever- al important themes emerge from this lens: 1) the interaction between economic, social, and cultural processes in generating inequality and the centrality of the need for interdisciplinary analysis; vijayendra rao is a Lead 2) four approaches through which inequality-gen- Economist in the Development erating processes might work–evaluation, quanti- Research Group of the World fication, commodification, and policy drift; 3) the Bank. He is the author of Oral De- linkages between micro-, meso-, and macrolevels mocracy: Deliberation in Indian Vil- lage Assemblies (with Paromita of analysis; and 4) the importance, in thinking of Sanyal, 2018) and Localizing Devel- inequality-generating processes, of taking a longue opment: Does Participation Work? durée view. For the most part, however, the empha- (with Ghazala Mansuri, 2012). sis of the essays in this collection is on diagnosing

© 2019 by Vijayendra Rao Published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) license doi:10.1162/DAED_a_01756 181 Rethinking the causes of inequality, rather than find- (measured by the extent to which they in- How to ing solutions.1 Moreover, they are based crease intergenerational social mobility), Address Poverty & on an analysis of conditions in North or providing health insurance (measured Inequality America and Western Europe, where the by effects on public health and econom- concern is much more on the shift, over ic hardship). Outcome-policies are thus the last few decades, from equality-gen- closely tied to metrics, which also inform erating to inequality-generating process- debates over their efficacy. If the political es. This is different from the conditions environment is favorable, outcome-based in countries that are home to most of the policies are relatively easy to institute by world’s poor, whose rise in inequality has legislative or executive action. They are been coupled with large reductions in also easy to reverse. poverty and relative expansions of social A process-policy attempts to shift the safety nets over the last two decades. But trajectory of change. Its effects can be what is common to both the global North more difficult to measure because its prox- and South is the threat to democratic in- imate impact is often subtle. It focuses on stitutions and processes. In this com- equalizing power relationships by shift- mentary, I address some of these gaps ing the process of decision-making in fa- and reflect on how interdisciplinary pro- vor of the less privileged, and on the in- cess-thinking may result in a paradigm cremental change of one step building on shift in how we think about policy. While the last. The full impact of a process-pol- I will draw on experiences and evidence icy generally takes a much longer time to from the developing world, these points reveal itself but can be longer-lasting be- may be of broader relevance. cause it reduces the inequalities and im- The manner in which we translate the perfections in how decisions are made. desire to create a more equal world with Examples include systems of deliber- less poverty into action is shaped by how ative decision-making that have con- we organize and think about the world, stitutional sanction, political reserva- how we approach causality, and how tions for discriminated minorities and we make abstract ideas legible by meth- women, and adaptive systems of project ods of measurement and categorization. implementation. Over the last century, the policy options available have tended to focus on Policies for human welfare, growth, in- what I call outcome-policies, as opposed to equality, and poverty are broadly con- process-policies. ditioned by three paradigms that large- An outcome-policy focuses on manip- ly derive from economics. Like all ideal ulating the levers of government–taxes, types, these categories are not mutual- expenditures, regulations, systems of im- ly exclusive but intersect in a variety of plementation–to achieve certain out- ways and share many elements. They are comes. The success of the policy is judged for the most part outcome-policy orient- by those outcomes. Most policies to ed, though they also include some pro- combat inequality and poverty fall un- cess-policies. To these, I propose adding der this rubric. Think, for example, of a fourth paradigm that is more shaped by conditional cash transfers (whose suc- political and social theory, intersecting cess is measured by the extent to which with and also complementing the three the transfers encourage people to satis- dominant approaches. My goal is not to fy the “condition,” such as keeping chil- advocate for the “best” way of approach- dren in school), increasing estate taxes ing the problem–I do not believe there is

182 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences any such thing–but to give more weight of ensuring that markets function as effi- Vijayendra to an approach that has been relatively ciently as possible. Individual freedoms Rao neglected. are central to the approach, and demo- First, the neoliberal paradigm that grows cratic accountability through elections is from deep skepticism about the capacity a crucial counterpoint to market efficien- of social science to understand complex cy. Rational-choice methodological in- human interactions, and thus the ability dividualism is not easily reconciled with of policy to engineer a better world. This notions of social exclusion or cultural approach emphasizes the key principles and political inequality. Thus, any argu- of laissez-faire markets, free trade, hu- ment for socially driven policy-making– man rights, and electoral democracy. The to promote gender equality or social co- idea is that free markets result in high hesion, for instance–within a neoliber- rates of economic growth, while electoral paradigm has to be filtered through a al democracy ensures that governments growth prism. Hence the slew of papers are held accountable and create the con- from the 1990s on the positive effects of ditions for growth.2 This approach un- women’s education and social capital on derlies the “Washington consensus” growth.7 that prevailed in the development pol- Welfare is measured through either an icy world through the 1980s and 1990s income metric or consumption metric. and that over the long term, recent evi- This has spawned a large industry mea- dence has shown, has led to higher rates suring individual- and household-level of growth.3 income and consumption through house- The neoliberal approach to poverty re- hold surveys, which are then used to cal- duction argues that maximizing econom- culate poverty rates via a poverty line de- ic growth and improving and equalizing fined in terms of dollars and cents. Note access to human capital allows every in- that the neoliberal paradigm, by focusing dividual to benefitfrom the growth and on core principles rather than policy pro- be liberated from poverty. There is some posals, is primarily process-driven, rath- evidence in favor of this,4 but also ever than driven by outcomes. However, idence showing that “the growth inci- the processes are largely devoted to creat- dence of poverty”–the effect that a 1 per- ing an environment for prosperity rather cent increase in economic growth has on than economic equality. relative reductions in poverty–is condi- The second approach, which I will tioned by inequality.5 There is also strong broadly term neo-Keynesian, is a counter reason to believe that neoliberal poli- to the perceived limitations of neoliber- cies increase inequality and reduce social alism. It is much more cognizant of mar- support, for instance, by creating “op- ket failure and convinced of the ability of portunity markets” that commodify and the social sciences to inform policy solu- sharply restrict access to basic needs such tions that deal with market failure. With as education and housing.6 policies informed by growth models that The driving discipline behind neolib- emphasize investments in physical and eralism is rational-choice economics, human capital, growth is still a priority, which provides a consistent framework but with an awareness of the central role to think about growth, welfare, pover- played by ideas and information. There is ty, and equality of opportunity. It derives acute awareness of the inability of mar- from a worldview that is methodologi- kets to deliver basic services to the poor cally individualistic with the central goal and of systemic discrimination. Poverty

148 (3) Summer 2019 183 Rethinking is still a welfarist metric, but along with data” for diagnosis and surveillance. It How to data on income and consumption, house- takes its cues from public health with a Address Poverty & hold surveys now collect data on gender, firm commitment to “evidence-based” Inequality religion, race, and caste to enable analy- policy-making. It draws on research from ses of discrimination. There is broad rec- behavioral science on “scarcity” to argue ognition of the need for equality of op- that the poor face large constraints on portunity and for the necessity of legal their time and attention that direct them interventions to ensure it. Strong support to make suboptimal choices.10 Thus, the for affirmative action in employment and freedom to choose is not a meaningful government is a key element. option when the ability to choose is itself All this provides the justification for severely constrained. This provides the more interventionist governments, as justification for a top-down push to shift shown in the important slate of recom- people away from perceived harmful ac- mendations to tackle inequality made by tions, norms, and practices.11 the economist Tony Atkinson.8 Atkin- This then requires policy-makers– son’s recommendations include directing governments and ngos–to find ways technological change to favor more em- of doing things that the poor cannot do ployment, increased minimum wages, a for themselves. What those things are, capital endowment fund that ensures that however, depends on whether the poli- everyone has a minimum inheritance, and cy option has been vetted by “rigorous” progressive property taxes. Governments evidence. What follows is a synergistic are expected to invest in infrastructure, ed- relationship between research and policy- ucation, and public access to better health, making: an industry of social scien- nutrition, and sanitation. Governments tists testing the efficacy of various inter- are expected to ensure effective safety nets ventions around the world with surveys so the vulnerable are not subject to acute and experiments. One advantage of this distress. The enhanced role for the govern- is that it generates vast amounts of data ment also results in an emphasis on “good that shed light on a wide variety of out- governance” and thus greater awareness comes that affect the poor. While income of the importance of equalizing access to and consumption definitions of poverty information and improving public service are still prevalent, there is now a broad- delivery. This leads to a greater apprecia- er understanding of the conditions faced tion of government failure and, in particu- by the poor. Another advantage is that it lar, of clientelism and difficulties in ensur- creates a culture in which policy has to be ing the interests of women and minorities. justified with evidence rather than hope Neo-Keynesianism is thus the archetype or idealism. And a third advantage is that of outcome-policy-making. it focuses attention on the efficacy of in- The third approach, though it is argu- tervention design, weeding out good de- ably a more stringent extension of the signs from bad ones. second, is called neopaternalism.9 Neopa- The disadvantages, however, have been ternalism, which has exploded in influ- well cataloged by scholars.12 Here, I want ence over the last decade, starts from ex- to focus on two that are central to the case actly the other end of neoliberalism in its for a fourth paradigm. Neopaternalism abiding belief in the power of social sci- has, within it, the danger of overreach. Pol- ence and data, particularly behavioral ex- icy can be driven by the narrow demands periments and randomized trials, to give of scientific technique, rather than scien- direction to policy, and the use of “big tific technique being driven by the needs

184 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences of policy: a case of the tail wagging the structural constraints to mobility and the Vijayendra dog. If all evidence is to be passed through reproduction of inequality, is far more Rao the test of a behavioral experiment or a comfortable with certainty than it is with randomized trial, then policy interven- reflexivity. Nonrational action is adduced tions that are not amenable to experimen- via behavioral experiments, with cultur- tation and randomization will be gradual- al “traits” and social norms seen as good ly eliminated from consideration. More- or bad. There is, implicitly, little patience over, a good randomized trial requires for contextual complexity, participant good implementation because imperfect observation, or participant engagement implementation would contaminate the to discover the complex interactions be- design of the experiment; it would be dif- tween cultural and social process, eco- ficult to untangle the effect of the design nomic conditions, and politics that de- from the effect of the implementation. termine persistent inequality. The goal is This means that trials, in essence, assume to discover broad “truths” to inform pol- away the challenge of implementation: icies to design “nudges” to move people the complicated process by which poli- out of what are seen as harmful or dys- cy ideas are converted into action on the functional behaviors. The analysis of cul- ground. This deemphasizes what scholars ture and social interactions is, therefore, since Albert Hirschman have argued is the part of the scientific apparatus of the ex- critical problem of policy-making, partic- pert, to nudge people toward improve- ularly in poor countries.13 ments in welfare, as the experts define it. Behavioral experiments and random- It is important to note that all three para- ized trials, moreover, have trouble dealing digms rely on the checks, balances, and ac- with high degrees of contextual variation. countability mechanisms of electoral de- An experiment or intervention that works mocracy. Neoliberalism and neo-Keynes- in one region will not necessarily work in ianism are both closely intertwined with another: the well-known problem of ex- the notion that universal franchise will ternal validity. Advocates for randomiza- be enough to keep government actions tion have dealt with this by conducting aligned with the needs and interests of trials across a variety of countries to test citizens. Neopaternalism takes this reli- the efficacy of a design, or by conducting ance one step further. What legal scholar randomized trials at a very large scale.14 Cass Sunstein calls “liberal paternalism” But this solution gets much more diffi- requires that governments do not use the cult with “complex” interventions, such power of behavioral nudges to impinge on as those tailored for and, in particular, tai- the fundamental freedoms of citizens.15 lored by communities at the microlevel. But the limitations of the electoral Such designs are very difficult to evaluate mechanism as a way of governing large, with standard techniques because wide complex societies have increasingly be- variations in design make sample siz- come apparent, with challenges like elite es with adequate statistical power unten- capture and clientelism taking influence able for reasons of cost and manageabil- throughout the world.16 This weakening ity. Neopaternalism, therefore, intrinsi- of electoral democracy as a mechanism to cally favors interventions that are simple, check elite dominance is partly responsi- do not require much adaptation on the ble for unleashing processes of commen- ground, and have predictable outcomes. suration, commodification, and policy Neopaternalism, while cognizant of drift that have reinforced inequality-gen- social norms and the contribution of erating processes.17 Moreover, we live in

148 (3) Summer 2019 185 Rethinking an age when big data is increasingly being gests that this is not sufficient to deal How to used toward a new form of “surveillance with the relational aspects of depriva- Address Poverty & capitalism,” causing widespread concern tion. As Michèle Lamont and Paul Pier- Inequality that without urgent regulatory measures, son argue in their contribution to this is- the ability to track and monitor people sue of Dædalus, the processes that repro- with extremely precise data will increas- duce, intensify, or deepen inequality are ingly lead to the delegitimization of dem- often distinct from those that generated ocratic processes.18 it, and are fundamentally influenced by Moreover, democracy “has come to social relationships.22 Furthermore, in mean much more than free and fair elec- arguing that human beings are primarily tions, though nothing less.”19 Through- held back by exogenous obstacles and not out the world, at every level–micro, endogenous processes, equality of oppor- meso, and macro–people have orga- tunity implicitly assumes a distinction nized themselves into bodies to monitor between preferences and constraints. those in power, in what political theorist Equality of opportunity, consequently, John Keane has called “monitory democ- needs to be supplemented by an “equal- racy.” To mention just a few, such insti- ity of agency” that takes into account the tutions include citizen committees, self- impact of the relationality of individuals; help groups, minipublics, environmental the political, social, and cultural contexts groups, think tanks, and organizations within which they operate; and the im- such as the Bretton-Woods Project, which pact of these processes on power differ- monitors the imf and World Bank. More- ences, inequality, and poverty.23 over, such institutions can exist even in The reflective paradigm for policy-mak- more authoritarian settings like China, ing follows from this. It recognizes that where citizens groups, often with the ac- even if someone is lifted above an ex- tive concordance of civil servants, have ternally defined poverty line, they may created “accountability without democ- still be subject to vulnerability, discrim- racy” working within systems of “author- ination, and exclusion because they lack itarian deliberation.”20 Such forums for voice, agency, and what anthropologist citizen engagement and participation do Arjun Appadurai has called the “capaci- not always emerge organically but are in- ty to aspire,” the ability to envision a fu- duced by policy interventions, with de- ture different from what they see around velopment organizations spending hun- them.24 It is fundamentally about redraw- dreds of billions of dollars on such proj- ing boundaries and shifting “norms of in- ects with the hope that they will alleviate teraction.”25 It allows for the fact that dis- poverty and empower the excluded.21 crimination is not just material, it is also It is clear that a new paradigm of action “epistemic” in the sense that the capaci- has emerged that relies much more on ty to speak, and be listened to, is also un- process-policy than on outcome-policy, equally distributed.26 particularly in comparison with the three The term reflective builds on political dominant paradigms. It may be time to theorist Robert Goodin’s notion of “re- give this paradigm a label and sketch its flective democracy,” the idea that an ef- basic characteristics. fective democracy needs to inculcate the capacity for individuals to “deliberate Economists think about inequality within.”27 Deliberating within creates largely through the lens of equality of the space for what sociologist Mario Luis opportunity. A process perspective sug- Small has called “cognitive empathy”:

186 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences “the ability to understand another per- • Using technology in a way that gives Vijayendra son’s predicament as they understand people control over their own data to Rao it.”28 But it is a fundamental challenge to strengthen democratic processes, facil- do this at the scale of entire communities itate collective action, and equalize ac- and countries, to change processes of de- cess to public services.31 cision-making so that the powerful and the less powerful–politicians, govern- Implementing policies that do this at ment officials,and citizens alike–all de- scale is neither easy nor predictable; in- velop horizontal and vertical cognitive deed, it is not always measurable. As Jane empathy. Jenson, Francesca Polletta, and Paige Raib- Many social movements, governance mon show in their essay in this volume, innovations, and policy interventions to get this right requires an understand- around the world are attempting to turn ing of policy not as a one-shot deal, but as this paradigm into practice. While there a process of constant adaptation, through are large variations in the specifics of which successes and failures provide les- their actions and objectives, some im- sons for incremental change.32 Process- portant processes are worth noting: es take a long time to show “hard” results because they shift trajectories of change • Filling in the blank space between elec- in unpredictable ways. Thus, it is impor tions by fostering continuous dialogue tant to analyze shifts in processes like how between citizens and governments. This decisions are made, in power relations requires the creation of systems of de- and in narratives and discourse. These 29 liberative decision-making. The “sys- are difficult to measure in conventional tem” usually has some kind of officially ways and require us to draw on qualitative sanctioned civic space–a forum or a reg- methods and narrative analysis, includ- ularly scheduled public meeting–where ing natural language processing meth- the average citizen is given a chance to ods.33 It also requires coordination across influencedirectly public decisions that quantitative and qualitative methods, for have a bearing on their lives. But forums instance by conducting mixed-methods alone are not enough; they need to be evaluations.34 The process of adaptive, embedded within a culture of dialogue, citizen-engaged policy-making also helps debate, and discussion in which the goal avoid the problem of “policy drift,” when is to make the act of speaking and listen- policies are fixed in the past rather than ing an everyday practice. adapted to changing times. What are the disadvantages? The re- • Equalizing power in decision-making flective paradigm requires that policy- by giving voice to disadvantaged groups makers take a very long time horizon. It and, more radically, by reserving a per- requires a tolerance of mess because it centage of seats in legislatures for repre- attempts to reverse inequalities in pow- sentatives from such groups. er and agency, which is, at best, a con- • Creating feedback loops within govern- tentious and uncertain process. Perhaps ments, and between governments and the most significant challenge is that citizens, in which decision-making be- governments (and other quasigovern- comes adaptive and incremental.30 This ment actors like the World Bank and do- helps governments deliver better pub- nor agencies) are not set up to work with 35 lic services and respond to the needs of process-policies. The logic of bureau- citizens. cracies and the political environments

148 (3) Summer 2019 187 Rethinking in which they function make them much in any given country will draw on all four How to more focused on interventions that can paradigms; and it is not clear that any one Address Poverty & induce a quick, measurable impact that paradigm is clearly superior to any other. Inequality does not threaten the political status quo. They have different goals with different The essays in this collection make methods of execution. However, the re- an important contribution toward reflective paradigm tends to be neglected thinking the diagnosis of inequality to in policy circles precisely because it is not help reverse inequality-generating pro- easy to measure. cesses. I have tried in this commentary to Process-policies usually come about as draw on some of the ideas in these essays, the result of years of efforts by activists along with other literatures, to make the working organically, usually at a small case for a new reflective paradigm for pol- scale, within social movements or non- icy-making that focuses on process-poli- governmental organizations. Given con- cies, rather than outcome-policies, that temporary concerns about unstable dem- can supplement neoliberal, neo-Keynes- ocratic institutions and inequality, it may ian, and neopaternalistic paradigms that be time to think about how to bring them have dominated how we think about pol- to the mainstream. icy. In practice, policies at any given time

author’s note I am grateful to Monica Biradavolu, Michèle Lamont, Paul Pierson, J. P. Singh, and Mike Walton for their valuable comments on this essay.

endnotes 1 David B. Grusky, Peter A. Hall, and Hazel Rose Markus, “The Rise of Opportunity Markets: How Did It Happen & What Can We Do?” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019); and Jane Jenson, Francesca Polletta, and Paige Raibmon, “The Difficulties of Combating Inequality in Time,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019) are, to some extent, exceptions. 2 A view that now has some empirical support; see Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James Robinson, “Democracy Does Cause Growth,” Journal of Political Econo- my 127 (1) (2019): 47–100. 3 William Easterly, “In Search of Reforms for Growth: New Stylized Facts on Policies and Growth Outcomes” (2018), https://www.gc.cuny.edu/CUNY_GC/media/CUNY-Graduate -Center/PDF/Programs/Economics/Other%20docs/Easterly-Policy-Reforms-and-Growth .pdf. 4 David Dollar and Aart Kraay, “Growth is Good for the Poor,” Journal of Economic Growth 7 (3) (2002): 195–225. 5 Martin Ravallion, “Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages,” World Devel- opment 29 (11) (2001): 1803–1815. 6 Peter A. Hall and Michèle Lamont, eds., Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 2013). On opportunity markets, see Grusky et al., “The Rise of Op- portunity Markets”; and Patrick Le Galès and Paul Pierson, “‘Superstar Cities’ & the Gener- ation of Durable Inequality,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019). 7 For example, Lawrence H. Summers, “Investing in All the People,” World Bank Policy Re- search Working Paper No. 905 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1992); and Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4) (1997): 1251–1288.

188 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 8 Anthony B. Atkinson, Inequality: What Can be Done? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Vijayendra Press, 2015). Rao 9 Cass R. Sunstein, Why Nudge? The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2014). 10 Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir, Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much (New York: Times Books, 2013). 11 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008); and The World Bank, World De- velopment Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2015). 12 For example, Angus Deaton and Nancy Cartwright, “Understanding and Misunderstand- ing Randomized Controlled Trials,” Social Science & Medicine 210 (2018): 2–21; and Martin Ravallion, “Should the Randomistas (Continue to) Rule,” Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 492 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2018). 13 Albert O. Hirschman, Development Projects Observed (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1967). 14 Karthik Muralidharan and Paul Niehaus, “Experimentation at Scale,” Journal of Economic Per- spectives 31 (4) (2017): 103–124. 15 Sunstein, Why Nudge? 16 Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer –And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010); and Pra- nab Bardhan and Dilip Mookherjee, “Clientelistic Politics and Economic Development: An Overview,” Economic Development and Institutions Working Paper Series No. WP16/10.III.5 (Oxford: Economic Development and Institutions, 2016). 17 Michèle Lamont and Paul Pierson, “Inequality Generation & Persistence as Multidimensional Processes: An Interdisciplinary Agenda,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019). 18 Shoshana Zuboff, “Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Informa- tion Civilization,” Journal of Information Technology 30 (1) (2015): 75–89; and Dirk Helbing, Bruno S. Frey, Gerd Gigerenzer, et al., “Will Democracy Survive Big Data and Artificial In- telligence,” Scientific American, February 25, 2017. 19 John Keane, Power and Humility: The Future of Monitory Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 105. 20 Lily Tsai, Accountability Without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Baogang He and Mark E. Warren, “Authoritarian Deliberation in China,” Dædalus 146 (3) (Summer 2017): 155–166. 21 Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao, Localizing Development: Does Participation Work (Wash- ington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2012). 22 Lamont and Pierson, “Inequality Generation & Persistence as Multidimensional Processes.” 23 Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton, “Culture and Public Action: Relationality, Equality of Agency and Development,” in Culture and Public Action, ed. Vijayendra Rao and Michael Wal- ton (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004). 24 Arjun Appadurai, “The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recognition,” in Culture and Public Action. 25 Irene Bloemraad, Will Kymlicka, Michèle Lamont, and Leanne S. Son Hing, “Membership without Social Citizenship? Deservingness & Redistribution as Grounds for Equality,” Dædalus 148 (3) (Summer 2019). 26 Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2007).

148 (3) Summer 2019 189 Rethinking 27 Robert E. Goodin, Reflective Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). How to 28 Address Mario Luis Small, “Rhetoric and Evidence in a Polarized Society,” Coming to Terms with a Poverty & Polarized Society Lecture Series, Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy, Co- Inequality lumbia University, New York, March 1, 2018. 29 John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge, eds., Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 30 Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock, Building State Capability: Evidence, Analysis, Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 31 For more on this, see Vijayendra Rao, “Reflectivism: A Process Paradigm for Addressing Pov- erty and Inequality,” mimeo, Word Bank. For videos, data, and visualizations that show an application of “citizen-generated data,” see The World Bank, “Democratizing Data,” http:// socialobservatory.worldbank.org/categories/democratizing-data. 32 Jenson et al., “The Difficulties of Combating Inequality in Time.” 33 Justin Grimmer and Brandon M. Stewart, “Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Auto- matic Content Analysis Methods for Political Text,” Political Analysis 21 (3) (2013): 267–297. 34 Vijayendra Rao, Kripa Ananthpur, and Kabir Malik, “The Anatomy of Failure: An Ethnog- raphy of a Randomized Trial to Deepen Democracy in Rural India,” World Development 99 (2017): 481–497. 35 Mansuri and Rao, Localizing Development.

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