The Constitutionality of Canada's Youth Courts Under the Young Offenders Act
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The Constitutionality of Canada's Youth Courts under the Young Offenders Act John P. McEvoy* The author examines the constitutionality of Uauteur 6tudie la constitutionalit6 des tri- Canada's Youth Courts as presently consti- bunaux pour adolescents, tels que pr~sente- tuted under the Young Offenders Act. He ar- ment constitus dans les provinces canadiennes par la Loi sur les jeunes contrevenants. Scion gues that the fact that these courts are presided l'auteur, l'article 96 de la Loi constitution- over by provincially appointed judges con- nelle, 1867 est viol6 puisque ces tribunaux travenes section 96 of the Constitution Act, sont pr~sid~s par des juges nomm~s par les 1867. An historical inquiry leads to the de- provinces. Une analyse historique r~v~le que termination that powers of jurisdiction which des pouvoirs qui 6taient en 1867 propres A une cour sup~rieure, de district ou in 1867 were exclusively those of a superior, de comt6 ont W d~volus aux tribunaux pour adoles- district or county court have been conferred cents par la Loi sur les jeunes contrevenants. on the Youth Courts by the Young Offenders A la suite d'une application du test mis de Act. Through an application of the test set l'avant dans l'arrt Renvoi relatifd la Loi de out in Reference Re The Residential Tenan- 1979 sur la location residentielle, l'auteur soutient que ces pouvoirs ne peuvent tre cies Act, 1979, it is asserted that this juris- exerc~s par des tribunaux dont les juges ne diction cannot be exercised by a non-section sont pas nomm~s suivant la procddure de 96 court. l'article 96. *Ofthe Faculty of Law, University of New Brunswick. ©McGill Law Journal 1986 Revue de droit de McGill REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL [Vol. 32 A new era in the administration of juvenile justice in Canada was launched with the coming into force of the Young Offenders Act.' Besides tinkering with procedures, the Act significantly altered juvenile justice by implementing a diversion system which allows deserving young persons in conflict with the law to avoid the necessity of appearing before a court for disposition. The purpose of this note is neither to discuss the merits of diversion nor the other philosophical changes represented by the Act, but to present a problem arising from the tinkering: the proposition advanced is that the Young Offenders Act, as implemented, violates section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867,2 which requires the Governor General to appoint the judges of the superior, district and county courts. The Young Offenders Act repealed and replaced the Juvenile Delinquents Act, which, although amended over time, remained in substance as originally enacted in 1908. 3 Both Acts followed a similar philosophy by establishing systems of juvenile justice separate and apart from that to which adult offenders are subject. The adjudicative tribunal with jurisdiction under the two Acts, a "juvenile court" under the former and a "youth court" under the current scheme, are similarly defined. That tribunal is either a new court established by the Legislature for the purpose, or an existing court designated or authorized by the Legislature, the Governor in Council or the Lieutenant Governor in Council to exercise jurisdiction under the Act.4 The present "youth courts", as with the former "juvenile courts", in each province of Canada are presided over by judges appointed by the respective Lieutenant Governors in Council.5 One important distinction between the two schemes is the range of offences covered. Under the Juvenile DelinquentsAct, the omnibus offence 'S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 110. The Act came into force on 2 April 1984, SI/84-56. 2Enacted as British North America Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. -Juvenile Delinquents Act, S.C. 1908, c. 40; R.S.C. 1927, c. 108, as rep. The Juvenile Delin- quents Act, 1929, S.C. 1929, c. 46; R.S.C. 1952, c. 160; Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3. 4Juvenile DelinquentsAct, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3, s. 2(l); Young Offenders Act, supra, note 1, s. 2(1). 5Newfoundland: Provincial Court, per Nfld Reg. 72/84; Nova Scotia: Family Court, per N.S. Reg. 65/84 Schedule A, s. 2; Prince Edward Island: Provincial Court, per EC 282/84; New Brunswick: Provincial Court, per O.C. 85-882; Quebec: Youth Court, per Courts ofJusticeAct, R.S.Q. c. T-16, ss 110-14; Ontario: Unified Family Court (a superior court) Provincial Court (Criminal Division) and Provincial Court (Family Division), per Courts of Justice Act, 1984, S.O. 1984, c. 11, ss 47(b), 67(2) and 75(b); Manitoba: Provincial Court (Family Division), per The ProvincialCourtAct, S.M. 1982-83-84, c. 52, s. 19(l)(b) and per O.C. 283/84; Saskatchewan: Provincial Court, per O.C. 378/84; Alberta: Provincial Court, per The Provincial Court Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. P-20, as am. Young Offenders Act, S.A. 1984, c. Y-l, s. 38; British Columbia: Provincial Court, per ProvincialCourtAct, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 341, s. 2(4), as am. Young Offenders (B.C.) Act, S.B.C. 1984, c. 30, s. 59 and per O.C. 617/84. 1986] NOTES of "delinquency" was substituted for the myriad of possible violations of federal and provincial statutes and municipal by-laws. 6 It also extended the reach of the statute to include sexual immorality or "any similar form of vice". The Young Offenders Act, however, is limited to violations of federal statutes or regulations and retains the character or identity of each offence as the specific offence, characterized as being either an indictable or sum- mary conviction offence. Thus a violation of the theft provisions of the CriminalCode retains its identity as theft and is the offence with which the young person is charged rather than, as under the former Act, being sub- sumed within the general offence of "delinquency". At minimum, it is this retention of the character or identity of each federal offence which, it is suggested, is fatal to the Young Offenders Act as implemented with prov- incially appointed judges acting as youth court judges. Over the eight decades of its existence, the Juvenile Delinquents Act faced only two substantial challenges on constitutional grounds. The first concerned the validity of subsection 20(2) of the Act which allowed a court to impose liability upon a municipality for the financial support of a child in care. This challenge was maintained over a twenty year period from its initial rejection in 1962 by Schatz J. in Re Dunne7 to its ultimate acceptance in 1982 by the Supreme Court of Canada in Regional Municipality of Peel v. MacKenzie.8 The statutory imposition of this financial burden upon a municipality was finally determined not to be supportable as, or necessarily incidental to, the criminal law and procedure justification of the Act and was found to encroach upon provincial jurisdiction in relation to municipal institutions under subsection 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Accord- ingly, the severance doctrine was applied to annul any reference to munic- ipalities in the section, the imposition of such a financial burden being tra vires the jurisdiction of Parliament. The second challenge questioned the constitutional validity of the sub- stitution of the procedures of the Juvenile Delinquents Act for those under provincial legislation where a violation of provincial law was alleged against a juvenile. The case arose out of an alleged speeding infraction under the provincial Motor Vehicle Act of British Columbia. Rather than being pro- ceeded against under the Juvenile DelinquentsAct, the accused, a juvenile, was tried by the magistrate as if he were an adult and upon conviction was "Juvenile Delinquents Act, supra, note 4, ss 2(1) and 3(1). 7(1962), [1962] O.R. 595, 33 D.L.R. (2d) 190 (H.C.). 8(1982), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 9, 42 N.R. 572, Martland J. Three years earlier in A.G. Ontario v. Regional Municipality of Peel (1979), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1134, [1981] 2 W.W.R. 540, the Court approved a construction of the Act such that a committal order to a private enterprise home was not authorized by s. 20(l). This was sufficient to dispose of the case without addressing the constitutional issue. McGILL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32 fined $400. Under subsection 92(15) of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 the prov- incial legislatures enjoy exclusive jurisdiction in relation to "the imposition of punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Imprisonment for enforcing any Law of the Province ...". The issue, therefore, was whether such provincial en- forcement procedures and penalties in respect of violations of provincial law could be ousted by the Parliament of Canada in the exercise of its jurisdiction under subsection 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867 over "the Criminal Law ... including Procedure in Criminal Matters". More specifi- cally, was the creation of an all-encompassing offence of "delinquency" in the Juvenile Delinquents Act a valid exercise of the criminal law power? Fauteux J., for the Supreme Court of Canada in A.G. British Columbia v. Smith,9 held that it was. Two well-accepted general propositions in respect of federal power under subsection 91(27) of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 were found to be controlling: subsection 91(27) confers upon Parliament juris- diction in relation to criminal law in its widest sense,' 0 and it includes the power to create new crimes."l Given the breadth of these propositions, his Lordship did no more than merely accept that the Act was a proper exercise of the criminal law power: The primary legal effect of the Jurenile DelinquentsAct ..