Isis Medeiros Minas [Gerais] Has No Sea

Foto: Isis Medeiros Minas [Gerais] has no sea. My safe haven, Yet they made two seas of My ground. mud in the mines. No, it was not mud! Where is my house that was It was man who made the mud that here? knocked Mariana and Brumadinho Where are my bull and horse? down to the ground. Where is my papaya tree? Dyed the waters of my My wheelbarrow? Doce River brown, Where is my lime tree? Colored my Paraopeba [River] brown, Where are my books? Will dye my Old Chico Where are my rice and beans? [San Francisco River]. Where is my mattress? Will silence the voice of birds, Where are my father, mother Kill shes… and siblings? What will happen to me? e mud took them away… Who will give me back everything e mud took my life away, that was taken My dreams, away from me? (Unknown author) LIFE BEFORE PROFIT! MAB’S ANALYSIS OF VALE’S CRIME IN BRUMADINHO/MINAS GERAIS

Author Movimento dos Ati ngidos por Barragens – MAB (Movement of People Aﬀ ected by Dams)

Graphic project MDA Comunicação

February 2019

Movimento dos Ati ngidos por Barragens (MAB) Nati onal Secretariat São Paulo – Brazil www.mabnacional.org.br

| 2 | TABLE OF CONTENTS

Presentation ...... 5 Introduction ...... 7 1. A CRIME AGAINST WORKERS AND NATURE ...... 9 1.1. Vale’s crime a ects the Paraopeba and São Francisco Rivers ...... 12 2. VALE: THE PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIME ...... 13 2.1. Brief history of the company ...... 13 2.2. Private company controlled by nancial capital...... 13 2.3. How does Vale obtain extraordinary pro ts? ...... 14 3. AFFECTED PEOPLE DO NOT WANT TO BE VALE’S HOSTAGES...... 17 3.1. What does Mariana teach us? ...... 18 4. VALE’S TAILINGS AND AFFECTED PEOPLE’S HEALTH ...... 21 5. ELEMENTS FOR BUILDING A SAFETY POLICY FOR THE PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DAMS...... 25 6. THE CONCEPT OF “AFFECTED PERSON”: AN OLD DISPUTE ...... 27

| 3 | PRESENTATION

razil faces a new crime where, once e main strategy adopted by Vale is again, thousands of people were af- to reassure the market and investors. With fected and hundreds of people lost regards to a ected people, it continues to Btheir lives. In Brumadinho, Minas Gerais, violate rights, denying the extent of the the collapse of Vale’s tailings dam devas- impact and damages caused, as well as de- tated nature, and one month a er, it is still nying their participation in decision-mak- not possible to measure completely its im- ing processes. pacts. ree years a er the collapse of the We demand that the a ected peo- Fundão tailings dam in Mariana, also in lo- ple in Brumadinho, and people who live cated Minas Gerais, Vale is still unpunished along and/or depend on the Paraopeba and does not hesitate in causing new crimes. River, as well as those living close to the Vale is, therefore, recidivist and responsible São Francisco River must obtain the cor- for another social, environmental and eco- rect information regarding the level of nomic tragedy. water contamination, be compensated for is document aims to denounce Vale’s the damages they su ered and participate crime through the lens of workers. We, people in spaces where decisions about the future a ected by dams who su er the continuous of their lives are made. is is the least we violation of our rights, denounce the destruc- expect and we will ght for it! tion and appropriation of natural goods, the We warn that the impunity and exploitation of workers and the disrespect for the complicity of all public bodies mean communities by companies for the purpose of the authorization for new crimes to take generating extraordinary pro ts. place. In this sense, we demand justice e struggle for the recognition of the and ask for Brazilian people’s support and rights of people a ected by dams is histori- solidarity. cal. Given this situation and the withdrawal We wish a good reading and that this of rights in the country, the crime that oc- document may serve to strengthen the or- curred with the collapse of the tailings dam ganization and struggle of all of the a ect- in the Córrego do Feijão mine proves that ed people in Brazil. the existing development model, which is based on pro t and in the private accumula- MAB’s National Coordination tion, does not serve the people. São Paulo, February 2019.

| 5 | INTRODUCTION

Crime Scene: understanding the Córrego do Feijão mine

Around 12:30pm on January 25, 2019, mines have high-grade iron ore reserves in Brumadinho, Minas Gerais, approxi- estimated at 308.5 million tons. mately 60km from Belo Horizonte, some Activities in the Córrego do Feijão mine of the dams of the Córrego do Feijão mine began in 1956 by the Iron and Coal Mining belonging to the Vale mining company Company. In 1973, ownership of the mine collapsed. e biggest one of them, Dam I, was transferred to Ferteco Mining and later, in was 87 meters tall and had around 12 mil- 2003, to Vale. e facility had the complete in- lion cubic meters of tailings. In this region, frastructure for ore mining and processing, in in addition to the Córrego do Feijão mine, addition to administrative and support struc- Vale owns the concession to another four tures, an ore storage yard and a railway system, ore reserves: Jangada, Mar Azul, Capão acting as an outlet for external and internal Xavier and Capim Branco. In total, these markets (SUPPRI/SEMAD, 2018, P. 03).

Figure 1 – Structures of the Jangada and Córrego do Feijão mines. Source: Rima, 2014 | 7 | Studies indicate that tailings dams are ten of these dams (one of which was Dam not safe and that there are more risks when I that collapsed), continued to be used for dams are built upstream, as the case of tailings. According to Vale, the other nine Dam I. is kind of dams continues to be dams were decommissioned. used because it is less costly. A er the col- Hereby follows primary factors the lapse of the Fundão tailings dam in 2015, Movement of People A ected by Dams Vale announced that it would deactivate (MAB at the acronym in Portuguese) con- the 19 upstream dams in the state of Minas siders important to denounce Vale’s reinci- Gerais. However, in spite of being inactive, dent crime.

Toxic mud in the Paraopeba River in Minas Gerais | Photo: Nilmar Lage

| 8 | 1. A CRIME AGAINST WORKERS AND NATURE

tudies indicate that this has been the Many workers were at the affected area second biggest collapse of tailings since it was time for the change of shift. dam in the world, with the number Given that the region is touristic and the Sof deaths being smaller only to another se- collapse of the dam occurred in begin- rious episode that took place in Bulgaria in ning of the weekend, many tourists and 1966, which had 488 victims. residents were in their homes at the moment that the mud devastated the valley. In Brumadinho, 12 million cubic meters of mud flowed from the dam. Its Comments about the existence of trajectory destroyed the cafeteria of Vale’s cracks in the dam were common amongst administrative unit, restaurants and the workers and documents prove that Vale Ferteco Vila, killing hundreds of people. knew about the risk of its collapse. As Photo: Isis Medeiros Photo:

| 9 | disclosed by various media outlets, the in a context where the price of iron ore be- engineers of the German company Tüv ing sold by Vale rose above US$ 90 per ton. Süd Bureau Projects and Consultancy e Córrego do Feijão mine em- who signed the reports affirming the sta- ployed 613 direct and 28 subcontracted bility of the dam gave the police testimo- workers, working in 3 shi s, with one shi nies that they were under pressure to sign of 6 hours and 2 shi s of 9 hours, operating them. They also said they had requested 24 hours per day 7 days a week (SUPPRI/ already in June 2018 that Vale intensify SEMAD, 2018). its monitoring, the reading of instru- ments and the increase in the number of Amongst the dead and missing are probes used to verify the humidity of the more than 300 people. Additionally, thou- soil (piezometers). sands of people are a ected, and the Para- opeba River, a uent of the São Francisco Since 2015, the dam that collapsed did River, is seriously contaminated by toxic not receive any tailings. On December 5th, mud. 2018, a er Vale’s request for an operation license, the Chamber of Mining Activities e Paraopeba River supplies water of the Environmental Council of Minas to 8 a ected municipalities, with 6 of these Gerais granted a license for the company being located in the metropolitan region of to recover the iron ore disposed amongst Belo Horizonte (Brumadinho, Betim, São the tailings found in Dam I, in addition to João das Bicas, Juatuba, Esmeraldas, Maria a number of internal logistics structures. Campos, Igarapé and Pará de Minas). e most serious case is that of the municipality With this alternative, the capacity of of Pará de Minas, where water collection in the Jangada and Córrego do Feijão mines the Paraopeba River has been interrupted increased from 10,6 million tons/year to since February 29 and water is being col- 17 million tons/year and the service life lected from other sources instead. Howev- of this enterprise would be extended until er, there is uncertainty regarding the water 2032 (SUPPRI/SEMAD, 2018). In summa- supply capacity in periods characterized by ry, Vale’s proposal was to mine once again less rain. In total, around 600.000 people the tailings held in Dam I and deposit rem- su er from having their water supply jeop- nants in the Córrego do Feijão mine’s pit, ardized in these cities.

| 10 | o

c s i

c n THE MUD’S TRAIL a O CAMINHO DA LAMA r F

o The collapse of Dam I of the Paraopeba Complex ã

S O rompimento da barragem I, do Complexo o spilled 12 million cubic meters of tailings in the i R watersParaope ofba Feijão, da Val estream, despej oandu 12 mini lhtheões Paraopebade metros river.cúbic oThes de dispersalrejeito nas á ofgu athes d omud córre maygo do affect Feijão ethe São UHE Três Marias Franciscoposteriorme nriver,te no rinio Pcasearaop theeba tailings. A disper sdon’tão da retainlama at poderá atingir o rio São Francisco, caso o rejeito não fique the Retiro Baixo dam, located in the municipalities retido na barragem da usina de Retiro Baixo, localizada entre ofos Felixlândia,municípios de FPompéuelixlândia, andPom pCurvelo.éu e Curvelo. Reservatório de Três Marias A

OTHE RA SDESTRUCTIONTRO DA DESTR UTRAILSIÇÃO 2 FELIXLÂNDIA CURVELO Vale’sO d disasteresastre danda V athele

UHE Retiro Baixo espill a d iofsp ethersã mudo da inla mthea Reservatório de Retiro Baixo R no leito do Rio Paraopeba i o Paraopeba river

d a s

V e l PA Queima Fogo h THE DAMS IN BRAZIL’S LARGEST IRON ORE AREA a s Quadrilátero Ferrífero (QF) namesAS the B AregionRRA ofG theE NS PA 26 de Outubro Brazilian largest iron ore production area, located in the o c NO QUADRILÁTERO FERRÍFERO is c n south-east of Minas Gerais state. According to data of ra F o POMPÉU ã the DamsSe gSecurityundo dad Planos do ofPla ntheo d eNational Seguranç Watera de Ba Agencyrragens, d a S o R i i R o there Aaregên c114ia N atailingscional d damse Água sin, e thexiste mQF 11 4area barr aandgens wherede rejei to PARAOPEBA P a r em todo o Quadrilátero Ferrífero (QF), mais 104 estruturas não a 104 structures are not registered within this plan, among TI Caxixó o p cadastradas no Plano, entre barragens, diques, gabiões. e these structures are dikes, dams and draining systems. b a This structuresEssas estru tareuras builddecor rdueem d toa e thexplo roreaçã oexploitation mineral na re giniã o, the region,especia speciallylmente ferr oiron,, ouro gold,, argila clay e ge mandas. Dgemstone.este total, o dTheano PAPAGAIOS potentialpotencia damagel associado caused (dano o cbyasi othenad collapseo caso oc oofrra one uma ofrup thesetura) é alto para 70 delas e baixo para apenas 12. Em caso de ruptura R structures is very high for 70 of these and of low for 12

i MARAVILHAS o as bacias do rio Doce, rio das Velhas, Paraopeba e rio Pará serão

P of these structures. In case of collapse the Doce, Velha, a FORTUNA DE MINAS as mais atingidas. Além das barragens, existem ainda 56 minas r PA Roseli Nunes á Paraopeba and the Pará riversparal iswillada bes e amostband oaffected.nadas no QF. PEQUI Besides these dams, there are 56 abandoned mines in PEOPLE AND ENVIROMENT this region. PAFFECTEDOPULAÇÃO E SÃO JOSÉ DA VARGINHA ATheM Bmud’sIEN outﬂTE ow destroyed AcórregoTING doID FeijãoOS Valley, houses, ESMERALDAS small rural properties, hotels and O escoamento da lama destruiu todo Vale’s administrative headquarter. PARÁ DE MINAS o vale do córrego do Feijão, atingindo Circa of 300 hectares of land are FLORESTAL PA Serra Negra BELO HORIZONTE casas, pequenas propriedades rurais, under mud. The mud affected PA 2 de Julho sítios, pousadas e a sede administrativa JUATUBA the Paraopeba river and ﬂ ows BETIM da Vale. Cerca de 300 hectares de terra Represa Serra Azul fo245kmram sote untilrrado sit. Aarrives lama a ttheingi uRetiro o rio Pa raopeba Baixo dam. 944 thousand people SÃO JOAQUIM DE BICAS MARIO CAMPOS e deverá seguir por 245 km até a barragem IGARAPÉ darea us inestimateda de Retiro Basaix affectedo. A popu lawithinção a tingida ptheelo d18esa municipalitiesstre chega a ma isaround de 944 m il pessoas, BRUMADINHO } ntheos 1 8Paraopeba municípios co river.rtados Thepelo Pwholearaop eba. Aextensionlém da pop uofla çtheão, triverodo o environment ambiente aqu ático do Represa Rio Manso riois t aalsombé mimpacted. foi impactado.

LGRAPHICEGENDA SUBTITLE

} CParaopebaomplexo P aComplexraopeba –- BDamarra g1e –m Vale 1 - Vale

Ì AbandonedMinas Paralis aminesdas e Abandonadas AgrarianAssentam Reformentos Sett lements !n Hydro-powersUsinas Hidrelétricas IndigenousTerra Indígen areasa ® !n TailingsBarrage ndamss de Rejeito AﬀMu ectednicípio municipalitis afetados es RiversRios (no entorno do Rio Paraopeba) Escala Fonte e Base Digital: ANA (Hidroweb); IBGE; Plataforma I3GEO (MMA); Instituto Pristino, Plano Nacional de Segurança de Barragens. 0 5 10 20 30 Datum: SIRGAS 2000 km Data: Jan/2019

Pesquisa e Elaboração: GT Agrária Rio/Niterói - Associação dos Geógrafos Brasileiros IF Baiano, campus Valença/Bahia PoEMAS - Grupo Política, Economia, Mineração, Ambiente e Sociedade

Sources: Esri, GarmiAn, USGS, NPS | 11 | 1.1. Vale’s crime affects the Paraopeba and São Francisco RiverS

he Paraopeba River meets the São pacts that this contamination may have on TFrancisco River in the reservoir of the shing, sh production, tourism and elec- Três Marias hydroelectric dam in Minas tric energy production in the Retiro Baixo Gerais, and it is responsible for 4% of its and Três Marias hydroelectric dams. ow. When such an important a uent riv- is contamination can travel the dis- er is destroyed in this manner, we can af- tance of approximately 2,100 km, a ecting rm that the São Francisco River is also around 100 municipalities along the São contaminated! Francisco River, until it reaches the Atlantic e shermen and women and the in- Ocean. It is important to note that the São habitants of the Paraopeba and São Francis- Francisco River Basin is one of the most co River Basin fear losing their main source important in the country, with an area of of income. e Water Institute of Minas approximately 639,219 km2. It supplies Gerais (IGAM) indicates non-standard lev- water in 7 states, and particularly for their els of metal contamination, including nick- industry and farming (irrigation). ese el, lead, mercury, cadmium and zinc. ere regions will su er severe consequences, as is no information regarding the possible im- the impact is inevitable. Photo: João Zinclar Photo:

| 12 | 2. VALE: THE PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIME

2.1. A brief history of the company

he Vale do Rio Doce Company (CVRD) Many popular actions questioned the Twas created in 1942 and over the course sale of Vale do Rio Doce. However, these of 55 years it has consolidated itself as a great actions were neither judged nor their mer- public company, patrimony of the Brazilian it analyzed by the judiciary, with the sale people. e company was privatized in 1997 presented as an accomplished fact. In 1998, in one of the biggest scandals entailing the the year following the sale, Vale’s pro t was submission of the State to private capital. approximately US$ 851.33 million, and the pro ts continued in the next years. Between e privatization policy of the Fernando 2008 and 2017, Vale accumulated a pro t Henrique Cardoso government contribut- of around US$ 57 billion, in spite of having ed to turn the privatization a fraud against committed a crime in Mariana in 2015 with public patrimony. Mines, reserves, technol- the collapse of the Fundão tailings dam. ogies, dams, railways, structure and logistics sectors were intentionally devalued, so that Social movements and organizations developed a long debate regarding the the sale price of the state owned company privatization of the company and in 2007 (US$ 3.3 billion at the time) was estimated organized a Popular Plebiscite to discuss below its real value. Moreover, the Nation- the necessity for re-nationalization of the al Bank for Economic and Social Develop- company, among other themes. e great ment (BNDES) funded the buyers. In other majority of the people that participated in words, the State sold the company for a low the plebiscite (3,729,538 people) agreed price and lent money for private companies that Vale’s re-nationalization is necessary to appropriate Vale. to guarantee our country’s sovereignty.

2.2. Private company controlled by financial capital

n the nearly 22 years of its existence sold in the main. Stock Exchanges. Ias a private company, Vale became Vale’s main objective is to increase one of the biggest mining companies in profits and distribute dividends to its the world, with open capital and shares shareholders. | 13 | rough speculation, shareholders appropriate the pro t produced by the dai- ly labor of workers. e spaces separating the moment of ore production and the appropriation of wealth by shareholders are presented distinctly; the shareholders acts as if workers and a ected people are sec- ondary and that it is not their concern. is becomes clear with the crimes in Mariana and Brumadinho, where foreign investors sue Vale, claiming that their pro ts were harmed. is demonstrates that nancial capital does not want to get entangled with production-related problems, only with its result. Source: Vale, 2018 (www.vale.com)

2.3. How does Vale obtain extraordinary profits?

ale is the biggest producer of iron es per ton (called “premium”), and which Vand nickel ore in the world. It also contributes to the increase in its extraor- produces manganese, ferroalloys, ther- dinary pro t. Most of the ore extracted mal and metallurgical coal, copper and in Brazil is for export. e following g- sub-products of platinum, gold, silver and ure shows the countries in which Vale ex- cobalt metal. e main concentration of plores minerals: Vale’s iron ore production is in Brazil. e iron ore found in Pará, more speci cally in the Carajás area, has the highest quality (around 62%), which allows Vale to obtain higher pric- Figure 2 – Countries in which Vale explores minerals | Source: CVM, 2018 | 14 | In Brazil, Vale extracts iron ore in three states: Minas Gerais, Pará and Mato Grosso do Sul. About 53% of the production comes from Minas Gerais, where the company has six “production systems” (extraction and processing set), including the Paraopeba system (CVM, 2018). All of these production systems are linked to a complex logistical infrastructure, which allows ore to arrive quickly to ports where they can be shipped for export. Photo: Isis Medeiros Vale’s high pro tability is not only a result of the quantity of ore that produces, • Absence of preparation and control but also the way in which it produces. In of security issues that concern the order to increase its pro ts and distribute people a ected by the crimes; dividends to shareholders, the company • Disrespect for a ected communities, undertakes many actions, including: including traditional and indigenous • Devaluation of the labor force, with people. maximum exploitation and outsourcing; • Capture of State structures, by acting • Maximum use of machinery and in several fronts: equipment. In many places, they op- erate a three shi regime covering 24 a) Strong lobby within the National hours 7 days a week, as was the case in Agency for Mining to extend its Brumadinho; capacity for granting mineral re- • High production targets with intense serves; harassment of workers; b) Putting pressure in structures • AAttempt of cooptation, control and per- responsible for the environment secution of workers’ unions; to reduce and/or extinguish • Exploitation of natural resources at monitoring and control require- its maximum, neglecting environmen- ments; tal legislation, in addition pressuring to c) In addition to having a series of tax weaken control laws; bene ts, plays tax evasion; • Security negligence, accumulating to d) Putting pressure to State sectors date two of Brazil’s biggest socio-en- to deny ne and lawsuit payments, vironmental crimes in Mariana and guaranteeing the impunity for Brumadinho; crimes.

| 15 | p to April 2018, Vale owed public coﬀ ers more than U29 billion BRL in taxes of various types: circulati on of goods and services tax (ICMS), income tax, social integrati on program taxes (PIS) and contributi on for social security ﬁ nancing (COFINS) and royalti es. The company was being questi oned by public bodies in lawsuits for incorrect calculati ons that led to underpayment.

ale owed 596 million BRL to Vsocial security (INSS), according to data disclosed by the Nati onal Treasury Att orney’s Oﬃ ce.

ven aft er the crime in Mariana investments in maintenance and E(2015) and successive records security for the tailings dams were in producti on levels, Vale kept, the crime in Brumadinho could systemati cally reduced investments have been avoided and/or its impacts in maintenance and security. miti gated, as well as hundreds of The graph below shows that if lives could have been spared.

Source: Le Monde, 2019. Writt en by author in 2018, based on informati on of the ﬁ rst three trimesters

| 16 | 3. AFFECTED PEOPLE DO NOT WANT TO BE VALE’S HOSTAGES

e see a “modus operandi” of forcing those a ected to treat prob- the companies when acting in lems individually – considering only the treatment of those a ected, its case and not the community case; Wpreventing participation in the decision e) Pressure for those a ected to make making process in order to minimize the immediate decisions: they are coerced costs of the repairs. rough our experi- into negotiations with several lawyers ence of organization, we realize that com- of the company, not allowing lawyers panies use many tactics, among them we or representatives of their con dence; point out: f) e company doesn’t accept the auton- a) Establishment of agreements between omous organization of those a ected; the State (public bodies) and the company, without the participation of those g) An aggressive advertising tactic that a ected, in order to determine who are spends more money on the disclosure a ected, the costs, how they should be of alleged actions than on actual repair; repaired and who does the repair; h) Encouraging disputes among those af- b) Creation of “shield institutions” that fected while the company freely deny protect the name of the company re- their rights. sponsible for the crime. In this way, foundations and/ or entities with new ese are some of the initiatives that nomenclatures are created, but man- the people a ected have denounced. Im- aged by the company itself, capable of mediately, Vale does not recognize the producing new violations. e most requests of those a ected. But our organi- recent example is the creation of the zation remains committed to putting pres- Renova Foundation, which operates sure on the company and the judiciary to throughout the Doce River basin; secure the rights, such as the Preliminary Adjustment Agreement (TAP) built in Bru- c) e frequent rotation of interlocutors madinho, which provides for initial and to intentionally cause discontinuity of monthly emergency nancial support attendance with those a ected; for household costs until the situation of d) Combating collective solutions and work and life stabilize. | 17 | In this perspective, reparation be- formed into another pro table business of comes an unequal dispute, with the use the companies, besides giving the criminal of negotiation and coercion techniques the power to de ne the parameters and to against the a ected population. In addi- determine who are victim. tion, the company as the primary respon- e impunity and connivance of the sible, acts directly at the scene of crime, judiciary with the company is the authori- manipulating information, pressing the zation for new crimes to happen. In Mari- people a ected and chasing local groups. ana, for example, nes and lawsuits against It is important to emphasize that when the companies involved (Samarco, Vale and governments and public agencies allow the BHP Billiton) and compensation for those company to continue conducting the rep- a ected were suspended by initiatives of the aration process, they are authorizing that judiciary itself, which acts more as Vale’s the rights of those a ected to be trans- lawyer than as a defender of justice.

3.1. What Mariana teach us?

Photo: Leandro Taques he people a ected from Tthe communities of Ben- to Rodrigues and Paracatu de Baixo, in the city of Mariana, and the community of Gesteira in Barra Longa, had their houses destroyed by the mud of the Fundão Dam and were forced to leave their communities. Af- ter three years of the crime in that region no house was rebuilt and no family was resettled. e companies had made the negotiations as hard as possible, dis- couraging the people a ected and forcing put up on ghts to claim the right to in- them to give up of their rights or to accept formation, to recognition, the right to re- the lowered o er made by Renova Foun- settlement, to a home, to fair indemnities, dation. the right to health, to quality water, to e people a ected organized within access and quality of their lands that got MAB around the Doce River basin have contaminated with the tailings.

| 18 | Through the fight, the people af- On the evaluation of the MAB, the fected are achieving advances on the ne- cost of reparation is responsibility of Vale, gotiations, for example the emergency and the process of reparation must be built card, as a way for the family to restore collectively, with popular participation their income that was interrupted, and with an independent technical support, more recent achievements as the acquisi- that responds to the true needs of the pop- tion of land for the settlement of Gestei- ulation. e people must be protagonist ra. In addition, those affected achieved within the repair of their lives, because technical advisory teams throughout they are the only ones who know the local the basin to contribute to the process of reality, the ways their life has been a ected, discussion and diagnosis of rights. what needs and how it must be repaired.

Photo: Maxwel Vilela

| 19 | Vale’s strategy to deny the rights of the people affected in the Doce River basin

er the rupture of the Fundão Dam in duties. e Renova is also totally managed AMariana, the company Samarco, formed and directed by Samarco (Vale and BHP). by Vale and BHP Billiton, is building a strategy e companies and governments de- of power and hegemony throughout the Doce ned who the people a ected was, and cre- River basin. Firstly, the State moved a Public ated an institutional arrangement to oper- Civil Action against the companies, estimating ate actions in the entire Doce River basin. a value of 20 billions BRL for reparation. As con- Created a “Solution Model” for repairs and sequence, a “big agreement” was made between compensations. In other words, a “Gover- the companies, States governments and public nance Model” to protect the company of agencies - the Brazilian federal government, great expenses with reparations, to guaran- IBAMA (Brazilian Institute of the Environ- tee the direction and complete control of the ment and Renewable Natural Resources), ANA repair actions and o er the best condition to (National Water Agency), DNPM (National challenge hegemony all around the territory. Department of Mineral Production), FUNAI (National Indigenous Foundation), ICMBio A Civil Public Action (ACP) moved (Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Con- by the Federal Prosecution Service ques- servation), Government of the States of Minas tioned the above mentioned agreement Gerais and Espírito Santo - the so called Trans- and at the same time estimated a value of action and Conduct Adjustment Agreement 155 billions BRL for reparation. (TTAC), that estimated in 15 years the repair of In 2018 a new agreement was signed be- the damages, de ned who were the a ected, in tween companies and the State, the “Gover- addition to creating the Renova Foundation to nance TAC”, which provides participation of manage the whole process. e people a ected the people a ected in some advisory spaces, were not part of this agreement. but that keep the total hegemony of the com- Together with the creation of the Ren- panies in the process. In this way, the Federal ova Foundation, the agreement stated its Justice suspended for undetermined time the guidelines and goals, as well as 41 programs lawsuits (including the ACP of 155 billions supposedly thought for the damages repairs BRL) against Samarco (Vale and BHP). process. e TTAC also created the Inter-fed- ree years later any house, school, eral Committee (CIF) and the Technical church was build, or land was given back to Chambers, spaces supposedly prepared for any a ected family, and the Renova Foun- the inspection of the Renova actions, but that dation has been ful lling its role, violating in practice have di culties to perform such the rights of the people a ected.

| 20 | 4. VALE’S TAILINGS AND THE HEALTH OF THE PEOPLE AFFECTED

he rupture of dams also has the of a new dam rupture, and loss of consequence of violating the hu- collective leisure spaces such as the man right to health. Mainly be- river, soccer elds, sports arenas, Tcause it disrupts socially, economically and religious practice spaces, squares culturally the entire region, far beyond the and loss of workspaces. physical space where the mining tailings In the documentary produced has arrived. In this sense, all those who by MAB called “Renova: Periodi- have had their health a ected are also af- cal Crime”, from 2019, an a ected fected. Health is understood here in terms women reports her feeling a er of the World Health Organization that de- the crime: “Horrible fear of death. nes as “a state of complete physical, men- is fear of dying don’t let go of tal and social well-being and not merely us”. Fear turns to anxiety, insom- the absence of disease or illness”. nia, and depression for many peo- When analyzing the health problems ple a ected throughout the basin, caused a er Vale’s crime in Mariana, it is especially from places where the necessary to propose collective solutions mud has crossed with more vio- from those a ected, who are able to repair lence. Signi cantly increased the the damages: number of people who are accom- panied by professionals (psychol- > Diseases related to depression, ogy and psychiatry), as well as an anxiety, insomnia, and stress: increase in the number of people several studies have identi ed the a ected who use medication for signi cant growth of diseases relat- psychological problems. ed to depression within the a ected populations. ese diseases are > Skin diseases: the main complaints a consequence of, among others, of those a ected are allergies, itch- delays in negotiation with the com- ing, scaling of the skin and wounds. pany, loss of family members, fear ese various problems are report-

| 21 | their blood. ese metals can have serious consequences for people’s health.

> Diseases in the respiratory system: according to reports of those a ected, there was an increase in respiratory allergies, rhinitis, shortness of breath and asthma in Child aﬀ ected from Mariana with a skin rash reacti on several municipalities a er contact due to contact with the mud’s heavy metals with the mud dust. Photo: Mídia Ninja

> Infestation of mosquitoes and other insects: the outbreak of ed in several towns along the Doce Dengue Fever in the municipality River basin that had direct contact, of Barra Longa between 2015 and inhalation of mud dust from the 2016, as well as the outbreak of Yel- air, water consumption, etc. Stud- low Fever in 2017 in the towns of the ies carried out by the Ministry of Doce River basin is strongly related Health (2016) and the Institute of to the environmental destruction Health and Sustainability (2017) in caused by Samarco (Vale/BHP). the city of Barra Longa/MG found the increase of skin diseases as one of the main health problems in the Just as in the crime in Mariana, the region. companies do not want to admit that dam rupture causes health problems be- > Contamination of the river, the cause they know that the ways to repair environment and people: there such impacts are more complex and cost- was loss of leisure space in the riv- ly. The damage to health goes far beyond er used by the riverine community, where the mud has reached, and the loss of shing and fertile lands that number of victims is always larger than guaranteed healthy food, in addi- the companies count for. tion to contamination of water, soil, air and plants that in uence the en- In parallel, we understand that tire food chain, and consequently Vale’s crime in Brumadinho, being a sim- damage health. Exams conducted ilar situation, is causing much damage in residents of Barra Longa found to people’s health. From the trauma of the presence of heavy metals in people who lost family members, or who

| 22 | experienced the rupture of the dam un- produce healthy food, or even fish that der several aspects, to the long period of were used for food, affecting the quality searching for missing people. The disin- of food consumed by these families. formation, confusion, and negatives that In the Paraopeba River, the public Vale has made in the negotiations are organs responsible on the Government also a cause of health problems on those of Minas Gerais identified the pres- affected. ence of heavy metals at levels up to 21 Several places of leisure have ended, times higher than acceptable. The met- such as the river itself that is important als found (lead, mercury, nickel, cadmi- to many riverine people and the loss of um and zinc) have been dumped along these spaces affects health. In the region with the tailings and can have serious of Brumadinho, there were many small consequences for human health. Both scale vegetable farming communities lead and mercury affect various systems that supply local markets and the met- in the body, such as the cardiovascular, ropolitan area of Belo Horizonte. Those renal, reproductive, respiratory and cen- affected who lost these production spac- tral nervous system. After identification es will also have reduced their ability to of the metals in the studies carried out,

Photo: Isis Medeiros

| 23 | in a note the Minas government direct- monitoring should be carried out to iden- ed people to keep a minimum distance of tify whether metals are found continue or 100 meters from the river. even diluted in the environment, such as soil, air, plants, animals and the food chain. In the understanding of those a ect- All people who have had contact with toxic ed, health is everyone’s right, and State mud should have the right to pass examina- obligation, and must be managed by the tions to evaluate possible contamination. public Uni ed Health System (SUS) as a guarantee of the principle of universality. The company wants to omit, but However, the resources to pay for care and those who are affected report that the health policies to those a ected should be crime violates the right to health. Dam- provided by the criminal company, which age to health needs to be mapped, quan- is responsible for the damage. Constant tified and fully repaired.

Photo: Isis Medeiros | 24 | 5. ELEMENTS FOR BUILDING A SAFETY POLICY FOR THE PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DAMS

Photo: Maxwel Vilela ntil 2010 there were practical- ly no initiatives and concerns of the State with what could happen Uin regions downstream of the dams. Only in 2010 was created the Federal Law No. 12,334, which established the National Dams’ Security Policy (PNSB), which re- quires the National Water Agency (ANA) to conduct annually a Report on Safety of Dams (RSB). b. ere is no reliability on the information: much of the informa- It is estimated that in Brazil there are tion is provided by the companies’ about 24,000 dams. ese are dams of tail- owners of the dam; ings, power generation and water supply. Of these, only 4,510 are submitted to the c. ere is no public system of PNSB and only 3% were inspected. Even security and supervision: af- registered dams do not have information, ter privatizations, this task has much less are properly monitored. been delegated to the companies (self-policing). ere is no public Facing this reality, the people a ected security system capable of acting present some evaluations on the subject of independently and properly super- dam safety: vising the works. On the contrary, the companies want environmental a. ere is no adequate security “self-licensing”; policy that addresses the situation of dams at risk. e recent cases in d. e owner companies omit ba- Mariana and Brumadinho reveal sic information and the state or- that the current mechanisms are gans are not able to proper verify insu cient; the information provided.

| 25 | Vale’s actions in Mariana and Bru- are not prepared to act in these conditions. madinho show clearly the lack of prepara- We understand that from the point of view tion of the company in dealing with the con- of security of the a ected populations, some sequences of this type of crime. Workers, measurements must be taken to protect life. residents, as well as aid agencies themselves Here we point some points:

a. Establish local social control, capable of guaranteeing full information and participation of the people a ected on the decisions and measurements that should be adopted in each dam; b. In every dam, it must be built together with the local population: - Plan to alert and evacuate the population in case of disruption, as well as prior training of the population at risk; - Plan for the rescue of the victims, de ning ac-

tions that must be taken by the population Photo: Isis Medeiros and workers, by the company and by state agencies; - Policy of Integral Reparation of Rights (mit- igation, restitution, identi cation, compensation), material and immaterial, adequate to the a ected families and communities.

| 26 | 6. THE CONCEPT OF “AFFECTED”: THE OLD DISPUTE

aced with the breaking of dams and In Brumadinho, Vale has defend- the imminence of new disruptions, ed that only those who died, disappeared in society the debate becomes evi- or lost their homes are a ected: what the Fdent: who are the ones a ected company calls a “Hot Zone” or “Self-rescue e companies try, at all times, to ap- Z o n e”. ply a restrictive de nition of the concept For many years MAB has been ght- of “people a ected”, because in the cur- ing so that those who su ered damages by rent model people a ected is considered the policy of dam building in Brazil are rec- an additional cost that lower the compa- ognized. In this way we seek the fair con- nies’ pro ts. us, families, social groups ceptualization and reparation of the people or individuals who should be considered a ected by dams. In 2010, the report of the eligible for reparation are not adequately Special Commission “A ected by Dams”, guaranteed and quali ed. In addition, sev- approved by the Council for the Defense eral damages are not raised, also as a way of Human Rights (CDDPH), wrote the fol- to reduce costs, not organizing a full repair. lowing recommendation on the concept:

“It is understood that the concept of sulting not only from the reservoir im- people a ected, applicable to individuals, plantation, but also from other works and families, social groups and populations in interventions associated with the project, general, should consider the following di- such as construction site, functional facili- mensions: ties and residential buildings, roads, trans- e implementation of a dam implies a mission lines, etc. complex process of social change, which in- In identifying the types of impacts, the volves compulsory displacement of popu- following should be considered, among oth- lation and changes in cultural, social, eco- ers: a) compulsory displacement; b) loss of nomic and territorial organization. land and other property (for owners and It is understood that in the identi ca- not owners); c) loss or restriction of access tion of the impacts and the social groups, to resources necessary for the reproduc- communities, families and individuals af- tion of the way of life; d) loss or reduction fected, must be considered the changes re- of income. | 27 | In certain circumstance also should be monetization, must be considered and ob- considered as a ected host communities ject of wide open discussion and negotiation. and populations, that is, that have received Owners and non-owners, small sharecrop- resettlements of people displaced because of pers, partners, occupants (public or private the project. lands), employees, self-employed, informal workers, small business owners and others Consideration should be given to the may be considered a ected. downstream e ects of the dam, which are normally felt only a er lling the reservoir. e absence of legal title of property, e restriction or loss of shing potential, legal employment bond or formalization changes in the water regime, e ects on nav- of occupation or activity will not be taken igation and communication, loss or reduc- as criteria to exclude groups, communities, tion of resources for e uent farming or other families or individuals from the appropriate forms of exploitation of oodplains (mining, recognition as person a ected. extraction of materials, etc.), as well as all e temporal dimension of impacts downstream interference shall be considered should be considered in order to incorporate for the purpose of identifying the impacts. the essentially dynamic character of social, Changes imposed within social rela- economic, political and environmental pro- tions should be considered as losses, when- cesses. is will involve considering impacts ever they imply the breaking of important that are felt at di erent points in the project relationships for social reproduction, cycle from the beginning of planning. considering the cultural dimensions and For Indigenous Peoples and other identity of the groups, communities and Traditional Communities will be consid- families a ected. ered their cultural speci cities, historical, Losses of a ective, symbolic and cul- constitutional and recognized by interna- tural nature, immaterial and intangible, tional conventions rights” (CDDPH, 2010. and therefore not quanti able and, a fortiori, p. 30 and 31).

In this way, we seek to organize those a ected by dams so that they are recognized and have their rights guaranteed. And that the population a ected by the Vale’s crime, along the Parao- peba River and throughout the basin of the São Francisco River, can be recognized and fully repaired.

ORE, WATER AND ENERGY ARE NOT COMMODITIES!

| 28 | Foto: Isis Medeiros