CENTRAL OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Views of a window inside the National Church of Nigeria (L) and the front of the Abuja National Mosque (R), on USCIRF visits to Nigeria in 2018. CENTRAL NIGERIA OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES

By Ferdaouis Bagga, Policy Analyst

FEBRUARY 2019

COMMISSIONERS Tenzin Dorjee Chair

Kristina Arriaga, Vice Chair Gayle Manchin, Vice Chair

Gary L. Bauer Anurima Bhargava Andy Khawaja Nadine Maenza Johnnie Moore Tony Perkins

Erin D. Singshinsuk Executive Director

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

WHO WE ARE WHAT IS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM The U.S. Commission on International Religious Free- Inherent in religious freedom is the right to believe or dom (USCIRF) is an independent, bipartisan U.S. federal not believe as one’s conscience leads, and live out one’s government commission created by the 1998 Interna- beliefs openly, peacefully, and without fear. Freedom of tional Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) that monitors the religion or belief is an expansive right that includes the universal right to freedom of religion or belief abroad. freedoms of thought, conscience, expression, associa- USCIRF uses international standards to monitor viola- tion, and assembly. While religious freedom is Ameri- tions of religious freedom or belief abroad and makes ca’s first freedom, it also is a core human right interna- policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary tional law and treaty recognize; a necessary component of State, and Congress. USCIRF Commissioners are of U.S. foreign policy and America’s commitment to appointed by the President and Congressional leaders defending democracy and freedom globally; and a vital of both political parties. The Commission’s work is sup- element of national security, critical to ensuring a more ported by a professional, nonpartisan staff of regional peaceful, prosperous, and stable world. subject matter experts. USCIRF is separate from the State Department, although the Department’s Ambas- sador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom is a non-voting, ex officio Commissioner. PROFESSIONAL STAFF Dwight Bashir, Director of Research and Policy Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Director of International Law and Policy Thomas Kraemer, Director of Operations and Finance Isaac Six, Director of Congressional Affairs and Communications Tina L. Mufford, Deputy Director of Research and Policy

Ferdaouis Bagga, Policy Analyst Jason Morton, Policy Analyst Dominic Nardi, Policy Analyst Scott Weiner, Policy Analyst Kurt Werthmuller, Policy Analyst

Keely Bakken, Researcher Alex Iverson, Researcher Patrick Greenwalt, Researcher Zach Udin, Research Assistant

Kirsten Lavery, International Legal Specialist Javier Peña, Communications Specialist Henry Young, Management and Program Analyst

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Table of Contents

Executive Summary ...... 1

Conflict in the Middle Belt Region...... 3

Addressing Hateful and Dangerous Speech ...... 5

Countering or Spreading Divisions: Media and Mass Messages ...... 7

Messages from Elites and Status Influencers in Public Fora ...... 9

Polarizing Narratives that Fuel and Reflect Religious Tensions...... 11

U.S. Policy and Support for NGO Initiatives...... 13

Conclusion and Recommendations...... 15

Executive Summary

n Nigeria, a range of state and societal violations be a flashpoint for further violence along ethnic and have adversely impacted religious freedom condi- religious lines, in part due to polarization and disinfor- Itions in the country. As a result, since 2009, USCIRF mation, voter suppression and intimidation, and other has recommended the U.S. Department of State threats to a peaceful process. designate Nigeria as a “country of particular concern,” A number of religious leaders, non-governmental or CPC. Some of the most egregious are the denials of organizations, and government actors have proposed the right to life, liberty, and the security of people on a range of solutions and made attempts to repair the basis of religion or belief. Divides between religious deeply entrenched religious divisions, such as making communities and the spread of dangerous speech statements condemning hate speech or participating that incites further violence often prompt or escalate in interfaith fora, with varied success. The United these violations. The Nigerian government has yet to States has also supported efforts to improve peace and find sustainable solutions to perennial conflict and security for Nigerian citizens to freely manifest their religious polarization. In addition, the terrorist group religion or belief. Towards that end, the U.S. Commis- Boko Haram has waged war in Nigeria for 10 years to sion on International Religious Freedom recommends eliminate religious freedom and impose an absolute that the United States increase its efforts to creatively religious authority in the northeast. State security and more effectively decrease religious discord, forces, too, have arrested, detained, and killed indi- dangerous speech, and violence in the Middle Belt. viduals over differences of religion or belief. Moreover, The U.S. government should utilize the tools available the longstanding problem of sectarian conflict around under the International Religious Freedom Act, and ethno-religious divides, resources, and property and enter into a binding agreement with the Nigerian citizenship rights between citizens in the Middle Belt government on commitments to improve religious region of the country escalated in 2018. freedom. Commitments could include enhancing Dangerous speech and polarizing narratives programs to counter hate speech and incitement to around religion have fueled violence, discrimination, violence based on religious identity; supporting the and segregation between Muslims and Christians for training of police and military officers on human decades, particularly, in central Nigeria. Some reli- rights standards and religious tolerance; and devel- gious and political leaders have warned that national oping tailored conflict prevention mechanisms at the and state elections in February and March 2019 could local, state, and federal levels.

OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 1

Conflict in the Middle Belt Region

onflict in the Middle Belt—a variously defined and cattle rustlers to wreak havoc indiscriminately region extending across multiple administra- across Nigeria. Finally, violence in this region can also Ctive geopolitical zones, including North-Cen- be a product of deep societal mistrust and historical tral Nigeria—arises from a web of issues and includes grievances between some religious and ethnic groups. violent clashes between farmers and herders. These Among the many diverse language and ethnic groups clashes also resemble farmer-herder conflict in other residing in the Middle Belt are the Adara, Bachama, parts of Nigeria and West Africa, and are a product Bassa, Berom, Fulani, Irigwe, and Tiv. Often these eth- of an intense competition for resources and liveli- nic groups are further defined according to a predom- hoods. The scale and sites of clashes are related to inant ethno-religious affiliation, such as “Christian high population growth, expansion of farms, and Bachama” or “Muslim Fulani.” environmental degradation in northern states. Inter- Although Boko Haram terrorist violence continues communal conflict is also interlinked with policies to make the northeast one of the most dangerous regions on “indigeneity” and citizenship. Although originally in Nigeria, reports indicate that in 2018 conflict in the intended as a protective measure, such policies have Middle Belt has had an even greater death toll and more marginalized certain ethnic and religious groups who human suffering. This is especially true in states to the may not be recognized as indigenous to their state east of the capital territory of Abuja, including Plateau, of residence. In addition, the proliferation of small Nasarawa, Benue, Taraba, and Adamawa states, which arms has empowered more criminal gangs, bandits, saw the most sectarian violence in 2018 (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Council on Foreign Relations Nigeria Security Tracker; states in descending order according to total number of deaths in 2018. SECTARIAN VIOLENCE BY STATEYEAR Benue Plateau Taraa Adaaa asaraa aduna ogi ross Rier aara Delta Eonyi atsina

100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200

TOTAL DEATHS

OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 3 Figure 2: Council on Foreign Relations Nigeria Security Tracker; with 2,037 total deaths from sectarian conflict recorded in 2018.

SECTARIAN VIOLENCE BY YEAR

TOTAL DEATHS TOTAL

YEAR

Moreover, some media reports and security and by Fulani militia, killed more than 200 people; Human violent incident trackers showed more violent incidents Rights Watch called this tragedy “a clear indication and fatalities due to intercommunal conflict, surpass- that the decades-long conflict has reached new levels of ing the damage due to Boko Haram attacks in 2018. brutality.” Finally, in October, clashes between Adara According to data analysis by the Council on Foreign Christian and Hausa Muslim youth militia resulted in Relations’ Nigeria Security Tracker, 2018 has seen more than 50 people killed. almost the same numbers of deaths from sectarian con- At the same time, other multi-religious areas flict as 2014, and almost double the number of deaths in in the Middle Belt have not seen such interreligious the Middle Belt region compared to 2017 (Figure 2). violence. Research has shown that unique factors, An Amnesty International report released in such as the existence of power-sharing institutions, December 2018 also indicates over 2,000 people were contribute to peace in some of these areas. The north- killed in violent clashes between members of farmer ern states of Kaduna and Zamfara, on the other hand, and herder communities, mostly in Middle Belt states. have seen a similar level and type of rural violence In Nigeria, religion has been and continues to be a continue in 2018, but not framed along religious powerful and exponential escalation factor in conflict. lines. Meanwhile, land disputes with high numbers An incident or crime involving a few people of different of fatalities, the displacement of thousands of people, religious, ethnic, or occupational identities can escalate and destruction of property occurred in southern if one community seeks collective revenge against the states such as Cross River. Indeed, the scope of the other group. In the past few years, conflicts based on conflict is unique to these geographic, demographic, ethnic and religious identity have killed thousands of and historical contexts, and does not assume the people and displaced tens of thousands. After a spike polarized religious dimensions of some areas in the in violence in Benue state in January 2018, thousands Middle Belt. mourned at the mass burial of the 73 victims. In an In addition to addressing the major security and attack in April thought to be perpetrated by herders, 19 governance challenges, particularly in rural parts of people were killed in a Catholic church during a mass Nigeria, non-military solutions are essential to grap- in Benue state. In June, in Plateau state, ethnic Berom pling with the complex issues of ethnic and reli- militias reportedly mounted roadblocks and stopped gious-based division and violence. Thus far, however, and killed passersby identified as Fulani or Muslim, but political and religious leaders have been unable to also sometimes targeted Christian enemies. In June, adequately promote peaceful solutions as interreligious attacks on multiple villages in Plateau state, reportedly relations continue to deteriorate.

4 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Addressing Hateful and Dangerous Speech

ate speech in Nigeria is used against many ing imminent violence (see UN Human Rights Council identity groups, including those based on Resolution 16/18 (2011)). Other types of hate speech Hethnicity, political opinion, religion, and com- should be countered through non-criminal measures, binations thereof, and has historically been amplified including dialogue, education, and counter-speech. around elections. For Nigerians, a variety of speech or Nigerian government and civil society actors insults could be considered “hate speech” – for exam- have taken a range of approaches to counter hate and ple, an insult to one’s family by someone of a different dangerous speech. Non-governmental organizations religion or ethnicity, or an assertion that one religion (NGOs) have conducted community discussions, radio is dominant (or has a higher share of the population) programs, and other activities across the country. in an area than another could be called hate speech. Political leaders and lawmakers continue to take strong In April 2018 the PeaceTech Lab published a lexicon of public stances against hate speech, often condemning it hate speech terms, outlining more than a dozen offen- or calling on fellow leaders to restrain from engaging in sive and inflammatory words and phrases and their it. Debate about criminalizing hate speech is ongoing, meanings in Nigeria. Although there is no universal and several bills to do so are still being considered, but definition for hate speech, the explains there is as of yet no federal law. Many Nigerians worry that hate speech is usually “any kind of communication that hate speech laws can be vague and inhibit freedom in speech, writing or behavior that denigrates a person of expression, but the public has expressed both resis- or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words tance to and support for recently proposed bills related based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, or to inflammatory speech. other identity factor. While all incitement to discrimi- In February 2018, Senator Aliyu Abdullahi, who nation, hostility, or violence is hate speech, not all hate represents Niger state, introduced a bill to criminalize speech constitutes incitement.” To focus on the poten- hate speech and incitement to violence on the basis of tial result of violence, experts have defined a specific ethnicity and religion. News reports noted that Abdul- subcategory of hate speech: “dangerous speech” is “any lahi’s drive to sponsor the bill was the “cases of religious form of expression that can increase the risk that its and ethnic violence experienced in the past years.” How- audience will condone or participate in violence against ever, Nigerians widely criticized the bill because it would members of another group.” demand death by hanging for any person guilty of hate Nigeria acceded to the International Covenant speech resulting in the death of another person. Also, the on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1993, which bill was seen as intending to target certain political par- requires in Article 20 that “Any advocacy of national, ties and prohibit speech critical of the government. Other racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement civil society and political actors have similarly called for to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be pro- a national hate speech law, increasingly so in the lead up hibited by law.” However, to avoid unduly restricting to the 2019 presidential election. Since 2017, prominent fundamental rights that the ICCPR protects, including religious leaders and civil society leaders have worked freedom of expression, this provision is interpreted together to promote a separate religious tolerance and narrowly, to mandate prohibition only of speech incit- hate speech bill that they view as important to deter

OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 5 further violence ahead of elections. In 2016, Kaduna state Figure 3: Tweets by Vice President Yemi Osinbajo in Governor El Rufai put forward a bill in that state to revise August 2017 a 1984 law to add sections aimed at stemming religious extremism and hate speech. The bill would charge committees from the leading Muslim and Christian organizations—the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)—with reviewing and granting permits for religious preaching as well as other regulation. The bill has not passed, however, due to opposition from Christian and Muslim leaders. This law is similar to other state-level laws that also regulate religious activities and which have been problematic for respect of freedom of religion or belief. At the same time, other laws have been used with- out naming hate speech directly but with the intention or effect of thwarting it. For example, the Cybercrime Act of 2015 outlines penalties for certain forms of hate speech and prohibits the distribution of “material which denies or approves or justifies acts constituting genocide or crimes against humanity.” This act crimi- nalizes any person who with intent threatens or insults publicly “through a computer system or network (i) persons for the reason that they belong to a group dis- tinguished by race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin, as well as religion, if used as a pretext for any of these factors; or (ii) a group of persons which is distin- guished by any of these characteristics . . .” In a Twitter thread in August 2017, Vice President Yemi Osinbajo declared that hate speech would be con- sidered “a specie” of terrorism (Figure 3) and tied it to acts prohibited under the Terrorism Prevention Act. He drew a link between hate speech and both intimidation and violence, and called on leaders not to remain silent in the face of such speech.

6 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Countering or Spreading Divisions Media and Mass Messages

n addition to legislative efforts, civil society actors and other means. WhatsApp, in particular, is often have taken up numerous projects aiming to counter used to spread hate and polarizing messages. Ihateful and dangerous speech, often in partner- Many Facebook posts and WhatsApp messages, ship with local religious leaders. Radio programs have which are widely shared and liked, decry the actions of been one successful means of addressing hate speech religious and ethnic groups. Users promote claims that with mass reach, discussing interreligious issues, and another group is playing the victim, lying, or violently encouraging civic engagement and nonviolent solu- attacking innocent people “on their side,” and accuse tions to local problems. In July, during a radio program the “other side” of protecting perpetrators of attacks. broadcast across 12 states, guest speakers and callers Such social media posts have the power to perpetuate discussed the drivers and impacts of ethnic and reli- stereotypes and the belief that different ethno-religious gious conflict and the roles citizens can play to end vio- groups will be perpetual enemies, and use language lence. In another radio program in October, civil society that dehumanizes other ethnic and religious groups. guest speakers, including religious leaders, discussed Despite efforts to combat inciteful messages on plat- politicians’ promotion of hatred in the political space forms like Facebook and Twitter, such efforts are more and religious teachings against hate and prejudice. difficult to implement on WhatsApp where messages Citizens who called in expressed concerns that some are private and encrypted. religious institutions and leaders also engage inappro- With conflict occurring across rural areas of the priately in politics and elections. Middle Belt, media coverage of specific violent incidents Just as it can advance positive conversations, is often highly limited. Problems with police investiga- mass media can also reinforce divisions in Nigeria. tions have left many journalists responsible for docu- Dangerous and polarizing speech can spread more menting conflict details and unable to rely on official widely and cause more harm through digital media, data. News reports often vary widely as to the estimated and social media platforms are increasingly accessi- numbers of individuals affected, and also differ from ble. According to We Are Social and Hootsuite, with official figures if any are available. Moreover, many a population of over 193 million people in Nigeria, reports fail to investigate the causes of incidents or cite there are 94.8 million internet users (49%), 19 million credible security sources. Some news reports promote active social media users (10%), 105 million mobile prejudice against a particular group. Both Chris- users (54%), and 17 million active mobile social users tians and Muslims have said that the media blatantly (9%). WhatsApp and Facebook are by far the most used expresses bias against their religion, and that journalists platforms. Where social media is not as accessible, or will deliberately not report their story or perspective. among older members of the population, radio and TV Outside the immediate communities affected by continue to reach all 36 states. According to percep- a specific incident, the general public’s understanding tions polls conducted by Orange Door Research and of violent events is often incomplete. In some cases, the Nexus Fund in Plateau state in 2018, respondents false news about attacks has incited people to conduct believed that a majority of hate speech is spread by revenge attacks in various parts of the country. The social media, followed by family and friends, radio, BBC has published multiple reports about the troubling

OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 7 effects of “fake news” on conflict in Nigeria, including information can be attributed to police and government in June and November 2018. In their reporting, the BBC officials’ efforts to deny journalists access to informa- presented graphic photos which had been spread in tion. Furthermore, journalists have been threatened in online Nigerian media and attributed to recent attacks, particular for their reporting on conflict, the Nigerian but explained that in fact the photos came from other military, and human rights abuses. Reporters Without countries and contexts altogether. The BBC reports pro- Borders warns that journalists work in a “climate of vide a critical spotlight on the problems of hate speech permanent violence,” often threatened and subject to and false information, and what is being done to tackle violence, and that regional governors act with complete them in Nigeria and through social media platforms. impunity when they are involved in blocking access In 2017 and 2018 some Nigerian news outlets took to information or silencing the media. In August 2018 new initiatives to combat inadequate reporting and to a radio station was reportedly partially demolished improve the credibility of their brands. One interna- on orders of the Oyo state government because of its tionally-funded program supports Nigerian journalists reporting. NGOs have also reported curtailing of inter- to collaborate on investigating claims spread on social net freedom and crackdowns on particular bloggers media. Channels TV, one of the main stations in Nige- and websites, including arrests under the Cybercrimes ria, integrated hate speech training into its new jour- Act of 2015. In January 2019 the Nigerian military raided nalism academy. Other programs also provide training offices of the Daily Trust paper and arrested journalists and support for media on countering hate speech, with over their reporting on the war with Boko Haram. Yet a particular focus on election campaigns. human rights organizations and journalists alike con- Unfortunately, many of the challenges with media tinue to take risks to document and report on violence remain outside of journalists’ control. Part of the gap in in Nigeria.

8 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Messages from Elites and Status Influencers in Public Fora

ne perpetual barrier to ending polarization and ethnic groups as “terrorists.” In October, the Supreme divisions remains the outsized influence of high Council for Shari’ah in Nigeria shared a press release Ostatus, or elite, individuals and groups promot- on social media titled “Berom Christians: The Real ing division based on religion. Political and religious Terrorists,” which claimed that “Since early 2001, the leaders may intentionally or accidentally promote the Plateau has become the most spectacular theatre of continuation of conflict. Religious leaders’ voices carry mass killings and destruction of properties by the so a special weight in Nigeria. As one person told USCIRF, called “‘indigenous Christians.’” The Berom Educa- “religious leaders are given full respect, especially Chris- tional and Cultural Organization, in turn, spoke out tians cannot speak above the word of a pastor.” With the against the promotion of ethnic hatred. Similarly, many upcoming elections and announcements of presidential public figures have attributed attacks in the Middle Belt candidates, religious leaders are also heavily influential broadly to “Fulani terrorists.” This language has had in the realm of civic education, including encouraging the effect of collectively demonizing ethnic groups and people to register to vote. Although religious actors have has led to people being targeted or stigmatized based specifically endorsed candidates in the past, some warn on their ethnic and religious affiliation. These terms against doing so in the upcoming election for fear that it have been frequently echoed by prominent religious will deepen religious tensions. leaders and the local population alike, and spread by Prominent Nigerian religious and political lead- the media. Other influential leaders have spoken out ers in 2018 continued using polarizing rhetoric that against the language. For example, former vice presi- amplifies fear and suggests the inevitability of further dent and 2019 presidential candidate Atiku Abubakar violence. In one widely-reported example in March, in March encouraged media to refrain from using such following severe incidents of violence, former defense language, instead advising “. . . let us identify them by minister General T.Y. Danjuma made a public call their activities and not by their ethnicity.” for Nigerians to defend themselves from killings in Political leaders in Nigeria are increasingly using the Middle Belt—and referred to the attacks as eth- social media to communicate directly with the popu- nic cleansing. He said “everyone of us must rise up. lation (Figure 4). Government officials usually make The armed forces are not neutral. They collude with public speeches regarding interreligious issues, hold the armed bandits that kill people.” In so doing, he meetings with religious leaders, visit sites of recent both justified and promoted more reprisal attacks. intercommunal violence, and share statements online He also further polarized Christians and Muslims, to reassure the people that attention is being paid. and suggested government complicity in the violence, After violence in January, federal government officials entrenching distrust of government and security actors. released statements that they were determined to Nevertheless, many Nigerians recognized the incite- resolve the ongoing herder-farmer conflict. For many ment and condemned the speech. Still other prominent Nigerians, these statements are expected and neces- leaders have also incited division by labeling entire sary, but not enough as the violence continues.

OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 9 Figure 4: Tweets by President and Government Senior Special Assistant to Vice President Osinbajo, Laolu Akande in 2018.

10 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Polarizing Narratives that Fuel and Reflect Religious Tensions

hroughout 2018, USCIRF learned from a variety of a broader plan to “Islamize” Nigeria by expelling of Nigerian civil society and government repre- Christians from the Middle Belt and seizing their land for T sentatives about the many intersecting issues Muslims. This narrative has existed for decades, since the polarizing society. Economic and ethno-religious reformulations of government in the 1960s, through the tensions were at the heart of many of the narratives debates over the extension of Shari’ah implementation explaining current conflict and security problems. in the 1970s, the adoption of the federal constitution in Although Nigeria has long been a highly religious 1999, the continuation of the Shari’ah debate and expan- country, some religious community members say the sion in 2000, up to the present with the Boko Haram division along religious lines is now the worst they have insurgency and the rise of the ISIS-West Africa faction. ever seen, and is severely affecting children and youth. In a cyclical fashion, fears of religious domination Civil society representatives across religious lines have led to interreligious violence, which has further noted that children as young as five want to know the amplified fears and motivated reprisal attacks. In religion of the people around them. While many inter- the year 2000, more than 2,000 people were killed in locutors agreed that the Nigerian government needs fighting between Muslims and Christians in Kaduna to do much more to provide security for its citizens of over the Shari’ah debate. The history of conflict related all faiths, they disagreed on whether the government to religious dominance in Nigeria strongly informs the is intentionally neglecting, or even complicit in the views of many Nigerians today. Going back even further attacks on civilians. They also disagreed about whether in history, many Nigerians still reference Usman Dan cattle grazing bans or other approaches are helpful in Fodio, the Fulani Muslim scholar who led a religious addressing farmer-herder conflict. war in northern Nigeria from 1804 to 1810 to revive and Narratives around the causes of violence in the reform Islam in the region, leading to the establishment Middle Belt are some of the most polarizing between of the Sunni Islamic Sokoto Caliphate. Some Chris- religious communities. One widely reported narrative is tian leaders suggest that current conflict with Fulani that the sectarian conflict is fueled by hired criminals. herders is a continuation of this religious war, and some Reports claim that criminals are posing as herders, go so far as to say that herders are working on behalf “dressed like Fulani” to deceive the communities they of the Nigerian government to complete Dan Fodio’s attack. Proponents of this narrative suspect that, as mission and conquer more territory. Corresponding to many wealthy Nigerians own large herds of cattle and this narrative, some news reports on the Middle Belt hire armed guards to defend them, there may be people conflict have used the terms “genocide” and “ethnic paid by elite actors involved in the attacks. This is cleansing.” However, other Christian leaders disagree believable for witnesses who say that the attackers they with this framing and discuss the complexity of causes saw were “not our Fulani neighbors” but rather others, of violence in Nigeria. The narrative and fear of Islam- even foreigners, whom they do not know. Other inter- ization itself contributes to the polarization of society: it locutors say attacks in the Middle Belt are simply led by negatively portrays the spread of Islam as a threat to be conflict entrepreneurs. thwarted, it allows for the generalization that all Mus- One of the most striking narratives is that for many lims are interested or participating in the effort, and it is Christians the violence occurring in this region is part used to attribute conflicts between Muslim actors and

OVERCOMING DANGEROUS SPEECH AND ENDEMIC RELIGIOUS DIVIDES 11 non-Muslim actors—or political/economic conditions lence. Others said the religious element to the conflict that benefit Muslims over non-Muslims—as related to is secondary. This tracks with research and conflict the effort. analyses conducted by international and Nigerian Nonetheless, the narrative of Islamization remains NGOs in states such as Plateau, Benue, and Nasarawa, a real and pervasive fear for many Christians in Nige- which have found that competition over resources, ria. Interlocutors have shared with USCIRF a range of particularly farmland and water access, is the main examples to describe the fear, including discrimination source of conflict. Civil society members, including by government actors against Christians in employ- the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MAC- ment and political leadership, freedoms for Muslims BAN), noted that it is in part because the majority of to build mosques but heavy restrictions on Christians Fulani herders are Muslim that the conflict has taken building churches, statistics on the numbers of Muslims on a religious tone in many areas. In other areas of in government and security agencies in comparison the Middle Belt, however, conflict may occur between to Christians, the growth in Islamic banking, govern- farming communities, or between herders and farm- ment failure to protect Christians from violence, and ers of the same religion. MACBAN pointed out the the increasing death toll in parts of the Middle Belt. government neglect of grazing reserves and the dete- The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and the rioration of pastures and routes in the north as part of National Christian Elders’ Forum have in the past year the reason herders have been increasingly taking their repeatedly expressed that this is an ongoing threat to cattle to new areas. One prominent imam shared with the country and Christians. CAN leadership and others USCIRF his exasperation with the narrative that the have highlighted Nigeria’s participation in interna- government is attacking or persecuting Christians, tional Islamic organizations such as the Organization of and said that in fact the government has failed all of its Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as evidence of the Nigerian citizens, including Muslims, by not tackling the root government’s approval of or complicity in the Islamiza- issues or providing adequate governance and security. tion of the country. Another example commonly cited Both Muslims and Christians have suffered massive is the appointment of Muslims to key leadership posts. loss of life in these conflicts, and share a common Some interlocutors with whom USCIRF met said that the interest in building peace and security in the region. government has not been balanced, and several high- As noted earlier, a complex web of motivations for lighted that Muslim individuals lead the “entire security violence exists in the Middle Belt and the causes of con- apparatus”—which promotes the conspiracy theory of flict are often highly localized and rooted in competi- government complicity in a broader campaign. tion over limited resources. Nevertheless, religion is an In contrast, as noted previously, others describe important strand of this web that cannot be dismissed, conflict in the Middle Belt as primarily about and a lens through which many Nigerians continue to resources and the increasing threats to Nigerians’ view and describe conflict in this region. The narratives livelihoods and traditional occupations of farming or that communities use have the power to mobilize peo- herding. USCIRF met with Fulani and Berom commu- ple around religious identity to conduct reprisal attacks, nity members near Jos, Plateau state, who said fighting to escalate minor incidents into more deadly ones, and over land has led youth in particular to resort to vio- to deepen divisions.

12 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM U.S. Policy and Support for NGO Initiatives

he United States government has been actively Dialogue at the local level is essential for building rela- supporting the Nigerian government and tionships between different religious communities as T people to improve security and build peace well as between citizens and local officials and security and respect among religious groups. U.S. Ambassador actors. Nigerian civil society leaders have consistently to Nigeria Stuart Symington and other U.S. Embassy voiced to USCIRF the value of interreligious dialogue officials continue to encourage religious leaders, efforts, and have made important recommendations for journalists, political leaders, and others to refrain from improving their impact. They recommend programs that hateful and divisive speech. U.S. Consul General F. John engage more youth, address trauma, combat and train Bray made remarks at a religious tolerance confer- community members on hate speech and its impact, and ence in Lagos in August 2018, in which he condemned engage religious and traditional leaders, among others. the ongoing violence in the Middle Belt. He said that The U.S. government has long supported activities the U.S. Mission firmly believes that every life lost like this in Nigeria. For example, for more than five “whether a farmer or a herder, a Muslim or a Christian, years, the U.S. Agency for International Development a Berom or a Fulani–is a tragedy.” He also emphasized (USAID) has supported the Training of Leaders on the importance of all voices in promoting peace: “Our Religious and National Coexistence (TOLERANCE) words matter. Each of us has a role to play in tamping project, which has contributed to improving interfaith down tensions between communities of all kinds. It is relations, advocating for religious freedom, and dimin- in your hands to ensure that this tragic violence does ishing discrimination. In 2017, USAID brought together not descend into broader ethnic and religious fighting, more than 150 stakeholders, Muslims and Christians, and a cycle of reprisals.” in partnership with several NGOs from the United U.S. NGOs such as Search for Common Ground, States and Nigeria, to address farmer-herder issues. the United States Institute of Peace, Mercy Corps, and One key recommendation from the conference was Nexus Fund, are just a few examples of groups working to provide training for the media, which, as discussed at the community level in the Middle Belt to address earlier, sometimes exacerbate tensions by the nature local farmer-herder conflict and to prevent hate speech of their reporting. Interlocutors praised the conference and further violence. In one local initiative, a women’s as productive and inclusive, but recommended more farmer-herder dialogue led to a woman preventing her follow-up, in particular from the Nigerian government, husband from committing violence against a herder. to continue its impact.

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Conclusion and Recommendations

n the lead up to the 2019 presidential election, and • Increasing peacebuilding programming and with the highly politicized nature of the conflict, research—in partnership with local and tradi- I both Nigerians and the international community tional leaders and other parts of civil society—in have worried about a further downward spiral into order to counter hate speech and incitement to violence. The Middle Belt region is widely seen as one violence based on religious identity, such as: of the most powerful constituencies to influence pres- ■ conducting a national survey on the manifesta- idential elections because of its role as a swing region tions and effects of dangerous speech in Nigeria; where the more Muslim north and mostly Christian ■ holding action-oriented town halls and south converge, and as a significant and continuous inter-ethnic/interreligious dialogues to reach site of deadly sectarian conflict. As the U.S. govern- more communities impacted by violence; ment supports Nigerian preparations for the 2019 elec- tions, including for the post-election period, it should ■ developing long-term radio programming to work to enhance short- and long-term peacebuilding educate wider audiences and to build inter- initiatives and combat the escalation of hate speech, religious understanding and collaborative polarization, and sectarian violence. peacebuilding; As USCIRF has noted in its Annual Report ■ training media actors on identifying and coun- recommendations each year, the U.S. government tering hateful and dangerous speech; should designate Nigeria a CPC, which would provide ■ training of local, state, and federal officials on many opportunities and non-punitive measures for freedom of religion or belief and countering the U.S. government to more effectively promote hate speech based on religious identity; respect for freedom of religion or belief in Nigeria, and to reduce polarization and conflict between • Training police on conducting professional and religious groups. If it designates Nigeria as a CPC, thorough investigations into violent incidents and the U.S. government should enter into a binding prosecuting perpetrators; agreement with the Nigerian government to set forth • Enhancing training for military and police officers mutually agreed upon commitments for improving on international human rights standards and reli- religious freedom in Nigeria, and provide technical gious tolerance; and and financial support for the fulfillment of those • Developing early warning systems and other con- commitments. Key commitments in this agreement flict prevention mechanisms at the local, state, and could include: federal levels.

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UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714 Washington, D.C. 20401 www.uscirf.gov

Telephone: (202) 523–3240, Fax: (202) 523–5020 email: [email protected]