DOCSLIB.ORG

Theoretical Frames on Pathways to Violent Radicalization

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Theoretical Frames on Pathways to Violent Radicalization Theoretical Frames on Pathways to Violent Radicalization Understanding the Evolution of Ideas and Behaviors, How They Interact and How They Describe Pathways to Violence in Marginalized Diaspora August 2009 TABLE OF CONTENTS ARTIS Research & Risk Modeling .. 3 Project Team . 4 Executive Summary (Scott Atran and Richard Davis) ... .. 5 Hofstad Case Study & The Blob Theory (Marc Sageman)............................................ ... 13 Madrid Case Study (Scott Atran with Marc Sageman) 30 Hebron Case Study (Scott Atran).................................................................................. ... 59 Toward a Social-Cognitive Theory of Radicalization (Jeremy Ginges) ... 74 Appendix A: Hofstad . 82 Appendix B: Madrid . 100 Appendix C: Hebron . 111 2 ARTIS RESEARCH & RISK MODELING ARTIS is a scientific research group institute dedicated to improving understanding of collective political and cultural violence and risk assessment and modeling through field-based research. At ARTIS, we believe that multidisciplinary field research is an essential ingredient to scientific research on human cognition and behavior. Consequently, we join together top scientists, universities and research institutions with policy makers and experts so that multidisciplinary field research can better enhance scientific understanding of political and cultural violence. 3 PROJECT TEAM Sponsor: Office of Naval Research Program Officer: Harold Hawkins Project Director: Richard Davis Principal Investigator: Scott Atran Co-Principal Investigator: Marc Sageman Investigator: Rogier Rijpkema Consultant: Jeremy Ginges Consultant: Dominick Wright 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Theoretical Summary (Concluding Hypothesis): As the result of our case studies, we hypothesize that the development of terrorist networks, plots and attacks resembles more the development of a complex system, with inherently chaotic and unpredictable characteristics, which can nevertheless be evaluated for probabilistic and path-dependent developments. Much like water that becomes heated to boiling, or even more like a soup with locally different densities and viscosities, it may be impossible in principle to precisely predict where the rising cones and bubbles will first appear; however, likely “neighborhoods” and path-dependent developments can be projected. Understanding the dynamic interaction of interpersonal behaviors, social emotions (e.g., moral outrage) and collectively distributed cognitions (including causal and moral construals of the world )is critical to projecting path-dependent developments. The growth and development of terrorist networks is largely a decentralized and evolutionary process, based on contingent adaptations to unpredictable events and improbable opportunities, more the result of localized tinkering (of fragmentary connections between semi- autonomous parts) than intelligent design (hierarchical command and control). As in any natural evolutionary process, individual variation and environmental context are the creative and critical determinants of future directions and paths. To ignore or essentialistically abstract away from variation and context is to entirely miss the character of natural group formation and development along with better chances for intervention and prevention of enemy attacks from the bottom up rather than the top down. Empirical Summary (Case Studies Content): Distinguishing networks of violent extremists from mere supporters. Many millions of people express sympathy with Al Qaeda or other forms of violent political expression that support terrorism, but relatively few willingly use violence. From a 2001ņ2007 survey of over 35 predominantly Moslem nations (with 50,000 interviews randomly chosen to represent about 90 percent of the Muslim world), a Gallup study projected that 7 percent of the worlds 1.3 billion Muslims (some 90 million people) felt that the 9/11 attacks were completely justified. If one includes Muslims who considered the attacks largely justified, their ranks almost double. And adding those who deemed the attacks "somewhat justified" boosts the number to 37 percent (which implies hundreds of millions of Muslims).1 But of the many millions who express support for violence against the out-group there only some thousands who show willingness to actually commit violence. Among Palestinians, although surveys conducted during the Second Intifada show that upwards of 80 percent of the population has supported suicide bombing,2 only a small percentage have been willing to follow through 1 J. Esposito, D. Morehead (2008) Who speaks for Islam? What a billion Muslims really think. Gallup Press. 2 See polls by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research at http://www.pcpsr.org/. 5 with such extreme action (for example, prior experiments and surveys by our research team indicate that most Palestinians who feel humiliation would not directly engage in violence, whereas those who feel moral outrage at the humiliation of others might).3 Our case studies indicate that those who do move on to violence, usually emerge in small groups of action-oriented friends. They often come from the same neighborhood and interact during activities such as soccer or extracurricular study groups. These young people self-mobilize to the tune of a simple, superficial, but broadly appealing takfiri message of withdrawal from impure mainstream society and of a need for violent action to cleanse it. It is a surprisingly flat, but fluid message pre-adapted to any new event in the world, which is readily shared by young people. Most of these young people are born again in their late teens and early twenties and have little knowledge of religion beyond the fact that they consider themselves true Muslims who must fight enemies near and far to defend their friends and the faith that makes their friendship meaningful and enduring. One telltale sign of radicalization in the move is when members of a neighborhood mosque or cultural center (or just an informal discussion group that meets at a bookstore or at picnics) gel into a militant faction that leaves, voluntarily or involuntarily. This is what happened, for example, when Ali al-Timimi and his group of paintball buddies were ejected from the Dar al- Arqam Cultural Center in Falls Church, Virginia after praising the 9/11 attack (12 members of the group were later convicted for aiding Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani group sympathetic to Al Qaeda), or when the soccer-playing Salafi Imam at the M-30 mosque in Madrid expelled Serhane Fakhet, El Tunecino, and friends (who continued to self-radicalize, playing soccer and picnicking together, in the lead up to the Madrid train bombings, see The Madrid Case). Marc Sageman has generalized this move from low-level community activism to high-stakes militancy in a counter-cultural cause within the framework of a Blob to BoG theory of radicalization (see The Hofstad Case). Soccer, paintball, camping, hiking, rafting, body building, martial arts training and other forms of physically stimulating and intimate group action create a bunch of buddies, which becomes a band of brothers in a glorious cause. It usually suffices that a few (usually at least two) of these action buddies come to believe in the cause, truly and uncompromisingly, for the rest to follow even unto death. Humans, like all primates, need to socially organize, lead and be led; however, notions of charismatic leaders going out or sending recruiters to brainwash unwitting minds into joining well-structured organizations with command and control is exaggerated. 3 J. Ginges, S. Atran (2008) Humiliation and the inertia effect: Implications for understanding violence and compromise in intractable intergroup conflicts. Journal of Cognition and Culture 8:281-294. Takfiris would excommunicate (takfir) fellow Muslims as lackeys of the infidel (kafir) and de facto apostates, and so justify killing them along with the infidels to save the Muslim community from conquest and corruption. Takfiri doctrine represents an extreme form of Salafism, and modern Salafism is historically related to Wahabism. But it is important to understand that Wahabis are not Takfiris, and neither are most Salafis. Just as Calvinism rejects opposition to the (Protestant) state, so a central tenet of Wahabism is loyalty to the (Saudi) State and rejection of violence against fellow (Sunni) Muslims. Nearly all Saudis are also Salafis, as are many if not most Egyptians. But for the most part, they reject Takfiri doctrine and often deeply oppose it (much as most Christian fundamentalists reject Christian supremacist doctrine). Unlike Hofstad, Madrid and other Al Qaeda wannabes, few Hamas militants express support Takfiri doctrine. 6 For the most part, the new wave of terrorism that expresses allegiance to Al Qaeda tends to be poorer, less educated and more marginal than the old Qaeda or its remnants. It relies to a greater extent for financing and personnel on pre-existing petty criminal networks because large-scale financing is easily tracked.. In his book Leaderless Jihad,4 Sageman finds that more recent formations of terrorist networks resemble previous waves insofar as they are built up around friendship and kinship; however, violent extremists today are more marginal relative to surrounding society. This new wave pattern of increasingly marginality and born-again religion is reflected in European and North African groups that express allegiance to Al Qaeda, as well as foreign fighters in Iraq (41 percent from Saudi Arabia and 39 percent from
Load more

Recommended publications
  • PERSPECTIVES on TERRORISM Volume 11, Issue 5
    ISSN 2334-3745 Volume V, Issue 5 October 2017 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 11, Issue 5 Table of Contents Welcome from the Editors......................................................................................................1 Articles Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons: A Review of Key Recent Research and Critical Research Gaps.........................................................................................................................2 by Andrew Silke and Tinka Veldhuis The New Crusaders: Contemporary Extreme Right Symbolism and Rhetoric..................12 by Ariel Koch Exploring the Continuum of Lethality: Militant Islamists’ Targeting Preferences in Europe....................................................................................................................................24 by Cato Hemmingby Research Notes On and Off the Radar: Tactical and Strategic Responses to Screening Known Potential Terrorist Attackers................................................................................................................41 by Thomas Quiggin Resources Terrorism Bookshelf.............................................................................................................50 Capsule Reviews by Joshua Sinai Bibliography: Terrorist Organizations: Cells, Networks, Affiliations, Splits......................67 Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes Bibliography: Life Cycles of Terrorism..............................................................................107 Compiled and selected by Judith
    [Show full text]
  • Reframing Sacred Values
    In Theory Reframing Sacred Values Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod Sacred values differ from material or instrumental values in that they incorporate moral beliefs that drive action in ways dissociated from prospects for success. Across the world, people believe that devotion to essential or core values — such as the welfare of their family and country, or their commitment to religion, honor, and justice — are, or ought to be, absolute and inviolable. Counterintuitively, understanding an opponent’s sacred values, we believe, offers surprising opportunities for breakthroughs to peace. Because of the emotional unwillingness of those in conflict situations to negotiate sacred values, conventional wisdom suggests that nego- tiators should either leave sacred values for last in political negotia- tions or should try to bypass them with sufficient material incentives. Our empirical findings and historical analysis suggest that conven- tional wisdom is wrong.In fact, offering to provide material benefits in exchange for giving up a sacred value actually makes settlement more difficult because people see the offering as an insult rather than a compromise. But we also found that making symbolic concessions of no apparent material benefit might open the way to resolving seem- ingly irresolvable conflicts. Scott Atran is research director in anthropology at CNRS — Institut Jean Nicod in Paris, a presidential scholar in sociology at the John Jay College of the City University of New York, and a visiting professor of psychology and public policy at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. His e-mail address is [email protected]. Robert Axelrod is Walgreen Professor for the Study of Human Understanding in the department of political science and in the Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan.
    [Show full text]
  • Violent Jihad in the Netherlands
    Violent Jihad in the Netherlands Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat Violent Jihad in the Netherlands Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat 2 Contents Foreword 5 Introduction 7 The murder of Theo van Gogh: consequences and effects 7 General trends in the development of jihadism 9 Framework of terms and definitions 10 1 From exogenous threat to home-grown terrorism 13 1.1 What is a jihadist network? 13 1.2 Historical development of network formation 15 1.2.1 The traditional phase: migration of jihadists 15 1.2.2 The proliferation phase: recruitment 16 1.2.3 The ‘home-grown’ phase: radicalisation and jihadisation 17 1.3 Three types of jihadist networks 17 2 Decentralisation and local implantation of international jihad19 2.1Al-Qaeda: from ‘network of gynetworks’ 19 to trademark and ideolo 2.2 Ideology of global violent jihad 21 2.3 Decentralisation of international jihad 22 2.4 Local implantation of international jihad 26 3 Radicalisation and the emergence of local networks 29 3.1Radicalisation, recruitment and jihadisation 29 3.2 The religious context of radicalisation 30 3.3 The socio-political context of radicalisation 33 3.4 The cultural and socio-psychological context of radicalisation 35 3.5 Emergence of local autonomous cells and networks 37 3.6 Backgrounds and functioning of local autonomous networks 38 3.7 The significance of the Hofstad network 39 4 Virtualisation of jihad 43 4.1The Internet as a propulsion of the jihad movement 43 4.2 Al-Qaeda as a virtual database (top-down) 44 4.3 The virtual umma (grass
    [Show full text]
  • Beyond Belief: Science, Religion, Reason and Survival the Conversation Continues
    Beyond Belief: Science, Religion, Reason and Survival The Conversation Continues Criticism of Beyond Belief by RP Bird It deeply annoys me when the Big Guns of science spout off about protecting science. Like the rest of us have our thumbs up our asses? I'm one of the thousands of Kansans who wrote to the state board of education complaining about the pseudo-science of Intelligent Design. I'm always short of money, but I gave a little to SEA when they started up operations. I've written letters to my state representatives and my congressmen on the subject of science and keeping religious ideas out of science education. So imagine my dismay when I read the NY Times account of the La Jolla meeting. Remember just before the Iraq war, when Middle Eastern experts warned Bush and the rest of us that invading Iraq would be confirmation of the worst fantasies of the jihadist movement? Congratulations, you've just done for science what Bush did for the USA in the Middle East. I can already hear the Christian Right: "We told you, they're out to get us!" Not only that, but you and others want to hurt the cause of science by adopting the methods of the Right? Are you nuts? If you adopt the methods of a religion, you make science into a religion. Also, what's with this "loyalty oath" everyone at the conference had to spout before being heard? No one will listen to them unless they declare the aren't religious? Isn't that what the Christian Right does? You of all people should know that the best defense of science is to do science and teach what you have learned.
    [Show full text]
  • Folk Biology and the Anthropology of Science Page 1 of 41
    Folk biology and the anthropology of science Page 1 of 41 Folk Biology and the Anthropology of Science: Cognitive Universals and Cultural Particulars Scott Atran Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CREA - Ecole Polytechnique) 1 rue Descartes 75005 Paris FRANCE and Institute for Social Research The University of Michigan Ann Arbor MI48106-1248 USA [email protected] Keywords Folk biology, taxonomy, cognitive universals, modularity, evolution, culture, Maya, anthropology Abstract This essay in the "anthropology of science" is about how cognition constrains culture in producing science. The example is folk biology, whose cultural recurrence issues from the very same domain- specific cognitive universals that provide the historical backbone of systematic biology. Humans everywhere think about plants and animals in highly structured ways. People have similar folk- biological taxonomies composed of essence-based species-like groups and the ranking of species into lower- and higher-order groups. Such taxonomies are not as arbitrary in structure and content, nor as variable across cultures, as the assembly of entities into cosmologies, materials or social groups. These structures are routine products of our "habits of mind," which may be in part naturally selected to grasp relevant and recurrent "habits of the world." An experiment illustrates that the same taxonomic rank is preferred for making biological inferences in two diverse populations: Lowland Maya and Midwest Americans. These findings cannot be explained by domain-general models of similarity because such models cannot account for why both cultures prefer species-like groups, despite the fact that Americans have relatively little actual knowledge or experience at this level. This supports a modular view of folk biology as a core domain of human knowledge and as a special player, or "core meme," in the selection processes by which cultures evolve.
    [Show full text]
  • Extremism and Terrorism
    Morocco: Extremism and Terrorism On November 14, 2020, the Polisario Front, a pro-independence group in the Western Sahara, declared war on Morocco, ending a ceasefire that has been in place for over three decades. The declaration of war came one day after Morocco launched a military operation in the U.N.-patrolled buffer zone as the Polisario Front allegedly blocked access to Mauritania, Morocco’s neighboring country, preventing the transfer of goods and people between the two countries. About a month later on December 10, 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Morocco agreed to establish full diplomatic relations, including formalizing economic ties, with Israel. The move is a part of a deal that includes U.S. recognition of the disputed territory of Western Sahara as part of Morocco. Morocco joins Bahrain, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates in normalizing diplomatic ties with Jerusalem. (Sources: Axios, New York Times, New York Times) On October 6, 2020, Moroccan authorities arrested four men allegedly linked to ISIS in Tangiers. According to the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations (BCIJ), the four suspects planned to “destabilize security in the kingdom,” by carrying out attacks similar to ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Similar raids were carried out by Moroccan authorities on September 11 in Rabat and July 7 in Nador, northeastern Morocco. The suspects in each raid were allegedly linked to ISIS and sought to carry out terror attacks against prominent figures and sensitive sites in the Kingdom. (Sources: Associated Press, Defense Post, Defense Post) On December 17, 2018, Moroccan authorities discovered the decapitated bodies of two female Scandinavian tourists at a campsite near Mount Toubkal.
    [Show full text]
  • Counting Casualties: a Framework for Respectful, Useful Records
    J Risk Uncertainty DOI 10.1007/s11166-006-9001-6 Counting casualties: A framework for respectful, useful records Baruch Fischhoff · Scott Atran · Noam Fischhoff C Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007 Abstract Counting casualties in conflict zones faces both practical and ethical concerns. Drawing on procedures from risk analysis, we propose a general approach. It represents each death by standard features, having either essential value, for capturing the social and cultural meaning of individual casualties, or instrumental value, for relating patterns of casualties to possible causes and effects. We illustrate the approach with the choices involved in attempts to record casualties in Iraq and the Israel-Palestine conflict, and with natural disasters, as exemplified by Hurricane Katrina. We advocate institutionalizing the approach, so that recording casualties increases understanding, rather than suspicion. Keywords Risk analysis . Risk characterization . Casualties . Conflict . Forensics JEL Classification D74 . D78 . D81 . F51 . H56 . I18 . N40 . Q54 Counting casualties is part of any conflict. The parties must do it both to monitor the conflict’s progress and to give it meaning (Department of Defense, 2005; Graham, 2005; Holt, 2006). Without accurate counts, the situation is obscured and the fallen are dishonored. If these failures appear deliberate, then they may aggravate the conflict, by adding insult to injury. Political scientists need these counts for their own reasons: creating narrative accounts, providing policy advice, and testing theories of conflict and reconciliation (e.g., Daponte, 2003; Epstein, 2002; Peterson, 2002; Walzer, 1992). The work is grim and challenging. The recorders face not only the risks of work in a conflict zone, but also the wrath of those who want the story told a particular way or not told at all.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa a ‘Thorn in the Neck’ of the United States?
    Islamist Terrorism in Northwestern Africa A ‘Thorn in the Neck’ of the United States? Emily Hunt Policy Focus #65 | February 2007 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any infor- mation storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. © 2007 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Published in 2007 in the United States of America by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036. Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication Front cover: A Nigerian girl walks past a wall displaying graffiti and political posters on the eve of presidential elections, April 18, 2003. Copyright AP Wide World Photos/Schalk van Zuydam. About the Author Emily Hunt is a former Soref fellow at The Washington Institute, where she studied North African terrorist net- works. Prior to joining the Institute, she worked as a terrorism consultant for the London security firm Aegis Defence Services. Ms. Hunt is currently a research fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center. She holds a master’s degree in war studies from King’s College, London, and a bachelor’s degree from the Univer- sity of St Andrews, Scotland. n n n The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors.
    [Show full text]
  • Morocco: Current Issues
    Morocco: Current Issues Alexis Arieff Analyst in African Affairs June 30, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21579 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Morocco: Current Issues Summary The United States government views Morocco as an important ally against terrorism and a free trade partner. Congress appropriates foreign assistance funding for Morocco for counterterrorism and socioeconomic development, including funding in support of a five-year, $697.5 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) aid program agreed to in 2007. Congress also reviews and authorizes Moroccan purchases of U.S. defense articles. King Mohammed VI retains supreme political power in Morocco, but has taken some liberalizing steps with uncertain effects. On June 17, the king announced he would submit a new draft constitution to a public referendum on July 1. The proposed constitution, which was drafted by a commission appointed by the king in March, aims to grant greater independence to the prime minister, the legislature, and the judiciary. Nevertheless, under the proposed constitution the king would retain significant executive powers, such as the ability to fire ministers and dissolve the parliament, and he would remain commander-in-chief of the armed forces. U.S. officials have expressed strong support for King Mohammed VI’s reform efforts and for the monarchy. Protests, which have been largely peaceful, have continued, however, with some activists criticizing the king’s control over the reform process and calling for more radical changes to the political system. Authorities have tolerated many of the protests, but in some cases security forces have used violence to disperse demonstrators and have beaten prominent activists.
    [Show full text]
  • The Trouble with Memes: Inference Versus Imitation in Cultural Creation Scott Atran
    The Trouble with Memes: Inference versus Imitation in Cultural Creation Scott Atran To cite this version: Scott Atran. The Trouble with Memes: Inference versus Imitation in Cultural Creation. Human Nature, Springer Verlag, 2001, 12 (4), pp.351-381. ijn_00000123 HAL Id: ijn_00000123 https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000123 Submitted on 3 Sep 2002 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. 1 Appeared in: Human Nature 12(4):351-381, 2001 THE TROUBLE WITH MEMES : INFERENCE VERSUS IMITATION IN CULTURAL CREATION Scott Atran CNRS – Institut Jean Nicod, Paris and The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Address for correspondence: CNRS, 9 rampe de l‟observatoire, 66660 Port Vendres, France Email: [email protected] 2 ABSTRACT (Word Count: 100) Memes are hypothetical cultural units passed on by imitation; although non-biological, they undergo Darwinian selection like genes. Cognitive study of multimodular human minds undermines memetics: unlike genetic replication, high fidelity transmission of cultural information is the exception, not the rule. Constant, rapid “mutation” of information during communication generates endlessly varied creations that nevertheless adhere to modular input conditions. The sort of cultural information most susceptible to modular processing is that most readily acquired by children, most easily transmitted across individuals, most apt to survive within a culture, most likely to recur in different cultures, and most disposed to cultural variation and elaboration.
    [Show full text]
  • 11 July 2006 Mumbai Train Bombings
    11 July 2006 Mumbai train bombings July 2006 Mumbai train bombings One of the bomb-damaged coaches Location Mumbai, India Target(s) Mumbai Suburban Railway Date 11 July 2006 18:24 – 18:35 (UTC+5.5) Attack Type Bombings Fatalities 209 Injuries 714 Perpetrator(s) Terrorist outfits—Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT; These are alleged perperators as legal proceedings have not yet taken place.) Map showing the 'Western line' and blast locations. The 11 July 2006 Mumbai train bombings were a series of seven bomb blasts that took place over a period of 11 minutes on the Suburban Railway in Mumbai (formerly known as Bombay), capital city of the Indian state of Maharashtra and India's financial capital. 209 people lost their lives and over 700 were injured in the attacks. Details The bombs were placed on trains plying on the western line of the suburban ("local") train network, which forms the backbone of the city's transport network. The first blast reportedly took place at 18:24 IST (12:54 UTC), and the explosions continued for approximately eleven minutes, until 18:35, during the after-work rush hour. All the bombs had been placed in the first-class "general" compartments (some compartments are reserved for women, called "ladies" compartments) of several trains running from Churchgate, the city-centre end of the western railway line, to the western suburbs of the city. They exploded at or in the near vicinity of the suburban railway stations of Matunga Road, Mahim, Bandra, Khar Road, Jogeshwari, Bhayandar and Borivali.
    [Show full text]
  • Violent Radicalization Jamie Bartlett a & Carl Miller a a Violence and Extremism Programme , Demos, London, UK Published Online: 06 Dec 2011
    This article was downloaded by: [UVA Universiteitsbibliotheek SZ] On: 16 March 2015, At: 07:25 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Terrorism and Political Violence Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20 The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non- Violent Radicalization Jamie Bartlett a & Carl Miller a a Violence and Extremism Programme , Demos, London, UK Published online: 06 Dec 2011. To cite this article: Jamie Bartlett & Carl Miller (2012) The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization, Terrorism and Political Violence, 24:1, 1-21, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2011.594923 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.594923 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
    [Show full text]