The JapaneseSocietyJapanese Society for Slavic and East European Studies

iVbl.19 JopaneseSlavicandEastEutzqpeanStudies 1998

FRANCO-RVSSkN INTELLffGENCE COLLABORATEON A(}AgNST JAPAN DVRgNG TME RVSSO-3APANESE WAR, ti9pagS

Chiharu INABA

(Meijo Uitiversity)

[Klay woreis: France, Russja, Intelligence, Russo-Japanese War]

1. Discovery of New Historicag Materaal in Russia armdi France

During the Second World War, the United States decoded the Pup:ple Cipher, the secret cipher of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Atifairs. The results were

"Magic filed in the enormous Diplomatic Summary", which must have been, it is said, very impertant fbr making US fbreign policy against japan. A few sQurces have pointed out that Japanese cryptography was also decoded by its enemy during the Russo-Japanese War. This Russian decoding has, however, not been proved for a long time. Dr.Dmitrii B. Pavlov, Senior Researcher of the Russian Independent Institute of National and Social Problems, discovered a targe number of Japanese documents from 1904-05 at the GosudorstvenniiArkhiv Rossiiskoi federatsii

(GARF: National Archives of the RussiaR Federation), Moscow: translations of diplomatic telegrams, copies and photos of Japanese letters, memorandums made by Russian agents, and reports by the Okhra.na (Russian Seeret Police). Dr.Antti Kajala, Docent of Helsinki University, thoroughly Iooked over these documents in 1991 and I got a chance to analyse them in summer 1992. The new Russian

historical material showed that the Okhruna had intercepted Japanese letters and telegrams in France, and decoded its diPlornatic code during the war. In

Europe, Japanese infbrmation was stolen by the Russians. The Russian materia] also points out that France, the Russjan ally, had collaborated to collect Japanese information. This material alone, however, is

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insufficient to assert that there was a certain collaboration between France and

Russia. Only if there is correlation betvveen both French and Russian material,

historians can begin to agree on the existence of the Franco-Russian intelligence collaboration. When I was conductiRg research about the French intelligence, g was introduced by Dr. Christopher Andrew's article to the decoding by the Freilch

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which･there was a description about its decoding

of Japanese telegrams.i I visited the Archives Nationales, Paris in the summer

of 1993 and .1994 and sought out documents about decoding by the French

There were reports about decoding written by a French inspector and police, 'I coded japanese telegrams. By chance, also found decoded Japanese telegrams

in theArc:hives de Ministbre de la Afiliiires E)ute'riebtre, Paris. The nuc]eus direct]y

concemed ",ith the interception and decoding of Japanese telegrams was France.

2. Suspacgon of the Leakage: Vp to the ?resent

Colonel Motojiro Akashi, Japanese Military Attach6 to Sweden, who had con-

ducted intelligence and subversion against Russia in Europe during the Russo- Japanese War, submitted Rakka ryusui, a report on his activities, soon after his arrival to Japan at the end of 190S. There is a description in the report that the

Okhrana had obtained Akashi's and his Finnish and Georgian collaborators'

achvltles:

- I [Akashi Inaba] received a proposal for selling information about the Okhrana aetivities from a lady calling herself the wife of one of its agent. I

told her that I would be lavish in spending money, if the information were

important. She told me that I had been closely watched by the Okhnana which

reported my actions in Paris and Hamburg and opened my letters. She gave

instructions on the way to elude its observatiQn, And called my attentien te

the fact that the Okhrana was taking notice of the arms purchase and that the

Japanese code has already been decoded by the Russians.2

Can it be tiue that Akashi's letters .were opened in Paris and japanese telegrams were decoded? The character of this material submitted to the General StafYi

should be comparatively reliable. It was impossible, however, to prove the

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historical fact of whethcr the Okhrana had known the Japanese activities well

or not.

"Backward In summer 1906, a small pamphlet called of the Revolution -- Armed uprisings in Russia by Japanese money" was published in St.Petersburg.3 The content is t.hat Japan gave subsidies tb the Russian revolutionary parties and fomented arrped uprisings in Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. This

gossip was soon reproduced in German newspapers,4 and became a topic of

conversation in Berliil. Though Russia did not want to make trouble with Japan after the war, why did it publish the scandal at the time? The Japaiiese General Staff ordered Akashi to research conditions in Russia after the war in secret and dispatched him to

Berlin as a military attach6.5 It must not have been difficult to carry eut the

order, if he had used his intelligence network built during the war. The Russians

must have watched Akashi as a dangerous officer and tried to turn him out from

Europe. It is obvious that Akashi couid not continue inteliigence easily in

Germany, because the expos6 showed that his relationship with the

revolutionaries was hated by the Great Powers. He worked as military attaehe

only for ten menths and returned to Japan.6

In the pamphlet, there are copies of Ietters and telegrams, originally written in French, exchanged among Akashi, Konni Zilliacus, his most important

collaborator and Fjnnishjournalist, Georgii Dekanozi, Georgian revolutionary,

and Eugene Baud, an anarchist Iiving in Switzerland, flrom November 1904 to

june 1905, in addition to their Russian translations and explanations. Each letter

and telegram was sent to Paris or wrkten to Akashi and Dekanozi both of whom stayed in the capital. The Russian revolutionary parties teok in hand and p]anned a great uprising in St.Petersburg in summer 1905 with the Japanese aid. These letters tell the way in which aid was speRt and the course of purchasing arms fbr

the uprising.7

The discovery of the pamphlet evidently indicated that the Japanese letters and telegrams were stolen by the Russians. In what way did the Russians intercept

Japanese correspondence? Ziliiacus later described in his memoirs:

- He [Akashi Inabq] shdiply rejected that the letters were stolen. They were

brought to Japan and kept with other documents in the national arehives,

[fokye. However, he had received letters not in Berlin but in Paris, where he

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was traveling at that time. Now he astonishingly recalled that transportation of post had been delayed. Letters, which the Japanese Minister to Berlin sent to him, reached him one day later than they should have usually done. This

showed how the case was. And there were the other letters from Dekanozi to Akashi in the pamphlet in question. He had just the same idea asIdid, so the matter was completely clear. Dekanozi lived in Paris and wrote letters to

Akashi in London. It is said exactly that the letters were not opened or photographed in England. In this respect, the French had evidently helped Russian friends.8

During the Russo-Japanese War, although France declared its neutrality at the beginning of the war, it took this pro-Russian policy because of the Franco- Russian Alliance concluded in 1891-94. This gave a lot of advantages to the Russian Baltic Fleet voyaging from Europe to the Far East due to French colonies

rlbkyo in Africa and Asia. Furthermore, the French Minister to made efforts for to Russia the Russian prisoners of war, such as sending information on them and bringing them letters and a number of commodities.9 In addition to such a close relationship, I assent to Zilliacus' suppositi'on that the French government should have come to the Russia's assistance, because the letters stolen by the Okhrana were sent from and received in Paris. French participation, however, is historically no better than collateral evidence. Up to the beginning of the 1 990s, neither France or Russia referred to the matter as to whether the Japanese cQdes had been decoded or not during the Russo-Japanese War.

3. The Okhrana's Integligence againsg Japan

A large number of material related to Russian intelligence against Japan during

the Russo-Japanese War was discovered in the Departament flolitsii, Osohyi Otdel (DP OO: Special Section of the Police Department) Papers, GARF, which keeps an enormous volume of documents about Russian and Sovietjudicial and

inner affairs. The Okhrana was commonly known as a seeret organization of the Russian police stationed in various districts of the Russian Empire and foreign countries to keep watch on aRti-Tsarist opposition groups such as revolutionaries,

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liberalists, and minority nationaiities. The 0sobyi Otdel fbunded in 1898 was

the section which supervised the organization.iO The material filed in the Osobyi

Otdet consisted of reports of its domestic and foreign branches, and attached

papers: letters, memorandums, telegrams, orders, and other documents. The Material discovered in the GARF is main!y the reports and attached papers which I.F.Manasevich-Manuilov, the Subsection Chief of International

Espionage and Investigation under the Osobyi 0tdel, had sent to the director of

the Police department during the Russo-Japanese War. The attached papers

contain letters .and memorandums written by Japanese officials and officers stationed in Europe and leaders of the anti-Tsarist opposition groups, Japanese

encoded diplomatic telegrams and their decoded ones, and so on.ii

Analysis shows that the expose in 1906 was edited within the documents

"the filed in Reproachable anti-Russian activities by Japanese colonel Akashi

and his collaborators such as Dekanozi, Zilliacus and others", in the DP 00 papers. 12

How were Akashi's and Zilliacus' letters stolen? There is a description about

the method of stealing in Manasevich-Manuilov's report to the director of the

Police Departrnent on May 3, 1905: to steal Akashi's information, he asked for

a former French police superintendent's help; his agent took Akashi's adjoining

room in Paris and listened to discussions between Akashi and his visitors.]3

When Akashi was away from his room, the agent looked to a room boy for

assistance and photographed his letters and memorandumS.i` The agent fo11owed Akashi and Zilliacus and made reports of surveillance.!S These papers and photos

were sent to St.Petersburg as attached papers and lay in the Russian archives up to the present.

Another Manuilov's report on October 20, 1904 shows that he received the

information about Charles Brouard, French agent employed by the legation of

Japan in Paris, from the director of the French Intelligence Bureau, which

minutely inquired into the agent's background and activities in Paris.i6 Also

Manuilov requested the French to dispatch agents to Vienna, Stockholm, and

Antwerp, where the Japanese military intelligence organization would have

established its branches. When the French demanded 8,eOO francs (nowadays,

approximately 300,OOO dol]ars) fbr collecting information, Manuilov informed

the director in St.Petersburg of the fee.i' Of course, the intelligence fee should have been paid,

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In the DP OO papers, there are also documents collected elsewhere than Paris: manuscripts of ozzcial letters, telegrams, and other confidential documents

sent by the legation of Japan in the Hague, and private letters to its staff including Nobukata Mitsuhashi, Minister in Netherlands. These documents, shredded by

hand, were bound by adhesive tape.i8 The French Intelligence Bureau smuggled

an agent into the Hague and had him col]ect Japanese information.

The Subsection of the International Espionage and Investigation in

St.Petersburg analysed the collected documents. Letters and memorandums

written in French and English were translated into Russian and attached to the

reports. Although Japanese documents were also translated, Russian translations 'It were terribly bad, especial!y if characters were written in a running hand.iD is

very clear that the Russians had at least one Russian or French who could read

Japanese to a certain extent, but there was no Japanese collaborator either in

Paris or St.Petersburg.

The Okhrana's activities against Japan were not carried out mainly by Manuilov. In order to collect the information on the Japanese sabotage against the Baltic Fleet (Second Russian Pacific FleeO, A.M.Harting of the Osohyi Otdel

was dispat¢ hed to the Baltic Sea and the Nerth Sea coast, and VV.'Ilirzhetsiak of

Gendarme to the Black Sea.2D

Based on the collected material, Manuilov eagerly made reports to St.Petersburg. A.A.Lopoukhin (a:fter May 1905, PI.Rachikovskii), Director of

the Police Department sent those reports to P. Sviatopolk-Mirskii, Minister of

Interior, if the director regarded them as important. They were also sent to

V.M.Lamsdorf, Minister of Foreign Affairs. The most important ones were

submitted to Emperor Nicholas II. The information collected by Manuilov was

evaluated highly enough to be notified to those persons making decisions on Russian supreme policy during the war. The director submitted the importaRt reports not only to the government but to the Navy. Lopoukhin sent Manuilov's infbrmation directly to A.A.Virenius,

Vice Chief of Naval Staff who held the concurrent post of director of the naval

intelligence. In addition to charged the intelligence fee which Manuilov requested

to the Navy. The Russian Navy looked to the Police Department for assistance

in collecting japanese infbrmation in Europe for the sake of checking the

Japanese sabotage against the Baltic Fleet.2i The Okhrana's ifltelligence against

Japan was regarded as important in Russia.

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The Russian material proved that the Okhrana asked for FIJench help to keep

watch on Japanese activities. The Russians maintained fbr thernselves only a

small intelligence organization in Western Europe, and was overall dependent

on the French. Without French help, the Okhnana ceuld not obtain Japanese

letters and memorandums. The French go'vernment, as Zilliacus wrote, shouid

have agreed to the Russian requests and ordered the French Intelligence Bureau

to censor the letters mailed by Akashi and his collaborators and to give them to

the Russians. Thus, the French accorded facilities to the Russians for collecting

Japanese information.

4. Japanese Cryptograpky during the Russo-Japanese wtTar

It has not been known whether Japanese cryptography was decoded or not,

because Japanese telegrams and their translations did not appear in the expos6

rlbday, in 1906 or any other rnaterial. there are, however, a lot of Japanese

diplomatic telegrams and their translations in the DP OO papers. Especially,

most of telegrams exchanged between the Japanese legation in Paris and the

rlbkyo Ministry of Foreign Affairs in and other Japanese legations in European

capitals were trans}ated into Russian or French. This means that the Okhrana er

its collaborator intercepted Japanese telegrams in Paris and decoded th¢ m.22

The Japanese diplomatic cryptography was decoded during the Russo-Japanese War.

It is necessary to analyse the system of Japanese cryptography, before

clarifying how the Russians decoded it. There are, however, only a few historical

material in the Diplomatic Records effice and the Library of the Military History

Department in Tokyo: manuals of cryptography, code books, and cipher

telegrams, though there are a large number of telegrams written in plain text.

The manuais of cryptography and code books should haye been burned in order

to maintain secrecy as soon as the new cryptographic system was introduced.

Moreover, after the decoding, code telegrams became unnecessary and were to

have been abolished. Sporadically, we can find decoded telegrams set down in

files with code texts. The GARF vvas the first archive where a large number of

Japanese code telegrams of the 1900s 4nd their decoded results were discovered. After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the Japanese government and army "cipher introduced the system of cryptography by telegraph called alphabet":

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the !etters and Japanese chara ¢ ters of plain text were to be replaced by the letters and characters beneath them in the cipher,23

In 1885, the Ministry ef Foreigll Affairs newly adopted the Me(ii I8-nen

of 1885) for communicating with legations especially in Europe ,fL{go (Code

and America. This was a system of code: a code consists of thousands of words,

phrases, letters, characters, and syllables with the codewords or codenuinbers that replace these plain text elements. In this systern, peculiarly five-digit codenumbers that replaced not Japanese but English plain text elements were adopted. The method of adding random numbers to codenumbers had not been, however, established yet in the I900s. The usage of this code was the reason why the telegraph fee became cheaper

than telegraphing by cipher: the numbers of letters on the code text are usually 'if less than that on the cipher text, the centents of the plain text is the same. It,

on the one hand, contributed to making a saving in the fee between the Far East

and Europe and America, which was very expensive in the beginning of this

century.24 On the other hand, the Ministry had been obliged to change the

telegram style of writings, when it directly introduced the new cryptographic

system from Great Britain. This code compelled Japanese diplomats to write

with plain text of telegrams in English.25 It has not been ascertained when the usage of the Code of 1885 ran out. Up

to the beginning of this century, however, the other cryptographic system was - introduced. Words with five nine alphabets were used in this code. Though the

cryptography was renewed, the codewords still replaced English piain texts. Et

remained unchanged that Japanese diplomats had to write telegrams iH English.

The MiRistry of Foreign Affairs had even used this alphabet code during the

Russo-Japanese War.26

The new cryptography system Meiji 37-nen kanajugo (japanese Character

Cipher of 1904) was introduced by the Ministry on February 3, 1904. The manual

indicated that Japanese plain texts replaced newly provided five-digit cipher numbers by a certain law, and English plain texts replaced five-digit code

numbers by the Code of 1885.2' The new cryptography used the code and cipher

at the same time was rather complicated. And it was more convenient fbr Japanese

dip]omats, because most of them who were not good at English obtailled the

chance of writing original telegrams in Japanese,

Though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs introduced the new cipher, the person

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in charge in Ibkyo and diplomats abroad often used the old alphabet code. They

had, of course, written original telegrams in English continuously.28 In this

situation, it was meaningless to introduce the new cipher,

Why did they not write telegrams in Japanese? Because the person in charge had adopted the habit of writing telegrams in Eng]ish for almost twenty years,

regardless of it being more ditlficult for older diplomats, most of whom became

high-ranking officials, to acquire the new system. Furthermore, they probably

believed that writing telegrams in EAglish to be the status of a Japanese elite

diplomat. Their attitude could have caused a great mistake later. If and when

the European codebreakers knew the fact that an alphabet code was adopted in

the Japanese cryptography aRd its piain texts was written originally in English, they could easily grasp the contents of its telegrams without any burden such as

translating a different language of Eastern origin to a European language. When the Japanese Army started to dispatch military attaches and observers to foreign countries after 1875, it became necessary to introduce its own

cryptography fbr communicating with them by telegraph. It was by a code with

a five-digit number during the Russo-Japanese War, but was diffk)rent from the

diplomatic code of 1885. The code numbers replaced not English but Japanese plain text elements.29 'Ibkyo In the naval correspondence between the Naval Staff in and naval

attach6s abroad, the code with five-nine alphabets was used. It looked like the

diplomatic alphabet code. The naval one, however, was niore practical, because the code alphabets replaced Japanese plain text elements similar fashion to the Arrny.iO

S. The Method of Deeeding Japanese Code

How did the OkhKina intercept the Japanese telegrams? Most of those preserved in the Russian archives were .dispatched or received by the Japanese legation in Paris. It is very obvious that they fell into the ekhrana's hands in Paris. From whcre did they get Japanese telegrams? ki the beginning of the Twentjeth Century, encoded telegrams fromlto Japan at first arrivedidispatched at a Pbstes et 7Ule'graphes (PT: post and telegraph office) in Paris, and were delivered to

rlbkyo. the legation or sent to The japanese telegrams were ¢ opied at a PT in

Paris in secret. The French Intelligence Bureau surely ordered the PT to make

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the copies available and secretly gave them to the Olchrana.3i

From when was the Japanese code decoded? In the DP OO papers, the

Japanese telegrarn of the earliest date translated into French was an undated

one from Shin'ichiro Kurino, Minister to St.Petersburg, to Ichiro Motone,

Minister to Paris.32 Although undated, it' may safoly be said that the date of

dispatch was before the date when the Japanese delegation left the Russian

capital on February 1O, 1904, because･ of Kurino's telegram. The interception of the Japanese telegrams in France began at just the same time of the outbreak

of the Russo-Japanese War. That telegrarn, however, can not still be distinguished

whether it was the result of decoding the Japanese diplomatjc code or not. For

example, I discovered a telegram translated into French and also its original not

encoded butjust written as Japanese plain text in Roman letters.33 Furthcrmore,

Manuilov purchased a general English codebook and tried te decoded tens and

tens of Japanese telegrams in June, 1904.3` Though they battled with these

encoded telegrams during the month,3S the Russians were not, of course, able to

decode them. The first Japanese telegram translated into French, considered to

be the result of decoding the one encoded in the alphabet diplomatic code, was

dated on July 30, 1904.36 The period which the Japanese diplomatic code was

started to be decoded on a fu11 scale is regarded as being from the end of July, 1904.

There are, in total, almost forty Japanese telegrams frem the Iegation in Paris to [[bkyo by the alphabet diplomatic code and translated ihto French in Moscow.

The Iatest one was dated on March l2, 1905. More than 250 telegrams were

rlbkyo dispatched from Paris to in 1904 alone. This leads to the conclLtsion as

far as I read the DP OO documents that all the encoded telegrarns were not

decoded by the Russians. Even the five-digit diplomatic cipher, the five-digit

military attach6 code, or the alphabet naval attache code were not able to be

decoded at all, though Manuilov tried to break them by the u$e of a general English cedebook.37 There is no evidence that the non-alphabet dip]omatic codes were decoded. Only the telegrams written as Japanese plain text in Roman letters

were directly translated into Russian. How accurately did the Russians decode the Japanese alphabet diplomatic code? [[b use the scigntific method .for decoding, they must have gathered

specialists of many different fields, repeated trial and error for many times, and

spent a lot of labour and time: a huge number of encoded telegrams were collected

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at first; then it must be clear in which cryptographical method they were encoded,

and be specified in which Ianguage they were written; thereafter, the codebreakers

should have ana]ysed the peculiarfity of the language, such as the frequency of

letters and its grammar, in cooperation with linguists; if the cryptography was a kind of code, they must statistically prepare a certain codetable or codebook similar te acquiring the kllack of completing a colossal jigsaw puzzle; finally the translators trlmslate the decoded telegrams into their native language.3S

"Yet I have not found any historical material in the GARF pointing to which technique was psed to decode the Japanese code corrcretely, though there is the

fact that the Russian had stsvggled against heavy odds at the beginning. A Russian

in the service of the Okhrana in those days, however, wrote in his memoirs that

`He Manuilov told: smuggled an agent to the Japanese legation in the Hague and ordered him to secretly take Pictures of the diplematic codebook; the agent succeeded in this task in the local employee's room lecated on the outskirts of

the city; Both of the two big codebooks were photographed at the same time; - Manuilov received the copies and paid almost 8,OOO 9,OOO francs'.3" If the cryptography was a type of. code, it coRsists of two codebooks fbr

sending and receiving. The copies which Manuilov's agent took in secret must

have been the codeboolcs fbr Japanese alphabet diplomatic code. The Japanese

telegrams intercepted in Paris were decoded by the use of the codebook for

receiving. Still there remains a question. The decoded telegrams were originally

written not in Japanese but in English. Why were the dec6ded English te]egrams

translated into French? It is not unthinkable that the Manuilov's organization

translated the English telegrams not directly into Russian but into French, when

they sent the translations from Paris to St.Petersburg. There is a possibility that

not Russian but French would been used in the decoding of Japanese cede

considering the existenee of French translations.

6. The Stirete Ggne'rats Codebrethkgng

It is written in the Russian material that the organization collaborating with the

"French Okhrana in the field of inteiligence against Japan in Paris was called the

Intelligence Bureau". There was, ho.wever, ne such kind ef organization or

department in France at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. It is also

described that Manuilov paid a huge amount of money to the chief of bureau

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"Moro" (which was written in Russian and wou}d be spelled most likely "Moreau" in French), and asked him to collect the Japanese information.40

Though I referred to archivists and librarians in Arehive,s' 7Vkitionates, Archives

'Arme'e du Ministene des Relations Exte'rieures, Serviee Uistorique de l de 7lerre,

and Biblioteque ?Vationales in Paris, I could not find any official or eencer known

"Moro". as I have not been able to pin the bureau down yet. Even if there was no intelligence organization in France, some French sections

'Amiee were carrying out espionage against Japan. The Etat-Mqior de t de 7lerre,

-2e Bureau of French military intelligence coliected detai]ed information en

Japan via military attach6s to Russia aRd to Japan."i Still, I could not discover

ally material on intelligence in France, because the bureau mainiy gathered the

miiitary infOrmatien not in the home country but abroad.

The organization which observed foreigners' aetivities in France was the

Direction de la Sanete Gene'rale (Police Department) under the control of Ministare de interieur des Cultes (Ministry of Interior and Religion). The second bureau of the SArete Ge'ne'rale, which controlled immigration and paid attention to foreigners, gathered the information.42 The following Japanese code telegrams were discovered in a dossier of the

Flapiers I]blice Ge'ne'tzale, Archives Aiationales: the telegram from Jutaro Komura,

Mi'nister of Foreign Affairs, to Ichiro Motono, Minister to Paris, on March 8,

1904 encoded by the alphabet diplomatic code, and the telegram from Shogo

Iguchi, Chief of General Affairs Department, the Gene'ral Staff, to Sadakoto

Hisamatsu, Military Attach6 to Paris, on March 3, l 904 by the alphabet militarty

cipher.`3 Both are handwritten documents, but the decoded documents are not

attached to them. Since March 1904, telegrams received and sent by the Japanese

legation in Paris had been intercepted by the Sinete Ge'ne'rale. The above material ,

however, does not mention the decoding at all.

I found French translations ef twenty-six diplomatic telegrams received and

sent by the Japanese legation in Paris in the ]FZipiers Detcasse', Archives du

MinistaTie des Relalions Exte'rieMres. The handwritten or typed translations were

copied on cyanotypes or mimeegraphed on pulp papers, and manuscript

memoranda summarized the contents were also attached." The style of typed

translations coincided with the style of decoded telegrams written in French in

the Russian archives. Moreover the lettcrhead on a memorandum indicates that

the translations should be dispatched by the director of Saiete Ge'ne'rage.`5 The

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oldest one was dated on December 9, 1904, and the latest on May 29, 1905,

soon after the defeat of the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Sea of Japan."L6 gt is

obvious by the above material that the decoded documents of Japanese diplomatie

telegrams were dispatched to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the ' SAnete Ge'ne'rale.

There is even a report on the organisation and function of the Service Criptographiq"e (section ofcryptography) in the Sarete Ge'ne'rale in the f]apiers R?lice Ge'ne'rale, Archives 7Vationales.'This looks like the memoirs of Haverna,

Chief of the section, who described: the cooperated organization en the decoding

among the police, the Army, and the Foreign Ministry was founded in the Stirete

and almost Ge'ne'ralein 1904; itinterceptedJapanese telegrams decoded 1,600

with the assistance of Major Bazeries, specialist of cryptography; the results

were dispatched to Th6ophile Deacasse, Minister of Foreign Affairs, viaA.G.J.

Mollard, Chief of the Protocol Section of the ministry; and Ren6 Waldeck-

Rousseau, Minister of Interior, ordered to give them to Russia, the French ally, yia Manuilov."7

y Major Etienne Bazeries was the great French pragmatist of eryptology and

"cylinder invented a special cryptographic system ca!led the cipher" adopted

by the U.S. Army in 1922."8 It must have been impossible to decode the Japanese

code telegrams, if he could not have assisted in the work of decoding. As a

matter of fact, an agent sneaking into the Japanese legation in the Hague took

copies of the codebook of the alphabet diplomatic code. Probabty the Stirete

Ge'ne'vaZe smuggled him into the legation according to Bazeries' advice. The

Service Criptogrqphique ordered the PT to hand over the copies of Japanese

telegrarns. It decoded them by the use of the copied codebook, translated into

French, and distributed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and even to the

Okhrana. Manuilov surely rewarded the agent for his service. The description

memoirs most of the telegrams, inHaverna's that1,600 pages, decoded Japanese

is rather exaggerated from the reality, from the viewpoint of the amount of

decoded telegrams remainiRg at the Russian and French archives. There is no

doubt that the decoding of Japanese telegrams was mainly promoted by the Sarete Ge'ne'nale. Manuilov received the decoded versions written in French

from the French police in Paris and i4tactly addressed them to St.Petersburg. "French The organization called the Intelligence Bureau" by Manuilov would

most probably have been the Service CriptogiuphiqLte in the Second Bureau of

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the Snnete Ge'ntirale. The Osohyi Otdeljust acquired the decoded telegrams,

and did not even need to organize itself a unit for decoding the Japanese codes

in Russia.

7. Tite Intelligeitce (]olgaboratiome aitd Ias Pumpose

In France, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Army had cooperated with

each other in deeoding the Italian diplomatic code cencerning the Dreyfus AEfair

since the end of the Nineteenth Century.`9 The imits of decoding for a long time

must have been snccess of the Service Criptogrophiqble founded in 1 904. Not

only because of these result, but also because it would have been expedient fbr France to gather information on the belligerent of its allied power, the Stirete Ge'ne'rate started te decode the lapanese telegrams soon after the outbreak of

the Russo-Japanese War.50

The above reason is supported by the fact that tens of decoded documents remained in the euai d'ersay. The Sarete Gene'vale addressed the decoded and translated telegrams to the protocol seetion, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mollard,

chief of the section, had been a secretary of the French embassy iit St.Petersburg

between 1897 and 1902.5i He should have been one of a few authorities on

Russia in the French diplomatic circles at the beginning of the TXnrentieth Century

He up and redirected some important information to the Foreign picked 'are 'Ibday, Minister's Secretariat. therefore, the documents filed in the Ptxpiers Delcasse'.

The J'apanese telegrams in the French dipiomatic archives concern the French violation of its neutrality and the holding of the Russo-Japanese peace conference.S2 In the spring of 1905, when France permitted the Russian Baltic

Fleet to anchor off its colony in Indochina, theugh it declared neutrality at the beginning of the war, Japan protested against this violation of international law.S3

When Germany which came into conflict with France over the Moroccan

problem became intimate with Russia, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs set al)out mediating the peace between Russia and Japan fbr the sake of fastening Russian reliance.j" The ministry was greatly interested in the Japanese response

toward French violatjon of neutrality and the peace with Russia, The French government took such a position in public that there was no relationship between the foreign polices stationed in Paris and the Sfirete

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Ge'ne'nale.SS Why did it give important information on Japan to the OkhFuna in secret? Because the French, unable to contro} anarchist activities, also desired the Russians to offer necessary information, for example concerning the Russian exiles in France, in return the Snrete 6e'ne'ncile, on the one hand. prepared the precious information for Russia, and on the other, tried to utilize the Okhrana in order to gather concemed information. The Okhrana established the Zdgranichinaia Agentura (Foreign Agency) in France in 1882 fbr the purpose of observing Russian e'migre's in Europe who promoted revolutionary thought and were in danger of undertaking terrorism.

RI.Rachikovskii, chief of the agency, had mainiy become operative in Paris

until 1902. L.A.Rataev was appointed to his successor, and kept watch on the

Russian revolutionary movements there.56 For exainple, Evno AzeL chief of the

fighting organization of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party and also a

double agent of the Okhrana, sent a number of reports to Rataev. The agency got wind of the dangerous anti-Tsarist movement: some opposition parties in Western Europe strengthened the sense of solidarity against the Tsar; the Russian revolutionaries, the liberalists, and the minority nationalists all over the Russian Empire planned forjoint uprisings; the Japanese gave them subsidies to promote their solidarity and uprising.57

The Subsection of International Espionage and Investigation was established for the sake ofintelligence against Japan in the Osobyi Otdel in June 1904 and

Manuilov became its chief. This section at first obtained the fruits of French decoding and then watched the possibility of Japanese sabotage against the Baltic Fleet. When it observed the Japanese military and naval attach6s in Westem Europe, this section dis¢ overed by chance Akashi's manoeuvres in Paris.

Manuilov had to often travel between St.Petersburg and Paris. That is the reason

why the two different Russian police organizatjons existed together in Paris at the same time. Both, however, were not able to establish a good relationship vvith each other. Manuilov spent much money and gathered a huge amount of infbrmatien on

Akashi and his collaborators including some exaggerated and mistaken observations, by which he was regarded as an ufldesirable person in St.Petersburg. Rataev also suspectedAkashi as a supporter of the revolutionary movernent and dispatched the same kind of information. But the information gathered by both

organizations was complicated to some extent. That is the reason why the chief

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of the Police Department dismissed Manuilov from his section and made the Ztzgranichinaia Agentura stop its activities in Paris in the summer 1905.S8 Of course, the Russians were not able to obstruct the planned uprising, though it was finally unsuccessfu1 because of insufficient preparatjon by the opposition partles. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs paid great attention to japanese diplomacy in Europe. For instance, Russia proposed Paris as the veRue for the Russia and peace conference, when the atmosphere of conciliation between Japan arose in June 1905.j9 There was, of course, a close relationship between this proposal and the fact that the Okhrana succeeded for intercepting and decoding Japanese telegrams in France. If the conference were to be held in

Paris and Japan were to use the same code, the Russians must have known Japanese tactics regarding the peace to a certain extent. That proposal was neglected finally, because Japan expressed disapproval of holding the conference

in the capital of the Russian ally. Russian diplomats were surely planning to

utilize the results of their decoding. The Russian Navy was most dependent en the intelligence of the Police 'I[here Department. were many kinds of rumours in Europe that Japanese torpedo

boats would ambush and attack the Baltic Fleet somewhere on its long trip from

Eurepe to the Far East. So the Narvy had to investigate the possibility of a Japanese attack. It, however, was practically impossible to establish its own tntelligeiice lletwork in the long voyage route toward Europe, Afriba, and Asia. That is the

reason why the Navy paid a lot of funds to the Police Department requesting information from Europe for the sake of examining the situation in the Baltic

Sea, the North Sea, and the Black Sea coasts.60

8. The Resuets of Collaboration anci Japauese Co-nteurmeasanres

Russia paid intelligence funds to the Sarete Ge'ne'rate, It ordered the PT in Paris to offer the copies of Japanese diplomatic telegrams. The Service Criptogiziphique decoded them and the results translated inte Hrench were given to the Russians. It employed agents and made them observe 3apanese officers and officials in Europe, copy their documents in secret, and offered the information te the Russian. The intelligence collaboration succeeded with the use of Russian money and French labour. It also means that the Okhrana had

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not prepared enough fbr its own intelligence network in Western Europe. It was

indispensable for the Russians to collect Japanese tnformation for the supreme

purpose of the victory over Japan. In order to avoid military defeat in the Faar

East, the expense of intelligence was to be sustained, It was even necessary fbr

the French to collect the informatioR on the'Japanese in Europe fbr the purrposes of its foreign policy toward Japan. It need not be said in this sense that the Russian proposal was convenient for the Sthete Ge'ne'rale. The intelligence

collaboration was realised not only because of the Franco-Russian Alliance but also because of rhe coincidence of the both interests. The decoding of Japanese telegrams is rather ditficult to explain oR]y by the reason of the intelligence collaboration between Russia and France. A third

collaborator existed. It was Japan which had been careless in its management

of secrets. Akashi and his collaborators relaxed their vigilance over Russian

intelligence, when they sent and received letters in the territory of the Russian ally. It is rather preposterous that Akashi just went out without important

documents when he left his hotel room in Paris. No one must be surprised that the expos6 was published in Russia. According to the Japanese diplomatic code, neither the Ministry of Foreign

Athirs in [Ibkyo nor Japanese legations abroad changed the habit of writing

telegrams in English, though the new cryptographic system using their native

language was introduced. I have great misgivings about the bureaucratic attitude of Japanese diplomats who did not hesitate to use the old code. Furthermore,

the slipshod control of the codebook in the Hague led to the code being decoded. Moreover the staff did not burn the drafts of important telegrams but just cut them up by hand and threw them away in the trash box. The important documents

were inevitably stolen by a agent smuggled into the legation there. Even though,

when Hirobumi Ito, the fomner Prime Minister, asked as to the re]iability of the Japanese code just before the Portsmouth peace conference, Kumataro Honda, ``I chief of the telegraph section in the Japanese delegation, answered, believe it

iS very safe".6i

After the end of the war, the extent of Russian decoding was ascertained. Motono, Minister to Paris, telegraphed using the new cryptographic system on

September 8, 1905, soon after the end .of the war that the old diplomatic code had been decoded.62 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had used the same code

from the end of the Nineteenth Century to the beginning of September 1905,

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but barely stopped using the diplomatie alphabet code and writing telegrams in English. The carelessness of the codebook control, the countermeasures by the belligerent agents in Europe and the superficial understanding of the diplomatic

rlbkyo code in made the Japanese management of secrets prone to fault during ' the Russo-Japanese War. Not only in Europe but even in the Far East, Japanese infbrmation was stolen. The Russians intercepted Japanese telegrams in Shanghai fer most of the war.63 It can not be asserted, however, that bnly Japan did not attach importance to the information, because Russia was not much more cautious in its management of secrets, either. Masunosuke Odagiri, General-Consul to Shanghai, and Ybsuke Matsuoka, its Charge' d'AXfaii?s, smuggled an agent to the otlfice of the Russian military attach6 to acquire the evidence of interception in 1905.6` Japan had

'Ibkye tapped the telegrams between the Russian military attach6 in and the General Staff in St.Petersburg, and had grasped their contents since the rniddle of the 1890s.65 When a system of managing secrets is put into practice on a world scale, on the one hand, each member concerned must be cautious in its operation. It is the use of the same not easy to prevent each member from lesing attention, if system lasts fbr a long time. On the other hand, a group which wants to gather secret information, becomes so eager as to watch an unguarded point. When the this group hits upon a small mistakes, it is not be unimaginable to break code. If the same system can be operated for a long petiod, it is needless to say that the possibility of decoding increases highly. Franco-Russian intelligence collaboration succeeded exactly because of Japanese unskil]fulness management of secrets. Can this success be contributed to the tide of the war or not? Russia was able to obtain a Iarge number of

rllokyo correspondence between and the Japanese legation in Paris. As it had of collected and analysed information on the belligerent for many months, it, course, must have grasped somewhat the Japanese diplomatic sta"ce. The Russia and France. legation, however, mostly dispatched information concerning of incitingthe Japan had not planned any manoeuvre except Akashi's operation Russian revolutionary parties. Therefore, jt was impossible for the Japanese to send or receive information about sabotage. The Russians were mistaken in their fbrecast of the existence of Japanese sabotage of the Baltic Fleet in Europe. Eyen by using these intelligence results, the Okhrana was not able to arrest

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Japanese agents in Russia. The intelligence against Akashi's manoeuvre was

interrupted by the internal conflict with the police in the summer of 19e5. Even if France knew of the information on the Japanese protest against the French violation ef international law, it did not intend to change its diplomacy.

Russia could not improve the war sit'uation, though it succeeded in its intelligence. It was rather difficult for Russia to ensure its predominance in strategy ancl tactics, even if it understood more or less the direction ofJapanese

diplomacy by the use of decoded diplomatic t.elegrams. Nevertheless, the

Russians continued this espionage, probably because of the anxiety which the Russian high-ranking officials and officers maintained at their depths of mind.

Curiosity which a human being can not inhibit made the Russians collect

information on Japanese activities.

NOTES

"D6chiffirement 1. Christopher Andrew, et Diplematie: Le cabinet noir du Quai d'Orsay sous laTroisieme R6publique", Relations interncttionales, No,5, (1976), pp.37-64. 's 2. AKASHI Motojiro, Rakka ryusui: CotonelAko.yhi Report on His Secret Coopetution with ihe Russian Revoltttionarly Ptzrties durin'g the Russo-Jopanese Uexr, trans.Inaba Chiharu, ed.Olavi K.Falt and Antti Kop'ala, (Helsir]ki, 1988), pp.48-49. 3. Ignanka Revotiu.tsii: !,bonzhennoe vozstanie v Rossii na faponski.ia sFedstva, (S.PeterbuTg, 19e6),

"Revolutionljre t`Die 4. als Sdldlinge japans'], Berliner 7bgeblatt, 21 Jun. 1906. Japaner sind schuld", BerZiner Morgeupost, 22 Jun, 1906.

5. Iwao Oyama, Chief of the General Staff, to Akashi, order No.6 in March 1905, Aka,fhi A4btojiro llapers No,104, Kensei shirye shitsu, Natienal Diet Library, Tt,kyo, 6, [Ibkaji Kemori,Akashi Motqiiro I, ([[bkyo, 1968), pp.211-12, 7. See, Iznankcz revoliutsii 8. Konni Zilliacus, Sortovuesitta; feliittisia muistelmia, (Helsinki, 1920), pp.168-69. 9, Mchiro sen'eki no sai teikokcf ni oite juryojoho k.yoku settchi narabi nijuryo kankei zassan, 'Ibkyo. [S.2,8.1O], Diplomatic Record Office, 1O. T:sentralnyi GosudarstvennyiArkhiv Oktiabi:shai Rvoliutsii, SxTsshikh organov gosudans'tvenvi vtasti i organov gosucJanstvennogo apravlemiia ssSRt Elpvavochnik, 1[bm I (Do revoliutsionnyi peried), (Moskva, 1 990), p.15,

"Reshia 11. See, Chiharu Inaba, kokuritsu monjekan ni miru Nichiro senso chu no nihon kanren monjo: Roshia himitsu keisatsu ni nusumareia denpe, shokan", Shakai kagaku tokyu Ne, 1 1 2, (March, 1993).

"O 'protiv I2. predosuditelnoi Rossii deiatel'nosti iaponskoge polkovnika Akashi i ego sotrudnikov DekanQzi, Ziliakousa i dr", (II{RF, Fond 102, DP OO, Opis' 316, 1904, Delo

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28, For example, Russian translation ofAkashi's letter to Dekanozi on November 18, 1904 (list 4, the number written by pencil in ai1 the files) coincides with the translation printed in knanka nevoliulsiiis p.5, and the copy of Zi]]iacus' Setter to Akashi on April 25, 1905 (I.12)

did with its p,9.

report No,125 on May 3, 1905, (IARF, F102, DP OO, Op.316, 1904, D.28, 1.4B- 13, Manuilov's ' ' 51.I4.

"Doklttd Ibid, 1,202-222, T.F.Manasevicha-JVIanuilova RI. Rachkovskomu", Tlainy Rbtssko-

Japonskoi voinM (Moskva, 1993), pp.95-i39,

"Rappoit 15. "Rapport sur la surveillance du coloriel japonai$ AKASHI", de la surveillance excrcee sur Koni Ziliacus a Hambeurg", GARE F. 102, DP OO, 1904, Op.316, D.28, l.71- 75,1.142-lt7. "Raznye 16. Manujlev's report on October 7 [the Julian calendar], 1904, svedeniia lcasaiushchiesia russl

I 8. There are a large number of Japanese documents in the files sent by Manuilov. (IIARE E102, DP OO, Op,316, 1904-}I, D.1, ch.2, ch.3, and ch.4.

I9. For exainple, the contents ef running hand written letter from Ichiro Moteno, iapanese

Minister to Paris, to Mitsuhashi on October 14, 1904 is very different from its Russian

translation, CIARE E102, DP OO, Op.316, 1904-II, D, 1, ch.4, 1.65, l,59.

"Russian 20. D.B.Pavlov, Counterintelligence during the Russo-Japanese War 1904-I 905", Paper presented at the 2Sth National ConventioR of theAmerican Association for Advanc ¢ ment of

Slavic Studies, Honolulu, November 20, 1993,

21, GARE E102, DP OO, Op,316, 19e4-II, ]).1, chA, 1.75.

"Roshia 22. Inaba, kokuritsu moajokani', pp.246-5] . 23.David Karn, Codebieakers: lke Sto,y ofSectet W,"i.ting, (New Ybrk, 1967). pp.xiii-xiv. 24,Junko Nagata, Ango, ([Ibkyo, 1985), pp.l47-S9, p.167. junko Nagata, NL;.gata ango juk}t `tKana Fcbruary nyunton, (Tbl

Diplematic Record OEfice, Tbkyo. 26. There is no code telegram cncoded duiiug the Russo-Japanese War in the Diplomatic Record Office, :bkyo. These are only in the DP OO Papers: GARE E1 02, DP OO, Op.316, 1904-II,

D. 1, ch.4, 1,56-S7.

L`Kana 27. liugo shiye kokoroe sho".

28. See. Note No.25.

29. Gaishi Nagaoka, Vice-Chiefof the General Staff; [R)kyo, to thro Utsunomiya, Military Attach6 San to London, and to Akashi, telegram (no number) on 31.8.1904, Me4ii 37-nen 8-gatsu,

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tsu tuduri, [Daihon'ei, Nichiro sen'eki, M37-l], Library of Military History Department, DefenseInstitute,[[bkyo.

30. Ybshitaro Mori, Naval Attache to Shanghai, to Makote Saito, Vice-Minister of the Navy,

Tokyo, telegram on April1,1904,Meiji3Z 8-nen senji shorui lhl.1.1,.loho hokoku No.2, [11, Nichiro senshe, M37/38-1l], Maketo Kaburagi, Naval Attach6 to London, to Saito, telegram on October I6, 1904, Meiji 3Z 8-nen seqfi shortti W)L13, Jbho hokoku IVb.4, [11, Nichiro sensho, M37/38-13], Library of Military History Department, Tbkyo. Tlakouchi [Saneteru Ich'ijo, Naval Attach6 to Paris].te 1[lasogare [Yinko Ito, Ch{ef of the Naval Staff],

telegram on September 13, 1904, (L4RF, F.1e2, DP OO, Op.316, i904-II, D,l, ch.3. 1.282. There are some telegrams encoded by the naval attach6 code in this file.

"International 31, Chiharu Inaba, :lelecommunications during the Russe-Japanese War: the

Developments o'f the Te]egraph Service between Europe and Japan and the Russian Interception ef Japanese Tblegrams", 71he Studies No.32, (Tbyo Eiwa College, ] 993), pp.32- 34.32.

G4RF, F.102, DP OO, Op.316, 1904-II, D.I, ch.1, 1.I97.

33. Komura to Motono, telegram on June 7, 1904, anRF, R102, PP OO, Op,316, 1904-II, D.1,

ch.I,1.206,

34. Manuilov to Direktor Departamenta Polichii, report No.151 on June 3, 1904, GARF, Fl102,

DP OO, Op.316, 1904-II, D,1. ch.l, L139.

35. (IIARF, El02, DP OO, Op.316, 1904-II,-D.1, ch.1, l.206-56.

36, Komura to Motonu, telegram Ne.172 on July 30, 1904, GARE F.102, DP OO, Op,316,

1904-II, D,1, ch.3, l.67.

37. {M4RF, F. 102, DP OO, Op,316, 1904-II, D,1, ch.1, 1,229-33.

38. Nagata (1985), pp.344-408. 39. RE.Shchegolev, Okhranniki i avantiuristi, (Muskva, 1930), p. 10e.

"Reshia 40. enRF, E102, DP OO. Op.316, l904-TI, D.1, ch.4, 1.76, Inaba, kokuritsu moajokan", pp.252.

tfAttach6s '?Xttach6s 41. Militaires, Russie, 1900-l904", Dossier 7N1476, and Militaires, Japon,

1903-1907", D.7N1701, Service Historieue de l'Arme'e de 7lerre, Paris, There are a few

hundred documents from L.E.Meulin, Military Attach6 to St.Petersburg, to the Minister of War in the fonner dossier, ancl from Corvisart, Miiitary Attach6 to Tokyo, in the latter. 42,Almanach Ndtional, pour 1904, (PaTis. 1904), p,147, There are a large number of reports and clocuments on foreigners in the F' : I]btice Ge'ne'rale, Ai=hives Ndtionates, Paris. Especially on RA.Kropotkin and G.VLPIekhanov. See Michel Lesttre, Les Soucres de l'Histoire de Russie aux A,z'hives IVdtionates, (Paris, 1970), pp.67-7l.

43.Komura to Koshi Paris (Legation Japon), telegram on 8 March I904, Iguchishosho to

"T616grammes Hisamat$u Legation Japon Paris, on 7/3104, chitlf're's, r9 Fevrier-27 Mars l904", Ch(fiChe secret No,6, D.F7i2829, Archives NLitionales, Paris.

"France-Russie, 44. 1898-1914i', fupiers Delcasse' Vbl.1 1,AfThives du Ministere des Relations

Exte'rieunes, Puris,

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"France-Russie, 45. The memorandum by the director of Snrete 6e'ne'raie on April 3, 190S, 1898-1914",

46, K{}mura to Motono, telegrarn Ne.275 on November 9, 1904, Hayashi [llladasu. Minister to "France-Russie, London] to Motono, transmitted telegram No.174 from [[bkyo, I898-1914".

"Note 47. Haverna, sur 1'Organisation et le Fonction"ement du Service Criptographique de la SOrete G6n6raie", on September 7, 1917, Nbtes sur Ies potices titrangaresfonctionnant en A rchives Ndtionates,'Paris, Fnctnce, D.F7 1.4605 , 48. Kahn, op.cit., pp.244-9. . 49.Jbid.,pp.255-63.

50. See Note No.46.

51.Annuaire Di'plomatiq"e et Consttiaire de la Ropubliq"e I;},angaisepour J923, (Paris, 1923), p.273. 52. See Note No.43.

'eki 53. Komura to Moteno, telegram No.I04 on April 18, 1905, NichiFo sen kankei kakkoku no

"Meiji churitsu zakken (Futsukoku no bu), [5.2,14,8], Diplomatic Record Office, Tbkyo. 37, 8-nen Nichirojiken ni taisuru rekkeku no taido", Gaimusho hokoku, ll1, Nichire, M37- 341], Library of Military History, Tokyo. Nihon gaiko monjo, Niehiro senso Vbl.1, (Tbkyo, 1958),pp.533-34.

54, Ni,chiiv senso-shi no kenkyu, ed.Seizaburo Shinobu and Jiichi Nakayama, (Tbkye, 1972), p.316, "La 55. Peliee Tusse en France'i, D.F'14605,AiThives Alationates, Paris. d`Zfigiunichnaia S6. Rechard J,Johnson, Agentu iu: The Tsarist Political Police in Europe", Jbumal & Oleg qf Contemporary History, Vbl,17, No,1-2, (l 972), pp.221-4. ChristopherAndrew Gordievsky, KGB: 71Pie Inside Story ofIts Iibreign (2perationsf}oin Lenirz to Gorhachev, (London, 1990), pp.42-46, "Deneseniia 57. Evno Azefa (Perepiska Azefa s Rataevym v 1903-1905 gg)", Byloe: Zhurnat' posviashchennyi istorii osvoboditeg'nago dvizheniia, No.1 (23), Iiul' 19l7, pp.196-22S. Pis 'ma Azefin: J893-191Z sostD.B.Pavlov & Z.I.Peregudova, (Moskva, 1994), pp.1 16-32. Rakka ryusui, pp, 148-164. Chiharu Inaba, Akashi kosaku: Botlyaku no Alichiro senso, (Tbkyo, 1995),pp.127-54.

"[aponskie 58. D.B.Pavlov, S.A.Petrov, den'gi i Russkaia revoliutsiia", 7Ziiay Russko-Iaponskoi

U)iny, pp.39-S4.

59, 1(bm"ng gaiko-shi Vbl,2, ed, Gaimusho, ([lbkyo, i953), p,5.

60. See Note No,20,

61. Honda Kumataro, 72xmashii no gaiko: Nichiio senso ni okeru Kbnzuru ko, ([Ibkye, 194E), pp.167-8, on September 8,I905, 62. Motono to Katsura [ftLre, Foreign Minisger, telegram No 177 and 179 Meiii 38-nen 9-gatsu Raiden, No.14572, 14576. TEL 65, Checklist qfArchives in the Jdepanese

Ministry of R)reign Afilriirs. 7bkyo, lapan, i868-1945, Microfilmed for the Library of

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Congress.

"International 63. Inaba, [Ik)lecommunications", p.35, 64.Ibid.,p36,

65. The Russian General Staff to Tbkyo, secret order on July 29, 1897, Ianshul, Tbkyo to the

General Staff, telegram on August 3, 1897, Meiji 30-nen 8-gatsu, Hi ho, [Bunko, Chiyoda ' shiryo, 472], Library of Military History, [[bkyo. ' '

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