Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction
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Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF Document 109 Filed 06/24/21 Page 1 of 25 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION NETCHOICE, LLC d/b/a NETCHOICE, a 501(c)(6) District of Columbia organization; and COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS Civil Action No.: INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION d/b/a CCIA, a 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF 501(c)(6) non-stock Virginia corporation, Plaintiffs, v. ASHLEY BROOKE MOODY, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Florida; JONI ALEXIS POITIER, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Florida Elections Commission; JASON TODD ALLEN, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Florida Elections Commission; JOHN MARTIN HAYES, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Florida Elections Commission; KYMBERLEE CURRY SMITH, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Florida Elections Commission; and PATRICK GILLESPIE, in his official capacity as Deputy Secretary of Business Operations of the Florida Department of Management Services, Defendants. PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF Document 109 Filed 06/24/21 Page 2 of 25 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS. ................ 1 A. The State Cannot Evade Strict Scrutiny. ............................................... 1 Editorial Judgments Are Protected Speech........................................... 1 PruneYard and FAIR Are Not On Point. ..............................................3 Turner Confirms Strict Scrutiny Is Required. ....................................... 5 The “Common Carrier” Theory Fails. ................................................. 6 B. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny. ........................................... 8 i. The Act Does Not Advance Any Substantial Interest. ................. 9 ii. The Act Lacks Any Tailoring.....................................................11 C. The Act’s Vagueness Exacerbates the Burden on Speech. .................12 D. The Act is Preempted by Section 230. ................................................13 II. THE EQUITABLE FACTORS FAVOR AN INJUNCTION. ......................14 i Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF Document 109 Filed 06/24/21 Page 3 of 25 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Page(s) Arizona Free Enter. Club v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011) ............................................................................................ 10 Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021) .......................................................................................... 7 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) .............................................................................................. 8 Divino Grp. LLC v. Google LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3245 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2021) ....................................... 13 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) .............................................................................................. 7 Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................ 2 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) .....................................................................................passim Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) .......................................................................................... 1, 9 Murphy v. Twitter, Inc., 60 Cal. App. 5th 12 (2021) ................................................................................. 13 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) ............................................................................................ 12 Nat’l Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976) .............................................................................. 7 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) .................................................................................... 8, 11 Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2020) .............................................................................. 2 ii Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF Document 109 Filed 06/24/21 Page 4 of 25 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. CPUC, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) .............................................................................................. 4, 8 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) ............................................................................................ 3, 4 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) .............................................................................................. 5 Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) ........................................................................................ 3, 4, 5 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) ........................................................................................ 2, 10 Turner Broadcasting Systems v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) ................................................................................ 5, 6, 8, 11 Vigue v. Shoar, 494 F. Supp. 3d 1204 (M.D. Fla. 2020) .............................................................. 14 Wollschlaeger v. Governor, Fla., 848 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) .................................................................... 11, 12 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) .............................................................................................. 8 Zhang v. Baidu.com, 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) .................................................................... 6 Other Authorities U.S. CONST., amend. I ....................................................................................passim iii Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF Document 109 Filed 06/24/21 Page 5 of 25 The State defends a law very different from the one Florida actually enacted. The Act does not regulate the “conduct” of “common carriers” or impose only “incidental” burdens on speech. It overrides online services’ protected editorial judgments, interfering with the messages those judgments express and making the State the ultimate arbiter of private companies’ speech. Florida cannot mandate such “enforced access”—even in the name of “enhanc[ing]” speech, promoting “fairness,” or addressing supposedly “vast accumulations of unreviewable power in the modern media empires.” Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 245, 250-51 (1974). Technology changes, but the First Amendment endures. The Act should be enjoined. I. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS. A. The State Cannot Evade Strict Scrutiny. Defendants do not seriously dispute that the Act’s core provisions are content- based. Nor do they dispute that the Act singles out particular speakers for burdens while privileging others. These features alone warrant strict scrutiny (PI 23-32), and Defendants’ efforts to evade that standard fail. Editorial Judgments Are Protected Speech. Defendants are wrong in suggesting that the only speech implicated here is that of the online services’ users. Opp. 18-19, 22-23. The First Amendment limits government, not private actors, and Florida is restricting the services’ protected speech—their editorial judgments about Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF Document 109 Filed 06/24/21 Page 6 of 25 whether and how to display user content. PI 21-23. “[P]resentation of an edited compilation of speech generated by other persons … fall[s] squarely within the core of First Amendment security.” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995). It is those editorial judgments that the Act not only burdens, but flatly proscribes. The State is equally wrong in claiming that the Act regulates conduct, not speech. Opp. 30-31. “Labeling certain … communications ‘speech’ and others ‘conduct’ is unprincipled and susceptible to manipulation.” Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 865 (11th Cir. 2020). That is especially so here, where the editorial functions have long been recognized as speech, and the Act both prohibits posting addenda and compels sweeping disclosures. “Both on its face and in its practical operation, [Florida’s] law imposes a burden based on the content of speech and the identity of the speaker.” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011). Enforcing standards about subjects like hate speech, pornography, or disinformation expresses a message about the nature of the online community and what its moderator finds objectionable. No additional speech is needed for such expression to be protected. Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1243-45 (11th Cir. 2018). That such editorial judgments 2 Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF Document 109 Filed 06/24/21 Page 7 of 25 may take place behind the scenes (Opp. 31) is irrelevant—just as it is when newspapers reject op-eds. It is also untrue that only “highly selective” newspapers or “parades” expressing a “common theme” enjoy constitutional protection. Opp. 21-23. “[A] private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569-70. Newspaper op-ed pages, for example, have no “common theme”—they collect disparate perspectives. Similarly, that some online services choose to host a wide range of views and topics is no basis for curtailing their First Amendment