De Pruisische Slagorde Bij Wavre

The action at Wavre.

The orders for general Thielmann for the early morning of the 18th of June prescribed him to hold himself with his corps into readiness, if needed, to follow the other corps to the battlefield of Mont Saint Jean. Thielmann was also informed that all the baggage and trains had to be directed towards Louvain. 1 Further instructions came at 1 p.m. At that time Von Grolmann told the chief of staff of the 3rd corps, general Von Clausewitz, that the 3rd corps was intended either to defend the position at Wavre or to leave some battalions there and to march off towards the battlefield of Mont Saint Jean, to act as a reserve and a rear-guard. 2 Eventually, by 3 p.m. Thielmann received the order to march off towards Couture. 3 In leaving, Thielmann was convinced the enemy would only keep him occupied and that he wouldn’t push through any attack. 4 Thielmann had started his march when circumstances however forced him to change his intention. Therefore, he decided to halt his troops and to take up positions in and around Wavre. His main reason to do so was the fact that the enemy was deploying in front of him. Further, he wasn’t able to continue his march as the 1st corps filled up the road of Bierges, while the 2nd was doing the same towards Neuf Cabaret. 5 While the brigade of Von Kemphen hadn’t moved at all, the brigade of Von Stülpnagel was already moving and the one of Von Lucke had just started its march. 6 Both brigade were now ordered to return to their positions. With Von Borcke’s brigade the situation was that at 8.30 .a.m. Thielmann had ordered Von Borcke to occupy the defile at Wavre with two battalions and to keep them there until further notice so as to cover the retreat of the rear-guard across the Dyle here. Von Borcke received the order by 10 a.m. 7 The battalions Von Borcke used to accomplish this were the 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment of Kurmark Landwehr-infantry (led by major Von Bornstedt) and the 3rd battalion of the 30th regiment (led by major Von Sprenger). At Wavre, both battalions came under the command of the brigade major Von Zeppelin. 8 While the units of Bülow crossed Wavre, both battalions arrived there. At Wavre, Von Zeppelin had his post on the market-place from where he directed his command. 9 It was Thielmann’s intention that Von Borcke would follow the 3rd corps in its course towards Couture. Of the 2nd corps, two brigades of infantry (those of Von Reckow and of Von Brause) and one brigade of cavalry (Von Sohr) were still on the right bank of the Dyle, forming a rear- guard. Eventually, Von Brause and Von Reckow crossed the Dyle at Wavre, while Von Sohr did so at Bierges. Von Borcke crossed the Dyle at Basse Wavre in order not to obstruct the units of the 2nd corps moving through Wavre. 10 It was here that Von Borcke left the Schützen- platoons of the fusilier battalion of the Leib-regiment, led by captain Von Steinäcker, as well as those of the 1st battalion of the 30th regiment (led by captain Von der Horst), under the common command of major Von Bornstedt. 11 Before ascending the north bank of the Dyle, Von Borcke reinforced the garrison of Von Zeppelin at Wavre with the 2nd battalion of the 30th regiment (led by major Grolman) and the two squadrons of the brigade (the 1st and 2nd squadron of the 3rd regiment of Kurmark

Landwehr-cavalry) which came in observation at the crossing of the Dyle at the chateau de Laurensart, some two kilometres further north-east from Wavre. 12 Now, Von Borcke moved his remaining forces (of five and half battalion and a battery) further in a northwest direction, through Champles as he had got the order to take up a position on the other side of Wavre, on the road which leads to Brussels and to await further orders there. 13 As Von Borcke had original orders to move to Couture, he yet wheeled from the Brussels road to his left and by doing so eventually bumped in the early evening into the flank of the 1st corps which was moving towards Wellington. This may have been in the vicinity of Bourgeois or Froidmont. In fact, by passing through the gap of the column, it seriously delayed the 4th brigade of Von Henckel in its course towards Mont Saint Jean. 14 As the brigade continued it course towards Couture it was informed of the success at Waterloo and then halted at Chapelle Saint Lambert. 15

The field.

The field of Wavre is located in the valley of the Dyle, which is bordered on both sides by heights. Those on the right bank of the Dyle (i.e. the French side) dominate those on the left side (110-115 / 90-100) , but the last ones were steeper. 16 Due to the rainfall in the afternoon and the night of the 17th of June, the Dyle had swollen at some points to several metres wide. 17 On top of that, the bottom of the valley between Wavre and Limale consisted mostly of marshy grass-fields, which were cut up by deep ditches which ran parallel to the stream and which were filled with water. 18 At some places the Dyle was bordered by trees, most of them on the left bank. 19

The Dyle in the centre of Wavre, with the pont du Christ in the background.

Wavre, counting in 1815 about 400 inhabitants and 725 houses, was for the most part located on the left bank of the Dyle and some parts were on the slopes of the valley. The suburb of Wavre was situated on the right bank of the Dyle and was grouped around a square called the Place du Sablon and a street which left south (now called the rue de Namur). In 1774 this street was paved and prolonged as far as l’Auzel in 1783. At the side of the street was the farm of Demortier, and it was this farm which escaped the flames of the fire on the morning of the 18th of June. 20 At about one kilometre east of the Place du Sablon was the farm of Chèremont. About 300 metres east of the suburb of Wavre were the scattered houses of the hamlet of Aisémont. Wavre was connected to its suburb by a stone bridge over the Dyle, the so-called Pont du Christ" (1702). 21 Three-hundred metres upstream there was in 1815 another stone bridge but this one was smaller as the Pont du Christ. It emerged on a small square, which was surrounded by some houses and which was 200 metres west of the suburb. 22 At Wavre, the Carmelites church was located at the Place de l'Hotel de Ville. 23 Just as the church, the Hotel de l'Escaille, at the rue de Bruxelles nr.20, served as a hospital after the battle. 24 West of Wavre and 600 metres west of the church was an isolated house called the Hermitage St.Jacques.

The Place du Sablon at Wavre.

The hamlet of Basse-Wavre (25) was at one kilometre north-east of the church of Wavre and was located on both banks of the Dyle. The bridge here was built from wood. 26 The extreme north- east part of Wavre was in 1815 connected with Bas-Wavre by a 600 metre long lane, bordered by trees, called the Belle Voie. This lane led through the marshy fields which separated Wavre and Bas-Wavre. In 1815, a footpath here led here along the Dyle and which was called the sentier des Olives. The Belle Voie emerged in one of the two wooden bridges of the hamlet in 1815. The other bridge was 150 metres further downstream. 27 In the part on the right bank of the Dyle, the farm 3

of la Vacherie was the most important building; the houses here were grouped around a small square and an old chapel of St. Job. On the other side of the Dyle, Bas-Wavre was dominated by a monastery and its church, dating from 1708-1712. At about 400 metres north of these buildings was the farm of l'Hotel (now called the farm de l'Hosté).

The Dyle, with Basse Wavre in the back and the Belle Voie on the left.

General Thielmann’s headquarters were established in the chateau of la Bavette. 28 The chateau is situated about 1.5 kilometres north-west of Wavre, at the road which leads from Wavre towards Brussels. Until 1770 this paved road ran up to the hamlet Notre Dame des Bois (about 14 kilometres north-west of Wavre), but in that year it was extended up to Wavre. 29 On the other side of the road was the farm of du Rie. 30 The area to the west, between this farm and Wavre, was covered by the Bois de Beumont. The village of Bierges was situated on the left bank of the Dyle and had, like today, an extended and scattered outline. Its church and its rectory date from 1788. A building here which played a major role in the struggle in and around Wavre in 1815 was the watermill. Situated on the left bank of the Dyle, it was at 750 metres south-east of the church of Bierges and about 1300 metres south-west of the one at Wavre. The mill was actually a massive farm, constructed around a courtyard; one of its outbuildings was built across the Dyle and this contained the watermill itself. The difference in the level of the water in the Dyle is here one to two metres. 31 Opposite the mill was a wooden bridge over the Dyle. 32 On the right bank it did not emerge on a road though, but in open fields. On the left bank, however, it did and in doing so it crossed the courtyard of the mill.

The Prussian order of battle at Wavre.

The Prussian position at Wavre was naturally very strong. Having Bierges and Basse Wavre on its flanks, it was established along the Dyle, which acted as a perfect defence-line. Dominated by the steep slopes of the heights on its left bank, it was there that Von Thielmann had placed his reserves and from here he was able to fire with his artillery on the few bridges which allowed access to the right bank of the Dyle. In general, because of its general structure, its outbuildings and overgrowth the position was very much suited for the use of a relative small garrison, combined with skirmishers. Therefore, Von Thielman was led by the idea of holding the line of the Dyle with skirmishers and sharpshooters in sufficient strength to prevent any sudden surprise, and to keep his supports together close at hand, to reinforce any threatened point there. From a higher level, artillery covered the access-points over the Dyle. Further to the rear, Thielmann kept his major force as a reserve in case Grouchy would try to turn one of his flanks. 33

General Thielmann had started his movement towards Couture just as the French appeared in large numbers on the heights opposite Wavre. Now, Thielmann halted his march and moved his units back to where had come from. Brigade major Von Zeppelin initially placed the 3rd battalion of the 1st Kurmark Landwehr infantry and the 3rd battalion of the 30th regiment in the immediate surroundings of the stone bridge at Wavre. After that, in the order to hold the bridge to the utmost,Von Bornstedt was instructed to place two companies near the bridge at Wavre. For this he accordingly used the 10th and 11th company (about 300 men) of the 1st regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry, led by captain Von Göhren. After they had detached their skirmishers and their supports, the remaining platoons were placed in the streets in the immediate vicinity of the bridge. The remaining battalions of the garrison were placed in reserve in the streets further to the rear. During the afternoon, major Von Bornstedt learned through two Belgian gendarmes that the French were moving towards Basse-Wavre. After that, Von Göhren led the 150 men of the 9th company to the bridge there. The 12th company, commanded by captain Von Eichstadt, was distributed along the lane between Wavre and Basse Wavre, as well as along the bank of Dyle here. 34 The moment Von Bornstedt had sent out patrols on the other side of the Dyle he realized the importance of the defence of his position and then instructed his men to defend the bridges and their positions to the utmost. 35During these events, the remainder of the brigade crossed the bridge at Basse Wavre. During the passage, Von Bornstedt was able to convince the commander of the 30th regiment, major Von Ditfurth, of the importance of defending the bridge and Von Ditfurth decided to reinforce the position. Von Bornstedt now left one officer and platoon at the bridge and placed 30 men in rear of it on the opposite slope. Von Ditfurth had the bridge demolished, the houses on the right bank of the Dyle set on fire and the access over the Dyle barricaded by large trees. 36 Not long after, Von Ditfurth himself left for his 2nd and 3rd battalion at and near Wavre. It was there that he fell with his horse over a tree which had been cut down and was severely wounded as a result. 37 Von Bornstedt also placed a detachment of hussars in observation at the crossing of the Dyle at

the chateau of Laurensart. 38 Just before the outbreak of the hostilities, the Pont du Christ was barricaded in a great hurry by colonel Von Zeppelin with three waggons and twelve barrels. 39 The bridge at Bierges was left intact and was barricaded just before the action started by the 11th company of the 31st regiment. 40 As the exact positions of the brigades of the 3rd army corps (except for the one of the 9th brigade) during the night of the 17th and the morning of the 18th of June are not known, it is virtually impossible to determine which movements had to be carried out in order to take up their positions in the order of battle for the afternoon. For example, there is no certainty whether the whole corps (the 9th brigade excluded) was east of the road leading to Brussels or not. The 10th brigade of Von Kemphen came on the heights between the Bois de Beumont and the great read to Brussels, in rear of Wavre. The brigade was in six columns of battalions: in the first line were the 3rd battalion of the 27th regiment and the 1st battalion of the 2nd Kurmark Landwehr infantry regiment. In the second line were the musketeer battalions of the 27th regiment and the 3rd battalion of the 2nd Kurmark Landwehr infantry regiment, while the third line was taken by the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry. The two squadrons of Landwehr cavalry were in rear the infantry. 41 The 11th brigade of Von Luck came in position in rear of Wavre, on both sides of the road to Brussels and to the left of the 10th brigade. This brigade also was in columns of battalions, three on each side of the road (two in front and one in rear). 42 The 3rd regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry was south of the road leading to Brussels, the 4th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry north of it. In rear of them were both squadrons of the brigade. 43 The 12th brigade, the one of colonel Von Stülpnagel, was the one which set off to march west, but which was accordingly halted by Von Thielmann. Because of this it probably got a position on the right wing on the heights between Bierges and the Bois de Beumont. On the slopes of the heights above the mill of Bierges, Von Stülpnagel placed major Von Natzmer with the fusilier battalions of the 31st regiment and of the 6th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry. In rear of these battalions were those of the 5th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry and the 1st battalion of the 6th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry. In the third line, as a reserve, were the musketeer battalions of the 31st regiment. For the communication to the left, Von Stülpnagel placed the 2nd battalion of the 6th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry in the low ground south of the Bois de Beumont (Hermitage St.Jacques). 44 The two squadrons which were attached to the 12th brigade were established in rear of the infantry. 45 The 12th brigade also occupied the mill of Bierges with the 11th company of the 31st regiment, led by captain Von Schwedler, plus skirmishers on both sides of the Dyle. 46 The left bank of the Dyle between Basse-Wavre and Bierges was all along occupied by skirmishers. Between Basse-Wavre and Wavre were those of the 4th regiment of Kurmark Landwehrinfantry (brigade of Von Luck), between the bridges of Wavre those of the 3rd regiment of Kurmark Landwehr and those of the brigade of Von Kemphen. The skirmishers between the south bridge at Wavre and the one of Bierges were the ones sent out by major Von Natzmer and those sent out by colonel Von Stülpnagel of the 3rd regiment Kurmark Landwehr infantry and those of the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 6th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry.

47 The cavalry-reserve led by Von Hobe had been pulled in by Thielmann on the left bank of the Dyle in the early morning and was in columns of squadrons opposite the château of La Bavette, south of the road which leads to Brussels, immediately south of the farm of du Rie. 48

The mill of Bierges.

On the 15th of June the Neumark regiment of dragoons nr.6 (brigade Von Thümen, 2nd corps) had left two of its squadrons (the 2nd and the 3rd) led by colonel Von Borcke near Namur. As Von Borcke learned about the Prussian defeat at Ligny, he tried to reach the army on the 17th of June by marching through Hanut. After halting there for some time, he heard the Prussian army had gone back towards Louvain. He then marched off and got there on the 18th of June by 11 a.m. but finally attached himself to the 3rd corps near Wavre. His exact position, however, is not known. 49 The horse battery no.20 was on the heights east of the 12th brigade. Here six guns were covered by the Schützen-division of the 2nd battalion of the 31st regiment under captain Von Zurwesten. The two howitzers were drawn towards Hermitage St.Jacques in order to cover the wooden bridge over the Dyle at Wavre. 50 On the height between the 10th and 11th brigade were the half batteries of 6p. foot battery no.35 and 12p. foot battery no.7 51 The remaining three guns of horse battery nr.19 were in all probability in front of the 11th brigade. 52 The other half of the foot battery no.35 was south of the road which led to Brussels, in case the enemy might break through Wavre. The other half of the 12p. foot battery no.7 was just east of the chapel of Louis Delotte (at some 1000 metres north-west of the crossing at Basse-Wavre) in order to cover the 7

defile of Basse-Wavre. 53 The horse battery nr.18 was in reserve near La Bavette, in front of the cavalry-reserve. 54 With these positions, the majority of the artillery was in positions to cover the area from which the enemy approached, as well as in positions to defend the bridges over the Dyle. Just a small part was kept in reserve. 55 At Wavre, general Thielmann had about 20.000 men and 35 guns (excluding the detachment of Von Stengel and the main part of the 9th brigade), distributed over 24.5 battalions, 26 squadrons and 5 batteries. 56

The action.

The vanguard of the 3rd French corps arrived in front of Wavre shortly after 4 p.m. In case the divisions would march in the numerical order, Lefol would have been the first to arrive (57) but in this case the one of Habert was the one in front. Vandamme probably posted his division of Lefol to the left of the road towards La Baraque, while he kept the division of Berthézène in reserve on the road. 58 As these first units emerged on the opposite heights, Vandamme was supposed to halt his forces and to await further orders from Grouchy there. He decided not to comply with them and developed his own plan of attack. 59 It basically consisted of a brief bombardment of Wavre, after which his front division, the one of Habert, would storm its suburb straight out. At the same time, Vandamme decided to attack the crossings over the Dyle at Bierges and Basse- Wavre with single battalions of his corps. Accordingly, he gave orders to Habert for the attack. His advance was preceded by a bombardment of two batteries (of which one of 12-pounders) which were posted to the right of the road which leads to La Baraque, on the height of Aisémont, opposite the suburb of Wavre. 60 Habert now launched the assault on the suburb of Wavre with a part of his division, while other units soon joined in. 61 It was between 4 and 4.30 p.m. 62 By that time, the dragoons of Exelmans were probably somewhere between Dion-le-Mont and Wavre. Of them, the 17th regiment reconnoitred in the direction of the road Louvain – Namur. 63 As a result, the 8th regiment of uhlans (brigade Von der Marwitz) detached its first squadron towards Laurensart. 64 By 4.45 p.m. - as coming back from La Baraque - Grouchy reached the heights in front of Wavre. He was highly irritated as soon as he found out that Vandamme had not obeyed his instructions of not entering into any action until further notice. 65 As he advanced, Habert soon forced the Prussian garrison out of the suburb of Wavre. 66 This was not too hard as the Prussians had not the intention to keep it all cost. 67 The French, having occupied this part of Wavre, now arrived at the Dyle. The Prussian defence-system here was very efficient: first, the French were fired at in their flanks and front by the Prussian skirmishing fire, which came from the banks of the stream. Then - having arrived at the bridge - they got hit in front by the fire from the Prussian supports which were in the parallel streets and finally to be pushed back by a bayonet-charge of further reserves. 68 The first French attack was forced back by two platoons of the 10th and 11th company of the 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry, led by lieutenant Nachtigal and Britzke. During this action, the houses near the bridge were for one part occupied

and for another set alight. 69 More importantly, the Prussian artillery had bombarded the suburb in order to decrease the French pressure upon the main bridge. 70 The 3rd battalion of the 30th regiment under major Von Sprenger held its position until it had run out of ammunition. Shortly after, Von Sprenger – after his request – was supported by the 2nd battalion of the same regiment, as well as by two platoons of the 1st Kurmark Landwehr infantry regiment. Just at that time, Von Sprenger had evacuated the bridge which was now retaken by bayonet. 71 It was in this stage that the 70th regiment of the line stormed the bridge under a shower of hail. As a result the regiment panicked but its commander, colonel Uny, grabbed the colour and led his men forward again. Soon after, Uny fell and then his men fell back. 72 Apart from Uny, general Habert plus 600 men were wounded or killed. 73The French attempts also failed because of the strong Prussian artillery fire from the banks and slopes of the Dyle upon the suburb, and the central square there in particular. As a result, the French tried to avoid it by getting into the side streets which ran parallel to the Dyle but by doing so, their power slackened. 74 Meanwhile a French battery had come into play to the left of the road which leads to La Baraque. Around the same time the French had been able to cross the Dyle over the small bridge to Von Sprenger’s left. In the attempt they had succeeded in penetrating into the adjacent street and occupy a few houses; they were immediately thrown back again however by a platoon of the 3rd battalion of the 30th regiment and one of the 1st regiment Kurmark Landwehr infantry. 75 The skirmishing had also extended over the whole front of the line, from Basse-Wavre up to the mill of Bierges. The main reason for this was the fact that simultaneously with the attack on the suburb of Wavre, further attacks were launched by the French further to the right and left. By 4.15 p.m. Basse-Wavre was attacked by a battalion of the division of Habert, three squadrons of Exelmans and a battery. 76 Shortly before, 80 men of the 9th company of the 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment Kurmark Landwehr-infantry had occupied the buildings here on the right bank of the Dyle. Initially they repulsed the French dragoons but soon they gave up their position and set the buildings on fire. The French took the farm of la Vacherie and some houses, but were not able to penetrate onto the other bank of the Dyle and the fighting turned into skirmishing. 77 On the French left flank, Vandamme had launched one of Lefol’s battalions against the mill of Bierges. Here, he also deployed some artillery. 78 By that time it was around 4.30 p.m. The Prussian position here was extremely strong: the mill was covered by marshy field which were cut up by trenches (running parallel with the Dyle) filled with water and which were almost impossible to wade through. The left bank was also covered with bushes and trees which gave excellent protection for the Prussian skirmishers to deliver a sharp musketry-fire and the whole position was - from a higher point - covered by artillery-fire. 79 The attack was therefore doomed to fail. By now, around 5 p.m., the front division of the 4th corps - the one of Hulot – reached a position opposite the mill of Bierges, near the Bois de Manil. It took up a position next to and in rear of the artillery which had been placed there by Vandamme some time before. 80 After the fruitless attack of Lefol’s battalion on the mill of Bierges, Gérard now decided to replace the battalion by one of Hulot’s division so as to renew the assault. He then ordered Hulot to lead a battalion of the 9th regiment of light infantry forward. It was now almost 5.30

p.m. 81 The battalion was given a slightly more westward direction in an attempt to avoid the ditches, but this did not work out. Ultimately, the men fell back to their original positions. General Gérard had seen the débâcle and now decided to attack again with another battalion of the 9th regiment of light infantry and which was supported by the same battalion of the same regiment which had made the first attempt. Gérard himself - accompanied by his staff – advanced as well. However, the attempt also failed and to make things worse, Gérard himself got wounded by a musket-ball in his chest and was taken to the rear. 82 For the moment, Hulot’s division now fell under the orders of Vandamme. 83

The Dyle near Bierges at the beginning of the 20th century.

By now, Grouchy himself had arrived from his position opposite Wavre and as he had assessed the situation, he instructed Hulot to keep his battalions at the foot of the heights and await further instructions. It was just about this time, somewhere between 6 and 7 p.m., that Grouchy received the order which was written by Soult at 1 p.m. from the heights of Rossomme. 84 Having read it, Grouchy decided to bring the two remaining divisions of the 4th corps across the Dyle at Limale and to leave the one of Hulot in front of Bierges. 85 At the same time he issued the following order to general Pajol:

Général,

Portez vous en toute hâte avec la division Teste et votre corps d'armée à Limale, passez-y la Dyle et attaquez l'ennemi qui est en face.

Grouchy 86

It was now almost 7 p.m. 87 Limale is about two kilometres distant from Bierges, on the left bank of the Dyle. Between both villages the Dyle streams through a flat area of meadows, which are confined by smaller and higher heights. At Limale, these heights are steeper and more close to the Dyle. To the northwest these heights were cut through by two defiles in which the village was situated. From here, it stretched with small outbuildings towards the Dyle, where a stone bridge connected it to the opposite bank. 88 The environment of Limale consisted of heights, covered with forests and cut through by defiles and sunken roads. Limale itself was cut through by the road coming from Bierges and in which two roads, coming from the Dyle, came out. Two other ones started from here, leading towards Grand Sart and Delbourg. Apart from the presence of a post of the 11th Prussian regiment of hussars led by major Simolin (Sohr’s brigade, 2nd corps), the bridge of Limale was not occupied. 89 Before the two divisions of French infantry reached the bridge, another French force had got there. It was the one which was led by general Pajol. Having received Grouchy’s order of 2 p.m. at Tourinnes around 3.30 p.m., Pajol left for La Baraque, probably through Nils Saint Vincent and Corbais. 90 During this march Pajol met the cavalry-division of Vallin (4th corps). 91 It came under Pajol’s orders and was placed in front of the column in its course towards La Baraque, where Pajol’s forces started to arrive by 6.30 p.m. 92 Pajol had just established his own corps en bataille on the heather-fields around La Baraque, when a messenger of Grouchy, the aide de camp Pont Bellanger, announced himself to him. He handed him Grouchy’s order to leave for Limale straight away. 93 Pajol did so and took a course along l’Auzel and the hamlet of Trou de Houx. Pajol’s vanguard, Vallin’s division, arrived in front of the bridge of Limale by 8 p.m. 94 The French were very cautious in front of the bridge, to avoid being trapped in the defile of the Dyle. After colonel Biot had found out about the situation around the bridge, Pajol then ordered him to take the bridge with the first squadron of the 6th regiment of hussars (led by the prince De Carignan), turn right from there and to advance on the opposite bank of the Dyle towards Wavre. Pajol would support him if needed. De Carignan left with his squadron, followed by the remainder of the brigade of Vallin. Though the enemy gave some musketry-fire, De Carignan took the bridge without any problems whatsoever. 95 The Prussian hussars pulled off to their main body towards Chapelle Saint Lambert without interfering in the French advance. By now it was 8.30 p.m. 96 From the bridge, both regiments of Vallin’s brigade turned right, to a position at the eastern extremity of the village. After colonel Von Stülpnagel, at Bierges, had heard about the French advance to Limale through major Simolin of the 11th regiment hussars, he sent the detachment led by major Von Stengel (in position in and near Bierges), in the direction of Limale in order to halt the French advance. Shortly after, he also sent his two squadrons of cavalry, the 3rd and 4th squadron of the 6th regiment Kurmark Landwehr-cavalry there. Meanwhile, from his position, Von Stülpnagel was able to witness the approach of a strong French column to Limale on the other bank of the Dyle. They were the divisions of Pécheux and Vichery which came from their position east of Mannil, where they had halted between 5.30 and 7.30 p.m. 97 Von Stengel moved his troops through the fields and over the heights between Bierges and the farm of Delbourg. 98 In doing so, he lost valuable time, which was used by the French in

occupying the bridge of Limale. Von Stengel moved the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 19th regiment on the height north of Limale, while the 3rd battalion descended the valley of the Dyle and approached the village from the east. During this march, however, it halted near a ford which appeared to be threatened by the enemy. The moment the 1st battalion came upon the height of Delbourg, the French were still on the other bank of the Dyle; major Von Schouler immediately detached the Schützen led by captain Von Pritzelwitz forward to secure the bridge but by the time they were near the village the enemy had taken it, and by now French cavalry was crossing the stream and was occupying the village. Additionally, French artillery on the opposite heights had started firing. Though the French were not in some strength yet, due to his own weakness, the uncertain situation and the vicinity of French infantry, Von Stengel acted with caution and therefore kept most of his forces upon the heights. 99

The grand-place at Limale.

The French, probably because of the lack of infantry, however, didn’t push through. This allowed Von Stengel to take the initiative. The 1st battalion of the 19th regiment took a position to the west of the road leading to the farm of Delbourg, and the 2nd to the east. By now it was about 8.45 p.m. 100 While keeping the 3rd battalion and the majority of the musketeers battalion on the height, Von Stengel sent his sharpshooters and large groups of skirmishers into the village to retake it, those of the 1st battalion to the right and those of the 2nd battalion to the left. The sharpshooters of the 2nd battalion were led by 1st lieutenant Von Kern, who was now joined by the 8th company of the same battalion led by captain Von Glasenapp. These troops succeeded in driving the French out of the northern and eastern part of the village. The company of the 2nd battalion, led by captain Von Glasenapp, reached the fields on the bank of the Dyle and was able to find a covered position in a hollow road which ran parallel to the Dyle. It was from there that he fired successfully on the French on the other bank of the stream. Another platoon of sharpshooters of the 1st battalion was able to find a similar position and to fire on the bridge from there. Meanwhile, as it suffered slightly from French gunfire, the 1st battalion moved to a more 12

covered position. By now, the 3rd battalion had got into a position on the height above the east entrance of the village. Initially it had left its sharpshooters near the ford, but now these were also pulled in. By now, the action had evolved into a stalemate, which neither party was able to break through. Yet, as Teste had collected sufficient infantry, the French now launched a sudden counter-attack of columns and swarms of skirmishers. Though the sharpshooters and skirmishers of the 2nd battalion managed, by climbing the steep height, to reach their reserves, three platoons of the 1st battalion were not able to do this and they had to find their way back towards the 3rd battalion on the height above Limale. Having lost the village by 9.30 p.m., Von Stengel now tried to keep the wide front of the heights north of the village by keeping the 1st battalion to the west of the road leading to Delbourg, the 2nd to the east of it and the 3rd on the height immediately above the eastern exit of the village. All roads, tracks and other entries towards the heights were guarded by detachments. The two squadrons of the regiment of uhlans nr.6 were in rear of the 3rd battalion of the 19th regiment of infantry, while the 1st squadron of 1st regiment of Westphalian Landwehr formed the right wing. The main thrust of the French battalions, probably eight in number, was directed towards the 2nd battalion of the 19th regiment. The action was on its flanks covered by cavalry, of which the one on the French left flank was the best able to deploy, as in the valley of the Dyle to the right this was far more difficult to do. The intention of the French was to pin down and turn the Prussian centre; an action towards the 3rd battalion to the right was much harder as this battalion was covered by the valley of the Dyle. However, the moment the Prussian 2nd battalion started to retreat, the French infantry immediately attacked the skirmishers which covered this retreat. The battalion tried to push off the French, but especially the 6th and 7th company suffered severely from French canister-fire. This situation was aggravated by the fact that the troops had to climb the heights. Now, the battalion almost fell apart but the officers succeeded in rallying it again and getting it further to the rear. This safe retreat was also possible because of the vigorous actions of the battalions skirmishers, led by lieutenant Von Kern. In retreating, the 2nd battalion now left the left flank of the 1st battalion exposed. For this reason this battalion fell back towards Delbourg and there at least a part of the battalion, was able to re-assemble, also because of a flank attack carried out by a detachment led by 1st lieutenant Von Röbke of the 3rd battalion. By now, night fell. Meanwhile, the French cavalry had developed to the French left and was now menacing the 1st battalion of the 19th Prussian regiment of infantry. A first French charge on the right flank of the battalion failed, and another attempt done by French cavalry (on the Prussian flank) and infantry (on the Prussian front) failed as well; the battalion was covered by sharpshooters and these men managed to drive off the French. They also had the support of the squadrons of Von Stengel. Now, the battalion escaped. By now, however, the battalion had lost its fighting power and retreated through the Bois de Rixensart towards the chaussée leading from Wavre to Brussels. The French now directed their attack to the fusilier battalion. The French tried to outflank the Prussian to their right, but major Hüttel now detached a platoon led by lieutenant Lehman. Though the platoon was no match to the French, they had the advantage of the night falling in. Their advance was also so bold that the French held back, and now though menaced by French cavalry to his left flank, Hüttel was able to draw in his small detachments which were covering

the entrances of the heights. 101 Until then, they had run the risk of being cut off of their main body, having the French in their front and at the same time trying to push through on the heights. However, some of these detachments were closely monitored by French cavalry and now this cavalry followed in their wake up to the battalion itself. This formed square and managed to drive off the French four times, retreating during each charge 30 to 50 paces. The Prussians, having spent most of their ammunition, accordingly slipped away in the darkness and in an for the French unknown area. Here, it was captain Von Borcke who led the Prussian rear- guard. Additionally, to the battalion’s right, a small part of the 1st battalion led by lieutenant n Von Velten, supported. The role of the Prussian cavalry in the fighting in and around Limale was very small; they merely served as a reserve and as flank-cover. The situation was that major Von Stülpnagel had sent 20 horsemen of the 6th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry towards Limale to observe the French movements on the opposite bank of the Dyle. Having apprehended however that the French were approaching Limale and that this village wasn’t occupied by Prussian troops, he sent out his two squadrons (the 3rd and the 4th) of the 6th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry to follow the units of Von Stengel. Their mission was to observe the French and to maintain the communication between Von Stülpnagel and Von Stengel. They marched in trot over the heights towards Limale and while they did so this was taken; now they bumped into the 6th regiment of uhlans of Von Stengel who were in rear of the 3rd battalion of the 19th regiment. The Kurmark squadrons took up a position further to their left, on the heights covering the valley of the Dyle, which they now observed. As the French skirmishers now climbed the heights, advanced and started their fire and the Kurmark cavalry was about to face them, they got the information from the uhlans that the French cavalry was making progress on the Prussian right flank (where they had more space to do so) and now they all went back. The moment Von Stülpnagel learned the French had crossed the Dyle at Limale and had taken the village, he immediately informed Von Thielmann of the situation. He also sent him word he would advance to Limale while at the same time he asked for cavalry. Sometime after, Von Stülpnagel was reinforced with that of lieutenant colonel Von Hobe. Von Stülpnagel was ordered by Von Thielmann to prevent the enemy from emerging from Limale as he couldn’t spare any other troops for another action on his extreme right flank. 102 Meanwhile – it might have been around 8 p.m. – Thielmann received Blücher’s instruction to hold his position as long as he could. 103 It was around 8.45 p.m. that the first units of Pécheux’s division had arrived at the bridge of Limale. From there, followed by the remainder of this division, plus the one of Vichery, they pulled up in a northern direction on the steep slopes beyond Limale. 104 The brigade of Berruyer (Vallin’s division) and the division of Soult (Pajol’s corps) were ready to turn west, towards Chapelle Saint Lambert, and they did so after Vallin’s brigade had been called back from its position east of Limale. Teste’s division turned right, to a position east of Limale. 105 Due to the Prussian presence and the darkness, the development of large amounts of French troops on a confined space was slow. 106

Panorama of the heights beyond Limale, towards Delbourg, with the farm of that name in the back.

Von Stülpnagel had left Bierges, leaving behind skirmishers on the bank of the Dyle, the 2nd battalion of the 6th regiment Kurmark Landwehr infantry between Wavre and Bierges (in the low ground south of the wood of Hermitage St.Jacques) and two battalions ( the 3rd battalion of the 31st regiment and the 3rd battalion of the 6th regiment Kurmark Landwehr infantry) near Bierges itself. During the march the 1st battalion of the 31st regiment was in front, followed by the 2nd. 107 As he marched up, Von Stülpnagel met the units of Von Stengel which fell back[108] and now he realized that Limale and the heights were in hands of the French. By now, it was almost dark but still Von Stülpnagel decided to try to retake the village, or at least, to try to prevent the French from advancing further. To this end, Von Stülpnagel placed his foot-battery nr.24 and the 3rd battalion of the 5th Kurmark Landwehr infantry regiment in reserve near the eastern part of the Bois de Rixensart. For the attack he formed the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 31st regiment in columns of battalions, with skirmishers in front [109]; at 50 paces further to the rear, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 5th regiment Kurmark Landwehr and the 1st battalion of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr followed. While Von Stengel (as well as the two squadrons of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry of the 12th brigade) formed the extreme right wing, the reserve cavalry was held further to the rear near the half-round small wood which lies to the front left of the Bois de Rixensart. By now, it was 10 p.m. and the Prussians stormed forward. 110 However, the attack lacked cohesion which was caused by the darkness and the high corn. During their advance, the skirmishers unexpectedly bumped into the road which leads from Bierges to Neuf Cabaret and which was locally hollow and bordered with hedges. This situation caused the skirmishers to move side-wards, a manoeuvre Von Stülpnagel did not see. Right at that moment the men got a volley of musketry fire of units of the division of Vichery (111) and a bayonet action became almost impossible due to the presence of the hollow road. Major Von Kesteloot, commander of the 2nd battalion of the 31st regiment as well as major

Gaedicke fell wounded. In this situation, and by the fear to be charged by cavalry, Von Stülpnagel had the battalions, covered by their skirmishers, fall back as far as the Bois de Rixensart. 112 It was now between 10 and 11 p.m. and the fighting died down. General Von Thielmann had arrived as well and he saw that in the darkness further fighting was useless; he gave the 12th brigade a covered position in and at the southern edge of the Bois de Rixensart, covered by the skirmishers of the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 31st regiment which had their positions in the low grounds in front of the wood. These outposts in their turn were reinforced by the 1st battalion of the 6th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry (12th brigade) by taking up a position immediately in rear of the small wood which was in the left front of the Bois de Rixensart. Von Stülpnagel didn’t succeed in convincing major Von Stengel to maintain his position to the right, or, at least, to take a position immediately in rear of the wood: Von Stengel decided to retire further north towards the road leading from Wavre to Brussels. 113 Yet, for the time being, the majority of the detachment of Von Stengel was on the extreme right flank of the 12th brigade, in front of the Bois de Rixensart. Here too were the two squadrons of Kurmark Landwehr cavalry which were attached to the 12th brigade. The 2nd battalion of the 19th regiment, though, was led by its commander , major Bünau, through the forest to the road leading from Wavre to Brussels. As it had taken a bivouac here, it was told by a hussar officer that Wellington was pulling back towards Louvain. As a result, Bünau did the same; he got there the next day by 3 p.m. After the actions of the day before, a platoon of Schützen of the 1st battalion was attached to Bünau’s battalion. 114 Near the musketeer-battalions of the 31st regiment, in and in front of the wood, were also the three battalions of the 5th regiment of Kurmark landwehr infantry. The left wing of the 12th brigade was linked up with the units of the 10th brigade which were now in and around Bierges. 115 Von Hobe’s cavalry had advanced but had halted after the Prussian infantry had fallen back and now in its turn went back as far as a position in rear of the Bois de Rixensart. 116 By now, it was after 11 p.m. 117 All in all, the Prussian position was weak due to the low number of troops spread over a wide front. 118 After the units of the 12th brigade had left their positions to move towards Limale, Thielmann placed both musketeer battalions of the 27th regiment as well as the fuselier battalion of the 2nd Kurmark Landwehr infantry regiment (all of the 10th brigade) there. 119 The 4th regiment Kurmark Landwehr infantry of the 11th brigade crossed the road to Brussels. 120 That night, the division of Teste had its bivouac in front of Bierges. North of the farm of Delbourg, on the heights, were the divisions of Pécheux and Vichery; to their left (i.e. to the right of Neuf Cabaret) was the cavalry of Pajol and Vallin. 121 The French and Prussian outposts were very near to each other, which caused numerous skirmishes during the night. 122 Von Thielmann spent the night at his headquarters that night, from where he wrote a report to Blücher at 1 a.m. about the events of the preceding day and his situation of that moment. 123 Grouchy had his headquarters at Limale and it was here at midnight that he wrote the following order for Vandamme:

Limale, le 18 juin 1815 à minuit

Mon cher général, nous avons débouché de Limale; mais la nuit n'a pas permis de nous porter bien loin, de sorte que nous sommes bec à bec avec l'ennemi, occupant cependant les hauteurs. Puisque vous n'avez pas été à même de passer la Dyle, vieuillez vous rendre de suite à Limale, avec votre corps, ne laissant à Wavre, que ce qui est indispensable pour défendre les ponts. Nous ferons effort par ici demain à la point du jour; vous ferez occuper l'ennemi à Wavre, par un simulance d'attaque et nous réussirons, j'espère à joindre l'Empereur, ainsi qu'il ordonne de le faire. On dit qu'il a battu les Anglais, mais je n'ai plus de ses nouvelles, et suis fort dans l'embarras pour lui donner des notres. C'est au nom de la patrie que je vous prie, mon cher général, d'exécuter de suite le présent ordre. Je ne vois que cette manière de sortir de la position difficile où nous sommes; et le salut de l'armée en dépend. Je mets en outre sous votre commandement tout le corps de Gérard. Mille amitiés, je vous attend, le maréchal Grouchy

P.S. Le rapport des prisonniers faits ici, annonce que Blücher et Bülow sont en face de nous, j'en doute fort. 124

The entrance of the chateau at Limale where Grouchy had his headquarters during the night of the 18th of June. 17

Meanwhile, since Grouchy had left Vandamme around 6 p.m., this general had continued his attacks on the bridge of Wavre and to bombard the place with howitsers. After the first actions against the stone bridge of Wavre, the Prussians here, led by captain Von Göhren, were relieved by those of the 3rd battalion 30th regiment, which had stood further to the rear within Wavre. After some time, lieutenant Nachtigal advanced again with some volunteers and joined the fight. 125 It was already around 6 p.m. that the French were able to take the stone bridge and some adjoining houses on the opposite bank of the Dyle, but they were immediately driven back. 126 In their turn, the Prussians penetrated five times on the French side of the Dyle without being able to retake the suburb of the city. 127 All in all, in the period from 4 until 11 p.m. , the French carried out thirteen fruitless attacks on Wavre. 128 That night, Vandamme had his units in and in front of the suburb of Wavre. Wavre was held by the 3rd battalion of the 30th regiment as well as by a part of the 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry. During the night the small bridge was barricaded. 129 Until the moment that the 12th brigade of Von Stülpnagel was sent to its right to be involved in Limale, it had stood in its position watching the actions and suffering from French artillery fire, which came from different levels and on which the Prussian artillery reacted. 130 The situation at Basse-Wavre had not changed: all French attempts to take it had stranded on the bridge. Major Von Bornstedt was in control here. As he also had his men in Wavre itself and spread along the Dyle as far as Wavre, he regularly sent out his lieutenant Coburg to find out about the situation at these points. At 6 p.m. Von Bornstedt sent the same lieutenant to general Von Thielman to report back to him and to ask him for reinforcements for the post at Basse- Wavre and for those between this point and Wavre. Von Bornstedt was instructed to turn to colonel Von Zeppelin, who told him there were no reinforcements available. Yet, not long after, Von Bornstedt was reinforced by the 1st battalion of the 4th regiment Kurmark Landwehr infantry led by captain Von Leist (brigade Von Luck). 131-132 A group of 24 men led by lieutenant Töpfer was sent by Von Bornstedt to support the detachment of hussars which was at the bridge of the Dyle near the chateau of Laurensart. 133 This movement may have been caused by the fact that Grouchy (before he left for Limale towards 7 p.m.) had given Exelmans the instruction to demonstrate further to the east to give Von Thielmann the impression that he intended to cross the Dyle there. 134 Towards dusk there was a break in the fighting around Basse-Wavre, but by 10 p.m. the French advanced again in such a way that the Prussians were obliged to keep up a continuous skirmishing fire. That night, Von Bornstedt held 30 men near the bridge as sentries; Von Bornstedt himself patrolled in the immediate surroundings. The result was that the remains of the bridge and the part of Basse-Wavre on the left bank of the Dyle were kept in Prussian hands during the night. 135 The French took up a position in the farm of la Vacherie and its immediate surroundings, as the houses in its vicinity had been burnt down . 136 Exelmans’ dragoons were probably further to the east, but further details are missing. 137

1 Cf. the letter written at 11 p.m. on the 17th of June by Blücher to Von Müffling and the order writtten by Blücher for Bülow at midnight. To this last instruction, Thielmann wrote: “Sind die Trains bei Rouxmiroir angekommen, so können per Brigade einige Wagen mit Zwieback und Branntwein über die Abtei St.Florent wo sie das Thal der Dyle passieren müssen hierher dirigirt werden. “ Cf.Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.86 Rouxmiroir is about 12.5 kilometres east of Wavre.

2. General Thielmann himself. In: Ollech, Von _ Geschichte des Feldzuges etc. p.194 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.87 Clausewitz, Von - Campagne de 1815 en France p.129 According to the chief of staff of the 11th brigade (Von Luck), captain Von Röder, Thielmann received these orders at 11 a.m. Cf. Röder, C.von Erinnerungen etc. p. 325

3. Report of Von Thielmann himself. In: Ollech, Von – Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.195 Cf. Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.87 Cf. Service journal of Von Borcke. In: Förster, F. Chr. -, Geschichte der Befreiungskriege 1813, 1814, 1815 p.1080 The carrier, lieutenant Von Gerlach, states it was about 2.30 p.m. Von Gerlach joined Gneisenau and his staff again on the battlefield of Waterloo, in front of the Bois de Paris. Cf.his diary. In: Aus den Jahren preussischer Not etc. p.151-152

4. Thielmann in his report. In: Ollech, Von – Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 p.195

5. Plotho, Von - Der Krieg des Verbundeten Europa gegen Frankreich im Jahre 1815 p.75 Ollech, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 p.210 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.87

6. In: Militärische Zeitschrift (1820), p.303 That morning, the 12th brigade had moved from a position to the west of the road which leads from Wavre to Brussels to a position to the right rear of Wavre; during this change of position the troops halted several times. Earlier that day they had got their first breakfast (some rice) since the battle of Ligny. Cf. lieutenant Mankopf (commander of the platoon of skirmishers of the 4th company of the 31st regiment, brigade Von Stülpnagel). In: Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.106-109

7. Major Von Bornstedt (commander of the 3rd battalion of the 1st regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry) Cf. Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18.und 19.Juni 1815 p.30-40 The service-journal of Von Borcke . In: Förster, F. Chr. - Geschichte der Befreiungskriege 1813, 1814, 1815 p.1080

8. Cf. Service journal of Von Borcke. In: Förster, F. Chr. -, Geschichte der Befreiungskriege 1813, 1814, 1815. Vol.III Berlin, Gustav Hempel, 1866

Von Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18.und 19. Juni 1815 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.88 Damitz, Von – Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 p.324 In: Militärische Zeitschrift (1820), p.303 Ollech,Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 p.195 Clausewitz, Von - Campagne de 1815 en France p.130

9 Report of major Von Zeppelin. In: GSA, HA-VI, nr.V.8b.p.21 (in former KA, nr. VI.E.22.9)

10. Von Bornstedt. Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18.und 19.Juni 1815 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.88 Lettow Vorbeck, Von – Napoleons Untergang Vol.III p.451

11 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.88 Major Von Holleben (commander of the fusilier battalion of the 8th regiment). In: Aus den hinterlassenen Papiere p.141 Cf. Service journal of Von Borcke. In: Förster, F. Chr. - Geschichte der Befreiungskriege 1813, 1814, 1815 p.1081 Von Bornstedt - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.14-30 Von der Horst himself acknowledged in 1858 that he did not remember anything relevant, due to the lapse of time. In: Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.110- 111

12. Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18.und 19.Juni 1815 Cf. Service journal of Von Borcke. In: Förster, F. Chr. - Geschichte der Befreiungskriege 1813, 1814, 1815 p.1081 Damitz, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 p.325 Lettow Vorbeck, Von – Napoleons Untergang Vol.III p.451 Clausewitz, Von – Campagne de 1815 en France p.130 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.88

13. Major Von Holleben (commander of the fusilier battalion of the 8th regiment). In: Aus den hinterlassenen Papiere p.141 Some claim the force consisted of six battalion, two squadrons and one battery. Cf. The service journal of Von Borcke. In: Förster, F. Chr. - Geschichte der Befreiungskriege 1813, 1814, 1815 p.1081

Plotho, Von - Der Krieg des Verbundeten Europa gegen Frankreich im Jahre 1815 p.75 In: Militärische Zeitschrift (1820) p.303 Six battalions and a battery. Cf. Major Von Holleben (commander of the fusilier battalion of the 8th regiment). In: Aus den hinterlassenen Papiere p.142 Damitz, Von – Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 p.326

14. Cf. Henckel von Donnersmarck, count Erinnerungen etc. p.359 According to Gottschalck, the brigade was initially trapped in the column of Henckel’s brigade and afterwards it started following the 7th and 8th brigade, presuming they were units of the 3rd corps. Cf. Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.88 Von Pflugk Harttung states Von Borcke left the chaussée de Bruxelles near the “barrier”, but where this is remains unclear. He also states Von Borcke had an initial instruction to continue his march on this road. In: GSA, HA-VI,nr.V.8.p.33

15. Von Ollech claims Von Borcke had his bivouacs between Chapelle Saint Lambert and Ohain. In: Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.210 Von Plotho says it was near Ohain. In: Der Krieg des Verbundeten Europa gegen Frankreich im Jahre 1815 p.75 According to major Von Holleben, the brigade moved its position north of Wavre (from the road which leads to Brussels) towards Couture and from there to Ohain, near which village it bivouacked. Cf. Major Von Holleben (commander of the fusilier battalion of the 8th regiment). In: Aus den hinterlassenen Papiere p.142 According to the service journal of Von Borcke, the brigade reached Ohain through Couture which is simply impossible. In: Förster, F. Chr. - Geschichte der Befreiungskriege 1813, 1814, 1815 p.1081

16. Cf. Damitz, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 p.326

17. Sonmereyn claims a width of 9 metres near the mill of Bierges, while Doorman states it was 10 to 13 metres between Limale and Bierges. Cf. Sonmereyn, A.Ch. - Les combats de Wavre des 18 et 19 Juin 1815 p.28 Doorman - De gevechten bij Wavre op 18 en 19 Juni 1815. In: Militaire spectator (1907) nr.5 p.203-217, 253-268, 325-336 In his memorandum dated 6th of April 1815, lieutenant B.Jackson states the stream was about 5.40 metres wide and 0.90 metre deep in summer. In: GstA, Berlin nr.VI,HA NL Gneisenau kt.19 p.23

18. Gérard - Quelques documents sur la bataille de Waterloo p.35

19. Gérard - Quelques documents sur la bataille de Waterloo p.35

20 Cf. Sonmereyn, A.Ch. - Les combats de Wavre des 18 et 19 Juin 1815 p.27 and 42

21 The name is derived from a crucifix on one of its parapets (it is still there) and which was damaged by a howitzer in 1815. On one of the parapets of the bridge, which was enlarged in 1845, a tablet was placed bearing the following text: "le 18 Juin, ce pont fut l'enjeu d'un combat entre les troupes de Grouchy et de Blücher."

22. Damitz, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 p.326 Sonmerey, A. Ch. - Les combats de Wavre des 18 et 19 Juin 1815 p.27 Plans of Von Lettow Vorbeck. In: Napoleon’s Untergang Vol.III

There is a strong indication that there was a small, third bridge at Wavre, some hundred metres further downstream from the pont du Christ. Cf. the account of major Von Sprenger (3rd battalion 30th regiment), see below. In: GSA-HA, VI.V.8b.p.21

23 It dates from around 1476. In a column in the right aisle a cannonball can be found and which would date from 1815. It is surrounded by a tablet depicting a winged warrior beating down a naked man and bearing the text: "Quid vis, o irrita acies contra hanc petram ? Ecce medum plus ultra ! Sic inconsulta transit gloria mundi." The translation reads: "Why, powerless pieces of iron, do you assault this stone. No, you are going too far. In this way the world’s glory will fall due to impetuous plans." The tablet would date from the seventies of the 19th century.

24. Speeckaerts, G.P. & Baecker, I. - Les 135 vestiges et monuments commémoratifs des combats de 1815 en Belgique p.62

25. Cf. map of Ferraris. Nowadays it is called Basse-Wavre.

26 Cf. Memorandum dated 6th of April 1815 of lieutenant B.Jackson. In: GstA, Berlin nr.VI,HA NL Gneisenau kt.19 p.23

27. Cf. map of Ferraris.

28. The modern name is De la Bawette.

29. Cf. Sonmereyn, A.Ch. - Les combats de Wavre des 18 et 19 Juin 1815 p.27

30. Nowadays it is called du Ri.

31. Doorman, A.J. - “De gevechten bij Wavre op 18 en 19 Juni 1815.” In: Militaire spectator (1907) nr.5 p.203-217, 253-268, 325-336 Fierens-Gevaert, H. - “Waterloo légendaire.” In: Revue de Paris. 15th September 1900,

p.402-448

32. Cf. map of Ferraris Sonmereyn, A.Ch. - Les combats de Wavre des 18 et 19 Juin 1815 p.28 Siborne, W. – History of the war etc. Vol.II p.277 The current bridge is further west; the old bridge has since long disappeared.

33. Hyde kelly, p.112-113 Von Clausewitz.

34. These men were led by sergeant-majors Hold, Knack and Friedrich. Cf. Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.14-30 These were the skirmishers mentioned by Sonmereyn as occupying the Sentier des Olives and the avenue. Cf. Sonmereyn, A.Ch. - Les combats de Wavre des 18 et 19 Juin 1815 p.28

35 Probably due to a lack of time, the Prussians did not transform any buildings in the centre of Wavre into strongpoints, to use as defence on the left bank here, in case the French might break through.

36. In: Major Von Ditfurth, in a letter dated 21st June 1815 to his wife. In: Aus sturmbewegter Zeit. Briefe etc. p.195 Also see his report. In: KA, VI.E.22.12 In: GSA, HA-VI, nr.V.8b.p.19 Cf. Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.14-30 Those who volunteered to assist were Schley, Jannot, Stamm, Grohmann, Friebel and Wolff, as well as people of the 12th company, led by captain Von Eichstadt. Lieutenant Jäckel (3rd battalion / 4th Kurmark Landwehr infantry) confirms three platoons were in reserve and a part of them as a support for the whole line. In: Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19.Juni 1815 p.120-124 The battalion had about 600 men, having four companies (9th-12th) of each about 150 men, and each company having four platoons (each of about 35 men).

F.Kohlheim (rank unknown, 3rd battalion / 4th Kurmark Landwehr infantry) states he was sent to the chateau to collect a few axes. These proved absent; in fact, the building was empty and deserted. He also adds the bridge at Basse Wavre was dismantled. In: Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.102-105

37. Major Von Ditfurth, in a letter dated 21st June 1815 to his wife. In: Aus sturmbewegter Zeit. Briefe etc. p.195 Cf. accounts of members of the 3rd battalion 1st regiment Kurmark Landwehr-infantry: major Von Bornstedt, captain Von Göhren, captain Von Eichstadt, lieutenant Jäckel, F.Kohlheim, administrator Krack, private Strantz. In: Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815. Berlin, F.Heinicke, 1858

According to Von Damitz, the Jäger-company of the 3rd battalion / 8th regiment, led by captain Steinäcker, plus one company of jäger of the 1st battalion / 30th regiment, led by captain Von der Horst were located at Basse Wavre. In: Geschichte des Feldzugs in 1815 p.324 Von Plotho speaks of 2 companies of the 3rd battalion / 1st regiment Kurmark Landwehr- infantry. In: Der Krieg etc. p.73 Von Ollech doesn’t specify the identities of the two companies he mentions. In: Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 p.210

38. Major Von Bornstedt. In: Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.30-40 Which hussars these were remains unclear.

39. Damitz, Von – Geschichte des Feldzugs in 1815 p.324 Ollech, Von – Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 p.2111 Colonel Fantin des Odoards - Journal du général Fantin des Odoards. Etapes d’un officier de la grande armée, 1800-1830 p.434 Account of F.F.Herpigny, mayor of Wavre. In: Sonmereyn, A.Ch. Les combats de Wavre des 18 et 19 Juin 1815 p.68

40. Damitz, Von – Geschichte des Feldzugs in 1815 p.325 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.89 According to colonel Simon Lorière the Prussians had blown it up. Cf. his letter to general Hulot dated 16 august 1819, in SHAT, nr According to another source the bridge was destroyed the moment the extra battalion came as a support. Even a fire would have been set into the mill itself. Cf. Bericht über das Arriergarden Gefecht bei Wavre den 18.Juni 1815 In: Militär Wochenblatt, 1836 p.2 The fact that the mill may have been set in fire by the 1st battalion of the 1st regiment of Elbe landwehr infantry, is denied by Gottschalck; it may have been that the French artillery had bombarded it, but the fire which may have resulted must have been very small. Cf. Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.89

41. Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.89 Cf. the plans of Von Lettow Vorbeck, Wagner and Von Damitz.

42. Cf. the plans of Von Lettow Vorbeck, Wagner and Von Damitz.

43 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.89

44. Gottschalck, M. -Geschichte etc. p.89-90 Cf. the plans of Von Lettow Vorbeck, Wagner and Von Damitz.

Clausewitz, Von – Campagne de 1815 en France p.130 Von Bornstedt situates the 2nd battalion of the 6th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr near the mill of Bierges. In: Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.30-40

45 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.90

46. Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.14-30 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.89 According to Von Plotho there were sharpshooters of the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 3rd regiment of Kurmark Landwehr-infantry, but this regiment formed part of the 11th brigade. In: Der Krieg etc. p.73

47 Damitz, Von – Geschichte des Feldzugs in 1815 p.329 Lettow Vorbeck, Von – Napoleons Untergang Vol.III p.452 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.91

48. General Thielmann himself. In: Ollech, Von _ Geschichte des Feldzuges etc. p.194 Cf. the plans of Von Lettow Vorbeck, Wagner, Von Ollech and Von Damitz. Cf. Epner and Braun. Geschichte des Ulanen-Regiments etc. p.10

49 Cf. Hagen, E.von - Geschichte des Neumärkischen Dragonder-Regiments nr.3 p. 280

50. Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.90 Cf. the plans of Wagner, Von Lettow Vorbeck and Von Damitz.

51. Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.90 Wagner, J.Chr.A. - Pläne der Schlachten und Treffen etc. p.99

52. Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.90 Wagner, J.Chr.A. - Pläne der Schlachten und Treffen etc. p.99 Von Clausewitz claims 27 guns were in position, with 8 in reserve. These eight may have been those of horse battery nr.18 In: Campagne de 1815 en France p.130

53. Gottschalck, M. Geschichte etc. p.90 Ollech, Von – Geschichte des Feldzuges p.210 Plotho, Von – Der Krieg etc. p.74 Lettow Vorbeck, Von – Napoleons Untergang Vol.III p.452

54. Damitz, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs in 1815 p.325 Ollech, Von - Geschichte des Feldzuges p.210 Clausewitz, Von – Campagne de 1815 en France p.130 Wagner, J.Chr.A. - Pläne der Schlachten und Treffen etc. p.99

Plotho, Von – Der Krieg etc. p.73

55 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.90

56. This figure has been based upon the strengths given by Bowden (totalling at 22.790), diminished by the casualties suffered at Ligny (about 2000). In: Bowden, S. – The armies at Waterloo p.180-188 Bas, F.de & T’Serclaes de Wommersom – La campagne de 1815 Vol.III, p.221-222 Other strengths given are: 13.800 men: Gottschalk, M. - Geschichte etc. p.88 15.200 men (24 battalions): Wagner, J.Chr.A. - Pläne der Schlachten und Treffen etc. p.99 Lettow Vorbeck, Von – Napoleons Untergang Vol.III p.452 15.000 (24 battalions and 21 squadrons).: Clausewitz, Von – Campagne de 1815 en France p.130 16.000 (24 battalions and 21 squadrons): Plotho, Von – Der Krieg etc.p.73 14.000 (24,5 battalions and 23 squadrons): Ollech, Von – Geschichte des Feldzuges p.210 17.790 men: 14.860 men infantry (24 battalions), 2070 men cavalry (23 squadrons) and 860 men artillery (5 batteries): Sonmereyn. In: Les combats de Wavre des 18 et 19 Juin 1815 p.24

The guns were those of the following batteries: -foot battery nr.35 -horse batteries nr.18, 19 and 20. Nr.19 had only three guns, having lost the other five on the 16th of June. -12p. battery nr.7 -foot battery nr.18 (with the 9th brigade) For 35 guns also see: Von Clausewitz, Von – Campagne de 1815 en France p.131 Von Plotho believes there were 40. In: Der Krieg etc. p.75 Von Lettow Vorbeck comes to 31 guns (5 were lost on the 16th of June, horse battery nr.18 with the cavalry and half a 12p. battery near Louis Delotte). In: Napoleons Untergang Vol.III p.452

57. Cf. Gerbet (27th regiment of the line, division Lefol). In: Souvenirs etc. p.19

58. According to general Berthézène, only Habert was initially engaged. Cf. Berthézène – Souvenirs etc. p.391

59 Cf. Grouchy. In: Relation succincte p.35

60. Damitz, Von – Geschichte des Feldzugs p.327 Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.14-30 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.14-30

Militärische Zeitschrift (1820) p.304 Grouchy. In: Fragments historiques, p.7 According to Grouchy, the bombardment consumed lots of ammunition in 12 pounders, which were already running low. In: Relation succincte p.38

61. Militärische Zeitschrift (1820) p.303

62. Von Ollech claims it was between 4 and 5 p.m. In: Geshichte des Feldzuges etc. p.211 The Militärische Zeitschrift (1820) states it was after 4 p.m. p.303 For 4 p.m. see: F.Kohlheim, member of the 3rd battalion 1st regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry. In: Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.102-105 Von Clausewitz believes it was between 2 and 3 p.m. In: Campagne de 1815 en France p.132

63. Berton, J.B. – Précis etc. p.65

64 Förster, Von - Geschichte des königlich preussischen Ulanen-Regiments Graf zu Dohna nr.8 p.72

65 Grouchy. In his questionnaire to Bella. In: Relation succincte 4e série p.50 Colonel Le Sénécal. 2nd statement, dated 2nd June 1830. In: SHAT, nr.C15/5

66 Grouchy in his report written from Rosières to the emperor, dated 19th June. In: SHAT, nr.C15/5

67. Damitz, Von – Geschichte des Feldzugs p.329

68. Damitz, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs p.334-335 Private Strantz (3rd battalion / 1st Kurmark Landwehr-infantry). In: Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.117-119 Colonel Stoffel (2nd regiment of Swiss infantry) in his journal. In: “Waterloo” , manuscript file of colonel Eugène Stoffel. In: Collection D.Lérault, France.

69. Captain Von Göhren (3rd battalion / 1st Kurmark Landwehr-infantry). In: Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.124-126

70 Militärische Zeitschrift (1820) p.304 Cf. Colonel Stoffel (2nd regiment of Swiss infantry ) in his journal. In: “Waterloo” , manuscript file of colonel Eugène Stoffel. In: Collection D.Lérault, France.

71 Cf. Account of major Von Sprenger. In: KA, VI.E.22.14. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Aus den Tagen des 17. Und 18. Juni 1815 p.198 and in GSA,HA-VI,nr.V.8b.p.21

72. Colonel Fantin des Odoards (22nd line infantry). In: Journal du général Fantin des Odoards. Etapes d’un officier de la grande armée, 1800-1830 p.434 Fantin des Odoards mixes up Uny and Maury. However, Maury had fallen on the 16th of June. Cf. Martinien, E. – Tableaux etc. p.280-281

According to Lérault, Uny got wounded and lived from 1765 to 1842. In: De Waterloo à la Légion étrangère p.106

73 Berthézène claims general Habert got wounded. In: Souvenirs etc. p.391

74 Cf. Colonel Stoffel (2nd regiment of Swiss infantry ) in his journal. In: “Waterloo” , manuscript file of colonel Eugène Stoffel. In: Collection D.Lérault, France. Analysing his account it becomes clear that his battalion was probably engaged between about 7 and 9 p.m. in two surges against the bridge of the Dyle. In his first attempt he managed to get across the barricaded bridge in single file, but the Prussian counterattack forced him to fall back in disorder. In his second attempt, Prussian resistance was slightly weaker, while French grenadiers had managed to occupy houses in the immediate vicinity of the bridge. In addition, the French had been able to remove some of the barricades from the bridge. As Stoffel was about to penetrate onto the other bank of the Dyle, he was called back to let reinforcements advance. In the act, the remains of his battalion were in error fired at by the 70th and 88th regiment which stood further to the rear in the suburb. In another document Stoffel speaks of three attempts to gain the bridge over the Dyle. Cf. his letter dated 2nd January 1816. In: Lérault, D. - De Waterloo à la legion étrangère p.223

75 In: GSA-HA, VI.V.8b.p.21

76. Von Bornstedt - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.14-30

77. Major Von Bornstedt. In: Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.30-40 Captain Von Eichstadt (3rd battalion / 1st regiment Kurmark Landwehr-infantry). In: Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.43-45 F. Kohlheim (rank unknown). In: Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.102-105 Houssaye claims that Exelmans limited himself to demonstrations in front of Basse Wavre, but from the Prussian accounts it becomes clear that the French dragoons actually charged. The demonstrations took place later that day. In: 1815.Waterloo p.469

78. Grouchy. In: Relation succincte p.40-41 Hulot. Le lieutenant général baron E.Hulot 1774-1850. Notice biographique. Documents historiques et militaires p.29

79. Hulot – Documents militaires etc.p.29 Notes of Gérard. In: Quelques documents etc. p.34-35 Gérard speaks about a depth varying between 120 and 160 cm.

80. Hulot. Le lieutenant général baron E.Hulot 1774-1850. Notice biographique. Documents historiques et militaires p.28 Hulot claims his division got there between 3.30 and 4 p.m.

Hulot’s division passed La Baraque around 3 p.m. and in between the woods of Sarrats and Manil around 4 p.m.

81. According to Gérard the attack took place quite some time after he and Grouchy had returned from La Baraque. In: Letter to Simon Lorière. In: SHAT, nr.C15/5 In another note, Gérard claims it was at 4.30 or 5 p.m. In: Réfutations sur livre Gourgaud etc. In: Mémoires du maréchal Grouchy Vol.V p.257 Also see other notes of Gérard. In: Quelques documents etc. p.34-35

82. Hulot, E. – Documents militaires etc. p.30 Grouchy in his report to Napoleon, dated 19th June at Rosières. In: SHAT, nr.C15/5 In: Bataille de Waterloo, par un combattant de Waterloo, cited by: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy, Vol.V p.98 In: Réfutations du livre Gourgaud etc. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy Vol.V p.125 Lieutenant Le Gouest. In: Mémoires du maréchal Grouchy Vol.IV p.141-145 Mémoires pour servir etc. p.172

Gérard’s aide de camp Rumigny states Gérard got wounded by a bullet which hit the button of his jacket and which took a piece of clothing with it into the left lung. Gérard would have been treated by a surgeon called Cuttinger. In: Souvenirs etc. p.107 General Gérard was led to the rear as far as Walhain, to the house of Hollertt. Those present during the removal of the bullet were colonel Rumigny, baron Denniée and Hollertt himself. Cf. De Rumigny. In: Souvenirs etc. p.107 Baron Denniée. In: Quelques documents p.20 Hollertt himself, through M.Catoire. In: Quelques documents p.19-20

In remembrance of the incident a monument was unveiled on 28th September 1958, which was designed by the sculptor Meurant. The inauguration was done by the Comité des fêtes pour la commémoration des journées de Septembre 1830. The monument portrays Gérard in a medallion, with the inscription: "En ces lieux fut blessé le 18 juin 1815 le général Gérard, héros de l'empire et défenseur de notre indépendence nationale." The monument is near the road which runs from Wavre to Ottignies, at 200 metres of the highway Brussels - Namur, but this is not the place where Gérard actually got wounded. The

current monument stands in the former Prussian position; it would have been far more logic to place it along the road on the right bank of the Dyle, parallel to the Dyle, opposite the mill of Bierges.

83. Hulot - Documents militaires etc. p.30 According to the adc Bella, general Balthus was asked to take over the command of the 4th corps, but he refused. In: Relation succincte 4me série p.55

84. For the moment he received these orders, Grouchy gives various conflicting accounts. In his report for Napoleon, dated 19th June from Rosières, he says it was 5 p.m. In his report dated 20th June written at Dinant for the emperor, he refers to a time of 7 p.m. Both in: SHAT, nr.C15/5 He also gives a time between 4 and 5 p.m. In: Fragments historiques etc. Barthélémy. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy. Vol.V p.285 Four o’clock: Cf. Marshal’s Grouchy own account of the battle of Waterloo p.9 In yet another publication he mentions 7 p.m., but La Baraque as the location. In: Relation succincte p.39

Houssaye believes the orders reached Grouchy by 5 p.m. Accordingly he tries to explain why the carrier of the order of 10 a.m. did the distance Rossomme - Wavre in 5.5 hours and the other one in 3.5 hours. He claims the first one rode through Genappe, Quatre Bras, Sombreffe and Gembloux and the second one through Ottignies and Limelette. Cf. Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.465 He does not take into account however that the first courier left at 11.30 a.m. instead of 10.30 a.m. Next to that, the second courier would take a serious risk by moving through Ottignies and Limelette. Fact is that both men rode through Genappe, Quatre Bras, Sombreffe and Gembloux, thereby using 4.5 to 5 hours. Houssaye also says that Gérard doesn’t mention the fact that Grouchy received this set of orders of 1 p.m. This is correct: by the time Grouchy got them, Gérard had got wounded and was taken to the rear.

85. Grouchy. In: Réfutations du livre Gourgaud etc. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy Vol.V p.126 Here he mentions Limelette by mistake. Hulot - Documents militaires etc. p.30 Lieutenant Le Gouest. In: Mémoires du maréchal Grouchy Vol.IV p.141-145

86. Grouchy. In: Ordres donnés par le maréchal Grouchy ou transmis etc. p.12 Grouchy - Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy Vol.IV p.81 He erroneously dates it at 2 p.m. as he mixes the order up with his instructions to Pajol earlier that day. As a result, he also erroneously situates it Sur la route de Sart-à-Walhain à Wavre, le 18 Juin 1815.

In another account Grouchy erroneously mentions Limelette instead of Limale. In: Relation

succincte p.37, 42 Based upon these circumstances, it should not be excluded that the order has never been drafted by Grouchy in writing, but orally only.

87. Hulot says Grouchy left his division about two hours after he had committed his first battalion. In: Documents militaires etc. p.30

88 For the fact that the bridge was a one from stone, cf. the memorandum dated 6th of April 1815 of lieutenant B.Jackson. In: GstA, Berlin nr.VI,HA NL Gneisenau kt.19 p.23

89. Reports of colonel Von Stülpnagel (dated 8th July 1815) and of major Simolin of the 11th regiment of hussars. Cf. Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das Gefecht bei Limale p.65

90. Teste confirms that his division left from Tourinnes by 4 p.m. In: Souvenirs etc. p.242

91 Vallin had been ordered for the 18th of June to move from Bothey to Grand Leez, and from there to Tourinnes, through Sart-à-Walhain.

92 Colonel Biot. In: Campagnes et garrisons p.250 Teste states that his division got there by 8 p.m. In: Souvenirs etc. p.242

93 Colonel Biot. In: Campagnes et garrisons p.250

94. Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das Gefecht bei Limale p.54 Captain Francois (30th regiment line, division Pécheux) speaks of 6 p.m. In: Journal du capitaine Francois p.888 Napoleon states it was 7 p.m. In: Mémoires pour servir etc. p.155

95. Cf. Colonel Biot. In: Campagnes et garrisons p. 252

96 Report of the 11th hussars from KA, VI.E.15.170 In: Cf. Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das Gefecht bei Limale p.54

97 Gérard confirms that these divisions were waiting for further orders on the heights dominating the Dyle for a period of about two hours. Cf. his letter to colonel Simon Lorière, dated 10th August 1819. In: SHAT, nr.C15/5 Hulot also indicates that both divisions reached this position about half an hour after he had got in front of Bierges himself [= 5.30 p.m.]. In: Documents militaires etc. p.28

98 The following chapter on the actions near Limale relies heavily on an article of J.von Pflugk Harttung. This article is largely based on reports of the former Kriegsarchiv. Cf. Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das Gefecht bei Limale p.34-66 Some of these reports are those of major Von Stengel (VI.E.7.I.151), captain Von Glasenapp

(II.M.213), major Schouler (VI.E.7.II.151), the reports of the Kurmark landwehr regiment of cavalry (VI.E.22,61) as well as the report of major Von Stülpnagel, dated 8th July 1815. Also see Von Pflugk Harttung in: GSA, VI-HA,nr.V.8.p.3-10,14,16 Also see: Leszczynski, Von - 50 Jahr Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 2.Posenschen Infanterie-Regiments nr.19 p.170-182

99 Von Pflugk Harttung. In: GSA, VI-HA,nr.V.8b.p.30-31 Colonel Von Reiche. In: Memoiren etc. p.218-219

100 According to captain Von Glasenapp (2nd battalion 19th regiment) it was between 6 and 7 p.m. that both battalion came on the heights above Limale. Cf. Cf. Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das Gefecht bei Limale p.39

101 Two of these detachments were led by 2nd lieutenant Rhasa and subaltern Frankel.

102 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.93

103. Report of Gneisenau, dated 20th June 1815. In: Bas, F.de & T'Serclaes de Wommersom - La campagne de 1815 Vol.III p.486 Gneisenau’s letter to Hardenberg, 22nd June 1815 In: Ein Leben in Briefen p.323 Damitz, Von – Geschichte etc. p.298

104. It meant that the French crossed the bridge in the following sequence: the division of Vallin, the corps of Pajol, the divisions of Teste, Pécheux and Vichery. The farms of Delbourg (1702, now called "la Bourse") and the one "des Carmélites" were almost in the centre of the French advance.

105. Cf. Grouchy's report to Napoleon, dated 20th of June. In: SHAT, nr.C15/5 Cf. Biot – Campagnes et garrisons p.253

106. Grouchy. In: Réfutations du livre Gourgaud etc. In: Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy Vol.V p.126

107. Report of Von Stülpnagel. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das Gefecht bei Limale p.65 Gottschalck, M. Geschichte etc. p.93

108 According to the diary of the 1st corps the detachment of Stengel held out from 5 p.m. until dusk, without mentioning however the support of Von Stulpnagel [!]. Cf. Diary of the 1st corps. In: Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das I.Korps Zieten bei La Belle Alliance und Wavre p.202

109 The Schüzten of the 2nd battalion, led by captain Zurwesten, had left for the march with the brigade towards Limale, but when they were about to join the brigade it had already left; for this reason it arrived slightly later when the attack had been just set in. Cf. Gottschalck,

M. - Geschichte etc. p.93

110 Major Von Kesteloot, commander of the 2nd battalion of the 31st regiment. In: Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.93-94

111. The fact that this division had an active part and not the one of Pécheux can be read from Grouchy’s reports to Napoleon of the 19th and the 20th of June. Pécheux may have been handled particularly hard during the battle of Ligny.

112 Cf. Pflugk Harttung, J.von Das Gefecht bei Limale p.61 Lieutenant Mankopf, commander of a platoon of skirmishers of the 4th company of the 2nd battalion 31st regiment. In: Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.105-109 Account of major Von Kesteloot. In: Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.94

113 Cf. Pflugk Harttung, J.von - Das Gefecht bei Limale p.61 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.97 Gottschalck cites the report of Von Stülpnagel in which Von Stengel would have said that he was summoned by his superiors to return to his corps, but at the same time Gottschalck cites from the history of the 19th regiment in which Von Stengel would have said that he returned to his corps as he was in need of supplies. This, according to Gottschalck, would mean that Von Stengel lied to Von Stülpnagel, as this would indicate that he didn’t have an order to return to his corps.

114 Leszczynski, Von - 50 Jahr Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen 2.Posenschen Infanterie-Regiments nr.19 p.175

115 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.94

116 The brigade of general Von der Marwitz was in the evening ordered by colonel Von Stülpnagel to come to his aid, but by the time it got there it was dark. The brigade then took up a position in rear of the 12th brigade. Cf. Von der Marwitz. In: Aus dem Nachalasse p.120 At least the 8th regiment of uhlans (brigade Von der Marwitz) wasn’t allowed to have any fires. Cf. Förster, Von - Geschichte des königlich preusischen Ulanen-Regiments Graf zu Dohna nr.8 p.72

117 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.94

118. Damitz, Von – Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 p.336 Grouchy in his reports to Napoleon dated 19th and 20th June 1815. In: SHAT, nr.C15/5

119 Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.93

120. Damitz,Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 p.335 Wagner. Pläne der Schlachten und Treffen p.107 Wagner mentions two battalions of the 4th regiment Kurmark Landwehr-infantry in a position in rear of Wavre. Of the other half (3 battalions) of Von Kemphen’s brigade it is unclear where they stood that night; perhaps in rear of the Bois de Beumont.

121. Houssaye, H. 1815.Waterloo p.471 He claims the infantry bivouacked in squares

122. Cf. order of Grouchy to general Vandamme (see below) and his reports of the 19th and 20th of June to Napoleon. In: SHAT, nr.C15/5 Account of lieutenant colonel Wehmeyer (31st regiment). In: Gottschalck, M. - Geschichte etc. p.95 Initially, Grouchy would have been in a square of the 4th corps, but after some time he established his headquarters at Limale. Cf. Lieutenant Le Gouest. In: Mémoires du maréchal Grouchy Vol.IV p.143

123 The report itself is not available, but its existence can be derived from Blücher’s order to Von Thielmann of the 20th of June. In: Ollech, Von – Geschichte des Feldzugs etc. p.271

124. In: SHAT, nr.C15/5 In: Le maréchal de Grouchy du 16 au 19 Juin 1815 etc. p.73-74 In: Grouchy, G.de Mémoires du maréchal de Grouchy. Vol.IV.p.86-87 and 288-289 Grouchy. In: Ordres donnés par le maréchal Grouchy ou transmis etc. p.12 Here Grouchy dates it at 11.30 p.m. According to the adc Bella, Grouchy wrote this order from within the square of the 56th regiment of line infantry, where he spent the night; this is incorrect not only in the identity of the regiment, but also in the place where he spent the night. In: Relation succincte 4me série p.56

125. Cf. Captain Von Göhren and private Strantz. In: Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.40-43, 117-119

126. Account of F.F.Herpigny, mayor of Wavre. In: Sonmereyn, A.Ch. Les combats de Wavre des 18 et 19 Juin 1815 p.68

127 Report of major Von Zeppelin. In: GSA, HA-VI, nr.V.8b.p.21 In: Damitz, Von - Geschichte des Feldzugs von 1815 p.334 Wagner – Pläne der Schlachten und Treffen etc. p.106

128. Report of major Von Zeppelin. In: GSA, HA-VI, nr.V.8b.p.21

Damitz, Von – Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 p.334 Wagner – Pläne der Schlachten und Treffen etc. p.106 Lieutenant Desnoyers of the artillery of the French 3rd corps claims that his battery was in action till around 10 p.m. Cf. his letter dated 21st June 1815. In: Sonmereyn, A.Ch. - Les combats de Wavre des 18 et 19 Juin 1815 p.66 Major Von Ditfurth claims that the bridge was taken and retaken 14 times that day. Cf. Major Von Ditfurth, in a letter dated 21st June 1815 to his wife. In: Aus sturmbewegter Zeit. Briefe etc. p.195

129. Bornstedt, Von –Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.14-30

130. Lieutenant Mankopf (commander of the platoon of skirmishers of the 4th company of the 31st regiment, brigade Von Stülpnagel). In: Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.105-109

131. Major Von Bornstedt. In: Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.30-40 The chief of staff of the brigade of Von Luck, captain Von Röder, however, says the 1st battalion of the 4th regiment of Kurmark Landwehr infantry was at Wavre. In: Röder, C.von - Erinnerungen etc. p. 326 Von Damiz confirms this, as well as for the 2nd battalion of the 30th regiment. In: Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 p.335

132.During the afternoon, major Von Bornstedt sent two wagons with wounded towards Louvain. One of these detachments was led by the administrator Krack. He arrived at Louvain in the night and the wounded were brought to a field hospital. On the 19th of June Krack left with some sick soldiers and others to Brussels where they arrived in the evening. Later they left for Charleroi and to rejoin the battalion near Avesnes. Cf. Account of administrator Krack. In: Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.111-116

133. Major Von Bornstedt. In: Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.30-40

134. Cf.Grouchy's report to Napoleon, 19th and 20th of June 1815. In: SHAT, nr.C15/5 Relation succincte p.41

135. Von Bornstedt - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.14-30 Damitz, Von – Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 p.336

136. Damitz, Von – Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 p.336 There is a claim that a patrol of the 3rd battalion 1st Kurmark Landwehr infantry, led by lieutenant Nachtigal, had its bivouac for the night in rear of this farm, but this is highly improbable, otherwise Von Bornstedt would not have placed sentries at the bridge. In:

Bornstedt, Von - Das Gefecht bei Wavre an der Dyle am 18. und 19. Juni 1815 p.14-30

137. Charras situates this cavalry near St.Anne, about 1.5 kilometre south of Wavre. In: La campagne de 1815 Vol.II p.52